Intelligence Community Spending Trends
Updated January 9, 2023
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
R44381

Intelligence Community Spending Trends

Summary
The intelligence budget, as considered separate and distinct from the defense budget, dates to
reforms initiated in the 1970s to improve oversight and accountability of the intelligence
community. The intelligence budget funds intelligence and intelligence-related activities. These
activities include the strategic and tactical collection, analysis, production and dissemination of
information that is particularly relevant to United States national security; covert action; and
counterintelligence programs directed against threats to the United States. Since the budget funds
programs and activities that typically enable national security decisionmaking, military planning,
and operations, changes to the topline figures for intelligence programs closely follow trends in
national defense spending.
Intelligence spending is usually understood as the sum of two separate budget programs: (1) the
National Intelligence Program (NIP), which covers the programs, projects, and activities of the
intelligence community oriented toward the strategic needs of decisionmakers, and (2) the
Military Intelligence Program (MIP), which funds defense intelligence activities intended to
support operational and tactical level intelligence priorities supporting defense operations. The
combined NIP and MIP budgets do not encompass the total of U.S. intelligence-related spending.
Many departments have intelligence-gathering entities that support a department-specific mission,
use department funds, and do not fall within either the NIP or the MIP. This report considers only
the NIP and MIP budget figures.
The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and
Security (USD(I&S)), respectively, manage the NIP and MIP separately under different
authorities, and work together in a number of ways to facilitate the integration of NIP and MIP
intelligence efforts. Although Congress has occasionally debated whether to declassify the topline
figures for each of the 18 statutory elements of the intelligence community, to date only the NIP
and MIP budget totals are released to the public each year. These totals are significant. In FY2023
alone, the aggregate amount of appropriations requested for these two programs is $93.7 billion,
including $67.1 billion for the NIP and $26.6 billion for the MIP, an increase of $3.9 billion over
what was appropriated the previous year: For FY2022 the aggregate amount appropriated for the
NIP and MIP was $89.8 billion, $65.7 billion for the NIP, and $24.1 billion for the MIP. The size
of the intelligence budget has remained relatively constant over the past decade, between 11%
and 11.7% of the total defense budget.

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Introduction
This report examines intelligence funding from fiscal years 1965 to 2023, with an emphasis on
the period from 2007 to 2023, during which total national and military intelligence program
spending dollars have been publicly disclosed on an annual basis.1 A table of topline budget
figures (see Table 1) and accompanying graphs (see Figure 2 and Figure 3) illustrate that in
comparison with national defense spending, intelligence-related spending also fluctuates on an
annual basis, though to a somewhat lesser degree. Intelligence spending generally has remained
consistent at between 11% and 11.7% of annual national defense spending over the past decade.
Various tables and graphs included in this report illustrate trends in intelligence spending. Figure
1 illustrates highs and lows in NIP spending between 1965 and 1994. Table 1 compares NIP and
MIP spending to national defense spending from FY2007 to FY2023, reporting values in both
nominal and constant dollars. Figure 2 and Figure 3 use the data in Table 1 to provide an
overview of intelligence spending compared to total national defense spending.
The Intelligence Budget
Total intelligence spending by the 18 elements of the U.S. intelligence community is usually
understood as the combination of the National Intelligence Program (NIP), and the Military
Intelligence Program (MIP). The NIP funds strategic intelligence planning and policymaking, as
well as the intelligence capabilities and activities that support more than one department or
agency. This funding includes the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), and
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in their entirety, and the strategic-level intelligence activities
associated with departmental intelligence community elements such as the National Security
Agency (NSA) and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) of the Department of
Defense (DOD), and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) of the Department of State
(see Appendix A for a list of the 18 statutory elements of the intelligence community). The NIP
also funds Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) programs throughout the intelligence
community. The MIP funds defense activities that address tactical or operational-level
requirements specific to the DOD. Programs that support both national and tactical or operational
military requirements may receive both NIP and MIP resources. 2
The combined NIP and MIP budgets do not encompass the total of U.S. intelligence-related
spending. Many departments have intelligence-gathering entities that support a department-
specific mission, use department funds, and do not fall within either the NIP or the MIP. For
example, the Homeland Security Intelligence Program (HSIP) is sometimes referenced in
intelligence-related legislation.3 The HSIP is a small program that exists within the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) to fund those intelligence activities of the DHS Office of Intelligence
and Analysis that serve predominantly departmental-specific missions. With the exception of U.S.

