Department of Defense Directed Energy
September 13, 2022
Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress Kelley M. Sayler,
Directed energy (DE) weapons use concentrated electromagnetic energy, rather than kinetic
Coordinator
energy, to combat enemy forces. Although the United States has been researching directed
Analyst in Advanced
energy since the 1960s, some experts have observed that the Department of Defense (DOD) has
Technology and Global
invested billions of dollars in DE programs that failed to reach maturity and were ultimately
Security
cancelled. In recent years, however, DOD has made progress on DE weapons development,

deploying the first operational U.S. DE weapon in 2014 aboard the USS Ponce. Since then, DE
Andrew Feickert
weapons development has continued, with DOD issuing a Directed Energy Roadmap to
Specialist in Military
coordinate the department’s efforts. DOD has also introduced a High Energy Laser Scaling
Ground Forces
Initiative, which seeks to strengthen the defense industrial base for DE weapons and improve

laser beam quality and efficiency.
John R. Hoehn
Analyst in Military
This report provides background information and issues for Congress on DE weapons, including
Capabilities and Programs
high-energy lasers (HELs) and high-powered microwave (HPM) weapons, and outlines selected

unclassified DOD, Air Force, Army, and Navy DE programs. If successfully fielded, HELs could
be used by ground forces in a range of missions, including short-range air defense (SHORAD);
Ronald O'Rourke
counter-unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS); and counter-rocket, artillery, and mortar (C-RAM)
Specialist in Naval Affairs
missions. HPM weapons could provide a nonkinetic means of disabling adversary electronics and

communications systems. Compared with traditional munitions, DE weapons could offer lower
logistical requirements, lower costs per shot, and—assuming access to a sufficient power

supply—deeper magazines. These weapons could, however, face a number of limitations not
faced by their kinetic counterparts. For example, atmospheric conditions (e.g., rain, fog, obscurants) could potentially limit
the range and beam quality of DE weapons, in turn reducing their effectiveness.
As DOD continues to invest in DE weapons, Congress may consider the weapons’ technological maturity, lifecycle cost,
characteristics, mission utility, industrial base, intelligence requirements, and oversight structure. Congress may also consider
the implications of DE weapons for future arms control agreements.

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Department of Defense Directed Energy Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress

Introduction
This report provides background information and issues for Congress on Department of Defense
(DOD) efforts to develop and procure directed energy (DE) weapons. The report provides an
overview of certain DOD, Air Force, Army, and Navy DE programs. Two other CRS reports
provide additional discussion of Army and Navy DE programs.1 Some types of DE weapons, such
as particle-beam weapons, are outside the scope of this report.
DOD’s efforts on DE weapons pose a number of potential issues for Congress. Decisions that
Congress makes on these issues could have substantial implications for future DOD capabilities
and funding requirements and the U.S. defense industrial base.
Overview of Directed Energy Weapons2
DOD defines directed energy weapons as those using concentrated electromagnetic energy, rather
than kinetic energy, to “incapacitate, damage, disable, or destroy enemy equipment, facilities,
and/or personnel.”3 DE weapons include high-energy laser (HEL) and high-powered microwave
(HPM) weapons.
HEL weapons might be used by ground forces in various missions, including short-range air
defense (SHORAD); counter-unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS); and counter-rocket, artillery,
and mortar (C-RAM) missions.4 The weapons might be used to “dazzle” (i.e., temporarily
disable) or damage satellites and sensors. This could in turn interfere with intelligence-gathering
operations; military communications; and positioning, navigation, and timing systems used for
weapons targeting. In addition, HEL weapons could theoretically provide options for boost-phase
missile intercept, given their speed-of-light travel time; however, experts disagree on the
affordability, technological feasibility, and utility of this application.5
In general, HEL weapons might offer lower logistical requirements, lower costs per shot, and—
assuming access to a sufficient power supply—deeper magazines compared with traditional
munitions. (Although a number of different types of HELs exist, many of the United States’
current programs are solid state lasers, which are fueled by electrical power. As a result, the cost
per shot would be equivalent to the cost of the electrical power required to fire the shot.)6 These

1 See CRS Report R45098, U.S. Army Weapons-Related Directed Energy (DE) Programs: Background and Potential
Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert, and CRS Report R44175, Navy Shipboard Lasers: Background and Issues
for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
2 This section was written by Kelley M. Sayler, CRS Analyst in Advanced Technology and Global Security. For more
information—including information about DE weapons programs in China and Russia—see CRS Report R46458,
Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress, by Kelley M. Sayler.
3 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations, Joint Publication 3-85, May 22, 2020, p. GL-6.
4 For more information about the role of DE weapons in C-UAS missions, see CRS In Focus IF11426, Department of
Defense Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems, by John R. Hoehn and Kelley M. Sayler.
5 See, for example, James N. Miller and Frank A. Rose, “Bad Idea: Space-Based Interceptors and Space-Based
Directed Energy Systems,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 13, 2018, at
https://defense360.csis.org/bad-idea-space-based-interceptors-and-space-based-directed energy-systems/; and Justin
Doubleday, “Pentagon punts MDA’s laser ambitions, shifts funding toward OSD-led ‘laser scaling,’” Inside Defense,
February 19, 2020, at https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/pentagon-punts-mdas-laser-ambitions-shifts-funding-
toward-osd-led-laser-scaling.
6 Ariel Robinson, “Directed Energy Weapons: Will They Ever Be Ready?,” National Defense, July 1, 2015, at
https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2015/7/1/2015july-directed energy-weapons-will-they-ever-be-
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characteristics could in turn produce a favorable cost-exchange ratio for a defender, whose
marginal costs would be significantly lower than those of an aggressor.
Similarly, HPM weapons could provide a nonkinetic means of disabling adversary electronics and
communications systems. These weapons could potentially generate effects over wider areas—
disabling any electronics within their electromagnetic cone—than HEL weapons, which emit a
narrower beam of energy (see Figure 1). Some analysts have noted that HPM weapons might
provide more effective area defense against missile salvos and swarms of unmanned aircraft
systems. HPM weapons in an anti-personnel configuration might provide a means of nonlethal
crowd control, perimeter defense, or patrol or convoy protection.7 Potential advantages and
limitations of both HEL and HPM weapons are discussed in greater detail in Appendix A.
Figure 1. Illustrative Effects of HELs Versus HPM Weapons

Source: CRS image based on an image in Mark Gunzinger and Chris Dougherty, Changing the Game: The Promise
of Directed-Energy Weapons, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, April 19, 2021, p. 40, at
https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/CSBA_ChangingTheGame_ereader.pdf.
Note: Units of measurement are il ustrative.
Selected Defense-Wide Directed Energy Programs8
DOD directed energy programs are coordinated by the Principal Director for Directed Energy
within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
(OUSD[R&E]). The Principal Director for Directed Energy is responsible for development and
oversight of the Directed Energy Roadmap, which articulates DOD’s objective of “[achieving]
dominance in DE military applications in every mission and domain where they give advantage.”9
According to OUSD(R&E), the current roadmap outlines DOD’s plans to increase power levels
of HEL weapons from around 150 kilowatt (kW), as is currently feasible, to around 300 kW by
FY2023, “with goal milestones to achieve 500 kW class with reduced size and weight by FY2025

ready.
7 See, for example, Joint Intermediate Force Capabilities Office, “Active Denial System FAQs,”
https://jnlwp.defense.gov/About/Frequently-Asked-Questions/Active-Denial-System-FAQs/.
8 This section was written by Kelley M. Sayler, CRS Analyst in Advanced Technology and Global Security.
9 Dr. Jim Trebes, “Advancing High Energy Laser Weapon Capabilities: What is OUSD (R&E) Doing?,” presentation at
the Institute for Defense and Government Advancement (IDGA), October 21, 2020.
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and to further reduce size and weight and increase power to MW [megawatt] levels by
FY2026.”10 For reference, although no consensus exists regarding the precise power level that
would be needed to neutralize different target sets, DOD briefing documents (see Figure 2)
suggest that a laser of approximately 100 kW could engage UASs, rockets, artillery, and mortars,
whereas a laser of around 300 kW could additionally engage small boats and cruise missiles
flying in certain profiles (i.e., flying across—rather than at—the laser).11 Lasers of 1 MW could
potentially neutralize ballistic missiles and hypersonic weapons.12
Figure 2. Summary of DOD Directed Energy Roadmap

Source: Dr. Jim Trebes, “Advancing High Energy Laser Weapon Capabilities: What is OUSD (R&E) Doing?,”
presentation at the Institute for Defense and Government Advancement (IDGA), October 21, 2020.
In addition to managing the DE roadmap, OUSD(R&E) manages the High Energy Laser Scaling
Initiative (HELSI), which seeks “to demonstrate laser output power scaling while maintaining or
improving beam quality and efficiency.”13 HELSI is intended to strengthen the defense industrial
base for potential future DE weapons by providing near-term prototyping opportunities for
industry partners.14 OUSD(R&E) has completed a DOD-wide Laser Lethality Analysis Process
Review to identify future needs for the department and best practices for DE development and
use. In addition, OUSD(R&E) is developing a Directed Energy Lethality Database, a searchable
repository for DOD’s DE analyses.15

