Nuclear Cooperation with Other Countries:
November 17, 2022
A Primer
Paul K. Kerr
In order for the United States to engage in significant civilian nuclear cooperation with other
Specialist in
states, it must conclude a framework agreement that meets specific requirements under Section
Nonproliferation
123 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA). Significant nuclear cooperation includes the export of

reactors, critical parts of reactors, and reactor fuel. The AEA also provides for export control
Mary Beth D. Nikitin
licensing procedures and criteria for terminating cooperation. Congressional review is required
Specialist in
for Section 123 agreements; the AEA establishes special parliamentary procedures by which
Nonproliferation
Congress may act on a proposed agreement.

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What Is a “Section 123” Agreement?
Under the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954, as amended (P.L. 83-703; 42 U.S.C. §2153 et
seq.),1 all significant U.S. nondefense nuclear cooperation with other countries requires a nuclear
cooperation agreement.2 Significant nuclear cooperation includes the transfer of U.S.-origin
special nuclear material3 subject to licensing for commercial, medical, and industrial purposes,
and the export of reactors and critical parts of reactors. Section 123 agreements are required for
the export of commodities under Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) export licensing
authority (10 C.F.R. 110).4
Such agreements, which are “congressional-executive agreements” requiring congressional
approval, set the terms of reference and authorize cooperation but do not guarantee that
cooperation will take place. The AEA includes requirements for an agreement’s content,
conditions for the President to exempt an agreement from those requirements, presidential
determinations and other supporting information to be submitted to Congress, conditions
affecting the implementation of an agreement once it takes effect, and procedures for Congress to
consider and approve the agreement.
Section 123 of the AEA requires that any agreement for nuclear cooperation meet nine
nonproliferation criteria and that the President submit any such agreement to the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. The Department
of State is required to provide the President with an unclassified Nuclear Proliferation Assessment
Statement (NPAS), which the President is to submit, along with the agreement, to those two
committees. The State Department is also required to provide a classified annex to the NPAS,
prepared in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence. The NPAS is meant to explain

1 The Atomic Energy Act (AEA) was amended by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA) (P.L. 95-242) to
include stringent nonproliferation requirements for significant U.S. nuclear exports. For example, the act required
nonnuclear-weapon states to have comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards as a condition for
entering into nuclear cooperation agreements with the United States. For existing and future agreements, the NNPA
added a provision for Congress to review export licenses. The act also included a provision for halting exports if a
country tested a nuclear device, violated safeguards agreements, or continued nuclear weapons-related activities.
The AEA also authorizes U.S. government transfer to foreign governments of information, as well as certain
components, related to nuclear weapons. The AEA authorizes the export of nuclear reactors and related information for
naval propulsion. This report does not cover such agreements.
2 Section 57b. (2) of the AEA allows for limited forms of nuclear cooperation related to the “development or
production of any special nuclear material outside of the United States” without a nuclear cooperation agreement if that
activity has been authorized by the Secretary of Energy following a determination that it “will not be inimical to the
interest of the United States.” Agreements governing such cooperation are also known as “Section 810” agreements,
after 10 Code of Federal Regulations Part 810. (See “Part 810 Agreements.”)
A nuclear cooperation agreement is not required for transmission of nuclear-related information, except for restricted
data. “Restricted data,” defined by the statute, means “all data concerning (1) design, manufacture, or utilization of
atomic weapons; (2) the production of special nuclear material; or (3) the use of special nuclear material in the
production of energy.” Restricted data, however does not “include data declassified or removed from the Restricted
Data [sic] category” pursuant to the AEA. A nuclear cooperation agreement is necessary, though not necessarily
sufficient, to permit the transfer of restricted data.
3 “Special nuclear material,” defined by the AEA, means “(1) plutonium, uranium enriched in the isotopes 233 or 235,
and any other material” that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) “determines to be special nuclear material, but
does not include source material, or (2) any material artificially enriched by any of the foregoing, but does not include
source material.” The AEA defines “source material” as “(1) uranium, thorium, or any other material” determined by
the NRC “to be source material; or (2) ores containing one or more of the foregoing materials, in such concentration as
the Commission may by regulation determine.”
4 For a list of commodities, see http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/ip/export-import.html. 123 agreements are not required
for U.S. exports of nuclear-related dual-use items, which are controlled for export by the Commerce Department.
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Nuclear Cooperation with Other Countries: A Primer

the agreement’s compliance with the AEA nonproliferation requirements. The President must also
make a written determination “that the performance of the proposed agreement will promote and
will not constitute an unreasonable risk to, the common defense and security.”
Requirements Under the Atomic Energy Act
Section 123 of the AEA specifies the necessary steps for engaging in nuclear cooperation with
another country.
 Section 123a. states that the proposed agreement is to include the terms,
conditions, duration, nature, and scope of cooperation and lists nine criteria that
the agreement must meet. This section also contains provisions for the President
to exempt an agreement from any of these criteria and specifies information the
executive branch must provide to Congress.
 Section 123b. specifies the process for submitting the text of the agreement to
Congress.
 Section 123c. specifies the procedure for congressional approval of cooperation
agreements that are limited in scope (e.g., do not transfer nuclear material or
cover reactors larger than 5 megawatts electric [MWe]). This report does not
discuss such agreements.
 Section 123d. specifies the procedure for congressional approval of agreements
that do cover significant nuclear cooperation (transfer of nuclear material or
reactors larger than 5 MWe), including exempted agreements.
Section 123a., paragraphs (1) through (9), lists nine criteria that an agreement with a nonnuclear-
weapon state must meet unless the President determines an exemption is necessary. These include
guarantees that
 safeguards on transferred nuclear material and equipment continue in perpetuity;
 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) comprehensive safeguards are
applied in nonnuclear-weapon states;5
 nothing transferred is used for any nuclear explosive device or for any other
military purpose; the United States has the right to demand the return of
transferred nuclear materials and equipment, as well as any special nuclear
material produced through their use, if the cooperating state detonates a nuclear
explosive device or terminates or abrogates an IAEA safeguards agreement;
 no retransfer of material or restricted data occur without U.S. consent;
 recipient states maintain physical security on transferred nuclear material;
 recipient states obtain approval before enriching or reprocessing transferred
nuclear material or nuclear material produced with materials or facilities
transferred pursuant to the agreement;
 recipient states obtain U.S. advance approval for storage of transferred plutonium
and highly enriched uranium; and