1 The topline number for the NIP was classified until 2007—with two exceptions (October 1997 and March 1998). The
exceptions are discussed later in this report. Topline is a frequently used colloquial term referring to any aggregated
budget total.
2 See also, Dan Elkins, Managing Intelligence Resources, 4th ed. (Dewey, AZ: DWE Press, 2014), p. 4-12. This report
addresses intelligence spending within the NIP and MIP. Intelligence-related spending (such as the Homeland Security
Intelligence Program) that does not fall within the NIP and MIP, supporting organizations outside of the statutory
elements of the IC, is outside the scope of this report.
3 Per 6 U.S.C. §125(a), the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) and Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence (SSCI) have jurisdiction over the HSIP.
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Coast Guard Intelligence (CG-2) and the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), the NIP
does not fund intelligence activities of DHS, nor does the NIP fund law enforcement intelligence
activities of state, local, tribal, and territorial governments within the United States. In addition,
the MIP does not fund certain military platforms that can have a secondary intelligence
application, but whose main purpose is not intelligence, such as the E-3 Airborne Warning and
Control System (AWACS) or the MQ-9 Reaper unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) air-to-ground
strike platform.4
The intelligence budget funds intelligence and intelligence-related activities—defined in this
report to include the following:5
 The collection, analysis, production, dissemination, or use of information that
relates to a foreign country, or a government, political group, party, military
force, movement, or other association in a foreign country, and that relates to the
defense, foreign policy, national security, or related policies of the United States,
and other activity in support of the collection, analysis, production,
dissemination, or use of such information;
 Activities taken to counter similar activities directed against the United States;
 Covert and clandestine activities affecting the relations of the United States with
a foreign government, political group, party, military force, movement, or other
association;6
 Collection, analysis, production, dissemination, or use of information about
activities of persons within the United States, its territories and possessions, or
nationals of the United States abroad whose political and related activities pose,
or may be considered by a department, agency, bureau, office, division,
instrumentality, or employee of the United States to pose, a threat to the internal
security of the United States; and
 Covert or clandestine activities directed against persons within the United States,
its territories and possessions, or nationals of the United States abroad whose
political and related activities pose, or may be considered by a department,

4 Generally, the MIP excludes the inherent intelligence gathering capabilities of a weapons system whose primary
mission is not intelligence. For more information, see Dan Elkins, Managing Intelligence Resources, 4th ed., (Dewey:
DWE Press, 2014), p. 4-12.
5 For the purposes of this report, CRS uses the definition of intelligence and intelligence-related activities established
by the Rules of the House of Representatives for the operations of the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence (HPSCI) (see Rule X, clause 11, (j)(1) of U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Rules of the House of
Representatives of the United States, 117th Congress, 117th Cong., 1st sess., February 2, 2021, p. 16, at
https://rules.house.gov/sites/democrats.rules.house.gov/files/117-House-Rules-Clerk.pdf). The definition was first
adopted by the House through H.Res. 658 (95th Congress, July 14, 1977), which established the HPSCI whose purpose,
according to the House Rules was to, “oversee and make continuing studies of the intelligence and intelligence-related
activities and programs of the United States Government.” In contrast, S.Res. 400 (94th Congress, June 23, 1976),
which established the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), described the SSCI as “oversee[ing] and
[making] continuing studies of the intelligence activities and programs of the United States government,” and specified
that any such intelligence activity “does not include tactical foreign military intelligence serving no national
policymaking function.” Unlike S.Res. 400, H.Res. 658 did not specifically exclude “tactical foreign military
intelligence serving no national policymaking function” from its definition of intelligence and intelligence-related
activities.
6 For more information on the distinction between covert action and clandestine activities, see CRS Report R45175,
Covert Action and Clandestine Activities of the Intelligence Community: Selected Definitions, by Michael E. DeVine.
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agency, bureau, office, division, instrumentality, or employee of the United States
to pose, a threat to the internal security of the United States.
Origin of the Intelligence Budget
The intelligence budget, as considered separate and distinct from the defense budget, dates to
reforms initiated in the 1970s to improve oversight and accountability of the intelligence
community.7 Presidents Ford, Carter, and Reagan gradually centralized management and
oversight over what was then known as the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP), which
consolidated the CIA budget with portions of the defense budget associated with national
intelligence activities, such as cryptologic and reconnaissance programs.8 Originally, the Director
of Central Intelligence (DCI) managed the NFIP, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense,
and the National Security Council (NSC) provided oversight.9
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 modified the NFIP as the
NIP.10 The IRTPA also created the position of Director of National Intelligence (DNI).11 The DNI
was given greater budgetary authority over the NIP in comparison to the authority the DCI had
over the NFIP. Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 104 provides overall policy to include a
description of the DNI’s roles and responsibilities as program executive of the NIP.12
Military-specific tactical or operational intelligence activities were not included in the NFIP.
They were referred to as Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) and were managed
separately by the Secretary of Defense. TIARA referred to the intelligence activities “of a single
service” that were considered organic (meaning “to belong to”) to individual military units. In
1994, a new category was created called the Joint Military Intelligence Program (or JMIP) for
defense-wide intelligence programs.13 A DOD memorandum signed by the Secretary of Defense
in 2005 merged TIARA and JMIP to create the MIP.14 DOD Directive 5205.12, effective
November 2008, established policies and assigned responsibilities for management of the MIP, to
include the role of USD(I&S) as MIP program executive and “principal proponent for MIP
policies and resources to the Secretary of Defense and the DNI.”15

