China Naval Modernization: Implications for
U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and
Issues for Congress
Updated December 1, 2022
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
RL33153

China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities

Summary
China’s military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, is the top focus of
U.S. defense planning and budgeting. China’s naval modernization effort has been underway for
more than 25 years, since the early to mid-1990s, and has transformed China’s navy into a much
more modern and capable force. China’s navy is a formidable military force within China’s near-
seas region, and it is conducting a growing number of operations in the broader waters of the
Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and waters around Europe.
China’s navy is, by far, the largest of any country in East Asia, and sometime between 2015 and
2020 it surpassed the U.S. Navy in numbers of battle force ships (meaning the types of ships that
count toward the quoted size of the U.S. Navy). DOD states that China’s navy “is the largest navy
in the world with a battle force of approximately 340 platforms, including major surface
combatants, submarines, ocean-going amphibious ships, mine warfare ships, aircraft carriers, and
fleet auxiliaries.... This figure does not include approximately 85 patrol combatants and craft that
carry anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM). The... overall battle force [of China’s navy] is expected
to grow to 400 ships by 2025 and 440 ships by 2030.” The U.S. Navy, by comparison, included
294 battle force ships at the end of FY2021, and the Navy’s FY2023 budget submission projects
that the Navy will include 290 or 291 battle force ships by the end of FY2030. U.S. military
officials and other observers are expressing concern or alarm regarding the pace of China’s naval
shipbuilding effort and resulting trend lines regarding the relative sizes and capabilities of
China’s navy and the U.S. Navy.
China’s naval modernization effort encompasses a wide array of ship, aircraft, weapon, and
C4ISR (command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance) acquisition programs, as well as improvements in logistics, doctrine, personnel
quality, education and training, and exercises. China’s navy has currently has certain limitations
and weaknesses, which it is working to overcome.
China’s military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, is assessed as
being aimed at developing capabilities for, among other things, addressing the situation with
Taiwan militarily, if need be; achieving a greater degree of control or domination over China’s
near-seas region, particularly the South China Sea; defending China’s commercial sea lines of
communication (SLOCs), particularly those linking China to the Persian Gulf; displacing U.S.
influence in the Western Pacific; and asserting China’s status as the leading regional power and a
major world power. Observers believe China wants its navy to be capable of acting as part of an
anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) force—a force that can deter U.S. intervention in a conflict in
China’s near-seas region over Taiwan or some other issue, or failing that, delay the arrival or
reduce the effectiveness of intervening U.S. forces.
The U.S. Navy has taken a number of actions to counter China’s naval modernization effort.
Among other things, the U.S. Navy has shifted a greater percentage of its fleet to the Pacific;
assigned its most-capable new ships and aircraft to the Pacific; maintained or increased general
presence operations, training and developmental exercises, and engagement and cooperation with
allied and other navies in the Indo-Pacific; increased the planned future size of the Navy;
initiated, increased, or accelerated numerous programs for developing new military technologies
and acquiring new ships, aircraft, unmanned vehicles, and weapons; developed new operational
concepts for countering Chinese maritime A2/AD forces; and signaled that the Navy in coming
years will shift to a more-distributed fleet architecture that will feature a substantially greater use
of unmanned vehicles. The issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify the Biden
Administration’s proposed U.S. Navy plans, budgets, and programs for responding to China’s
naval modernization effort.
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China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities

Introduction
Issue for Congress
This report provides background information and issues for Congress on China’s naval
modernization effort and its implications for U.S. Navy capabilities. China’s military
modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, is the top focus of U.S. defense
planning and budgeting.1 The issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify the
Biden Administration’s proposed U.S. Navy plans, budgets, and programs for responding to
China’s naval modernization effort. Congress’s decisions on this issue could affect U.S. Navy
capabilities and funding requirements, and the U.S. defense industrial base.
Sources and Terminology
This report is based on unclassified open-source information, such as the annual Department of
Defense (DOD) report to Congress on military and security developments involving China,2 a
2019 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report on China’s military power,3 a 2015 Office of
Naval Intelligence (ONI) report on China’s navy,4 published reference sources such as IHS Jane’s
Fighting Ships,5 and press reports.
For convenience, this report uses the term China’s naval modernization effort to refer to the
modernization not only of China’s navy, but also of Chinese military forces outside China’s navy
that can be used to counter U.S. naval forces operating in the Western Pacific, such as land-based
anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), land-based surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), land-based Air
Force aircraft armed with anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), and land-based long-range radars
for detecting and tracking ships at sea.
China’s military is formally called the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Its navy is called the
PLA Navy, or PLAN (also abbreviated as PLA[N]), and its air force is called the PLA Air Force,
or PLAAF. The PLA Navy includes an air component that is called the PLA Naval Air Force, or
PLANAF. China refers to its ballistic missile force as the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF).
This report uses the term China’s near-seas region to refer to the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and
South China Sea—the waters enclosed by the so-called first island chain. The so-called second
island chain encloses both these waters and the Philippine Sea that is situated between the
Philippines and Guam.6

1 For an overview of China’s military, see CRS Report R46808, China’s Military: The People’s Liberation Army
(PLA), by Caitlin Campbell. For more on China’s military modernization effort being the top focus of U.S. defense
planning and budgeting, see CRS Report R43838, Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for
Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
2 Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2022, Annual
Report to Congress, released on November 29, 2022, 174 pp. Hereinafter 2022 DOD CMSD.
3 Defense Intelligence Agency, China Military Power, Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win, 2019, 125 pp.
Hereinafter 2019 DIA CMP.
4 Office of Naval Intelligence, The PLA Navy, New Capabilities and Missions for the 21st Century, undated but released
in April 2015, 47 pp.
5 IHS Jane’s Fighting Ships 2021-2022, and previous editions.
6 For a map showing the first and second island chains, see 2019 DIA CMP, p. 32.
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Background
Brief Overview of China’s Naval Modernization Effort
Key overview points concerning China’s naval modernization effort include the following:
 China’s naval modernization effort, which forms part of a broader Chinese
military modernization effort that includes several additional areas of emphasis,7
has been underway for more than 25 years, since the early to mid-1990s, and has
transformed China’s navy into a much more modern and capable force.
 China’s navy is a formidable military force within China’s near-seas region, and
it is conducting a growing number of operations in more-distant waters, including
the broader waters of the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and waters around
Europe.
 China’s navy is, by far, the largest of any country in East Asia, and as shown in
Table 2, sometime between 2015 and 2020, China’s navy surpassed the U.S.
Navy in numbers of battle force ships (meaning the types of ships that count
toward the quoted size of the U.S. Navy), making China’s navy the numerically
largest in the world. DOD states that “the PLAN is the largest navy in the world
with a battle force of approximately 340 platforms, including major surface
combatants, submarines, ocean-going amphibious ships, mine warfare ships,
aircraft carriers, and fleet auxiliaries.... This figure does not include
approximately 85 patrol combatants and craft that carry anti-ship cruise missiles
(ASCM). The PLAN’s overall battle force is expected to grow to 400 ships by
2025 and 440 ships by 2030. Much of this growth will be in major surface
combatants.”8 The U.S. Navy, by comparison, included 294 battle force ships at
the end of FY2021, and the Navy’s FY2023 budget submission projects that the
Navy will include 290 or 291 battle force ships by the end of FY2030.9
 U.S. military officials and other observers are expressing concern or alarm
regarding the pace of China’s naval shipbuilding effort and resulting trend lines
regarding the relative sizes and capabilities of China’s navy and the U.S. Navy.10

7 Other areas of emphasis in China’s military modernization effort include space capabilities, cyber and electronic
warfare capabilities, ballistic missile forces, and aviation forces, as well as the development of emerging military-
applicable technologies such as hypersonics, artificial intelligence, robotics and unmanned vehicles, directed-energy
technologies, and quantum technologies. For more on China’s military modernization effort in general, see CRS Report
R46808, China’s Military: The People’s Liberation Army (PLA), by Caitlin Campbell. For a discussion of advanced
military technologies, see CRS In Focus IF11105, Defense Primer: Emerging Technologies, by Kelley M. Sayler. U.S.-
China competition in military capabilities in turn forms one dimension of a broader U.S.-China strategic competition
that also includes political, diplomatic, economic, technological, and ideological dimensions.
8 2022 DOD CMSD, p. 52. See also 2019 DIA CMP, p. 63.
9 For additional discussion, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and
Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke
10 See, for example, Oliver Parken and Tyler Rogoway, “Extremely Ominous Warning About China From US Strategic
Command Chief, Admiral Richard Says ‘The Big One’ with China Is Coming and the ‘Ship Is Slowly Sinking’ in
Terms of U.S. Deterrence,” The Drive, November 6, 2022; Xiaoshan Xue, “As China Expands Its Fleets, US Analysts
Call for Catch-up Efforts,” VOA, September 13, 2022; Aidan Quigley, “Chinese Navy Narrowing Capability Gap with
U.S., Analysts Say,” Inside Defense, November 16, 2021; Alex Hollings, “Just How Big Is China’s Navy? Bigger Than
You Think,” Sandboxx, July 28, 2021; Kyle Mizokami, “China Just Commissioned Three Warships in a Single Day,
That’s Almost Half as Many as the U.S. Will Induct in One Year,” Popular Mechanics, April 27, 2021; Geoff
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China’s navy is viewed as posing a major challenge to the U.S. Navy’s ability to
achieve and maintain wartime control of blue-water ocean areas in the Western
Pacific—the first such challenge the U.S. Navy has faced since the end of the
Cold War. China’s navy forms a key element of a Chinese challenge to the long-
standing status of the United States as the leading military power in the Western
Pacific.
 China’s naval ships, aircraft, and weapons are now much more modern and
capable than they were at the start of the 1990s, and are now comparable in many
respects to those of Western navies. DOD states that “as of 2021, the PLAN is
largely composed of modern multi-role platforms featuring advanced anti-ship,
anti-air, and anti-submarine weapons and sensors.”11 ONI states that “Chinese
naval ship design and material quality is in many cases comparable to [that of]
USN [U.S. Navy] ships, and China is quickly closing the gap in any areas of
deficiency.”12
 China’s naval modernization effort encompasses a wide array of platform and
weapon acquisition programs, including anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs),
anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), submarines, surface ships, aircraft, unmanned
vehicles (UVs),13 and supporting C4ISR (command and control,
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance)

Ziezulewicz, “China’s Navy Has More Ships than the US. Does That Matter?” Navy Times, April 9, 2021; Dan De
Luce and Ken Dilanian, “China’s Growing Firepower Casts Doubt on Whether U.S. Could Defend Taiwan, In War
Games, China Often Wins, and U.S. Warships and Aircraft Are Kept at Bay,” NBC News, March 27, 2021; Brad
Lendon, “China Has Built the World’s Largest Navy. Now What’s Beijing Going to Do with It?” CNN, March 5, 2021;
Andrew S. Erickson, “A Guide to China’s Unprecedented Naval Shipbuilding Drive,” Maritime Executive, February
11, 2021; Stephen Kuper, “Beijing Steps Up Naval Shipbuilding Program with Eyes on Global Navy,” Defence
Connect, January 11, 2021; James E. Fanell, “China’s Global Navy—Today’s Challenge for the United States and the
U.S. Navy,” Naval War College Review, Autumn 2020, 32 pp.; Ryan Pickrell, “China Is the World’s Biggest
Shipbuilder, and Its Ability to Rapidly Produce New Warships Would Be a ‘Huge Advantage’ in a Long Fight with the
US, Experts Say,” Business Insider, September 8, 2020; Ryan D. Martinson, “Deciphering China’s ‘World-Class’
Naval Ambitions,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August 2020; Dave Makichuk, “China’s Navy Shipbuilders Are
‘Outbuilding Everybody,’” Asia Times, March 11, 2020; Jon Harper, “Eagle vs Dragon: How the U.S. and Chinese
Navies Stack Up,” National Defense, March 9, 2020; H. I. Sutton, “The Chinese Navy Is Building An Incredible
Number Of Warships,” Forbes, December 15, 2019; Nick Childs and Tom Waldwyn, “China’s Naval Shipbuilding:
Delivering on Its Ambition in a Big Way,” International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), May 1, 2018; James R.
Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “Taking Stock of China’s Growing Navy: The Death and Life of Surface Fleets,” Orbis,
Spring 2017: 269-285.
For articles offering differing perspectives, see, for example, David Axe, “The Chinese Navy Can’t Grow Forever—
The Slowdown Might Start Soon,” Forbes, November 12, 2020; Mike Sweeney, Assessing Chinese Maritime Power,
Defense Priorities, October 2020, 14 pp.
11 2022 DOD CMSD, p. 50.
12 Source: Unclassified ONI information paper prepared for Senate Armed Services Committee, subject “UPDATED
China: Naval Construction Trends vis-à-vis U.S. Navy Shipbuilding Plans, 2020-2030,” February 2020, p. 3. Provided
by Senate Armed Services Committee to CRS and CBO on March 4, 2020, and used in this CRS report with the
committee’s permission.
13 See, for example, Ryan Martinson, “Gliders With Ears: A New Tool in China’s Subsea Surveillance Toolbox,”
Maritime Executive, March 21, 2022; Gabriel Honrada, “Underwater Drones Herald Sea Change in Pacific Warfare,”
Asia Times, January 12, 2022.
Ryan Fedasiuk, “Leviathan Wakes: China’s Growing Fleet of Autonomous Undersea Vehicles,” Center for
International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), August 17, 2021.
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systems. China’s naval modernization effort also includes improvements in
logistics, doctrine, personnel quality, education and training, and exercises.14
 China’s military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, is
assessed as being aimed at developing capabilities for, among other things,
addressing the situation with Taiwan militarily, if need be; achieving a greater
degree of control or domination over China’s near-seas region, particularly the
South China Sea; enforcing China’s view that it has the right to regulate foreign
military activities in its 200-mile maritime exclusive economic zone (EEZ);15
defending China’s commercial sea lines of communication (SLOCs), particularly
those linking China to the Persian Gulf; displacing U.S. influence in the Western
Pacific; and asserting China’s status as the leading regional power and a major
world power.16
 Observers believe China wants its navy to be capable of acting as part of an anti-
access/area-denial (A2/AD) force—a force that can deter U.S. intervention in a
conflict in China’s near-seas region over Taiwan or some other issue, or failing
that, delay the arrival or reduce the effectiveness of intervening U.S. forces.
Additional missions for China’s navy include conducting maritime security
(including antipiracy) operations, evacuating Chinese nationals from foreign
countries when necessary, and conducting humanitarian assistance/disaster
response (HA/DR) operations.
 The planned ultimate size and composition of China’s navy is not publicly
known. In contrast to the U.S. Navy, China does not release a navy force-level
goal or detailed information about planned ship procurement rates, planned total
ship procurement quantities, planned ship retirements, and resulting projected
force levels.
 Although China’s naval modernization effort has substantially improved China’s
naval capabilities, China’s navy currently is assessed as having limitations or
weaknesses in certain areas,17 including joint operations with other parts of
China’s military,18 anti-submarine warfare (ASW), long-range targeting, a limited
capacity for carrying out at-sea resupply of combatant ships operating far from
home waters,19 a limited number of overseas bases and support facilities,20 a need
to train large numbers of personnel to crew its new ships,21 and a lack of recent

14 See, for example, Roderick Lee, “The PLA Navy’s ZHANLAN Training Series: Supporting Offensive Strike on the
High Seas,” China Brief, April 13, 2020.
15 For additional discussion, see CRS Report R42784, U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
16 For additional discussion, see Ryan D. Martinson, “Deciphering China’s ‘World-class’ Naval Ambitions,” U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings, August 2020.
17 For a discussion focusing on these limitations or weaknesses, see Mike Sweeney, Assessing Chinese Maritime
Power, Defense Priorities, October 2020, 14 pp. See also Tai Ming Cheung, “Russia’s Ukraine Disaster Exposes
China’s Military Weakness,” Foreign Policy, October 24, 2022.
18 See, for example, Ben Noon and Chris Bassler, “Schrodinger’s Military? Challenges for China’s Military
Modernization Ambitions,” War on the Rocks, October 14, 2021.
19 See, for example, Will Mackenzie, “Commentary: It’s the Logistics, China,” National Defense, June 10, 2020.
20 See, for example, Kristin Huang, “Size of China’s Navy May Be Closing Gap on US Fleet But What Can the PLA
Do with Just One Overseas Naval Base?” South China Morning Post, March 14, 2021.
21 See, for example, Minnie Chan, “China’s Navy Goes Back to Work on Big Ambitions but Long-Term Gaps
Remain,” South China Morning Post, August 22, 2020.
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combat experience.22 China is working to reduce or overcome such limitations
and weaknesses.23 Although China’s navy has limitations and weaknesses, it may
nevertheless be sufficient for performing missions of interest to Chinese leaders.
As China’s navy reduces its weaknesses and limitations, it may become sufficient
to perform a wider array of potential missions.
 In addition to modernizing its navy, China has substantially increased the size
and capabilities of its coast guard. DOD states that China’s coast guard is “the
largest maritime law enforcement fleet in the world.”24 China also operates a
sizeable maritime militia that includes a large number of fishing vessels. China
relies primarily on its maritime militia and coast guard to assert and defend its

22 See, for example, Alastair Gale, “China’s Military Is Catching Up to the U.S. Is It Ready for Battle?” Wall Street
Journal, October 20, 2022; Benjamin Brimelow, “China’s Military Is Growing Rapidly, But It Hasn't Been ‘Tested’
Like US Troops Have, Former Top US Admiral Says,” Business Insider, March 29, 2022. The use of a dual command
structure in the crews of larger Chinese ships, involving both a commanding officer and a political officer, has also
been raised as a source of potential reduced command effectiveness in certain tactical situations. See “Leadership:
China Cripples Naval Officers,” Strategy Page, July 18, 2020. Some observers argue that corruption in China’s
shipbuilding companies may be a source of additional weaknesses in China’s naval modernization effort. See, for
example, Zi Yang, “The Invisible Threat to China’s Navy: Corruption,” Diplomat, May 19, 2020. See also Frank Chen,
“Ex-PLA Navy Chief in Deep Water Amid War on Graft,” Asia Times, June 26, 2020.
23 For example, China’s naval shipbuilding programs were previously dependent on foreign suppliers for some ship
components. ONI, however, states that “almost all weapons and sensors on Chinese naval ships are produced in-
country, and China no longer relies on Russia or other countries for any significant naval ship systems.” (Source:
Unclassified ONI information paper prepared for Senate Armed Services Committee, subject “UPDATED China:
Naval Construction Trends vis-à-vis U.S. Navy Shipbuilding Plans, 2020-2030,” February 2020, pp. 2-3. Provided by
Senate Armed Services Committee to CRS and CBO on March 4, 2020, and used in this CRS report with the
committee’s permission.) Regarding the ASW capabilities of China’s Navy, DOD states:
The PLAN is also improving its anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities through the
development of its surface combatants and special mission aircraft, but it continues to lack a robust
deep-water ASW capability. By prioritizing the acquisition of ASW capable surface combatants,
acoustic surveillance ships, and fixed and rotary wing ASW capable aircraft, the PLAN is
significantly improving its ASW capabilities. However, it will still require several years of training
and systems integration for the PLAN to develop a robust offensive deep water ASW capability.
(2022 DOD CMSD, p. 53.)
See also Ryan D. Martinson and Conor Kennedy, “Using the Enemy to Train the Troops—Beijing’s New Approach to
Prepare its Navy for War,” China Brief, March 25, 2022; Samuel Cranny-Evans, “China’s Maritime Surveillance
Network: Bold Moves for Ocean Dominance,” Jane’s International Defence Review, February 17, 2022; Ma Xiu and
Peter W. Singer, “How China Steals US Tech to Catch Up in Underwater Warfare,” Defense One, June 8, 2021;
Amanda Rivkin, “German Engine Technology Found in Chinese Warships—Report,” Deutsche Welle (dw.com),
November 6, 2021.
24 DOD states that
The CCG’s [China Coast Guard’s] rapid expansion and modernization has made it the largest
maritime law enforcement fleet in the world. Its newer vessels are larger and more capable than
older vessels, allowing them to operate further offshore and remain on station longer. A 2019
academic study published by the U.S. Naval War College estimates the CCG has over 140 regional
and oceangoing patrol vessels (of more than 1,000 tons displacement). Some of the vessels are
former PLAN vessels, such as corvettes, transferred to the CCG and modified for CCG operations.
The newer, larger vessels are equipped with helicopter facilities, high-capacity water cannons,
interceptor boats, and guns ranging from 20 to 76 millimeters. In addition, the same academic study
indicates the CCG operates more than 120 regional patrol combatants (500 to 999 tons), which can
be used for limited offshore operations, and an additional 450 coastal patrol craft (100 to 299 tons).
(2022 DOD CMSD, p. 78. See also 2019 DIA CMP, p. 78.)
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maritime claims in its near-seas region, with the navy operating over the horizon
as a potential backup force.25
Numbers of Ships; Comparisons to U.S. Navy
Overview
DOD states that “the PLAN is the largest navy in the world with a battle force of approximately
340 platforms, including major surface combatants, submarines, ocean-going amphibious ships,
mine warfare ships, aircraft carriers, and fleet auxiliaries.... This figure does not include
approximately 85 patrol combatants and craft that carry anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM). The
PLAN’s overall battle force is expected to grow to 400 ships by 2025 and 440 ships by 2030.
Much of this growth will be in major surface combatants.”26 DIA states that “the PLAN is rapidly
retiring older, single-mission warships in favor of larger, multimission ships equipped with
advanced antiship, antiair, and antisubmarine weapons and sensors and C2 [command and
control] facilities.”27
Ultimate Size and Composition of China’s Navy Not Publicly Known
The planned ultimate size and composition of China’s navy is not publicly known. The U.S. Navy
makes public its force-level goal and regularly releases a 30-year shipbuilding plan that shows
planned procurements of new ships, planned retirements of existing ships, and resulting projected
force levels, as well as a five-year shipbuilding plan that shows, in greater detail, the first five
years of the 30-year shipbuilding plan.28 In contrast, China does not release a navy force-level
goal or detailed information about planned ship procurement rates, planned total ship
procurement quantities, planned ship retirements, or resulting projected force levels. The ultimate
size and composition of China’s navy might be an unsettled and evolving issue among Chinese
military and political leaders. One observer states that “it seems the majority of past foreign
projections of Chinese military and Chinese navy procurement scale and speed have been
underestimates…. All military forces have a desired force requirement and a desired ‘critical
mass’ to aspire toward. Whether the Chinese navy is close to its desired force or not, is of no
small consequence.”29
Number of Ships Is a One-Dimensional Measure, but Trends in Numbers Can
Be of Value Analytically
Relative U.S. and Chinese naval capabilities are sometimes assessed by showing comparative
numbers of U.S. and Chinese ships. Although the total number of ships in a navy (or a navy’s
aggregate tonnage) is relatively easy to calculate, it is a one-dimensional measure that leaves out
numerous other factors that bear on a navy’s capabilities and how those capabilities compare to
its assigned missions. As a result, as discussed in further detail in Appendix A, comparisons of

