Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and
September 14, 2022
Intelligence Aspects
Andrew S. Bowen
Russia’s renewed invasion of neighboring Ukraine in February 2022 marked the start of Europe’s
Analyst in Russian and
deadliest armed conflict in decades. After a steady buildup of military forces along Ukraine’s
European Affairs
borders since 2021, Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, with Russian ground forces

attacking from multiple directions.

Initially, Russian forces made gains along all lines of advance. However, Russian forces ran into
effective and likely unexpected levels of Ukrainian resistance from the invasion’s outset. In addition, many analysts and
officials assess that during this first stage of the war the Russian military performed poorly overall and was hindered by
specific tactical choices, poor logistics, ineffective communications, and command-and-control issues. The Ukrainian
military, while at a quantitative and qualitative disadvantage in personnel, equipment, and resources, has proven more
resilient and adaptive than Russia expected.
Over the course of the first several weeks of the war, Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Russian military had to adjust
to various setbacks and other developments on the ground. With many of its advances stalled, in late March 2022, Russian
defense officials announced that Russian military operations would focus on eastern Ukraine, including the regions of
Donetsk and Luhansk (collectively known as the Donbas, where Russian-led separatists have been fighting since 2014) and
that Russia would withdraw its forces around Kyiv and Chernihiv in the north.
Since refocusing on the Donbas region of Ukraine, Russia has gained territory in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. President
Putin recalibrated his stated war aims to emphasize helping “the people in the Donbas, who feel their unbreakable bond with
Russia.” It is unclear whether Russia has the necessary forces to achieve its recalibrated objectives, considering losses of
personnel and equipment. However, short-term strategies to increase recruitment are unlikely to resolve personnel challenges
and likely will undermine Russian capability going forward.
As Russia suffers from a lack of personnel and supply challenges, momentum may be shifting to Ukrainian Armed Forces
(UAF) counterattacks. The UAF continues to train and deploy personnel to exploit Russian weaknesses, including the use of
advanced Western systems to target key Russian logistics, infrastructure, and command centers. How the UAF decides to
deploy limited resources and personnel likely will play a crucial role in the conflict’s evolution.
After unprecedented Ukrainian success retaking territory in Ukraine’s northeastern region of Kharkiv in September 2022,
many observers believe momentum has swung in Ukraine’s favor for the immediate future. The UAF has demonstrated an
ability to deploy forces effectively to conduct offensive operations, and the Russian military continues to suffer from endemic
and structural failings. Recent Russian losses in personnel, equipment, and morale likely will limit its operational capability
for the immediate future.
Congress is poised to continue to track these developments closely, especially as it considers U.S. and international efforts to
support Ukraine militarily and respond to events on the ground. For more, see CRS Report R47054, Russia’s 2022 Invasion
of Ukraine: Related CRS Products.
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Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects

Introduction
Russia’s renewed invasion of neighboring Ukraine in February 2022 marked the start of Europe’s
deadliest armed conflict in decades. It also prompted intensive international efforts to respond to
the war. Multiple Members of Congress have engaged with U.S. and international measures,
including by supporting sanctions against Russia, providing assistance to Ukraine, and bolstering
support to neighboring NATO countries. The immediate and long-term implications of the war
are likely to be far-reaching, affecting numerous policy dimensions of concern to Congress.
This report addresses Russian and Ukrainian military and intelligence aspects of the war, which
are of interest to many in Congress as Congress considers various legislative measures and
conducts oversight of U.S. policy. It provides an overview of the conflict, including the run-up to
the invasion, the performance and conduct of the Russian and Ukrainian militaries, possible
Russian intentions, and recent developments on the ground. For other CRS products related to
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, including U.S. policy dimensions, see CRS Report R47054,
Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine: Related CRS Products.
Prelude to Invasion: Military Buildup and Force Posture
In mid-October 2021, social media and news outlets began to report significant movement by
Russian military forces, with limited Russian transparency, on or near the Ukrainian border and
within Ukraine’s occupied Crimea region. The buildup came after a sustained increase in Russia’s
permanent force posture on the Ukrainian border.1 Since 2014, Russia has created two new
Combined Arms Armies (CAAs), one in the Western Military District (20th CAA, headquartered
in Voronezh) and one in the Southern Military District (8th CAA, headquartered in Rostov-on-
Don and Novocherkassk) bordering Ukraine. Russia created these CAAs to oversee, coordinate,
and manage command and control of units transported to the border. The 8th CAA also reportedly
commands the separatist units in two Russia-controlled areas in eastern Ukraine (the so-called
Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, or DNR/LNR).
Throughout December 2021, Russia continued to build up its forces in the region. Prior to the
February 2022 invasion, Russia had mobilized between 150,000 and 190,000 personnel and 120
Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) on its border with Ukraine,2 in Belarus, and in Ukraine’s
occupied Crimea region, according to U.S. government estimates.3

1 Michael Kofman, “Putin’s Wager in Russia’s Standoff with the West,” War on the Rocks, January 24, 2022.
2 Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) are ad hoc, task-specific formations designed to operate autonomously as combined
arms formations. BTGs are built around infantry and armor units, with supporting air defense, artillery, and other units.
BTGs comprise the higher readiness units of the Russian military and are staffed by professional (also known as
contract) personnel. Each Russian regiment or brigade is intended to generate two BTGs. In August 2021, Russian
Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu stated the Russian military had 168 BTGs. Lester W. Grau and Charles K. Bartles, The
Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces (Leavenworth, KS:
Foreign Military Studies Office, 2016), pp. 34-40; Tass, “Russian Army Operates Around 170 Battalion Tactical
Groups—Defense Chief,” August 20, 2021; Sebastien Roblin, “Russian Battalion Groups Are Assembling Around
Ukraine. What Is Putin Up To?”19FortyFive, December 17, 2021; Conflict Intelligence Team, “‘Almost All Contract
Soldiers Are Going to the Border:’ Comments on Social Media Shed Light on Russian Troop Transfer,” January 19,
2022.
3 U.S. Mission to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, “U.S. Statement for the Vienna Document
Joint PC-FSC Chapter III Meeting,” February 12, 2022; Department of Defense, “Senior Defense Official Holds a
Background Briefing,” March 3, 2022, at https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2954139/
senior-defense-official-holds-a-background-briefing/.
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During this buildup, analysts and observers documented the movement of Russian units from
across Russia toward Ukraine.4 The 41st and 2nd CAAs moved from the Central Military District
into Belarus and to Ukraine’s northeast border with Russia; the 1st Guards Tank Army and the 6th
CAA moved from the Western Military District to Ukraine’s eastern border with Russia; the 49th
and 58th CAAs moved from the Southern Military District to occupied Crimea and to Ukraine’s
southeast border with Russia; and the 35th and 36th CAAs (and elements of the 29th and 5th CAAs)
moved from the Eastern Military District to Belarus.5 In addition, Russia deployed elite units—
such as Russian Airborne (VDV), Naval Infantry, and spetsnaz (elite light infantry units used for
reconnaissance and direct action)—around Ukraine’s borders.6
These forces included the full range of Russian military capabilities, including artillery and
support systems. The ground forces included air defense, artillery and rocket artillery, long-range
precision missile systems (Iskander-M short-range ballistic missile [SRBM] systems), electronic
warfare, support, and logistics units.7 Additionally, by February 2022, Russia had mobilized large
numbers of Aerospace Forces (VKS) fighter, fighter-bomber, and helicopter squadrons, which
some observers believed would play a key role in the initial invasion.8
On February 21, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia would recognize
the independence of the DNR and LNR. Russian recognition appeared to include the entire
regions of Donetsk and Luhansk (collectively known as the Donbas), most of which had
remained under Ukrainian control since Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine in 2014, and not just
territory controlled by DNR/LNR.
Shortly after February 21, Putin announced Russia would send “peacekeepers” into the
DNR/LNR, claiming they were to defend against Ukrainian plans for invasion and sabotage
attempts. These Russian charges had no basis in fact. Despite denials from Russian officials,
Russia had spent months amassing a significant portion of its military capabilities around
Ukraine.9
On February 24—following months of warning and concern from the Biden Administration,
European allies, NATO, and some Members of Congress—Russia invaded Ukraine.10 Russia
claimed its invasion was to conduct a “special military operation” to protect the civilian

4 For more on the Russian military buildup, see CRS Insight IN11806, Russian Military Buildup Along the Ukrainian
Border, by Andrew S. Bowen.
5 Units from all 11 Combined Arms Armies (CAAs) and one Tank Army (as well as the 14th and 22nd Army Corps)
were present on the borders of Ukraine in the run-up to the invasion. For more, see Konrad Muzyka, “Tracking Russian
Deployments near Ukraine—Autumn-Winter 2021-22,” Rochan Consulting, November 15, 2021; Dmitry Gorenburg
and Michael Kofman, “Here’s What We Know About Russia’s Military Buildup near Ukraine,” Washington Post,
January 15, 2022.
6 VDV include elite paratroop and air assault forces. VDV act as Russia’s elite rapid response forces. For more on
Russian military capabilities and structure see CRS In Focus IF11589, Russian Armed Forces: Capabilities, by Andrew
S. Bowen; Christian Haimet, “Russian Troop Buildup Continues on Ukrainian Borders,” Janes IHS, February 21, 2022.
7 Michael R. Gordon and Max Rust, “Russian Buildup near Ukraine Features Potent Weapons Systems, Well-Trained
Troops,” Wall Street Journal, February 14, 2022.
8 Russia’s Aerospace Forces include the air force, air defense, and space defenses forces. Russia merged these
organizations into the VKS in 2015. Julian E. Barnes, Michael Crowley, and Eric Schmitt, “Russia Positioning
Helicopters, in Possible Sign of Ukraine Plans,” New York Times, January 10, 2021; Tass, “Russia’s Su-35S Fighter
Jets Deployed in Belarus for Upcoming Drills-Ministry,” January 26, 20212.
9 Tara Copp, “They Could Go at Any Hour Now;’ U.S. Official Warns of Larger Russian Invasion of Ukraine,”
Defense One, February 23, 2022.
10 Shane Harris et al., “Road to War: U.S. Struggled to Convince Allies, and Zelensky, of Risk of Invasion,”
Washington Post, August 16, 2022.
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population and to “demilitarize” and “de-Nazify” Ukraine; many observers understood the latter
term as a false pretext for overthrowing the democratically elected Ukrainian government.11
Figure 1. Ukraine

Source: Congressional Research Service.
Initial Invasion
On February 24, 2022, hours after Putin’s televised address announcing a “special military
operation,” Russia invaded Ukraine with an air and missile attack, using precision-guided
munitions (PGMs) against key targets. These early targets included logistics centers, naval
installations, command and control centers, air defenses, and critical infrastructure.12 In the
opening stages of the attack, the Pentagon assessed that Russia launched over 100 SRBMs,
including Iskander-M SRBMs, and air- and sea-launched cruise missiles.13
Some observers believe Russia’s initial strategy was (or was intended) to achieve air superiority,
degrade Ukrainian air defenses, and undermine the Ukrainian military’s ability to coordinate
defenses and counterattacks. This initial bombardment, however, was more limited in duration

11 Audrius Rickus, “Baseless Claims of ‘Denazification’ Have Underscored Russian Aggression Since World War II,”
Washington Post, March 9, 2022.
12 Isabelle Khurshudyan et al., “As West Unleashes Sanctions, Russian Military Pushes Toward Kyiv,” Washington
Post, February 24, 2022; Alex Kokcharov and John Raines, “Russia Begins ‘Blitzkrieg’ Invasion of Ukraine with
Objective of Quick Victory; Intensive Fighting Likely Across Country,” Janes IHS, February 25, 2022.
13 RFE/RL, “Zelenskiy Says Ukraine Has Suffered ‘Serious Losses’ After Russian Air Strikes Pound Dozens of
Targets,” February 24, 2022; Thomas Newdick, “These Are the Standoff Missiles Russia Used to Open Its War Against
Ukraine,” The Drive, February 24, 2022.
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and scale than some analysts expected.14 In particular, analysts noted that the Russian air forces
(VKS) failed to conduct effective suppression of enemy air defense missions, either because of an
unwillingness to act or because of a lack of capability. Russia’s failure to degrade the Ukrainian
air force and air defenses, as well as Ukrainian command and control capabilities, allowed the
Ukrainian military to respond more successfully to Russia’s invasion than most observers
expected, both at the outset and subsequently.15
After the air assault, Russian ground forces attacked from multiple directions: north from
occupied Crimea in the direction of Kherson; limited incursions west from DNR/LNR; from
Russia’s Belgorod and Kursk toward Ukraine’s cities of Kharkiv and Sumy; and a strong two-
pronged thrust toward the capital of Kyiv from Belarus.16 The first phase of the war was
subsequently defined by rapid maneuver operations to outflank and seize key objectives.
Kyiv was an initial key Russian military target.17 Led by elite, but comparatively lightly
equipped, VDV, spetsnaz, and reconnaissance units, Russian forces advanced along the western
side of Kyiv and reached the outskirts of the city within days.18 In the early hours of the invasion,
Russian VDV units conducted a risky air assault to seize the Antonov International Airport in
Hostomel, on the outskirts of Kyiv.19 Analysts have argued that the Russian attack to seize the
airport was intended to allow the rapid introduction of follow-on VDV units to surround and seize
the Ukrainian capital.20 Ukrainian forces, however, responded and repulsed the attack, reportedly
causing heavy Russian casualties and shooting down several helicopters.21
Initially, Russian forces made gains along all lines of advance.22 Russia made the most progress in
the south from occupied Crimea, reportedly imposing significant casualties on Ukrainian forces
in the region. Russian forces advanced quickly toward Kherson (which they captured on March 2,
2022) and eventually turned toward the Ukrainian coastal city of Mariupol.23 Analysts argue that
Russian advances in the south were successful in part because they involved some of Russia’s
most modern and professional units from the Southern Military District and had better logistical