10 CRS correspondence with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, September 8,
2022. Kilowatts and megawatts are units of power. For example, 1 kilowatt is equal to 1,000 watts, and 1 megawatt is
equal to 1 million watts.
11 Dr. Jim Trebes, “Advancing High Energy Laser Weapon Capabilities: What is OUSD (R&E) Doing?,” presentation
at IDGA, October 21, 2020; and CRS conversation with Principal Director for Directed Energy Modernization Dr. Jim
Trebes, November 17, 2020. Required power levels could be affected by additional factors such as adversary
countermeasures and atmospheric conditions and effects.
12 Dr. Jim Trebes, “Advancing High Energy Laser Weapon Capabilities: What is OUSD (R&E) Doing?,” presentation
at IDGA, October 21, 2020.
13 Dr. Jim Trebes, “Advancing High Energy Laser Weapon Capabilities: What is OUSD (R&E) Doing?,” presentation
at IDGA, October 21, 2020.
14 Industry participants in HELSI include nLight-Nutronics (sponsored by the Navy), Lockheed Martin (sponsored by
the Army), and General Atomics (sponsored by the Air Force). See Nancy Jones-Bonbrest, “Scaling Up: Army
Advances 300kW-class Laser Prototype,” Army Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office, March 3, 2020, at
https://www.army.mil/article/233346/scaling_up_army_advances_300kw_class_laser_prototype.
15 The database has been populated with limited data and is being updated based on user feedback. OUSD(R&E) plans
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In support of these initiatives, DOD maintains a number of research programs, including
programs at the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD),
and the Defense Advanced Projects Research Agency (DARPA). For example, MDA’s Directed
Energy Demonstrator Development program addresses “technology risk reduction and maturation
for high powered strategic lasers, beam control, lethality, and related technologies” in support of
OUSD(R&E)’s Directed Energy Roadmap.16 The program received $42 million in FY2021.
Although MDA did not request funding for the program in FY2022 “due to a shift in Department
of Defense priorities,” Congress appropriated $39 million to continuing development efforts.17
MDA did not request funds for the Directed Energy Demonstrator Development program in
FY2023.18
In FY2023, OSD requested $16 million for High Energy Laser Research Initiatives, including
basic research and educational grants, and $49 million for High Energy Laser Development,
which funds applied research.19 OSD additionally requested $111 million in FY2023 for High
Energy Laser Advanced Development, which is focused on “scaling the output power of DE
systems to reach operationally effective power levels applicable to broad mission areas across the
DOD.”20 OSD requested $11 million in FY2023 to continue assessments of directed energy
weapons, including assessments of the weapons’ effects, effectiveness, and limitations.21 Finally,
DARPA’s Waveform Agile Radio-frequency Directed Energy (WARDEN) program seeks to
“extend the range and lethality of high power microwave weapons ... [for] counter-unmanned
aerial systems, vehicle and vessel disruption, electronic strike, and guided missile defense.”22

to have an updated version of the database available in FY2023. CRS correspondence with Distinguished Scientist for
Laser Weapon Systems Lethality Dr. Christopher Lloyd, August 29, 2022.
16 DOD, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Missile Defense Agency, Defense-Wide
Justification Book Volume 2a of 5 Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Defense-Wide, pp. 601-603, at
https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2023/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/
RDTE_Vol2_MDA_RDTE_PB23_Justification_Book.pdf.
17 DOD, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Missile Defense Agency, Defense-Wide
Justification Book Volume 2a of 5 Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Defense-Wide, pp. 601-602, at
https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2023/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/
RDTE_Vol2_MDA_RDTE_PB23_Justification_Book.pdf.
18 DOD, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Missile Defense Agency, Defense-Wide
Justification Book Volume 2a of 5 Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Defense-Wide, p. 601, at
https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2023/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/
RDTE_Vol2_MDA_RDTE_PB23_Justification_Book.pdf.
19 DOD, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Defense-
Wide Justification Book Volume 3 of 5 Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, pp. 1 and 91, at
https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2023/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/
OSD_PB2023.pdf. These programs were transferred to OSD from the Air Force to “better align [the] research area to
Department of Defense Science and Technology strategy and priorities for Directed Energy.” This transfer could reflect
greater coordination across DOD DE programs. DOD, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates,
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Defense-Wide Justification Book Volume 3 of 5 Research, Development, Test &
Evaluation, pp. 1 and 79, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2022/
budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol3_OSD_RDTE_PB22_Justification_Book.pdf.
20 DOD, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Defense-
Wide Justification Book Volume 3 of 5 Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, p. 327, at
https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2023/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/
OSD_PB2023.pdf.
21 DOD, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Defense-
Wide Justification Book Volume 3 of 5 Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, p. 348, at
https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2023/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/
OSD_PB2023.pdf.
22 DOD, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects
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DARPA received $20 million for WARDEN in FY2022 and requested $23 million for the
program in FY2023.23
Overall, DOD requested at least $669 million in FY2023 for unclassified DE research,
development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E)—up from its FY2022 request of at least $578
million and down from its FY2022 appropriation of at least $745 million. The department
requested at least $345 million for unclassified DE weapons procurement in FY2023—up from
its FY2022 request of at least $332 million and its FY2022 appropriation of at least $325
million.24
Selected Air Force Directed Energy
Weapons Programs25
The Air Force is developing and testing a number of DE technologies through the Directed
Energy Directorate of the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL). The following section provides
a brief description of selected unclassified efforts.
Tactical High-Power Operational Responder (THOR)
The Tactical High-Power Microwave Operational Responder (THOR) technology demonstrator
(see Figure 3), designed by AFRL in collaboration with industry partners, is intended to provide a
viable DE C-UAS weapon system focused on short-range air base defense.26 THOR is housed in
a standardized 20-foot transport container that enables it to fit inside a C-130 transport aircraft.
Users reportedly can deploy the system in three hours and operate its user interface with only
rudimentary training.27 According to Air Force press releases, THOR has successfully completed
a two-year test period and is to inform follow-on prototype efforts.28

Agency, Defense-Wide Justification Book Volume 1 of 5 Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, p. 145, at
https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2023/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/
RDTE_Vol1_DARPA_MasterJustificationBook_PB_2023.pdf.
23 DOD, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency, Defense-Wide Justification Book Volume 1 of 5 Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, p. 145, at
https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2023/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/
RDTE_Vol1_DARPA_MasterJustificationBook_PB_2023.pdf.
24 The dollar amounts in this paragraph include funding for DOD-wide programs as well as programs managed by the
Air Force, Army, and Navy. CRS analysis of FY2022 and FY2023 budget documents; see Appendix B and Appendix
C for additional information.
25 This section was written by former CRS Research Assistant Samuel D. Ryder and updated by John R. Hoehn, CRS
Analyst in Military Capabilities and Programs.
26 Industry partners include BAE Systems, Leidos, and Verus Research. THOR also features a proprietary radar system
developed by Black Sage.
27 Bryan Ripple, “Enemy drone operators may soon face the power of THOR,” 88th Air Base Wing Public Affairs,
September 24, 2019, at https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1836495/air-force-research-laboratory-
completes-successful-shoot-down-of-air-launched-m/.
28 1st Lt. James Wymer, “AFRL’s drone killer, THOR will welcome new drone ‘hammer,’” U.S. Air Force, August 2,
2021, at https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2713908/afrls-drone-killer-thor-will-welcome-new-drone-
hammer/.
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Figure 3. THOR Demonstrator

Source: U.S. Air Force, AFRL Directed Energy Directorate, press release, September 24, 2019.
Phaser High-Powered Microwave
The Phaser High-Powered Microwave system (see Figure 4), developed by Raytheon, is intended
to provide a short-range C-UAS capability similar to that of THOR. The Air Force reportedly
procured a $16.3 million prototype Phaser for testing and overseas field assessments; however, it
is unclear whether the system has been deployed outside the United States.29
Figure 4. Phaser Demonstrator

Source: Raytheon Missiles and Defense, Phaser product page, February 2020.
Counter-Electronic High-Power Microwave Extended-Range Air
Base Defense (CHIMERA)
AFRL awarded Raytheon Missiles and Defense a contract for testing of the Counter-Electronic
High-Power Microwave Extended-Range Air Base Defense (CHIMERA) system in October