7 Dan Elkins, Managing Intelligence Resources, 4th ed. (Dewey, AZ: DWE Press, 2014), p. 4-3.
8 See Executive Order (E.O.) 11905 (July 29, 1976), E.O. 12036 (January 24, 1978), E.O. 12333 (December 8, 1981),
successive executive orders, signed by Presidents Gerald R. Ford, James E. Carter, and Ronald W. Reagan,
respectively, providing the authority for the United States to conduct foreign intelligence activities.
9 Dan Elkins, Managing Intelligence Resources, 4th ed. (Dewey, AZ: DWE Press, 2014), p. 4-3. The Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458) abolished the position of the DCI and established in its
stead the position of Director of National Intelligence (DNI) who manages the NIP.
10 See §1074 of P.L. 108-458.
11 See §1011 of P.L. 108-458.
12 ICD 104, “National Intelligence Program (NIP) Budget Formulation and Justification, Execution, and Performance
Evaluation,” April 30, 2013, at https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICD/ICD%20104.pdf.
13 Dan Elkins, Managing Intelligence Resources, 4th ed. (Dewey, AZ: DWE Press, 2014), p. 4-13. See also DOD
Directive 5205.9 “Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP),” April 7, 1995.
14 Janet McDonnell, “The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence: The First 10 Years,” Studies in
Intelligence, vol. 58, no. 1 (Extracts, March 2014): 9-16, p. 13 at
https://www.cia.gov/static/3c5f936a8a9717fca3685b2d0b9cccf0/Leading-Defense-Intel-Community.pdf. McDonnell
cites the memorandum creating the MIP as follows: Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England,
Memorandum to the Secretaries of Military Departments et al., Subj: Establishment of the Military Intelligence
Program, September 1, 2005.
15 DOD Directive 5205.12, “Military Intelligence Program,” November 14, 2008; change 2, October 1, 2020 at
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Thus, the DNI and USD(I&S), respectively, manage the NIP and MIP separately under different
authorities.16 A program is primarily NIP if it funds an activity that supports more than one
department or agency, or provides a service of common concern for the IC.17 The NIP funds the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), the CIA, and the national-level
intelligence activities associated with the NSA, DIA, and NGA, which can be distinguished from
their tactical-level activities supporting the military. It also funds Sensitive Compartmented
Information programs throughout the intelligence community. A program is primarily MIP if it
funds an activity that addresses tactical or operational-level requirements specific to the DOD.
The DNI and USD(I&S) work together in a number of ways to facilitate the integration of NIP
and MIP intelligence efforts.18 Programs that support both national and tactical or operational
military requirements may receive both NIP and MIP resources.
The NIP may be perceived as more complicated than the MIP because it funds an aggregation of
programs that span the entire intelligence community. In general, NIP programs are based on
capabilities such as cryptology, reconnaissance, and signals collection that span several IC
components. Each program within the NIP is headed by a program manager. Program managers
exercise daily direct control over their NIP resources.19 The DNI acts as an intermediary in the
budget process, facilitating communications between program managers, the President, and
Congress.20 The DNI determines and controls defense and nondefense NIP funds from budget
development through execution.
In contrast, the MIP encompasses only those defense dollars associated with the operational and
tactical-level intelligence activities of the military services.21 According to the MIP charter
directive:
The MIP consists of programs, projects, or activities that support the Secretary of Defense’s
intelligence, counterintelligence, and related intelligence responsibilities. This includes
those intelligence and counterintelligence programs, projects, or activities that provide
capabilities to meet warfighters’ operational and tactical requirements more effectively.