14 Michael Kofman and Jeffrey Edmonds, “Russia’s Shock and Awe: Moscow’s Use of Overwhelming Force Against
Ukraine,” Foreign Affairs, February 22, 2022.
15 Some analysts speculate that this result was due to Ukraine’s decision, possibly influenced by U.S. and Western
intelligence, to activate and disperse most of its units from their permanent bases in preparation for a possible Russian
invasion. Warren P. Strobel and Michael R. Gordon, “Biden Administration Altered Rules for Sharing Intelligence with
Ukraine,” Wall Street Journal, March 8, 2022.
16 Nicholas Fiorenza, Huw Williams, and Thomas Bullock, “Ukraine Conflict: Russia Launches Multipronged Attack
on Ukraine,” Janes IHS, February 24, 2022.
17 Yuliya Talmazan et al., “Russian Troops Advance Within 20 Miles of Ukraine Capital, Pentagon Says,” NBC News,
February 24, 2022; Katie Bo Lillis, Natasha Bertrand, and Barbara Starr, “U.S. Officials Fear the Worst Is Yet to Come
for Kyiv,” CNN, March 1, 2022.
18 Mark Galeotti, “Russian Airborne Forces Retool for an Expanded Role,” Janes IHS, October 25, 2021.
19 Haley Williams, Ainara Tiefenthaler, and Masha Froliak, “Russian Helicopters Attack an Airport Near Kyiv,” New
York Times, February 24, 2022.
20 Mason Clark, George Barros, and Kateryna Stepanenko, “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment,” Institute for the
Study of War, February 25, 2022.
21 James Marson, “Putin Thought Ukraine Would Fall Quickly. An Airport Battle Proved Him Wrong,” Wall Street
Journal, March 3, 2022.
22 CRS Insight IN11872, Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Issues and Aspects, by Andrew S.
Bowen.
23 Michael Schwirtz and Richard Perez-Pena, “First Ukraine City Falls as Russia Strikes More Civilian Targets,” New
York Times, March 2, 2022.
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support than other units, due to rail access from Crimea.24 In other regions, Russia made slow but
initially steady progress, seeking to encircle rather than capture major urban centers such as
Sumy, Kharkiv, and Chernihiv.25 Logistics issues and other factors soon stalled most Russian
advances.26
Russian forces ran into effective Ukrainian resistance from the invasion’s outset.27 Despite not
announcing a general mobilization until February 25, after the invasion began, the Ukrainian
military immediately hindered, deflected, and imposed costs on Russian forces in personnel and
equipment. The Ukrainian military appeared to exploit numerous tactical and operational
deficiencies of Russian forces (which were overextended in many cases), allowing the Ukrainian
military to conduct ambushes and counterattacks.
Russian units operated with little tactical sophistication and not as combined arms formations,
leaving units exposed and unprepared for Ukrainian resistance, according to observers and
analysts.28 Overall, training and professionalism of Russian units appeared much lower than
expected, even among supposedly “elite” units. For example, elite but relatively lightly equipped
units (such as VDV, spetsnaz, and reconnaissance units) conducted operations they were not
trained or equipped to conduct, such as advancing into urban areas, where they appeared to suffer
heavy casualties due to the lack of heavy armored support.29
Additionally, armored units advanced without infantry support in numerous instances.30 In
another example, Russian National Guard (Rosgvardiya) units reportedly advanced alongside,
and sometimes in front of, Russian military forces, apparently with little coordination.31
Contributing to the confusion, observers documented Russian units operating without encrypted
communications, often using civilian equipment to communicate.32

24 Michael Kofman and Ryan Evans, “Into the Third Week: Will Russian Forces Need to Pause?,” War on the Rocks,
March 14, 2022.
25 Richard Perez-Pena, “Russia Batters and Encircles Ukrainian Cities, as Diplomacy Falters,” New York Times, March
10, 2022.
26 Bonnie Berkowitz and Artur Galocha, “Why Russia’s Military Is Bogged Down by Logistics in Ukraine,”
Washington Post, March 30, 2022.
27 Yaroslav Trofimov, “Ukrainian Forces Repel Russian Attack on Kyiv, Prepare for Next Assault,” Wall Street
Journal, February 26, 2022.
28 Liz Sly and Dan Lamothe, “The War in Ukraine Isn’t Working Out the Way Russia Intended,” Washington Post,
February 27, 2022; Jack Watling, “Just How Tall Are Russian Soldiers?” RUSI, March 11, 2022; Mark Galeotti,
“Echoes of Afghanistan in Russian Soldiers’ Poor Discipline in Ukraine,” Moscow Times, April 1, 2022.
29 Observers noted these units suffered particularly high casualties, which undermined Russian military effectiveness
due to their perceived high professionalism and ratio of contract/professional servicemen. James Beardsworth and Irina
Shcherbakova, “Are There Even Any Left? 100 Days of War in Ukraine for an Elite Russian Unit,” Moscow Times,
June 4, 2022.
30 Serguy Bobok and Frankie Taggart, “Russian Airborne Troops Land in Ukraine’s Second City Kharkiv,” Moscow
Times, March 2, 2022; James Marson and Daniel Michaels, “Ukraine’s Troops Fight War of Ambush and Skirmish
Against Russian Invaders,” Wall Street Journal, March 22, 2022; Mark Urban, “The Heavy Losses of an Elite Russian
Regiment in Ukraine,” BBC, April 2, 2022.
31 Rosgvardiya units are key internal security troops, neither equipped nor trained for conventional combat and likely
sent into Ukraine early in the invasion to prevent protests against any new pro-Russian Ukrainian leadership. See CRS
In Focus IF11647, Russian Law Enforcement and Internal Security Agencies, by Andrew S. Bowen; Vladimir
Sevrinovsky, “Refusing to Kill People Isn’t a Crime:’ The Russian National Guard Is Firing Officers Who Refuse to
Join the War in Ukraine,” Meduza, March 29, 2022; Tim Ripley, “Russian National Guard Deployed Across Ukraine,”
Janes IHS, April 4, 2022.
32 Sergei Dobrynin and Mark Krutov, “Communication Breakdown: How Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Bogged
Down,” RFE/RL, March 19, 2022; Jack Detsch and Amy MacKinnon, “‘The Ukrainians Are Listening’: Russia’s
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Despite having significant artillery, rocket artillery, and air capabilities, Russian forces appeared
restrained in their use of these systems and capabilities during the initial invasion.33 Some
analysts speculated this occurred because the Russian military underestimated the level of
Ukrainian resistance and that it may have indicated an initial hesitation to inflict collateral
damage on civilian targets that would be crucial for supporting a Russian occupation.34
Analysis of Russia and Ukraine’s Initial Military Performance
Russian Performance
Despite Russian forces launching heavy attacks and advancing across Ukraine, the Russian
military overall performed poorly during the initial phases of the invasion, surprising most
observers and analysts (including Ukrainian military and political officials).35 Reports indicated
that Russia’s military and political leadership appeared surprised by the military’s lack of
progress and the level of resistance from Ukrainian forces.36 Some Russian forces invaded with
apparently little preparation. Captured Russian soldiers and intercepted communications revealed
that many units were unaware they were to invade Ukraine until shortly beforehand.37 As Director
of National Intelligence Avril Haines stated to Congress in early March 2022, “We assess
Moscow underestimated the strength of Ukraine’s resistance and the degree of internal military
challenges we are observing, which include an ill-constructed plan, morale issues and
considerable logistical issues.”38
In particular, many analysts were surprised at the apparently limited role the VKS played at the
outset of the invasion, beyond the initial bombardment.39 Russian ground forces appeared to have
limited air cover, with Russia primarily relying on Iskander-M SRBMs or air-launched cruise
missiles launched from VKS bombers inside Belarus and Russia, especially to target Ukrainian
infrastructure and other targets in western Ukraine (see Figure 2).40 The Ukrainian air force

Military Radios Are Getting Owned,” Foreign Policy, March 22, 2022; Alex Horton and Shane Harris, “Russian
Troops’ Tendency to Talk on Unsecured Lines Is Proving Costly,” Washington Post, March 27, 2022; James Rands,
“Doctrine, Tactics, and Technical Issues Underpin Russian Forces’ Communication Woes,” Janes IHS, March 29,
2022.
33 Thomas Newdick, “A Rundown of Russia’s Arsenal of Artillery That Could Wreak Havoc on Ukraine’s Cities,” The
Drive, March 4, 2022.
34 Helene Cooper and Eric Schmitt, “Russian’s Assault in Ukraine Slows After an Aggressive Start,” New York Times,
February 25, 2022.
35 Robert Dalsjo, Michael Jonsson, and Johan Norberg, “A Brutal Examination: Russian Military Capability in Light of
the Ukraine War,” Survival 64, no. 3 (2022), pp. 7-28; Sam Jones, John Paul Rathbone, and Demetri Sevastopulo, “A
Serious Failure’: Scale of Russian Military Blunders Becomes Clear,” Financial Times, March 12, 2022; Paul Sonne et
al., “Battle for Kyiv: Ukrainian Valor, Russian Blunders Combined to Save the Capital,” Washington Post, August 24,
2022.
36 Department of Defense, “Ukrainian Resistance, Logistics Nightmares Plague Russian Invaders,” press release,
March 1, 2022; Michael Schwirtz, “Proud Band of Ukrainian Troops Holds Russian Assault at Bay—for Now,” New
York Times, March 6, 2022.
37 Luke Harding, “Demoralized Russian Soldiers Tell of Anger at Being ‘Duped’ into War,” Guardian, March 4, 2022;
Helene Cooper, Eric Schmitt, and Julian E. Barnes, “As Russia’s Military Stumbles, Its Adversaries Take Note,” New
York Times, March 7, 2022
38 U.S. Congress, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Worldwide Threats, 117th Cong., March 8, 2022.
39 Justin Bronk, “The Mysterious Case of the Missing Russian Air Force,” RUSI, February 28, 2022; Phil Stewart and
Idrees Ali, “What Happened to Russia’s Air Force? U.S. Officials, Experts Stumped,” Reuters, March 1, 2022.
40 Reuters, “Ukrainian Official Says Missiles Launched from Belarus to Ukraine,” February 27, 2022; Reuters,
“Ukraine Says It Downed Missile Launched by Russian Bomber Flying over Belarus,” February 27, 2022; Kyrylo
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continued to operate over western Ukraine, and its air defenses shot down Russian aircraft and
challenged Russian air superiority.41
Figure 2. Ukraine Airfields and Key Infrastructure

Sources: Congressional Research Service, Janes IHS.
The Russian military’s logistics issues limited its offensives in almost all sectors.42 Russian units
appeared poorly supplied (for example, some captured Russian food reportedly was expired and
inedible) and seemed to advance past available logistics support.43 Available logistics appeared
too limited to sustain multiple simultaneous offensives.44 Moreover, the Ukrainian military
appeared to prioritize ambushing Russian supply columns, exacerbating Russian logistics
issues.45
In addition, the Russian military appears to have challenges with command and control, both at
the tactical and the operational levels. First, reports indicate there was no overall Russian

Ovsyaniy, “A Source of Death:’ Air Bases in Russia, Belarus, and Crimea Used in Moscow’s Assault on Ukraine,”
RFE/RL, March 24, 2022.
41 Media reports have documented the loss of Su-25 (SM/SM3), Su-30SM, and Su-34 fighters and fighter-bombers, as
well as numerous Mi-8, Mi-24, Mi-35, Mi-28N, and Ka-52 helicopters. Jack Siminski, “What the Air Campaign in
Ukraine Tells Us About the Current State of the Russian Air Force,” Aviationist, March 4, 2022.
42 Alex Vershinin, “Feeding the Bear: A Closer Look at Russian Army Logistics and the Fait Accompli,” War on the
Rocks, November 23, 2021; Ryan Baker, “The Russian Invasion Has Some Logistical Problems. That Doesn’t Mean
It’s Doomed,” Washington Post, February 28, 2022.
43 Emily Ferris, “Russia’s Military Has a Railroad Problem,” Foreign Policy, April 21, 2022
44 Polina Beliakova, “Russian Military’s Corruption Quagmire,” Politico.eu, March 8, 2022; Bill Chappell, “Russia’s
40-Mile Convoy Has Stalled on Its Way to Kyiv, a U.S. Official Says,” NPR, March 1, 2022.
45 Julian Borger, “The Drone Operators Who Halted Russian Convoy Headed for Kyiv,” Guardian, March 28, 2022.
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operational commander.46 As a result, it appears each CAA and axis of advance was operating
independently, with questionable levels of coordination.47 Second, Russian commanders appeared
unprepared for many aspects of the invasion, as evidenced by a lack of coordination among
branches (such as VKS and Rosgvardiya) and between units.48 Reporting indicates that
communication problems compounded these command and control issues, contributing to higher-
ranking officers moving closer to the frontlines and contributing to casualties among these
officers.49
Ukrainian Performance
Many observers and analysts have been surprised and impressed by Ukraine’s military resistance.
Despite having a smaller military than Russia, and a quantitative and qualitative disadvantage in
equipment and resources, the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) have proven resilient and
adaptive.50 The UAF has demonstrated greater flexibility than the Russian military and a
willingness to adapt to changing conditions to exploit Russian missteps and weaknesses.51 The
UAF also has benefited from high levels of motivation and recruitment, as well as significant
Western security assistance and training.52
Initially, the UAF traded space to draw Russian forces in, as Russian units advanced without
sufficient convoy protection and logistical support. As Russian units advanced, Ukraine
emphasized guerrilla strategies, such as hit and run or ambushes, to attack supply lines.53 Ukraine
also isolated Russian units in an effort to tire and deplete Russian forces. Ukraine leveraged key
capabilities (such as the TB2 unmanned combat aerial vehicle for strikes and targeting), security
assistance, and artillery to stymie Russian advances and undermine Russian advantages, such as