25 For additional discussion, see 2022 DOD CMSD, pp. 79-80, and CRS Report R42784, U.S.-China Strategic
Competition in South and East China Seas: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
26 2022 DOD CMSD, p. 52. See also 2019 DIA CMP, p. 63.
27 2019 DIA CMP, p. 69.
28 For more information on the U.S. Navy’s force-level goal, 30-year shipbuilding plan, and five-year shipbuilding
plan, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress,
by Ronald O'Rourke.
29 Rick Joe, “Hints of Chinese Naval Procurement Plans in the 2020s,” Diplomat, December 25, 2020.
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the total numbers of ships in China’s navy and the U.S. Navy are highly problematic as a means
of assessing relative U.S. and Chinese naval capabilities and how those capabilities compare to
the missions assigned to the two navies. At the same time, however, an examination of trends
over time in these relative numbers of ships can shed some light on how the relative balance of
U.S. and Chinese naval capabilities might be changing over time.
Three Tables Showing Numbers of Chinese and U.S. Navy Ships
Table Showing Figures from Annual DOD Reports
Table 1 shows numbers of certain types of Chinese navy ships—those that might be thought of as
the principal combat ships of China’s navy—from 2005 to the present, along with the number of
China coast guard ships from 2017 to the present, as presented in DOD’s annual reports on
military and security developments involving China. As can be seen in Table 1, every type of
Chinese navy ship shown in the table has increased numerically since 2005.
As can be seen in Table 1, about 61% of the increase since 2005 in the total number of Chinese
navy ships shown in the table (a net increase of 83 ships out of a total net increase of 135 ships)
resulted from increases in missile-armed fast patrol craft starting in 2009 (a net increase of 33
ships) and corvettes starting in 2014 (50 ships). These are the smallest surface combatants shown
in the table. The net 33-ship increase in missile-armed fast patrol craft was due to the construction
between 2004 and 2009 of about 60 new Houbei (Type 022) fast attack craft30 and the retirement
of about 27 older fast attack craft. The 50-ship increase in corvettes is due to the Jingdao (Type
056) corvette program discussed later in this report. ONI states that “a significant portion of
China’s Battle Force consists of the large number of new corvettes and guided-missile frigates
recently built for the PLAN.”31 As can also be seen in the table, most of the remaining increase
since 2005 in the number of Chinese navy ships shown in the table is accounted for by increases
in cruisers and destroyers (21 ships) and amphibious ships (14 ships).
Table 1 lumps together less capable older Chinese ships with more capable modern Chinese
ships. In examining the numbers in the table, it can be helpful to keep in mind that for many of
the types of Chinese ships shown in the table, the percentage of the ships accounted for by more
capable modern designs was growing over time, even if the total number of ships for those types
was changing little.
For reference, Table 1 also shows the total number of ships in the U.S. Navy (known technically
as the total number of battle force ships), and compares it to the total number of the types of
Chinese ships that are shown in the table.32 The result is an apples-vs.-oranges comparison,
because the Chinese figures exclude certain ship types, such as auxiliary and support ships, while
the U.S. Navy figure includes auxiliary and support ships but excludes patrol craft. Changes over
time in this apples-vs.-oranges comparison, however, can be of value in understanding trends in
the comparative sizes of the U.S. and Chinese navies.

30 The Type 022 program was discussed in the August 1, 2018, version of this CRS report, and earlier versions.
31 Source: Unclassified ONI information paper prepared for Senate Armed Services Committee, subject “UPDATED
China: Naval Construction Trends vis-à-vis U.S. Navy Shipbuilding Plans, 2020-2030,” February 2020, p. 4. Provided
by Senate Armed Services Committee to CRS and CBO on March 4, 2020, and used in this CRS report with the
committee’s permission.
32 The DOD report generally covers events of the prior calendar year. Thus, the 2021 edition covers events during
2020, and so on for earlier years. Similarly, for the U.S. Navy figures, the 2021 column in Table 1 shows the figure for
the end of FY2020, and so on for earlier years.
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Table 1. Numbers of Certain Types of Chinese and U.S. Ships Since 2005
Figures for Chinese ships taken from annual DOD reports on military and security developments
involving China for the years 2005-2022
Total
U.S.
PLAN
vs.
ship
PLAN
Year of
types
ship
DOD
LST/
shown
U.S.
types
report
SSB
SSN
SS
CV
CG DD
FF
FFL
PC
LPD LSM to right CCG total shown
2005
1
6
51
0
0
21
43
0
51
20
23
216
n/a
292
+76
2006
1
5
50
0
0
25
45
0
45
25
25
221
n/a
281
+60
2007
1
5
53
0
0
25
47
0
41
25
25
222
n/a
281
+59
2008
1
5
54
0
0
29
45
0
45
26
28
233
n/a
279
+46
2009
2
6
54
0
0
27
48
0
70
27
28
262
n/a
282
+20
2010
2
6
54
0
0
25
49
0
85
27
28
276
n/a
285
+9
2011
2
5
49
0
0
26
53
0
86
27
28
276
n/a
288
+12
2012
2
5
48
0
0
26
53
0
86
28
23
271
n/a
284
+13
2013
3
5
49
1
0
23
52
0
85
29
26
273
n/a
287
+14
2014
3
5
51
1
0
24
49
8
85
29
28
283
n/a
285
+2
2015
4
5
53
1
0
21
52
15
86
29
28
294
n/a
289
-5
2016
4
5
57
1
0
23
52
23
86
30
22
303
n/a
271
-32
2017
4
5
54
1
0
21
56
23
88
34
21
317
185
275
-42
2018
4
5
57
1
0
28
51
28
86
33
23
306
240
279
-27
2019
4
6
50
1
0
33
54
42
86
37
22
335
248
286
-49
2020
4
6
46
2
1
32
49
49
86
37
21
333
255
290
-43
2021
6
9
56
2
1
32
48
51
86
57
348
223
296
-52
2022
6
9
56
2
6
36
45
50
84
57
351
224
294
-57
2022:
change
since
2005
+5
+3
+5
+2
+6
+15
+2
+50
+33
+14
+135
n/a
+2
-133
Sources: Table prepared by CRS based on 2005-2022 editions of annual DOD report to Congress on military
and security developments involving China (known for 2009 and prior editions as the report on China military
power), and (for U.S. Navy ships) U.S. Navy data as presented in CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and
Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
Key to abbreviations: n/a = data not available in annual DOD report. SSB = ballistic missile submarines. SSN
= nuclear-powered attack submarines. SS = diesel attack submarines. CV = aircraft carriers. CG = cruisers. DD
= destroyers. FF = frigates. FFL = corvettes (i.e., light frigates). PC = missile-armed coastal patrol craft. LST =
amphibious tank landing ship. LPD = amphibious transport dock ship. LSM = amphibious medium landing ship.
(Starting with the 2021 edition, the annual DOD report shows a combined figure for LST/LPD and LSM.)
Column for Total PLAN ship types shown to right, which shows what might be thought of as the principal
combat ships of China’s navy, does not include other PLAN ship types not shown to right, such as auxiliary and
support ships. CCG = China Coast Guard ships. U.S. total = Total U.S. Navy battle force ships, which includes
auxiliary and support ships but excludes patrol craft. U.S. vs. PLAN ship types shown = total U.S. Navy
battle force ships compared to the column for Total PLAN ship types shown to right.
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Notes: The DOD report general y covers events of the prior calendar year. Thus, the 2021 edition covers
events during 2020, and so on for earlier years. Similarly, for the U.S. Navy figures, the 2021 column shows the
figure for the end of FY2020, and so on for earlier years.
On the basis of the figures in Table 1, it might be said that in 2015, the total number of principal
combat ships in China’s navy surpassed the total number of U.S. Navy battle force ships (a figure
that includes not only the U.S. Navy’s principal combat ships, but also other U.S. Navy ships,
such as auxiliary and support ships). It is important, however, to keep in mind the differences in
composition between the two navies. The U.S. Navy, for example, has many more aircraft
carriers, nuclear-powered submarines, and cruisers and destroyers, while China’s navy has many
more diesel attack submarines, frigates, and corvettes.
Table Showing ONI Figures from February 2020
Table 2 shows comparative numbers of Chinese and U.S. battle force ships (and figures for
certain types of ships that contribute toward China’s total number of battle force ships) from 2000
to 2030, with the figures for 2025 and 2030 being projections. The figures for China’s ships are
taken from an ONI information paper of February 2020. Battle force ships are the types of ships
that count toward the quoted size of the U.S. Navy. For China, the total number of battle force
ships shown excludes the missile-armed coastal patrol craft shown in Table 1, but includes
auxiliary and support ships that are not shown in Table 1. Compared to Table 1, the figures in
Table 2 come closer to providing an apples-to-apples comparison of the two navies’ numbers of
ships, although it could be argued that China’s missile-armed coastal patrol craft can be a
significant factor for operations within the first island chain.
Table 2. Numbers of Chinese and U.S. Navy Battle Force Ships, 2000-2030
Figures for Chinese ships taken from ONI information paper of February 2020

2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
Ballistic missile submarines
1
1
3
4
4
6
8
Nuclear-powered attack submarines
5
4
5
6
7
10
13
Diesel attack submarines
56
56
48
53
55
55
55
Aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers
19
25
25
26
43
55
65
Frigates, corvettes
38
43
50
74
102
120
135
Total China navy battle force ships,
210
220
220
255
360
400
425
including types not shown above
Total U.S. Navy battle force ships
318
282
288
271
297
287
290 or 291
U.S. total above compared to China
+108
+62
+68
+16
-63
-113
-135 or -134
total above
Sources: Table prepared by CRS. Source for China’s navy: Unclassified ONI information paper prepared for
Senate Armed Services Committee, subject “UPDATED China: Naval Construction Trends vis-à-vis U.S. Navy
Shipbuilding Plans, 2020-2030,” February 2020, 4 pp. Provided by Senate Armed Services Committee to CRS and
CBO on March 4, 2020, and used in this CRS report with the committee’s permission. Figures are for end of
calendar year. Source for figures for U.S. Navy: U.S. Navy data; figures are for end of fiscal year.
Note: In the column for the year 2000, the ONI information paper showed a figure for the total number of
China navy battle force ships of 110, but the Navy later stated that this was a typo, and that the correct figure is
210.
As shown in Table 2, China’s navy surpassed the U.S. Navy in terms of total number of battle
force ships sometime between 2015 and 2020. As mentioned earlier in connection with Table 1,
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however, it is important to keep in mind the differences in composition between the two navies.
The U.S. Navy, for example, currently has many more aircraft carriers, nuclear-powered
submarines, and cruisers and destroyers, while China’s navy currently has many more diesel
attack submarines, frigates, and corvettes.
Table Showing U.S. Navy Figures from October 2020
Table 3 shows numbers of certain types of Chinese navy ships in 2020, and projections of those
numbers for 2025, 2030, and 2040, along with the total number of U.S. Navy battle force ships in
2020. The figures for China’s ships were provided by the Navy at the request of CRS. As with
Table 1, the result for 2020 is an apples-vs.-oranges comparison between the Chinese navy and
U.S. navy totals, because the Chinese total for 2020 excludes certain ship types, such as auxiliary
and support ships, while the U.S. Navy total for 2020 includes auxiliary and support ships.
Table 3. Numbers of Chinese and U.S. Navy Ships, 2020-2040
Figures for Chinese ships are from U.S. Navy, reflecting data as of October 2020
2040
change
Ship type
2020 2025
2030
2040
from 2020
Ballistic missile submarines
4
6
8
10
+6
Nuclear-powered attack submarines
6
10
14
16
+10
Diesel attack submarines
47
47
46
46
-1
Aircraft carriers
2
3
5
6
+4
Cruisers and destroyers
41
52
60
80
+39
Frigates and corvettes
102
120
135
140
+38
LHA-type amphibious assault ships
0
4
4
6
+6
LPD-type amphibious ships
7
10
14
14
+7
LST-type amphibious tank landing ships
30
24
24
15
-15
TOTAL for China of types shown above
239
276
310
333
+94
TOTAL number of U.S. Navy battle force ships
297
287
290 or 291 324 or 350
+27 or +53
U.S. total above compared to China total above
+58
+11
-20 or -19
-9 or +17
-67 or -41
Source: For Chinese navy ships: U.S. Navy data provided to CRS by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs, reflecting
data as of October 26, 2020.
Note: The figures for the U.S. Navy for 2030 and 2040 show different alternatives presented in the Navy’s
FY2023 budget submission.
As shown in Table 3, the U.S. Navy projects that between 2020 and 2040, the total number of
Chinese ships of the types shown in the table will increase by 94, or about 39%, with most of that
increase (77 ships out of 94) coming from roughly equal increases in numbers of large surface
combatants (cruisers and destroyers—39 ships) and small surface combatants (frigates and
corvettes—38 ships). Numbers of ballistic missile submarines and nuclear-powered attack
submarines are each projected to more than double between 2020 and 2040, and the total number
of diesel attack submarines is projected to remain almost unchanged. The number of large surface
combatants is projected to almost double, and the number of small surface combatants is
projected to increase by more than one-third. Numbers of larger (LHA- and LPD-type)
amphibious ships are projected to increase, and the number of smaller (LST-type) amphibious
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ships is projected to decline, with the result that the total number of amphibious ships of all kinds
is projected to decline slightly.
Selected Elements of China’s Naval Modernization Effort
This section provides a brief overview of elements of China’s naval modernization effort that
have attracted frequent attention from observers.
Anti-Ship Missiles
Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs)
China is fielding two types of land-based ballistic missiles with a capability of hitting ships at
sea—the DF-21D (Figure 1), a road-mobile anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) with a range of
more than 1,500 kilometers (i.e., more than 910 nautical miles), and the DF-26 (Figure 2), a
road-mobile, multi-role intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) with a maximum range of
about 3,000 kilometers (i.e., about 1,620 nautical miles) that DOD says “capable of conducting
both conventional and nuclear precision strikes against ground targets as well as conventional
strikes against naval targets.”33
Figure 1. DF-21D Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM)

Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying Andrew S. Erickson, “China’s DF-21D Anti-Ship Ballistic
Missile (ASBM)—Officially Revealed at 3 September Parade—Complete Open Source Research Compendium,”
AndrewErickson.com, September 10, 2015, accessed August 28, 2019.

33 2022 DOD CMSD, p. 64. A map on page 67 of the report shows the DF-26 with a range of 4,000 kilometers (about
2,160 nautical miles).
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Figure 2. DF-26 Multi-Role Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM)

Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying Missile Defense Project, “Dong Feng-26 (DF-26),”
Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 8, 2018, last modified January 15, 2019,
accessed August 28, 2019.
Until 2020, reported test flights of DF-21s and SDF-26s had not involved attempts to hit moving
ships at sea. A November 14, 2020, press report, stated that an August 2020 test firing of DF-21
and DF-26 ASBMs into the South China resulted in the missiles successfully hitting a moving
target ship south of the Paracel Islands.34 A December 3, 2020, press report stated that Admiral
Philip Davidson, the commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, “confirmed, for the first time
from the U.S. government side, that China’s People’s Liberation Army has successfully tested an
anti-ship ballistic missile against a moving ship.”35
In April 2022, it was reported that China may have developed a new type of ASBM, perhaps
designated the YJ-21, that is small enough to fit into the vertical launch tube of a surface
combatant, and that China had test fired such a weapon from a Type 055 cruiser (or large
destroyer).36
China reportedly is also developing hypersonic glide vehicles that, if incorporated into Chinese
ASBMs, could make Chinese ASBMs more difficult to intercept.37
Observers have expressed strong concerns about China’s ASBMs, because such missiles, in
combination with broad-area maritime surveillance and targeting systems, would permit China to
attack aircraft carriers, other U.S. Navy ships, or ships of allied or partner navies operating in the
Western Pacific. The U.S. Navy has not previously faced a threat from highly accurate ballistic
missiles capable of hitting moving ships at sea. For this reason, some observers have referred to
ASBMs as a “game-changing” weapon.

34 Kristin Huang, “China’s ‘Aircraft-Carrier Killer’ Missiles Successfully Hit Target Ship in South China Sea, PLA
Insider Reveals,” South China Morning Post, November 14, 2020. See also Peter Suciu, “Report: China’s ‘Aircraft-
Carrier Killer’ Missiles Hit Target Ship in August,” National Interest, November 15, 2020; Andrew Erickson, “China’s
DF-21D and DF-26B ASBMs: Is the U.S. Military Ready?” Real Clear Defense, November 16, 2020.
35 Josh Rogin, “China’s Military Expansion Will Test the Biden Administration,” Washington Post, December 3, 2020.
36 Rick Fisher, “China Deploys New Missiles Against the US Navy,” Epoch Times, April 29, 2022; Minnie Chan,
“Chinese Navy Shows Off Hypersonic Anti-Ship Missiles In Public,” South China Morning Post, April 20, 2022; Tyler
Rogoway, “Mysterious New Missile Launched By China’s Giant Type 055 Destroyer,” The Drive, April 20.
37 See, for example, Christian Davenport, “Why the Pentagon Fears the U.S. Is Losing the Hypersonic Arms Race with
Russia and China,” Washington Post, June 8, 2018; Keith Button, “Hypersonic Weapons Race,” Aerospace America,
June 2018.
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Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs)
China’s extensive inventory of anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) (see Figure 3, Figure 4, and
Figure 5 for examples of reported images) includes both Russian- and Chinese-made designs,
including some advanced and highly capable ones, such as the Chinese-made YJ-18.38
Figure 3. Reported Image of Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM)

Source: Detail of photograph accompanying Pierre Delrieu, “China Promotes Export of CM-302 Supersonic
ASCM,” Asian Military Review, July 3, 2017. (The article states “This is an article published in our December 2016
Issue.”) The article states “According to Chinese news media reports, the China Aerospace Science and Industry
Corporation (CASIC) CM-302 missile is being marketed for export as “the world’s best anti-ship missile.” The
missile was showcased at the Zhuhai air show in the southern People’s Republic of China (PRC) in early
November [2016], and is advertised as [a] supersonic Anti-Ship Missile (AShM) [ASCM] which can also be used
in the land attack role. The report, published by the national newspaper China Daily, suggest[s] that the CM-302
is the export version of CASIC’s YJ-12 supersonic AShM, which is in service with the PRC’s armed forces.”)
Although China’s ASCMs do not always receive as much press attention as China’s ASBMs
(perhaps because ASBMs are a more recent development), observers are nevertheless concerned
about them. As discussed later in this report, the relatively long ranges of certain Chinese ASCMs
have led to concerns among some observers that the U.S. Navy is not moving quickly enough to
arm U.S. Navy surface ships with similarly ranged ASCMs.
Press reports in April 2019 and December 2021 state that China might be developing a YJ-18
launcher that can be packaged inside a standard commercial shipping container, for the potential

38 2022 DOD CMSD, p. 54. See also Sam Goldsmith, Vampire Vampire Vampire, The PLA’s Anti-Ship Cruise Missile
Threat to Australian and Allied Naval Operations, Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), April 2022, 43 pp.;
Michael Peck, “Chinese Scientists Say They're Working on an Anti-Ship Missile that Can Fly as High as an Airliner
and Dive as Deep as a Submarine,” Business Insider, October 20, 2022; “China Is Developing a New Supersonic Anti-
Ship Missile,” Naval News, September 19, 2022.
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purpose of surreptitiously deploying YJ-18s on merchant ships (Figure 6),39 a capability that, if
implemented, could violate the law of naval warfare.40
Figure 4. Reported Image of Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM)

Source: Photograph accompanying “YJ-18 Eagle Strike CH-SS-NX-13,” GlobalSecurity.org, updated October 1,
2019. The article states, “A grand military parade was held in Beijing on 01 October 2019 to mark the People’s
Republic of China’s 70th founding anniversary.… One weapon featured was a new generation of anti-ship missiles
called YJ-18. China unveiled YJ-18/18A anti-ship cruise missiles in the National Day military parade in central
Beijing.”