http://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/520512p.pdf?ver=2018-05-10-083514-693.
16 For more information on the position of USD(I&S), see CRS In Focus IF10523, Defense Primer: Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence and Security, by Michael E. DeVine.
17 50 U.S.C. Section 3003(6) defines the term National Intelligence Program as “[A]ll programs, projects, and
activities of the IC, as well as any other programs of the IC designated jointly by the Director of National Intelligence
and the head of a United States department or agency or by the President. Such term does not include programs,
projects, or activities of the military departments to acquire intelligence solely for the planning and conduct of tactical
military operations by United States Armed Forces.”
18 In May 2007, the Secretary of Defense and DNI formally agreed in a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) that the
USD(I&S) position would be “dual-hatted”—the incumbent acting as both the USD(I&S) within the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Director of Defense Intelligence (DDI) within the ODNI in order to improve the
integration of national and military intelligence. According to the MOA, when acting as DDI, the incumbent reports
directly to the DNI and serves as his principal advisor regarding defense intelligence matters. See Michael McConnell,
DNI and Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense, “Memorandum of Agreement,” May 2007, news release no. 637-07, May
24, 2007, “Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to be Dual-Hatted as Director of Defense Intelligence,” at
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Press%20Releases/2007%20Press%20Releases/
20070524_release.pdf.
19 See ICD-104 for the roles and responsibilities of NIP Program Managers.
20 Dan Elkins, Managing Intelligence Resources, 4th ed. (Dewey, AZ: DWE Press, 2014), p. 4-5.
21 Ibid. pp. 4-11.
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The term excludes capabilities associated with a weapons system whose primary mission
is not intelligence.22 (emphasis CRS)
MIP dollars are managed within the budgets of DOD military departments and agencies by
component managers. Examples include the senior intelligence officer (SIO) for the intelligence
element of the U.S. Air Force (USAF A2/A6), who manages Air Force MIP dollars, and the
senior leader for the intelligence element of the U.S. Navy (OPNAV N2/N6), who manages MIP
dollars for the Navy. Both manage funds in accordance with USD(I&S) guidance and policy.23
MIP components include the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD); the intelligence elements
of the military departments; the intelligence element of U.S. Special Operations Command
(USSOCOM/J2); and military intelligence activities associated with DIA, NGA, NRO, and
NSA.24 Some DOD intelligence components make use of both NIP and MIP funds. The directors
of DIA, NGA, NRO, and NSA serve simultaneously as program managers for their NIP funds and
component managers for their MIP funds.
Secrecy vs. Transparency
Congress and the American public’s ability to oversee intelligence dollars and understand how
they are spent is limited by the secrecy that surrounds the intelligence budget process. IC officials
have expressed general commitments to transparency.25 Yet, in terms of intelligence community
spending, some believe that intelligence community disclosure of intelligence-related spending
beyond just the topline NIP and MIP figures would not pose risks to national security.26
Most intelligence dollars are embedded in the defense budget. Historically, it was for security
purposes. Disclosure of details associated with the intelligence budget has been debated for many
years, with proponents arguing for more accountability27 and intelligence community leadership
arguing that disclosure of such figures poses risks of damaging national security.28 In 1999, then-
DCI George Tenet articulated the potential risk of disclosure as follows:

22 DOD Directive 5205.12(3)(a).
23 DOD Directive 5205.12(3)(c).
24 DOD Directive 5205.12(3)(b).
25 For example, Former DNI Daniel Coats stated his commitment to transparency “as a foundational element of
securing public trust in our endeavors.” See Daniel R. Coats, “Issuance of Updated Intelligence Community Directive
107 on Civil Liberties, Privacy, and Transparency,” Memorandum for Distribution, March 22, 2018, at
https://www.intelligence.gov/publics-daily-brief/public-s-daily-brief-articles/798-dni-affirms-commitment-to-
transparency.
26 Some Members of Congress have occasionally introduced legislation to declassify the topline budget figures of each
element of the intelligence community, most recently Representative Peter Welch, who introduced H.R. 2735, the
Intelligence Budget Transparency Act of 2019 (116th Congress, 1st Session). Identical legislation was introduced during
the 115th Congress: In the House, co-sponsored by Representatives Jim Sensenbrenner, Zoe Lofgren, Thomas Massie,
Justin Amash, and James McGovern (H.R. 5406, the Intelligence Budget Transparency Act of 2018 (115th Congress,
2nd Session)); and in the Senate by Senators Ron Wyden and Rand Paul (S. 2631, the Intelligence Budget Transparency
Act of 2018 (115th Congress, 2nd Session)). See “Wyden, Paul, Welch, and Sensenbrenner Introduce Legislation to
Increase Transparency of Intelligence Spending,” Press Release, March 23, 2018, at
https://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/press-releases/wyden-paul-welch-sensenbrenner-introduce-legislation-to-increase-
transparency-of-intelligence-spending.
27 For a history of the debate over intelligence budget transparency, see Anne Daugherty Miles, “Secrecy vs. Disclosure
of the Intelligence Community Budget: An Enduring Debate,” Secrecy and Society, vol. 2, no. 1 (2018) at
https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/secrecyandsociety/vol2/iss1/4?utm_source=scholarworks.sjsu.edu%2Fsecrecyandsociety
%2Fvol2%2Fiss1%2F4&utm_medium=PDF&utm_campaign=PDFCoverPages.
28 See ODNI News Release No. 46 of November 21, 2014: “Beyond this [NIP] disclosure, there will be no other
National Intelligence Program disclosures of currently classified information because such disclosures could harm
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Disclosure of the budget request reasonably could be expected to provide foreign
governments with the United States’ own assessment of its intelligence capabilities and
weaknesses … [T]he difference between Congressional appropriations from one year to
the next provides a measure of Congress’s assessment of the nation’s intelligence efforts
and their satisfaction of stated policy objectives. Not only does an increased, decreased, or
unchanged appropriation reflect a congressional determination that existing intelligence
programs are less than adequate, more than adequate, or just adequate, respectively, to meet
the national security needs of the United States, but an actual figure also indicates the
degree of change. This knowledge could assist foreign governments or other organizations
in redirecting their own resources to frustrate U.S. intelligence collection efforts, with
resulting damage to our national security.29
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission)
agreed with critics who argued for more transparency but also found that disclosure of numbers
below the topline could cause damage to national security. It recommended that the total amount
of money spent on national intelligence be released to the public:
[T]he top-line figure by itself provides little insight into U.S. intelligence sources and
methods. The U.S. government readily provides copious information about spending on its
military forces, including military intelligence. The intelligence community should not be
subject to that much disclosure. But when even aggregate categorical numbers remain
hidden, it is hard to judge priorities and foster accountability.30
In response to the 9/11 Commission recommendations, Section 601(a) of P.L. 110-53 (codified at
50 U.S.C. Section 3306(b)) directs the DNI to disclose the NIP topline number:
Not later than 30 days after the end of each fiscal year beginning with fiscal year 2007, the
Director of National Intelligence shall disclose to the public the aggregate amount of funds
appropriated by Congress for the National Intelligence Program for such fiscal year.
Section 601(b) (codified at 50 U.S.C. Section 3306(c)(1)(A)) allows the President to “waive or
postpone the disclosure” if the disclosure “would damage national security.”31 The first such
disclosure was made on October 30, 2007.32 The Intelligence Authorization Act (IAA) of 2010
(P.L. 111-259) further amended Section 601 to require the President to publicly disclose the
amount requested for the NIP for the next fiscal year “at the time the President submits to
Congress the budget.”33

national security,” available at https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/press-releases-2014/item/1141-
dni-releases-updated-budget-figure-for-fy-2015-appropriations-requested-for-the-national-intelligence-program. See
also U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Whether Disclosure of Funds for the Intelligence
Activities of the United States is in the Public Interest, 95th Cong., 1st sess., S.Rept. 95-274, June 16, 1977 (Washington,
DC: GPO, 1977), at http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/publications/95274.pdf.
29 “Declaration of George J. Tenet,” Aftergood v. Central Intelligence Agency, U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia, Case No. 02-1146, March 19, 2003, at https://fas.org/sgp/foia/2002/tenet.html.
30 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report (Washington, DC:
GPO, 2004), p. 416.
31 P.L. 110-53, The Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 and was enacted August 3,
2007.
32 ODNI, “DNI Releases Budget Figure for National Intelligence Program,” press release, October 30, 2007, at
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Press%20Releases/2007%20Press%20Releases/20071030_release.pdf.
33 P.L. 111-259 §364. See for example, ODNI Releases Requested Budget Figure for FY2016 Appropriations for the
National Intelligence Program,” ODNI News Release no. 24-15, February 2, 2015, at https://www.dni.gov/index.php/
newsroom/press-releases/press-releases-2015/item/1168-dni-releases-requested-budget-figure-for-fy-2016-
appropriations.
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At the present time, U.S. law only requires the NIP topline figure to be disclosed. The DNI is not
required to disclose any other information concerning the NIP budget, including whether the
topline budget figures released concerns particular intelligence agencies or particular intelligence
programs. In 2010, the Secretary of Defense began disclosing MIP appropriations figures on an
annual basis and in 2011 disclosed those figures back to 2007.34 These actions have provided
public access to previously classified budget numbers for national and military intelligence
activities with the assumption that doing so no longer presented a risk to U.S. national security.
The most recent congressional effort to require the disclosure of more information on the
intelligence budget was in 2019, when Representative Peter Welch introduced H.R. 2735, the
Intelligence Budget Transparency Act of 2019 (116th Congress, 1st Session). This legislation
would have amended Section 1105 of Title 31, U.S. Code by requiring the President to disclose in
his annual budget request to Congress,
[T]he total dollar amount proposed in the budget for intelligence or intelligence related
activities of each element of the Government engaged in such activities in the fiscal year
for which the budget is submitted and the estimated appropriation required for each of the
ensuing four fiscal years.35
Identical bills had been previously introduced in 2014 (H.R. 3855), 2015 (H.R. 2272 and S.
1307), and 2018 (H.R. 5406 and S. 2631).