46 Katie Bo Lillis and Zachary Cohen, “Who Is Russia’s Top Field Commander in Ukraine? The U.S. Isn’t Sure.”
CNN, March 22, 2022; Helene Cooper and Eric Schmitt, “Russia’s War Lacks a Battlefield Commander, U.S. Officials
Say,” New York Times, March 31, 2022.
47 Reportedly, each CAA brought and set up its own headquarters structure rather than integrating under the command
of the Western or Southern Military Districts, as most analysts expected. Tim Ripley, “Russian Military Adapts
Command and Control for Ukraine Operations,” Janes IHS, March 7, 2022.
48 Sam Cranny-Evans and Thomas Withington, “Russian Comms in Ukraine: A World of Hertz,” RUSI, March 9,
2022.
49 Compared with Western militaries, Russian commanders have smaller staffs to assist command and generally are
closer to the frontlines, which makes casualties among Russian officers more likely. Many analysts, however, have
been surprised by the number and ranks of officers killed. The high number likely indicates that problems forced
Russian commanders to accept greater levels of exposure. Jack Detsch, “‘Winging It’: Russia Is Getting Its Generals
Killed on the Front Lines,” Foreign Policy, March 21, 2022; Alex Horton and Shane Harris, “Russian Troops’
Tendency to Talk on Unsecured Lines Is Proving Costly,” Washington Post, March 27, 2022.
50 CRS In Focus IF11862, Ukrainian Armed Forces, by Andrew S. Bowen; CRS In Focus IF12150, Ukrainian Military
Performance and Outlook, by Andrew S. Bowen.
51 Nabih Bulos, “Ukraine’s Army, Vastly Outgunned, Inflicts Losses on More Powerful Russian Forces,” Los Angeles
Times, March 9, 2022; Tim Judah, “How Kyiv was Saved by Ukrainian Ingenuity as Well as Russian Blunders,”
Financial Times, April 10, 2022.
52 52 Brett Forrest and Alan Cullison, “How Ukraine Blunted the Russian Advance,” Wall Street Journal, March 6,
2022; CRS In Focus IF12040, U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine, by Christina L. Arabia, Andrew S. Bowen, and
Cory Welt. In addition to the significant levels of security assistance, Western training for the Ukrainian military,
specifically Ukrainian special operations forces, has played a key role in defending against Russia’s invasion. For
more, see Andrew White, “Ukraine Conflict: Ukrainian Special Operations Forces in Focus,” Janes IHS, March 4,
2022.
53 John Paul Rathbone, Roman Olearchyk, and Henry Foy, “Ukraine Uses Guerrilla Counter-Attacks to Take Fight to
Russia,” Financial Times, April 1, 2022.
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airpower.54 Easily deployable weapons systems (including foreign and domestic anti-tank and
anti-air systems) were effective at imposing losses in Russian personnel and equipment.55 The
UAF also appears to have adopted a diffuse command structure, allowing each operational
command to coordinate and initiate operations according to local conditions.
Possible Russian Intentions and Expectations
Observers continue to speculate about Russia’s initial objectives and plans in launching its
offensive against Ukraine. Many analysts believe Russia’s expectations were based on faulty
assumptions that undermined Russia’s conduct of the invasion.56 If this is the case, these incorrect
political assumptions possibly determined and imposed unrealistic objectives and timetables onto
the Russian military. This in turn may partially, but not entirely, explain the Russian military’s
unpreparedness and poor performance.57
On February 25, 2022, the Pentagon assessed that Russia had committed one-third of its available
troops into Ukraine. U.S. officials and some analysts believe Russia’s initial operation was to
“decapitate” the Ukrainian government and rely on fast-moving, elite units to quickly seize key
junctures, similar to Russia’s seizure of Ukraine’s Crimea region in 2014.58 Some analysts
speculate that Russia may have based such a strategy on assumptions that the Ukrainian military
would be ineffective and the Ukrainian political leadership could be easily replaced.59 As Central
Intelligence Agency Director William J. Burns testified before the House Intelligence Committee
in March 2022, Putin “was confident that he had modernized his military and they were capable
of a quick, decisive victory at minimal cost. He’s been proven wrong on every count. Those
assumptions have proven to be profoundly flawed over the last 12 days of conflict.”60
Analysts speculate that Putin and other Russian policymakers may have held these faulty
assumptions in part due to poor intelligence and a willingness by subordinates to convey only
positive information to Russian decisionmakers.61 Recent media reporting indicates the FSB

54 Dave Phillips and Eric Schmitt, “Over Ukraine, Lumbering Turkish-Made Drones Are an Ominous Sign for Russia,”
New York Times, March 11, 2022.
55 Henry Foy and Ian Bott, “How Is Ukraine Using Western Weapons to Exploit Russian Weaknesses?” Financial
Times, March 16, 2022.
56 Zach Beauchamp, “Why the First Few Days of War in Ukraine Went Badly for Russia,” Vox, February 28, 2022;
Jack Detsch and Amy MacKinnon, “How Putin Bungled His Invasion of Ukraine,” Foreign Policy, March 18, 2022;
Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, “Operation Z: The Death Throes of an Imperial Delusion,” RUSI, April 22, 202;
Mark Galeotti, “The Interfering Tsar: Why Putin Is Ukraine’s Best Hope of Victory,” The Times, April 23, 2022.
57 Michael Kofman and Ryan Evans, “11 Days In: Russia’s Invasion Stumbles Forward,” War on the Rocks, March 7,
2022; Isaac Chotiner, “The Russian Military’s Debacle in Ukraine,” New Yorker, March 11, 2022.
58 Helene Cooper, “Pentagon Gives a Grim Assessment of the First Stages of the Russian Invasion,” New York Times,
February 24, 2022.
59 Nick Reynolds and Jack Whatling, “The Plot to Destroy Ukraine,” RUSI, February 15, 2022; Economist, “Russia’s
Army Is In a Woeful State,” April 20, 2022.
60 U.S. Congress, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Worldwide Threats, 117th Cong., March 8, 2022.
61 See Mark Galeotti, “The West Thinks Putin Is Russia’s Spymaster. But Are the Spies Controlling Him?” Guardian,
June 20, 2019; Todd Prince, “Eyeing Ukraine, Putin Huddles in a Tight, Hawkish Circle,” RFE/RL, February 15, 2022;
Henry Foy and John Paul Rathbone, “Intelligence Failures Hamper Russia’s Ukraine Mission,” Financial Times,
March 1, 2022; David V. Gioe and Huw Dylan, “Putin’s KGB Past Didn’t Help Him with Intelligence on Ukraine,”
Washington Post, March 17, 2022; Julian E. Barnes, Lara Jakes, and John Ismay, “U.S. Intelligence Suggests That
Putin’s Advisors Misinformed Him on Ukraine,” New York Times, March 30, 2022; Steve Holland and Andrea Shalal,
“Putin Misled by ‘Yes Men’ in Military Afraid to Tell Him the Truth, White House and EU Officials Say,” Reuters,
March 31, 2022; Philip H. Davies and Toby Steward, “No War for Old Spies: Putin, the Kremlin and Intelligence,”
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overstated its influence and agent networks inside Ukraine, possibly contributing to a false
expectation of a quick regime change.62 Additionally, many observers speculate a relatively small
circle of advisers may have outsized influence on Putin and may have contributed to potentially
unrealistic assumptions.63 Observers believe this circle includes Minister of Defense Sergei
Shoigu, who may have overstated the Russian military’s capabilities.64
March-May 2022
Since early March 2022, Russian forces attempted to adapt to the reality of effective Ukrainian
resistance. Russia made some changes to its military operations, including more coordination
between units and a greater attempt to operate as combined arms formations, increased air
support, and significantly higher levels of artillery and rocket artillery fire.65 Russian forces made
slow incremental advances but continued to suffer heavy losses in both personnel and
equipment.66 By March 7, 2022, U.S. officials believed Russia had committed “nearly 100
percent” of its available forces into Ukraine.67 The Russian VKS increased its number of sorties
and operations, although most missions appeared to employ unguided weaponry rather than
PGMs.68 The increased sortie rate also meant heavier losses for the VKS, including some of its
most advanced helicopter, fighter, and fighter-bombers.69
At this stage of the conflict, instead of concentrating on one area of operations, the Russian
military appeared to continue multiple lines of advance.70 In the north, Russian forces attempted
to break through Ukrainian defenses around Kyiv, from both the northwest and the east. In the
east, Russian forces surrounded Kharkiv and attacked toward Izyum. In the south, Russian forces
conducted an offensive to seize Mykolaiv in the southwest and Mariupol in the southeast.71 Each

RUSI, May 20, 2022.
62 Mari Saito and Maria Tsvetkova, “The Enemy Within,” Reuters, July 28, 2022; Greg Miller and Catherine Belton,
“Russia’s Spies Misread Ukraine and Misled Kremlin as War Loomed,” Washington Post, August 19, 2022.
63 Analysts have debated the balance between advisers providing false or misleading information to Putin and the
leadership itself imposing unrealistic objectives and limitations onto the Russian government and military. See Adam
E. Casey and Seva Gunitsky, “The Bully in the Bubble,” Foreign Affairs, February 4, 2022; Mark Galeotti, “The
Personal Politics of Putin’s Security Council Meeting,” Moscow Times, February 22, 2022; Amanda Taub, “Putin
Seems to Sideline Advisers on Ukraine, Taking a Political Risk,” New York Times, March 1, 2022.
64 Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, “The Man Behind Putin’s Military,” Foreign Affairs, February 26, 2022;
Thomas Grove, “Russia’s Military Chief Promised Quick Victory in Ukraine, But Now Faces a Potential Quagmire,”
Wall Street Journal, March 6, 2022; Sam Cranny-Evans and Sidharth Kaushal, “The Intellectual Failures Behind
Russia’s Bungled Invasion,” RUSI, April 1, 2022.
65 Steven Erlanger, “After a Fumbled Start, Russian Forces Hit Harder in Ukraine,” New York Times, February 28,
2022; Dan Lamothe, “Russia’s Invasion Began with Precision Missiles, But Weapons Are Changing as Siege War
Begins,” Washington Post, March 1, 2022.
66 Griff Witte et al., “After More Than Two Weeks of War, the Russian Military Grinds Forward at a Heavy Cost,”
Washington Post, March 11, 2022.
67 Quint Forgey, “Putin Sends ‘Nearly 100 Percent’ of Russian Forces at Border into Ukraine,” Politico, March 7,
2022.
68 Alan Cullison and Alexander Osipovich, “Russian General Is Killed in Ukraine as Airstrikes Intensify,” Wall Street
Journal, March 11, 2022; Abraham Mahsie, “Air War Ramps Up in Russia-Ukraine Conflict as Russian PGMs Run
Out,” Air Force Magazine, March 21, 2022; Dan Lamothe, “Russian Air Force Action Increases Despite Flood of
Antiaircraft Missiles into Ukraine,” Washington Post, March 22, 2022.
69 David Axe, “The Russian Air Force Is Losing Its Best Jets over Ukraine,” Forbes, March 29, 2022.
70 For specific tracking of the conflict, see Konrad Muzyka, “Ukraine Conflict Monitor,” Rochan Consulting.
71 Financial Times, “How Russia’s Mistakes and Ukrainian Resistance Altered Putin’s War,” March 18, 2022.
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advance appeared to compete against the others for increasingly limited reinforcements, logistics,
and air support. Gradually, most Russian offensives began to stall due to a number of factors,
including continued logistics issues, mounting casualties and a lack of available reinforcements,
and increasing Ukrainian counterattacks.72
Throughout mid-March 2022, the Ukrainian military conducted effective counterattacks across
most axes of advance, defeating repeated Russian offensives outside of Kyiv, outside of Kharkiv
and Sumy, and in Mykolaiv.73 Ukraine also attacked captured infrastructure, such as an airbase in
Kherson and the port of Berdyansk, and destroyed key Russian assets.74
Toward the end of March 2022, Russian offensives around Kyiv stalled. Ukrainian forces
launched multiple sustained counteroffensives and pushed back Russian forces.75 Observers noted
that, after failing to achieve a decisive victory quickly, Russia was reevaluating its objectives and
strategy toward achieving territorial gains in the south and east of Ukraine.76 On March 25, the
Russian Ministry of Defense held a press conference alleging that Russia had mostly met its
initial objectives and would move on to the second phase of the operation, focusing on eastern
Ukraine, including the Donbas.77 Russia soon announced it was withdrawing forces from around
Kyiv and Chernihiv; analysts speculated that this was aimed at allowing the redeployment of
units for further offensives in the east.78 U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan stated on
April 4, 2022, “Russia is repositioning its forces to concentrate its offensive operations in eastern
and parts of southern Ukraine.... All indications are that Russia will seek to surround and
overwhelm Ukrainian forces in eastern Ukraine.”79
Subsequently, Russia redirected forces to support operations in the east to cut off Ukrainian
military units in the Donbas.80 On April 12, President Putin stated that Russia’s “military

