Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW)
December 21, 2022
Program: Background and Issues for Congress
Ronald O'Rourke
The Navy’s Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) program envisions procuring a class of 18 to 35
Specialist in Naval Affairs
new amphibious ships to support the Marine Corps, particularly in implementing a new Marine

Corps operational concept called Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO). The Navy
had previously envisioned procuring the first LAW in FY2023, but the Navy’s FY2023 budget

submission defers the procurement of the first LAW to FY2025. The Navy’s proposed FY2023
budget requests $12.2 million in research and development funding for the program.
The EABO concept was developed with an eye toward potential conflict scenarios with China in the Western Pacific. Under
the concept, the Marine Corps envisions, among other things, having reinforced-platoon-sized Marine Corps units maneuver
around the theater, moving from island to island, to fire anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and perform other missions so as
to contribute, alongside Navy and other U.S. military forces, to U.S. operations to counter and deny sea control to Chinese
forces. The LAW ships would be instrumental to these operations, with LAWs embarking, transporting, landing, and
subsequently reembarking these small Marine Corps units.
LAWs would be much smaller and individually much less expensive to procure and operate than the Navy’s current
amphibious ships. Under the Navy’s FY2023 budget submission, the first LAW would be procured in FY2025 at a cost of
$247.0 million, the second LAW would be procured in FY2026 at a cost of $203.0 million, and the third and fourth LAWs
would be procured in FY2027 at a combined cost of $290.0 million (i.e., an average cost of $145.0 million each). The first
LAW would cost substantially more than subsequent ships in the program because the procurement cost of the first LAW
would include much or all of the detailed design/nonrecurring engineering (DD/NRE) costs for the class. (It is a traditional
Navy budgeting practice to include much of all of the DD/NRE costs for a class of ship in the procurement cost of the lead
ship in the class.)
The LAW as outlined by the Navy could be built by any of several U.S. shipyards. The Navy’s baseline preference is to have
a single shipyard build all the ships, but the Navy is open to having them built in multiple yards to the same design if doing
so could permit the program to be implemented more quickly and/or less expensively. The Navy’s FY2023 budget
submission states that the contract for the construction of the first LAW would be awarded in December 2024, and that the
ship would be delivered in July 2028.
The LAW program poses a number of potential oversight matters for Congress. The issue for Congress is whether to
approve, reject, or modify the Navy’s annual funding requests and envisioned acquisition strategy for the program.
Congress’s decisions regarding the program could affect Navy and Marine Corps capabilities and funding requirements and
the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base.
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Tables
Table 1. Congressional Action on FY2023 Procurement Funding Request .................................. 23

Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 28

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Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress

Introduction
This report provides background information and issues for Congress on the Navy’s new Light
Amphibious Warship (LAW) program, which envisions procuring a class of 18 to 35 new
amphibious ships to support the Marine Corps, particularly in implementing a new Marine Corps
operational concept called Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO). The Navy had
previously envisioned procuring the first LAW in FY2023, but the Navy’s FY2023 budget
submission defers the procurement of the first LAW to FY2025. The Navy’s proposed FY2023
budget requests $12.2 million in research and development funding for the program.
The LAW program poses a number of potential oversight matters for Congress. The issue for
Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy’s annual funding requests and
envisioned acquisition strategy for the program. Congress’s decisions regarding the program
could affect Navy and Marine Corps capabilities and funding requirements and the U.S.
shipbuilding industrial base.
A separate CRS report discusses the Navy’s programs for building much-larger LPD-17 Flight II
and LHA-class amphibious ships.1 Other CRS reports provide an overview of Navy force
structure and shipbuilding plans2 and the Marine Corps’ overall plan for redesigning its units and
equipment to meet future mission demands, called Force Design 2030, of which the LAW
program is a part.3
Background
U.S. Navy Amphibious Ships
Roles and Missions
Navy amphibious ships are operated by the Navy, with crews consisting of Navy personnel. They
are battle force ships, meaning ships that count toward the quoted size of the Navy. The primary
function of Navy amphibious ships is to lift (i.e., transport) embarked U.S. Marines and their
weapons, equipment, and supplies to distant operating areas, and enable Marines to conduct
expeditionary operations ashore in those areas. Although amphibious ships can be used to support
Marine landings against opposing military forces, they are also used for operations in permissive
or benign situations where there are no opposing forces. Due to their large storage spaces and
their ability to use helicopters and landing craft to transfer people, equipment, and supplies from

1 CRS Report R43543, Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs: Background and Issues for
Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
2 CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by
Ronald O'Rourke
3 CRS Insight IN11281, New U.S. Marine Corps Force Design Initiative: Force Design 2030, by Andrew Feickert.
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ship to shore without need for port facilities,4 amphibious ships are potentially useful for a range
of combat and noncombat operations.5
On any given day, some of the Navy’s amphibious ships, like some of the Navy’s other ships, are
forward-deployed to various overseas operating areas in multiship formations called amphibious
groups (ARGs). Amphibious ships are also sometimes forward-deployed on an individual basis,
particularly for conducting peacetime engagement activities with foreign countries or for
responding to smaller-scale or noncombat contingencies.
Current Types of Amphibious Ships
The Navy’s current amphibious-ship force consists entirely of large amphibious ships, including
the so-called “big-deck” amphibious assault ships, designated LHA and LHD, which look like
medium-sized aircraft carriers, and the smaller (but still quite sizeable) amphibious ships,
designated LPD or LSD, which are sometimes called “small-deck” amphibious ships.6 As
mentioned earlier, a separate CRS report discusses the Navy’s current programs for procuring
new LHA- and LPD-type ships.7 The LAWs discussed in this CRS report would be much smaller
than the Navy’s current amphibious ships.
Amphibious Ship Force at End of FY2021
The Navy’s force of amphibious ships at the end of FY2021 included 31 ships, including 9
amphibious assault ships (2 LHAs and 7 LHDs), 11 LPD-17 Flight I ships, and 11 older LSD-
41/49 class ships. The LSD-41/49 class ships are to be replaced by new LPD-17 Flight II class
ships.
Amphibious Ship Force-Level Goal Under 355-Ship Plan of 2016
The Navy’s current force-level goal, released in December 2016, calls for achieving and
maintaining a 355-ship fleet that includes 38 amphibious ships—12 LHA/LHD-type ships, 13
LPD-17 Flight I class ships, and 13 LPD-17 Flight II class ships (12+13+13).8 This 38-ship force-

4 Amphibious ships have berthing spaces for Marines; storage space for their wheeled vehicles, their other combat
equipment, and their supplies; flight decks and hangar decks for their helicopters and vertical take-off and landing
(VTOL) fixed-wing aircraft; and in many cases well decks for storing and launching their landing craft. (A well deck is
a large, garage-like space in the stern of the ship. It can be flooded with water so that landing craft can leave or return
to the ship. Access to the well deck is protected by a large stern gate that is somewhat like a garage door.)
5 Amphibious ships and their embarked Marine forces can be used for launching and conducting humanitarian-
assistance and disaster-response (HA/DR) operations; peacetime engagement and partnership-building activities, such
as exercises; other nation-building operations, such as reconstruction operations; operations to train, advise, and assist
foreign military forces; peace-enforcement operations; noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs); maritime-security
operations, such as anti-piracy operations; smaller-scale strike and counter-terrorism operations; and larger-scale
ground combat operations. Amphibious ships and their embarked Marine forces can also be used for maintaining
forward-deployed naval presence for purposes of deterrence, reassurance, and maintaining regional stability.
6 U.S. Navy amphibious ships have designations starting with the letter L, as in amphibious landing. LHA can be
translated as landing ship, helicopter-capable, assault; LHD can be translated as landing ship, helicopter-capable, well
deck; LPD can be translated as landing ship, helicopter platform, well deck; and LSD can be translated as landing ship,
well deck. Whether noted in the designation or not, almost all these ships have well decks. The exceptions are LHAs 6
and 7, which do not have well decks and instead have expanded aviation support capabilities. For an explanation of
well decks, see footnote 4. The terms “large-deck” and “small-deck” refer to the size of the ship’s flight deck.
7 CRS Report R43543, Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs: Background and Issues for
Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
8 For more on the Navy’s 355-ship force-level goal, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding
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level goal predates the EABO concept and the initiation of the LAW program and consequently
includes no LAWs.
Emerging New Amphibious Ship Force-Level Goal
The Navy and DOD since 2019 have been working to develop a new force-level goal to replace
the Navy’s current 355-ship force-level goal. The Navy’s FY2023 30-year (FY2023-FY2052)
shipbuilding plan, released on April 20, 2022, includes a table summarizing the results of studies
that have been conducted on the successor force-level goal. These studies outline potential future
fleets with 6 to 10 LHAs/LHDs and 30 to 54 other amphibious ships, including but not
necessarily limited to LPDs and LAWs.9
Marine Corps officials state that, from their perspective, a minimum of 66 amphibious ships will
be required in coming years, including a minimum of 31 larger amphibious ships (10
LHAs/LHDs and 21 LPDs) plus 35 LAWs (aka “31+35”).10
At an April 26, 2022, hearing on Department of the Navy (DON) investment programs before the
Seapower subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Department of the Navy
testified that
In order to ensure the future naval expeditionary force is maximized for effective combat
power, while reflecting and supporting the force structure changes addressed in USMC’s
Force Design, the Secretary of the Navy directed an amphibious requirement study that
will inform refinement of amphibious ship procurement plans and shipbuilding profiles, as
well as inform the ongoing overall Naval Force Structure Assessment.11
In January 2022, Navy officials reportedly anticipated that the above-mentioned study would be
completed by the end of March 2022.12 At the end of March 2022, the study reportedly was
expected to be completed shortly.13 At the beginning of April 2022, the study reportedly was in its

Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. For a more detailed review of the 38-ship force
structure requirements, see Appendix A of archived CRS Report RL34476, Navy LPD-17 Amphibious Ship
Procurement: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
9 For additional discussion, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and
Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
10 See, for example, Todd South, “Back to Ship: Marines Need Ships to Fight. Will They Get Them?” Military Times,
March 24, 2022; Megan Eckstein, “Some Lawmakers Back Marines in Disagreement over Navy Amphib Force,”
Defense News, April 5, 2022; Caitlin M. Kenney, “Marines Push Light Amphib Warship While Navy Secretary Awaits
Study,” Defense One, April 5, 2022; Mallory Shelbourne, “Navy and Marines Divided Over the Amphibious Fleet’s
Future as Delays and Cancellations Mount in FY 2023 Budget Request,” USNI News, April 3, 2022.
11 Statement of Frederick J. Stefany, Principal Civilian Deputy, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research,
Development and Acquisition), Performing The Duties Of The Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research,
Development and Acquisition), and Vice Admiral Scott Conn, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Warfighting
Requirements And Capabilities (OPNAV N9), and Lieutenant General Karsten S. Heckl, Deputy Commandant,
Combat Development and Integration, Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, before
the Subcommittee on Seapower of the Senate Armed Services Committee on Department of the Navy Fiscal Year 2023
Budget Request for Seapower, April 26, 2022, PDF page 12 of 37.
12 See Megan Eckstein, “Amphib Ship Requirements Study Could Spell Bad News for Marines, Industry,” Defense
News, January 18, 2022.
13 Megan Eckstgein, “US Navy Seeks to End San Antonio-Class Ship Production, Reducing Fleet by 8 Amphibious
Hulls,” Defense News, March 28, 2022.
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final stages.14 The issue of the future amphibious ship force level goal reportedly has been a
matter of debate within the Defense Department.15
The Navy’s FY2023 30-year (FY2023-FY2052) shipbuilding plan, released on April 20 2022,
states that “the Navy will begin assessment of a next-generation amphibious ship (i.e., LPD(X))
in FY2023.”16
Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program17
Overview
As noted earlier, the LAW program may include 18 to 35 ships. A total of 18 is mentioned in a
July 2022 Navy document, Chief of Operations Navigation Plan 2022.18 A total of 35 is
mentioned regularly by Marine Corps officials, and would include nine operational LAWs for
each of three envisioned Marine Littoral Regiments (MLRs),19 plus eight additional LAWs to
account for factors such as a certain number of LAWs being in maintenance at any given
moment.20 LAWs would be much smaller and individually much less expensive to procure and
operate than the Navy’s current amphibious ships. The Marine Corps sometimes refers to the
LAW as a Landing Ship Medium (LSM), meaning a medium-sized landing ship.21
Procurement Schedule
As noted earlier, the Navy had previously envisioned procuring the first LAW in FY2023, but the
Navy’s FY2023 budget submission defers the procurement of the first LAW to FY2025. The
Navy’s FY2023 five-year (FY2023-FY2027) shipbuilding plan calls for procuring the first LAW
in FY2025, the second in FY2026, and the third and fourth in FY2027. The Navy’s FY2023

14 Mallory Shelbourne, “Navy and Marines Divided Over the Amphibious Fleet’s Future as Delays and Cancellations
Mount in FY 2023 Budget Request,” USNI News, April 3, 2022; Caitlin M. Kenney, “Marines Push Light Amphib
Warship While Navy Secretary Awaits Study,” Defense One, April 5, 2022.
15 See Megan Eckstein, “White House Steps in as Navy, Pentagon Feud over Amphibious Ship Study,” Defense News,
December 8, 2022. See also Justin Katz, “Del Toro: Navy-Marine Corps Amphib Study in ‘Final Stages,’ Being
Briefed to Leadership,” Breaking Defense, December 6, 2022; Lee Hudson, “Senators Press Del Toro for Update on
Amphib Study,” Politico Pro, November 14, 2022.
16 U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year
2023, April 2022, p. 14.
17 Unless otherwise stated, information in this section about the LAW is taken from Navy briefing slides and Navy
answers to industry questions from LAW program industry days that were held on March 4 and April 9, 2020, and
posted on March 20, May 5, and May 7, 2020, at “RFI: US Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW),”
https://beta.sam.gov/opp/90a9ece86ade48089e9f6d57d2969d23/view, accessed by CRS on May 15, 2020.
For press articles about the LAW, see Megan Eckstein, “Navy Researching New Class of Medium Amphibious Ship,
New Logistics Ships,” USNI News, February 20, 2020. See also Rich Abott, “FY 2021 Request Starts Work on Future
Amphibs and Logistics Ships,” Defense Daily, February 20, 2020; David Axe, “This Weird Little Ship Could Be the
Future of Amphibious Warfare,” National Interest, February 24, 2020; Mallory Shellbourne, “Navy begins pursuit of
Light Amphibious Warship,” Inside Defense, March 26, 2020; Joseph Trevithick, “Navy Wants To Buy 30 New Light
Amphibious Warships To Support Radical Shift In Marine Ops,” The Drive, May 5, 2020; Megan Eckstein, “Navy
Officials Reveal Details of New $100M Light Amphibious Warship Concept,” USNI News, November 19, 2020.
18 U.S. Navy, “Chief of Operations Navigation Plan 2022,” undated, released July 26, 2022, p. 10.
19 For more on the MLRs, see CRS In Focus IF12200, The U.S. Marine Corps Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR), by
Andrew Feickert, The U.S. Marine Corps Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR), by Andrew Feickert.
20 See also Mallory Shelbourne, “Marine Corps, Navy Remain Split Over Design, Number of Future Light Amphibious
Warship, Divide Risks Stalling Program,” USNI News, September 14 (updated September 15), 2022.
21 See, for example, U.S. Marine Corps, Force Design 2030, Annual Update, May 2022, p. 15.
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budget submission states that the contract for the construction of the first LAW would be awarded
in December 2024, and that the ship would be delivered in July 2028.
Procurement Cost
Under the Navy’s FY2023 budget submission, the first LAW would be procured in FY2025 at a
cost of $247.0 million, the second LAW would be procured in FY2026 at a cost of $203.0
million, and the third and fourth LAWs would be procured in FY2027 at a combined cost of
$290.0 million (i.e., an average cost of $145.0 million each). The first LAW would cost
substantially more than subsequent ships in the program because the procurement cost of the first
LAW would include much or all of the detailed design/nonrecurring engineering (DD/NRE) costs
for the class. (It is a traditional Navy budgeting practice to include much of all of the DD/NRE
costs for a class of ship in the procurement cost of the lead ship in the class.)
By way of comparison, the Navy’s most recently procured LHA-type amphibious ship has an
estimated unit procurement cost in the Navy’s FY2023 budget submission of about $3.5 billion,
and LPD-17 Flight II amphibious ships have unit procurement costs of about $1.9 billion. As
additional comparisons, the Navy’s Ship-to-Shore Connectors (SSCs)—its new air-cushioned
landing craft—are about 92 feet long and have a unit procurement cost of roughly $95 million,
the Coast Guard’s new Fast Response Cutters (FRCs) are 154 feet long and have a unit
procurement cost of about $65 million, and the Navy’s new TATS towing, salvage, and rescue
ships are 263 feet long and have a unit procurement cost of about $96 million.
Operational Rationale, Including EABO
To improve their ability to perform various missions in coming years, including a potential
mission of countering Chinese forces in a possible conflict in the Western Pacific, the Navy and
Marine Corps want to implement a new operational concept called Distributed Maritime
Operations (DMO).22 DMO calls for U.S. naval forces (meaning the Navy and Marine Corps)23 to
operate at sea in a less concentrated, more distributed manner, so as to complicate an adversary’s
task of detecting, identifying, tracking, and targeting U.S. naval forces, while still being able to
bring lethal force to bear against adversary forces.
In parallel with DMO, and with an eye toward potential conflict scenarios in the Western Pacific
against Chinese forces, the Marine Corps has developed two supporting operational concepts,
called Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment (LOCE) and Expeditionary Advanced
Base Operations (EABO). Under the EABO concept, the Marine Corps envisions, among other
things, having reinforced-platoon-sized Marine Corps units maneuver around the theater, moving
from island to island, to fire anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and perform other missions so as

22 For additional discussion, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and
Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke, and CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for
U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
23 Although the term naval is often used to refer specifically to the Navy, it more properly refers to both the Navy and
Marine Corps, because both the Navy and Marine Corps are naval services. Even though the Marine Corps sometimes
operates for extended periods as a land fighting force (as it has done in recent years, for example, in Afghanistan and
Iraq), and is often thought of as the country’s second land army, it nevertheless is, by law, a naval service. 10 U.S.C.
§8001(a)(3) states, “The term ‘member of the naval service’ means a person appointed or enlisted in, or inducted or
conscripted into, the Navy or the Marine Corps.” DON officials sometimes refer to the two services as the Navy-
Marine Corps team. For additional discussion, see CRS In Focus IF10484, Defense Primer: Department of the Navy,
by Ronald O'Rourke.
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to contribute, alongside Navy and other U.S. military forces, to U.S. operations to counter and
deny sea control to Chinese forces.
More specifically, the Marine Corps states that the EABO concept includes, among other things,
establishing and operating “multiple platoon-reinforced-size expeditionary advance base sites that
can host and enable a variety of missions such as long-range anti-ship fires, forward arming and
refueling of aircraft, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance of key maritime terrain, and
air-defense and early warning,”24 The use of Marine Corps units to contribute to U.S. sea-denial
operations against an opposing navy by shooting ASCMs would represent a new mission for the
Marine Corps.25
Light Amphibious Warships (LAWs) would be instrumental to these operations, with LAWs
embarking, transporting, landing, and subsequently reembarking these small Marine Corps units.
An August 27, 2020, press report states, “Maj. Gen. Tracy King, the director of expeditionary
warfare on the chief of naval operations’ staff (OPNAV N95), said today that LAW was perhaps
the most important investment the Marine Corps was making to optimize itself for expeditionary
advance base operations (EABO).”26 A February 2021 Marine Corps tentative manual on EABO
states
Littoral maneuver will rely heavily on surface platforms such as the light amphibious
warship (LAW) and a range of surface connectors, as well as aviation assets. The LAW is
envisioned as the principal littoral maneuver vessel of the littoral force.…
The LAW supports the day-to-day maneuver of stand-in forces operating in the LOA
[littoral operations area]. It complements L-class amphibious ships27 and other surface
connectors. Utilizing the LAW to transport forces of the surface reduces the impacts of
tactical vehicles on the road network, increases deception, and allows for the sustainment
of forces during embarkation. The range, endurance, and austere access of LAWs enable
the littoral force to deliver personnel, equipment, and sustainment across a widely
distributed area. Shallow draft and beaching capability are keys to providing the volume
and agility to maneuver the required capabilities to key maritime terrain.