39 See, for example, Bill Gertz, “China Building Long-Range Cruise Missile Launched From Ship Container,”
Washington Free Beacon, March 27, 2019; Alex Hollings, “China’s New Long-Range Cruise Missiles Are Built to be
Fired from Containers on Merchant Ships,” SOFREP (Special Operations Forces Report), April 4, 2019; “China Is
Building Long-Range Cruise Missiles Launched from Ship Containers,” Navy Recognition, April 8, 2019; Rajesh
Uppal, “Threat of Concealed Weapon and Missiles Systems on Standard International Shipping Container,”
International Defense, Security & Technology, October 20, 2021; Tariq Tahir, “China Feared to be Hiding Missiles in
Shipping Containers for Trojan Horse-Style Plan to Launch Attack Anywhere in World,” U.S. Sun, December 6, 2021.
See also Fan Wei and Cao Siqi, “China Debuts Container-Type Missile Launch System; Weapon Can ‘Effectively
Improve Defense Capabilities of Coastal Countries,’” Global Times, November 12, 2022.
40 Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, “China’s Container Missile Deployments Could Violate the Law of Naval Warfare,”
International Law Studies (U.S. Naval War College), vol. 97, 2021: 1160-1170.
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Figure 5. Reported Image of Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM)

Source: Dennis M. Gormley, Andrew S. Erickson, and Jingdong Yuan, A Low-Visibility Force Multiplier, Assessing
China’s Cruise Missile Ambitions, Published by National Defense University Press for the Center for the Study of
Chinese Military Affairs, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Washington, DC, 2014. The image appears on an
unnumbered page fol owing page 14. The caption to the photograph states, “YJ-83A/C-802A ASCM on display at
2008 Zhuhai Airshow.” The photograph is credited to Associated Press/Wide World Photos.
Figure 6. Illustration of Reported Potential Containerized ASCM Launcher

Source: Il ustration accompanying Tariq Tahir, “China Feared to be Hiding Missiles in Shipping Containers for
Trojan Horse-Style Plan to Launch Attack Anywhere in World,” U.S. Sun, December 6, 2021.
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Submarines
Overview
China has been steadily modernizing its submarine force, and most of its submarines are now
built to relatively modern Chinese and Russian designs.41 Qualitatively, China’s newest
submarines might not be as capable as Russia’s newest submarines,42 but compared to China’s
earlier submarines, which were built to antiquated designs, its newer submarines are much more
capable.
Types and Numbers
Most of China’s submarines are non-nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSs). China also
operates a small number of nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) and a small number of
nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). The number of SSNs and SSBNs may
grow in coming years, but the force will likely continue to consist mostly of SSs. DOD states that
“the PLAN has placed a high priority on modernizing its submarine force, but its force structure
continues to grow modestly as it works to mature its force, integrate new technologies, and
expand its shipyards.... The PLAN will likely maintain between 65 and 70 submarines through
the 2020s, replacing older units with more capable units on a near one-to-one basis.”43
ONI states that “China’s submarine force continues to grow at a low rate, though with
substantially more-capable submarines replacing older units. Current expansion at submarine
production yards could allow higher future production numbers.” ONI projects that China’s
submarine force will grow from a total of 66 boats (4 SSBNs, 7 SSNs, and 55 SSs) in 2020 to 76
boats (8 SSBNs, 13 SSNs, and 55 SSs) in 2030.44 A November 27, 2022, press report states: “The
dry-docks at China’s nuclear submarine facility at Huludao, Liaoning province, show increased
activity. New construction halls are primed. Another dry dock is ready to go. International
analysts point to this as evidence Beijing is gearing up for the mass production of a new
generation of nuclear-powered attack and ballistic missile submarines.”45

41 For a discussion of Russian military transfers to China, including transfers of submarine technology, see Paul
Schwartz, The Changing Nature and Implications of Russian Military Transfers to China, Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS), June 2021, 8 pp.
42 Observers have sometimes characterized Russia’s submarines as being the most capable faced by the U.S. Navy. See,
for example, Joe Gould and Aaron Mehta, “US Could Lose a Key Weapon for Tracking Chinese and Russian Subs,”
Defense News, May 1, 2019; Dave Majumdar, “Why the U.S. Navy Fears Russia’s Submarines,” National Interest,
October 12, 2018; John Schaus, Lauren Dickey, and Andrew Metrick, “Asia’s Looming Subsurface Challenge,” War
on the Rocks, August 11, 2016; Paul McLeary, “Chinese, Russian Subs Increasingly Worrying the Pentagon,” Foreign
Policy, February 24, 2016; Dave Majumdar, “U.S. Navy Impressed with New Russian Attack Boat,” USNI News,
October 28, 2014.
43 2022 DOD CMSD, p. 52.
44 Source: Unclassified ONI information paper prepared for Senate Armed Services Committee, subject “UPDATED
China: Naval Construction Trends vis-à-vis U.S. Navy Shipbuilding Plans, 2020-2030,” February 2020, p. 1. Provided
by Senate Armed Services Committee to CRS and CBO on March 4, 2020, and used in this CRS report with the
committee’s permission. See also H. I. Sutton, “China Increases Production Of AIP Submarines With Massive New
Shipyard,” Naval News, February 16, 2021; H. I. Sutton, “First Image Of China’s New Nuclear Submarine Under
Construction,” Naval News, February 1, 2021.
45 Jamie Seidel, “Satellite Photos Reveal China’s Hypocrisy After Dig to Australia,” News.com.au, November 27,
2022.
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China’s newest series-built SS design is the Yuan-class (Type 039) SS (Figure 7), its newest SSN
class is the Shang-class (Type 093) SSN (Figure 8), and its newest SSBN class is the Jin (Type
094) class SSBN (Figure 9).
Figure 7. Yuan (Type 039) Attack Submarine (SS)

Source: Photograph accompanying “Type 039A Yuan class,” SinoDefence.com, July 10, 2018, accessed August
28, 2019.
Figure 8. Shang (Type 093) Attack Submarine (SSN)

Source: Photograph accompanying SinoDefence.com, “Type 093 Shang Class,” July 1, 2018, accessed August 27,
2019, at http://sinodefence.com/type093_shang-class/.
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Figure 9. Jin (Type 094) Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN)

Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying Minnie Chan, “China Puts a Damper on Navy’s 70th
Anniversary Celebrations As It Tries to Al ay Fears Over Rising Strength,” South China Morning Post, April 23,
2019. The article credits the photograph to Xinhua.
DOD states that
the PRC continues to increase its inventory of conventional submarines capable of firing
advanced anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM). Between the mid-1990s and mid-2000s, the
PLAN purchased 12 Russian-built KILO class SS units, eight of which are capable of
launching ASCMs. China’s shipyards have delivered 13 SONG class SS (Type 039) and
17 YUAN class diesel-electric air-independent propulsion attack submarine[s] (SSP)
(Type 039A/B). The PRC is expected to produce a total of 25 or more YUAN class
submarines by 2025. In late 2021, the PLAN retired the first two KILO-class submarines
purchased from Russia in the 1990s.46
DOD states further that
Over the past 15 years, the PLAN has constructed twelve nuclear submarines—two
SHANG I class SSNs (Type 093), four SHANG II class SSNs (Type 093A), and six JIN
class SSBNs (Type 094). Equipped with the CSS-N-14 (JL-2) submarine-launched ballistic
missile (SLBM) (7,200KM), the PLAN’s six operational JIN class SSBNs represent the
PRC’s first credible sea-based nuclear deterrent.
By the mid-2020s, the PRC will likely build the SHANG class (Type 093B) guided-missile
nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSGN). This new SHANG class variant will enhance
the PLAN’s anti-surface warfare capability and could provide a clandestine land-attack
option if equipped with land-attack cruise missiles (LACM).47

46 2022 DOD CMSD, pp. 52-53.
47 2022 DOD CMSD, p. 53.
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In February 2022, the first of a new class of SS, smaller than the Yuan design, was reported, but it
is not clear whether this design is intended for China’s navy, for export to other countries, or
both.48
A May 16, 2022, press report states
A submarine seen in a satellite photo of a Chinese shipyard shows what could be a new
class or subtype of a nuclear-powered attack sub with a new stealthy propulsion system
and launch tubes for cruise missiles.
The satellite photo of the shipyard at Huludao in Liaoning province, northern China, which
was provided to Defense News by Planet Labs, was taken May 3 and shows a submarine
on a drydock.
The unidentified boat’s presence at the yard was first noted in an April 29 satellite image
by geospatial intelligence outfit AllSource Analysis. The organization said the submarine
is possibly a new class undergoing construction by China.49
Submarine Weapons
China’s submarines are armed with one or more of the following: ASCMs, wire-guided and
wake-homing torpedoes, and mines. Wake-homing torpedoes can be very difficult for surface
ships to decoy. DOD states that each Jin-class SSBN is equipped to carry 12 JL-2 or JL-3 nuclear-
armed submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).50 The JL-3 is a new SLBM with a range
longer than that of the JL-2. A May 2, 2021, press report stated that China’s latest Jin-class SSBN
is armed with JL-3s.51

48 H. I. Sutton, “China’s New Submarine Is Unlike Anything In Western Navies,” Naval News, February 15, 2022;
Gabriel Honrada, “China Offers a Glimpse of New Type Mini-Submarine,” Asia Times, February 10, 2022.
49 Mike Yeo, “Satellite Photo Shows Possible New Chinese Nuclear Submarine Able to Launch Cruise Missiles,”
Defense News, May 16, 2022. See also Gabriel Honrada, “Satellite Reveals China’s New Nuclear Attack Sub,” Asia
Times, May 16, 2022; John Feng, “China’s New Nuclear Submarine May Just Have Been Revealed,” Newsweek, May
10, 2022; Greg Torode, “Satellite Images Raise Prospect of New Class of Chinese Submarine,” Reuters, May 10, 2022.
50 2022 DOD CMSD, pp. 94, 96. DOD estimates the range of the JL-2 at 7,200 km (2022 DOD CMSD, p. 53). Such a
range could permit Jin-class SSBNs to attack targets in Alaska (except the Alaskan panhandle) from protected bastions
close to China, targets in Hawaii (as well as targets in Alaska, except the Alaskan panhandle) from locations south of
Japan, targets in the western half of the 48 contiguous states (as well as Hawaii and Alaska) from mid-ocean locations
west of Hawaii, or targets in all 50 states from mid-ocean locations east of Hawaii. DOD states that
The current range limitations of the JL-2 will require the JIN to operate in areas north and east of
Hawaii if the PRC seeks to target the east coast of the United States. The fielding of newer, more
capable, and longer ranged SLBMs such as the JL-3 gives the PLAN the ability to target the
continental United States from littoral waters[,] allowing the PLAN to consider bastion operations
to enhance the survivability of its sea-based deterrent. The South China Sea and Bohai Gulf are
probably the PRC’s preferred options for employing this concept.
(2022 DOD CMSD, p. 96.)
See also Kyle Mizokami, “China’s New Submarine-Launched Missile Can Reach the Western U.S., The JL-3 Nuclear-
Tipped Missile Can Only Hit About a Third of the United States, But It’s Enough,” Popular Mechanics, November 28,
2022.
51 Minnie Chan, “China’s New Nuclear Submarine Missiles Expand Range in US: Analysts,” South China Morning
Post, May 2, 2021. The article states that the JL-3 has a “range [of] over 10,000km (6,200 miles), a source close to the
[Chinese] navy said.” Such a range could permit Jin-class SSBNs to attack larger portions of the United States from the
locations described in the previous footnote.
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Aircraft Carriers
Overview52
China’s first aircraft carrier, Liaoning (Type 001) (Figure 10), entered service in 2012. China’s
second aircraft carrier (and its first fully indigenously built carrier), Shandong (Type 002) (Figure
11) entered service on December 17, 2019. Liaoning and Shandong launch fixed-wing aircraft
using a “ski ramp” at the ship’s bow.
Figure 10. Liaoning (Type 001) Aircraft Carrier

Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying China Power Team, “How Does China’s First Aircraft
Carrier Stack Up?” China Power (Center for Strategic and International Studies), December 9, 2015, updated
December 14, 2018, accessed August 28, 2019.
Compared with Liaoning and Shandong, U.S. Navy aircraft carriers are larger (about 100,000
tons full load displacement), nuclear powered (giving them greater cruising endurance than a
conventionally powered ship), able to embark and operate a larger number of aircraft (60 or
more), and launch fixed-wing aircraft using catapults, which can give those aircraft a
range/payload capability greater than that of aircraft launched with a ski ramp.
China’s third carrier, Fujian (Type 003) (Figure 12, Figure 13, and Figure 14), was launched
(i.e., put into the water for the final stages of its construction) in on June 17, 2022.53 ONI expects

52 For an article providing a review of developments in China’s aircraft carrier and carrier-based aircraft programs, see
Rick Joe, “003 and More: An Update on China’s Aircraft Carriers,” Diplomat, September 29, 2020. Consistent with the
discussion in that article, this CRS report uses the following updated designations of China’s carriers: China’s second
aircraft carrier, previously referred to as the Type 001A, is now referred to as the Type 002; the next aircraft carrier
design after that, previously referred to as the Type 002, is now referred to as the Type 003, and the potential design
that could follow, previously referred to as the Type 003, is now referred to as the Type 004.
53 See, for example, Alexandra Stevenson, “China Launches Third Aircraft Carrier in Major Milestone for Xi Jinping,”
New York Times, June 17, 2022; Chun Han Wong, “China Launches Third Aircraft Carrier, Advancing Naval
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the ship to enter service by 2024.54 The ship is expected to be conventionally powered, closer in
size to U.S. Navy aircraft carriers, and equipped with catapults rather than a ski ramp for
launching aircraft. China’s fourth carrier reportedly may have begun construction as early as
2021.55
Figure 11. Shandong (Type 002) Aircraft Carrier

Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying Daniel Brown, “China’s Newest Aircraft Carrier Is
Actually Very Outdated—But Its Next One Should Worry the US Navy A Lot,” Business Insider, July 18, 2018.
The article credits the photograph to Reuters.
Observers have speculated that China may eventually field a force of four to six (or possibly more
than six) aircraft carriers. In late November 2019, it was reported that the Chinese government,
while deciding to proceed with the construction of the fourth carrier, had put on hold plans to
build a fifth carrier, known as the Type 004, which was to be nuclear-powered, due to budgetary
and technical considerations.56 Observers expect that it will be some time before China masters
carrier-based aircraft operations on a substantial scale.
Liaoning (Type 001)
Liaoning is a refurbished ex-Ukrainian aircraft carrier that China purchased from Ukraine in 1998
as an unfinished ship.57 It is conventionally powered, has an estimated full load displacement of
60,000 to 66,000 tons, and reportedly can accommodate an air wing of 30 or more fixed-wing

Ambitions,” Wall Street Journal, June 17, 2022; Jack Lau, “China Launches Fujian, PLA Navy’s 3rd Aircraft Carrier,”
South China Morning Post, June 17, 2022.
54 Source: Unclassified ONI information paper prepared for Senate Armed Services Committee, subject “UPDATED
China: Naval Construction Trends vis-à-vis U.S. Navy Shipbuilding Plans, 2020-2030,” February 2020, p. 4. Provided
by Senate Armed Services Committee to CRS and CBO on March 4, 2020, and used in this CRS report with the
committee’s permission.
55 Minnie Chan, “Chinese Navy Set to Build Fourth Aircraft Carrier, but Plans for a More Advanced Ship Are Put on
Hold,” South China Morning Post, November 28, 2019.
56 Minnie Chan, “Chinese Navy Set to Build Fourth Aircraft Carrier, but Plans for a More Advanced Ship Are Put on
Hold,” South China Morning Post, November 28, 2019. See also Steven Stashwick, “Technical Problems, Slowing
Economy Cut China’s Carrier Ambitions,” Diplomat, December 4, 2019; Sebastien Roblin, “China Cancels Plans for
Two Nuclear-Powered Super Aircraft Carriers,” National Interest, December 7, 2019; Minnie Chan, “China’s Navy is
Being Forced to Rethink Its Spending Plans as Cost of Trade War Rises,” South China Morning Post, May 26, 2019.
57 Prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, Ukraine was a part of the Soviet Union and the place
where the Soviet Union built its aircraft carriers.
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airplanes and helicopters, including 24 fighters. The Liaoning lacks aircraft catapults and instead
launches fixed-wing airplanes off the ship’s bow using an inclined ski ramp.
Figure 12. Fujian (Type 003) Aircraft Carrier

Source: Photograph accompanying Brad Lendon, “Never Mind China’s New Aircraft Carrier, These Are the
Ships the US Should Worry About,” CNN, June 26, 2022.
Some observers have referred to the Liaoning as China’s “starter” carrier. China has been using
Liaoning in part for pilot training. In May 2018, China reportedly announced that the aircraft
carrier group formed around Liaoning had reached initial operational capability (IOC),58 although
that term might not mean the same as it does when used by DOD in connection with U.S. weapon
systems.
Shandong (Type 002)
Shandong is a modified version of the Liaoning design that incorporates some design
improvements, including features that reportedly will permit it to embark and operate a larger air
wing of 40 aircraft that includes 36 fighters.59 Its displacement is estimated at 66,000 to 70,000
tons.