72 John Paul Rathbone, Sam Jones, and Daniel Dombey, “Why Russia Is Deploying More Troops to Ukraine,”
Financial Times, March 17, 2022; Andrew E. Kramer, “Ukraine’s Troops Begin a Counteroffensive That Alters Shape
of the Battle with Russia,” March 24, 2022; Alex Horton, “Why Russian Troops Are Using Tree Branches for
Camouflage in Ukraine,” Washington Post, March 30, 2022; Stephen Fidler and Thomas Grove, “Behind the Front
Lines, Russia’s Military Struggles to Supply Its Forces,” Wall Street Journal, April 1, 2022.
73 Yaroslav Trofimov, “A Ukrainian Town Deals Russia One of the War’s Most Decisive Routs,” Wall Street Journal,
March 16, 2022; Yaroslav Trofimov, “Ukrainian Counteroffensive near Mykolaiv Relieves Strategic Port City,” Wall
Street Journal, March 18, 2022; David Stern et al., “Ukraine Claims It Had Retaken Key Town Outside Kyiv, as
Defenses Hold Against Fierce Russian Onslaught,” Washington Post, March 22, 2022.
74 Most analysts believe Ukraine launched Tochka-U short-range ballistic missile systems during the attacks on
Kherson Airbase and the port of Berdyansk. Analysts cite this occurrence as another failure of the VKS to target and
destroy such key strategic weapon systems. Joseph Trevithick and Tyler Rogoway, “Barrage Leaves Russian-Occupied
Kherson Airbase in Flames,” The Drive, March 15, 2022; Andrew Carey et al., “Ukrainians Claim to Have Destroyed
Large Russian Warship in Berdyansk,” CNN, March 25, 2022.
75 Andrew E. Kramer, “In Kyiv Suburb, Ukrainian Military Claims a Big Prize,” New York Times, March 29, 2022;
John Paul Rathbone, Roman Olearchyk, and Henry Foy, “Ukraine Uses Guerrilla Counter-Attacks to Take Fight to
Russia,” Financial Times, March 31, 2022.
76 Michael R. Gordon and Alex Leary, “Russia, Failing to Achieve Early Victory in Ukraine, Is Seen Shifting to ‘Plan
B,’” Wall Street Journal, March 20, 2022.
77 Konrad Muzyka, “Ukraine Conflict Monitor: March 25, 2022,” Rochan Consulting, March 26, 2022.
78 Jim Sciutto, “U.S. Intel Assess ‘Major’ Strategy Shift by Russia as It Moves Some Forces away from Kyiv,” CNN,
March 31, 2022; David Axe, “Ukraine’s Best Tank Brigade Has Won the Battle for Chernihiv,” Forbes, March 31,
2022; Anjali Singhvi et al., “How Kyiv Has Withstood Russia’s Attacks,” New York Times, April 2, 2022.
79 White House, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan,” press
briefing, April 4, 2022.
80 The Joint Forces Operation (JFO) is Ukraine’s term for its military operation against the Russian-controlled Donetsk
and Luhansk People’s Republics. Most analysts consider Ukrainian military forces in the JFO to be Ukraine’s best
units. Barbara Starr et al., “Russia Shifting Focus to Show a Victory by Early May in Eastern Ukraine, U.S. Officials
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operation will continue until its full completion” but said, “Our goal is to help the people in the
Donbas, who feel their unbreakable bond with Russia.”81 The terrain in the Donbas favored
Russian forces, with its advantages in artillery units, and made it more difficult for Ukrainian
forces to conduct guerrilla-style attacks.82
Despite the apparent focus on the Donbas, some observers remained concerned about larger
Russian objectives. On April 22, 2022, Major General Rustam Minnekayev, the deputy
commander of the Central Military District, said in an interview that Russia wanted to take full
control of eastern and southern Ukraine, including a possible land bridge to Transnistria, a
Russia-supported breakaway territory in Moldova.83 Many observers believe this statement
reflects larger Russian political objectives over the medium to long term, since Russian military
force constraints prevent a serious offensive to capture Odessa and link up with Transnistria.
Sinking of the Moskva and Snake Island
On April 13, 2022, the flagship of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, the Slava class missile cruiser Moskva, reportedly was
struck by two Ukrainian R-360 Neptune anti-ship missiles. Initially, Russia denied the Moskva was hit by missiles,
said it sunk in a storm after an accidental fire, and attempted to tow the heavily damaged cruiser back to port in
Sevastopol; the damage was catastrophic, however, and the ship eventually sank. Reports indicate the Moskva was
blockading Odessa and providing air defense support to Russian units in the southwest near Kherson when it was
struck. The sinking provided a morale boost to Ukrainian forces and undermined Russian efforts to threaten an
amphibious assault against Odessa, potentially freeing up Ukrainian forces defending the city to conduct
counteroffensives against Russian forces near Kherson. Russia’s new flagship of the Black Sea Fleet is the Project
11356 frigate Admiral Makarov.
The sinking of the Moskva also threatened Russia’s control over Snake Island, a small rock outcropping Russia
seized during the initial days of the invasion and used to support the Russian blockade of Odessa. Ukrainian forces
harassed Russian forces on the island throughout the conflict using TB2 UCAVs and fighters, sinking Russian ships
and destroying air defense systems. Eventually, long-range Ukrainian artil ery and the loss of the Moskva made the
island untenable, and Russian forces departed Snake Island by the end of June.
Sources: Brad Lendon, “Moskva Sinking: What Really Happened to the Pride of Russia’s Fleet?” CNN, April 15,
2022; Adam Taylor and Claire Parker, “’Neptune’ Missile Strike Shows Strength of Ukraine’s Homegrown
Weapons,” Washington Post, April 15, 2022; Economist, “How Did Ukraine Destroy the Moskva, a Large Russian
Warship,” April 20, 2022; B. J. Armstrong, “The Russo-Ukrainian War at Sea: Retrospect and Prospect,” War on
the Rocks, April 21, 2022; Marc Santora and Ivan Nechepurenko, “Ukraine Drives Russian Forces from Snake
Island, a Setback for Moscow,” New York Times, June 20, 2022.
On April 18, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said Russia had begun its offensive in the
Donbas after a barrage of Russian missile strikes across Ukraine.84 Russian forces initially
conducted slow and gradual probing attacks against Ukrainian forces, including the use of heavy
artillery and rocket artillery to support operations.85 Russia concentrated on pressing Ukrainian

Say,” CNN, April 2, 2022.
81 Anton Troianovski, “Putin Says Peace Talks Are at a ‘Dead End’ and Calls Atrocities in Bucha ‘Fake,’” New York
Times, April 12, 2022.
82 Liz Sly and Dan Lamothe, “Battles May Be Tougher for Ukrainians as War Shifts to Wide-Open Terrain in East,”
Washington Post, April 9, 2022; Jack Watling, “Why the Battle for Donbas Will Be Very Different from the Assault on
Kyiv,” Guardian, April 9, 2022; Howard Altman, “Ukraine’s Ability to Withstand Russian Artillery Critical to Fight
for Donbas,” The Drive, April 19, 2022; Sam Cranny-Evans and Sidharth Kaushal, “Technical Reflections on Russia’s
Armoured Fighting Vehicles,” RUSI, April 27, 2022.
83 Mary Ilyushina et al., “Commander Hints at Russian Ambitions Beyond Ukraine,” Washington Post, April 22, 2022.
84 Hannah Allam et al., “Zelensky Says Russia Has Launched Offensive in Eastern Ukraine,” Washington Post, April
18, 2022; Max Seddon and Henry Foy, “Vladimir Putin Abandons Hopes of Ukraine Deal and Shifts to Land-Grab
Strategy,” Financial Times, April 24, 2022.
85 Ivana Saric, “Russia Seizes Eastern Ukraine City of Kreminna, Official Says,” Axios, April 19, 2022; Christopher
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forces south of Izyum, west from Severodonetsk toward Kramatorsk and Slovyansk, and from
Donetsk to create a large encirclement of UAF.86
Russian forces ran into determined and effective UAF resistance and were unable to make
significant progress.87 Russian forces could not break through Ukrainian defenses around Izyum,
partially resulting from too few units and a gradual deployment, even with reinforcements from
the abandoned effort to take Kyiv.88 Additionally, UAF forces reinforced and conducted
counterattacks outside of Kharkiv, pushing Russian forces in some positions back toward the
border and potentially placing the Russian city of Belgorod within striking distance of long-range
Ukrainian rocket and missile artillery.89 Throughout the war, numerous unexplained explosions
have occurred at various industrial sites in Russia, some of which are likely the result of
Ukrainian air, missile, or sabotage attacks.90 UAF forces also conducted counterattacks toward
Izyum, reportedly advancing against Russian units (such as those from the Russian 1st Guards
Tank Army), which had suffered significant casualties.91
Russia’s redeployment of forces away from Kyiv and toward eastern Ukraine indicated the
Russian military’s need to rest and resupply after using most of its combat-effective units. During
this time, analysts noted the need for Russian personnel reinforcements, not only to replace losses
but also to support further Russian offensives.92 Conditions forced Russia to pull units from
foreign bases to help replace and rotate out units.93 Russia reportedly also has deployed private
military companies (including heavy use of Wagner Private Military Company) to support
operations, primarily to oversee and support Russian-led forces from the DNR/LNR.94 Many
observers speculated that Putin would announce a state of war and national mobilization during
Russia’s May 9 Victory Day celebration, allowing Russia to call up reserves and use conscripts in
combat.95 The celebration passed with no such announcement. Despite the slow pace of Russian

Miller and Paul McLeary, “Heavy Weaponry Pours into Ukraine as Commanders Become More Desperate,” Politico,
April 25, 2022; Konrad Muzyka, “Ukraine Conflict Monitor: April 24, 2022,” Rochan Consulting, April 25, 2022.
86 Konrad Muzyka, “Ukraine Conflict Monitor: April 16-18, 2022,” Rochan Consulting, April 19, 2022; Author
correspondence with Michael Kofman.
87 Zachary Cohenet et al., “Russia Making ‘Slow and Uneven’ Progress as Military Tries to Fix Problems That Plagued
Early Invasion, U.S. Officials Say,” CNN, April 28, 2022; Sam Jones et al., “‘Anemic’ Russian Advance Heralds Long
War of Attrition,” Financial Times, May 5, 2022.
88 Konrad Muzyka, “Ukraine Conflict Monitor: 9-15 May 2022,” Rochan Consulting, May 15, 2022. Some estimated
20-25 Russian BTGs in the Izyum area, but those forces were never fully deployed together and some were held in
reserve. Additionally, some units were reported to rotate back to Russia after suffering heavy losses and becoming
combat ineffective.
89 Konrad Muzyka, “Ukraine Conflict Monitor: 5 May 2022,” Rochan Consulting, May 6, 2022.
90 Mike Eckel, “Blasts, Bombs, and Drones: Amid Carnage in Ukraine, A Shadow War on the Russian Side of the
Border,” RFE/RL, April 29, 2022.
91 Mike Eckel, “Fizzled Faltering? ‘Anemic’? Why Russia’s Donbas Offensive Isn’t Going Exactly as Anticipated,”
RFE/RL, May 3, 2022.
92 Department of Defense, “Senior Defense Official Holds a Background Briefing,” press release, April 8, 2022;
Economist, “Rob Lee on Why Attrition Will Be a Critical Factor in the Battle for the Donbas,” April 23, 2022.
93 Reports indicate Russia was forced to deploy units from several foreign bases, including units from the 201st Military
Base in Tajikistan, 7th Military Base in Russia-occupied Abkhazia (Georgia), and 4th Military Base in Russia-occupied
South Ossetia (Georgia), to support operations in Ukraine. Digital Forensics Research Lab, “Additional Units from
Georgian Breakaway Regions Join Russian Offensive,” Atlantic Council, March 28, 2022.
94 Economist, “Russia’s Brutal Mercenaries Probably Won’t Matter Much in Ukraine,” April 9, 2022; Miriam Berger,
“What Is the Wagner Group, the Russian Mercenary Entity in Ukraine?,” Washington Post, April 9, 2022.
95 Robyn Dixon and Liz Sly, “On a Victory Day Without Victory, Putin Faces Choice over All-Out War,” Washington
Post, May 7, 2022; Dmitry Alperovitch and Michael Kofman, “War in Ukraine,” Silverado Policy Accelerator, May 8,
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progress and need for reinforcements, Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines testified to
the Senate Armed Services Committee on May 20, 2022, “We assess President Putin is preparing
for prolonged conflict in Ukraine during which he still intends to achieve goals beyond the
Donbas.”96
A key Russian military objective was the coastal city of Mariupol, in the Donetsk region.97
Russian forces gradually surrounded and advanced into Mariupol against stiff Ukrainian
resistance.98 The effort to seize the city benefited from Russia shifting operations away from
seizing further territory in the Kherson region (which includes Mykolaiv).99 After weeks of
bombardment and fighting, Ukrainian military forces and large numbers of civilians were isolated
in the Azovstal iron and steel plant.100 On April 21, Putin announced that Russia had seized
Mariupol and that Russian forces would not assault the Azovstal plant but would surround and
seal it off, despite Ukrainian forces’ continued resistance.101 Ukraine announced on May 16 that it
had instructed its remaining troops at Azovstal to cease combat missions.102 Shortly thereafter,
Ukrainian troops began surrendering and were evacuated to Russian-controlled areas.103 The
status of these prisoners remains unclear, with potential options ranging from “trials” for Russian
propaganda purposes to some form of prisoner exchange.104 On July 29, a massive explosion
ripped through a prisoner-of-war camp housing many of the prisoners from Mariupol, killing an
estimated 50 prisoners.105 Russia alleged the explosion was the result of a Ukrainian missile
strike, but many observers believe it was some other cause.106
Russia also continued its use of long-range PGMs against targets in western Ukraine, but the
VKS did not seek further air superiority beyond eastern Ukraine. Russia conducted long-range
PGM strikes against what Russian officials say are the Ukrainian defense industry and
infrastructure targets in an attempt to cripple and undermine the Ukrainian military’s long-term
capability. However, observers began to note the questionable precision, capability, and quantity