5 Comprehensive safeguards agreements are based on a model described in INFCIRC 153, which states that such
agreements “should provide for the Agency's right and obligation to ensure that safeguards will be applied” to all
nuclear material of potential proliferation concern “in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of the State,
under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material
is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”
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 any material or facilities produced or constructed through use of sensitive nuclear
technology transferred under the cooperation agreement is subject to all of the
above requirements.
Although some experts have advocated requiring governments to forgo enrichment and
reprocessing (a nonproliferation commitment sometimes referred to as the “Gold Standard”) as a
condition for concluding a nuclear cooperation agreement, the Atomic Energy Act does not
include such a requirement (see Appendix B).
Exempted vs. Nonexempted Agreements
The President may exempt an agreement for cooperation from any of the requirements in Section
123a. if the President determines that the requirement would be “seriously prejudicial to the
achievement of U.S. nonproliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and
security.” The AEA provides different requirements, conditions, and procedures for exempt and
nonexempt agreements.6 To date, all of the Section 123 agreements in force are nonexempt
agreements.7 The Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of
2006 (P.L. 109-401) exempted nuclear cooperation with India from some of the AEA’s
requirements.8
Congressional Review
Under the AEA, Congress has the opportunity to review a nuclear cooperation agreement for two
time periods totaling 90 days of continuous session.9 The President must submit the text of the
proposed agreement, along with required supporting documents (including the unclassified
NPAS) to the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
The President is to consult with the committees “for a period of not less than 30 days of
continuous session.” After this period of consultation, the President is to submit the agreement to
Congress, along with the classified annex to the NPAS and a statement of the President’s
approval of the agreement and determination that it will not damage U.S. national security
interests. This action begins the second period, which consists of 60 days of continuous session.
In practice, the President has sent the agreement to Congress at the beginning of the full 90-day
period, which begins on the date of transmittal. Typically, the 60-day period has immediately
followed the expiration of the 30-day period. The President transmits the text of the proposed
agreement along with a letter of support with a national security determination, the unclassified
NPAS, its classified annex, and letters of support for the agreement from the Secretary of State
and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

6 Nuclear cooperation agreements with nuclear weapon states recognized by the NPT are provided for in the AEA, and
are therefore nonexempt agreements. The NPT defines nuclear-weapon states as those that exploded a nuclear weapon
or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. All other NPT states-parties are nonnuclear-weapon states.
7 The United States has concluded more than 20 bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements, as well as similar agreements
with the European Atomic Energy Community and the IAEA. See Nuclear Commerce: Governmentwide Strategy
Could Help Increase Commercial Benefits from U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Agreements with Other Countries,
Government Accountability Office, GAO-11-36, November 2010.
8 See CRS Report RL33016, U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress, by Paul K. Kerr.
9 When calculating periods of “continuous session” under the AEA, every calendar day is counted, including Saturdays
and Sundays. Only days on which either chamber has adjourned for more than three days pursuant to the adoption a
concurrent resolution authorizing the adjournment do not count toward the total. If Congress adjourns its final session
sine die, continuity of session is broken, and the count must start anew when it reconvenes.
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If the President has not exempted the agreement from any Section 123a requirements, the
agreement may enter into force after the end of the 60-day period unless, during that time,
Congress adopts a joint resolution disapproving the agreement and the resolution becomes law.
In order for an exempted agreement to enter into force, Congress must adopt a joint resolution of
approval and it must become law by the end of the 60-day period. At the beginning of this 60-day
period, joint resolutions of approval or disapproval, as appropriate, are to be automatically
introduced in each house. During this period, the committees are to hold hearings on the proposed
agreement and “submit a report to their respective bodies recommending whether it should be
approved or disapproved.” If either committee has not reported the requisite joint resolution of
approval or disapproval by the end of 45 days, the resolution is automatically discharged from
further consideration of the measure. After the joint resolution is reported or discharged, Congress
is to consider it under expedited procedures, as established by Section 130.i. of the AEA.
Congress has used procedures outside the above-described process to adopt legislation approving
some nuclear cooperation agreements (see Appendix C).
Section 202 of P.L. 110-369, the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and
Nonproliferation Enhancement Act, which President Bush signed into law October 8, 2008,
amended Section 123 of the AEA to require the President to keep the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee “fully and currently informed of any
initiative or negotiations relating to a new or amended agreement for peaceful nuclear
cooperation.”
Export Licensing
The AEA sets out procedures for licensing exports to states with which the United States has
nuclear cooperation agreements. (Sections 126, 127, and 128 codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
2155, 2156, 2157). Each export of nuclear material, equipment, or technology requires a specific
export license or other authorization. The NRC is required to meet criteria in Sections 127 and
128 when authorizing export licenses. These criteria are as follows:
 Application of IAEA safeguards to any material or facilities proposed to be
exported, material or facilities previously exported, and to any special nuclear
material used in or produced through the use thereof (these are not
comprehensive safeguards, but safeguards required under NPT Article III.2).
 Nothing exported can be used for any nuclear explosive device or for research on
or development of any nuclear explosive device.
 Recipient states must have adequate physical security on “such material or
facilities proposed to be exported and to any special nuclear material used in or
produced through the use thereof.”
 Recipient states are not to retransfer exported nuclear materials, facilities,
sensitive nuclear technology, or “special nuclear material produced through the
use of such material” without prior U.S. approval.
 Recipient states may not reprocess or alter in form or content exported nuclear
material or special nuclear material produced though the use of exported nuclear
material without prior U.S. approval.
 The foregoing conditions must be applied to any nuclear material or equipment
that is produced or constructed under the jurisdiction of the recipient by or
through the use of any exported sensitive nuclear technology.
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Nuclear Cooperation with Other Countries: A Primer