29 Joe Pappalardo, “The Air Force Is Deploying Its First Drone-Killing Microwave Weapon,” Popular Mechanics,
September 24, 2019, at https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a29198555/phaser-weapon-air-force/;
and Theresa Hitchens, “AF Says Lasers Are Being Field Tested, but NOT THOR or Other Microwave Weapons,”
Breaking Defense, December 22, 2020, at https://breakingdefense.com/2020/12/af-says-lasers-are-being-field-tested-
but-not-thor-or-other-microwave-weapon/.
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2020. In contrast to THOR and Phaser, which are designed for a short-range C-UAS mission, the
CHIMERA system is intended to be able to engage UAS at greater distances.30 Unclassified
information about the CHIMERA system is limited.
High-Energy Laser Weapon System (HELWS)
The High-Energy Laser Weapon System (HELWS) is to serve as a mobile C-UAS capability for
air base defense (see Figure 5). The system comprises a laser weapon and multispectral targeting
system mounted on the back of a Polaris MRZR all-terrain vehicle and can reportedly operate at
distances of up to 3 km.31 HELWS developer Raytheon claims the laser can fire dozens of shots
using a single charge from a standard 220-volt outlet, and an indefinite number of shots if
connected to an external power source such as a generator.32 The Air Force acquired the first
HELWS in October 2019 and reportedly deployed HELWS overseas for field assessments in
April 2020.33 The Air Force awarded Raytheon a $15.5 million contract for an upgraded version
of HELWS in April 2021.34 This version is to be “delivered unmounted on pallets for potential
use with different platforms.”35

30 Sara Sirota, “AFRL to award Raytheon sole-sourced contract for directed energy weapon,” Inside Defense, October
29, 2020, at https://insidedefense.com/insider/afrl-award-raytheon-sole-sourced-contract-directed-energy-weapon.
31 Raytheon, “Raytheon Intelligence & Space delivers another Air Force laser system ready for operational use,”
September 14, 2020, https://www.raytheonintelligenceandspace.com/news/advisories/raytheon-intelligence-space-
delivers-another-air-force-laser-system-ready; and Nathan Strout, “Raytheon awarded $15.5 million to upgrade laser
weapon,” C4ISRNET, April 7, 2021, at https://www.c4isrnet.com/unmanned/2021/04/07/raytheon-awarded-155-to-
upgrade-laser-weapon/.
32 Kyle Mizokami, “The Air Force Mobilizes Its Laser and Microwave Weapons Abroad,” Popular Mechanics, April 9,
2020, at https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a32083799/laser-microwave-weapons/; and Raytheon,
“Raytheon Intelligence & Space delivers another Air Force laser system ready for operational use,” September 14,
2020, at https://www.raytheonintelligenceandspace.com/news/advisories/raytheon-intelligence-space-delivers-another-
air-force-laser-system-ready.
33 Raytheon, “Raytheon Delivers First Laser Counter-UAS System to U.S. Air Force,” October 22, 2019, at
https://raytheon.mediaroom.com/2019-10-22-Raytheon-delivers-first-laser-counter-UAS-System-to-U-S-Air-
Force#:~:text=Laser%20dune%20buggy%20set%20for,Air%20Force%20earlier%20this%20month; and 88th Air Base
Wing Public Affairs, “AFRL gives warfighters new weapons system,” April 6, 2020, at https://www.whs.mil/News/
News-Display/Article/2138161/afrl-gives-warfighters-new-weapons-system/.
34 Nathan Strout, “Raytheon awarded $15.5 million to upgrade laser weapon,” C4ISRNET, April 7, 2021, at
https://www.c4isrnet.com/unmanned/2021/04/07/raytheon-awarded-155-to-upgrade-laser-weapon/.
35 Ibid.
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Figure 5. HELWS Prototype

Source: Raytheon Missiles and Defense, HELWS product page, April 2020.
Self-Protect High-Energy Laser Demonstrator (SHiELD)
The Self-Protect High-Energy Laser Demonstrator (SHiELD) is a prototype system in
development by AFRL, Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Northrop Grumman (see Figure 6). It is
intended to mount as an external pod on Air Force aircraft—from fourth-generation F-15 fighters
to sixth-generation aircraft currently in development—and target incoming air-to-air and surface-
to-air missiles.36 The Air Force conducted a series of tests of the Demonstrator Laser Weapon
System, a ground-based test surrogate for SHiELD, in April 2019. The demonstrator successfully
engaged incoming missiles and helped validate SHiELD’s technology; however, technical issues
and challenges related to the COVID-19 pandemic have reportedly pushed SHiELD’s first flight
demonstration from FY2021 to FY2024.37 Furthermore, at a June 2020 Mitchell Institute event,
then-Assistant Secretary of the Air Force Will Roper stated that the Air Force is reassessing the
technological maturity of and use cases for SHiELD, as well as its potential role in missile
defense missions.38 Former Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Mike
Griffin has noted that he is “extremely skeptical that we can put a large laser on an aircraft and
use it to shoot down an adversary missile, even from fairly close.”39

36 See Joanne Perkins, “AFRL’s SHiELD set to receive critical assembly,” Air Force Research Laboratory, February
23, 2021, at https://www.afrl.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2511692/afrls-shield-set-to-receive-critical-
assembly/.
37 “Air Force Research Laboratory completes successful shoot down of air-launched missiles,” 88th Air Base Wing
Public Affairs, May 3, 2019, at https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1836495/air-force-research-
laboratory-completes-successful-shoot-down-of-air-launched-m/; Valerie Insinna, “US Air Force delays timeline for
testing a laser on a fighter jet,” Defense News, June 30, 2020, at https://www.defensenews.com/air/2020/06/30/us-air-
force-delays-timeline-for-testing-a-laser-on-a-fighter-jet/; and Nathan Strout, “Air Force to begin assembly of airborne
laser,” C4ISRNET, February 23, 2021, at https://www.c4isrnet.com/battlefield-tech/2021/02/23/air-force-to-begin-
assembly-of-airborne-laser/.
38 Valerie Insinna, “US Air Force delays timeline for testing a laser on a fighter jet,” Defense News, June 30, 2020, at
https://www.defensenews.com/air/2020/06/30/us-air-force-delays-timeline-for-testing-a-laser-on-a-fighter-jet/.
39 Aaron Mehta, “Griffin ‘extremely skeptical’ of airborne lasers for missile defense,” Defense News, May 20, 2020, at
https://www.defensenews.com/2020/05/20/griffin-extremely-skeptical-of-airborne-lasers-for-missile-defense/.
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Figure 6. SHiELD Prototype Rendering

Source: Lockheed Martin, Tactical Airborne Laser Weapon System, September 14, 2020.
Selected Army Directed Energy Weapons Programs40
The Army Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office (RCCTO) is currently managing
three major Army DE weapons programs:
 Directed Energy Maneuver-Short Range Air Defense (DE M-SHORAD),
 Indirect Fire Protection Capability-High Energy Laser (IFPC-HEL), and
 Indirect Fire Protection Capability-High Power Microwave (IFPC-HPM).41
The Army is developing DE weapons to counter UAS and rockets, artillery, and mortars (RAM),
in turn increasing Army air and missile defense capability and reducing total system lifecycle
costs by means of reduced logistical demands.42
Directed Energy Maneuver-Short-Range Air Defense
(DE M-SHORAD)
DE M-SHORAD, also known as Guardian (see Figure 7), seeks to integrate a 50 kW laser on a
Stryker combat vehicle to provide short-range air defense support to the Army’s combat brigades.
The Army reportedly tested two DE M-SHORAD prototypes—one from Raytheon/Kord and one
from Northrop Grumman—in a “shoot-off” at Ft. Sill, Oklahoma, in July 2021.43 According to
Director of the RCCTO Lieutenant General Neil Thurgood, DE M-SHORAD successfully
defeated UAS but failed to defeat mortar rounds during this test; Northrop Grumman
subsequently withdrew from the program.44 The Army tested the Raytheon/Kord prototype again

40 This section was written by Andrew Feickert, CRS Specialist in Military Ground Forces.
41 Lieutenant General (LTG) L. Neil Thurgood, “Space and Missile Defense Symposium,” Army Rapid Capabilities
and Critical Technologies Office, August 11, 2021.
42 Nancy Jones-Bonbrest, “Army Advances First Laser Weapon Through Combat Shoot-Off,” Army Rapid Capabilities
and Critical Technologies Office, August 10, 2021, at https://www.army.mil/article/249239/
army_advances_first_laser_weapon_through_combat_shoot_off.
43 Jared Keller, “The Army’s First Laser Weapon Almost Ready for a Fight,” Task and Purpose, August 12, 2021; and
Ethan Sterenfeld, “Laser M-SHORAD works against mortars in Army test,” Inside Defense, May 17, 2022.
44 Evan Oschner, “Army set to deliver first 50-kilowatt lasers,” Inside Defense, August 10, 2022; and Jen Judson,
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in 2022, during a four-week exercise at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico.45 According to
a Raytheon press release, the prototype “acquired, tracked, targeted, and defeated multiple
mortars and successfully accomplished multiple tests simulating real-world scenarios.”46
The Army plans to deliver the first DE M-SHORAD systems to a Ft. Sill-based air defense unit
by the end of September 2022, with plans to deliver additional prototype systems in FY2023 and
FY2024.47 In FY2025, the Army is to transfer the program from the RCCTO to the Program
Executive Office (PEO) Missiles and Space M-SHORAD Product Office.48 The Product Office is
to then “initiate acquisition and contract documents to support a competitive production
decision.”49
Figure 7. Guardian DE M-SHORAD