2022.
96 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, To Receive Testimony on Worldwide Threats, 117th Cong.,
May 10, 2022.
97 Alan Cullison, Brett Forrest, and Bojan Pancevski, “Russia Ramps Up Ukraine Attacks in Effort to Seize
Strategically Key Port City,” Wall Street Journal, March 10, 2022.
98 Bermet Talant, “Why Is Mariupol So Important to Russian Forces?,” Guardian, March 22, 2022.
99 Nick Paton Walsh et al., “Russia Could Be Losing Ground in Battle for Mykolaiv, But It Still Seeks to Crush What It
Cannot Have,” CNN, March 21, 2022.
100 Ann M. Simmons and Daniel Michaels, “Mariupol, in Ruins, Still Looms Large for Russia and Ukraine,” Wall
Street Journal, April 19, 2022; Amy Mackinnon, “What the Fall of Mariupol Would Mean for the War,” Foreign
Policy, April 20, 2022.
101 Michael Schwirtz, “Ukrainians in Mariupol’s Steel Mill Are Holding On, Despite Intensifying Attacks, a
Commander Tells the Times,” New York Times, April 24, 2022.
102 Valerie Hopkins, Ivan Nechepurenko, and Marc Santora, “The Ukrainian Authorities Declare an End to the Combat
Mission in Mariupol After Weeks of Russian Siege,” New York Times, May 16, 2022.
103 Todd Prince, “Russia’s Capture of Azovstal: Symbolic Success, ‘Pyrrhic’ Victory?,” RFE/RL, May 18, 2022;
Michael Schwirtz, “Last Stand at Azovstal: Inside the Siege That Shaped the Ukraine War,” New York Times, July 27,
2022.
104 Claire Parker et al., “Moscow Casts Doubt on Prisoner Swap; Soldier Pleads Guilty in Killing.” Washington Post,
May 18, 2022; Isabel Coles and Ann M. Simmons, “Russia Takes Captured Ukrainian Fighters from Mariupol to Its
Territory,” Wall Street Journal, June 8, 2022.
105 Matthew Mpoke Bigg and Maria Varenikova, “Here’s What We Know About the Deadly Blast at a Prisoner Camp
in Eastern Ukraine,” New York Times, August 1, 2022.
106 Joyce Sohyun Lee et al., “What We Know About the Blast That Killed Ukrainian POWs in Olenivka,” Washington
Post, August 6, 2022.
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of PGMs still available to Russian forces.107 U.S. officials have stated most PGMs appear to be
air-launched cruise missiles from bombers inside Russia.108
May-September 2022
After the capture of Mariupol, Russia refocused efforts on seizing key urban and infrastructure
areas in Donetsk and Luhansk.109 Due to losses, Russia appeared unable to focus and concentrate
combat power on multiple advances, forcing it to refocus efforts on a single objective while
consolidating its hold on captured territory (such as in Kharkiv, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia).110
By mid-May 2022, Russia appeared unable to capture the key cities of Slovyansk and
Kramatorsk, a likely target of Russia’s refocused offensives. Instead, Russia focused on on
seizing the towns of Severodonetsk and Lysychansk, which would give Russia almost total
control over Luhansk Oblast.111
In contrast to the early days of the invasion,
Figure 3. Donbas Region of Ukraine
the fighting in the Donbas resembled a more
traditional conventional conflict of slow but
intense fighting, and Russia reverted to its
traditional reliance on the massed used of
artillery and rocket artillery.112 Russian forces
appeared to conduct a pincer movement to cut
off Ukrainian forces in Severodonetsk and
Lysychansk.113 In the north, Russian forces
pushed southeast from Izyum, capturing
Lyman and attempting to make several
crossings of the Siverskyi Donets River near
Bilohorivka, but came under Ukrainian
artillery fire and suffered heavy casualties.114
In the Donbas, Russia relied heavily on
Wagner Private Military Company (PMC)

Source: Congressional Research Service

107 John Ismay, “Russian Guided Weapons Miss the Mark, U.S. Defense Officials Say,” New York Times, May 9, 2022;
Thomas Newdick, “We May Have Our First Sight of a Russian Bomber Launching Missiles at Ukraine,” The Drive,
May 11, 2022; Stetson Payne and Tyler Rogoway, “Kyiv Claims Russia is Running Low on Missiles,” The Drive,
August 27, 2022.
108 Department of Defense, “Senior Defense Official Holds a Background Briefing,” press release, May 18, 2022.
109 Dan Lamothe, Ellen Nakashima, and Alex Horton, “Russia Tries to Rebound in Ukraine as Prospects for Victory
Fade,” Washington Post, May 21, 2022.
110 Department of Defense, “Senior Defense Official Holds a Background Briefing,” press release, May 18, 2022.
111 Frederick W. Kagan, Kateryna Stepanenko, and George Barros, “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May
28,” Institute for the Study of War, May 28, 2022.
112 John Paul Rathbone and Max Seddon, “Battle for Severodonetsk Shows Russian Strategy in Donbas,” Financial
Times, May 25, 2022; John Paul Rathbone et al., “Russia’s Barrage Hits Ukrainian Morale in the Donbas,” Financial
Times, June 10, 2022.
113 Konrad Muzyka, “Ukraine Conflict Monitor: May 21-23, 2022,” Rochan Consulting, May 24, 2022.
114 Howard Altman, “Debacle on the Donets: How Russian Forces Got Obliterated Trying to Cross a River,” The Drive,
May 12, 2022; Daniel Michaels, “Ukraine’s Forces Sink Russian River Crossings, Inflicting Heavy Damage,” Wall
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and local DNR/LNR units.115 These forces sustained heavy casualties but gradually pushed the
UAF back and captured key towns such as Popasna.116
The UAF continued to staunchly defend territory instead of conducting an organized withdrawal,
leading some analysts to speculate that Ukraine’s strategy was to impose as much attrition on
Russian forces as possible.117 Nevertheless, Russian forces, including Chechen Rosgvardiya and
DNR/LNR troops, continued their offensive into Severodonetsk and gradually seized control of
the city after Ukraine ordered its forces to retreat to Lysychansk.118 Russian forces continued to
advance north from Popasna toward Bakhmut, threatening to cut off UAF units and envelope
Lysychansk.119 Subsequently, the UAF withdrew from Lysychansk to prepared defensive lines
between Bakhmut and Siversk.120
Reported Russian and Ukrainian Casualties
Estimates of wartime casualties vary widely and may not be considered reliable. Due to the continuing state of
war, verifying exact numbers of casualties is nearly impossible. Generally, ranges of possible casualties are given as
estimates due to the uncertain and changing nature of assessments. Below are some estimates mentioned in
various press reports through August 2022.
Russian Casualties
Russia: Officially, the Russian government stated in late March 2022 that 1,351 soldiers had died and another 3,850
had been wounded. On March 20, 2022, the pro-Kremlin newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda appeared to publish
Russian Ministry of Defense figures that listed 9,861 deaths. This figure remains unconfirmed, and the newspaper
deleted the report and stated that it had been hacked. Russia has not provided a casualty update since.
United States: U.S estimates of Russian military losses range from 70,000 to 80,000 total (including killed and
wounded). In July, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director Wil iam Burns estimated the Russians suffered
15,000 kil ed. In early August, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Colin Kahl stated, “I think it’s safe to suggest
that the Russians are probably taking 70 or 80,000 casualties in less than six months.”
United Kingdom: UK estimates of Russian casualties are slightly higher than those of U.S. officials. UK Defense
Secretary Ben Wallace in August stated Russia has suffered 80,000 casualties, while citing in June estimates that
Russia suffered 25,000 kil ed.
Ukrainian Casualties
Until recently, Ukraine has been reluctant to share casualty figures. In June 2022, Ukrainian officials stated that
Ukraine was losing 100-200 soldiers per day during the height of fighting around Severodonetsk. On August 22,
2022, Commander in Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Valeri Zaluzhny stated Ukraine had suffered almost
9,000 kil ed.

Street Journal, May 23, 2022.
115 Observers note Russian Private Military Company (PMC) and DNR/LNR forces are integrated into the Russian
military command structure. Reuters, “Conscripts Sent to Fight by Pro-Russia Donbas Get Little Training, Old Rifles,
Poor Supplies,” April 4, 2022; Ihor Burdyga and Regina Gimalova, “How Ukraine Separatists are Mass Conscripting
Anyone of Fighting Age,” DW, April 27, 2022; Lilia Yapparova, “A Mercenaries’ War,” Meduza, July 14, 2022;
Reuters, “Russian Firm Wagner Made Tactical Advances in Donbas-UK Intelligence,” July 27, 2022.
116 Reuters, “Ukraine Troops Retreat from Popasna, Luhansk Governor Confirms,” May 8, 2022; Karolina Hird,
Frederick W. Kagan, and George Barros, “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 20,” Institute for the Study
of War, May 20, 2022.
117 Ian Lovett, “Ukraine Counterattack Takes Back Parts of Strategic Donbas City,” Wall Street Journal, June 5, 3033;
Tim Lister, “Two Months On, Russia Is Still Struggling to Capture This Small Ukrainian City,” CNN, June 21, 2022.
118 Yaroslav Trofimov, “Ukrainian Troops Retreat from Severodonetsk After Weeks of Brutal Battle,” Wall Street
Journal, June 24, 2022; Tass, “Mopping Up of Village near Severodonetsk in LPR Being Completed — Chechen
Leader,” June 19, 2022.
119 Konrad Muzyka, “Ukraine Conflict Monitor: 27 June – 3 July 2022,” Rochan Consulting, July 3, 2022.
120 Jonathan Beale, “Ukraine Confirms Russia Captured Eastern City Lysychansk,” BBC, July 3, 2022; Annabelle
Timsit et al., “Russia Claims Key City in Punishing Conquest of Eastern Ukraine,” Washington Post, July 3, 3033.
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Civilian Casualties
In August 2022, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights estimated 5,587 civilians had been kil ed and 7,890
wounded since the war began. The commissioner also noted that this was likely an undercount. For example, in
Mariupol, a city that suffered especial y severe civilian casualties, Ukrainian sources have stated that local morgues
have documented at least 87,000 deaths.

Sources: BBC, “Kyiv Losing Up to 200 Troops a Day-Zelensky Aide,” June 9, 2022; Economist, “How Heavy Are
Russian Casualties in Ukraine?” July 24, 2022; Niamh Cavanagh, “Russia Has Suffered an Estimated 75,000
Casualties in Ukraine Invasion, U.S. Officials Say,” Yahoo News, July 28, 2022; Jack Detsch, “Russia Is Readying the
Zinc Coffins Again,” Foreign Policy, August 8, 2022; Helene Cooper, “Heavy Losses Leave Russia Short of Its Goal
U.S. Officials Say,” New York Times, August 11, 2022; Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, “Almost 9,000 Ukrainian
Defenders Died in the War with the Russian Federation-Zaluzhny,” August 22, 2022; U.N. Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights, “Ukraine: Civilian Casualty Update 22 August 2022,” press release, August 22,
2022; Kyiv Independent, “British Defense Minister: Combined Russian Casualties at 80,000 Troops in War Against
Ukraine,” August 24, 2022; Euromaidan Press, “87,000 Kil ed Civilians Documented in Occupied Mariupol—
Volunteer,” August 30, 2022.
The UAF suffered heavy casualties during the fighting for Severodonetsk and Lysychansk,
including among experienced veterans who volunteered for the Territorial Defense Forces (TDF)
and reserve units.121 The UAF broke up the core of its maneuver formations into smaller units to
spearhead localized counterattacks and to shore up TDF and Reserve units manning defensive
positions. According to a RUSI study, “In the defense, this has led to reasonable combat
performance by these troops. For the attack, however, the Ukrainian armed forces have found it
necessary to bring their best units back together and have them spearhead attacks.”122 Many UAF
counteroffensives, such as outside of Kharkiv, slowed as Russian units regrouped and UAF forces
concentrated on defending the Ukrainian-controlled areas of the Donbas, leaving TDF units to
defend the frontline but unable to launch further offensive action.123 The UAF also struggled with
secure communications and instances of command and control issues between the TDF and
regular military, as well as a dire need for artillery and heavy weapon support.124
Beginning in mid-May 2022, the UAF began receiving significant shipments of U.S. and Western
artillery systems, specifically the U.S. M777 155mm howitzer and ammunition.125 Security
assistance has been critical to sustaining UAF operations and countering the Russian advantage in
artillery and rocket artillery, since the UAF reports it is running low on ammunition and parts for
its Soviet/Russian artillery systems.126 Nevertheless, training time and the high need for systems
have resulted in most UAF units still relying on older Soviet/Russian systems while waiting for

121 Dave Lawler, “Ukraine Suffering Up to 1,000 Casualties Per Day in Donbas, Official Says,” Axios, June 15, 2022;
Stephen Kalin, “Ukraine’s War of Attrition Exacts Heavy Toll on Both Sides,” Wall Street Journal, June 29, 2022. See
also CRS In Focus IF12150, Ukrainian Military Performance and Outlook, by Andrew S. Bowen.
122 Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, “Ukraine at War: Paving the Road From Survival to Victory,” RUSI, July 4, 2022,
p. 17
123James M. Lindsay, “The Long War in Ukraine, With Michael Kofman,” Council on Foreign Relations, July 12,
2022.
124 Thomas Gibbons-Neff and Natalia Yermak, “On Front Lines, Communication Breakdowns Prove Costly for
Ukraine,” New York Times, June 28, 2022; Viviana Salama, “Ukraine Faces Shortfall in Weapons as It Gears Up for
First Major Counteroffensive,” Wall Street Journal, July 21, 2022.
125 David Vergun, “M777 Artillery Deliveries Should Help Ukraine in the Donbas, Says Official,” DoD News, April
29, 2022; and Andrew E. Kramer and Maria Varenikova, “Powerful American Artillery Enters the Fight in Ukraine,”
New York Times, May 23, 2022.
126 Lara Seligman, “Biden to Send New Precision-Guided Artillery Rounds to Ukraine,” Politico, July 8, 2022.
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new Western weaponry.127 By July, Ukraine began receiving U.S.-supplied M270 Multiple
Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) and M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS),
providing the UAF with significantly improved targeting ability, including increased range and
precision accuracy.128 Early assessments by U.S. officials and other observers indicate the UAF is
using these systems effectively, including to target key Russian command and control, logistics,
and transport infrastructure.129 One significant challenge, however, is maintaining and repairing
the vast number of Western systems the UAF has received, all with different standards and
requirements for operating.
Over the rest of July, Russian forces attempted to regroup and take an “operational pause” after
suffering heavy casualties capturing Severodonetsk and Lysychansk.130 Most observers believed
Russia had exhausted most of its forces and required time to refit, resupply, and reorganize.
Russian forces did not achieve any significant territorial progress over the next weeks, other than
small gains between Siversk and Bakhmut, and appeared to focus on solidifying their control over
existing territory.131 Russia increasingly relied on Wagner PMC and DNR/LNR forces to probe
UAF lines and then direct artillery and rocket artillery upon making contact.132 Open-source
reporting continued to document instances of low Russian morale and increasing reports of
Russian soldiers refusing to fight, resigning from their contracts before deployment, or refusing
orders from their superiors.133
Russian Command and Control Challenges
Since the start of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, reports indicate Russia has attempted to address its command
and control issues, including the lack of an overall operational commander. It is difficult for most observers to
definitively identify and state the nature of Russian command and control due to the changing circumstances and