24 Emailed statement from Marine Corps as quoted in Shawn Snow, “New Marine Littoral Regiment, Designed to Fight
in Contested Maritime Environment, Coming to Hawaii,” Marine Times, May 14, 2020. See also David H. Berger,
“Preparing for the Future, Marine Corps Support to Joint Operations in Contested Littorals,” Military Review, April
2021, 8 pp.
25 For press articles discussing these envisioned operations, see, for example, Jeff Schogol, “Inside the US Military’s
Modern ‘Island Hopping’ Campaign to Take on China,” Task and Purpose, June 16, 2022; Justin Katz, “Marines’ New
Warfighting Concept Focuses on Small, Agile Forces with an Eye on China,” Breaking Defense, December 1, 2021;
Bill Gertz, “Marine Commandant Reveals New Mission Preparing for China Conflict,” Washington Times, April 21,
2021; Megan Eckstein, “CMC Berger Outlines How Marines Could Fight Submarines in the Future,” USNI News,
December 8, 2020; David Axe, “Meet Your New Island-Hopping, Missile-Slinging U.S. Marine Corps,” Forbes, May
14, 2020; Shawn Snow, “New Marine Littoral Regiment, Designed to Fight in Contested Maritime Environment,
Coming to Hawaii,” Marine Times, May 14, 2020; William Cole (Honolulu Star-Advertiser), “The Marine Corps Is
Forming a First-of-its-Kind Regiment in Hawaii,” Military.com, May 12, 2020; Joseph Trevithick, “Marines To
Radically Remodel Force, Cutting Tanks, Howitzers In Favor Of Drones, Missiles,” The Drive, March 23, 2020; Chris
“Ox” Harmer, “Marine Boss’s Audacious Plan To Transform The Corps By Giving Up Big Amphibious Ships,” The
Drive, September 5, 2019.
26 Megan Eckstein, “Marines Already In Industry Studies for Light Amphibious Warship, In Bid to Field Them
ASAP,” USNI News, August 27 (updated August 28), 2020. See also Paul McLeary, “‘If It Floats, It Fights:’ Navy’s
New Small Ship Strategy,” Breaking Defense, August 28, 2020.
27 The term L-class amphibious ships refers to the Navy’s LHA/LHD- and LPD-type amphibious ships, whose
designation begins with the letter L in reference to amphibious landing.
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LAW employment requires reconnaissance and prior planning relating to the bathymetry
of the littoral environment. Effective LAW employment relies on knowledge of the beach
makeup, slope, currents, tidal effects, and other environment factors.
As envisioned and when properly postured, LAWs possess the range, endurance, speed,
sea-keeping, and C4ISR capabilities to support and conduct complementary operations
with, but not as part of, US Navy tactical groups, including an expeditionary strike group
(ESG) or amphibious ready group (ARG). Forward-positioned LAWs may augment the
capabilities of deploying ARG/MEUs during regional engagement and response to crises
or contingencies.
The LAW with embarked forces, generates and/or enables the following effects:

Rapidly maneuver forces from shore-to-shore in a contested environment

Sustain a combat-credible force ashore

Conduct enduring operations

Enable persistent joint-force operations and power projection

Provide increased and capable forward presence28
The survivability of the LAW ships would come from their ability to hide among islands and
other sea traffic, from defensive support they would receive from other U.S. Navy forces, and
from the ability of their associated Marine Corps units to fire missiles at Chinese ships and
aircraft that could attack them with their own missiles (which can be viewed as an application of
the notion that the best defense is a good offense).
As a key platform for implementing EABO, the LAW program forms a part of Force Design
2030, the Marine Corps’ overall plan for plan for redesigning its units and equipment to meet
future mission demands.29
Ship Design
Overview
The Navy wants LAWs to be a relatively simple and relatively inexpensive ships with the
following features, among others:
 a length of 200 feet to 400 feet;30
 a maximum draft of 12 feet;
 a displacement of up to 4,000 tons;31
 a ship’s crew of no more than 40 Navy sailors;32

28 Department of the Navy, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base
Operations, February 2021, pp. 7-9 to 7-10.
29 For more on Force Design 2030, see CRS Insight IN11281, New U.S. Marine Corps Force Design Initiative: Force
Design 2030, by Andrew Feickert.
30 Megan Eckstein, “Navy Officials Reveal Details of New $100M Light Amphibious Warship Concept,” USNI News,
November 19, 2020.
31 Megan Eckstein, “Navy Officials Reveal Details of New $100M Light Amphibious Warship Concept,” USNI News,
November 19, 2020.
32 A draft circular of requirements (CoR) attached to a request for information (RFI) on the Law program that Navy
released on October 16, 2020, states that “The ship shall be capable of at least 11 day missions without replenishment
for 40 crew and 50 embarked personnel.” (“Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Circular of Requirements (CoR), Draft
for Preliminary Design RFI, Ver 0.12, 10-13-20, PDF page 6 of 19, attachment to “RFI: DRAFT US Navy Light
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 an ability to embark at least 75 Marines;
 4,000 to 8,000 square feet of cargo area for the Marines’ weapons, equipment,
and supplies;33
 a stern or bow landing ramp for moving the Marines and their weapons,
equipment, and supplies the ship to shore (and vice versa) across a beach;
 a modest suite of C4I equipment;34
 a 25mm or 30mm gun system and .50 caliber machine guns for self-defense;
 a transit speed of at least 14 knots, and preferably 15 knots;35
 a minimum unrefueled transit range of 3,500 nautical miles;36
 a “Tier 2+” plus level of survivability (i.e., ruggedness for withstanding battle
damage)—a level, broadly comparable to that of a smaller U.S. Navy surface
combatant (i.e., a corvette or frigate), that would permit the ship to absorb a hit
from an enemy weapon and keep the crew safe until they and their equipment
and supplies can be transferred to another LAW;37
 an ability to operate within fleet groups or deploy independently; and
 a 20-year expected service life.38
In addition to the above points, the Navy states that the LAW’s design can be based on a
commercial-ship design.

Amphibious Warship Preliminary Design/Contract Design Statement of Work,” Beta.sam.gov, accessed November 23,
2020, at https://beta.sam.gov/opp/c1c8a3900504442fa5ad3bac48cec001/view?index=opp.)
33 Megan Eckstein, “Navy Officials Reveal Details of New $100M Light Amphibious Warship Concept,” USNI News,
November 19, 2020. A draft circular of requirements (CoR) attached to a request for information (RFI) on the Law
program that Navy released on October 16, 2020, states that the “ship shall have a cargo deck capable of carrying 648
ST [short tons] and a minimum deck area of 8000” square feet. (“Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Circular of
Requirements (CoR), Draft for Preliminary Design RFI, Ver 0.12, 10-13-20, PDF page 5 of 19, attachment to “RFI:
DRAFT US Navy Light Amphibious Warship Preliminary Design/Contract Design Statement of Work,” Beta.sam.gov,
accessed November 23, 2020, at https://beta.sam.gov/opp/c1c8a3900504442fa5ad3bac48cec001/view?index=opp.)
34 C4I is command and control, communications, computers, and intelligence.
35 Megan Eckstein, “Navy Officials Reveal Details of New $100M Light Amphibious Warship Concept,” USNI News,
November 19, 2020. A draft circular of requirements (CoR) attached to a request for information (RFI) on the Law
program that Navy released on October 16, 2020, states that the “ship shall be capable of a minimum transit speed of
14 knots in Sea State three (SS3) at the ship’s full load condition….” (“Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Circular of
Requirements (CoR), Draft for Preliminary Design RFI, Ver 0.12, 10-13-20, PDF page 6 of 19, attachment to “RFI:
DRAFT US Navy Light Amphibious Warship Preliminary Design/Contract Design Statement of Work,” Beta.sam.gov,
accessed November 23, 2020, at https://beta.sam.gov/opp/c1c8a3900504442fa5ad3bac48cec001/view?index=opp.)
36 Megan Eckstein, “Navy Officials Reveal Details of New $100M Light Amphibious Warship Concept,” USNI News,
November 19, 2020. A draft circular of requirements (CoR) attached to a request for information (RFI) on the Law
program that Navy released on October 16, 2020, states that The ship shall be capable of 3500 nautical miles endurance
at 14 knots without refueling at the ship’s full load condition….” (“Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Circular of
Requirements (CoR), Draft for Preliminary Design RFI, Ver 0.12, 10-13-20, PDF page 6 of 19, attachment to “RFI:
DRAFT US Navy Light Amphibious Warship Preliminary Design/Contract Design Statement of Work,” Beta.sam.gov,
accessed November 23, 2020, at https://beta.sam.gov/opp/c1c8a3900504442fa5ad3bac48cec001/view?index=opp.)
37 Megan Eckstein, “Navy Officials Reveal Details of New $100M Light Amphibious Warship Concept,” USNI News,
November 19, 2020.
38 Megan Eckstein, “Navy Officials Reveal Details of New $100M Light Amphibious Warship Concept,” USNI News,
November 19, 2020. See also Mallory Shelbourne and Sam LaGrone, “Navy, Marines Want the Light Amphibious
Warship to Haul 75 Marines for $150M or Less,” USNI News, February 10, 2022.
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A ship fitting the requirements listed above would be only a fraction as large as the Navy’s
current amphibious ships. The Navy’s LHA/LHD-type ships are 844 to 855 feet long and have a
full load displacements between 40,000 and 45,000 tons, while its and LPD-17 class ships are 684
feet long and have a full load displacement of 24,900 tons. As noted in the third bullet point
above, the LAW is to have a displacement of up to 4,000 tons—about 1/10th or 1/11th the
displacement of an LHA/LHD-type ship, and about 1/6th the displacement of an LPD-17 class
ships.
The LAW’s maximum draft of 12 feet is intended to permit the ship to transit shallow waters on
its way to and from landing beaches. The Navy prefers that the ship’s cargo space be in the form
of open deck storage. Unlike most of the Navy’s current amphibious ships, the LAW would not
have a well deck.39 A transit speed of about 15 knots would be less than the approximate 22-knot
maximum sustained speed of larger U.S. Navy amphibious ships, but it is a relatively fuel-
efficient speed for moving ships through water,40 which would permit the ship to be equipped
with a less powerful and consequently less expensive propulsion plant. The 20-year expected
service life is less than the 30- to 45-year expected service lives of larger U.S. Navy amphibious
ships—a difference that could reduce the LAW’s construction cost for a ship of its type and
size—and closer to the 25-year expected service life of the Navy’s Littoral Combat Ships
(LCSs).41
Navy-Marine Corps Discussion on LAW Design Features
The Navy and Marine Corps reportedly have been discussing and debating some of LAW’s
design features, with a key issue being the amount of combat survivability to be incorporated into
the LAW’s design, and the impact this would have on the LAW’s unit procurement cost. A
September 14, 2022, press report stated
The Marine Corps and Navy remain at an impasse over the future of the Light Amphibious
Warship, as skepticism about the program’s viability mounts due to the internal division,
sources familiar with the program have told USNI News....
The division between the two services largely comes down to survivability, or what types
of weapons and armors to place on a ship that would operate in the first island chain,42
within range of Chinese missiles.
Adding more weapons and armor to LAW makes the ship more expensive. Projections in
2020 called for each LAW to cost $100 million, a number described as unrealistic by the
person familiar with program discussions. Now the Marine Corps wants the ship to cost
around $150 million apiece so it can buy more of them, while the Navy is pushing for a
more survivable ship that would end up costing about $300 million each.43