58 Andrew Tate, “Liaoning Carrier Group Reaches Initial Operational Capability, IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly, June 4,
2018. See also Travis Fedschun, “China Says Carrier Group Reaches ‘Initial’ Combat Capability,” Fox News, May 31,
2018; “China’s First Aircraft Carrier Formation Capable of Systemic Combat Operation,” CGTV.com, May 31, 2018;
Global Times, “Chinese Aircraft Carrier Forming All-Weather Combat Capability with Successful Night Takeoff and
Landing,” People’s Daily Online, May 29, 2018.
59 See, for example, Liu Xuanzun, “China’s Second Aircraft Carrier Can Carry 50% More Fighter Jets Than Its First,”
Global Times, August 13, 2019; Liu Zhen, “China’s New Aircraft Carrier to Pack More Jet Power Than the Liaoning,”
South China Morning Post, August 15, 2019.
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Figure 13. Fujian (Type 003) Aircraft Carrier

Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying Minnie Chan, “China’s Fujian aircraft carrier doesn’t
have radar and weapon systems yet, photos show,” South China Morning Post, July 19, 2022.
Fujian (Type 003)
Earlier press reports had generally stated that Fujian might have a displacement of 80,000 tons to
85,000 tons. A November 29, 2020, press report, however, stated that satellite images of the ship
under construction suggest that this estimate may be a bit low, and that Fujian might be closer in
displacement to U.S. Navy aircraft carriers, which have a displacement of about 100,000 tons.60
Fujian is expected to be equipped with electromagnetic catapults rather than a ski ramp, which
will improve the range/payload capability of the fixed-wing aircraft that they operate.
China’s Fourth Carrier
A May 1, 2022, press report states, “Recent images of a stealth fighter jet at a naval airbase
suggest China has begun pilot training preparations for a fourth aircraft carrier, defence experts
say.”61 Some sources have stated that China’s fourth aircraft carrier would be built to the Type

60 See, for example, H. I. Sutton, “China’s New Super Carrier: How It Compares To The US Navy’s Ford Class,”
Naval News, July 2, 2021; H. I. Sutton, “China’s New Aircraft Carrier Is In Same League As US Navy’s Ford Class,”
Naval News, April 15, 2021. See also Ryan Pickrell, “Satellite Photos Show China’s New Aircraft Carrier Coming
Together Quickly and Reveal More About its Design,” Business Insider, July 20, 2021.
61 Minnie Chan, “Is China Ready for Aircraft Carrier No 4? Talk Swirls Over Stealth Fighter Jets at PLA Naval Base,”
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003 design. Press reports from October 10, 2022, and March 13, 2021, however, suggest that the
ship may be nuclear-powered rather than conventionally powered.62
Figure 14. Fujian (Type 003) Aircraft Carrier

Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying David Rising and Ken Moritsugu, “China Launches High-
Tech Aircraft Carrier in Naval Milestone,” Associated Press, June 17, 2022. The caption to the photograph
states, “This satellite image from Planet Labs PBC shows China’s new Type 003 aircraft carrier with bunting on
its desk preparing to be launched Wednesday, June 15, 2022, from a shipyard in Shanghai, China. China on
Friday, June 17, 2022, launched its third aircraft carrier, the first such ship to be designed and built entirely within
the country. (Planet Labs PBC via AP)”

South China Morning Post, May 1, 2022.
62 Gabriel Honrada, “China’s Next Aircraft Carrier Likely to Be Nuclear,” Asia Times, October 10, 2022; Minnie Chan,
“Chinese Military: Fourth Aircraft Carrier Likely to Be Nuclear Powered, Sources Say,” South China Morning Post,
March 13, 2021. See also EurAsian Times Desk, “China Aims To Deploy First-Ever ‘Nuclear-Powered Aircraft
Carrier’ By 2025–Reports,” EurAsian Times, March 13, 2021.
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Possible Type 076 Catapult-Equipped Amphibious Assault Ship
See also the discussion of the possible catapult-equipped Type 076 amphibious assault ship
(Figure 26 and Figure 27) in the section on China’s amphibious ships.
Commercial Heavy-Lift Ship Reportedly Used in Exercise as Helicopter Carrier
In August 2020, it was reported that China had used a commercial heavy-lift ship in a military
exercise as a platform for operating at least two PLA Army helicopters.63
Carrier-Based Aircraft64
China’s primary carrier-based fighter aircraft is the J-15 or Flying Shark (Figure 15 and Figure
16), an aircraft derived from the Russian Su-33 Flanker aircraft design that can operate from
carriers equipped with a ski ramp rather than catapults, but which some observers have critiqued
for its range/payload limitations in operations from carriers equipped with ski ramps rather than
catapults.65 December 2021 press reports stated that China has developed an upgraded, catapult-
capable version of the J-15 that could have improved range/payload when operated from a
catapult-equipped carrier.66
China reportedly plans to develop a carrier-capable variant of its J-20 fifth-generation stealth
fighter and/or a carrier-capable variant of its FC-31/J-31 fifth-generation stealth fighter to
complement or succeed the J-15 on catapult-equipped Chinese carriers.67 China reportedly is also

63 David Axe, “Surprise! The Chinese Navy Just Transformed This Cargo Ship Into An Instant Helicopter Carrier,”
Forbes, August 22, 2020; Dave Makichuk, “PLA Army Tests Commercial Ships as Wartime Flight Decks,” Asia
Times, August 25, 2020; John Dotson, “Semi-Submersible Heavy Lift Vessels: A New “Maritime Relay Platform” for
PLA Cross-Strait Operations?” Jamestown Foundation, August 31, 2020.
64 For an overview of PLA naval aviation forces, see “PLA Navy Aerospace Forces” in PLA Aerospace Power: A
Primer on Trends in China’s Military Air, Space, and Missile Forces, 3rd Edition, Air University, China Aerospace
Studies Institute (CASI), undated, posted August 15, 2022, pp. 38-52.
65 For a discussion of the J-15, see, for example, Rick Joe, “China’s J-15 Carrierborne Fighter: Sizing up the
Competition,” Diplomat, May 20, 2021.
66 Andreas Rupprecht Mainz and Jon Grevatt, “Shenyang Produces First Catapult-Capable J-15,” Jane’s Defence
Weekly, December 16, 2021; David Axe, “China’s Next Carrier Fighter Is A Lighter, Meaner J-15,” Forbes, December
20, 2021.
67 See 2022 DOD CMSD, p. 60; Daniel Salisbury, PRC Navy Likely Testing Carrier-Based Stealth Fighters, China
Aerospace Studies Institute, January 2022, 3 pp.; Mike Yeo, “New Variants of Chinese Stealth Fighters Break Cover,”
Defense News, October 29, 2021; Ryan Pickrell, “China Is Working on a Next-Generation Fighter Jet for Its Growing
Fleet of Aircraft Carriers and Could Unveil It This Year,” Business Insider, September 30, 2021; Zhao Lei, “New
AVIC Fighter Jet to Appear ‘Before Year’s End,’” China Daily, September 30, 2021; Reuben Johnson, “China’s J-35
Carrier Fighter Appears; Step To ‘Most Powerful Navy’?” Breaking Defense, July 1, 2021; Reuben Johnson, “COVID,
Hacking, and Spying Helped China Develop a New Stealth Fighter in Record Time,” Bulwark, June 23, 2021; Mike
Yeo, “Stealth Fighter Mock-up Appears at China’s Aircraft Carrier Testing Facility,” Defense News, June 9, 2021; H. I.
Sutton, “First Sighting Of New Stealth Fighter For Chinese Navy’s Aircraft Carriers,” Naval News, June 8, 2021; Rick
Joe, “The FC-31, China’s ‘Other’ Stealth Fighter, A Look at the Jet with Many Names—and Its Carrier-Based Future,”
Diplomat, February 18, 2021; Kris Osborn, “Is China Building Its Own F-35 Fighter Jets for its Aircraft Carriers?”
National Interest, July 3, 2020; Caleb Larson, “FC-31: China’s Next Carrier Jet is Stolen and Stealthy,” National
Interest, April 18, 2020; Sebastien Roblin, “China’s New Aircraft Carriers Are Getting Stealth Fighters,” National
Interest, October 26, 2019; Rick Joe, “Beyond China’s J-20 Stealth Fighter,” Diplomat, September 20, 2019; Minnie
Chan, “China’s Navy ‘Set to Pick J-20 Stealth Jets for Its Next Generation Carriers,’” South China Morning Post,
August 27, 2019. See also Thomas Newdick, “New Images Of China’s Elusive Catapult-Capable J-15T Carrier Fighter
Emerge,” The Drive, November 18, 2020.
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developing a carrier-based airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft, called the KJ-600, that is
similar to the U.S. Navy’s carrier-based E-2 Hawkeye AEW aircraft,68 and stealth drone aircraft.69
Figure 15. J-15 Flying Shark Carrier-Capable Fighter

Source: Photograph accompanying “China Developing Elite New Variants of the J-15 Flying Shark to Deploy
from EMALS Equipped Future Carriers; Implications for the Balance of Power at Sea,” Military Watch Magazine,
August 17, 2018, accessed August 28, 2019.
Roles and Missions
Although aircraft carriers might have some value for China in Taiwan-related conflict scenarios,
they are not considered critical for Chinese operations in such scenarios, because Taiwan is within
range of land-based Chinese aircraft. Consequently, most observers believe that China is
acquiring carriers primarily for their value in other kinds of operations, and to demonstrate
China’s status as a leading regional power and major world power. Chinese aircraft carriers could
be used for power-projection operations, particularly in scenarios that do not involve opposing
U.S. forces, and to impress or intimidate foreign observers.70

68 2022 DOD CMSD, p. 55. See also, for example, Liu Zhen, “China’s Military Steps Up Development of Ship-Based
Warplanes to Keep Up with Aircraft Carrier Advances,” South China Morning Post, July 30, 2022; Liu Xuanzun,
“China’s First Carrier-Based Early Warning Plane Continues Flight Tests: Report,” Global Times, February 22, 2021;
H. I. Sutton, “First Image Of China’s New Carrier-Based AEW Plane,” Forbes, August 29, 2020; Liu Xuanzun,
“China’s First Carrier-Based, Fixed-Wing Early Warning Aircraft Makes Maiden Flight: Reports,” Global Times,
September 1, 2020; Peter Suciu, “The Xian KJ-600 Could Make China’s Aircraft Carriers Far More Powerful,”
National Interest, September 5, 2020; Kris Osborn, “KJ-600: China’s New Surveillance Plane Will Make Their
Aircraft Carriers Even More Deadly,” National Interest, September 8, 2020.
69 Minnie Chan, “China to Deploy Sharp Sword Stealth Drone for New Type 001A Aircraft Carrier,” South China
Morning Post, September 17, 2019. See also Joseph Trevithick, “Chinese Aircraft Carrier Seen With A Fleet Of
Drones On Its Deck,” The Drive, June 2, 2022.
70 For a discussion, see, for example, Bryan McGrath and Seth Cropsey, “The Real Reason China Wants Aircraft
Carriers, China’s Carrier Plans Target U.S. Alliances, Not Its Navy,” Real Clear Defense (www.realcleardefense.com),
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Figure 16. J-15 Flying Shark Carrier-Capable Fighter

Source: Photograph accompanying Mike Yeo, “Footage Shows Domestic Engine on China’s J-15 Fighter Jet,”
Defense News, November 28, 2022. The article credits the photograph to the Chinese Defense Ministry.
Chinese aircraft carriers could also be used for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
(HA/DR) operations, maritime security operations (such as antipiracy operations), and
noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs). Politically, aircraft carriers could be particularly
valuable to China for projecting an image of China as a major world power, because aircraft
carriers are viewed by many as symbols of major world power status. In a combat situation
involving opposing U.S. naval and air forces, Chinese aircraft carriers would be highly vulnerable
to attack by U.S. ships and aircraft, but conducting such attacks could divert U.S. ships and
aircraft from performing other missions in a conflict situation with China.
Surface Combatants
Overview
China since the early 1990s has put into service numerous new classes of indigenously built
surface combatants, including a new cruiser (or large destroyer), several classes of destroyers and
frigates, a new class of corvettes (i.e., light frigates), and a new class of missile-armed patrol
craft.

April 10, 2014; Sebastien Roblin, “All of the Reasons Why the World Should Fear China’s Aircraft Carriers,” National
Interest, October 24, 2017.
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These new classes of surface combatants demonstrate a significant modernization of PLA Navy
surface combatant technology. DOD states that China’s navy “remains engaged in a robust
shipbuilding program for surface combatants. At the close of 2021, the PLAN was building an
aircraft carrier, a new batch of guided-missile destroyers (DDG), and a new batch of guided
missile frigates (FFG). These assets will significantly upgrade the PLAN’s air defense, anti-ship,
and anti-submarine capabilities, and will be critical as the PLAN expands its operations beyond
the range of the PLA’s shore-based air defense systems.”71 DIA states that “the era of past designs
has given way to production of modern multimission destroyer, frigate, and corvette classes as
China’s technological advancement in naval design has begun to approach a level commensurate
with, and in some cases exceeding, that of other modern navies.”72 China is also upgrading its
older surface combatants with new weapons and other equipment.73
Type 055 Cruiser/Large Destroyer
China is building a new class of cruiser (or large destroyer), called the Renhai-class or Type 055
(Figure 17, Figure 18, and Figure 19), that reportedly displaces between 12,000 and 13,000
tons.74 A March 7, 2021, press report by a Chinese media outlet states that the ship displaces more
than 12,000 tons.75 By way of comparison, the U.S. Navy’s Ticonderoga (CG-47) class cruisers
and Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyers (aka the U.S. Navy’s Aegis cruisers and destroyers)
displace about 10,100 tons and 9,700 tons, respectively, while the U.S. Navy’s three Zumwalt
(DDG-1000) class destroyers displace about 15,700 tons.
Figure 17. Renhai (Type 055) Cruiser (or Large Destroyer)

Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying Marielle Descalsota, “Take a Look at China’s Biggest
Destroyer, a $920 Mil ion Cruiser That’s Said to Be the 2nd Most Powerful in the World after the USS Zumwalt,”
Business Insider, June 22, 2022. The photograph is credited to Sun Zifa/China News Service/Getty Images.

71 2022 DOD CMSD, p. 53.
72 2019 DIA CMP, p. 70.
73 See, for example, H. I. Sutton, “China Increases Potency Of Anti-Carrier Capabilities,” Forbes, May 1, 2020; Peter
Suciu, “Chinese Warships Are Now Armed with Supersonic Anti-Ship Missiles,” National Interest, May 10, 2020.
74 One article from a Chinse media outlet, for example, states, “This ship class has a displacement of more than 12,000
tons.” (Liu Xuanzun, “Chinese PLA’s Two Newly Commissioned Large Destroyers ‘Ready for Combat’ with Latest
Drills,” Global Times, August 22, 2022.) See also China Daily, “2nd Type 055 Destroyer Enters Service,” People’s
Daily Online, March 10, 2021.) For a discussion of the Type 055 design, see Sidharth Kaushal, “The Type 055: A
Glimpse into the PLAN’s Developmental Trajectory,” Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), October 19, 2020.
75 Liu Xuanzun, “China’s 2nd Type 055 Large Destroyer Enters Naval Service,” Global Times, March 7, 2021.
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Figure 18. Renhai (Type 055) Cruiser (or Large Destroyer)

Source: Photograph accompanying Peter Suciu, “Chinese Navy to Launch 8th New Type 055 ‘Stealth’
Destroyer,” National Interest, August 22, 2020. The article credits the photograph to “Chinese Internet.”
Figure 19. Renhai (Type 055) Cruiser (or Large Destroyer)
Unofficial illustration by Naval News

Source: Il ustration accompanying H. I. Sutton, “Bigger Than A U.S. Navy AEGIS Cruiser: China Is Building More
Type-055s,” Naval News, January 12, 2022.
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ONI states that Type 055 ships are being built by two shipyards.76 The first was reportedly
commissioned into service in January 2020.77 A total of six were reportedly in service as of
August 2022.78 In August 2020, it was reported that the seventh was delivered to the navy in May
2020,79 and that the eighth was launched on August 30, 2020,80 and “will complete the first group
of Type 055 destroyers.”81 DOD states that the fourth was commissioned in December 2021 and
that “the remaining four” would likely be commissioned during 2022.82 A January 2022 press
report stated that in addition to the first eight ships, at least two more are under construction.83
Type 052 Destroyer
China since the early 1990s has put into service multiple new classes of indigenously built
destroyers, the most recent of which is the Luyang III (Type 052D) class (Figure 20), which
displaces about 7,500 tons and is equipped with phased-array radars and vertical launch missile
systems that outwardly are broadly similar to those on U.S. Navy cruisers and destroyers. Type
052D ships have been in serial production for some time; an August 21, 2022, press report states
that 25 of the ships are in service and at least six more are under construction at the two shipyards
that build Type 052 destroyers.84 Press reports in March 2021 stated that China is now

76 Source: Unclassified ONI information paper prepared for Senate Armed Services Committee, subject “UPDATED
China: Naval Construction Trends vis-à-vis U.S. Navy Shipbuilding Plans, 2020-2030,” February 2020, p. 4. Provided
by Senate Armed Services Committee to CRS and CBO on March 4, 2020, and used in this CRS report with the
committee’s permission.
77 Liu Xuanzun, “China’s 2nd Type 055 Large Destroyer Enters Naval Service,” Global Times, March 7, 2021. See also
China Daily, “2nd Type 055 Destroyer Enters Service,” People’s Daily Online, March 10, 2021; Xavier Vavasseur,
“China’s 2nd Type 055 Destroyer ‘Lhasa’ 拉萨 Commissioned With PLAN,” Naval News, March 7, 2021; Xavier
Vavasseur, “China Commissions A Type 055 DDG, A Type 075 LHD And A Type 094 SSBN In A Single Day,”
Naval News, April 24, 2021.
78 Liu Xuanzun, “Chinese PLA’s Two Newly Commissioned Large Destroyers ‘Ready for Combat’ with Latest Drills,”
Global Times, August 22, 2022.
79 Minnie Chan, “Chinese Navy May Launch Eighth Type 055 Stealth Destroyer Later This Year,” South China
Morning Post, August 20, 2020.
80 Liu Xuanzun, “PLA Launches New Type 055, Type 052D Destroyers After Decommissioning All Type 051
Destroyers: Reports,” Global Times, August 30, 2020.
81 Minnie Chan, “Chinese Navy May Launch Eighth Type 055 Stealth Destroyer Later This Year,” South China
Morning Post, August 20, 2020. See also Peter Suciu, “Chinese Navy to Launch 8th New Type 055 ‘Stealth’
Destroyer,” National Interest, August 22, 2020. A November 18, 2020, press report that cited a November 16, 2020,
Chinese-language press report stated that “China’s Type 055 destroyer is equipped with a microwave anti-missile
system which can disable the electronic equipment of incoming enemy aircraft and missiles, and even burn the enemy’s
pilots.” (“China Uses Microwave Weapons against India,” Chinascope, November 18, 2020, which cited the following
as its source: “Lianhe Zaobao, November 16, 2020, https://www.zaobao.com.sg/realtime/china/story20201116-
1101404.”)
82 2022 DOD CMSD, pp. 53-54.
83 H. I. Sutton, “Bigger Than A U.S. Navy AEGIS Cruiser: China Is Building More Type-055s,” Naval News, January
12, 2022.
84 Xavier Vavasseur, “Five Type 052D Destroyers Under Construction In China,” Naval News, August 21, 2022. The
article’s headline refers to a photograph of five of the ships under construction at a shipyard at Dalian, China. The
article states, “Contacted by Naval News, two Chinese military observers confirmed that there are currently 25
destroyers of the class (13 Type 052D and 12 Type 052DL) currently in service with the PLAN. They will soon be
joined by the five under construction at Dalian and (at least) one more being built at the Jiangnan Changxing
Shipbuilding and Heavy Industry Corporation (the other Chinese shipyard building large surface combatants, located
North East of Shanghai).”
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commissioning an upgraded version of the Type 052D, informally called the Type 052DL, that
incorporates an extended-length helicopter flight deck and a new radar.85
Figure 20. Luyang III (Type 052D) Destroyer

Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying “Type 052D Luyang-III Class,” SinoDefence.com,
September 3, 2017, accessed August 28, 2019.
Type 054 Frigate
China since the early 1990s has also put into service multiple new classes of indigenously built
frigates, the most recent of which is the Jiangkai II (Type 054A) class (Figure 21), which
displaces about 4,000 tons. ONI stated in February 2020 that 30 Type 054As entered service
between 2008 and 2019, and that no additional Type 054As were then under construction.86 An
August 2021 press report from a Chinse media outlet, however, stated that “China is reportedly
building another batch of Type 054A frigates for the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA Navy)
after it had launched two new ships of this class over the past few months.” The press report
noted that a report from the Jane’s organization had stated that the 32nd Type 054A ship had
recently been launched (i.e., put into the water for the final stages of its construction).87 A May 7,
2022, press report stated
Speculation is mounting among China’s military observers that construction is about to
start on a bigger and faster frigate, designed to keep up with the PLA Navy’s third aircraft
carrier which is nearing completion.