127 CRS In Focus IF12040, U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine, by Christina L. Arabia, Andrew S. Bowen, and Cory
Welt; Thomas Gibbons-Neff, Natalia Yermak, and Andrew E. Kramer, “Ukraine Is Running Short of Soviet-Era
Ammunition for Its Artillery, Crippling Its Ability to Hold the Line in the East,” New York Times, June 10, 2022; and
Serhiy Morgunov, “As They Wait for Weapons, Ukrainians Hold the Line with Soviet Artillery,” Washington Post,
July 27, 2022.
128 Stephen Kalin and Georgi Kantchev, “Ukraine Loses Ground in Battle for Severodonetsk but Gains Firepower from
U.S.” Wall Street Journal, June 23, 2022; Jack Detsch, “Ukraine Is Bringing a Big Gun to a Knife Fight,” Foreign
Policy, July 13, 2022; and Isabel Coles and Evan Gershkovich, “Ukraine Strike on Russian Air-Defense Unit Shows
Impact of New Weapons from West,” Wall Street Journal, July 13, 2022.
129 Isabelle Khurshudyan and Kostiantyn Khudov, “U.S. Supplied HIMARS Changing the Calculus on Ukraine’s
Frontlines,” Washington Post, July 1, 2022; Illia Ponomarenko, “Ukraine Targets Russia’s Ammunition Depots,
Undermining Its Artillery Advantage,” Kyiv Independent, July 8, 2022; and C. Todd Lopez, “U.S. Provided HIMARS
Effective in Ukraine,” DoD News, July 15, 2022.
130 Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “Russia Advances Behind Brutal Barrage, But Will Its Strategy Keep Working?” New York
Times, July 4, 2022; Erika Solomon, “Behind Russia’s ‘Pause’ Are Signs of a Troubled Effort to Regroup,” New York
Times, September 10, 2022.
131 Konrad Muzyka, “Ukraine Conflict Monitor: 18-24 July 2022,” Rochan Consulting, July 25, 2022; Dara Massicot,
“Moscow’s New Strategy in Ukraine Is Just as Bad as the Old One,” Foreign Affairs, August 15, 2022.
132 Konrad Muzyka, “Ukraine Conflict Monitor: 25-31 July 2022,” Rochan Consulting, August 1, 2022.
133 It is unclear how widespread and pervasive low morale is in the Russian military, but the rise of such reports, along
with the reliance on PMC and DNR/LNR units (including public appeals from DNR/LNR units for support), likely
indicates it is not an isolated issue. Because Russia states it is not at war and its invasion is a “Special Military
Operation,” contract soldiers can refuse deployment and face only dismissal, not prosecution. This places added
pressure on the Russian military’s personnel issues. Timofei Rozhanskiy, “Why Russian Soldiers Are Refusing to Fight
in the War on Ukraine,” RFE/RL, July 20, 2022; Pjotr Sauer, “Russian Soldiers Accuse Superiors of Jailing Them for
Refusing to Fight,” Guardian, August 2, 2022.
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lack of transparency. Recent events and reports, however, have provided greater visibility into the general
structure and picture of Russian command.
In April 2022, reports emerged that General Alexander Dvornikov, head of the Southern Military District, was
given operational command of Russia’s war to help streamline command and control. However, the extent of his
direct control and whether he supervised all Russian forces remained unclear. By June, reports emerged that
General Dvornikov had been removed from command and replaced by General Gennady Zhidko, the then-head
of the Main Military Political Directorate.
As of August, four of five Military District commanders, the head of the Airborne forces (VDV), the commander
of the Black Sea Fleet, and multiple junior commanders had been replaced. Russian forces appear to be organized
into two “groupings”: the Western and Southern Groupings of Forces. General Sergei Surovikin, commander of
the Aerospace Forces, reportedly has taken over command of Russia’s Southern Grouping of Forces from General
Zhidko. Colonel General Aleksander Lapin, head of the Central Military District, now commands the Western
Grouping of Forces. Overall operation of the war continues to be control ed through the National Defense
Management Center in Moscow, which appears to have greater oversight and management of the “groupings” of
Russian forces than in the early stages of the invasion.
Sources: Helene Cooper and Eric Schmitt, “Russia’s War Lacks a Battlefield Commander, U.S. Officials Say,” New
York Times, March 31, 2022; Miriam Berger and Bryan Pietsch, “What to Know About Russia’s Top Commander in
Ukraine,” Washington Post, April 10, 2022; Kyiv Independent, “Conflict Intelligence Team: General Dvornikov
Dismissed from Leading Russian Troops in Ukraine,” June 3, 2022; Karolina Hird, Mason Clark, and George
Barros, “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 25,” Institute for the Study of War, June 25, 2022; Karolina
Hird et al. “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 28, 2022,” Institute for the Study of War, July 28, 2022;
Russia Experiments with Command and Control in Ukraine,” Janes IHS, August 2, 2022; UK Defense Intelligence,
“Intelligence Update, August 7, 2022,” press release, August 7, 2022.
By early August 2022, as Russian advances stalled, a gradual stalemate and war of attrition began
to set in. Russia continued some offensive operations (relying on Russian PMC and LNR/DNR
forces) toward Bakhmut and Avdiivka, as well as the town of Pisky, just outside Avdiivka in the
Donetsk region.134 The UAF appeared to prepare a shift from defensive to offensive operations.
Ukraine began carrying out a series of partisan attacks (including assassinations) against officials
in Russia-occupied regions, Russian government infrastructure, and key air bases and supply
positions in Crimea.135 These attacks, conducted by Ukrainian Special Forces and local
supporters, drones, and missile strikes, have destabilized the Russian military’s control over the
region and forced Russia to devote more forces to counterinsurgency and internal security
missions.136
International observers remain concerned by the Russian military’s occupation and management
of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), the largest nuclear plant in Europe.137 Some

134 Kateryna Stepanenko et al, “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 2,” Institute for the Study of War,
August 2, 2022; Susie Blann, “Russian Forces Begin Assault on Two Eastern Ukraine Cities,” AP, August 6, 2022;
David Axe, “The Russians Want Pisky. The Ukrainians Want Pisky. Neither Army Has Enough Troops For a Quick
Victory.” Forbes, August 1, 2022.
135 Marc Santora, “Guerrilla Attacks Signal Rising Resistance to Russian Occupation,” New York Times, June 6, 2022;
Kyiv Independent, “Russian Puppet Official in Ukraine’s Kherson Assassinated,” August 7, 2022; Todd Prince, “Long
Range Missiles? Special Op? Regardless, Crimean Air Base Blasts Are a ‘Real Quandry’ for Russia,” RFE/RL, August
12, 2022; and Anastasia Tenisheva, “Assassinations of Russia-Installed Officials on the Rise in Occupied Ukraine,”
Moscow Times, September 1, 2022.
136 Isabelle Khurshudyan, Liz Sly, and Adela Suliman, “Crimea Airfield Blast War Work of Ukrainian Special Forces,
Official Says,” Washington Post, August 10, 2022; and Oren Liebermann, “How Ukraine Is Using Resistance Warfare
Developed by the U.S. to Fight Back Against Russia,” CNN, August 27, 2022; Al-Jazeera, “Ukraine’s Partisans Won’t
Win War but Can ‘Wreak Havoc,” September 6, 2022.
137 For more, see CRS Insight IN11883, Russian Military Actions at Ukraine’s Nuclear Power Plants, by Mark Holt
and Mary Beth D. Nikitin; International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), “Director General Grossi Alarmed by
Shelling at Ukraine NPP, Says IAEA Mission Vital for Nuclear Safety and Security,” press release, August 6, 2022.
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analysts argue that attacks on nuclear power plants could be considered a “war crime”
under international law.138 The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) negotiated with
Russia and Ukraine to send an expert mission to ZNPP to “assess the physical damage to the
ZNPP’s facilities, determine whether the main and back-up safety and security systems were
functional and evaluate the staff's working conditions,” according to the IAEA. An IAEA
inspection team visited the plant on September 1; six IAEA inspectors remained on-site for a few
days. Two of those inspectors reportedly will stay to continue monitoring the plant’s operation as
a permanent presence.139
The UAF began preparations for a counteroffensive by conducting strikes across Kherson and
Crimea to degrade Russian capabilities and hinder the resupply of its forces in Kherson, including
attacks against key logistics targets and the bridges connecting occupied Kherson with the rest of
occupied southern Ukraine.140 According to U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General
Mark A. Milley, Ukraine conducted over 400 HIMARS strikes by September 8.141 These strikes
likely seriously strained Russian logistics and artillery ammunition supply by targeting previously
unreachable depots.142
The UAF also deployed high-speed anti-radiation missiles (HARM), used to target radar or
electronic warfare systems, on its MiG-29 fighters. Russian forces appeared to redeploy from
Donetsk and Luhansk to southern Ukraine in preparation for a UAF offensive.143 Observers had
noted reports of Ukrainian preparation for an offensive for months but speculated whether the
UAF had enough trained personnel and sufficient equipment (such as tanks and armored vehicles
to rapidly transport infantry) to sustain offensive operations, as well as possible risks of exposing
other fronts to counterattack from Russian forces by drawing away resources.144 Ukraine likely
considered the benefits—including deterring a possible Russian referendum and annexation of
occupied territories, considering winter and potential complications due to European reliance on
Russian natural gas, and demonstrating to Western allies that continued assistance could shift the

138 George M. Moore, “How International Law Applies to Attacks on Nuclear and Associated Facilities in Ukraine,”
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 6, 2022.
139 IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi, press conference, September 2, 2022.
140 Stephen Fidler and Daniel Michaels, “War with Russia Enters New Phase as Ukraine Readies Southern
Counterblow,” Wall Street Journal, July 31, 2022; and Konrad Muzyka, “Ukraine Conflict Monitor 22-28 August
2022,” Rochan Consulting, August 29, 2022.
141 Reuters, “Ukraine Has Struck More Than 400 Russian Targets with HIMARS - U.S. Top General,” September 8,
2022.
142 The Russian military must keep large supplies of ammunition close to the frontlines for resupply due to its heavy
reliance on massed artillery fires. These supplies present a particularly vulnerable and significant target. Liz Sly, John
Hudson, and David L. Stern, “Crimea Attacks Point to Ukraine’s Newest Strategy, Official Says,” Washington Post,
August 18, 2022.
143 Russia has constructed multiple lines of defense in preparation for a UAF offensive. Including DNR troops, Russia
has a significant concentration of VDV and Spetsnaz units (however, as demonstrated in the early stages of the
invasion, they are often insufficiently equipped to defend against a large conventional force), as well as various other
conventional Russian forces. Isobel Koshiw, “Ukrainian Offensive Forces Russia to Bolster Troops in Occupied
South,” Guardian, July 31, 2022; Brett Forrest and Bojan Pancevski, “Russia Redeploys Troops in Ukraine as Focus of
Conflict Turns South,” Wall Street Journal, August 1, 2022; and Matthew Luxmoore, “Russia Moves to Reinforce Its
Stalled Assault on Ukraine,” Wall Street Journal, August 28, 2022.
144 Julian E. Barnes and Eric Schmitt, “Russia’s Shortfalls Create an Opportunity for Ukraine, Western Officials Say,”
New York Times, August 4, 2022; Loveday Morris et al., “On the Kherson Front Lines, Little Sign of a Ukrainian
Counteroffensive,” Washington Post, August 12, 2022; Andrew E. Kramer, Anton Troianovski, and Helen Cooper,
“Ukraine Weighs a Risky Offensive to Break Out of a Stalemate,” New York Times, August 26, 2022.
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balance of momentum and allow Ukraine to retake territory and defeat Russia—to outweigh the
risks.145
Kherson Region Offensive
On August 29, 2022, Ukraine launched a long-awaited offensive into the Kherson region in the
south, reportedly making some initial advances.146 The extent of UAF success may depend on the
capability of Russian forces, which have increased in number in recent weeks; sufficient
equipment for UAF units; and sufficient reserves to replace casualties and exploit
breakthroughs.147 Some observers and U.S. officials believe the latest offensive may still be part
of a “shaping” strategy to improve the UAF position for future counteroffensives.148 Some reports
indicate Ukrainian forces, advised by U.S. officials, determined a smaller offensive would give
the UAF flexibility to deploy resources to other fronts and conduct multiple counteroffensives
against exposed Russian lines.149
By early September 2022, UAF offensives had made small but sustained progress across three
fronts in Kherson, pushing back some Russian forces.150 UAF forces ran into significant and
determined opposition, including the heavy use of artillery and air support.151 At the same time,
the UAF began an offensive on another front, in the northeastern region of Kharkiv. Some
observers thus speculated the Kherson offensive was intended as a distraction.152 While possible,
the level and scale of UAF resources suggested the Kherson offensive was not simply a feint.
Kharkiv Offensive
In the Kharkiv region, the UAF appeared to exploit a weak point in Russian defenses and
captured several towns (such as Balakliya) in early September 2022, potentially opening the
possibility of targeting a key resupply city of Kupyansk. Some initial reports indicated that
Russian defense was manned by Rosgvardiya troops not trained or equipped for frontline combat
as well as by lower-quality LNR troops.153 The UAF appeared to consolidate an estimated core of