39 As noted in footnote 4, a well deck is a large, covered, garage-like space in the stern of the ship. It can be flooded
with water so that landing craft can leave or return to the ship. Access to the well deck is protected by a large stern gate
that is somewhat like a garage door.
40 Due to the density of water, fuel consumption for moving monohull ships through the water tends to increase steeply
for speeds above 14 to 16 knots.
41 For more on the LCS program, see CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background
and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
42 The term first island chain refers to the large and small islands that together enclose China’s near-seas region,
including the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea. For a map showing the first island chain, see
Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2022, Annual
Report to Congress, released on November 29, 2022, p. 67.
43 Mallory Shelbourne, “Marine Corps, Navy Remain Split Over Design, Number of Future Light Amphibious
Warship, Divide Risks Stalling Program,” USNI News, September 14 (updated September 15), 2022.
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An October 5, 2022, press report states
The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, facing a decision point early next year on the light
amphibious warship, are working to balance the Corps’ focus on affordability with the
Navy’s push for survivability.
Lt. Gen. Karsten Heckl, the deputy commandant for combat development and integration,
told Defense News the two services are emerging from an initial disagreement about the
cost and capabilities of this new platform.
The Marine Corps, since the early days of the light amphibious warship program, has aimed
for a price of $100 million to $130 million a copy. But the Navy—whose sailors would
drive and maintain the ship—and the Office of the Secretary of Defense wanted much
greater protection for the personnel onboard, tripling the cost and leading the Navy to plan
to buy just 18 instead of the Marines’ stated objective of 35.
“What should be a $120-$130 million ship should not be north of $350 million a copy,”
Heckl said.
Though the platforms will have to be tougher than a commercial vessel, Heckl said the
light amphib is meant to appear like a commercial craft—to “hide in plain sight.”
“The [Indo-Pacific] sea lines of communication are the most traversed sea lines in the
world; it would be a challenge for any power to surveil everything all the time in that area,”
he said. “However, if you don’t look like everything else you’re trying to blend in with,
you make your adversary’s problem set much simpler.”
The Marines don’t envision using this vessel during combat operations either, the general
said.
If there are indications a conflict may break out, the combatant commander would order
the light amphibious warships, or LAW, to quickly relocate Marines or resupply units, “and
then it goes into hiding, it goes into bed-down somewhere. Nowhere do we envision the
LAW out transiting the sea lanes in the middle of a kinetic fight.”
After several meetings between Heckl’s team and the Navy’s Program Executive Office
for Ships and the assistant secretary for research, development and acquisition, Heckl said
the group agreed “there is a lot of maneuver space” to come to an agreement and keep the
program on track for its planned fiscal 2025 start of construction.
Five companies are working on preliminary designs following a June 2021 contract award,
and the Navy-Marine team will review those designs in January, Heckl said. At that point,
with industry input in hand and an agreement in place over the right balance of survivability
versus cost, he said the team will be in a better place to decide what that balance of
survivability and affordability looks like and which companies are equipped to build that
vessel....
[Lt. Gen. David Furness, the deputy commandant for plans, policies and operations] said
the way the light amphibious warships operate would mitigate the risk China defeats them.
These ships would operate in and around the 7,000 islands of the Philippines, for example,
blending in with local commercial craft and not likely to become a target for Chinese
precision missiles.
Heckl acknowledged the ships might be operating within the range of Chinese anti-ship
missiles, but said the military too often focuses “on worst-case scenario, which drives us
into situations where the force becomes just simply unaffordable and unattainable.”44

44 Megan Eckstein, “Marines, Navy Near Agreement on Light Amphibious Warship Features,” Navy Times, October 5,
2022.
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Renderings of One Firm’s LAW Design
Figure 1, Figure 2, and Figure 3 show one firm’s LAW design. The design reportedly has a
length of 120 meters (about 394 feet), a displacement of 4,500 tons, and 10,500 square feet of
deck space for rolling stock or other cargoes.45 The Navy’s eventual preferred design for the LAW
might or might not look like this design.
Potential Builders
The LAW as outlined by the Navy could be built by any of several U.S. shipyards.
Figure 1. One Firm’s Design for LAW
Artist’s rendering

Source: Cropped version of il ustration of Austal USA’s design for LAW accompanying Martin Manaranche,
“Sea Air Space 2021: Austal USA Unveils Its LAW Design,” Naval News, August 3, 2021. A caption credits the
il ustration to Austal.

45 Martin Manaranche, “Sea Air Space 2021: Austal USA Unveils Its LAW Design,” Naval News, August 3, 2021. See
also Thomas Newdick, “Austal’s Light Amphibious Warship Design Is A Throwback To WWII’s Tank Landing
Ships,” The Drive, August 6, 2021.
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Figure 2. One Firm’s Design for LAW
Photograph of model displayed at trade show

Source: Cropped version of photograph of model of Austal USA’s design for LAW accompanying Martin
Manaranche, “Sea Air Space 2021: Austal USA Unveils Its LAW Design,” Naval News, August 3, 2021. The model
was displayed at the Sea Air Space 2021 exposition.
Figure 3. One Firm’s Design for LAW
Photograph of model displayed at trade show

Source: Cropped version of photograph of model of Austal USA’s design for LAW accompanying Martin
Manaranche, “Sea Air Space 2021: Austal USA Unveils Its LAW Design,” Naval News, August 3, 2021. The model
was displayed at the Sea Air Space 2021 exposition.
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Acquisition Strategy
Overview
The Navy’s baseline preference is to have a single shipyard build all the ships in the LAW
program, but the Navy is open to having LAWs built in multiple yards to the same design if doing
so could permit the program to be implemented more quickly and/or less expensively.46 As noted
earlier, the Navy’s FY2023 budget submission states that the contract for the construction of the
first LAW would be awarded in December 2024.
Reported July 2020 Contract Awards
An October 6, 2020, press report stated that the Navy in July 2020 awarded contracts for LAW
concept design studies to 15 firms, with the studies due in November 2020. According to the
press report, the 15 companies awarded contracts included Austal USE, BMT Designers,
Bollinger Shipyards, Crescere Marine Engineering, Damen, Hyak Marine, Independent Maritime
Assessment Associates, Nichols Brothers Boat Builders, Sea Transport, Serco, St John
Shipbuilding, Swiftships, Technology Associates, Thoma-Sea, and VT Halter Marine. The studies
reportedly were intended to help inform concepts of operation, technical risk, and cost estimates
for the LAW program, in support of a planned lead-ship contract award in FY2022. An August
27, 2020, press report states
The Navy and Marine Corps’ new Light Amphibious Warship program is already in
industry studies, with the service pushing ahead as quickly as possible in an
acknowledgement that they’re already behind in their transformation of the force.
Maj. Gen. Tracy King, the director of expeditionary warfare on the chief of naval
operations’ staff (OPNAV N95), said today that LAW was perhaps the most important
investment the Marine Corps was making to optimize itself for expeditionary advance base
operations (EABO).
“Having these LAWs out there as an extension of the fleet, under the watchful eye of our
Navy, engaging with our partners and allies, building partner capacity, is what I think we
need to be doing right now. I think we’re late to need with building the Light Amphibious
Warship, which is why we’re trying to go so quickly,” he said, saying that N95 was copying
the surface warfare directorate’s playbook from the frigate program, which moved quickly