 Section 128 requires that recipient nonnuclear-weapon states must have
comprehensive IAEA safeguards.
The President must judge that the proposed export or exemption will “not be inimical to the
common defense and security” or that any export of that type “would not be inimical to the
common defense and security because it lacks significance for nuclear explosive purposes.” The
executive branch may also consider other factors, such as “whether the license or exemption will
materially advance the nonproliferation policy of the United States by encouraging the recipient
nation to adhere” to the NPT; whether “failure to issue the license or grant the exemption would
otherwise be seriously prejudicial” to U.S. nonproliferation objectives; and whether the recipient
nation has agreed to conditions identical to those laid out in Section 127.
Section 126b.(2) contains a provision for the President to authorize an export in the event that the
NRC deems that the export would not meet Section 127 and 128 criteria. The President must
determine “that failure to approve an export would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of
U.S. nonproliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security.” In
that case, the President would submit an executive order, along with a detailed assessment and
other documentation, to Congress for 60 days of continuous session. After 60 days of continuous
session, the export would executed unless Congress were to adopt a concurrent resolution of
disapproval.10
Section 128b.(2) contains a provision for the President to waive termination of exports by
notifying Congress that the state has adopted comprehensive safeguards or that the state has made
significant progress toward adopting such safeguards, or that U.S. foreign policy interests dictate
reconsideration. Such a determination would become effective unless Congress were to adopt a
concurrent resolution of disapproval within 60 days of continuous session.
Additionally, Section 129b.(1) forbids the export of “nuclear materials and equipment or sensitive
nuclear technology” to any country designated as a state sponsor of terrorism.11 Section 129b.(3)
allows the President to waive this provision.
Iran-Related Restrictions
The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA) of 2010 (P.L.
111-195), which became law on July 1, 2010, contains additional restrictions on licensing nuclear
exports to countries with entities that have been sanctioned for conducting certain types of
nuclear weapons-related transactions with Iran. Section 102a.(2)(A) of the law states that “no
license may be issued for the export, and no approval may be given for the transfer or retransfer”
of “any nuclear material, facilities, components, or other goods, services, or technology that are
or would be subject to an agreement for cooperation between the United States” and such
countries. Section 102 a.(2)(B), however, allows the President to waive these restrictions. Section
102a.(2)(C) allows the President to authorize licenses for nuclear exports “on a case-by-case

10 In light of the Supreme Court’s 1983 decision in INS v. Chadha, passing a concurrent resolution could invite a legal
challenge because it is arguably unconstitutional. Although not provided for in the AEA, Congress could choose to pass
a joint resolution of disapproval or a bill stating in substance it did not approve.
11 Section 129b. (2) states that the prohibitions described in the previous section “shall not apply to exports, reexports,
transfers, or retransfers of radiation monitoring technologies, surveillance equipment, seals, cameras, tamper-indication
devices, nuclear detectors, monitoring systems, or equipment necessary to safely store, transport, or remove hazardous
materials ... except to the extent that such technologies, equipment, seals, cameras, devices, detectors, or systems are
available for use in the design or construction of nuclear reactors or nuclear weapons.”
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Nuclear Cooperation with Other Countries: A Primer

basis” to entities (which have not been sanctioned) in countries subject to the restrictions
described above.12
Subsequent Arrangements
Section 131 of the AEA details procedures for subsequent arrangements to nuclear cooperation
agreements concluded pursuant to Section 123. Such arrangements are required for forms of
nuclear cooperation requiring additional congressional approval, such as transfers of nuclear
material or technology and cooperating states’ enrichment or reprocessing of nuclear materials
transferred pursuant to the agreement. Subsequent arrangements may also include arrangements
for physical security, storage, or disposition of spent nuclear fuel; the application of safeguards on
nuclear materials or equipment; or “any other arrangement which the President finds to be
important from the standpoint of preventing proliferation.”
Before entering into a subsequent arrangement, the Secretary of Energy must publish in the
Federal Register a determination that the arrangement “will not be inimical to the common
defense and security.” A proposed subsequent arrangement shall not take effect before 15 days
after publication of both this determination and notice of the proposed arrangement. The
Secretary of State is required to prepare an unclassified Nuclear Proliferation Assessment
Statement (NPAS) if, “in the view of” the Secretary of State, Secretary of Energy, Secretary of
Defense, or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, a proposed subsequent arrangement “might
significantly contribute to proliferation.” The Secretary of State is to submit the NPAS to the
Secretary of Energy within 60 days of receiving a copy of the proposed subsequent arrangement.
The President may waive the 60-day requirement if the Secretary of State so requests, but must
notify both the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee of any
such waiver and the justification for it. The Secretary of Energy may not enter into the subsequent
arrangement before receiving the NPAS.
Section 131 specifies requirements for certain types of subsequent arrangements. Section 131b.
describes procedures for the executive branch to follow before entering into a subsequent
arrangement involving the reprocessing of U.S.-origin nuclear material or nuclear material
produced with U.S.-supplied nuclear technology. These procedures also cover subsequent
arrangements allowing the retransfer of such material to a “third country for reprocessing” or “the
subsequent retransfer” of more than 500 grams of any plutonium produced by reprocessing such
material. The Secretary of Energy must provide both the House Foreign Affairs Committee and
Senate Foreign Relations Committee with a report describing the reasons for entering into the
arrangement. Additionally, 15 days of continuous session must elapse before the Secretary may
enter into the arrangement, unless the President judges that “an emergency exists due to
unforeseen circumstances requiring immediate entry” into the arrangement. In such a case, the
waiting period would be 15 calendar days.
If a subsequent arrangement described in the above paragraph involves a facility that has not
processed spent nuclear reactor fuel prior to March 10, 1978 (when the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Act of 1978 was enacted), the Secretaries of State and Energy must judge that the arrangement
“will not result in a significant increase of the risk of proliferation.” In making this judgment, the
Secretaries are to give “foremost consideration ... to whether or not the reprocessing or retransfer
will take place under conditions that will ensure timely warning to the United States of any
diversion well in advance of the time at which the non-nuclear weapon state could transform the