85 “Chinese Navy Commissions Upgraded Variation of the Type 052D Destroyer,” Navy Recognition, March 3, 2021;
Liu Xuanzun, “PLA’s 4th Improved Type 052D Destroyer Makes Maiden Appearance in Maritime Exercise,” Global
Times, March 30, 2021; Liu Zhen, “Chinese Navy Sails New Destroyers in South China Sea Amid Military
Shipbuilding Spree,” South China Morning Post, June 15, 2021.
86 Source: Unclassified ONI information paper prepared for Senate Armed Services Committee, subject “UPDATED
China: Naval Construction Trends vis-à-vis U.S. Navy Shipbuilding Plans, 2020-2030,” February 2020, p. 4. Provided
by Senate Armed Services Committee to CRS and CBO on March 4, 2020, and used in this CRS report with the
committee’s permission. For a press article discussing the potential features of China’s next frigate design beyond the
Type 054A, see Rick Joe, “What Will the Chinese Navy’s Next Frigate Look Like?” Diplomat, May 15, 2020.
87 Liu Xuanzun, “Type 054A Frigate Good Choice to Expand PLA Naval Fleet and Boost Combat Preparedness:
Experts,” Global Times, August 12, 2021.
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An open tender for super high-strength structural steel – the kind used in military hulls –
was issued by the Huangpu Wenchong shipyard in Guangzhou, southern China, in March,
with a delivery date of May 20.
It is unclear how many tonnes of the CCS-B structural steel plate were ordered by the
shipyard, a subsidiary of the China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC).
Several military commentators have taken to Chinese social media platforms to suggest the
order could signal that work is about to begin on a bigger, faster multi-role update of the
Type 054A, better suited to combat operations on the high seas.88
Figure 21. Jiangkai II (Type 054A) Frigate

Source: Cropped version of photograph from Chinese Military Review, “Type 054A (Jiangkai II class) FFG-546
Yancheng Guided Missile Frigate in Mediterranean,” undated (but with a URL suggesting that it was posted in
February of 2014), accessed August 29, 2018.
Type 056 Corvette
China has also built—in large numbers over a relatively short time period—a new type of
corvette (i.e., a light frigate, or FFL) called the Jiangdao class or Type 056 (Figure 22), which
reportedly displaces 1,300 tons to 1,500 tons.89 Type 056 ships were built at a high annual rate in
four shipyards—the first was commissioned in 2013, and the 72nd and final ship of the type was
reportedly commissioned in early 2021, implying an average commisisoning rate of about eight
ships per year. DOD states that China’s navy “commissioned the 72nd JIANGDAO [class

88 Minnie Chan, “China Naval Steel Order Sparks Speculation over Bigger, Faster Frigate,” South China Morning Post,
May 7, 2022.
89 For an overview of the Type 056 corvette, see Eric Wertheim, “China’s Jiangdao-class Corvette: Mainstay of the
First Island Chain,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, September 2022.
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corvette] in February 2021, completing the production run. The PLAN also transferred the early
flight JIANGDAO variants, likely 22 ships total, to the China Coast Guard in 2021, probably due
to the models’ lack of [a] towed-array sonar. The 056A FFLs are equipped with a towed-array
sonar and are thus capable ASW ships.”90 As shown in Table 1, the rapid growth in the number of
Type 056 corvettes since 2013 accounts for a substantial share of the net increase in the total
number of ships in China’s navy since 2013.
Figure 22. Jingdao (Type 056) Corvette

Source: Cropped version of image included at Chinese Military Review, “Random Images of Chinese Type 056
Jiangdao Class Light Corvette,” undated (but with a URL suggesting that it was posted in October 2013),
accessed August 29, 2018.
Amphibious Ships91
Type 071 Amphibious Ship
China’s new Yuzhao or Type 071 amphibious ships (Figure 23) have an estimated displacement
of more than 19,855 tons,92 compared to about 25,900 tons for the U.S. Navy’s new San Antonio
(LPD-17) class amphibious ships. A May 6, 2021, press report states that the eighth Type 071 ship
“recently made its first publicly known maritime exercise appearance.”93

90 2022 DOD CMSD, p. 53.
91 For an article providing a brief overview of China’s amphibious shipbuilding programs, see Yasmin Tadjdeh, “China
Building Formidable Amphibious Fleet,” National Defense, June 25, 2021.
92 Unless otherwise indicated, displacement figures cited in this report are full load displacements. IHS Jane’s Fighting
Ships 2017-2018, p. 156, does not provide a full load displacement for the Type 071 class design. Instead, it provides a
standard displacement of 19,855 tons. Full load displacement is larger than standard displacement, so the full load
displacement of the Type 071 design is more than 19,855 tons.
93 Liu Xuanzun, “China’s Newly Commissioned Amphibious Landing Ship Joins Exercises, ‘to Form Powerful
Partnership with Amphibious Assault Ship,’” Global Times, May 6, 2021.
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Figure 23. Yuzhao (Type 071) Amphibious Ship

Source: Cropped version of photograph from Chinese Military Review, “Jinggang Shan (999) Type 071
YUZHAO Class Amphibious Transport Dock,” undated (but with a URL suggesting that it was posted in
February 2012), accessed August 29, 2018.
Type 075 Amphibious Assault Ship
In April 2021, China commissioned into service the first of a new type of amphibious assault
ship,94 called the Yushen or Type 075 (Figure 24 and Figure 25), that has an estimated
displacement of about 35,000 tons, compared to 41,000 to 45,000 tons for U.S. Navy LHA/LHD-
type amphibious assault ships.95 In March 2022, it was reported that the first Type 075 ship had
achieved initial operational capability (IOC),96 although that term might not mean the same as it
does when used by DOD in connection with U.S. weapon systems.
The second Type 075 ship reportedly was commissioned into service in late December 2021.97
The third was reportedly commissioned on or perhaps a few days prior to October 1, 2022.98

94 Amphibious assault ships, also referred to as helicopter carriers or (in British parlance) commando carriers, look like
medium-sized aircraft carriers. U.S. Navy amphibious assault ships are designated LHA or LHD.
95 See, for example, Mike Yeo, “China simultaneously commissions three warships on Navy anniversary,” Defense
News, April 26, 2021. For an in-depth discussion of the Type 075 design, see Conor M. Kennedy and Daniel Caldwell,
The Type 075 LHD: Development, Missions, and Capabilities, China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI), U.S. Naval
War College, China Maritime Report No. 23, October 2022, 45 pp.
96 Liu Xuanzun, “China’s 1st Amphibious Assault Ship Reaches Initial Operating Capability, To Make World Tour,”
Global Times, March 2, 2022; Ridzwan Rahmat, “China’s First Type 075 Amphibious Assault Ship Achieves Initial
Operating Capability,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, March 4, 2022.
97 Xavier Vavasseur, “China’s 2nd Type 075 LHD Guangxi 广西 Commissioned With PLAN,” Naval News, December
30, 2021.
98 Xavier Vavasseur, “China’s 3rd Type 075 LHD Anhui 安徽 Commissioned With PLAN,” Naval News, October 1,
2022.
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Figure 24. Type 075 Amphibious Assault Ship

Source: Photograph accompanying David Axe, “China Is Finishing Its First Large Helicopter Assault Ship,”
National Interest, October 29, 2019.
In July 2020, it was reported that China might be planning to build the first of a new class of
amphibious assault ships, called the Type 076 by observers (Figure 26 and Figure 27), that
would be equipped with electromagnetic catapults, which would enhance its ability to support
operations by fixed-wing aircraft and make it somewhat more like an aircraft carrier.99
Amphibious Ship Roles and Missions
Although larger amphibious ships such as the Type 071 and Type 075 would be of value for
conducting amphibious landings in Taiwan-related conflict scenarios, some observers believe that
China is building such ships as much for their value in conducting other operations, such as
operations for asserting and defending China’s claims in the South and East China Seas,
humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) operations, maritime security operations (such as
antipiracy operations), and noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs). Politically, amphibious
ships can also be used for naval diplomacy (i.e., port calls and engagement activities) and for
impressing or intimidating foreign observers.100

99 H. I. Sutton, “Stealth UAVs Could Give China’s Type-076 Assault Carrier More Firepower,” Forbes, July 23, 2020;
Kathrin Hille, “China Plans Hybrid Assault Vessel to Strengthen Overseas Power,” Financial Times, July 24, 2020;
Minnie Chan, “Chinese Shipbuilder Planning Advanced Amphibious Assault Ship,” South China Morning Post, July
27 (updated July 28), 2020; Rick Joe, “Whispers of 076, China’s Drone Carrying Assault Carrier,” Diplomat, August
21, 2020.
100 See, for example, Grant Newsham, “China’s Amphibious Force Emerges,” Asia Times, November 5, 2019.
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Figure 25. Type 075 Amphibious Assault Ship

Source: Photograph accompanying Liu Zhen, “Chinese Military’s First Type 075 Amphibious Assault Ship Begins
Sea Trial,” South China Morning Post, August 7, 2020. The article credits the photograph to Weibo. Possible Type
076 Catapult-Equipped Amphibious Assault Ship.
Figure 26. Notional Rendering of Possible Type 076 Amphibious Assault Ship

Source: Il ustration accompanying H. I. Sutton, “Stealth UAVs Could Give China’s Type-076 Assault Carrier
More Firepower,” Forbes, July 23, 2020.
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Figure 27. Notional Rendering of Possible Type 076 Amphibious Assault Ship

Source: Il ustration accompanying Minnie Chan, “Chinese Shipbuilder Planning Advanced Amphibious Assault
Ship,” South China Morning Post, July 27 (updated July 28), 2020.
Potential Use of Commercial Ships
In assessing China’s capacity for conducting an amphibious invasion of Taiwan, some observers
have focused on China’s potential for using civilian ferries and other commercial ships to
augment the transport and landing capacity of China’s amphibious ships. Reported Chinese
exercises indicate that China is exploring and testing this concept.101

101 See, for example, Parth Satam, “Civilian Ship Armed With Tanks—Scary Images Reveal China’s ‘Notorious Plan’
To Invade & Annex Taiwan,” Eurasian Times, November 8, 2022; Thomas Shugart, “Mind the Gap, Part 2: The Cross-
Strait Potential of China’s Civilian Shipping Has Grown,” War on the Rocks, October 12, 2022; H I Sutton and Sam
LaGrone, “Chinese Launch Assault Craft from Civilian Car Ferries in Mass Amphibious Invasion Drill, Satellite
Photos Show,” USNI News, September 28, 2022; Bethany Dawson, “China Is Using a Stealth Fleet of Fishing Boats
and Ferries to Boost Its Naval Power, Say Military Experts,” Business Insider, September 24, 2022; David Rising,
“China Using Civilian Ships to Enhance Navy Capability, Reach,” Associated Press, September 24, 2022; Thomas
Shugart, “Mind The Gap: How China’s Civilian Shipping Could Enable a Taiwan Invasion,” War on the Rocks, August
16, 2022; J. Michael Dahm, Chinese Ferry Tales, The PLA’s Use of Civilian Shipping in Support of Over-the-Shore
Logistics, China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI), U.S. Naval War College, China Maritime Report No. 16,
November 2021, 56 pp.; Brian Waidelich, Patrick deGategno, Timothy Ditter, and Thomas Bickford, Chinese Views of
Civilian Ship Mobilization, DSI-2021-U-030614-Final, CNA, November 10, 2021, 2 pp. (with a note indicating that it
is a summary based on the full-length CNA report, Chinese Views of Civilian Ships’ Support to PLA Maritime
Operations, DRM2021-C-029795-Final); Kris Osborn, “Could China’s Civilian Ferries Play a Role in a Taiwan
Invasion?” National Interest, October 21, 2021; Keoni Everington, “Video Shows Ship Packed with Chinese Tanks for
‘Future Battlefield’ in Taiwan,” Taiwan News, October 18, 2021; Michael Dahm and Conor M. Kennedy, “Civilian
Shipping: Ferrying the People’s Liberation Army Ashore,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC),
September 9, 2021; Chris Horton, “China Mobilizes Civilian Ferries for Taiwan Invasion Drills,” Nikkei Asia, August
25, 2021; Andrew Tate, “Chinese Military Using Commercial Ro-Ro Shipping to Enhance Its Amphibious
Capabilities,” Jane’s, August 23, 2021; Thomas Shugart, “Mind the Gap: How China’s Civilian Shipping Could Enable
a Taiwan Invasion,” War on the Rocks, August 16, 2021; Mike Yeo, “China Reportedly Converted Civilian Ferries for
Amphibious Assault Operations,” Defense News, August 4, 2021; David Hambling, “China Converts Car Ferries For
Amphibious Assault,” Forbes, July 27, 2021; Courtney Mabeus, “Chinese Navy Using Commercial Car Ferries to
Launch Amphibious Landing Craft,” USNI News, July 26, 2021; Conor Kennedy, “Ramping the Strait: Quick and Dirty
Solutions to Boost Amphibious Lift,” China Brief, July 16, 2021.
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Operations Away from Home Waters
Ship Operations
Although China’s navy operates primarily in China’s home waters, Chinese navy ships are
conducting increasing numbers of operations away from China’s home waters, including the
broader waters of the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and the waters surrounding Europe,
including the Mediterranean Sea and the Baltic Sea. A November 23, 2019, DOD news report
quoted Admiral Philip Davidson, the commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, as stating
that China’s navy had conducted more global naval deployments in the past 30 months than it had
in the previous 30 years.102
DOD states that “the PLAN’s ability to perform missions beyond the First Island Chain is modest
but growing as it gains more experience operating in distant waters and acquires larger and more
advanced platforms. China’s experience in extended range operations primarily comes from
extended task group deployments and its ongoing counterpiracy mission in the Gulf of Aden.”103
China has been conducting antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden since December 2008 via a
succession of more than 40 rotationally deployed naval escort task forces. China’s long-distance
naval deployments have also been for making diplomatic port calls and conducting training
exercises.
Current or Potential Bases Outside China
China’s distant naval operations are supported in part by China’s military base in Djibouti, which
China officially opened in August 2017 as its first overseas military base.104
In December 2021, it was reported that China may be seeking to establish a military (including
naval) base at a port in Equatorial Guinea, a country located on the Atlantic coast of Africa—a
location that could enhance China’s ability to conduct naval operations in the Atlantic.105

102 David Vergun, “Freedom of Navigation in South China Sea Critical to Prosperity, Says Indo-Pacific Commander,”
DOD News, November 23, 2019.
103 2022 DOD CMSD, p. 51.
104 For discussions of Djibouti and other potential Chinese military bases outside China, see 2022 DOD CMSD, pp. xii,
143-145; Kathrin Hille, Demetri Sevastopulo, and John Paul Rathbone, “China Denies Building Naval Bases But Fear
of Its Military Reach Grows,” Financial Times, June 19, 2022. Regarding China’s military base in Djibouti, see H. I.
Sutton, “Satellite Images Show That Chinese Navy Is Expanding Overseas Base,” Forbes, May 10, 2020; Peter Suciu,
“China’s Naval Base in Africa Is Getting Bigger. Is a Network of Bases Next?” National Interest, May 11, 2020; staff
writer, “Chinese Navy Expanding Base in Africa, Satellite Images Confirm,” War Is Boring, May 11, 2020; Jean-Pierre
Cabestan, “China’s Djibouti Naval Base Increasing Its Power,” East Asia Forum, May 16, 2020; Dave Makichuk,
“China Builds a Mega-Fortress on the Horn of Africa,” Asia Times, May 18, 2020; Michael Evans, “Beijing’s African
Port Ready for Aircraft Carriers,” Times (UK), May 19, 2020.
105 See, for example, Michael M. Phillips, “China Seeks First Military Base on Africa’s Atlantic Coast, U.S.
Intelligence Finds, Alarmed Officials at the White House and Pentagon Urge Equatorial Guinea to Rebuff Beijing’s
Overtures,” Wall Street Journal, December 5, 2021; Bonny Lin, Jude Blanchette, Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., and Mvemba
Phezo Dizolele, “Is China Building a New String of Pearls in the Atlantic Ocean?” Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS), December 20, 2021; Michael M. Phillips, “U.S. Aims to Thwart China’s Plan for Atlantic
Base in Africa,” Wall Street Journal, February 11, 2022; Cobus van Staden, “Fears of a Chinese Naval Base in West
Africa Are Overblown,” Foreign Policy, March 3, 2022; Paul Nantulya, “Considerations for a Prospective New
Chinese Naval Base in Africa,” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, May 12, 2022.
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A June 8, 2022, press report stated, “Cambodian and Chinese officials broke ground on a Beijing-
funded expansion of Ream Naval Base on Wednesday [June 8], using the occasion to again reject
reports the site will be used by China’s military.”106 A June 6, 2022, press report stated
China is secretly building a naval facility in Cambodia for the exclusive use of its military,
with both countries denying that is the case and taking extraordinary measures to conceal
the operation, Western officials said. The military presence will be on the northern portion
of Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base on the Gulf of Thailand....
The Wall Street Journal reported in 2019107 that China had signed a secret agreement to
allow its military to use the base, citing U.S. and allied officials familiar with the matter....
Over the weekend ... a Chinese official in Beijing confirmed to The Washington Post that
“a portion of the base” will be used by “the Chinese military....
The two governments have taken pains to mask the presence of the Chinese military at
Ream, the official said....
The secrecy around the base appears to be driven primarily by Cambodian sensitivities and
concern about a domestic backlash, the second official said.108
A security agreement between China and the Solomon Islands that was announced by the
Solomon Islands in April 2022 has led some observers to express concern that the agreement
could eventually lead to, among other things, the establishment of a Chinese naval base in that
country.109 The Prime Minister of the Solomon Islands ruled out that possibility, stating that it
would “put our country and our people as targets for potential military strikes.”110
U.S. Navy Response
Overview
The U.S. Navy has taken a number of actions to counter China’s naval modernization effort.
Among other things, the U.S. Navy has

106 Shaun Turton and Bopha Phorn, “Cambodia Breaks Ground on China-Funded Ream Naval Base Expansion,” Nikkei
Asia, June 8, 2022.
107 Jeremy Page, Gordon Lubold, and Rob Taylor, “Deal for Naval Outpost in Cambodia Furthers China’s Quest for
Military Network,” Wall Street Journal, July 22, 2019.
108 Ellen Nakashima and Cate Cadell, “China Secretly Building Naval Facility in Cambodia, Western Officials Say,”
Washington Post, June 6, 2022. See also James R. Holmes, “A Naval Base in Cambodia Supports China’s Calibrated
Aggression,” The Hill, June 10, 2022; Niharika Mandhana, Sun Narin, and Chun Han Wong, “China to Upgrade Ream
Naval Base in Cambodia, Fueling U.S. Concerns,” Wall Street Journal, June 8, 2022; Charlie Campbell, “A Chinese
Naval Base in Cambodia Signals a New Era of Competition in the Asia-Pacific Region,” Time, June 7, 2022; “Dredgers
Spotted at Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) (Center for Strategic and
International Studies [CSIS]), January 21, 2022; RFA Khmer Service, “US calls on Cambodia to explain its plans for
Ream Naval Base,” Radio Free Asia, January 24, 2022.
109 See, for example, Camilla Pohle-Anderson, “China’s Search for a Permanent Military Presence in the Pacific
Islands,” United States Institute of Peace, July 21, 2022; Damien Cave, “Why a Chinese Security Deal in the Pacific
Could Ripple Through the World, In Potentially Opening the Door to a Chinese Military Base, the Solomon Islands
Threatens the Balance of Power in a Vital Shipping Region,” New York Times, April 20, 2022; Ralph Jennings,
“Analysts: Chinese Navy to Grow Through 2050, With Emphasis on Hardware,” Voice of America, April 5, 2022.
110 See, for example, “Solomons Leader: Chinese Base Would Make His People Targets,” Associated Press, July 14,
2022; John Feng, “China Military Base in Solomon Islands Ruled Out in Blow to Naval Ambitions,” Newsweek, July
14, 2022; Lice Movono and Kate Lyons, “Solomon Islands PM Rules Out China Military Base and Says Australia is
‘Security Partner of Choice,’” Guardian, July 13, 2022.
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 shifted a greater percentage of its fleet to the Pacific;111
 assigned its most capable new ships and aircraft to the Pacific;
 maintained or increased general presence operations, training and developmental
exercises, and engagement and cooperation with allied and other navies in the
Indo-Pacific;
 increased the planned future size of the Navy;
 initiated, increased, or accelerated numerous programs for developing new
military technologies and acquiring new ships, aircraft, unmanned vehicles, and
weapons;
 developed new operational concepts (i.e., new ways to employ Navy and Marine
Corps forces) for countering Chinese maritime A2/AD forces; and
 signaled that the Navy in coming years will shift to a more distributed fleet
architecture that will feature a substantially greater use of unmanned vehicles.
Some of the above items are discussed in more detail below.
Cooperation with Naval Forces of Allies and Other Countries
U.S. Navy efforts to increase cooperation with naval forces from allies such as Japan and
Australia and other countries such India appear aimed in part at expanding existing bilateral
forms of naval cooperation (e.g., U.S.-Japan, U.S.-Australia, U.S.-India) into trilateral (e.g., U.S.-
Japan-Australia, U.S.-Australia-India) or quadrilateral (U.S.-Japan-Australia-India) forms that
could enhance the ability of the United States and its allies in the Indo-Pacific region to balance
against China’s growing military capabilities and deter potential assertive actions by China.112
A June 15, 2021, press report stated
The Pentagon is considering establishing a permanent naval task force in the Pacific region
as a counter to China’s growing military might, according to two people familiar with
internal discussions.
The plan would also involve creating a named military operation for the Pacific that would
enable the defense secretary to allocate additional dollars and resources to the China
problem, said the people, who requested anonymity to discuss pre-decisional plans.
The two initiatives, which are not yet finalized, would add muscle to President Joe Biden’s
tough talk on China and send a signal that the new U.S. administration is serious about
cracking down on Beijing’s military buildup and aggressive behavior in the Pacific region.