46 The Q&A document from the Navy’s April 9, 2020, industry day on the LAW program (see footnote 17) states
Q [from industry]: Once [the industry] studies are done, what is the likelihood of [the Navy
making] multiple [contract] awards [for the next stage]?
A [from Navy]: When the [industry] studies are done, there will be multiple [contract] awards for
preliminary design [work]. Then [the Navy will] down select for a [preferred] prototype. [There is]
No plan for [building the ships at] multiple [ship]yards and [building them to multiple] designs like
[the] LCS [Littoral Combat Ship program]. It’s too hard of a logistics tail [to provide lifecycle
support for ships built to multiple designs]. But options are open if it is cheaper/faster.
Q [from industry]: Do you envision something similar to LCS variance [sic: variants]? Multiple
yards and designs?
A [from Navy]: No, it involves too much logistics and O&S [operation and support costs]. This
drives overall costs initially [i.e., locks higher life-cycle support costs into the program from the
outset of the program] and we’re not trying to go down that path. As we’ve said before, if studies
tell us we are wrong, if it’s affordable and fields faster, then we won’t ignore it. The data and cost
drivers will help us decide. The Government wants to field [the ships] as rapidly as possible, and
we believe that using multiple yards is not the best and most affordable path.
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from requirements-development to design to getting under contract thanks to the use of
mature technology and designs from industry.47
October 2020 Request for Information (RFI)
On October 16, 2020, the Navy released a request for information (RFI) to solicit industry input
on draft versions of documents relating to an eventual solicitation for conducting design work on
the ship.48
November 2020 Press Report About Concept Designs
A November 9, 2020, press report stated that, as part of its LAW industry studies, the Navy had
received nine LAW concept designs from 16 design firms and shipyards, some of which have
paired into teams. The report quoted a Navy official as stating that the following firms were
participating in the industry studies: Austal USA, BMT Designers, Bollinger Shipyards, Crescere
Marine Engineering, Damen, Hyak Marine, Independent Maritime Assessment Associates,
Nichols Brothers Boat Builders, Sea Transport, Serco, St. John Shipbuilding, Swiftships,
Technology Associates Inc., Thoma-Sea, VT Halter Marine and Fincantieri.49 A November 19,
2020, press report stated that “about six industry teams are working with the sea services [i.e., the
Navy and Marine Corps] after two industry days and industry studies over the summer.50
A January 11, 2021, press report stated
The Navy and Marine Corps are quickly seeking new ideas that allow Marines to support
the Navy in sea control and other maritime missions, including the rapid acquisition of a
light amphibious ship and a movement toward using Marine weapons while at sea.
Maj. Gen. Tracy King, the director of expeditionary warfare on the chief of naval
operations’ staff (OPNAV N95), told USNI News during a Jan. 8 media call that the
services are moving quickly to buy their first light amphibious warship (LAW) in Fiscal
Year 2022, as outlined in the recent long-range shipbuilding plan.
“We’re moving out at flank speed; I got a chance to brief the CNO and the commandant
recently, and they told me to maintain course and heading,” he said during the media call
ahead of the annual Surface Navy Association symposium.
“We’re going through the formal JCIDS (Joint Capabilities Integration and Development
System) process right now. [Naval Sea Systems Command] has completed its second
industry studies, and we’re working on all those documents.”
For now, 10 or 11 industry teams remain involved in the NAVSEA competition, which
recently held a second round of industry studies. NAVSEA is working with those teams to
help iterate what King called “novel” designs, to ensure they were the right size and could

47 Megan Eckstein, “Marines Already In Industry Studies for Light Amphibious Warship, In Bid to Field Them
ASAP,” USNI News, August 27 (updated August 28), 2020. See also Rich Abott, “Marine Corps In Industry Studies
For Light Amphibious Warship, Trying To Move Quickly,” Defense Daily, August 28, 2020.
48 See “RFI: DRAFT US Navy Light Amphibious Warship Preliminary Design/Contract Design Statement of Work,”
Beta.sam.gov, accessed November 23, 2020, at https://beta.sam.gov/opp/c1c8a3900504442fa5ad3bac48cec001/view?
index=opp. See also Rich Abott, “Navy Issues RFI For Light Amphibious Warship Preliminary Design,” Defense
Daily, October 19, 2020; Aidan Quigley, “Navy Solicits Light Amphibious Warship Preliminary Designs,” Inside
Defense, October 19, 2020.
49 Aidan Quigley, “Nine Concept Designs Submitted for LAW Industry Studies,” Inside Defense, November 9, 2020.
50 Megan Eckstein, “Navy Officials Reveal Details of New $100M Light Amphibious Warship Concept,” USNI News,
November 19, 2020.
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achieve cost and performance requirements. Mid next year, he said, NAVSEA would
downselect to three teams for full design, and then would downselect to just one to build
the first LAW in late FY2022.
“My suspicion is that we’ll begin [research, development, test and evaluation] next year,
and then we are aiming at lead ship construction in FY ’22, it’s going to be late in FY ’22
,but I still consider that pretty fast,” King said.
“We’re just going to build one, get that out and start playing with it. We’ll probably build
one the next year because we’ve got to get the doctrine right. The [Marine Littoral
Regiments] are going to start coming online at about the same time – first one’s in Hawaii,
we’ll get it out there and let them play with it. And then we’ll go into a build profile of, I
don’t know, probably four or five a year or something like that is what we’re going to aim
for.”51
June 2021 Contract Awards
A June 17, 2021, press report states
The Navy this week issued “concept design” contracts to five companies for the Light
Amphibious Warship ahead of the Fiscal Year 2023 design selection, a service spokesman
confirmed to USNI News.
Fincantieri, Austal USA, VT Halter Marine, Bollinger and TAI Engineers were selected
for the contracts, Naval Sea Systems Command spokesman Alan Baribeau said.
“A Concept Studies (CS) contract has been awarded to five offerors with a follow-on
option for Preliminary Design (PD),” Baribeau said in a statement. “The CS/PD efforts
include engineering analyses, tradeoff studies, and development of engineering and design
documentation defining concepts studies/preliminary designs.”
The Navy did not disclose the amount of money each company received to perform the
work, but Baribeau confirmed to USNI News that the total combined amount of the
contracts was less than $7.5 million.52
A February 10, 2022, press report states
Moving ahead, the services [i.e., the Navy and Marine Corps] expect a “full and open
competition” once they issue the request for proposals for the detail[ed] design and
construction phase, according to Tom Rivers, the executive director of the amphibious,
auxiliary and sealift office within the Program Executive Office for Ships.
After issuing five companies “concept design” contracts last year, those same five
companies recently received options for the preliminary design phase, Rivers said. The
companies working on the preliminary design are Fincantieri, Austal USA, VT Halter
Marine, Bollinger and TAI Engineers.
“So LAW—the initial thought process is based upon parent designs [i.e., existing ship
designs from which the design for LAW could be derived] that are already out there in the
world today to, again, to reduce our risks,” Rivers said at the conference. “As new
requirements are generated out of the Pentagon, we actually are sharing those with the
shipyards so they can kind of see what we’re thinking about how it evolves over time and

51 Megan Eckstein, “Marines, Navy Moving Quickly on Light Amphib, Anti-Ship Missiles to Create More Warfighting
Options,” USNI News, January 11, 2021. Material in brackets as in original. See also Rich Abott, “Kilby Outlines
Factors Leading To Faster New Light Amphib Development,” Defense Daily, February 5, 2021.
52 Mallory Shelbourne, “Navy Awards 5 Companies Light Amphibious Warship ‘Concept Design’ Contracts,” USNI
News, June 17, 2021.
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then they can kind of build that into the—and they come back to us and say, ‘hey here’s
the impact of that particular change on our configuration.’ Either it’s small or large and
then we take that in consideration into the final requirements.”
This type of process is helping the Navy determine what it can do with the various parent
designs, Rivers said.53
FY2023 Funding Request
The Navy’s proposed FY2023 budget requests $12.2 million in research and development
funding for the program. The funding is requested in Project 4044 (Next Generation Medium
Amphibious Ship) of PE (Program Element) 0603563N (Ship Concept Advanced Design), which
is line number 46 in the Navy’s FY2023 research and development account.
Issues for Congress
The LAW program poses a number of potential oversight matters for Congress, including those
discussed briefly in the sections below.
Analysis of Alternatives (AOA)
One issue for Congress concerns the analysis of alternatives (AOA) for the LAW program. An
AOA is a formal study that examines broad options for meeting a mission requirement,
determines whether that requirement would be best met through the procurement of a new
weapon system or platform (e.g., ship or aircraft), and if so, what that general features of that new
weapon system or platform should be. A June 2022 Government Accountability Office (GAO)
report assessing selected DOD weapon acquisition programs stated the following in its entry on
the LAW program:
The Navy plans to approve an analysis of alternatives—a key document that will help Navy
leadership decide whether a new ship class is necessary to meet mission needs—in support
of the program in early 2022. Nonetheless, the Navy is already in the process of defining
requirements for LAW and starting ship design efforts. Our prior work shows that moving
forward before Navy leadership validates the need for a new ship class can increase the
risk of acquiring ships that do not cost-effectively meet mission needs....
The [LAW] program office stated that the Navy is reviewing the analysis of alternatives
report in advance of a meeting to decide whether it will approve the analysis of alternatives
results. It added that moving forward with defining requirements through studies and
collaboration with industry on preliminary design concepts are common Navy best
practices being used to ensure LAW delivers the capability needed to support the Marine
Littoral Regiments.54
Deferral of Lead Ship Procurement to FY2025
Another issue for Congress concerns the date for procuring the first LAW. As noted earlier,
previous Navy plans envisioned starting procurement of LAWs in FY2023. Compared to the
previously envisioned start of procurement in FY2023, the Navy’s FY2023 five-year shipbuilding

53 Mallory Shelbourne and Sam LaGrone, “Navy, Marines Want the Light Amphibious Warship to Haul 75 Marines for
$150M or Less,” USNI News, February 10, 2022. See also Aidan Quigley, “Five Shipbuilders Emerge as Leading Light
Amphibious Warship Contenders,” Inside Defense, February 2, 2022.
54 Government Accountability Office, Weapon Systems Annual Assessment[:] Challenges to Fielding Capabilities
Faster Persist, GAO-22-105230, June 2022, p. 194.
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plan in effect defers the start of LAW procurement two years, to FY2025. A March 30, 2022,
press report stated
“The Marine Corps and the Department are getting the requirements tight on that ship
before we choose to put it in our [shipbuilding appropriations account]. So there is funding
in R&D for LAW,” Rear Adm. John Gumbleton, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy
for Budget, told reporters during a roundtable ahead of the [FY2023] budget release
Monday [March 28].55
Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following:
 Why does the Navy need an additional two years of time to study requirements
for the LAW? What has changed that would require that much additional time for
the study of operational requirements?
 What impact will the two-year deferral have in terms of reducing technical,
schedule, and cost risk in the LAW program? What impact will it have on Navy-
Marine Corps capabilities and operational risks over the next several years?
Future Amphibious Ship Force-Level Goal
Another issue for Congress concerns the future amphibious ship force-level goal, which could
affect future procurement quantities for LAWs. As noted earlier, the issue of the future
amphibious ship force level goal reportedly has been a matter of debate within the Defense
Department.56 A related potential oversight issue for Congress concerns how the LAW would fit
into the Navy’s overall future fleet architecture. Potential oversight questions for Congress
include the following:
 What is the analytical basis for the envisioned procurement quantity of 18 to 35
LAWs?57
 How well can the cost-effectiveness of a force of 18 to 35 LAWs be assessed if
the remainder of the Navy’s amphibious ship fleet architecture is not yet fully
known?
The issue of the future amphibious ship force-level goal is discussed further in the CRS report on
the Navy’s LPD-17 Flight II and LHA-class amphibious shipbuilding programs.58
Force Design 2030 and EABO Operational Concept
Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the merits of Force Design 2030 and the
EABO operational concept that the LAW is intended to help implement. Debate on the merits of
Force Design 2030 and the EABO concept has been vigorous and concerns issues such as

