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Updated January 13, 2023
Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV)
Background
The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) Family of
JLTV CTV
Vehicles (FoV) is an Army-led, joint-service program
Figure 1. JLTV Combat Tactical Vehicle Variant
designed to replace a portion of each service’s light tactical
(CTV)
wheeled vehicle fleets. The JLTV FoV consists of two
variants: the four-seat Combat Tactical Vehicle (CTV)
(Figure 1) and the two-seat Combat Support Vehicle (CSV)
(Figure 2). The CTV is to support the General Purpose,
Heavy Gun Carrier and Close Combat Weapon Carrier
missions. The CSV is to support the Utility/Shelter Carrier
mission. The JLTV is transportable by a range of lift assets,
including rotary-wing aircraft. Its maneuverability enables
activities across the spectrum of terrain, including urban
areas, while providing organic and supplemental armor
against direct fire and improvised explosive device threats.
Current Program Status
The JLTV is currently being produced by Oshkosh
Defense, headquartered in Oshkosh, WI. In August 2015,
the Army awarded Oshkosh a $6.7 billion low-rate initial
Source: https://asc.army.mil/web/portfolio-item/cs-css-joint-light-
production (LRIP) contract to procure the initial 16,901
tactical-vehicle/, accessed December 30, 2020.
vehicles for the Army and Marines. In June 2019, the
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisitions, Logistics,
JLTV CSV
and Technology) approved Army JLTV full-rate production
Figure 2. JLTV Combat Support Vehicle Variant
(FRP). The Army planned for a follow-on full-rate
(CSV)
production contract to be awarded to a single vendor in the
fourth quarter of FY2022. It is planned to be a competitive
five-year contract with five one-year options for about
30,000 JLTVs and 10,000 JLTV trailers. The Army began
fielding LRIP JLTVs to units in April 2019, and Marine
Corps units received their first LRIP JLTVs in February
2019.
Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) is a programmatic
decision made when manufacturing development is completed
and there is an ability to produce a small-quantity set of
articles. It also establishes an initial production base and sets
the stage for a gradual increase in production rate to allow for
Ful -Rate Production (FRP) upon completion of Operational
Test and Evaluation (OT&E).
Source: https://asc.army.mil/web/portfolio-item/cs-css-joint-light-
Full-Rate Production (FRP) is a decision made that allows
tactical-vehicle/, accessed December 30, 2020.
for government contracting for economic production
quantities fol owing stabilization of the system design and
validation of the production process.
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV)
Budgetary Information
JLTV, it is able to conduct a competition to see if any
Table 1. FY2023 DOD JLTV Budget Request
vendors can build the vehicle at a lower price than
Oshkosh, which was awarded the LRIP contract in 2015.
Total
The follow-on contract is reportedly estimated to be worth
Total Request
Request
over $7.3 billion over a decade.
Funding Category
($M)
(Qty.)
RDT&E USA
$9.4
—
Potential Issues for Congress
RDT&E USMC
$2.9
—
Potential Post Follow-On Contract JLTV
Procurement USA
$734.9
2,909
Cost Increase
Procurement USAF
$60.8
138
Reportedly, the JLTV could become more expensive after
Procurement USN
$28.6
18
the follow-on contract is awarded in 2023. Army FY2023
Procurement USMC
$222.3
656
budget documents suggest there might be “higher estimated
Source: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
unit costs for the competitive follow-on contract,” which
(Comptrol er)/Chief Financial Officer, Program Acquisition Cost by
could lead to a higher price per vehicle in FY2023 than in
Weapon System: United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year
FY2022. If a new manufacturer other than Oshkosh is
2023 Budget Request, April 2022, p. 3-2.
chosen in 2023, the new manufacturer could face higher
Notes: RDT&E = Research, Development, Test & Evaluation; $M =
costs than Oshkosh during the first year of its contract, as it
U.S. dollars in mil ions; Qty. = FY2023 procurement quantities.
would not have Oshkosh’s experience building the JLTV.
In such a case, it is anticipated costs would decrease
Table 2. FY2023 JLTV Authorizations and
significantly after the first year of the contract. The Army
Appropriations
further notes JLTV cost elements could also fluctuate
Total
beyond the first year of the new contract based on
Funding
Authorized Approp.
Request
unpredictable prices and strong commodity-related
Category
($M)
($M)
(Qty.)
inflation. Given the potential for JLTV cost increase,
RDT&E USA
$9.4
$9.4
—
Congress might review JLTV costs after the Army awards
the follow-on contract.
RDT&E USMC
$2.9
$2.9
—
Procurement
$686.4
$664.1
2,909
Future of JLTV Procurement
USA
The Army’s current modernization strategy is focused on
Procurement
$60.5
$60.5
138
six modernization priorities that do not include the JLTV.
USAF
The Army announced in January 2022 that under the 2030
Procurement
$28.6
$26.3
18
Force Design Initiative, the Army would either redesignate
USN
existing divisions or create new divisions into five new
Procurement
$222.3
$214.8
656
types of divisions. The Army announced in May 2022 that
USMC
it would create a new Alaska-based division, the 11th
Airborne Division, by activating new units and
Source:
reconfiguring two Alaska-based Infantry Brigade Combat
Authorized: P.L. 117-263, H.R. 7776—James M. Inhofe National
Teams (IBCTs). With the creation of new division types
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, December 27, 2022,
and an additional division in Alaska, it is possible that the
p. 735, p. 742, p. 712, p. 723, p. 727, p. 721, p. 734. Appropriated:
Army’s requirement for JLTVs could change significantly.
Fiscal Year 2023 Omnibus Appropriations Bil , H.R. 2617, Division
C—Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2023, December 19,
With the Marine Corps downsizing in accordance with its
2022, p. 89N, p. 61A, p. 69B, p. 76A, p. 67F, p. 91J.
March 2020 Force Design Initiative and adoption of a more
Notes: Approp. = Appropriations.
expeditionary posture (possibly requiring fewer JLTVs),
original JLTV procurement plans for both the Army and
Foreign Military Sales
Marine Corps might no longer be accurate. Despite the
The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notes
Army’s intent to lower costs by competing a follow-on
approved JLTV sales to the United Kingdom (2,747),
contract with another vendor, slowing production rates and
Lithuania (500), Poland (26), and Montenegro (20).
extended procurement timelines could act to increase costs
if current JLTV requirements are no longer valid. In
JLTV Follow-On Contract
addition, different versions of the JLTV produced by
The Army originally planned to award a follow-on full-rate
another vendor could result in additional operations and
JLTV production contract to a single vendor in the fourth
maintenance costs that can result from a mixed fleet of
quarter of FY2022. Reportedly, the Army pushed back the
vehicles. Taken collectively, these issues might merit DOD
due date for companies to bid on the JLTV follow-on
and policymakers examining the future of JLTV
contract based on requests from industry. The Army had
procurement.
planned to award the single vendor contract in December
2022 but now is expected to award the contract in early
Andrew Feickert, Specialist in Military Ground Forces
2023. Because the Army owns the technical data for the
IF11729
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV)
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11729 · VERSION 5 · UPDATED