145 Christopher Miller and Paul McLeary, “Ukraine Has Telegraphed Its Big Counteroffensive for Months. So Where Is
It?,” Politico, August 16, 2022; James Marson, Matthew Luxmoore, and Ian Lovett, “Ukraine Tried to Make Southern
Offensive a Turning Point in War,” Wall Street Journal, August 30, 2022.
146 James Marson, “Ukraine Launches Counteroffensive in South, Leading with Artillery Bombardment,” Wall Street
Journal, August 29, 2022; Economist, “Ukraine Starts a Push to Recapture Kherson, a Crucial Russian Occupied City,”
August 29, 2022; and Dan Parsons, “U.S. Says Some Russian Units Are ‘Falling Back’ In Kherson,” The Drive, August
31, 2022; Thomas Bullock, “Kyiv Begins Offensive in South of Country,” Janes IHS, September 2, 2022.
147 Matthew Luxmoore, “Ukrainian Soldiers Say They Are Advancing in the South, But at a Cost,” Wall Street Journal,
August 31, 2022.
148 Jim Sciutto, “Ukrainian Forces Begin ‘Shaping’ Battlefield for Counteroffensive, Senior U.S. Officials Say,” CNN,
August 29, 2022.
149 Katie Bo Lillis and Natasha Bertrand, “U.S. War Gamed with Ukraine Ahead of Counteroffensive and Encouraged
More Limited Mission,” CNN, September 1, 2022; Julian E. Barnes and Helene Cooper, “Ukrainian Officials Drew on
U.S. Intelligence to Plan Counteroffensive,” New York Times, September 10, 2022.
150 Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “Against Fierce Resistance, Ukraine Makes Small Gains in the South,” New York Times,
September 2, 2022; John Hudson, “Wounded Soldiers Reveal Steep Toll of Kherson Offensive,” Washington Post,
September 7, 2022.
151 Andrew E. Kramer, “For Ukraine, the Fight Is Often a Game of Bridges,” New York Times, September 10, 2022.
152 Isobel Koshiw, Lorenzo Tondo and Artem Mazhulin, “Ukraine’s Southern Offensive ‘Was Designed to Trick
Russia,” Guardian, September 10, 2022.
153 Konrad Muzyka, “Ukraine Conflict Monitor, September 6, 2022,” Rochan Consulting, September 7, 2022.
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five brigades to launch a counteroffensive.154The UAF benefited from Russia pulling its most
combat-effective troops south toward Kherson and from apparent Russian intelligence and
command failures, as Russia failed to detect the UAF buildup and organize a coordinated
response.155 Spearheaded by tanks, the UAF quickly exploited its breakthrough with high mobile
units that advanced behind Russian forces, conducting ambushes and cutting off Russian
reinforcements. By September 8, the UAF had broken through Russian lines and liberated almost
400 square miles, with Russia appearing unable to coordinate effective resistance or reestablish
defensive lines despite rushing in reinforcements.156 The UAF also launched offensives south of
Izyum and Lyman to put pressure on Russian forces, threatening to cut off Russian forces in the
area.
By September 10, Russian forces had announced a withdrawal from Izyum, a symbolic statement
after a near-total rout of Russian forces in the area.157 The collapse of Russian forces meant the
UAF advanced so quickly that UAF command had trouble keeping track of its units.158 Many
observers believe the UAF will focus on defending its recaptured territory to prevent becoming
overextended. Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov stated the offensive had gone “better
than expected” and that Ukraine’s focus was on consolidating and defending the recaptured
territory.159 By September 11, Russia announced it had withdrawn all forces west of the Oskil
River, with Ukraine retaking more than 1,000 square miles of territory and almost all previously
occupied territory in Kharkiv region.160
Russian Personnel and Manpower Challenges
Since the beginning of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, analysts have noted that one of the Russian military’s
greatest weaknesses is its lack of personnel. The Russian military includes two types of enlisted personnel:
conscripts drafted twice a year and contract (professional) soldiers who volunteer for a fixed term of service.
Since 2008, Russia has focused with limited success on recruiting contract soldiers, resulting in a mix of conscripts
and contract soldiers. Russian law prohibits conscripts from combat unless a national emergency and mobilization
is declared. As a result, contract soldiers are prioritized for combat units (and elite units such as VDV, Spetsnaz,
and reconnaissance) and to fulfil technical positions requiring higher levels of training and knowledge. Additionally,

154 President Zelensky praised the 25th Airborne Brigade, 80th Air Assault Brigade, and 92nd Mechanized Brigade in a
televised speech, but observers noted other units present in the initial offensive. BBC, “Zelensky Hails ‘Good News’ as
Settlements Recaptured from Russia,” September 7, 2022; Marc Santora, “How Ukraine Gained Momentum Against
Russia and Took a Critical Hub,” New York Times, September 10, 2022.
155 John Paul Rathbone and Roman Olearchyk, “Ukraine Gains Momentum with Kharkiv Offensive,” Financial Times,
September 9, 2022.
156 Kateryna Stepanenko, “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 8,” Institute for the Study of War,
September 8, 2022; Jack Detsch, “They Are Pushing Everywhere:’ Kyiv Goes on the Offensive,” Foreign Policy,
September 8, 2022; Isabel Coles, “Ukraine’s Rapid Advance in East Puts Russian Forces on Defensive,” Wall Street
Journal, September 9, 2022; Economist, “Ukraine Seizes the Initiative in the East,” September 9, 2022.
157 John Paul Rathbone and Roman Olearchyk, “Lightning Ukraine Offensive Pushes Russia Back 70km in a Week,”
Financial Times, September 10, 2022; Thomas Grove and Evan Gershkovich, “In Major Advance, Ukraine Drives
Russians Out of Key Front-Line Cities,” Wall Street Journal, September 10, 2022.
158 Economist, “Is Russia on the Run?,” September 11, 2022; Mike Eckel, “Turning the Tide? Ukraine Stuns Russia
with Counteroffensive but Can’t Claim Victory Yet,” RFE/RL, September 11, 2022.
159 Jack Watling, “Ukraine Can Now Exploit Russia’s Confusion, But Must Plan Carefully,” Guardian, September 10,
2022; John Paul Rathbone and Roman Olearchyk, “Ukraine’s Reznikov Warns on Russian Counter-attack,” Financial
Times, September 11, 2022.
160 James Marson, “Ukraine Claims Fresh Gains Against Russian Forces in Country’s East,” Wall Street Journal,
September 11, 2022; Konrad Muzyka, “Ukraine Conflict Monitor, 5-11 September 2022,” Rochan Consulting,
September 12, 2022; Illia Ponomarenko, “With Successful Kharkiv Operation, Ukraine Turns the War in Its Favor,”
Kyiv Independent, September 13, 2022.
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conscripts receive most training in their home units by contract personnel and officers, making contract personnel
crucial to the overall readiness of the Russian military.
The Russian military is a tiered readiness force, with personnel levels ranging from 70% to 90% of their authorized
strength. Additionally, since 2012-2014, Russia has expanded its ground forces structure by creating new units
without increasing the available personnel. Michael Kofman and Rob Lee note, “Russia regressed to a partial-
mobilization force, hoping to have the best of both worlds: more forces and equipment, reduced staffing and cost,
plus the ability to generate substantial combat power on short notice.” However, as new units were created, the
actual staffing level was reduced further due to insufficient personnel. Each Russian brigade or regiment is intended
to field and deploy two Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) of 700-900 contract soldiers (a third would consist of
conscripts), but it became clear that the BTGs varied in staffing levels. Some BTGs deployed with 400-600
contract personnel. The result was that the Russian military had a relatively limited core of deployable maneuver
combat formations of contract personnel relative to the total size of the military.
Heavy Russian casualties have exacerbated the personnel situation. In the initial invasion, Russia mobilized an
estimated 80% of its deployable units. Since Russia states its war is a “Special Military Operation,” which prohibits
the use of conscripts, it has limited contract personnel and staffed units available to reinforce, rotate, and replace
Russian casualties. Force quality has continued to deteriorate as units (especial y elite forces) poach the best
available officers and men from the lower-tiered units, which in turn do the same to the units below them
(including pul ing officer cadets from training schools and into command positions). This cycle undermines the
quality of the unit, as those pul ed up are not of the same quality and do not have sufficient training. As a result,
Russia has turned to a variety of “shadow mobilization” strategies to recruit and mobilize forces to sustain
offensive operations. These strategies include the fol owing:

Pressuring conscripts to sign as contract soldiers

Offering high salary levels and signing bonuses for new contract soldiers (estimates range from 3-5 times
the average Russian salary) and on a short-term basis (six months)

Recruiting at least one volunteer battalion per Russian federal district, with most of these battalions
reportedly forming the core of the newly established 3rd Army Corps in Mulino, Russia

Forcing conscription of local residents in DNR/LNR (Since these territories are not Russian territory
and the inhabitants not Russian citizens, they do not have the protections afforded to Russian conscripts
and likely are viewed as more expendable by the Russian leadership.)

Increasing reliance on Private Military Companies (PMCs), including the Wagner Group, to conduct
offensive operations, especial y in the Donetsk and Luhansk region. (PMCs reportedly have been
recruiting from Russian prisons in return for a reduced sentence.)
Most observers believe these strategies are short-term solutions to avoid a politically costly decision to declare
national mobilization. However, it is unclear how long these solutions wil suffice and to what extent they can
compensate for casualties among Russia’s professional contract soldiers. Many of these recruitment strategies
compete over the same recruits, and analysts note these recruitment drives are likely coming up short of
proposed goals. The strategies are further complicated by retention issues, as many volunteers reach the end of
their short-term contracts. On August 29, 2022, a Pentagon official stated, “This effort is unlikely to succeed, as
Russia has historically not met personnel and strength targets.... In fact, if you look at the Russian armed forces,
prior to the invasion, they may have already been 150,000 personnel short of their mil ion personnel goal.”
Observers also note these recruitment drives have lifted previous age and health restrictions, likely resulting in
lower-quality candidates and recruits (in addition to large regional and ethnic disparities among new volunteers).
Additionally, the extent and level of training for many of these new units is unclear. Since contract soldiers and
junior officers conduct most training at the unit level, including for new conscripts, casualties to these troops likely
wil negatively affect the Russian military’s ability to train and prepare incoming conscript cycles and wil undermine
readiness in the future. However, in the event of a national mobilization, conscripts with the most recent service
and personnel who served in motor rifle or elite units (VDV, Naval Infantry, Spetsnaz) likely would be among the
first targeted and thereby have decreased the training requirements before deployment.
On August 25, 2022, Russian President Putin signed a decree increasing the size of the active military to 1.15
mil ion, an increase of 137,000. Although the decree by itself does not resolve Russia’s personnel issues and does
not meaningful y allow for greater recruitment, it likely reflects the Russian government planning for a protracted
conflict and could provide a legal instrument to coordinate the integration and consolidation of volunteer and
DNR/LNR units into the Russian military.
Sources: Neil MacFarquhar, “Russia Planned a Major Military Overhaul. Ukraine Shows the Result,” New York
Times, May 16, 2022; Dara Massicot, “The Russian Military’s People Problem,” Foreign Affairs, May 18, 2022;
Michael Kofman and Rob Lee, “Not Built for Purpose: The Russian Military’s Il -Fated Force Design,” War on the
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Rocks, June 2, 2022; Neil MacFarquhar, “Desperate for Recruits, Russia Launches a ‘Stealth Mobilization,’” New
York Times, July 10, 2022; Mike Eckel, “The Orchestra Needs Musicians: Behind the Covert Mobilization to
Reinforce Russian Troops in Ukraine,” RFE/RL, July 14, 2022; Kateryna Stepanenko, George Barros, and Frederick
W. Kagan, “Russian Volunteer Units and Battalions,” Institute for the Study of War, July 16, 2022; Anastasia
Tenisheva, “Russia Sends Army Recruits to Fight in Ukraine After Just Days of Training,” Moscow Times, July 22,
2022; Moscow Times, “Russia Regions Form 40 Volunteer Battalions,” August 8, 2022; Economist, “Russia is
Forcing Ukrainian Conscripts into Battle,” August 11, 2022; Novaya Gazeta, “To War or to Prison?” August 12,
2022; Mary Ilyushina, “In Ukraine, a Russian Mercenary Group Steps Out of the Shadows,” Washington Post,
August 18, 2022; Yaroslav Trofimov, “Wagner Mercenaries Enter the Spotlight as Russian Troops Struggle in
Ukraine,” Wall Street Journal, August 18, 2022; Olga Ivshina, “Lost Battalions: Calculating Russia’s Casualties in Six
Months of War in Ukraine,” BBC, August 22, 2022; Economist, “Ukraine and Russia Both Need More Soldiers,”
August 25, 2022; Ann M. Simmons, “Russia’s Dwindling Manpower in Ukraine Spurs Recruitment Drive,” Wall
Street Journal, August 26, 2022; Yuliya Talmazan, “Putin Orders Russian Military to Increase Its Forces as Ukraine
War Passes the Six-Month Mark,” NBC News, August 25, 2022; Department of Defense, “Russian Efforts to Raise
Numbers of Troops ‘Unlikely to Succeed,’ U.S. Official Says,” press release, August 29, 2022.
War Crimes
Numerous countries, the International Criminal Court, the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), think tanks, and human rights organizations have identified
instances of potential Russian war crimes and human rights violations in Ukraine.161 On April 12,
2022, an OSCE report on possible human rights violations and war crimes in Ukraine found that,
“while in the circumstances a detailed assessment of most allegations of IHL (International
Humanitarian Law) violations and war crimes concerning particular incidents has not been
possible, the Mission found clear patterns of such violations by the Russian forces on most of the
issues investigated.”162
Russian forces have been accused of indiscriminate and mass killings, particularly after the
discovery of mass graves and murdered civilians following the Russian military’s withdrawal
from the Kyiv suburb of Bucha; rapes; and the forced “filtration” (interrogation and separation) of
civilians and noncombatants from occupied territories.163 On July 13, 2022, U.S. Secretary of
State Antony Blinken called on Russia to “halt its systematic filtration operations and forced
deportations in Russian-controlled and held areas of Ukraine.”164 Observers also have accused