111 Efforts in this regard began at least as far back as 2006: The final report on the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR) directed the Navy “to adjust its force posture and basing to provide at least six operationally available and
sustainable carriers and 60% of its submarines in the Pacific to support engagement, presence and deterrence.” (U.S.
Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Washington, 2006. February 6, 2006, p. 47.) Subsequent
to this directive, the Navy announced an intention to increase to 60% (from a starting point of about 55%) the
percentage of the fleet as a whole that is assigned to the Pacific. An October 13, 2021, press report stated, “US Naval
Chief of Operations, Admiral Michael Gilday, on Tuesday kicked off his 5-day visit to India by meeting his Indian
counterpart Admiral Karambir Singh, Chief of Defence Staff General Bipin Rawat and other senior government
officials.... Asked about what the US intends to do to counter China’s aggressive modernisation of its Navy, Gilday
said they will not try to outspend it, but partners like India in the region will be the key to ensure that the Indian Ocean
Region (IOR) is stable. Given the importance of the region, 60 per cent of US Navy’s forces are now in the Indo-
Pacific, he said.” (Krishn Kaushik, “60% Navy Forces in Indo-Pacific Region Now: US Navy Chief,” Indian Express,
October 13, 2021.)
112 For additional discussion, see CRS In Focus IF11678, The “Quad”: Security Cooperation Among the United States,
Japan, India, and Australia, coordinated by Emma Chanlett-Avery.
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The news comes as NATO leaders are increasingly aligning themselves with Washington’s
confrontational stance on Beijing. Four years after former President Donald Trump made
countering China a top foreign policy priority, NATO allies this week declared Beijing a
security challenge and said the Chinese are working to undermine global order.
The discussions grew out of work by the Pentagon’s China Task Force, which Biden
commissioned in March to examine the department’s China-related policies and processes.
The group, led by Ely Ratner, the nominee to serve as the Pentagon’s top Indo-Pacific
policy official, recently completed its work and presented recommendations to Defense
Secretary Lloyd Austin.
A defense official, responding to a request for comment, stressed that none of the plans
stemming from the China task force are finalized….
The naval task force would be modeled on a construct NATO launched in Europe leading
up to and during the Cold War, the Standing Naval Forces Atlantic, the people familiar
with the discussions told POLITICO. The squadron was an immediate reaction force that
could rapidly respond to a crisis but spent most of its time steaming around the region,
participating in scheduled exercises and making goodwill port calls. Six to 10 ships from
multiple NATO nations—destroyers, frigates and auxiliaries—were typically attached to
the force for up to six months.
The European task force allowed those nations to “maximize their influence at sea and to
specialize their investments simultaneously,” said Jerry Hendrix, an analyst for consulting
firm Telemus Group and the author of “To Provide and Maintain a Navy”. He noted that
an effective Pacific task force would also include European allies such as Britain and
France, who are increasing their Pacific naval presence, as well as Japan and Australia.
The proposed initiative would be a “deterrent because it demonstrates a unity of effort in
countering Chinese excessive threats to the concept of a free sea and free trade with their
large territorial sea claims,” Hendrix said.
It’s not yet clear whether the task force would involve only U.S. ships, or include other
nations’ militaries as well, the people said.113
Size of Navy, Fleet Architecture, and Operational Concepts
As discussed in greater detail in another CRS report,114 the Navy’s existing force-level goal,
which the Navy released on December 15, 2016, calls for achieving and maintaining a fleet of
355 ships—an increase of 47 ships over the previous 308-ship force-level goal of March 2015.
The Navy and DOD have been working since 2019 to develop a new force-level goal to replace
the 355-ship force-level goal. Remarks from Navy and DOD officials since 2019 have indicated
that the Navy’s next force-level goal will introduce a once-in-a-generation change in fleet
architecture, meaning basic the types of ships that make up the Navy and how these ships are
used in combination with one another to perform Navy missions. This new fleet architecture is to
be more distributed than the fleet architecture reflected in the 355-ship goal or previous Navy
force-level goals. In particular, the new fleet architecture is expected to feature a new third tier of
surface vessels about as large as corvettes or large patrol craft that will be either lightly manned,
optionally manned, or unmanned, as well as large unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs).

113 Lara Seligman, “Pentagon Considering Permanent Naval Task Force to Counter China in the Pacific,” Politico, June
15, 2021.
114 CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by
Ronald O'Rourke.
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Navy and DOD leaders believe that shifting to a more distributed fleet architecture is
 operationally necessary, to respond effectively to the improving maritime anti-
access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities of other countries, particularly China;115
 technically feasible as a result of advances in technologies for UVs and for
networking widely distributed maritime forces that include significant numbers
of UVs; and
 affordable—no more expensive, and possibly less expensive, than the current
fleet architecture for a given level of overall fleet capability, so as to fit within
expected future Navy budgets.
Regarding the first point above, shifting to a more distributed force architecture, Navy and
Marine Corps officials have indicated, will support implementation of the Navy and Marine
Corps’ new overarching operational concept, called Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO), and
a supporting Marine Corps operational concept called Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations
(EABO).116 A key aim of DMO and EABO is to improve the ability of the Navy and Marine
Corps to counter China’s improving maritime military capabilities.
Some elements of the Navy’s new, more distributed fleet architecture are reflected in Navy
budget submission, including the following:
 procurement of Constellation (FFG-62) class frigates;117
 development of a smaller amphibious warship called the Light Amphibious
Warship (LAW);118
 development of a smaller resupply ship called the Next-Generation Medium
Logistics Ship;119

115 See, for example, David B. Larter, “With China Gunning for Aircraft Carriers, US Navy Says It Must Change How
It Fights,” Defense News, December 6, 2019; Arthur H. Barber, “Redesign the Fleet,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,
January 2019. Some observers have long urged the Navy to shift to a more distributed fleet architecture, on the grounds
that the Navy’s current architecture—which concentrates much of the fleet’s capability into a relatively limited number
of individually larger and more expensive surface ships—is increasingly vulnerable to attack by the improving A2/AD
capabilities (particularly anti-ship missiles and their supporting detection and targeting systems) of potential
adversaries, particularly China. Shifting to a more distributed architecture, these observers have argued, would
•
complicate an adversary’s targeting challenge by presenting the adversary with a larger number of Navy units
to detect, identify, and track;
•
reduce the loss in aggregate Navy capability that would result from the destruction of an individual Navy
platform;
•
give U.S. leaders the option of deploying USVs and UUVs in wartime to sea locations that would be
tactically advantageous but too risky for manned ships; and
•
increase the modularity and reconfigurability of the fleet for adapting to changing mission needs.
For more on China’s maritime A2/AD capabilities, see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization:
Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
116 For more on DMO, see, for example, Edward Lundquist, “DMO is Navy’s Operational Approach to Winning the
High-End Fight at Sea,” Seapower, February 2, 2021. For more on EABO, see CRS Report R46374, Navy Light
Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
117 For more on the FFG-62 program, see CRS Report R44972, Navy Constellation (FFG-62) Class Frigate Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
118 For more on the LAW program, see CRS Report R46374, Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
119 For more on the next-generation Medium Logistics Ship, see, for example, Megan Eckstein, “Navy Researching
New Class of Medium Amphibious Ship, New Logistics Ships,” USNI News, February 20, 2020; Rich Abott, “FY 2021
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 development of two types of larger USVs—Large USVs (LUSVs) and Medium
USVs (MUSVs);120 and
 procurement of large UUVs called Extra Large UUVs (XLUUVs).121
Programs for Acquiring Highly Capable Ships, Aircraft, and Weapons
Many of the Navy’s programs for acquiring highly capable ships, aircraft, and weapon systems
can be viewed as intended, at least in part, at improving the U.S. Navy’s ability to counter
Chinese maritime A2/AD capabilities. Examples of new technologies being developed by the
Navy that might be of value in countering Chinese maritime A2/AD capabilities include the
above-mentioned large UVs122 as well as lasers.123
Issues for Congress
Overview
The overall issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify the Biden
Administration’s proposed U.S. Navy plans, budgets, and programs for responding to China’s
naval modernization effort. Within this overall issue, specific issues include the following:
 the current and potential future U.S.-China balance of naval power in general,
and in specific geographic areas, particularly the South China Sea;
 whether the planned size of the Navy will be appropriate for countering China’s
naval modernization effort in coming years while also permitting the Navy to
perform other missions, including countering Russian military forces and
defending U.S. interests in the Middle East;
 whether Navy shipbuilding plans and Navy plans for keeping existing Navy ships
in service are consistent with the goal of increasing the size of the Navy toward a
total of 355 ships or a successor force-level goal;
 whether the Navy should shift to a more-distributed fleet architecture so as to
improve the Navy’s ability to avoid and withstand attack from Chinese maritime
A2/AD forces—and if so, what that new architecture should look like, and how
quickly the Navy should shift to it;
 whether the Navy is doing enough to
 improve its ability to counter China’s ASBMs, hypersonic weapons, or other
maritime A2/AD weapons, such as wake-homing torpedoes;

Request Starts Work on Future Amphibs and Logistics Ships,” Defense Daily, February 20, 2020; Justin Katz, “Navy
Announces ‘Next Generation Logistics Ship’ Program with June 25 Industry Day,” Inside Defense, May 14, 2020; Paul
McLeary, “No Shipbuilding Plan, But Navy Works On New Ships To Counter China,” Breaking Defense, May 18,
2020.
120 For more on the LUSV and XLUUV programs, see CRS Report R45757, Navy Large Unmanned Surface and
Undersea Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
121 For more on the XLUUV program, see CRS Report R45757, Navy Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea
Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
122 For more on these efforts, see CRS Report R45757, Navy Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
123 For more on Navy laser programs, see CRS Report R44175, Navy Lasers, Railgun, and Gun-Launched Guided
Projectile: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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 develop and procure new ASCMs with ranges that match or exceed those of
China’s longer-ranged ASCMs;
 increase the operating range of Navy carrier air wings, so as to improve the
ability of carriers and their air wings to achieve effects while operating at
longer distances from Chinese ASBMs and other A2/AD weapons; and
 whether Congress should modify acquisition policies or the metrics for judging
the success of acquisition programs so as to facilitate faster development of new
technologies and weapons for the Navy—and if so, how those policies or metrics
should be modified.
U.S.-China Balance of Naval Power
Regarding the U.S.-China balance of naval power in general, U.S. and other observers generally
assess that while the United States today has more naval capability overall, China’s naval
modernization effort since the 1990s has substantially reduced the U.S. advantage, and that if
current U.S. and Chinese naval capability trends (such as those shown in Table 1 and Table 2) do
not change, China might eventually draw even with or surpass the United States in overall naval
capability. In remarks to a conference on November 3, 2022, for example, Admiral Charles A.
Richard, commander of U.S. Strategic Command, stated
As I assess our level of deterrence against China, the ship is slowly sinking. It is sinking
slowly, but it is sinking, as fundamentally they are putting capability in the field faster than
we are. As those curves keep going, it isn't going to matter how good our [operating plan]
is or how good our commanders are, or how good our forces are—we're not going to have
enough of them. And that is a very near-term problem....
Undersea capabilities is still the one ... maybe the only true asymmetric advantage we still
have against our opponents. But unless we pick up the pace, in terms of getting our
maintenance problems fixed, getting new construction going ... if we can't figure that out
... we are not going to put ourselves in a good position to maintain strategic deterrence and
national defense.124
Regarding the U.S.-China naval balance of power specifically in the South China Sea, some
observers are concerned that China has already drawn even with or even surpassed the United
States. U.S. Navy Admiral Philip Davidson, in responses to advance policy questions from the
Senate Armed Services Committee for an April 17, 2018, hearing before the committee to
consider nominations, including Davidson’s nomination to become Commander, U.S. Pacific
Command (PACOM),125 stated that “China is now capable of controlling the South China Sea in
all scenarios short of war with the United States.”126
Skeptics of assessments like those above might argue that they do not give adequate weight to
relative U.S. strengths (and corresponding Chinese relative weaknesses and limitations) in areas
such as undersea warfare; personnel quality, training, and initiative; operational experience

124 C. Todd Lopez, “Stratcom Commander Says U.S. Should Look to 1950s to Regain Competitive Edge,” DOD News,
November 3, 2022. (Material in brackets and ellipses as in original.) Admiral Richard’s remarks are quoted similarly in
Oliver Parken and Tyler Rogoway, “Extremely Ominous Warning About China From US Strategic Command Chief,
Admiral Richard Says ‘The Big One’ with China Is Coming and the “Ship Is Slowly Sinking” in Terms of U.S.
Deterrence,” The Drive, November 6, 2022; and Max Hauptman, “US Strategic Command Chief: Ukraine ‘Just the
Warmup’ for ‘the Big One’ with China,” Task & Purpose, November 8, 2022.
125 The name of the command has since been changed to the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM).
126 Advance Policy Questions for Admiral Philip Davidson, USN Expected Nominee for Commander, U.S. Pacific
Command, p. 18. See also pp. 8, 16, 17, 19, and 43.
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(particularly in combat situations); joint operations with other U.S. military services; and
potential support from allies and partners, particularly Japan and Australia. A March 5, 2021,
press report, for example, states
While China is expected to field 400 ships by 2025, the goal of the current US Navy
shipbuilding plan, a goal with no fixed date, is for a fleet of 355—a substantial numerical
disadvantage.
That’s not to say the US Navy has seen its days as the world’s premier fighting force come
to an end.
When counting troops, the US Navy is bigger, with more than 330,000 active duty
personnel to China’s 250,000.
Analysts point out several other factors in Washington’s favor.
The US Navy still fields more tonnage—bigger and heavier armed ships like guided-
missile destroyers and cruisers—than China. Those ships give the US a significant edge in
cruise missile launch capability.
The US has more than 9,000 vertical launch missile cells on its surface ships to China’s
1,000 or so, according to Nick Childs, a defense analyst at the International Institute for
Strategic Studies.
Meanwhile, the US attack submarine fleet of 50 boats is entirely nuclear powered, giving
it significant range and endurance advantages over a Chinese fleet that has just seven
nuclear-powered subs in its fleet of 62.127
Concern About Davidson Window/Decade of Concern
Some Members of Congress and other U.S. observers are concerned about the possibility that
China might attack Taiwan sometime between 2021 and 2027 (a timeframe sometimes referred to
as the Davidson window)128 or between 2020 and 2030 (a timeframe sometimes referred to as the

127 Brad Lendon, “China Has Built the World’s Largest Navy. Now What’s Beijing Going to Do with It?” CNN, March
5, 2021.
128 At a March 9, 2021, hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Admiral Philip S. Davidson,
Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM), when asked about a timeline for a potential conflict in
the Taiwan Strait, replied:
I think our concerns are manifest here during this decade not only on the development, the number
of ships, aircraft, rockets, etc. that they have—that they have put in the field but the way they are
advancing those capabilities as well in combination with everything that you just cited Hong Kong
and Tibet and line of actual control in the South China Sea, in the East China Sea.
I worry that they are accelerating their ambitions to be—to supplant the United States and our
leadership role in a rules-based international order which they have long said that they want to do
that by 2050. I'm worried about the moving that target closer. Taiwan is clearly one of their
ambitions before that, and I think the threat is manifest during this decade, in fact, in the next six
years.
(CQ transcript of hearing. See also, for example, Mallory Shelbourne, “Davidson: China Could Try
to Take Control of Taiwan In ‘Next Six Years,’” USNI News, March 9, 2021; Adela Suliman,
“China Could Invade Taiwan in the Next 6 Years, Assume Global Leadership Role, U.S. Admiral
Warns,” NBC News, March 10, 2021.)
The period between 2021 and 2027 subsequently came to be referred to by some observers as the Davidson window.
Possibly the earliest user of the term was Jerry Hendrix; see for example, Jerry Hendrix, “Closing the Davidson
Window,” Real Clear Defense, July 3, 2021.
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decade of concern),129 and about the readiness the U.S. military, including the U.S. Navy, for a
conflict in that timeframe. A March 6, 2021, press report, for example, stated
China could soon be emboldened to try to “forcibly change” the existing order in the
western Pacific, the head of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command said.
As its rapidly advancing military approaches “overmatch” with the United States in the
region, and absent a convincing deterrent, China could make a move this decade.
“Make no mistake about it, China seeks a new world order—one with Chinese
characteristics as they have often said where Chinese national power is more important
than international law,” Adm. Phil Davidson said during an American Enterprise Institute
forum Thursday [March 4]….
“The most important thing I‘d like you all to take away from the discussions |is a
fundamental understanding that the period between now and 2026—this decade—is the
time horizon in which China is positioned to achieve overmatch in its capability,” the
Oahu-based commander said.
That’s when Beijing could—and he emphasized “could”—“choose to forcibly change the
status quo in the region.”
Davidson didn't specify what action China might take, but he said with the growing military
imbalance comes greater risk that China could move “before our forces might be able to
deliver an effective response.”130
An October 19, 2022, press report stated
Amid concerns that China could try to reunify the mainland with Taiwan faster than
previously anticipated, the United States Navy is also eyeing a more immediate window
for a potential conflict over the island, the service’s top officer said Wednesday [October
19].
The Navy is still assessing how China’s recent 20th Party Congress meeting affects its plans
for the fleet, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Mike Gilday said at a virtual event hosted
by the Atlantic Council.
“It’s not just what President Xi says, but it’s how the Chinese behave and what they do.
And what we’ve seen over the past 20 years is that they have delivered on every promise
they’ve made earlier than they said they were going to deliver on it,” Gilday said when
asked about the so-called “Davidson window,” referring to former U.S. Indo-Pacific
Command chief Adm. Phil Davidson testifying to Congress in 2021 that China wanted the
capability to seize Taiwan within the next six years.