Source: Kristen Burroughs, “The Army Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office’s Directed Energy
Maneuver-Short Range Air Defense (DE M-SHORAD) Rapid Prototyping Effort is On-Track to Deliver,” Army
News, August 18, 2021.
Indirect Fire Protection Capability-High Energy Laser (IFPC-HEL)
IFPC-HEL, also known as Valkyrie (see Figure 8), is to protect fixed and semi-fixed sites from
cruise missiles, UAS, and RAM threats.50 According to Army budget documents, the system is to
include “a vehicle, 300 kW class [>250 kW] laser subsystem, power and thermal subsystem, and
a beam control subsystem integrated with a battle management command, control, and

“Northrop bows out of competition to build laser weapon for Strykers,” Defense News, August 18, 2021.
45 Ethan Sterenfeld, “Laser M-SHORAD works against mortars in Army test,” Inside Defense, May 17, 2022.
46 Ethan Sterenfeld, “Laser M-SHORAD works against mortars in Army test,” Inside Defense, May 17, 2022.
47 Max Hauptman, “The Army is Putting Lasers on Strykers Powerful Enough to Shoot Down Drones and Helicopter,”
Task and Purpose, January 26, 2022; Evan Ochsner, “Army Set to Deliver First 50-Kilowatt Lasers,”
InsideDefense.com, August 10, 2022; and SAM.gov, “Notice of Intent to Sole Source - DE M-SHORAD Prototype
Effort under Other Transaction Agreement,” November 17, 2021, at https://sam.gov/opp/
3ad5a9cbdba94c6ea2872374bdaefd48/view.
48 DOD, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Army Justification Book Volume II Budget
Activity 4, Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, p. 563, at https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Documents/
BudgetMaterial/2023/Base%20Budget/rdte/vol_2-Budget_Activity_4.pdf.
49 Ibid., p. 564.
50 DOD, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Army Justification Book Volume II Budget
Activity 4, Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, p. 405, at https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Documents/
BudgetMaterial/2023/Base%20Budget/rdte/vol_2-Budget_Activity_4.pdf.
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communication software.”51 Army RCCTO issued a request for white papers for IFPC-HEL in
January 2022, “with the intent of awarding one or more Other Transaction Agreement for
Prototype.”52 Reports indicate that the Army subsequently selected Dynetics to serve as systems
integrator for IFPC-HEL.53 Four IFPC-HEL prototypes are to be delivered by the fourth quarter
of FY2024, with “major test events” scheduled in 2022.54 IFPC-HEL is to transition to a program
of record in FY2025.55
Figure 8. Valkyrie IFPC-HEL

Source: “Dynetics to Build and Increase Power of U.S. Army Laser Weapons,” May 7, 2020,
https://www.dynetics.com/newsroom/news/2020/dynetics-to-build-and-increase-power-of-us-army-laser-
weapons, accessed August 12, 2022.
IFPC-High Power Microwave (IFPC-HPM)
The Army is developing IFPC-HPM (see Figure 9)—a transportable, containerized system—to
counter swarms of Group 1 and Group 2 UAS.56 IFPC-HPM is to be “paired with IFPC-HEL as
part of a layered defense to protect fixed and semi-fixed sites.”57 According to Army budget
documents, the program “leverages previous HPM technology demonstrations and

51 DOD, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Army Justification Book Volume II Budget
Activity 4, Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, p. 403, at https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Documents/
BudgetMaterial/2023/Base%20Budget/rdte/vol_2-Budget_Activity_4.pdf.
52 SAM.gov, “Request for White Papers (RFWP) Indirect Fire Protection Capability-High Energy Laser (IFPC-HEL)
Prototypes Prime Contractor,” January 20, 2022, at https://sam.gov/opp/fe1cce00fde64c328b5234be24c795b1/view.
For additional information about Other Transaction Agreements, see CRS Report R45521, Department of Defense Use
of Other Transaction Authority: Background, Analysis, and Issues for Congress, by Heidi M. Peters.
53 Andrew Eversden, “US Army successfully tests Iron Dome at White Sands Missile Range,” Breaking Defense,
August 2, 2022, at https://breakingdefense.com/2022/08/us-army-successfully-tests-iron-dome-at-white-sands-missile-
range/.
54 Jen Judson, “This infantry squad vehicle is getting a laser to destroy drones,” Defense News, August 11, 2022.
55 DOD, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Army Justification Book Volume II Budget
Activity 4, Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, p. 403, at https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Documents/
BudgetMaterial/2023/Base%20Budget/rdte/vol_2-Budget_Activity_4.pdf.
56 DOD, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Army Justification Book Volume II Budget
Activity 4, Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, p. 411, at https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Documents/
BudgetMaterial/2023/Base%20Budget/rdte/vol_2-Budget_Activity_4.pdf. Group 1 UAS are “typically hand-launched,
portable systems,” while Group 2 UAS are “typically medium-sized, catapult-launched, mobile systems.” For
additional information about UAS groups, see U.S. Army, US. Army Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2010-2035,
pp. 12-13, at https://irp.fas.org/program/collect/uas-army.pdf.
57 “Army Directed Energy Strategy,” Army Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office, August 20, 2021.
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experimentation campaigns such as the [the Air Force’s THOR program].”58 The Army intends to
develop, test, and deliver four IFPC-HPM prototypes by the fourth quarter of FY2024 and to
conduct planning for a potential transition to a program of record in FY2025.59
Lasers on Next-Generation Army Combat Vehicles
Army officials have suggested that next-generation combat vehicles could feature an active
protection system employing directed energy to protect the vehicle and to replace traditional
mounted weapons.60 The Army asserts that active protection systems featuring lasers could
provide 360-degree protection from incoming rounds or UASs, and that laser weapons might also
be used to disable or possibly destroy enemy vehicles. Officials note that to begin fielding Army
units with a next-generation combat vehicle in 2035, major decisions would need to be made by
2025. This time frame suggests that the Army has fewer than three years to advance laser
weapons technology to a point where it can be considered a viable option, if it is to be
incorporated into next-generation combat vehicles.61
Selected Navy Directed Energy Programs62
The Navy installed its first prototype DE weapon, a 30 kW laser capable of countering small
surface craft and UAS, on the USS Ponce in 2014.63 Since then, the Navy has been developing
lasers with improved capability for countering surface craft and UAS and is in the process of
developing a capability for countering anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs). Current Navy DE
programs include the following:
 Solid State Laser Technology Maturation (SSL-TM);
 Optical Dazzling Interdictor, Navy (ODIN);
 Surface Navy Laser Weapon System (SNLWS) Increment 1, also known as the
High-Energy Laser with Integrated Optical-dazzler and Surveillance (HELIOS);
and
 High Energy Laser Counter-ASCM Program (HELCAP).
The Navy’s laser development roadmap is illustrated in Figure 9.

58 DOD, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Army Justification Book Volume II Budget
Activity 4, Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, p. 411, at https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Documents/
BudgetMaterial/2023/Base%20Budget/rdte/vol_2-Budget_Activity_4.pdf.
59 DOD, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Army Justification Book Volume II Budget
Activity 4, Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, p. 412, at https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Documents/
BudgetMaterial/2023/Base%20Budget/rdte/vol_2-Budget_Activity_4.pdf.
60 CRS Report R44598, Army and Marine Corps Active Protection System (APS) Efforts, by Andrew Feickert.
61 See Gary Sheftick, “The Next-Generation Combat Vehicle Could Have Lasers, Run on Hybrid Power,” Army News
Service, November 3, 2016, and Hope Hodge Seck, “Next Army Combat Vehicle May Feature Active Protection, Laser
Weapons,” Defense Tech, October 30, 2017.
62 This section was written by Ronald O’Rourke, CRS Specialist in Naval Affairs. For more information about U.S.
Navy DE programs, including information about the Navy’s past DE development programs, see CRS Report R44175,
Navy Shipboard Lasers: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
63 Sam LaGrone, “U.S. Navy Allowed to Use Persian Gulf Laser for Defense,” USNI News, December 10, 2014.
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Figure 9. Navy Laser Development Roadmap

Source: Navy briefing slide provided by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs to CRS on September 10, 2021.
As shown in Figure 9, SSL-TM, ODIN, and SNLWS Increment 1/HELIOS are included in the
Navy Laser Family of Systems (NLFoS). (The Navy has since completed work on the fourth
NLFoS effort shown in Figure 9, the Ruggedized High Energy Laser [RHEL].) As also shown in
Figure 9, the Navy intends for both NLFoS and HELCAP efforts, along with DOD laser
technologies, to support the development of future, more capable lasers referred to as SNLWS
Increment 2 and SNLWS Increment 3.
Solid State Laser Technology Maturation (SSL-TM)
The SSL-TM program (see Figure 10) is to develop a prototype shipboard laser called the Laser
Weapons System Demonstrator (LWSD) “to address known capability gaps against asymmetric
threats (UAS, small boats, and ISR sensors).”64 The program is to additionally “inform future
acquisition strategies, system designs, integration architectures, and fielding plans for laser
weapon systems.”65 The Navy reportedly installed a 150 kW LWSD on the USS Portland in the
fall of 2019 and has since completed onboard testing.66 According to Navy budget documents,
“SSL-TM is planned to start de-installation [of LWSD], ship restoration, and hardware