12 For details on these sanctions, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman.
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diverted material into a nuclear explosive device.”13 For a subsequent arrangement involving
reprocessing in a facility that has processed spent nuclear reactor fuel prior to March 10, 1978,
the Secretary of Energy will “attempt to ensure” that reprocessing “shall take place under
conditions” that would satisfy the timely-warning conditions described above. Section 131f.
specifies procedures for congressional approval of subsequent arrangements involving the storage
or disposition of foreign spent nuclear fuel in the United States.
Section 133 states that, before approving a subsequent arrangement involving certain transfers of
special nuclear material, the Secretary of Energy must consult with the Secretary of Defense “on
whether the physical protection of that material during the export or transfer will be adequate to
deter theft, sabotage, and other acts of international terrorism which would result in the diversion
of that material.”14 If the Secretary of Defense determines that “the export or transfer might be
subject to a genuine terrorist threat,” that Secretary is required to provide a written risk
assessment of the risk and a “description of the actions” that he or she “considers necessary to
upgrade physical protection measures.”
Examples of Subsequent Arrangements
U.S.-Japan Agreement
The first test of the subsequent arrangement provisions came in August 1978, when the
Department of Energy informed the House and Senate foreign relations committees of a Japanese
request for approval of the transfer of spent fuel assemblies from Japan to the United Kingdom
for reprocessing. This was the first “subsequent arrangement” approved. The United States and
Japan entered into similar arrangements until 1988, when the two governments revised their
nuclear cooperation agreement. That agreement included an “implementing agreement,” which
provided 30-year advance consent for the transfer of spent fuel from Japan to Europe for
reprocessing. While controversial, Congress did not block the nuclear cooperation agreement.
A subsequent arrangement was also necessary for the sea transport from Europe to Japan of
plutonium that had been separated from the Japanese spent fuel. The Department of Energy
approved a Japanese request for 30-year advance consent for the sea transport of plutonium. It
was submitted to Congress as a subsequent arrangement, and took effect in October 1988.
U.S.-India Agreement
The U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement with India grants New Delhi consent to reprocess
nuclear material transferred pursuant to the agreement, as well as “nuclear material and by-
product material used in or produced through the use of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, or
equipment so transferred.” However, the agreement also includes a requirement that India first
build a new national reprocessing facility to be operated under IAEA safeguards. The two
countries signed a subsequent arrangement on July 30, 2010, which governs the procedures for
operating two new reprocessing facilities in India. The agreement also describes procedures for
U.S. officials to inspect and receive information about physical protection measures at the new
facilities. The arrangement would not have taken effect if Congress had adopted a joint resolution

13 These provisions also apply to facilities that, prior to March 18, 1978, did not have a subsequent arrangement for
reprocessing.
14 This section applies to “the export or transfer of more than 2 kilograms of plutonium or more than 5 kilograms of
uranium enriched to more than 20 percent in the isotope 233 or the isotope 235.”
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of disapproval within 30 days of continuous session; Congress did not adopt such a resolution.15
If India were to construct any additional facilities to reprocess fuel from U.S.-supplied reactors, a
new subsequent arrangement would need to be submitted to Congress.
Termination of Cooperation
Section 129a. of the AEA requires that the United States end exports of nuclear materials and
equipment or sensitive nuclear technology to any nonnuclear-weapon state that, after March 10,
1978, the President determines to have detonated a nuclear explosive device; terminated or
abrogated IAEA safeguards; materially violated an IAEA safeguards agreement; or engaged in
activities involving source or special nuclear material and having “direct significance” for the
manufacture or acquisition of nuclear explosive devices, and “has failed to take steps which, in
the President’s judgment, represent sufficient progress toward terminating such activities.”
Section 129a. also requires that the United States halt exports to any nation the President
determines to have materially violated the terms of an agreement for cooperation with the United
States; assisted, encouraged, or induced any nonnuclear-weapon state to obtain nuclear explosives
or the materials and technologies needed to manufacture them; or retransferred or entered into an
agreement for exporting reprocessing equipment, materials, or technology to a nonnuclear-
weapon state, unless in connection with an international agreement to which the United States
subscribes.
The President can waive termination of exports if the President determines that “cessation of such
exports would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States nonproliferation
objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security.” The President must submit
this determination to Congress, which is then to be referred to the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for 60 days of continuous session. The
determination becomes effective unless Congress adopts a joint resolution opposing the
determination.
Part 810 Agreements16
Section 57.b. (2) of the Atomic Energy Act allows for limited forms of nuclear cooperation
related to the “development or production of any special nuclear material outside of the United
States” if that activity has been authorized by the Secretary of Energy following a determination
that it “will not be inimical to the interest of the United States.” The Secretary may only make
such a finding with “the concurrence of the Department of State, and after consultation with the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission [NRC], the Department of Commerce, and the Department of
Defense.”17 Authorizations of such activities are also known as “Part 810 authorizations,” after 10
Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) Part 810. Part 810 regulations describe activities that are
“generally authorized” by the Secretary of Energy and activities that require “specific
authorization” by the Secretary. Some “generally authorized activities” are limited to a list of