129 Possibly the earliest user of the term decade of concern was James (Jim) Fanell. See, for example, China’s National
Sovereignty and the Tightening Noose Around the Senkaku Islands, James E. Fanell, Captain U.S. Navy (Retired),
Testimony before Hearing on the Hotspots Along China’s Periphery, Panel II: How China Prepares to Fight in
Hotspots: East China Sea / Senkaku Islands Contingency Operation, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, April 13, 2017, p. 3, 25-27, 32; Jim Fanell, “Now Hear This—The Clock is Ticking in China: The
Decade of Concern Has Begun,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, October 2017; China’s Global Naval Strategy and
Expanding Force Structure: Pathway to Hegemony, Testimony by Captain James Fanell (USN, Ret.) [prepared
statement for hearing on China’s worldwide military expansion before the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, May 17, 2018], pp. 55-59; Bonnie Girard, “Time to Counter China and Rebuild the US Navy? A Former
U.S. Pacific Fleet Naval Intelligence Chief Testifies to Congress on China’s Maritime Ambitions,” Diplomat, May 23,
2018; James E. Fanell, “Asia Rising: China’s Global Naval Strategy and Expanding Force Structure,” Naval War
College Review, Winter 2019.
130 William Cole, “China Could Soon Outgun US in Western Pacific, Indo-Pacific Chief Says,” Honolulu Star-
Advertiser, March 6, 2021.
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“When we talk about the 2027 window, in my mind that has to be a 2022 window or a
potentially a 2023 window. I can’t rule that out. I don’t mean at all to be alarmist by saying
that, it’s just that we can’t wish that away,” the CNO added.131
Other observers, including some DOD officials, believe a Chinese attack on Taiwan does not
appear to be imminent or is not particularly likely to occur in the near term.132
For observers who are concerned about the Davidson window or window of concern, given the
time needed to build major U.S. Navy warships (typically several years), decisions made now on
procuring new ships for the Navy will have only a small impact on the number of ships the Navy
will have in service during the Davidson window or the decade of concern. (Decisions made now
on procuring new ships for the Navy will primarily impact the number of ships the Navy will
have in service in years after the Davidson window or the decade of concern, a time period which
is also of potential concern to policymakers.) Options for bolstering Navy capabilities during the
Davidson window or the decade of concern focus mostly on matters other than procuring new
ships, including but not limited to the following, which are not presented in any particular order:
 keeping existing ships and aircraft in service during the Davidson window or
decade of concern rather than retiring them during the Davidson window or
decade of concern (while preserving the option of retiring them after the end of
the Davidson window or decade of concern);
 increasing the material readiness of existing ships and aircraft, so as to maximize
the percentage of them that are available for operations, by working down ship
and aircraft maintenance backlogs;
 shifting additional ships, aircraft, weapons, and supplies from the Atlantic theater
to the Pacific theater (although the risks of doing that in connection with
deterring and responding to Russian actions in the European theater would be a
factor to consider);
 upgrading existing ships, aircraft, and weapons, particularly through the
installation of improved or additional systems or components that can be quickly
switched out or bolted on;
 procuring new aircraft and weapons, if those aircraft and weapons can enter
service before the end of the Davidson window or the decade of concern;
 procuring spare parts and supplies and positioning them in the Pacific;
 acting to alleviate bottlenecks or otherwise increase the capacity of the industrial
base to produce and/or repair ships, aircraft, weapons, and supplies;

131 As quoted in Mallory Shelbourne, “China’s Accelerated Timeline to Take Taiwan Pushing Navy in the Pacific, Says
CNO Gilday,” USNI News, October 19, 2022. See also Robert Delaney, “US Navy Should Prepare for an Invasion of
Taiwan as Soon as This Year, Fleet Chief Says,” South China Morning Post, October 20, 2022; Demetri Sevastopulo,
“US Navy chief warns China could invade Taiwan before 2024,” Financial Times, October 20, 2022; Agence France-
Presse, “ China Could Invade Taiwan This Year, US Admiral Warns,” News.com.au, October 21, 2022.
132 See, for example, Meghann Myers and Joe Gould, “Pentagon Sees No Imminent Threat to Taiwan from Chinese
Buildup,” Military Times, November 29, 2022; Jerusalem Post Staff, “US General Mark Milley Says Invading Taiwan
Would Be ‘Very Difficult’ for China,” Jerusalem Post, November 18, 2022; Derek Grossman, “Xi Jinping Is Not
Looking to Go to War over Taiwan Anytime Soon, Little Sign Chinese Leader Is Accelerating Invasion Preparations,”
Nikkei Asia, November 16, 2022; Nick Wadhams, “China Won’t Be Able to Attack Taiwan in Near Future, US General
Milley Says,” Bloomberg, November 16, 2022; John Grady, “China Will Increase Pressure on Taiwan in Next Two
Years Rather Than Invade, Says Pentagon Official,” USNI News, November 7, 2022; Briana Reilly, “DOD Policy
Chief Doesn’t Anticipate Taiwan Invasion in ‘Near Term,’” Inside Defense, November 4, 2022; Iain Marlow,
“‘Sloppy’ US Talk on China’s Threat Worries Some Skeptical Experts,” Bloomberg, November 3 (updated November
4), 2022.
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 hardening air bases and other land-based facilities in the Pacific that support U.S.
Navy operations to improve their ability to withstand attack by Chinese missiles
or other weapons;
 increasing intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) activities for
understanding and monitoring China’s naval forces;
 increasing activities for measuring and understanding the physical operating
environment in the Pacific;
 increasing the operational proficiency of Navy personnel through training and
exercises; and
 increasing operations for demonstrating U.S. Navy capabilities to China and/or
perhaps creating uncertainty or confusion in China about U.S. Navy capabilities,
concepts of operations, or tactics.
Additional Discussion
Returning to the list of issues presented in the overview section above, the planned size of the
Navy and the shift to a more-distributed fleet architecture are discussed in detail in other CRS
reports.133 The issue of the Navy’s ability to counter China’s ASBMs and hypersonic weapons is
discussed in detail in this report in Appendix B. The issue of the Navy’s ability to counter wake-
homing torpedoes may have been made more pressing by the reportedly poor performance of an
anti-torpedo torpedo that the Navy was developing as a means for Navy surface ships to counter
hard-to-decoy wake-homing torpedoes and other torpedoes. The Navy now reportedly plans to
remove the anti-torpedo torpedo system from the ships that were equipped with it.134
The Navy has initiated efforts to develop and procure longer-ranged ASCMs, but some observers
have expressed frustration that these efforts are not moving quickly enough.135 In support of its
efforts, the Navy testified in April 2022 as follows:
Strike Weapons
The DON continues to focus on delivering a strong balance of offensive strike weapons by
maintaining the readiness of our strike weapons inventories, enhancing capacity and
performance of existing strike weapons, and developing next-generation strike missile
capabilities. Through these efforts, the DON will increase overall force effectiveness and
continue to address emerging threats from adversarial forces.
Tomahawk

133 See CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by
Ronald O'Rourke, and CRS Report R45757, Navy Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles: Background and
Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
134 For additional discussion, see Alex Lockie, “US Navy Admits Failure on $760 Million Weapon to Protect Its
Aircraft Carriers from An Age-Old Threat,” Business Insider, February 5, 2019; Joseph Trevithick, “The Navy Is
Ripping Out Underperforming Anti-Torpedo Torpedoes From Its Supercarriers,” The Drive, February 5, 2019. For an
article advocating certain measures to improve the Navy’s ability to counter China’s submarines in general, see Walker
Mills, Collin Fox, Dylan Phillips-Levine, and Trevor Phillips-Levine, “China’s Sub Force Is Growing More Powerful.
This Is What the US Navy Needs to Do to Stay Ahead,” Military.com, November 8, 2021.
135 See, for example, James Turnwall, “The Navy Is Losing the Missile Arms Race,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,
November 2019. For similar discussions regarding U.S. and Chinese air-to-air missiles, see Douglas Barrie, “Will
America’s Next Long-Range Air-to-Air Missile Match Up to China’s?” Defense One, October 22, 2019; Joseph
Trevithick, “Meet The AIM-260, The Air Force And Navy’s Future Long-Range Air-To-Air Missile,” The Drive, June
21, 2019; Thomas Newdick, “Testing Of The Secretive New AIM-260 Long-Range Air-To-Air Missile Is Well
Underway,” The Drive, November 22, 2021.
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In the FY 2023 budget request, the Department sustains the Tomahawk as the nation’s
premier all-weather, long-range, survivable deep strike offensive weapon to include new
production of and recertification of current inventory into modernized BLK V Tomahawk
missiles. BLK V(a) Maritime Strike Tomahawk (MST) provides a long range moving
maritime strike capability to meet current and future threats, supporting the Surface
Warfare Mission area through the inclusion of a seeker suite in the Tomahawk BLK V
missile. The FY 2023 budget request for MST provides continuation of Test and Evaluation
(T&E) plans that include missile functional ground testing and missile test flights from a
ground launcher apparatus to assess seeker performance, mature and refine seeker
algorithms, and provide verification and validation data for Modeling and Simulation. MST
IOC is planned for FY 2025. The FY 2023 budget request continues engineering,
manufacturing, and development of the Joint Multiple-Effects Warhead System (JMEWS),
which will deliver a hardened target penetration capability with the Tomahawk BLK V(b)
missile in FY 2027. The FY 2023 budget request continues engineering, manufacturing,
and development of the Military Code Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver, which
will deliver significant increased resiliency in spoofing and jamming threat environments
capability to the Tomahawk BLK V missile in FY 2026.
Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare (OASuW) Increment 1/ Long Range Anti-Ship
Missile (LRASM), OASuW Increment 2
The FY 2023 President’s Budget requests $226.0 million to fund Long Range Anti-Ship
Missile (LRASM) efforts associated with filling congressionally directed Operational
Testing, which includes telemetry kit installations and test support. FY 2023 also funds
procurement and installations of updated Weapon Data Link to satisfy compliance of NSA
crypto modification mandate, and procures 60 DON LRASM weapon systems. The FY
2023 President’s Budget also requests $12.8 million for completion of the LRASM 1.1
capability improvements.
The FY 2023 President’s Budget requests New Start authority to begin Technology
Development in support of OASuW Increment 2, now referred as Hypersonic Air
Launched OASuW (HALO). HALO supports the national imperative to mature hypersonic
capabilities. The program represents a longer-term capability that encompasses increased
performance and will provide the Navy a necessary air launched, carrier based weapon to
address evolving long range high speed threats from near peer competitors. In order to
deliver this capability to the warfighter when needed, the Navy will collaborate heavily
with the USAF.
Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM) & AARGM Extended-Range
AARGM procurement completed in FY 2021 with the award of the last DON Full Rate
Production (FRP) contract. There have been 1366 AARGMs (All Up Rounds, Training
Missiles, and Spares) delivered to the Fleet (as of March 2022). Program of record delivery
is 1803 missiles. Deliveries continue through FY 2024 in support of the transition to
AARGM-ER. AARGM-ER provides the DON with a 5th generation compatible extended
range asset to project power and provide Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses, both at-sea
and on land. The FY 2023 President’s Budget requests $90.8 million in RDT&E to support
operational and Integration testing of production representative hardware. The FY 2023
President’s Budget requests $131.3 million in WPN to procure 69 AARGM-ER All Up
Rounds and six Captive Air Training Missiles.136

136 Statement of Frederick J. Stefany, Principal Civilian Deputy, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research,
Development and Acquisition), Performing the Duties of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development
and Acquisition) and Vice Admiral Scott Conn, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Warfighting Requirements and
Capabilities (OPNAV N9) and Lieutenant General Karsten S. Heckl, Deputy Commandant, Combat Development and
Integration, Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, before the Subcommittee on
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An April 19, 2021, press report stated, “Exposing a new layer of long-range striking power for the
U.S. Navy carrier battle group, a photo obtained by Aerospace Daily shows what appears to be a
Raytheon RIM-174 SM-6 missile integrated on a left wing pylon of a Boeing F/A-18F Super
Hornet in flight.”137
The issue of the operating range of Navy carrier air wings is a key component of an ongoing
debate over the future survivability, utility, and cost-effectiveness of aircraft carriers and their air
wings, with critics arguing that the current operating range of Navy carrier air wings will force
Navy aircraft carriers to operate well within the ranges of Chinese ASBMs or other A2/AD
systems, which could put the carriers’ survivability at substantial risk, or alternatively require
carriers to operate beyond the range of those Chinese A2/AD systems, in locations that are safer
but so far away that the carriers and their air wings will contribute little combat capability.
A key U.S. Navy program for increasing the operating range of Navy carrier air wings is the MQ-
25 Stingray program, which is a program to acquire a carrier-based unmanned aerial vehicle
(UAV) for use as a tanker for in-flight refueling of manned carrier-based aircraft (with a
secondary mission of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance). Some observers, while not
necessarily objecting to the MQ-25 program, argue that the Navy should do more to increase the
operating range of Navy carrier air wings, such as developing a stealthy, carrier-based UAV
capable of penetrating enemy air defenses and striking land targets at very long ranges.
The issue of acquisition policies and the metrics for judging their success is discussed in more
detail in another CRS report.138
Legislative Activity for FY2023
Coverage in Related CRS Reports
A variety of CRS reports cover U.S. Navy programs that in varying degrees can be viewed as
responses to, at least in part, China’s naval modernization effort. These reports include but are not
limited to the following:
 CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke
 CRS Report RL32418, Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine
Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke
 CRS In Focus IF11826, Navy Next-Generation Attack Submarine (SSN[X])
Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke
 CRS Report RS20643, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke
 CRS Report RL30563, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program, by Jeremiah
Gertler (the JSF program is a joint DOD program with Navy participation)

Seapower of the Senate Armed Services Committee on Department of the Navy Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Request for
Seapower, April 26, 2022, PDF pages 31-33 of 37. See also Brian Everstine, “New U.S. Navy Weapons Plan Favors
Speed Over Range,” Aviation Week, September 19, 2022.
137 “The Weekly Debrief: Air-Launched, SM-6-Like Missile Exposed In New Test Photo,” Aviation Week, April 19,
2021.
138 See CRS Report R43838, Renewed Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress, by
Ronald O'Rourke.
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 CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke
 CRS In Focus IF11679, Navy DDG(X) Next-Generation Destroyer Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke
 CRS Report RL33745, Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke
 CRS Report R44972, Navy Constellation (FFG-62) Class Frigate Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke
 CRS Report R46374, Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke
 CRS In Focus IF11674, Navy Next-Generation Logistics Ship (NGLS) Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke
 CRS Report R45757, Navy Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke
 CRS Report R44175, Navy Lasers, Railgun, and Gun-Launched Guided
Projectile: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke
FY2023 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 7900/S. 4543)
House
Section 1065 of H.R. 7900 as reported by the House Armed Services Committee (H.Rept. 117-
397 of July 1, 2022) states
SEC. 1065. REPORTS ON EFFECTS OF STRATEGIC COMPETITOR NAVAL
FACILITIES IN AFRICA.
(a) INITIAL REPORT.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than May 15, 2023, the Secretary of Defense shall submit
to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the effects on the national security
of the United States of current or planned covered naval facilities in Africa.
(2) ELEMENTS.—The report required under paragraph (1) shall include the following:
(A) An identification of—
(i) any location in Africa where a covered naval facility has been established; and
(ii) any location in Africa where a covered naval facility is planned for construction.
(B) A detailed description of—
(i) any agreement entered into between China or Russia and a country or government in
Africa providing for or enabling the establishment or operation of a covered naval facility
in Africa; and
(ii) any efforts by the Department of Defense to change force posture, deployments, or
other activities in Africa as a result of current or planned covered naval facilities in Africa.
(C) An assessment of—
(i) the effect that each current covered naval facility has had on United States interests,
allies, and partners in and around Africa;
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(ii) the effect that each planned covered naval facility is expected to have on United States
interests, allies, and partners in and around Africa;
(iii) the policy objectives of China and Russia in establishing current and future covered
naval facilities at the locations identified under subparagraph (A); and
(iv) the specific military capabilities supported by each current or planned covered naval
facility.
(b) UPDATE TO REPORT.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than March 1, 2024, the Secretary of Defense shall submit
to the appropriate congressional committees a report containing an update to the report
required under subsection (a).
(2) ELEMENTS.—The report required under paragraph (1) shall include the following:
(A) An identification of—
(i) any location in Africa where a covered naval facility has been established since the date
of the submittal of the report under subsection (a); and
(ii) any location in Africa where a covered naval facility has been planned for construction
since such date.
(B) A detailed description of—
(i) any agreement entered into between China or Russia and country or government in
Africa since such date providing for or enabling the establishment of a covered naval
facility in Africa; and
(ii) any efforts by the Department of Defense since such date to change force posture,
deployments, or other activities in Africa as a result of current or planned covered naval
facilities in Africa.
(C) An updated assessment of—
(i) the effect that each current covered naval facility has had on United States interests,
allies, and partners in and around Africa since such date;
(ii) the effect that each planned covered naval facility has had on United States interests,
allies, and partners in and around Africa since such date;
(iii) the policy objectives of China and Russia, including new objectives and changes to
objectives, in establishing current and future covered naval facilities at the locations
identified in the report required under subsection (a) or in subparagraph (A); and
(iv) the specific military capabilities supported by each current or planned covered naval
facility at such locations, including new capabilities and changes to capabilities.
(D) A detailed description of—
(i) the policy of the Department of Defense surrounding strategic competitor efforts to
establish and maintain covered naval facilities in Africa; and
(ii) any actual or planned actions taken by the Department in response to such efforts and
in coordination with global Department priorities, as identified in the national defense
strategy under section 113(g) of title 10, United States Code.
(c) FORM.—A report required under subsection (a) or (b) shall be submitted in
unclassified form without any designation relating to dissemination control, but may
include a classified annex.
(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:
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(1) The term ‘‘Africa’’ means all countries in the area of operations of United States Africa
Command and Egypt.
(2) The term ‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ means—
(A) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and
(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
(3) The term ‘‘covered naval facility’’ means a naval facility owned, operated, or otherwise
controlled by the People’s Republic of China or the Russian Federation.
(4) The term ‘‘naval facility’’ means a naval base, civilian sea port with dual military uses,
or other facility intended for the use of warships or other naval vessels for refueling,
refitting, resupply, force projection, or other military purposes.
H.Rept. 117-397 states
Report on Air Force counter-maritime strategy
The committee notes the important work the Department of the Air Force is doing to
advance its ability to strike maritime targets, to include pursuit of the Joint Air-to-Surface
Standoff Missile, and test and integration activities to expand the compatibility of the
Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile. However, the committee is concerned that these efforts are
moving too slowly, and that wide gaps remain in the Department’s operational concepts,
plans, programs, capabilities and capacity for detecting and defeating adversary maritime
surface and subsurface forces from air and space at a scale that would be expected in an
Indo-Pacific conflict. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force, in
coordination with the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of the Army, to prepare a
report to the congressional defense committees by March 1, 2023 as to the strategy and
implementation plan for conducting counter-maritime operations.
The report shall include:
(1) operational concepts, plans, programs and key enabling technologies for detecting,
tracking and defeating a range of adversary maritime vessels, including while underway;
(2) how the Air Force command and control enterprise will support long-range standoff
fires for maritime engagements, to include proficient use of data link and joint range
extension networks required for dynamic weapons employment;
(3) how the air battle management system will incorporate sensing data for maritime
targets;
(4) how the bomber fleet, and specifically the B–21 program of record, accounts for the
capacity required for a counter-maritime role in addition to other mission sets, and if not,
provide an updated fleet size;
(5) what steps the Air Force will take and what resources are required to establish an
inventory in such quantities of appropriate munitions that achieve desired effects in
counter-maritime operations;
(6) what capability is needed to engage targets beyond the range of a Joint Direct Attack
Munition and inside the range of a Joint Air to Surface Stand-off Missile in a cost effective
way and an estimate of the funds necessary to accrue the capability in required quantities;
(7) considerations and modifications required for various platforms to carry munitions for
maritime engagement;
(8) what steps the Air Force is taking to ensure its training methods and simulators prepare
warfighters for the counter-maritime mission set alongside the Joint force;
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(9) an explanation of how the Air Force intends to integrate and leverage Department of
the Navy capabilities and technologies in its detection, targeting and engagement methods;
and
(10) an overall assessment of funding to include projected shortfalls and alternative near-
term funding opportunities in order to rapidly develop, test and field counter-maritime
capabilities from now and over the next five years. (Pages 35-36)

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link to page 12 link to page 13 China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities

Appendix A. Comparing U.S. and Chinese Numbers
of Ships and Naval Capabilities
This appendix presents some additional discussion of factors involved in comparing U.S. and
Chinese numbers of ships and naval capabilities.
U.S. and Chinese naval capabilities are sometimes compared by showing comparative numbers of
U.S. and Chinese ships. Although the total number of ships in a navy (or a navy’s aggregate
tonnage) is relatively easy to calculate, it is a one-dimensional measure that leaves out numerous
other factors that bear on a navy’s capabilities and how those capabilities compare to its assigned
missions. One-dimensional comparisons of the total numbers of ships in China’s navy and the
U.S. Navy are highly problematic as a means of assessing relative U.S. and Chinese naval
capabilities and how those capabilities compare to the missions assigned to those navies, for the
following reasons:
 A fleet’s total number of ships (or its aggregate tonnage) is only a partial
metric of its capability. Many factors other than ship numbers (or aggregate
tonnage) contribute to naval capability, including types of ships, types and
numbers of aircraft, the sophistication of sensors, weapons, C4ISR systems, and
networking capabilities, supporting maintenance and logistics capabilities,
doctrine and tactics, the quality, education, and training of personnel, and the
realism and complexity of exercises. In light of this, navies with similar numbers
of ships or similar aggregate tonnages can have significantly different
capabilities, and navy-to-navy comparisons of numbers of ships or aggregate
tonnages can provide a highly inaccurate sense of their relative capabilities. The
warfighting capabilities of navies have derived increasingly from the
sophistication of their internal electronics and software. This factor can vary
greatly from one navy to the next, and often cannot be easily assessed by outside
observation. As the importance of internal electronics and software has grown,
the idea of comparing the warfighting capabilities of navies principally on the
basis of easily observed factors such as ship numbers and tonnages has become
increasingly less reliable, and today is highly problematic.
 Total numbers of ships of a given type (such as submarines or surface
combatants) can obscure potentially significant differences in the
capabilities of those ships, both between navies and within one country’s
navy. Differences in capabilities of ships of a given type can arise from a number
of other factors, including sensors, weapons, C4ISR systems, networking
capabilities, stealth features, damage-control features, cruising range, maximum
speed, and reliability and maintainability (which can affect the amount of time
the ship is available for operation).
 A focus on total ship numbers reinforces the notion that changes in total
numbers necessarily translate into corresponding or proportional changes in
aggregate capability. For a Navy like China’s, which is modernizing by
replacing older, obsolescent ships with more modern and more capable ships, this
is not necessarily the case. For example, while China’s attack submarine force
has only a modestly larger number of boats now than it had in 2000 or 2005 (see
Table 1 and Table 2), it has considerably more aggregate capability than it did in
2000 or 2005, because the force today includes a much larger percentage of
relatively modern designs.
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 Comparisons of total numbers of ships (or aggregate tonnages) do not take
into account the differing global responsibilities and homeporting locations
of each fleet. The U.S. Navy has substantial worldwide responsibilities, and a
substantial fraction of the U.S. fleet is homeported in the Atlantic. As a
consequence, only a certain portion of the U.S. Navy might be available for a
crisis or conflict scenario in China’s near-seas region, or could reach that area
within a certain amount of time. In contrast, China’s navy has more-limited
responsibilities outside China’s near-seas region, and its ships are all homeported
along China’s coast at locations that face directly onto China’s near-seas region.
In a U.S.-China conflict inside the first island chain, U.S. naval and other forces
would be operating at the end of generally long supply lines, while Chinese naval
and other forces would be operating at the end of generally short supply lines.
 Comparisons of numbers of ships (or aggregate tonnages) do not take into
account maritime-relevant military capabilities that countries might have
outside their navies, such as land-based anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs),
land-based anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), and land-based Air Force aircraft
armed with ASCMs or other weapons. Given the significant maritime-relevant
non-navy forces present in both the U.S. and Chinese militaries, this is a
particularly important consideration in comparing U.S. and Chinese military
capabilities for influencing events in the Western Pacific. Although a U.S.-China
incident at sea might involve only navy units on both sides, a broader U.S.-China
military conflict would more likely be a force-on-force engagement involving
multiple branches of each country’s military.
 The missions to be performed by one country’s navy can differ greatly from
the missions to be performed by another country’s navy. Consequently,
navies are better measured against their respective missions than against one
another. Although Navy A might have less capability than Navy B, Navy A might
nevertheless be better able to perform Navy A’s intended missions than Navy B
is to perform Navy B’s intended missions. This is another significant
consideration in assessing U.S. and Chinese naval capabilities, because the
missions of the two navies are quite different.
As mentioned earlier, while comparisons of the total numbers of ships in China’s Navy and the
U.S. Navy are highly problematic as a means of assessing relative U.S. and Chinese naval
capabilities and how those capabilities compare to the missions assigned to those navies, an
examination of the trends over time in the relative numbers of ships can shed some light on how
the relative balance of U.S. and Chinese naval capabilities might be changing over time.
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Appendix B. U.S. Navy’s Ability to Counter
Chinese ASBMs and Hypersonic Weapons
This appendix provides additional discussion of the issue of the U.S. Navy’s ability to counter
China’s ASBMs and hypersonic weapons.
Ability to Counter ASBMs
Although China’s projected ASBM, as a new type of weapon, might be considered a “game
changer,” that does not mean it cannot be countered. There are several potential approaches for
countering an ASBM that can be imagined, and these approaches could be used in combination.
The ASBM is not the first “game changer” that the Navy has confronted; the Navy in the past has
developed counters for other new types of weapons, such as ASCMs, and is likely exploring
various approaches for countering ASBMs.
Countering China’s projected ASBMs could involve employing a combination of active (i.e.,
“hard-kill”) measures, such as shooting down ASBMs with interceptor missiles, and passive (i.e.,
“soft-kill”) measures, such as those for masking the exact location of Navy ships or confusing
ASBM reentry vehicles. Employing a combination of active and passive measures would attack
various points in the ASBM “kill chain”—the sequence of events that needs to be completed to
carry out a successful ASBM attack. This sequence includes detection, identification, and
localization of the target ship, transmission of that data to the ASBM launcher, firing the ASBM,
and having the ASBM reentry vehicle find the target ship.
Attacking various points in an opponent’s kill chain is an established method for countering an
opponent’s military capability. A September 30, 2011, press report, for example, quotes
Lieutenant General Herbert Carlisle, the Air Force’s deputy chief of staff for operations, plans,
and requirements, as stating in regard to Air Force planning that “We’ve taken [China’s] kill
chains apart to the ‘nth’ degree.”139
To attack the ASBM kill chain, Navy surface ships, for example, could operate in ways (such as
controlling electromagnetic emissions or using deception emitters) that make it more difficult for
China to detect, identify, and track those ships.140 The Navy could acquire weapons and systems
for disabling or jamming China’s long-range maritime surveillance and targeting systems, for
attacking ASBM launchers, for destroying ASBMs in various stages of flight, and for decoying

139 David A. Fulghum, “USAF: Slash And Burn Defense Cuts Will Cost Missions, Capabilities,” Aerospace Daily &
Defense Report, September 30, 2011: 6.
140 For a journal article discussing actions by the Navy during the period 1956-1972 to conceal the exact locations of
Navy ships, see Robert G. Angevine, “Hiding in Plain Sight, The U.S. Navy and Dispersed Operations Under EMCON,
1956-1972,” Naval War College Review, Spring 2011: 79-95. See also Jonathan F. Sullivan, Defending the Fleet From
China’s Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile: Naval Deception’s Roles in Sea-Based Missile Defense, A Thesis submitted to the
Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Security Studies, April 15, 2011, accessed August 10, 2011, at
http://gradworks.umi.com/1491548.pdf; Jon Solomon, “Deception and the Backfire Bomber: Reexamining the Late
Cold War Struggle Between Soviet Maritime Reconnaissance and U.S. Navy Countertargeting,” Information
Dissemination (www.informationdissemination.net), October 27, 2014; John Solomon, “Deception and the Backfire
Bomber, Part II,” Information Dissemination (www.informationdissemination.net), October 28, 2014; John Solomon,
“Deception and the Backfire Bomber, Part III,” Information Dissemination (www.informationdissemination.net),
October 29, 2014; John Solomon, “Deception and the Backfire Bomber, Part IV,” Information Dissemination
(www.informationdissemination.net), October 30, 2014.
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and confusing ASBMs as they approach their intended targets. Options for destroying ASBMs in
flight include the SM-3 midcourse BMD interceptor missile (including the new Block IIA
version), the SM-6 terminal-defense BMD interceptor missile,141 and accelerating development
and deployment of the hypervelocity projectile (HVP), electromagnetic rail gun (EMRG), and
solid state lasers (SSLs).142 Options for decoying and confusing ASBMs as they approach their
intended targets include equipping ships with systems, such as electronic warfare systems or
systems for generating radar-opaque smoke clouds or radar-opaque carbon-fiber clouds, that
could confuse an ASBM’s terminal-guidance radar.143
An October 4, 2016, press report states the following:
Several times in the past, [Chief of Naval Operations John] Richardson has stressed that
long range weapons developments from adversarial nations like Russia and China aren't
the end-all, be-all of naval conflicts.
Just because China’s “carrier-killer” missile has a greater range than the planes aboard a
US aircraft carrier doesn't mean the US would shy away from deploying a carrier within
that range, Richardson has stated on different occasions.
Again, Richardson challenged the notion that a so-called A2/AD zone was “an
impenetrable keep out zone that forces can only enter at extreme peril to their existence,
let alone their mission.”
Richardson took particular issue with the “denial” aspect of A2/AD, repeating his assertion
that this denial is an “aspiration” not a “fait accompli.” The maps so common in
representing these threats often mark off the limits of different system’s ranges with “red
arcs that extend off coastlines,” with the implication that military forces crossing these
lines face “certain destruction.”
But this is all speculation according to Richardson: “The reality is far more complex, it’s
actually really hard to achieve a hit. It requires the completion of a really complex chain of
events.... these arcs represent danger for sure... but the threats they are based on are not
insurmountable, and can be managed, will be managed.”
“We can fight from within these defended areas, and we will... this is nothing new and has
been done before,” said Richardson.
So while Russia and China can develop missiles and radars and declare their ranges on
paper, things get a lot trickier in the real world, where the US has the most and best
experience in operating.
“Potential adversaries actually have different geographic features like choke points,
islands, ocean currents, mountains,” said Richardson, who urged against oversimplifying
complicated, and always unique circumstances in so-called A2/AD zones.

141 For more on the SM-3, including the Block IIA version, and the SM-6, see CRS Report RL33745, Navy Aegis
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
142 For more on HVP, EMRG, and SSLs, see CRS Report R44175, Navy Lasers, Railgun, and Gun-Launched Guided
Projectile: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
143 Regarding electronic warfare, see, for example, Brett Tingley, “The Navy’s Secretive And Revolutionary Program
To Project False Fleets From Drone Swarms,” The Drive, November 7, 2019. Regarding the option of systems for
generating radar-opaque smoke clouds, Thomas J. Culora, “The Strategic Implications of Obscurants,” Naval War
College Review, Summer 2010: 73-84; Scott Tait, “Make Smoke!” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 2011: 58-63.
Regarding radar-opaque carbon-fiber clouds, see “7th Fleet Tests Innovative Missile Defense System,” Navy News
Services, June 26, 2014; Kevin McCaney, “Navy’s Carbon-Fiber Clouds Could Make Incoming Missiles Miss Their
Targets,” Defense Systems (http://defensesystems.com), June 27, 2014. See also Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Cyber, EW
Are Secret Missile Defense Weapons Too Secret To Use,” Breaking Defense, December 4, 2015.
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“Have no doubt, the US navy is prepared to go wherever it needs to go, at any time, and
stay there for as long as necessary in response to our leadership’s call to project our
strategic influence,” Richardson concluded.
Similarly, an August 29, 2016, press report states the following:
The United States Navy is absolutely confident in the ability of its aircraft carriers and
carrier air wings to fly and fight within zones defended by so-called anti-access/area denial
(A2/AD) weapons....
In the view of the U.S. Navy leadership, A2/AD—as it is now called—has existed since
the dawn of warfare when primitive man was fighting with rocks and spears. Overtime,
A2/AD techniques have evolved as technology has improved with ever-greater range and
lethality. Rocks and spears eventually gave way to bows and arrows, muskets and cannons.
Thus, the advent of long-range anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles is simply another
technological evolution of A2/AD.
“This is the next play in that,” Adm. John Richardson, chief of naval operations, told The
National Interest on Aug. 25 during an interview in his office in the Pentagon. “This
A2/AD, well, it’s certainly a goal for some of our competitors, but achieving that goal is
much different and much more complicated.”
Indeed, as many U.S. Navy commanders including Richardson and Rear Adm. (Upper
Half) DeWolfe Miller, the service’s director of air warfare, have pointed out, anti-access
bubbles defended by Chinese DF-21D or DF-26 anti-ship ballistic missile systems or
Russian Bastion-P supersonic anti-ship missile systems are not impenetrable ‘Iron Domes.’
Nor do formidable Russian and Chinese air defense systems such as the S-400 or HQ-9
necessarily render the airspace they protect into no-go zones for the carrier air wing.
Asked directly if he was confident in the ability of the aircraft carrier and its air wing to
fight inside an A2/AD zone protected by anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles as well as
advanced air defenses, Richardson was unequivocal in his answer. “Yes,” Richardson
said—but he would not say how exactly how due to the need for operational security. “It’s
really a suite of capabilities, but I actually think we’re talking too much in the open about
some of the things we’re doing, so I want to be thoughtful about how we talk about things
so we don’t give any of our competitors an advantage.”...
Miller said that there have been threats to the carrier since the dawn of naval aviation. In
many ways, the threat to the carrier was arguably much greater during the Cold War when
the Soviet Union massed entire regiments of Tupolev Tu-22M3 Backfires and deployed
massive cruise missile-armed Oscar-class SSGN submarines to hunt down and destroy the
Navy’s flattops. The service developed ways to defeat the Soviet threat—and the carrier
will adapt to fight in the current environment.
“We could have had this interview twenty-years-ago and there would have been a threat,”
Miller said. “The nature of war and A2/AD is not new—that’s my point. I don’t want to
downplay it, but our improvements in information warfare, electronic warfare, payloads,
the weapons systems that we’ve previously talked about—plus our ability to train to those
capabilities that we have—we will create sanctuaries, we’ll fight in those sanctuaries and
we’re a maneuver force.”144
An October 18, 2017, blog post states the following:

144 Dave Majumdar, “Chief of Naval Operations Richardson: US Aircraft Carriers Can Fight Inside A2/AD Zones,”
National Interest, August 29, 2016. See also Ryan Pickrell, “Navy Admirals Brush Aside Biggest Worry Of Modern
Naval Combat,” Daily Caller, August 31, 2016; Dave Majumdar, “Here Is Why the US Military Is Not In Panic Mode
Over China’s Carrier-Killer Missiles,” National Interest, June 20, 2016.
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Assuming the DF-21D is ready for battle, can America defend against China’s mighty
missile?
While opinions are clearly mixed—in speaking to many sources over the last several years
on this topic—it seems clear there is great nervousness in U.S. defense circles. However,
as time has passed, initial fears have turned towards a more optimistic assessment....
In the end, the weapon might not be the great “game-changer” that many point it out to be,
but a great complicator.145
A January 28, 2021, press report states
The U.S. Navy’s top intelligence officer has said the service is watching closely as China
expands its anti-ship missile capabilities, particularly in and around the disputed South
China Sea, to include the ongoing development of long-range anti-ship ballistic missiles.
At the same time, he said he “hopes” that China’s People’s Liberation Army will continue
to invest significant resources into these efforts, hinting that the U.S. Navy already has
extensive measures to counter these threats already in use now or in development.
Navy Vice Admiral Jeffrey Trussler, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information
Warfare, made his remarks about China’s anti-ship missile arsenal during an online event
put on by the non-profit Intelligence and National Security Alliance on Jan. 27, 2021….
… not only did Vice Admiral Trussler seem less concerned about PLA anti-ship missile
capabilities than one would expect, he made clear he was happy with them continuing to
pour time and resources into those efforts.
“I hope they just keep pouring money into that type of thing,” he said. “That may not be
how we win the next war.”
The clear indication here is that Trussler is aware of countermeasures, whether they be
certain systems or tactics, techniques, and procedures, that are either available now or in
development. The Vice Admiral did not offer any specific details about what the Navy is
doing to go along with these remarks….
We also know that, by 2019, warships assigned to the Navy’s 7th Fleet, which is based in
Japan, were fitted with the AN/SLQ-59 Transportable Electronic Warfare Modules
(TEWM). TEWM is described as a “counter-terminal threat defensive system,” indicating
that it is designed to help defeat incoming anti-ship missiles, or other threats, such as
swarms of small drones, in the final phase of their attack on a ship. Based on the
information available, The War Zone previously assessed that the AN/SLQ-59 was most
likely acquired in response to growing cruise missile threats, and Chinese developments,
in particular, given its fielding first on ships forward-deployed in Japan.
The Navy has also been hard at work developing an entire networked electronic warfare
“ecosystem,” as part of its shadowy Netted Emulation of Multi-Element Signature against
Integrated Sensors program, or NEMESIS. The goal here has been to craft a ‘system of
systems’ comprising of various manned and unmanned ships, as well as submarines and
aircraft, equipped with electronic warfare systems that can work together cooperatively.
One of the key uses of these capabilities would be to generate signals that mimic real fleets
of ships and aircraft to distract and confuse opponents, making it difficult for them to
effectively spot and target real Navy assets. These networked electronic warfare platforms
could also employ other kinds of electronic warfare tactics across a broad area to protect

145 Harry J. Kazianis, “Could China’s Aircraft Carrier Killer Missiles ‘Sink’ the U.S. Navy?” National Interest, October
18, 2017. See also Dick Mosier, “Breaking the Anti-Ship Missile Kill Chain,” Center for International Maritime
Security, February 26, 2018; Richard A. Bitzinger, “The Myth of the ‘Game-Changer’ Weapon,” Asia Times, April 26,
2018.
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against various kinds of threats. You can read more about NEMSIS in detail in this past
War Zone feature.146
A highly adaptive and deeply networked electronic warfare ecosystem could be particularly
useful against long-range anti-ship missile strikes, especially using ballistic missiles, which
would require targeting information from offboard platforms and the ability to send
updated information to the weapon during the mid-course stage of flight….
The Navy does have Arleigh Burke class destroyers outfitted specifically for ballistic
missile defense, including the ability to launch the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor, which is
designed to knock down ballistic missiles during the mid-course portion of their flight.
Those ships are also slated to get interceptors designed to bring down hypersonic weapons
in the future as part of the Regional Glide Phase Weapon System (RGPWS) program….
The Navy, which has been looking to stop deploying Arleigh Burkes on dedicated missile
defense missions, could seek to make more widespread use of the SM-3 Block IIA in the
future. Those destroyers and other ships could gain additional missile defense capabilities
as the improved Block IB variant of the SM-6 missile begins to enter service. Existing
Block I and IA versions of the SM-6 already have the ability to intercept ballistic missiles
during the terminal phase of their flight, as well as engage various other aerial and surface
threats. The SM-6, in particular, potentially provides a potent defense against anti-ship
ballistic missiles, especially those that break through mid-course traditional ballistic
missile defenses, if mid-course ballistic missile defense assets are available at all.
There’s the possibility that Vice Admiral Trussler is aware of other developments in the
classified realm that could further mitigate some or all of these threats, as well. Beyond
that, there’s no discounting that his public comments, which are certain to be scrutinized
by the PLA itself, are a form of misinformation designed to prompt concerns within the
Chinese military that its priorities may be, in some way, seriously off base.
Whatever the case, the threat posed by China’s anti-ship missile arsenal, which continues
to grow in capability, including with the development of new anti-ship ballistic missiles, is
real. At the same time, while the Navy obviously knows this, the service seems to be
strongly hinting that it feels it making very good progress on getting around these
challenges, or at least wants to make the Chinese think so.147
Regarding the above-reported remarks by Vice Admiral Trussler, a January 29, 2021, press report
stated
That confident [U.S. Navy] posture caught the attention of the Chinese military
establishment. “What Trussler is saying is that the U.S. has sufficient power to handle the
anti-ship missile threat from China,” former People’s Liberation Army instructor Song
Zhongping told the South China Morning Post on Friday [January 29]. “The U.S. is
emphasizing that threat and it will further boost its defenses against Chinese missiles.”148

146 The article linked at this point is Brett Tingley, “The Navy’s Secretive And Revolutionary Program To Project False
Fleets From Drone Swarms,” The Drive, November 7, 2019.
147 Joseph Trevithick, “Top Navy Intel Officer Hopes China Will Keep Dumping Money Into Anti-Ship Ballistic
Missiles, The Navy Is Strongly Hinting that It Feels It Is Well on Its Way to Mitigating the Very Real Threats Posed by
Anti-Ship Ballistic and Cruise Missiles,” The Drive, January 28, 2021. See also Mallory Shelbourne, “U.S. Admiral:
China Can ‘Keep Pouring Money’ Into Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles,” USNI News, January 27, 2021.
148 Joel Gehrke, “China’s ‘Carrier Killer’ and Military Won’t ‘Win the Next War,’ US Admiral Says,” Washington
Examiner, January 29, 2021. The South China Morning Post article being cited is Teddy Ng and Minnie Chan, “US
Admiral Calls China’s Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles a ‘Destabilising Effort’ that May Not Win a War,” South China
Morning Post, January 29, 2021. See also Kris Osborn, “Could the US Navy Destroy Attacking Chinese ‘Carrier-
Killer’ DF-26 Anti-Ship Missiles?” Warrior Maven, October 11, 2022.
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Ability to Counter Hypersonic Weapons
Regarding the Navy’s ability to counter hypersonic weapons, a June 24, 2022, press report states
Raytheon Technologies and Northrop Grumman have each won contracts to continue
developing hypersonic weapons interceptors in a Missile Defense Agency-led competition,
according to a June 24 Pentagon contract announcement.
Each company was awarded a firm-fixed price modification to a previously awarded
contract for rapid prototyping. Each modification is worth roughly $41.5 million, bringing
the total contract value thus far to around $61 million each, according to the contract
announcement.
In November 2021, the MDA chose the two companies along with Lockheed Martin to
design the Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI) for regional hypersonic missile defense. Through
other transactional agreements, the companies entered an “accelerated concept design”
phase.
The interceptors are intended to counter a hypersonic weapon during its glide phase of
flight, a challenge as the missiles can travel more than five times the speed of sound and
can maneuver, making it hard to predict a missile’s trajectory.
The interceptors will be designed to fit into the U.S. Navy’s current Aegis Ballistic Missile
Defense destroyers. It will be fired from its standard Vertical Launch System and integrated
with the modified Baseline 9 Aegis Weapon System that detects, tracks, controls and
engages hypersonic threats.149

Author Information

Ronald O'Rourke

Specialist in Naval Affairs

149 Jen Judson, “Raytheon, Northrop Advance in Competition to Develop Hypersonic Weapons Interceptor,” Defense
News, June 24, 2022. See also Jason Sherman, “MDA Selects Raytheon, Northrop to Advance in GPI Design Contest;
Lockheed Sidelined,” Inside Defense, June 24, 2022; Andrew Eversden, “Northrop, Raytheon Selected to Continue
Work on Hypersonic Missile Interceptor,” Breaking Defense, June 27, 2022; Rich Abott, “Raytheon And Northrop
Grumman Win Mods To Continue Refining Hypersonic Defense Concepts,” Defense Daily, November 16, 2022.
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