64 DOD, Department of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book Volume 2 of 5,
Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Navy, April 2022, p. 184, at https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/
Documents/23pres/RDTEN_BA4_Book.pdf.
65 DOD, Department of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book Volume 2 of 5,
Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Navy, April 2022, p. 184, at https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/
Documents/23pres/RDTEN_BA4_Book.pdf.
66 Christopher P. Cavas, “Lasers Sprout in San Diego,” Defense & Aerospace Report, March 1, 2020.
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disposition activities during FY23.”67 Program closeout is to occur by the fourth quarter of
FY2024.68
Figure 10. Navy Graphic of SSL-TM Laser System

Source: Navy briefing slide accompanying Tyler Rogoway, “Mysterious Object Northrop Is Barging From
Redondo Beach Is A High-Power Naval Laser,” The Drive, October 18, 2019. The blog post credits the slide to
the Navy and describes it as a “recent slide.”
Optical Dazzling Interceptor, Navy (ODIN)
According to the Navy’s FY2023 budget submission, the Optical Dazzling Interceptor, Navy
(ODIN) effort is designed to provide “near-term, directed energy, shipboard Counter-Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C-ISR) capabilities to dazzle UAS and other platforms that
address urgent operational needs of the Fleet.” 69 The Navy has reportedly deployed seven ODIN
units on Arleigh Burke Flight IIA destroyers, with the deployment of one additional unit planned
for FY2023.70

67 DOD, Department of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book Volume 2 of 5,
Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Navy, April 2022, p. 195, at https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/
Documents/23pres/RDTEN_BA4_Book.pdf.
68 DOD, Department of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book Volume 2 of 5,
Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Navy, April 2022, p. 200, at https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/
Documents/23pres/RDTEN_BA4_Book.pdf.
69 DOD, Department of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book Volume 2 of 5,
Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Navy, April 2022, p. 998, at https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/
Documents/23pres/RDTEN_BA4_Book.pdf.
70 DOD, Department of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book Volume 2 of 5,
Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Navy, April 2022, p. 999, at https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/
Documents/23pres/RDTEN_BA4_Book.pdf.
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SNLWS Increment 1 (HELIOS)
SNLWS Increment 1 is also known as the High-Energy Laser with Integrated Optical-dazzler and
Surveillance (HELIOS). The HELIOS effort is focused on rapid development and rapid fielding
of a 60 kW-class high-energy laser (with growth potential to 120 kW) and dazzler in an integrated
weapon system, for use in countering UAS, small boats, and ISR sensors, and for combat
identification and battle damage assessment.71 HELIOS systems integrator Lockheed Martin has
stated that HELIOS could eventually be integrated into the Aegis Combat System to provide
alternative “selections in [Aegis’s] weapon system component.”72 According to Navy budget
documents, HELIOS was installed on an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, the USS Preble, in
FY2022 and is to continue at-sea testing in FY2023.73 The system is to remain on the ship for
fleet testing and sustainment through at least the end of FY2027.74
High Energy Laser Counter ASCM Project (HELCAP)
The Navy’s FY2023 budget submission states that the HELCAP effort
will expedite the development, experimentation, integration and demonstration of critical
technologies to defeat crossing Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCM) by addressing the
remaining technical challenges, e.g.: atmospheric turbulence, automatic target
identification and aim point selection, precision target tracking with low jitter in high
clutter conditions, advanced beam control, and higher power HEL development. HELCAP
will assess, develop, experiment, and demonstrate the various laser weapon system
technologies and methods of implementation required to defeat ASCMs in a crossing
engagement.75
The HELCAP prototype system is to include a beam control testbed, 300 kW+ class laser
source—selected and adapted from a laser source developed under OSD’s laser scaling initiative,
prototype control system, and auxiliary prime power and cooling.76 The Navy plans to begin
system experimentation in FY2023, focusing on “ASCM detect to engage experimentation
against targets of increasing complexity up to and including static and dynamic ground targets

71 DOD, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 Budget Estimates, Navy, Justification Book Volume 2 of 5,
Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Navy, February 2020, p. 1021. Although the Navy previously identified
HELIOS as being scalable to 150 kW, recent reports indicate that the system is to be scalable to only 120 kW. See, for
example, Richard R. Burgess, “HELIOS Laser Weapon System Delivered for Installation on USS Preble,” Seapower
Magazine, March 31, 2022, at https://seapowermagazine.org/helios-laser-weapon-system-delivered-for-installation-on-
uss-preble/.
72 See Justin Katz, “Lockheed delivers high-energy laser four years in the making to US Navy,” Breaking Defense,
August 18, 2022. For additional information about the Aegis Combat System, see CRS Report RL33745, Navy Aegis
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
73 DOD, Department of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book Volume 2 of 5,
Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Navy, April 2022, p. 1011, at https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/
Documents/23pres/RDTEN_BA4_Book.pdf.
74 DOD, Department of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book Volume 2 of 5,
Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Navy, April 2022, p. 1019, at https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/
Documents/23pres/RDTEN_BA4_Book.pdf.
75 DOD, Department of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book Volume 2 of 5,
Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Navy, April 2022, p. 1001, at https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/
Documents/23pres/RDTEN_BA4_Book.pdf.
76 DOD, Department of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book Volume 2 of 5,
Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Navy, April 2022, p. 1003, at https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/
Documents/23pres/RDTEN_BA4_Book.pdf.
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and low-cost unmanned aerial targets.”77 HELCAP experimentation is to continue through
FY2027.78
Layered Laser Defense (LLD) System
An additional Navy laser development effort (not shown in Figure 9) is called the Layered Laser
Defense (LLD) system. A March 9, 2020, DOD contract award announcement stated that the
Navy awarded Lockheed Martin a $22 million contract for
the integration, demonstration, testing and operation of the Layered Laser Defense (LLD)
weapon system prototype onboard a Navy littoral combat ship [LCS] while that vessel is
underway.… Key areas of work to be performed include development of a prototype
structure and enclosure to protect the LLD from ships motion and maritime environment
in a mission module format; system integration and test with government-furnished
equipment; platform integration and system operational verification and test; systems
engineering; test planning; data collection and analysis support; and operational
demonstration.79
Press reports indicate that the Office of Naval Research—in partnership with Lockheed Martin
and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering—demonstrated
the system in February 2022 against a “target representing a subsonic cruise missile in flight.”80
The Navy reportedly does not plan to field the LLD.81
Potential Issues and Questions for Congress82
Technological Maturity
One question regarding directed energy weapons programs involves their technological maturity,
including the ability to improve beam quality and control to militarily useful levels, and to meet
size, weight, and power (SWaP) and cooling requirements for integration into current platforms.83
Some DE systems are small enough to fit on military vehicles, but many require larger and/or
fixed platforms that could potentially limit deployment options and operational utility. Congress

77 DOD, Department of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book Volume 2 of 5,
Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Navy, April 2022, p. 1003, at https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/
Documents/23pres/RDTEN_BA4_Book.pdf.
78 DOD, Department of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book Volume 2 of 5,
Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Navy, April 2022, p. 1008, at https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/
Documents/23pres/RDTEN_BA4_Book.pdf.
79 Department of Defense, “Contracts for March 9, 2020.” See also Rich Abott, “Lockheed Martin Nabs $22 Million
Contract For Layered Laser Defense Prototype On LCS,” Defense Daily, March 16, 2020.
80 Warren Duffie Jr., “Laser Trailblazer: Navy Conducts Historic Test of New Laser Weapon System,” Office of Naval
Research, April, 13, 2022, at https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/2998829/laser-trailblazer-navy-
conducts-historic-test-of-new-laser-weapon-system/.
81 Warren Duffie Jr., “Laser Trailblazer: Navy Conducts Historic Test of New Laser Weapon System,” Office of Naval
Research, April, 13, 2022, at https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/2998829/laser-trailblazer-navy-
conducts-historic-test-of-new-laser-weapon-system/.
82 This section was written by Kelley M. Sayler, CRS Analyst in Advanced Technology and Global Security, and John
R. Hoehn, CRS Analyst in Military Capabilities and Programs.
83 Ariel Robinson, “Directed Energy Weapons: Will They Ever Be Ready?,” National Defense, July 1, 2015, at
https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2015/7/1/2015july-directed-energy-weapons-will-they-ever-be-
ready.
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may consider directing DOD to establish metrics for assessing the pace of technological
advancement. In what ways, if any, are DOD technology maturation efforts reducing the SWaP
and cooling requirements of DE systems?
Cost
The United States has been researching directed energy since the 1960s, yet some experts have
observed that “actual directed-energy programs … have frequently fallen short of expectations,”
with DOD investing billions of dollars in programs that failed to reach maturity and were
ultimately cancelled.84 Directed energy weapons may therefore require greater up-front
investment than traditional kinetic weapons in order to field a successful weapons system.
Congress may consider requesting an independent assessment of the technological maturity and
life cycle cost estimates for various DE weapons, as well as a comparative assessment of costs of
DE weapons versus comparable kinetic weapons. How do estimates of the total lifecycle costs of
DE weapons compare with those of their kinetic counterparts? Does the technological maturity of
DE weapons warrant current funding levels?
Weapons Characteristics
Although DE weapons may offer a lower cost per shot than traditional weapons such as missiles,
DE weapons are subject to a number of limitations. For example, atmospheric conditions (e.g.,
rain, fog, obscurants) and SWaP and cooling requirements can limit the range and beam quality of
DE weapons, in turn reducing their effectiveness. Traditional weapons, in contrast, are less
affected by these factors.85 How, if at all, might the limitations of DE weapons be mitigated by
technological developments such as adaptive optics, concepts of operation, or other methods?
What impact might a failure to mitigate these limitations have on future military operations?
Mission Utility
Given the strengths and weaknesses of DE weapons, DOD is conducting multiple utility studies
to analyze potential concepts of operation for DE weapons and to assess the scenarios in which
they might be militarily useful.86 How might Congress draw upon the conclusions of these
analyses as it conducts oversight of DE weapons programs? What is the appropriate balance
between DE weapons and traditional munitions within the military’s portfolio of capabilities?
Defense Industrial Base
Some analysts have expressed concerns that, in the past, DOD did not provide stable funding for
DE weapons programs or sufficient opportunities for the DE workforce. Acknowledging these
concerns, DOD’s Principal Director for Directed Energy, Dr. Jim Trebes, has stated that, although