55 Rich Abott, “First Light Amphibious Warship Purchase Pushed Back To 2025,” Defense Daily, March 30, 2022.
56 See Megan Eckstein, “White House Steps in as Navy, Pentagon Feud over Amphibious Ship Study,” Defense News,
December 8, 2022. See also Justin Katz, “Del Toro: Navy-Marine Corps Amphib Study in ‘Final Stages,’ Being
Briefed to Leadership,” Breaking Defense, December 6, 2022; Lee Hudson, “Senators Press Del Toro for Update on
Amphib Study,” Politico Pro, November 14, 2022.
57 For an article that raises questions concerning the analytical foundation for the LAW program, see Daniel Goure,
“Light Amphibious Warship: A Mistake For The U.S. Marine Corps And Navy?” 19FortyFive, July 27, 2021.
58 CRS Report R43543, Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs: Background and Issues for
Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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 whether Force Design 2030 and the EABO concept are focused too exclusively
on potential conflict scenarios with China at the expense of other kinds of
potential Marine Corps missions;
 the ability of Marine forces to gain access to the islands from which they would
operate;
 the ability to resupply Marine forces that are operating on the islands;
 the survivability of Marine forces on the islands and in surrounding waters;
 how much of a contribution the envisioned operations by Marine forces would
make in contributing to overall U.S. sea-denial operations; and
 potential alternative ways of using the funding and personnel that would be
needed to implement EABO.59

59 For a CRS report on Force Design 2030, see CRS Insight IN11281, New U.S. Marine Corps Force Design Initiative:
Force Design 2030, by Andrew Feickert. See also CRS In Focus IF12200, The U.S. Marine Corps Marine Littoral
Regiment (MLR), by Andrew Feickert, The U.S. Marine Corps Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR), by Andrew Feickert.
For examples of press reports published since August 2022 discussing the merits of Force Design 2030 and the EABO
concept, see Paul Van Riper, “This Is the Marine Corps Debate We Should Be Having,” Marine Corps Times,
December 7, 2022; Harry W. Jenkins, “The Ugly Truth: Can the Light Amphibious Warship Survive War with China?”
The Hill, November 2, 2022; Dakota Wood, “The U.S. Marine Corps Has a Choice: Transform or Die,” Defense One,
October 16, 2022; Stephen Baird and Timothy Wells, “Why Marine Corps Forces Are Becoming Less Relevant to
Combatant Commanders,” The Hill, October 13, 2022; Paula Thornhill, “Civilians Will Choose the Marine Corps’
Future—and Soon, And They Will Do It by Selecting the Next Commandant and Other Four- And Three-Star
Generals,” Defense One, October 13, 2022; Gary Anderson, “Can Congress Save the Marine Corps from Itself?”
Military.com, October 5, 2022; John Sattely and Jason A. Paredes, “Sustainment of the Stand-In Force,” War on the
Rocks, September 12, 2022.
For examples of press reports published between June and August 2022, see Jonathan Lehrfeld, “Former Marine
Officials, Experts Praise Force Design 2030,” Defense News, August 26, 2022; Gary Anderson, “Creating a Real
Deterrent to Defend Taiwan,” Military.com, August 25, 2022; James A. Warren, “If the Marine Corps Isn’t Broken—
and It Isn’t—Why Fix It?” Daily Beast, August 20 (updated August 21), 2022; Richard R. Burgess, “Navy’s Light
Amphibious Warship Will Be A ‘Great Enabler’ for Marine Littoral Regiments, General Says,” Seapower, August 19,
2022; Franz J. Gayl, “The Marine Corps’ New Plan Will Not Beat China in a Fight for Taiwan,” Marine Corps Times,
August 4, 2022; Gary “GI” Wilson, William A. Woods, and Michael D. Wyly, “Send in the Marines? Reconsider Force
Design 2030 Beforehand,” Defense News, August 4, 2022; Michelle Macander Grace Hwang, “Marine Corps Force
Design 2030: Examining the Capabilities and Critiques,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), July 22,
2022; Max Boot, “The Top Marine Faces Unprecedented Opposition. He Says That’s ‘Positive.’” Washington Post,
July 20, 2022; Scott Cuomo, “On-the-Ground Truth and Force Design 2030 Reconciliation: A Way Forward,” War on
the Rocks, July 12, 2022; John F. Schmitt, “The Marine Corps’ Latest Idea for Countering China Has Major Problems,”
Task and Purpose, July 7, 2022; Mark Cancian, “Analyzing the Biggest Changes in the Marine Corps Force Design
2030 Update,” Breaking Defense, June 14, 2022; Worth Parker, “How the Marine Corps Went to War with Itself over
the Next War,” Task and Purpose, June 10, 2022; Jesse Schmitt, “When Only a Chisel Will Do: Marine Corps Force
Design for the Modern Era,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), June 2, 2022; Stuart Scheller, “The
Marine Corps’ Debate with Its Generals Is Amusing, but Dangerous,” Marine Corps Times, June 1, 2022.
For examples of press reports published during the second half of May 2022, see Brent Stricker, “Marine Corps
Metamorphosis: Legal Considerations,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), May 31, 2022; Charles
C. Krulak, “Whose Marine Corps? Why a Force Design Battle Is Losing Sight of the Basics,” Marine Corps Times,
May 27, 2022; Owen West, “Are the Marines Inventing the Edsel or the Mustang?” War on the Rocks, May 27, 2022;
David E. Johnson, “Ending the Civil War over the Future of the US Marine Corps,” Breaking Defense, May 24, 2022;
Elliot Ackerman, “A Whole Age of Warfare Sank With the Moskva, A Fierce Debate Is Raging within the U.S. Marine
Corps about What Comes Next.” Atlantic, May 22, 2022; CDR Salamander, “Force Design 2030: Futurism, Imbroglio,
or Creative Friction?” CDR Salamander, May 17, 2022; Todd South, “Lethal and Survivable or Irrelevant and
Vulnerable? Marine Redesign Debate Rages,” Marine Corps Times, May 16, 2022.
For examples of press reports published during the first half of May 2022, see Robert Work, “USMC Force Design
2030: Threat Or Opportunity?” 19FortyFive, May 15, 2022; Tom Hanson, “Rather Than Wreck It, Berger’s Vision
Will Save the Marine Corps from Itself,” Marine Corps Times, May 10, 2022; John Vandiver, “Marines Unveil Force
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Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following:
 What are the potential benefits, costs, and risks of the EABO concept?
 What work have the Navy and Marine Corps done in terms of analyses and war
games to develop and test the concept?
 Would EABO be more cost effective to implement than other potential uses of
the funding and personnel?
Accuracy of Estimated Procurement Cost
Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the accuracy of the navy’s estimated
procurement cost target for the LAW. Potential oversight questions for Congress include the
following:
 Is the Navy’s estimate reasonable, given the features the Navy wants the ship to
have?
 As the LAW program proceeds, will the operational requirements (and thus
procurement cost) of the LAW increase?
As noted earlier, a September 14, 2022, press report stated
The Marine Corps and Navy remain at an impasse over the future of the Light Amphibious
Warship, as skepticism about the program’s viability mounts due to the internal division,
sources familiar with the program have told USNI News....
The division between the two services largely comes down to survivability, or what types
of weapons and armors to place on a ship that would operate in the first island chain,60
within range of Chinese missiles.

Structure Update amid Opposition from Retired Generals about Service’s Direction,” Stars and Stripes, May 10, 2022;
Will McGee, “Forcing Design or Designing Force? The Reinvention of the Marine Corps,” Small Wars Journal, May
7, 2022; Howard Altman, “Marines Based Inside China’s Striking Distance Key To Deterrence General Says,” The
Drive, May 5, 2022; Audrey Decker, “Heckl: Force Design 2030 Will Make It ‘Damn Hard’ for China to Make a
Move,” Inside Defense, May 4, 2022; Mallory Shelbourne, “Marines Committed to New Force Design, Despite
Criticism From Retired Generals,” USNI News, May 4, 2022.
For examples of press reports published through the end of April 2022, see Gary Anderson, “The Marine Corps’
Intellectual Civil War,” Military.com, April 28, 2022; Charles Krulak, Jack Sheehan, and Anthony Zinni, “War Is a
Dirty Business. Will the Marine Corps Be Ready for the Next One?” Washington Post, April 22, 2022; P. K. Van
Riper, “The Marine Corps’ Plan to Redesign the Force Will Only End Up Breaking It,” Task and Purpose, April 20,
2022; Anthony Zinni, “What Is the Role of the Marine Corps in Today’s Global Security Environment?” Task and
Purpose, April 19, 2022; Philip Athey, “First to Fight: Is This the End of the Corps as America’s 911 Force?” Marine
Corps Times, April 12, 2022; Otto Kreisher, “Controversial EABO Concept Has Potential but Will Be Vetted, Speakers
Say,” Seapower, April 5, 2022; Konstantin Toropin, “After a Barrage of Editorials and Critiques, Marine Leaders
Defend Restructuring Plan,” Military.com, April 5, 2022; Craig Hooper, “Let The Marine Corps Build The New Light
Amphibious Warship,” Forbes, April 3, 2022; Mallory Shelbourne, “Navy and Marines Divided Over the Amphibious
Fleet’s Future as Delays and Cancellations Mount in FY 2023 Budget Request,” USNI News, April 3, 2022; Paul
McLeary and Lee Hudson, “How Two Dozen Retired Generals Are Trying to Stop an Overhaul of the Marines,”
Politico, April 1, 2022; Noel Williams, “Insights for Marine (and Beyond) Force Design from the Russo-Ukrainian
War,” War on the Rocks, March 31, 2022; Jim Webb, “Momentous Changes in the U.S. Marine Corps’ Force
Organization Deserve Debate,” Wall Street Journal, March 25, 2022; Paul K. Van Riper, “Jeopardizing national
security: What is happening to our Marine Corps?” Marine Corps Times, March 21, 2022; John M. Doyle, “Navy,
Marine Corps Labs Exploring How to Keep Advanced Bases Supplied and Safe,” Seapower, February 10, 2022; John
M. Doyle, “Berger Says Supporting a Widely Distributed Maritime Force Will Be a Challenge,” Seapower, May 14,
2021; Yasmin Tadjdeh, “Light Amphibious Warships Face Survivability Questions,” National Defense, April 23, 2021.
60 The term first island chain refers to the large and small islands that together enclose China’s near-seas region,
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Adding more weapons and armor to LAW makes the ship more expensive. Projections in
2020 called for each LAW to cost $100 million, a number described as unrealistic by the
person familiar with program discussions. Now the Marine Corps wants the ship to cost
around $150 million apiece so it can buy more of them, while the Navy is pushing for a
more survivable ship that would end up costing about $300 million each.61
Potential Alternative of Adapting Existing Army LSVs
Another potential issue for Congress is whether at least some portion of the operational
requirements for the LAW program could be met cost effectively met by adapting existing U.S.
military ships rather than building new LAWs. Some observers, for example, argue that at least
some portion of the operational requirements for the LAW program could be met more cost-
effectively by transferring existing Army watercraft known as Logistics Support Vessels (LSVs)
(Figure 4) to the Navy and adapting these LSVs to the LAW mission.
Figure 4. Besson-Class Logistics Support Vessel (LSV)

Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying Walker D. Mil s and Joseph Hanacek, “The US Navy and
Marine Corps Should Acquire Army Watercraft,” Defense News, June 22, 2020. The caption to the photograph
credits the photograph to the U.S. Navy and states, “U.S. Navy sailors conduct a simulated disaster relief supply
offload from a General Frank S. Besson-class logistics support vessel at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam on July
10, 2016.”
A June 22, 2020, opinion piece discussing this idea states
The Navy intends to acquire up to 30 new light amphibious warships, or LAW, to support
new Marine Corps requirements.… Rather than accepting a new amphibious design built
from the ground up, however, decision-makers should take advantage of the fact that many

including the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea. For a map showing the first island chain, see
Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2022, Annual
Report to Congress, released on November 29, 2022, p. 67.
61 Mallory Shelbourne, “Marine Corps, Navy Remain Split Over Design, Number of Future Light Amphibious
Warship, Divide Risks Stalling Program,” USNI News, September 14 (updated September 15), 2022.
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key requirements of the new vessels are very similar to the capabilities of vessels operated
by U.S. Army Transportation Command.
The Navy and Marine Corps should delay any new construction and immediately acquire
some of these existing vessels to drive experimentation and better inform their
requirements for the LAW program….
U.S. Army Transportation Command has over 100 vessels, and dozens have similar
capabilities to those required of the LAW. The Army’s LCU-2000s, also called the
Runnymede-class large landing crafts, are smaller, with roughly half of the cargo space
designed for the LAW and slightly slower, but they boast nearly double the range. The
Runnymede-class vessels have nearly 4,000 square feet of cargo space and can travel 6,500
miles when loaded and at 12 knots; and they can unload at the beach with their bow ramp.
The Army’s General Frank S. Besson-class logistics support vessels are larger than the
future LAW, at 273 feet in length but can claim 10,500 square feet of cargo space and a
6,500-mile range loaded to match the LCU-2000. These vessels also have both a bow and
stern ramp for roll-on/roll-off capability at the beach or ship-to-ship docking at sea. The
version built for the Phillipine military also has a helipad.
Army Transportation Command has 32 Runnymede-class and eight General Frank S.
Besson-class vessels in service. Mostly built in the 1990s, both classes of vessel have many
years left in their life expectancy and more than meet the Navy’s 10-year life expectancy
for the LAW.
These vessels are operable today and could be transferred from the Army to the Navy or
Marine Corps tomorrow. In fact, the Army was attempting to divest itself of these
watercraft less than a year ago, which underscores the importance of this opportunity even
further. Congress is firmly set against the Army getting rid of valuable, seaworthy vessels
and has quashed all of the Army’s efforts to do so thus far, but transferring this equipment
to the Navy is a reasonable course of action that should satisfy all parties involved….
By acquiring a watercraft that meets most of their requirements from the Army, the Navy
and Marine Corps simultaneously fill current capability gaps and obtain an invaluable
series of assets they can use to support the evaluation and experimentation of new designs
and concepts. This will allow Navy and Marine leaders to give their units the maximum
amount of time to evaluate and experiment with new designs to get a better idea of what
they need both in future amphibious craft as well as operational and support equipment….
Often overlooked, the availability of surplus vessels is absolutely critical to the process of
developing new technologies, developing the tactics to employ them, conducting training,
and providing decision-makers the requisite capacity to remain flexible in the face of
unexpected challenges….
[The Navy and Marine Corps have] long been in need of a boost in their amphibious
capabilities so as to be better positioned to meet the demands of today and prepare for the
challenges of tomorrow, and taking possession of the Army’s Runnymede- and Frank S.
Benson-class vessels is a solution on a silver platter.62
In a May 2022 update to its Force Design 2030 plan, the Marine Corps stated that it would
“Provide and sustain bridging solutions for littoral mobility for MLR experimentation and
training until the LAW is fielded,” and that

62 Walker D. Mills and Joseph Hanacek, “The US Navy and Marine Corps Should Acquire Army Watercraft,” Defense
News, June 22, 2020. See also William Cole, “Army Vessels Could Be Transferred To Marines To Counter China
Threat,” Honolulu Star-Advertiser, February 7, 2022; Chris Bernotavicius, Michelle Macander, Danielle Ngo, and John
Schaus, “You Go to War with the Watercraft You Have,” War on the Rocks, July 26, 2022.
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While we await the delivery of LSM [i.e., LAW], which post-dates the planned operational
readiness of our MLRs, we will explore a family of systems bridging plan—including,
Expeditionary Transfer Dock (ESB), Expeditionary Fast Transport (T-EPF), Landing Craft
Utility (LCU), and leased hulls—that can provide a basic level of mobility. Although not
optimal, such vessels will provide both operational capability and a sound basis for live
experimentation and refining detailed requirements for the LAW program.63
In June 2022, the Marine Corps stated that pending the delivery of the first LAWs, it will likely
use three civilian stern landing vessels to inform the design of the LAW hull form and experiment
with and confirm operational concepts for the LAW program.64
Potential questions for Congress include the following:
 How many of these watercraft would be available for transfer to the Navy for use
in meeting the operational requirements of the LAW program?
 How do the capabilities of these watercraft compare with those required for the
LAW?
 How much remaining service life do these watercraft have?
 Given the number of these watercraft that would be available for transfer to the
Navy, their operational capabilities, and their remaining service life, what portion
of the LAW program’s operational requirements could transferred watercraft
meet? How many LAWs, if any, would still need to be built to fully or
substantially meet the LAW program’s operational requirements?
 How do the acquisition and operation and support (O&S) costs of these
watercraft compare to the estimated acquisition and O&S costs of the LAWs they
would replace?
 Taking into account capabilities, acquisition costs, and O&S costs, how does the
cost effectiveness of an approach involving the transfer of these watercraft
compare to that of the Navy’s baseline approach of meeting the LAW program’s
requirements through the acquisition of 24 to 35 new LAWs?
 What would be the potential industrial-base implications of using transferred
watercraft to meet at least some portion of the LAW program’s operational
needs?
Industrial-Base Implications
Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the potential industrial-base implications
of the LAW program. In recent years, all Navy amphibious ships have been built by the Ingalls
shipyard of Pascagoula, MS, a part of Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII/Ingalls). As noted
earlier, LAWs could be built by multiple U.S. shipyards.65 Potential oversight questions for
Congress include the following:

63 U.S. Marine Corps, Force Design 2030, Annual Update, May 2022, pp. 8 and 15. See also Megan Eckstein, “The
Light Amphibious Warship Is Delayed, but the Marine Corps Has a Temporary Solution,” Defense News, May 10,
2022; Mallory Shelbourne, “Marines Look to EPFs, ESBs as Interim Solution for Light Amphibious Warship,” USNI
News, May 10 (updated May 11), 2022.
64 Audrey Decker, “Smith: Marine Corps Likely to Contract Three Stern Landing Vessels,” Inside Defense, June 16,
2022.
65 10 U.S.C. §8679 requires that, subject to a presidential waiver for the national security interest, “no vessel to be
constructed for any of the armed forces, and no major component of the hull or superstructure of any such vessel, may
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 What implications might the LAW program have for the distribution of Navy
shipbuilding work among U.S. shipyards?
 How many jobs would the LAW program create at the shipyard that builds the
ships, at associated supplier firms, and indirectly in surrounding communities?
 In a situation of finite defense resources, what impact, if any, would funding the
procurement of LAWs have on funding available for procuring other types of
amphibious ships, and thus on workloads and employment levels at HII/Ingalls,
its associated supplier firms, and their surrounding communities?66
Legislative Activity for FY2023
Summary of Congressional Action on FY2023 Funding Request
Table 1 summarizes congressional action on the FY2023 procurement funding request for the
LAW program.
Table 1. Congressional Action on FY2023 Procurement Funding Request
Millions of dollars, rounded to nearest tenth

Authorization
Appropriation
HASC-
SASC
HAC-

Request
HASC
SASC
Agreement
HAC
SAC
SAC
Research and development
12.2
16.2
12.2
16.2
12.2
12.2
12.2
Source: Table prepared by CRS based on Navy’s FY2023 budget submission, committee and conference
reports, and explanatory statements on FY2023 National Defense Authorization Act and FY2023 DOD
Appropriations Act. The funding is requested in Project 4044 (Next Generation Medium Amphibious Ship) of PE
(Program Element) 0603563N (Ship Concept Advanced Design), which is line 46 in the Navy‘s FY2023 research
and development account.
Notes: HASC is House Armed Services Committee; SASC is Senate Armed Services Committee; HAC is
House Appropriations Committee; SAC is Senate Appropriations Committee.