15 Section 201 of the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act (P.L.
110-369), which approved the U.S.-India cooperation agreement, specifies procedures (different from those described
in the Atomic Energy Act) for Congress to consider subsequent arrangements to that agreement.
16 See CRS In Focus IF11183, Nuclear Cooperation: Part 810 Authorizations, by Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth D.
Nikitin.
17 The Secretary must also consult the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in the case of transfers to China or
Russia.
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“generally authorized destinations.”18 These regulations also detail “reporting requirements for
authorized activities.”
Part 810 authorizations mostly involve unclassified nuclear technology transfer and services, such
as nuclear reactor designs, nuclear facility operational information and training, and nuclear fuel
fabrication. Civil nuclear cooperation agreements under Section 123 of the AEA are not required
for an 810 authorization or for transmission of nuclear-related information, except for restricted
data. The NRC may also authorize activities governed by Part 810 authorizations under a 123
agreement or under a subsequent arrangement to such an agreement.
Part 810.9 includes “[w]hether the United States has an agreement for cooperation in force
covering exports to the country or entity involved” as a factor for the Secretary of Energy to use
in determining that an activity “will not be inimical to the interest [sic] of the United States.”
Moreover, the list of “generally authorized destinations” is “based principally on the United
States agreements for civil nuclear cooperation,” according to guidance from the National
Nuclear Security Administration.19
Recent Selected Legislative Activity
115th Congress
S. 3785/H.R. 7350
On December 19, 2018, Senators Edward Markey and Marco Rubio introduced S. 3785, the No
Nuclear Weapons for Saudi Arabia Act of 2018; Representatives Brad Sherman and Luke Messer
introduced the companion bill, H.R. 7350. The bills would have required the President to submit
to Congress, in addition to the AEA-required material for a 123 agreement, a report describing
 the extent to which Saudi Arabia “has been truthful and transparent in its
investigation into the death” of journalist] Jamal Khashoggi;
 whether the Saudi government has held accountable “those responsible for his
death”;
 any Saudi efforts to renounce “uranium enrichment and reprocessing on its
territory”;
 whether Saudi Arabia “has agreed to sign and implement” an Additional Protocol
to the country’s IAEA safeguards agreement;
 the state of Saudi cooperation with other governments “on advancing its missile
programs and acquiring missile and other associated technologies that would be
restricted under the Missile Technology Control Regime”; and
 the extent to which Saudi Arabia “has made substantial progress on improving
the protection of human rights, including through the release of political
prisoners.”
The bills would also have required Congress to enact a joint resolution of approval for a 123
agreement with Saudi Arabia.