84 Paul Scharre, Directed-Energy Weapons: Promise and Prospects, Center for a New American Security, April 2015,
p. 4.
85 Ariel Robinson, “Directed Energy Weapons: Will They Ever Be Ready?,” National Defense, July 1, 2015, at
https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2015/7/1/2015july-directed-energy-weapons-will-they-ever-be-
ready; and David Vergun, “Army developing lasers that pierce fog, dust to destroy targets,” Army News Service,
October 23, 2017, at https://www.army.mil/article/195650/
army_developing_lasers_that_pierce_fog_dust_to_destroy_targets.
86 Dr. Jim Trebes, “Advancing High Energy Laser Weapon Capabilities: What is OUSD (R&E) Doing?,” presentation
at IDGA, October 21, 2020.
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he believes the DE industrial base is currently healthy, its capacity could be strained in the future
if DOD begins to buy larger numbers of DE systems. Dr. Trebes has noted that although today’s
DE workforce is sufficient, it may face a demographic problem in the future due to retirement.87
According to OUSD(R&E), HELSI is intended to address such concerns about the future of the
DE industrial base by providing industry with assured prototyping opportunities. In what ways, if
any, has HELSI strengthened the defense industrial base for DE weapons? What, if any,
challenges does the base continue to face, and how might they be mitigated?
Intelligence Requirements
Some analysts have questioned whether DOD has sufficient knowledge of adversary DE weapons
systems and materials to develop its own weapons requirements. DOD is currently attempting to
further define its DE collection requirements for the intelligence community (IC) through the
Directed Energy Lethality Intelligence initiative.88 To what extent, if at all, is this initiative
improving connectivity between DOD’s DE community and the IC? What collection
requirements, if any, remain?
Coordination Within DOD
Pursuant to Section 219 of the FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) (P.L. 114-
328), OUSD(R&E)’s Principal Director for Directed Energy is tasked with coordinating DE
efforts across DOD and with developing DOD’s Directed Energy Roadmap, which is to guide
development efforts. Section 215 of the FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) established a Directed
Energy Working Group to “analyze and evaluate the current and planned directed energy
programs of each of the military departments ... [and] make recommendations to the Secretary of
Defense.” These recommendations are intended to improve DOD DE coordination activities and
accelerate the fielding of DE capabilities. To what extent are the military departments and defense
agencies adhering to OUSD(R&E)’s roadmap? What, if any, additional authorities or structural
changes would be required to ensure proper implementation of the roadmap and execution of the
working group’s recommendations?
Arms Control
DE weapons “are not authoritatively defined under international law, nor are they currently on the
agenda of any existing multilateral mechanism.”89 However, some applications of DE weapons
are prohibited. Article 1 of the Protocol on Blinding Lasers prohibits the employment of “laser
weapons specifically designed, as their sole combat function or as one of their combat functions,
to cause permanent blindness to unenhanced vision.”90

87 CRS conversation with Principal Director for Directed Energy Dr. Jim Trebes, November 17, 2020. See also Dr. Jim
Trebes, “Advancing High Energy Laser Weapon Capabilities: What is OUSD (R&E) Doing?,” presentation at IDGA,
October 21, 2020.
88 Dr. Jim Trebes, “Advancing High Energy Laser Weapon Capabilities: What is OUSD (R&E) Doing?,” presentation
at IDGA, October 21, 2020.
89 “Directed Energy Weapons: Discussion paper for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW),”
Article 36, November 2017.
90 The protocol does not cover the development, procurement, or possession of such weapons, nor does it prohibit the
employment of laser weapons that may cause blindness “as an incidental or collateral effect.” Additional Protocol to
the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to
Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Vienna, October 13, 1995, United Nations, Treaty Series,
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Some analysts have suggested that additional multilateral agreements should be considered. For
example, Congress may consider prohibitions on nonlethal anti-personnel uses of DE weapons—
such as “heat rays”91 or lasers intended to cause temporary visual impairment—or on certain
military applications of DE weapons—such as aircraft interference—in peacetime.92 Other
analysts have argued that DE weapons could be considered more humane than conventional
weapons because their accuracy could reduce collateral damage and because they could provide a
nonlethal anti-personnel capability in circumstances when lethal force might otherwise be used.93
In what circumstances and for what purposes should the U.S. military’s use of DE weapons be
permissible? What, if any, regulations, treaties, or other measures should the United States
consider regarding the use of DE weapons in both war and peacetime?

vol. 1380, p. 370, at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1995/10/19951013%2001-30%20AM/Ch_XXVI_02_ap.pdf.
For additional information about the protocol and its relationship to DE weapons programs, see Appendix I of CRS
Report R41526, Navy Shipboard Lasers for Surface, Air, and Missile Defense: Background and Issues for Congress, by
Ronald O'Rourke.
91 See “Active Denial Technology: Fact Sheet,” Joint Intermediate Force Capabilities Office, May 11, 2020, at
https://jnlwp.defense.gov/Press-Room/Fact-Sheets/Article-View-Fact-sheets/Article/577989/active-denial-technology/.
92 Patrick M. Cronin and Ryan D. Neuhard, “Countering China’s Laser Offensive,” The Diplomat, April 2, 2020, at
https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/countering-chinas-laser-offensive/.
93 See, for example, Mark Gunzinger and Chris Dougherty, Changing the Game: The Promise of Directed-Energy
Weapons, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, April 19, 2021, at https://csbaonline.org/uploads/
documents/CSBA_ChangingTheGame_ereader.pdf.
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Appendix A. Potential Advantages and Limitations
of Directed Energy Weapons94
This appendix provides additional information on potential advantages and limitations of High-
Energy Laser (HEL) and High-Powered Microwave (HPM) weapons. The advantages and
limitations of any HEL or HPM weapons would be specific to the system; as such, all advantages
and limitations might not equally apply to each system.
Potential Advantages of HEL Weapons
In addition to deeper magazines, lower logistics requirements, and lower costs per shot, potential
advantages of HEL weapons include the following:
 Fast engagement times. Light from a laser beam can reach a target almost
instantly, thereby eliminating the need to calculate an intercept course, as
interceptor missiles must do. By remaining focused on a particular spot on the
target, a laser can cause disabling damage to the target within seconds, depending
on the laser power. After disabling one target, a laser can be redirected to another
target in several seconds.
 Ability to counter radically maneuvering missiles. HEL weapons can follow
and maintain their beam on radically maneuvering missiles that might stress the
maneuvering capabilities of kinetic interceptors.
 Precision engagements. HEL weapons are precision-engagement weapons—the
area irradiated by the laser, which might be several millimeters to several inches
in diameter, affects what it hits, while generally not affecting (at least not
directly) separate nearby objects.
 Graduated responses. HEL weapons can perform functions other than
destroying targets, including detecting and monitoring targets and producing
nonlethal effects, including reversible jamming of electro-optic (EO) sensors.
HELs offer the potential for graduated responses that range from warning targets
to reversibly jamming their systems, to causing limited but not disabling damage
(as a further warning), and then finally causing disabling damage.
Potential Limitations of HEL Weapons
Potential limitations of HEL weapons include the following:
 Line of sight. Since laser light passes through the atmosphere on an essentially
straight path, HEL weapons would be limited to line-of-sight engagements, and
consequently could not counter over-the-horizon targets or targets obscured by
intervening objects. As a result, potential engagement ranges against certain
targets (e.g., low-flying targets) would be limited.
 Atmospheric absorption, scattering, and turbulence. Substances in the
atmosphere—particularly water vapor, but also sand, dust, salt particles, smoke,
and other air pollution—absorb and scatter light, and atmospheric turbulence can
defocus a laser beam. These effects can reduce the effective range of an HEL