34 Department of Defense, “DOD Releases Military Intelligence Program Top Line Budget for Fiscal 2007, 2008,
2009,” DOD news release no. 199-11, March 11, 2011.
35 §2(A) of H.R. 2735 (116th Cong., 1st Sess.).
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Trends in Intelligence Spending
Historical Trends
Figure 1. Intelligence Spending 1965-1994
1994 constant dollars

Source: H.Rept. 103-254, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 1994, to accompany H.R. 3116, p. 14.
Figure 1 illustrates highs and lows in NIP spending between 1965 and 1994. Due to the classified
nature of the intelligence budget at that time, the graphic does not include dollar figures.36 Figure
1 suggests that NIP spending appeared to decline steadily from about 1971 to 1980, climbed back
to approximate 1968 levels by about 1983, and steadied to apparently constant levels between
1985 and 1994. The pattern of spending in Figure 1 generally follows the pattern of world events
and associated defense spending.37 Analyses of defense spending over the past several decades
usually attribute higher levels of defense spending in the 1960s to the Vietnam War; lower levels
of defense spending in the 1970s to the period of détente between the United States and the

36 U.S. Congress, House Appropriations Committee, Defense Subcommittee, Department of Defense Appropriations
Bill, 1994, to accompany H.R. 3116, 103rd Cong., 1st sess., H. Rept. 103-254 (Washington, DC: GPO, September 22,
1993), p. 14.
37See CRS presentation FY2022 Defense Budget Request, p. 6, “National Defense Outlays, FY1940-FY2026” at
https://www.crs.gov/Products/Documents/WVB00391_PresentationSlides/pdf/WVB00391_PresentationSlides.pdf#pag
e=6. See also CRS Report R47110, FY2022 National Defense Authorization Act: Context and Selected Issues for
Congress, by Brendan W. McGarry.
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Soviet Union and to the worldwide economic recession; and higher levels of defense spending in
the 1980s to the Reagan defense build-up.38
Recent Trends
Table 1 compares NIP and MIP spending to national defense spending from FY2007 to FY2023,
reporting values in both nominal and constant dollars. Budget toplines appropriated for FY2013
show adjustments made in accordance with automatic spending cuts required under the Budget
Control Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-25).39 Topline numbers associated with national defense spending
are reported in Table 1 and illustrated graphically in Figures 1 and 2.
Table 1. Intelligence Spending, FY2007-FY2023
Dollars in billions, rounded (FY2023 is the base year for constant dollars)
NIPa
MIPb
NIP MIP Total
National Defensec

Nom.
Const.
Nom.
Const.
Nom.
Const.
Nom.
Const.