161 See, for example, Amnesty International, “Russian Military Commits Indiscriminate Attacks During the Invasion of
Ukraine,” February 25, 2022; International Criminal Court, Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Karim A.A. Khan QC, on the
Situation in Ukraine: Receipt of Referrals from 39 States Parties and the Opening of an Investigation, March 2, 2022;
Steve Holland, “U.S. Begins Collecting Material For Russia War Crimes Inquiry,” Reuters, March 7, 2022; Human
Rights Watch, “Ukraine: Russian Assault Kills Fleeing Civilians,” March 8, 2022; Jamie Dettmer, “Judgement Day:
European Nations Start Probing Alleged Russian War Crimes in Ukraine,” VOA, March 9, 2022; Eliot Higgins, “These
Are the Cluster Munitions Documented by Ukrainian Civilians,” Bellingcat, March 11, 2022; Valerie Hopkins,
“Investigators of War Crimes in Ukraine Face Formidable Challenges,” New York Times, July 3, 2022.
162 OSCE, Report on Violations of International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, War Crimes, and Crimes
Against Humanity Committed in Ukraine Since 24 February 2022, April 12, 2022.
163 Malachy Browne, David Botti, and Haley Willis, “Satellite Images Show Bodies Lay in Bucha for Weeks, Despite
Russian Claims,” New York Times, April 4, 2022; Cara Anna, “War Crimes Watch: A Devastating Walk Through
Bucha’s Horror,” AP, April 10, 2022; Anthony Deutsch, “Ukraine Prepares War Crimes Charges Against Russian
Military Personnel, Including Pilots,” Reuters, April 26, 2022; Ivana Kottasova and Oleksandra Ochman, “Ukrainians
Must Endure a Brutal ‘Filtration’ Process to Escape Russian-Held Territory: Here’s What That Means,” CNN, May 23,
2022; National Intelligence Council, “Russian Forces Conducting Detentions and Forced Deportations Through
Systematic Filtration Operations,” unclassified press release, June 15, 2022.
164 U.S. State Department, “Russia’s ‘Filtration’ Operations, Forced Disappearances, and Mass Deportations of
Ukrainian Citizens,” press release, July 13, 2022.
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Russia of shelling humanitarian corridors established to allow civilians to flee urban and conflict
areas and targeting civilian areas.165 Russian authorities continue to deny accusations; Russian
President Putin honored one unit alleged to have conducted war crimes in Bucha for its actions in
Ukraine.166
Outlook
With the war past its six-month mark, most observers believe there is little likelihood for political
settlement or cessation of hostilities.167 Few observers expect Russia to agree to a political
settlement or cease-fire unless it believes it has realized enough territorial gains to achieve its
revised objectives and present a victorious narrative to domestic audiences.168 Observers continue
to speculate whether Russia has the military capabilities to achieve a decisive outcome or if the
UAF can sustain operations through the winter.169 For both sides, observers believe one of the
most critical issues will be raising, supporting, and deploying limited resources of personnel and
equipment most effectively.170
Russia likely believes it retains advantages heading into the winter that will allow it to regain the
initiative. On September 8, CIA Director William Burns stated, “Putin’s bet right now is that he is
going to be tougher than the Ukrainians, the Europeans, the Americans.”171 Russia also is betting
that its economy will weather international sanctions, and that international support for Ukraine
will dwindle as rising energy costs take hold in Europe.172 It is unclear whether Russia’s recent
battlefield failures have influenced these views.173

165 Tim Lister et al., “Civilians Killed as Russian Military Strike Hits Evacuation Route in Kyiv Suburb,” CNN, March
7, 2022; Amy Cheng, and Annabelle Timsit, “At Least Six Killed in Kharkiv Strikes; Chasiv Yar Death Toll Hits 34,”
New York Times, July 12, 2022.
166 The U.S. State Department has identified Russia’s 76th Guards Air Assault Division, its subordinate 234th Guards
Air Assault Regiment, and the 64th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade as involved in possible war crimes in Bucha. U.S.
State Department, “Targeting Russia’s War Machine, Sanctions Evaders, Military Units Credibly Implicated in Human
Rights Abuses, and Russian Federation Officials Involved in Suppression of Dissent,” fact sheet, June 28, 2022; See
also Bryan Pietsch, “Putin Honors Brigade Accused of War Crimes in Bucha,” Washington Post, April 19, 2022; and
Jade McGlynn, “Russia’s War Crime Denials Are Fuel for More Atrocities,” Foreign Policy, April 23, 2022.
167 Anton Troianovski, Andrew E. Kramer and Steven Erlanger, “Six Months into War, Ukraine and Russia Are Both
Reshaped,” New York Times, August 24, 2022; Mehul Srivastava et al., “Six Months of War in Ukraine: ‘The Enemy
Learned Fast,’” Financial Times, August 24, 2022.
168 Max Seddon and Henry Foy, “Vladimir Putin Abandons Hopes of Ukraine Deal and Shifts to Land-Grab Strategy,”
Financial Times, April 24, 2022.
169 Lilia Yapparova, “The Fog of War: Military Analyst Rob Lee on Ukraine’s Push to Liberate Kherson and Russia’s
Manpower Problem,’ Meduza, September 1, 2022; Michael Kofman and Ryan Evans, “Into the Breach: Ukraine’s
Counter-Offensive Begins,” War on the Rocks, September 2, 2022.
170 Economist, “Ukraine and Russia Both Need More Soldiers: Who Can Train Them Faster?,” August 25, 2022; Jack
Watling, “The Ukrainian Offensive Must Come in Stages,” RUSI, September 2, 2022.
171 Julian E. Barnes, “Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Looks Like a ‘Failure,’ C.I.A Director Says,” New York Times,
September 8, 2022.
172 Liz Alderman, “As Russia Threatens Europe’s Energy, Ukraine Braces for a Hard Winter,” New York Times, August
2, 2022; Mark Galeotti, “Organized Labour in Neoliberal and Authoritarian Russia,” In Moscow’s Shadows, September
5, 2022.
173 The need to replace losses could force Putin to make a decision to declare national mobilization, which he has
previously resisted. Anton Troianovski, “As Russians Retreat, Putin Is Criticized by Hawks Who Trumpeted His War,”
New York Times, September 10, 2022; John Paul Rathbone, Roman Olearchyk, and Polina Ivanova, “Russia to Press on
‘Until All the Goals’ Achieved in Ukraine, Says Kremlin,” Financial Times, September 12, 2022; Robyn Dixon,
“Putin, Tone Deaf and Isolated, Pursues War ‘Goals’ and Refuses to Lose,” Washington Post, September 13, 2022.
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Russia has suffered significant equipment losses, including tanks, armored fighting vehicles, and
artillery systems.174 These losses have forced Russia to pull older systems out of storage and
deploy them to the battlefield.175 Additionally, some reports indicate Russia is mobilizing its
defense industry to retool to produce and repair a variety of modern and older systems, including
new legislation giving the government “special economic measures” to control and compel the
work of the defense industry.176 However, even with these measures and considering the losses
suffered, it will take several months before production can be mobilized to full production
capacity. Even at full production, it is unclear how long and to what extent Russia can replace
equipment losses.
Observers are more skeptical regarding Russia’s ability to procure key components for advanced
weaponry (including microchips) and if countries (such as China or India) are willing to bear the
risks to assist Russia in avoiding export controls.177 Captured and destroyed Russian weaponry
have demonstrated the extent to which Russia has circumvented export controls and sanctions, as
well as the extent to which it has adapted civilian technology for military use.178 It is unclear if
Russia has sufficient stockpiles of critical components to continue producing advanced weaponry
or if its ability to replenish stockpiles is limited.179
Some have speculated about the potential for Russia to use nuclear, chemical, or biological
weapons if Russian policymakers perceive inadequate military advances or to demonstrate
capability. Most analysts, however, believe the likelihood of Russia’s use of nuclear weapons
remains low. CIA Director Burns said the United States has not “seen a lot of practical evidence
of the kind of deployments or military dispositions that would reinforce that concern.”180
For Ukraine, there is optimism, as some observers believe momentum has swung in its favor as
the UAF retakes territory across the country, and the Russian military continues to retreat.181
Ukraine’s Commander in Chief Valery Zaluhzny stated on September 7, “for the Armed Forces of
Ukraine, the situation will be a complex mix of the actual location of the line of contact, the
available resources, the pool of combat-ready forces, and, obviously, the strategic initiative that

174 Oryx (blog), “Documenting Russian Equipment Losses During the 2022 Russian Invasion of Ukraine,” February 24,
2022; James Beardsworth, “Tank Losses in Ukraine Raise Strategic Questions for Russia,” Moscow Times, July 18,
2022.
175 Alberto Nardelli, “Russia Turns to Old Tanks as It Burns Through Weapons in Ukraine,” Bloomberg, June 14, 2022.
176 Mark Trevelyan, “Russian Parliament Passes First Vote on War Economy Measures,” Reuters, July 5, 2022; Polina
Ivanova, “Russia Prepares to Mobilize Economy for Longer Way in Ukraine,” Financial Times, July 7, 2022; Mark
Galeotti, “Russia Is Militarizing Its Economy,” Spectator, July 9, 2022; Sebastien Roblin, “Russia Mulls Restarting
Production of Older Vehicles to Replace Ukraine Losses,” Forbes, August 31, 2022.
177 Sidharth Kaushal, “Can Russia Continue to Fight a Long War?,” RUSI, August 23, 2022; John Ismay, “How Russia
Uses Low Tech in Its High Tech Weapons,” New York Times, September 4, 2022.
178 James Byrne et al., “Silicon Lifeline: Western Electronics at the Heart of Russia’s War Machine,” RUSI, August 8,
2022.
179 Maria Shagina, “Technology Controls Can Strangle Russia—Just Like the Soviet Union,” Foreign Policy, August
22, 2022; Zoya Sheftalovitch and Laurens Cerulus, “The Chips Are Down: Putin Scrambles for High-Tech Parts as His
Arsenal Goes Up in Smoke,” Politico.eu, September 5, 2022; Julian E. Barnes, “Russia Is Buying North Korean
Artillery, According to U.S. Intelligence,” New York Times, September 5, 2022.
180 Central Intelligence Agency, “Director Burns’ Remarks at Georgia Tech,” press release, April 14, 2022; Kate
O’Keeffe, “Zelensky Warns That Russia Could Use Nuclear, Chemical Weapons,” Wall Street Journal, April 17, 2022;
CRS Report R45861, Russia’s Nuclear Weapons: Doctrine, Forces, and Modernization, by Amy F. Woolf.
181 Marcus Walker and Gordon Lubold, “After Six Months in Ukraine, Momentum Tilts Against Russia,” Wall Street
Journal, August 23, 2022; Jack Detsch, “Ukraine’s Lightning Counteroffensive Approaches the Russian Border,”
Foreign Policy, September 12, 2022.
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will remain in the enemy’s hands.”182 Despite being underequipped, UAF forces continue to
demonstrate high levels of operational and tactical flexibility to sustain operations.183
As the conflict shifts away from the Donbas to southern Ukraine, the UAF likely needs continued
support to replace lost equipment and support transitioning toward NATO-style weaponry.184
Ukraine’s recent Kharkiv offensive saw the UAF capture large quantities of Russian weaponry
and ammunition that can be used to replenish UAF stocks.185 The conflict has consumed
significant amounts of ammunition, and the UAF likely needs replenishment of ammunition,
assistance and advice in equipment maintenance and repair, and continued training of personnel.
Additionally, Ukraine continues to benefit from high levels of volunteers, and foreign support for
training will likely give Ukraine a personnel advantage as Russia continues to exhibit recruitment
problems.186
Congress is poised to continue to track developments in the war in Ukraine closely, especially as
it considers U.S. and international efforts to support Ukraine militarily and respond to events on
the ground.

Author Information

Andrew S. Bowen

Analyst in Russian and European Affairs

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
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under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
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copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

182 General Valery Zaluhzny and Lieutenant General Mykhailo Zabrodsky, “Prospects for Running a Military
Campaign in 2023: Ukraine’ Perspective,” Ukrinform.net, September 7, 2022.
183 John Hudson, “Ukraine Lures Russian Missiles with Decoys of U.S. Rocket System,” Washington Post, August 30,
2022; and Thomas Gibbons-Neff and Natalia Yermak, “A Frontline Shadow Economy: Ukrainian Units Swap Tanks
and Artillery,” New York Times, August 30, 2022.
184 Such as tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, reconnaissance and surveillance systems, medium-range air defenses, and
mobile artillery. CRS In Focus IF12040, U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine, by Christina L. Arabia, Andrew S.
Bowen, and Cory Welt.
185 Jack Detsch, “Russia Is Supplying Ukraine with Lightly Used Tanks,” Foreign Policy, September 13, 2022.
186 Jill Lawless, “Urban Combat and Beyond: Ukrainian Recruits Get UK Training,” AP, August 15, 2022; Vivienne
Machi, “Europeans Mull New Training Mission for Ukrainian Army,” Defense News, August 30, 2022.
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