be constructed in a foreign shipyard.” In addition, the paragraph in the annual DOD appropriations act that makes
appropriations for the Navy’s shipbuilding account (the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy account) typically contains
these provisos: “ … Provided further, That none of the funds provided under this heading for the construction or
conversion of any naval vessel to be constructed in shipyards in the United States shall be expended in foreign facilities
for the construction of major components of such vessel: Provided further, That none of the funds provided under this
heading shall be used for the construction of any naval vessel in foreign shipyards….”
66 Two observers argue that shifting the Navy to a fleet architecture that includes a larger proportion of smaller ships
would have beneficial impacts on U.S. shipbuilding industry’s ability to support Navy shipbuilding needs. See Bryan
Clark and Timothy A. Walton, “Shipbuilding Suppliers Need More Than Market Forces to Stay Afloat,” Defense News,
May 20, 2020.
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FY2023 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 7900/S. 4543/H.R.
7776)
House
The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 117-397 of July 1, 2022) on H.R.
7900, recommended the funding level shown in the HASC column of Table 1. The recommended
increase of $4.0 million is for “Advance LAW development.” (Page 473)
Section 1021 of H.R. 7900 as reported by the committee states
SEC. 1021. NAVY CONSULTATION WITH MARINE CORPS ON MAJOR
DECISIONS DIRECTLY CONCERNING MARINE CORPS AMPHIBIOUS FORCE
STRUCTURE AND CAPABILITY.
(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 8026 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting
‘‘or amphibious force structure and capability’’ after ‘‘Marine Corps aviation’’.
(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENTS.—
(1) SECTION HEADING.—The heading of such section is amended by inserting ‘‘or
amphibious force structure and capability’’.
(2) TABLE OF SECTIONS.—The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 803 of such
title is amended by striking the item relating to section 8026 and inserting the following
new item:
‘‘8026. Consultation with Commandant of the Marine Corps on major decisions directly
concerning Marine Corps aviation or amphibious force structure and capability.’’.
Section 1022 of H.R. 7900 as reported by the committee states
SEC. 1022. NUMBER OF NAVY OPERATIONAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS.
Section 8062 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following
new subsection:
‘‘(g) The naval combat forces of the Navy shall include not less than 31 operational
amphibious ships, comprised of LSD–41 class ships, LSD–49 class ships, LPD–17 class
ships, LPD–17 Flight II class ships, LHD–1 class ships, LHA–6 Flight 0 class ships, and
LHA–6 Flight I class ships. For purposes of this subsection, an operational amphibious
ship includes an amphibious ship that is temporarily unavailable for worldwide deployment
due to routine or scheduled maintenance or repair.’’.
H.Rept. 117-397 states
Assessment of the Navy’s amphibious warfare fleet
The Navy and Marine Corps have identified amphibious capabilities as an area of emphasis
in future conflicts and are reviewing the requirements and acquisition of the fleet of assets
dedicated to this mission. The committee is concerned about the potential impacts this has
for the acquisition of amphibious ships that are best suited for prosecuting a future
amphibious invasion. Further, the committee is also concerned about the broader
implications of the importance of amphibious warfare capabilities, the probability of such
a conflict, and the cost of building and maintaining a fleet that can prosecute such a conflict.
The committee is interested to learn more about the analysis, decision-making processes,
and the frequency with which the Navy and Marine Corps review requirements for
amphibious warfare and align these requirements with acquisition programs. Specifically,
the committee seeks to understand how the potential changes to requirements would impact
the acquisition plans identified in the most recent 30-year shipbuilding plan.
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Therefore, the committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to review
the Navy’s plans for the future amphibious warfare fleet. At a minimum, the review shall
address the following elements:
(1) analysis of the current amphibious warfare fleet;
(2) Navy and Marine Corps future plans for the fleet and how it will be positioned to evolve
as technology changes;
(3) an assessment of the costs of building and maintaining a fleet whose primary mission
is amphibious conflict, such as the light amphibious warship, large deck amphibious ships,
and LPD-class ships; and
(4) other items the Comptroller General determines appropriate.
The committee further directs the Comptroller General to provide a briefing to the House
Committee on Armed Services not later than March 1, 2023, on the Comptroller General’s
preliminary findings and to present final results in a format and timeframe agreed to at the
time of the briefing. (Page 15)
Senate
The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 117-130 of July 18, 2022) on S.
4543, recommended the funding level shown in the SASC column of Table 1.
Section 1022 of S. 4543 as reported by the committee states
SEC. 1022. AMPHIBIOUS WARSHIP FORCE STRUCTURE.
Section 8062 of title 10, United States Code, is amended—
(1) in subsection (b)—
(A) in the first sentence, by inserting ‘‘and not less than 31 operational amphibious warfare
ships, of which not less than 10 shall be amphibious assault ships’’ before the period; and
(B) in the second sentence—
(i) by inserting ‘‘or amphibious warfare ship’’ before ‘‘includes’’; and
(ii) by inserting ‘‘or amphibious warfare ship’’ before ‘‘that is temporarily unavailable’’;
(2) in subsection (e)—
(A) in paragraph (2) by striking ‘‘; and’’ and inserting a semicolon;
(B) in paragraph (3) by striking the period at the end and inserting ‘‘; and’’; and
(C) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
‘‘(4) the Navy adjusts scheduled maintenance and repair actions to maintain a minimum of
24 amphibious warfare ships operationally available for worldwide deployment.’’; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
‘‘(g) In this section, the term ‘amphibious warfare ship’ means a ship that is classified as
an amphibious assault ship (general purpose) (LHA), an amphibious assault ship (multi-
purpose) (LHD), an amphibious transport dock (LPD), or a dock landing ship (LSD).’’.
Regarding Section 1022, S.Rept. 117-130 states
Amphibious warship force structure (sec. 1022)
The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 8062 of title 10, United
States Code, to require that the naval combat force should include not less than 31
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operational amphibious warfare ships, of which not less than 10 should be amphibious
assault ships, and make other related changes. (Page 222)
House-Senate Agreement
The joint explanatory statement for H.R. 7776 recommended the funding level shown in the
HASC-SASC Agreement column of Table 1. The recommended increase of $4 million is for
“Advance LAW development” (PDF page 516 of 748).
Section 1022 of H.R. 7776 states
SEC. 1022. NAVY CONSULTATION WITH MARINE CORPS ON MAJOR
DECISIONS DIRECTLY CONCERNING MARINE CORPS AMPHIBIOUS FORCE
STRUCTURE AND CAPABILITY.
(a) In General.--Section 8026 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting ``or
amphibious force structure and capability'' after ``Marine Corps aviation''.
(b) Clerical Amendments.--
(1) Section heading.--The heading of such section is amended by inserting ``or amphibious
force structure and capability'' after ``aviation''.
(2) Table of sections.--The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 803 of such title is
amended by striking the item relating to section 8026 and inserting the following new item:
``8026. Consultation with Commandant of the Marine Corps on major decisions directly
concerning Marine Corps aviation or amphibious force structure and capability.''.
Section 1023 of H.R. 7776 states
SEC. 1023. AMPHIBIOUS WARSHIP FORCE STRUCTURE.
Section 8062 of title 10, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in subsection (b)--
(A) in the first sentence, by inserting ``and not less than 31 operational amphibious warfare
ships, of which not less than 10 shall be amphibious assault ships'' before the period; and
(B) in the second sentence--
(i) by inserting ``or amphibious warfare ship'' before ``includes''; and
(ii) by inserting ``or amphibious warfare ship'' before ``that is temporarily unavailable'';
and
(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(g) In this section, the term `amphibious warfare ship' means a ship that is classified as
an amphibious assault ship (general purpose) (LHA), an amphibious assault ship (multi-
purpose) (LHD), an amphibious transport dock (LPD), or a dock landing ship (LSD).''.
Regarding Section 1023, the joint explanatory statement states
Sec. 1023 - Amphibious warship force structure
The House bill contained a provision (sec. 1022) that would require the Navy to maintain
an inventory of not less than 31 operational amphibious ships.
The Senate amendment contained a similar provision (sec. 1022) that would further require
no fewer than 10 of the 31 required vessels to be amphibious assault ships and specify that
the Navy maintain no fewer than 24 amphibious ships in an operationally ready status.
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The agreement includes the Senate provision with an amendment that would delete the
requirement to maintain 24 amphibious ships in an operationally ready status.
We urge the Secretary of the Navy to maintain the classes of battle force ships at relatively
equal levels of readiness to support global force management and operational plans.
We direct the Commandant of the Marine Corps to brief progress made in achieving Force
Design 2030 to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives every six months beginning April 1, 2023 and ending April 1, 2026. Each
such briefing shall include: (1) Capabilities divested by the Marine Corps as part of Force
Design 2030 (e.g., bridging, explosive ordnance disposal, route clearance and tanks); (2)
The extent to which the Marine Corps is relying on the Army to provide such capabilities;
(3) Specific actions the Marine Corps has taken to ensure such divested capabilities are
available to the Marine Corps; and (4) A current timeline for fielding capabilities required
to implement Force Design 2030. (PDF page 230 of 748)
Section 1025 of H.R. 7776 states
SEC. 1025. AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE SHIP ASSESSMENT AND REQUIREMENTS.
Section 8695 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following
new subsection:
``(e) Amphibious Warfare Ships.--In preparing each assessment and requirement under
subsection (a), the Commandant of the Marine Corps shall be specifically responsible for
developing the requirements relating to amphibious warfare ships.''.
FY2023 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 8236/S. 4663/Division C of
H.R. 2617)
House
The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 117-388 of June 24, 2022) on H.R.
8236, recommended the funding level shown in the HAC column of Table 1. The committee’s
recommended funding level for line 46 as a whole includes a recommended reduction of $5.0
million for “Historical underexecution.” (Page 198) It is not clear how much of this reduction, if
any, would apply to the LAW program.
Senate
The explanatory statement for S. 4663 released by the Senate Appropriations Committee on July
28, 2022, recommended the funding level shown in the SAC column of Table 1.
House-Senate
The explanatory statement for the FY2023 DOD Appropriations Act (Division C of H.R. 2617) as
released by the Senate Appropriations Committee on December 19, 2022, provides the funding
level shown in the HAC-SAC column of Table 1.

Congressional Research Service
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Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress

Author Information

Ronald O'Rourke

Specialist in Naval Affairs

Disclaimer
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Congressional Research Service
R46374 · VERSION 52 · UPDATED
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