18 A list of such destinations is available at https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/10/appendix-A_to_part_810.
19 https://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/inlinefiles/nei_faqs_final_9-12-16_final_gc-53_adh.pdf.
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H.R. 7351
On December 19, 2018, Representatives Sherman and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen introduced H.R. 7351,
the Nuclear Cooperation Agreements Reform Act of 2018, which would have amended the
Atomic Energy Act (AEA) to require nonexempt nuclear cooperation agreements to include
several additional provisions. These provisions would have included a legally binding
“commitment” from the cooperating government stipulating that “no enrichment or reprocessing
activities, or acquisition or construction of such facilities, [would] occur within the territory over
which the cooperating party exercises sovereignty”; “a guaranty by the cooperating party that no
nationals of a third country” would be “permitted access to any reactor, related equipment, or
sensitive materials transferred under” the agreement without prior U.S. consent; a “commitment
to maintain” or enact “a legal regime providing for adequate protection from civil liability that
will allow for the participation of United States suppliers in any effort by the country to develop
civilian nuclear power”; and a stipulation that the United States can demand the return of
transferred items if the cooperating government “violates or abrogates any provision” of its IAEA
safeguards agreement.
H.R. 7351 would also have required a cooperating party to sign, ratify, and implement an
Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement; implement a number of export control-
related measures; comply with “all United Nations conventions to which the United States is a
party and all [UN] Security Council resolutions regarding the prevention of the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD)”; and be party to, as well as fully implement, “the
provisions and guidelines” of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC), as well as “all other international agreements to which the United
States is a party regarding the export of nuclear, chemical, biological, and advanced conventional
weapons, including missiles and other delivery systems.” In addition, the bill would have
prohibited nuclear cooperation agreements with a country designated as a Destination of
Diversion Concern pursuant to the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and
Divestment Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-195). The bill would also have prohibited such agreements with
a country that is not “closely cooperating with the United States to prevent state sponsors of
terrorism” from “acquiring or developing” nuclear, chemical, or biological (NBC) weapons “or
related technologies” or “destabilizing numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons.”
H.R. 7351 would also have limited the duration of a nuclear cooperation agreement to 15 years,
as well as prohibited nuclear-related exports to a country identified in the most recent version of a
report mandated by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (P.L. 105-85) as
possessing or seeking to “acquire or develop” NBC weapons, ballistic missiles, or cruise missiles.
Moreover, the bill would have amended the AEA’s congressional notification provisions
concerning ongoing nuclear cooperation agreement negotiations by requiring the President to
“consult” with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs
Committee
concerning such initiative or negotiations beginning not later than 15 calendar days after
the initiation of any such negotiations, or the receipt or transmission of a draft agreement,
whichever occurs first, and monthly thereafter until such time as the negotiations are
concluded.
These consultations would have included the provision of “current working drafts and proposed
text put forward for negotiation by the parties for inclusion in such agreement.”
The bill would also have required the President to submit a report to the House Foreign Affairs
and Senate Foreign Relations Committees “on the extent to which each country that engages in
civil nuclear exports ... requires nuclear nonproliferation requirements as conditions for export
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comparable to those” in the AEA as amended by the bill, which would also stipulate that the
report include “the extent to which the exports of each such country incorporate United States-
origin components, technology, or materials that require United States approval for re-export”;
“the civil nuclear-related trade and investments in the United States by any entity from each such
country”; and a list of “any United States grant, concessionary loan or loan guarantee, or any
other incentive or inducement to any such country or entity related to nuclear exports or
investments in the United States.”
H.R. 7351 contained provisions concerning U.S. foreign assistance. For example, the bill would
have prohibited “assistance (other than humanitarian assistance) under any provision of law ... to
a country that has withdrawn” from the NPT. H.R. 7351 would also have required the United
States to “seek the return of any material, equipment, or components transferred under” a nuclear
cooperation agreement with such a country, as well as the return of any “special fissionable
material produced through the use” of such transferred items. In addition, the bill would prohibit
any assistance
under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 [FAA], the Arms Export Control Act [AECA],
the Foreign Military Sales Act [FMSA], the Food for Peace Act, the Peace Corps Act, or
the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 to any country if the Secretary of State determines
that the government of the country has repeatedly provided support for acts of proliferation
of equipment, technology, or materials to support the design, acquisition, manufacture, or
use of weapons of mass destruction or the acquisition or development of missiles to carry
such weapons.
This section of the bill included a reporting requirement and a presidential waiver provision. H.R.
7351 would also require the U.S. government to “take into consideration whether” proposed
recipients of assistance pursuant to the AECA, FAA, or FMSA, have Additional Protocols to their
IAEA safeguards agreements. The bill would also have permitted joint resolutions approving
nuclear cooperation agreements to “include any other provisions to accompany such proposed
agreement for cooperation.’’ Lastly, H.R. 7351 would have required Congress to enact a joint
resolution of approval for subsequent arrangements to nuclear cooperation agreements.
Sherman and Ros-Lehtinen, along with Representatives Ted Poe and William Keating, had
introduced a similar bill, H.R. 5357, the Nuclear Cooperation Reform Act of 2018, on March 21,
2018.
116th Congress
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020
Section 7041. (h) of the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-94), prohibits
the Export-Import Bank of the United States from using its funding to support “the export of
nuclear technology, equipment, fuel, materials, or other nuclear technology-related goods or
services” to Saudi Arabia unless that government has ”signed and implemented an Additional
Protocol” to its IAEA Safeguards Agreement and has a 123 agreement in force that includes a
commitment “to renounce uranium enrichment and reprocessing” on Saudi territory.
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020
Section 1264 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2020 (P.L. 116-
92) would prohibit the Secretary of State from providing an NPAS to the President for a proposed
123 agreement “with any country that has not signed and implemented” an Additional Protocol to
its IAEA safeguards agreement. This provision would also prohibit the President from submitting
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such an assessment to Congress. Countries with which the United States has a 123 agreement as
of June 19, 2019, would be exempt from this requirement. The bill would permit the President to
waive the requirement 90 days after submitting a report to the “appropriate congressional
committees … describing the manner in which such agreement would advance the national
security and defense interests of the United States and not contribute to the proliferation of
nuclear weapons.”20
S. 612/H.R. 1471
On February 28, 2019, Senators Markey and Rubio introduced S. 612, the Saudi Nuclear
Nonproliferation Act of 2019; Representatives Sherman and Ted Yoho introduced H.R. 1471, a
companion bill, on the same date. The bills’ texts are the same as S. 3785/H.R. 7350, described
above.
S. 1157
On April 10, 2019, Senators Markey, Rubio, Tim Kaine, and Todd Young introduced S. 1157,
which would amend Section 57 of the AEA to include several reporting requirements.
S. 2338
On July 30, 2019, Senators Chris Van Hollen, Lindsey Graham, Jeff Merkley, and Jerry Moran
introduced S. 2338, the Preventing Nuclear Proliferation in Saudi Arabia Act of 2019, which
contains prohibitions similar to those in the FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-92) described above and
also adds a reporting requirement.
S. 3014
On December 10, 2019, Senator Markey introduced S. 3014, the Preventing the Spread of
Nuclear Weapons Act of 2019. This bill would require the President, at the time of submitting a
123 agreement, to transmit a report to Congress
 “declaring any credible evidence” that the cooperating government “intends,
conditionally or unconditionally, to pursue a nuclear program that is not
inherently peaceful”;
 “citing any instance in which” the cooperating government has violated the
BWC, CWC, the NPT, or “otherwise violated international standards with respect
to the development, storage, deployment, or use” of WMD;
 stating whether the cooperating government “has committed to” to forgo
enrichment and reprocessing “on its own territory concurrent to a submitted
proposed” 123 agreement or “a renewal of any pre-existing” 123 agreement; and
 stating whether the cooperating government “has committed to sign and ratify”
an Additional Protocol to the country’s IAEA safeguards agreement.
In the case of existing 123 agreements, the President must submit the report “60 days prior” to the
agreement’s renewal.

20 The Senate Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations and the House Committees on Armed Services
and Foreign Affairs.
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The bill would require that Congress enact a joint resolution of approval for the 123 agreement in
question if such a report contains “any known instance” of the activities described in the first two
points above. This requirement would not apply to nuclear weapon states or NATO members.

