Updated December 21, 2022
China Primer: The People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
Overview
territorial claims over disputed areas in the South China Sea
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is the military arm of
and East China Sea, and along the China-India border. As
the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’ or China’s) ruling
China’s economic and diplomatic interests have expanded
Communist Party. Since 2018, the U.S. Department of
beyond its immediate periphery, PRC leaders have tasked
Defense (DOD) has referred to China as the “pacing” threat
the PLA with global missions such as distant sea lane
or challenge for the U.S. military. DOD reported in
protection and United Nations peacekeeping operations.
November 2022 that China’s leaders aim to use the PLA, in
The PLA established its sole overseas military base in
part, to “restrict the United States from having a presence in
Djibouti in 2017. Some analysts assess that it will be the
China’s immediate periphery and limit U.S. access in the
first of several.
broader Indo-Pacific region.” Members of Congress have
responded in part by focusing on resourcing and conducting
PLA Modernization and Key Capabilities
oversight of U.S.-China security competition.
Since 1978, China has engaged in a sustained and broad
effort to transform the PLA from an infantry-heavy, low-
PLA Organization
technology, ground forces-centric military into a leaner,
Established in 1927, the PLA predates the founding of the
more networked, high-technology force with an emphasis
PRC in 1949. The PLA encompasses four services: the PLA
on joint operations and power projection. Xi has set the
Army, PLA Navy, PLA Air Force, and PLA Rocket Force,
goal of transforming the PLA into a “world-class” force by
as well as two sub-service forces, the Strategic Support
2049, the 100th anniversary of the PRC’s founding and the
Force, and the Joint Logistics Support Force. The
year by which Xi has stated he aims to achieve “the great
Communist Party oversees these forces through its Central
rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”
Military Commission, which in some respects is akin to the
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. This Commission also oversees a
A guiding principle of PLA modernization and strategy
paramilitary force, the People’s Armed Police (which
since the mid-2000s has been the concept of
includes the China Coast Guard), and China’s militia
“informatization,” or the application of advanced
forces. Xi Jinping, who serves concurrently as Communist
information technology across all aspects of warfare.
Party general secretary and PRC president, also has chaired
Reflecting widely-held expectations that artificial
the Commission—which currently has six other members—
intelligence and related technologies will have a
since 2012.
transformational effect on warfare, China’s leaders more
recently have called for the “intelligentization” of the PLA.
In 2015, Xi publicly launched the most ambitious reform
and reorganization of the PLA since the 1950s. This
The PLA is expanding its operational reach, strengthening
overhaul had two overarching objectives: reshaping and
its ability to conduct joint operations, and fielding
improving the PLA’s structure to enable joint operations
increasingly modern weapons systems. Key features of
among the services and ensuring PLA loyalty to the Party
PLA modernization include:
and Xi. Seven years on, the PLA continues to fine-tune and
institutionalize these sweeping changes.
An approximately 340-ship navy that includes modern
and advanced platforms such as submarines, aircraft
China’s Military Strategy and Goals
carriers, and large multi-mission surface vessels, giving
The stated goal of China’s national defense policy is to
China the ability to conduct naval combat operations in
safeguard the country’s sovereignty, security, and
its immediate periphery and sustained non-combat
development interests. The concept of “active defense”—
operations further afield.
the defining characteristic of PRC military strategy since
1949—prescribes how China can use defensive and
Air forces increasingly capable of conducting joint and
offensive operations and tactics to achieve these goals in
over-water missions, featuring a fighter fleet with
the face of a militarily superior adversary.
several hundred fourth-generation fighter aircraft and
growing numbers of fifth-generation fighters (China and
Authoritative PRC sources indicate China’s military
the United States are the only countries to have
strategy focuses primarily on preparing for a conflict
developed fifth-generation stealth fighters).
involving the United States over Taiwan—the self-ruled
island of 23 million people off the coast of mainland China
A conventional missile force designed to enable China
over which the PRC claims sovereignty. (See CRS In Focus
to deter or defeat third-party intervention in a regional
IF10275, Taiwan: Political and Security Issues, for a
military conflict, featuring at least 1,900 missiles,
discussion of U.S. interests related to Taiwan’s security.)
including approximately 300 intercontinental ballistic
The PLA also focuses on defending and advancing China’s
missiles, missiles armed with hypersonic glide vehicles,
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China Primer: The People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
and anti-ship ballistic missiles designed to target
congressional efforts to compete with China militarily have
adversary surface ships.
focused on a potential conflict over Taiwan.