FY07
43.5
57.9
20.0
26.6
63.5
84.6
626
834

FY08
47.5
60.9
22.9
29.4
70.4
90.3
696
893

FY09
49.8
64.0
26.4
33.9
76.2
97.9
698
897

FY10
53.1
67.0
27.0
34.1
80.1
101.1
721
910

FY11
54.6
67.0
24.0
29.4
78.6
96.4
717
879

FY12
53.9
65.2
21.5
26.0
75.4
91.2
681
824

FY13d
49.0
55.1
18.6
20.9

67.6
76.0

610
749

FY14
50.5
59.7
17.4
20.6
67.9
80.3
622
735

FY15
50.3
59.2
16.5
19.4
66.8
78.6
598
704

FY16
53.0
62.2
17.7
20.8
70.7
82.9
624
732

FY17
54.6
63.2
18.4
21.3
73.0
84.5
656
759

FY18
59.4
67.0
22.1
24.9
81.5
91.9
727
820

FY19
60.2
66.5
21.5
23.8
81.7
90.3
746
824

FY20
62.7
68.6
23.1
25.3
85.8
93.8
775
848

FY21
60.8
64.6
23.3
24.8
84.1
89.4
760
808

FY22
65.7
67.2
24.1
24.6
89.8
91.8
767
784

FY23e
67.1
67.1
26.6
26.6
93.7
93.7
827
827

Source: CRS, using numbers available at http://www.dni.gov, at https://www.dni.gov/index.php/what-we-do/ic-
budget; OMB Historical Table 5.1, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/historical-tables/. For the MIP topline
budget figure for FY2023, see U.S. Department of Defense Press Release, “Department of Defense Releases
2023 Military Intelligence Program Budget Request,” March 28, 2022, at
https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2980582/department-of-defense-releases-2023-military-
intelligence-program-budget-request/. Deflators can be found under “Total Defense” of Table 10.1of the OMB

38 For a more comprehensive graph of defense spending over time, see for example, Katherine Blakeley, Defense
Spending in Historical Context: A New Reagan-esque Buildup? Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments,
November 8, 2017, at https://csbaonline.org/reports/defense-spending-in-historical-context.
39P.L. 112-25. For more on required spending cuts and the Budget Control Act, see CRS Report R44039, The Defense
Budget and the Budget Control Act: Frequently Asked Questions, by Brendan W. McGarry.
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Historical Tables, adjusted for 2023 as the base year, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/historical-
tables/.
Notes:
a. NIP numbers include base budget and supplemental spending dol ars known as Overseas Contingency
Operations (OCO) dol ars up to FY2022 when the President’s budget request proposed discontinuing
OCO as a separate funding category.
b. MIP numbers include base budget and OCO dol ars up to FY2022.
c. National defense spending (using topline numbers associated with Function 050 National Defense) is
included for comparative purposes. See Office of Management and Budget, Historical Tables, Table 5.1,
Budget Authority by Function and Sub function: 1976-2027.
d. In 2013, in compliance with the Budget Control Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-25), the original $52.7 bil ion NIP
total was reduced to $49.0 bil ion (DNI press release No. 24-13, October 30, 2013), and the original $19.2
bil ion MIP total was reduced to $18.6 bil ion (DOD press release No. 765-13, October 31, 2013).
e. NIP and MIP data for FY23 are budget requests. National Defense data for FY23 are estimates.
Figure 2. Intelligence Spending as a Percentage of the National Defense Budget:
FY2007-FY2023

Source: CRS, using numbers available at http://www.dni.gov, at https://www.dni.gov/index.php/what-we-do/ic-
budget; OMB Historical Table 5.1, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/historical-tables/. For the MIP topline
budget figure for FY2023, see U.S. Department of Defense Press Release, “Department of Defense Releases
2023 Military Intelligence Program Budget Request,” March 28, 2022.
Note: See Table 1 for the topline numbers used to produce this graph.
Figure 3 adds four additional NIP topline values—numbers available for FYs 1997, 1998, 2005,
and 2006. The topline number for the NIP was classified until 2007, with two exceptions. In
October 1997, then-DCI George Tenet announced that the intelligence budget for FY1997 was
$26.6 billion.40 In March 1998, then-DCI Tenet announced that the budget for FY1998 was $26.7
billion.41 In addition, intelligence community officials retroactively declassified NIP topline

40 CIA, “DCI Statement on FY97 Intelligence Budget,” press release, October 15, 1997, at
https://sgp.fas.org/foia/tenet499.html.
41 CIA, “Disclosure of the Aggregate Intelligence Budget for FY98,” press release March 20, 1998, at
https://sgp.fas.org/foia/intel98.html#:~:text=In%20response%20to%20a%20Freedom,Year%201998%20is%20%2426.
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numbers for FY2005 ($39.8 billion)42 and FY2006 ($40.9 billion).43 Nevertheless, corresponding
MIP topline dollars for 1997, 1998, 2005, and 2006 are not publicly available. Figure 3 provides
a snapshot of NIP spending over the past two decades. In spite of absent spending data between
1999 and 2004, the values that are present suggest relative constancy in NIP topline dollar
appropriations.
Figure 3. Intelligence Spending Based on Publicly Available Numbers:
FY1997-FY2023