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Appendix A. Key Dates for Bilateral Civilian
Nuclear Cooperation (“Section 123”) Agreements
Table A-1. Key Dates
Most Recent
Agreement
Original
Country
Signed
Entered into Force Duration
Expiration
Renewal Termsa Agreementb

Argentina
February 29, 1996
October 16, 1997
30 years
October 16, 2027
Extension by
agreement of the
parties
Australia
May 4, 2010
December 22, 2010
30 years
December 22,
Automatic 5-yr
1956
2040
renewals after 30
years
Brazil
October 14, 1997
September 15, 1999
30 years
September 15,
Extension by
1972
2029
agreement of the
parties
Canada
June 23, 1999
December 13, 1999
30 years
January 1, 2030
Automatic 5-yr
1955
renewals after 30
years
Chinac
April 13, 2015
November 10, 2015
30 years
2045
None specified
1985

Egypt
June 29, 1981
December 29, 1981
40 years
December 29,
None specified
2021
European
November 7, 1995
March 29, 1996
30 years
March 29, 2026
Automatic 5-yr
1958
Atomic
renewals after 30
Energy
years
Community
(Euratom)d

Indiae
October 10, 2008
December 6, 2008
40 years
December 6, 2048
Automatic 10-yr
renewals after 40
years
Indonesia
June 30, 1980
December 30, 1981
50 years
December 30,
None specified
1960
2031
International May 11, 1959
August 7, 1959
95 years
August 7, 2054
None specified
1959
Atomic
(Amended
Energy
in 1974,
Agency
1980,
(IAEA)
Renewed
in 2014)
Japan
November 4, 1987
July 17, 1988
30 years
July 16, 2018
Remains in force
1968
until terminated by
a party

Kazakhstan
November 18, 1997 November 5, 1999
30 years
November 5, 2029 None specified
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Most Recent
Agreement
Original
Country
Signed
Entered into Force Duration
Expiration
Renewal Termsa Agreementb
Republic of
November 24, 1972 November 25, 2015
20 years
November 24,
Automatic 5-yr
1956
Korea
[proposed renewal
2035
renewals after 20
agreement signed
years
June 15, 2015]
Mexico
May 7, 2018
November 3, 2022
30 years

None specified

Morocco
May 30, 1980
May 16, 1981
30 years
May 16, 2021
Automatic 5-yr
renewals after 30
years
Norwayf
June 11, 2016

30 years
Thirty years after
None specified
1984
entry into force

Russian
May 6, 2008
January 11, 2011
30 years
January 11, 2041
None specified
Federation
South Africa August 25, 1995
December 4, 1997
25 years
1995 agreement
None specified
1957
+
expires December
proposed
4, 2022. Proposed
4-year
extension would
extensiong be in force until
December 4, 2026
Switzerland
October 31, 1997
June 23, 1998
30 years
June 23, 2028
Automatic 5-yr
1965
renewals after 30
years
Taiwan
December 20, 2013
June 22, 2014
amended
none
n/a
1955
(TECRO)
in 1974,
to 30
years;
renewed
in 2014 to
indefinite
duration

Turkey
July 26, 2000
June 2, 2008
15 years
June 2, 2023
Automatic 5-yr
renewals after 15
years

Ukraine
May 6, 1998
May 28, 1999
30 years
May 28, 2029
None specified

United Arab May 21, 2009
December 17, 2009
30 years
December 17,
None specified
Emirates
2039
United
May 4, 2018
Congressional review 30 years

None specified
Formerly
Kingdom
period completed;
under
EIF upon end of
EURATOM
transition period,
agreement
should the UK
withdraw from the
European Union.
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Most Recent
Agreement
Original
Country
Signed
Entered into Force Duration
Expiration
Renewal Termsa Agreementb
Vietnam
May 6, 2014
October 3, 2014
30 years
October 3, 2044
Automatic 5-yr

renewals after 30
years
Sources: CRS; Text of Agreements; U.S. Department of State Fact Sheet, “U.S. Bilateral Agreements for
Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Pursuant to Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended,”
December 5, 2013.
a. If renewal terms are not specified, then a new Section 123 agreement would need to be negotiated and
submitted to Congress for the required review.
b. The “Original Agreement” field refers to the year that the first civilian nuclear cooperation agreement was
concluded with that country. If it is blank, the current agreement is the first such agreement.
c. P.L. 99-183 approved the original 1985 agreement but prohibited licenses from being issued until the
President certified that transferred items would be used for solely peaceful purposes and reported to
Congress on China’s nonproliferation policies. Fol owing the Tiananmen Square crackdown, P.L. 101-246
(FY1990 Foreign Relations Authorization Act) also suspended nuclear cooperation with China. President
Clinton issued the required waiver, report, and certification in January 1998. The required congressional
review period ended on March 18, 1998, and implementation of the agreement was then allowed. See also
CRS Report RL33192, U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, by Mark Holt, Mary Beth D. Nikitin, and
Paul K. Kerr.
d. Euratom member states include Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden.
e. P.L. 109-401 and P.L. 110-369 approved the agreement with conditions. See CRS Report RL33016, U.S.
Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress, by Paul K. Kerr.
f.
P.L. 114-320 approved the 2016 renewal agreement.
g. President’s transmittal letter and determination to extend the 1995 agreement for four years was dated
September 1, 2022, and was stamped received by the Office of the President of the Senate on August 31,
2022.
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Appendix B. Enrichment and Reprocessing
Restrictions
Although some experts have advocated requiring governments to forgo enrichment and
reprocessing (a nonproliferation commitment sometimes referred to as the “Gold Standard”) as a
condition for concluding a nuclear cooperation agreement, the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) does
not include such a requirement. In recent years, the United States has attempted to persuade
certain countries with which it is negotiating nuclear cooperation agreements to forgo enrichment
and reprocessing and conclude Additional Protocols to their International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) safeguards agreements; past U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements have not included these
additional components. The AEA does mandate that U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements require
U.S. consent for any “alteration in form or content” (to include enrichment or reprocessing) of
U.S.-origin material or any material processed in a plant containing transferred U.S. nuclear
technology. Such agreements also require U.S. consent for any retransfer of material or
technology.
The United States has argued that its December 2009 nuclear cooperation agreement with the
United Arab Emirates (UAE) could set a useful precedent for mitigating the dangers of nuclear
proliferation.21 For example, President Barack Obama’s May 21, 2009, letter transmitting the
agreement to Congress argued that the agreement had “the potential to serve as a model for other
countries in the region that wish to pursue responsible nuclear energy development.” Similarly,
then-State Department spokesperson P.J. Crowley described the agreement as “the gold standard”
during an August 5, 2010, press briefing, although the Obama Administration generally did not
use this term when describing its nuclear cooperation policies.
The U.S.-UAE agreement’s status as a potential model is grounded in two nonproliferation
provisions not found in other U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements. First, the agreement requires
the country to bring into force the Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement before the
United States licenses “exports of nuclear material, equipment, components, or technology”
pursuant to the agreement.22 Second, the agreement states that the UAE
shall not possess sensitive nuclear facilities within its territory or otherwise engage in
activities within its territory for, or relating to, the enrichment or reprocessing of material,
or for the alteration in form or content (except by irradiation or further irradiation or, if
agreed by the Parties, post-irradiation examination) of plutonium, uranium 233, high
enriched uranium, or irradiated source or special fissionable material.
The U.S.-UAE agreement also provides the United States with the right to terminate nuclear
cooperation and to require the return of any nuclear “material, equipment or components ... and
any special fissionable material produced through their use” if, after the agreement’s entry into
force, the UAE “possesses sensitive nuclear facilities within its territory or otherwise engages in
activities within its territory relating to enrichment of uranium or reprocessing of nuclear fuel.”23