94 This appendix was written by Ronald O’Rourke (HEL weapons) and Andrew Feickert (HPM weapons), CRS
Specialist in Naval Affairs and CRS Specialist in Military Ground Forces, respectively.
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weapon. Absorption by water vapor is a particular consideration for shipboard
lasers because marine environments feature substantial amounts of water vapor in
the air. There are certain wavelengths of light (i.e., “sweet spots” in the
electromagnetic spectrum) where atmospheric absorption by water vapor is
markedly reduced. Lasers can be designed to emit light at or near those sweet
spots, so as to maximize their potential effectiveness. Absorption generally grows
with distance to target, making it in general less of a potential problem for short-
range operations than for longer-range operations. Adaptive optics, which make
rapid, fine adjustments to a laser beam on a continuous basis in response to
observed turbulence, can counteract the effects of atmospheric turbulence. Even
so, lasers might not work well, or at all, in rain or fog, preventing lasers from
being an all-weather solution.
 Thermal blooming. A laser that continues firing in the same exact direction for a
certain amount of time can heat up the air it is passing through, which in turn can
defocus the laser beam, reducing its ability to disable the intended target. This
effect, called thermal blooming, can make lasers less effective for countering
targets that are coming straight at them, on a constant bearing (i.e., “down-the-
throat” shots). Most tests of laser systems have been against crossing targets
rather than “down-the-throat” shots. In general, thermal blooming becomes more
of a concern as the power of the laser beam increases.
 Saturation attacks. Since a HEL weapon can attack only one target at a time,
requires several seconds to disable the target, and requires several more to be
redirected to the next one, a HEL weapon can disable only so many targets within
a given period of time. This places an upper limit on the ability of an individual
laser to deal with saturation attacks—attacks by multiple weapons that approach
the platform simultaneously or within a few seconds of one another. This
limitation can be mitigated by installing more than one laser on the platform, up
to space and energy availability.
 Hardened targets and countermeasures. Less powerful lasers—that is, lasers
with beam powers measured in kilowatts (kW) rather than megawatts (MW)—
can be less effective against targets that incorporate shielding, ablative material,
or highly reflective surfaces, or that tumble or rotate rapidly (so that the laser
spot does not remain continuously on a single location on the target’s surface).
Smoke or other obscurants can reduce the susceptibility of a target platform to
laser attack. Such measures, however, can increase the cost and/or weight of the
target platform.
Potential Advantages of HPM Weapons
In addition to deep magazines, low costs per shot, fast engagement times, and graduated
responses, potential advantages of HPM weapons include the following:
 Temporary or system-specific effects. HPM weapons can generate waves at
different frequencies and power levels to temporarily or permanently disrupt
targeted electronic systems while leaving others unaffected.
 Broad effects. HPM weapons can destroy a wide array of unshielded electronic
systems, including both military and commercial systems. In addition, they are
capable of disabling any unshielded electronic system within their
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electromagnetic cone (i.e., they can disable numerous systems, including swarms
of UAS, at once).
 Nonlethal applications. Certain HPM weapons, such as “heat rays,” could
provide a nonlethal anti-personnel capability in circumstances in which lethal
force might otherwise be used.
 Limitation of collateral damage. HPM weapons would generate little to no
collateral damage of physical structures.95 This feature could make them
attractive weapons in urban areas or in situations “short of war.”
Potential Limitations of HPM Weapons
Potential limitations of HPM weapons include the following:
 Range constraints. Because HPM beams are more diffuse than lasers and cannot
be as tightly focused, the “energy per unit area in HPM beams decreases
significantly over distance.”96 This characteristic could limit the range at which
HPM weapons are operationally effective.
 Potential for fratricide. Because HPM weapons could affect all unshielded
electronic systems within range, measures must be taken to ensure that friendly
systems are properly shielded or kept outside of the weapon’s range when the
weapon is in use.
 Effectiveness of countermeasures. Because electromagnetic radiation can be
absorbed by shielding, HPM weapons may not be effective against shielded
targets.

95 Anti-personnel HPM weapons could not, however, discriminate between military personnel and civilians and could
therefore impact civilians within the weapon’s electromagnetic cone. Similarly, HPM weapons used against military
electronic equipment could disable unshielded civilian equipment.
96 Mark Gunzinger and Chris Dougherty, Changing the Game: The Promise of Directed-Energy Weapons, Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, April 19, 2021, p. 39, at https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/
CSBA_ChangingTheGame_ereader.pdf.
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Appendix B. Funding for Directed
Energy Programs97
DOD has previously provided limited summary funding information for DE programs in budget
documentation. For example, in the FY2020 Defense Budget Overview document, the department
stated it planned to request $235 million for certain offensive and defensive DE capabilities,
including implementing DE applications for base defense, testing and procuring multiple types of
lasers, and researching and developing scalable high-power density applications.98 DOD has not
included such funding information in defense budget overview documents since FY2020.
The following sections provide estimates, based on keyword searches, of how much funding
DOD has requested for DE programs, how much funding Congress has authorized for these DOD
DE programs, and how much funding Congress has appropriated for these programs. CRS is
unable to authoritatively identify all DOD funding associated with DE, in part because the
department’s budget documents do not include standard data elements identifying all funding
associated with such work and do not require financial managers to explicitly reference certain
words or terms in program and project descriptions.
Determining Funding Levels for Programs
CRS used the Defense Technical Information Center’s (DTIC’s) DOD Investment Budget Search
tool to identify directed energy research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) and
procurement programs.99 Search terms included “directed energy” and “lasers.”100 These search
terms returned 264 research and development program elements and 90 procurement line items in
FY2020. After assessing each of these programs, CRS identified 13 research and development
program elements and four procurement line items funding directed energy efforts. Using these
results, CRS then traced the funding for these program elements and line items from FY2017 to
FY2023.
To assess whether a program element or line item is developing or procuring DE systems, CRS
analyzed budget documents. If a program element or line item identified more than 50% of its
funding for DE or lasers, it was counted as a DE program listed in Appendix C. This approach
may have certain methodological challenges. For example, different search terms might include
or exclude certain program elements or line items. Inclusion of a program element or line item
may overstate the amount of funding involved in DE efforts if, for example, the program element

97 This appendix was written by John R. Hoehn, CRS Analyst in Military Capabilities and Programs.
98 DOD, Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer,
March 2019, Defense Budget Overview, United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2020 Budget Request, pp. 1-
9, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2020/
fy2020_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf. The document does not, however, detail which specific programs,
projects, and activities are associated with this funding. It does not appear to include all of the department’s DE
programs, projects, and activities.
99 DOD’s Defense Technical Information Center, or DTIC, no longer maintains a publicly accessible website to search
procurement and research and development budget documentation (including R-2 and P-40 exhibits). For more
information, see Jason Sherman, “DOD moves Google-like tool for searching U.S. military weapon spending behind
firewall,” Inside Defense, November 3, 2020, at https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/dod-moves-google-tool-
searching-us-military-weapon-spending-behind-firewall.
100 Due to database access limitations, CRS was unable to conduct a search for “microwave.”
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or line item supports other purposes. These results therefore should be considered illustrative and
not comprehensive or exact.
After identifying specific program elements and line items, CRS used the National Defense
Authorization Acts from FY2017 through FY2022 to identify how much each program element or
line item was authorized to receive in a given fiscal year. CRS used two methods to identify
appropriated amounts for each program element or line item. First, DOD typically reports
appropriated amounts from the two previous fiscal years when it requests funding in budget
justifications. FY2019 through FY2022 budget justification documentation provided
appropriation amounts for FY2017 through FY2020.101 For FY2021 and FY2022 appropriations,
CRS analyzed funding tables in the Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the respective
Department of Defense Appropriations Acts (P.L. 116-260 and P.L. 117-103).102
Analysis
Figure B-1 depicts the differences between the President’s budget request and congressional
authorizations and appropriations in RDT&E and procurement across five fiscal years. Program
element and line item funding are combined to provide an overview of the appropriation category.
Individual program elements or line items trends may differ from the overview depicted below.
Appendix C provides a detailed list of RDT&E program elements and procurement line items.