An expanding and diversifying nuclear force (DOD
The annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) is
estimates China’s nuclear warhead stockpile exceeds
the primary legislative vehicle by which Congress has
400 with the potential to reach 1,500 by 2035).
sought to enhance the United States’ ability to compete
with China in the national security realm. Recent NDAAs
A Strategic Support Force that centralizes information
have included numerous provisions explicitly aimed at
warfare capabilities in the cyber and space domains
competing with China, in addition to provisions that relate
(referred to by the PRC as the “new commanding
or could relate to China (see Figure 1).
heights in strategic competition”) as well as electronic
and psychological domains.
Figure 1. References to China in the NDAA
A Joint Logistics Support Force that facilitates logistics
to enable complex operations.
These advances notwithstanding, many of the capabilities
the PLA is developing remain aspirational. In 2022, for
example, DOD assessed that the PLA’s ability to carry out
joint operations to counter third-party intervention beyond
the first island chain (which runs from Japan through
Taiwan and the Philippines to enclose the South China Sea)
is “in its infancy.” The PLA’s battlefield performance is
also uncertain: China last fought a war in the 1970s, and it
is not clear how successfully the PLA would operationalize
its new and largely untested post-reform organizational
structure. Analysts also debate the extent to which
Source: National Defense Authorization Acts, FY2000-FY2023.
corruption impedes the PLA’s effectiveness, whether the
Notes: Includes references to the words “China,” “Chinese,”
PLA’s intensive focus on political education and Party
“Taiwan,” and “Hong Kong.” The FY2023 NDAA refers to the
fealty is to the detriment of its operational effectiveness,
House- and Senate-passed version of the bil .
and how the PLA’s highly centralized command and
control apparatus affects its performance.
For example, the James M. Inhofe NDAA for FY2023
(H.R. 7776) would include dozens of provisions related to
Resourcing China’s Defense
China. Among these is the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience
The PLA’s modernization has been enabled by China’s
Act, which would include provisions to enhance deterrence
growing economy and a defense budget that has increased
of PRC military aggression against Taiwan by increasing
steadily since the 1990s. China’s officially-disclosed
and expediting the provision of weapons and munitions to
defense budget is the world’s second-largest (behind the
Taiwan. It also would authorize $2 billion in Foreign
United States)—around $229.5 billion for 2022—although
Military Financing (FMF) loans and $2 billion in FMF
some analysts assess China’s military-related spending is
grants to Taiwan each year through FY2027 (Taiwan has
higher. China also seeks to augment its military strength by
not previously received FMF). The omnibus appropriations
leveraging civilian commercial advances—particularly in
bill for FY2023 (H.R. 2617) would include the authorized
emerging high-tech areas—through a sprawling and
FMF loans but not the grants. The FY2023 NDAA also
ambitious initiative it calls “military-civil fusion.” PRC
would authorize $11.5 billion to extend the “Pacific
defense contractors in sectors such as aerospace,
Deterrence Initiative” established in the FY2021 NDAA
microelectronics, and advanced manufacturing benefit from
(P.L. 116-283) to fund and oversee U.S. and allied military
foreign joint ventures and technology licensing, as well as
capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region.
the alleged theft of technologies from the United States and
elsewhere. At the same time, Beijing seeks to make the
Congress requires both regular and one-off reports by the
country’s defense industry more self-sufficient and less
executive branch and other entities to inform its
reliant on foreign technology and supply chains.
decisionmaking on policy related to China’s military. Since
2001, pursuant to the FY2000 NDAA (P.L. 106-65),
Issues for Congress
Congress has required DOD to submit an annual report on
U.S. policymakers and observers increasingly describe
military and security issues related to China. The U.S.-
China’s military buildup as a threat to U.S. and allied
China Economic and Security Review Commission, created
interests. This view reflects concerns about PLA
by the FY2001 NDAA (P.L. 106-398), reports annually on
capabilities, China’s growing economic and geopolitical
PRC defense issues.
power, and China’s regional and global intentions. Some
Members in Congress have asserted that meeting this
Faced with competing priorities and limited resources,
perceived challenge requires the United States and its
Congress may face questions of whether and how the
partners to strengthen their advantages, and address their
United States should seek to sustain military primacy vis-a-
vulnerabilities, vis-à-vis the PLA. Increasingly,
vis China in various military domains and geographic
contexts.
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China Primer: The People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
IF11719
Caitlin Campbell, Analyst in Asian Affairs
Disclaimer
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