21 For more information, see CRS Report R40344, The United Arab Emirates Nuclear Program and Proposed U.S.
Nuclear Cooperation, by Christopher M. Blanchard and Paul K. Kerr.
22 The IAEA Board of Governors approved the Protocol March 3, 2009. The UAE signed it the next month, and
brought it into force December 20, 2010.
23 The AEA requires that there is no enrichment or reprocessing by the recipient state of transferred nuclear material or
nuclear material produced with materials or facilities transferred pursuant to the agreement without prior approval.
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Notwithstanding its characterization of the U.S.-UAE agreement, the Obama Administration
announced in December 2013 after an interagency review that renouncing domestic enrichment
and reprocessing would not be a prerequisite to concluding a nuclear cooperation agreement for
all countries, and each partner country would be considered individually.24 The U.S. nuclear
cooperation agreement with Vietnam, which the two governments concluded in 2014, did not
include a provision requiring the country to forgo enrichment and reprocessing, although the
agreement’s preamble includes a political commitment stating that Vietnam intends to rely on
international markets for its nuclear fuel supply, rather than acquiring sensitive nuclear
technologies.25

24 Daniel Horner, “U.S. Policy of Nuclear Pacts Detailed,” Arms Control Today, January/February 2014.
25 For more information about the Vietnam agreement, see CRS Report R43433, U.S.-Vietnam Nuclear Cooperation
Agreement: Issues for Congress, by Mary Beth D. Nikitin, Mark Holt, and Mark E. Manyin.
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Appendix C. Nuclear Cooperation Agreements
Approved Outside Atomic Energy Act Process
Congress has used legislation to approve nuclear cooperation agreements that did not use the
legislative process mandated by the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954, as amended.
Australia26
On May 5, 2010, President Barack Obama submitted a renewed U.S.-Australia nuclear
cooperation agreement to Congress for approval. H.R. 6411, which the House adopted on
November 30, 2010, would have approved the agreement even if there had not been sufficient
legislative days remaining in the 111th Congress; the Senate did not adopt its version of the bill (S.
3844). These bills were not needed because the 111th Congress contained a sufficient number of
days for the agreement to enter into force.
China27
In 1985, President Ronald Reagan submitted the first U.S.-China nuclear cooperation agreement
to Congress, which adopted a joint resolution, P.L. 99-183, requiring that the President make
certain nonproliferation-related certifications in order for the agreement to be implemented. P.L.
99-183 required a presidential certification and a report followed by a period of 30 days of
continuous session of Congress. P.L. 101-246, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal
Years 1990 and 1991, imposed sanctions on China, including suspending nuclear cooperation and
requiring an additional presidential certification on Beijing’s nuclear nonproliferation assurances.
Before a summit with China, President William Clinton on January 12, 1998, signed the required
certifications regarding China’s nuclear nonproliferation policy and practices. Clinton also issued
a certification and waived a sanction imposed under P.L. 101-246. Congressional review ended on
March 18, 1998, allowing the agreement to be implemented.
India28
P.L. 109-401, which became law on December 18, 2006, permitted the President to waive several
provisions of the AEA with respect to a nuclear cooperation agreement with India. On September
10, 2008, President George W. Bush submitted to Congress a determination that P.L. 109-401’s
requirements for such an agreement to proceed had been met. President Bush signed P.L. 110-
369, which approved the agreement, into law on October 8, 2008.
Norway
The President submitted an extension of the U.S.-Norway nuclear cooperation agreement to
Congress on June 14, 2016. P.L. 114-320, which became law on December 16, 2016, approved
the agreement “[n]otwithstanding the provisions for congressional consideration” in the AEA,

26 For more information, see CRS Report R41312, U.S.-Australia Civilian Nuclear Cooperation: Issues for Congress,
by Mary Beth D. Nikitin and Bruce Vaughn.
27 For more information, see CRS Report RL33192, U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, by Mark Holt, Mary
Beth D. Nikitin, and Paul K. Kerr.
28 For more information, see CRS Report RL33016, U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress, by Paul
K. Kerr.
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thereby addressing concerns that that there was an insufficient number of legislative days
remaining in the 114th Congress for congressional consideration.

Author Information

Paul K. Kerr
Mary Beth D. Nikitin
Specialist in Nonproliferation
Specialist in Nonproliferation

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Congressional Research Service
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