Source: CRS, using numbers available at http://www.dni.gov, at https://www.dni.gov/index.php/what-we-do/ic-
budget; OMB Historical Table 5.1, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/historical-tables/. For the MIP topline
budget figure for FY2023, see U.S. Department of Defense Press Release, “Department of Defense Releases
2023 Military Intelligence Program Budget Request,” March 28, 2022. For FY1997: CIA, “DCI Statement on FY97
Intelligence Budget,” press release, Oct 15, 1997. FY1998: CIA, “Disclosure of the Aggregate Intelligence Budget
for FY98,” press release Mar 20, 1998. FY2005: DNI, Memorandum for the Record, March 2015, FOIA response,
May 20, 2015. FY2006: ODNI, Letter to Steven Aftergood, FOIA response, Oct 28, 2010, Mar 24, 2009.
Note: Table 1 provides the other topline numbers used to produce this graph.
Issues for Congress
In examining the intelligence community funding from a strategic perspective, Congress may
want to consider the following:

7%20billion.
42 James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, Memorandum for the Record, March 2015, attached to a cover
letter to Mr. Steven Aftergood, May 20, 2015: “The aggregate amount appropriated to the National Foreign Intelligence
Program (NFIP) for FY 2005 is $39.8 billion, which includes funding to support Overseas Contingency Operations
(OCO),” at http://fas.org/irp/budget/fy2005.pdf.
43 John Hackett, Director, Information Management Office, Office of the DNI, Letter to Steven Aftergood, October 28,
2010, in response to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request from Steven Aftergood, March 24, 2009: “The
aggregate amount appropriated to the NIP for fiscal year 2006 was $40.9 billion,” at http://fas.org/irp/news/2010/10/
fy06-intelbud.pdf.
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 The risk, if any, to United States national security of declassifying and releasing
to the public the topline annual budget figures for each of the elements of the
intelligence community.
 The acceptable risk relative to budget limitations. Like all departmental and
agency budgets of the federal government, the intelligence community must
accept some risk in not being able to fund all of its priorities.
 The ways the intelligence community can become more efficient and cost-
effective through enhancements in the collection, analysis and sharing of
intelligence across its 18 elements. The Office of the Director of National
Intelligence is, in part, intended to realize greater efficiencies across the
intelligence community through greater collaboration and coordination.
 Whether the intelligence community investment in operational security programs
and technology is sufficient alongside the threat of compromise by adversarial
foreign intelligence services.
 Whether the intelligence community has leveraged international partners
effectively for coverage of emerging issues or areas where the intelligence
community itself has limited investment. International partners can provide
valuable insight in areas where they have particular exposure and experience.
 Whether the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) is optimally
organized to provide oversight of the intelligence community budgets of the 18
separate elements.
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Appendix A. Intelligence Community Elements
In statute, the intelligence community comprises 18 elements, across six separate departments of
the federal government, and two independent agencies. NIP spending is distributed across all 18,
while MIP spending is confined to the DOD.44
Table A-1. Elements of the U.S. Intelligence Community (2022)

Department of Defense (DOD) Components:

1. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

2. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)

3. National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)

4. National Security Agency (NSA)

Intelligence elements of the military services:

5. U.S. Air Force Intelligence (USAF A2/6)
6. U.S. Army Intelligence (USA G2)
7. U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence (USMC/MCISR-E)
8. U.S. Navy Intelligence (OPNAV N2/N6)
9. U.S. Space Force Intelligence (S-2)

Non-DOD Components:

1. Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)

2. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

Department of Energy (DOE) intelligence element:

3. Office of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence (I&CI)

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) intelligence elements:

4. Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A)
5. U.S. Coast Guard Intelligence (USCG/CG-2)

Department of Justice (DOJ) intelligence elements:

6. Drug Enforcement Administration’s Office of National Security
Intelligence (DEA/ONSI)
7. Federal Bureau of Investigation‘s Intelligence Branch (FBI/IB)

Department of State (DOS) intelligence element:

8. Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR)

Department of Treasury (Treasury) intelligence element:

9. Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA)
Source: 50 U.S.C. §3003(4), ODNI.

44 See 50 U.S.C. §3003 for statutory definitions of the terms intelligence, foreign intelligence, counterintelligence,
intelligence community, national intelligence, intelligence related to national security, and national intelligence
program.
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Author Information

Michael E. DeVine
Sofia Plagakis
Analyst in Intelligence and National Security
Research Librarian

Acknowledgments
This report was originally written by former CRS Analyst in Intelligence and National Security Policy
Anne Daugherty Miles.

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
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Congressional Research Service
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