101 When available, this report uses the “actual” values reported in the DOD budget justifications because the data
reported represent both congressional appropriations and congressionally approved reprogramming decisions. Thus the
“actuals” are a more complete representation of congressional action on an individual program.
102 The Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying P.L. 116-93, Congressional Record, December 17, 2019,
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CREC-2019-12-17/pdf/CREC-2019-12-17-house-bk2.pdf; and H.Rept. 116-453,
and Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying P.L. 117-103, Congressional Record, March 9, 2022, at
https://docs.house.gov/floor/Default.aspx?date=2022-03-07.
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Figure B-1. Requested, Authorized, and Appropriated Funding Levels for Selected
DE Programs

Source: CRS analysis of FY2017-FY2023 Army, Air Force, Navy, and Defense-Wide Research, Development,
Test and Evaluation and Procurement Budget Justifications, P.L. 114-328, P.L. 115-91, P.L. 115-232, P.L. 116-92,
P.L. 116-93, P.L. 116-260, P.L. 116-283, P.L. 117-81 and P.L. 117-103.
Note: Funding levels are in current U.S. dol ars.
The military services sometimes change the funding source for programs and activities, including
those related to DE. Two program elements in particular from FY2017 through FY2019 were
significantly restructured: Electronics and Electronic Devices (PE 0602705A) and Weapons and
Munitions Advanced Technology (PE 0603004A). These two program elements funded a number
of DE projects, which were shifted into multiple new program elements to support the Army’s
new modernization strategy. Based on FY2020 budget documents, these projects now primarily
reside in Air and Missile Defense Technology (PE 0602150A) and Air and Missile Defense
Advanced Technology (PE 0603466A). These new program elements fund a number of other
projects, but these alignments appear to provide the best linkage to historical programs.103 There
were no changes to programs in FY2023.
Many of the programs identified in this analysis appear to be defensive countermeasures designed
to protect aircraft. The Air Force’s Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures, the Army’s
Common Infrared Countermeasures, and the Navy’s Tactical Air Directed Infrared
Countermeasures are examples of these countermeasures. Other examples of DE programs

103 Figures document total funding in a program element or line item. Due to the data fidelity of FY2020
appropriations, CRS was unable to assess DE funding at the project level.
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include the Army’s Maneuver-Short Range Air Defense (M-SHORAD) and the Air Force’s
Threat Simulator Development.
Reviewing funding for FY2022, CRS noted several issues related to both procurement and
research and development. Using this methodology, it appears that the Biden Administration
requested approximately $909 million,104 was authorized $1,052 million, and was appropriated
$1,070 million. The deviation in FY2022 funding between authorization and appropriation levels
and the President’s budget request can largely be attributed to two research and development
programs, which received relatively large increases in appropriations compared with the request:
(1) the Air Force’s Air and Missile Defense Advanced Technology ($97 million) and (2) the
Army’s Air and Missile Defense ($74 million). Other smaller increases and decreases are
predominately offsetting.
Two additional trends occur across the two appropriation categories. First, it appears that DE
research and development programs received additional appropriations compared with both the
requested amount and the authorized amount. Second, programs that were in procurement over
the previous four years seem to have been appropriated less funding than was requested, though
on average it appears that appropriations have been larger than authorizations.

104 The FY2023 budget request did not provide an estimate for directed energy programs. However, the Trump
Administration stated in its FY2020 budget request that it funded $235 million in DE programs, whereas CRS
calculated the Administration’s request to be $634 million. The difference between these two funding levels is most
likely based on methodological differences.
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Appendix C. List of Selected Line Items and
Program Elements105
Table C-1. Selected Directed Energy Procurement Line Items
Requested Authorized Appropriated
Line
($ in
($ in
($ in
Title
Agency
Fiscal Year
Item
thousands) thousands)
thousands)
Large Aircraft
Air Force
2023
LAIRCM
25,286
—
—
Infrared
Countermeasures
(CM)
Large Aircraft
Air Force
2022
LAIRCM
57,001
57,001
57,001
Infrared CM
Large Aircraft
Air Force
2021
LAIRCM
57,521
57,521
46,321
Infrared CM
Large Aircraft
Air Force
2020
LAIRCM
97,093
53,335
97,093
Infrared CM
Large Aircraft
Air Force
2019
LAIRCM
149,778
149,778
149,778
Infrared CM
Large Aircraft
Air Force
2018
LAIRCM
4,046
4,066
4,066
Infrared CM
Large Aircraft
Air Force
2017
LAIRCM
135,801
135,801
135,801
Infrared CM
Common Infrared
Army
2023
5399AZ3537
288,209
—
—
CM (CIRCM)
CIRCM
Army
2022
5399AZ3537
240,412
238,012
234,012
CIRCM
Army
2021
5399AZ3537
237,467
237,464
234,117
CIRCM
Army
2020
5399AZ3537
178,094
168,784
178,094
CIRCM
Army
2019
5399AZ3537
60,899
36,839
60,899
CIRCM
Army
2018
AZ3537
49,777
43,440
108,721
CIRCM
Army
2017
AZ3537
108,721
108,721
80,677
Survivability CM
Army
2023
5044AZ3507
6,622
—
—
Survivability CM
Army
2022
5044AZ3507
5,104
5,104
5,104
Survivability CM
Army
2021
5044AZ3507
8,035
8,035
8,035
Survivability CM
Army
2020
5044AZ3507
8,388
8,388
8,388
Survivability CM
Army
2019
5044AZ3507
5,853
5,853
5,853
Survivability CM
Army
2018
AZ3507
5,884
5,884
5,884
Survivability CM
Army
2017
AZ3507
9,565
9,565
9,565
MAGTF EW for
Navy
2023
0587
24,684
—
—
Aviation

105 This appendix was written by John R. Hoehn, CRS Analyst in Military Capabilities and Programs.
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Requested Authorized Appropriated
Line
($ in
($ in
($ in
Title
Agency
Fiscal Year
Item
thousands) thousands)
thousands)
MAGTF EW for
Navy
2022
0587
29,151
29,151
29,151
Aviation
MAGTF EW for
Navy
2021
0587
27,794
27,794
26,822
Aviation
MAGTF EW for
Navy
2020
0587
26,536
26,536
26,536
Aviation
MAGTF EW for
Navy
2019
0587
11,590
11,590
11,590
Aviation
MAGTF EW for
Navy
2018
0587
10,111
10,111
10,111
Aviation
MAGTF EW for
Navy
2017
0588
5,676
5,676
21,968
Aviation
Source: CRS analysis of FY2017-FY2022 Army, Air Force, Navy, and Defense-Wide Research, Development,
Test and Evaluation and Procurement Budget Justifications, P.L. 114-328, P.L. 115-91, P.L. 115-232, P.L. 116-92,
and P.L. 116-93.
Notes: Blank cells represent data that were not available at the time of publication. MAGTF EW stands for
Marine Air Ground Task Force Electronic Warfare.

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Table C-2. Selected Directed Energy Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
Program Elements
Requested
Authorized
Appropriated
Fiscal
Program
($ in
($ in
($ in
Title
Agency
Year
Element
thousands)
thousands)
thousands)
Directed Energy
Air Force
2023
0604032F
4,269
—
—
Prototyping
Directed Energy
Air Force
2022
0604032F
10,820
10,820
15,820
Prototyping
Directed Energy
Air Force
2021
0604032F
20,964
20,964
19,464
Prototyping
Directed Energy
Air Force
2020
0604032F
10,000
20,000
42,390
Prototyping
Directed Energy
Air Force
2019
0604032F
—
—-
50,000
Prototyping
Directed Energy
Air Force
2018
0604032F
—
—
—
Prototyping
Directed Energy
Air Force
2017
0604032F
—
—
—
Prototyping
Directed Energy
Air Force
2023
0602605F
109,302
—
—
Technology
Directed Energy
Air Force
2022
0602605F
121,869
113,522
116,456
Technology
Directed Energy
Air Force
2021
0602605F
128,113
128,113
130,613
Technology
Directed Energy
Air Force
2020
0602605F
32,020
124,379
114,279
Technology
Directed Energy
Air Force
2019
0602605F
33,506
141,898
141,800
Technology
Directed Energy
Air Force
2018
0602605F
33,047
141,293
132,993
Technology
Directed Energy
Air Force
2017
0602605F
127,163
127,163
127,365
Technology
High Energy Laser
Air Force
2022
0602890F
—
—
—
Researcha
High Energy Laser
Air Force
2021
0602890F
45,088
45,088
29,208
Research
High Energy Laser
Air Force
2020
0602890F
44,221
44,221
47,462
Research
High Energy Laser
Air Force
2019
0602890F
43,359
45,859
43,192
Research
High Energy Laser
Air Force
2018
0602890F
43,049
43,049
43,049
Research
High Energy Laser
Air Force
2017
0602890F
42,300
42,300
39,545
Research
High Energy Laser
Air Force
2022
0601108F
—
—
—
Research Initiativesb
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Requested
Authorized
Appropriated
Fiscal
Program
($ in
($ in
($ in
Title
Agency
Year
Element
thousands)
thousands)
thousands)
High Energy Laser
Air Force
2021
0601108F
15,085
15,085
15,085
Research Initiatives
High Energy Laser
Air Force
2020
0601108F
14,795
14,795
13,736
Research Initiatives
High Energy Laser
Air Force
2019
0601108F
14,506
14,506
13,106
Research Initiatives
High Energy Laser
Air Force
2018
0601108F
14,417
14,417
14,417
Research Initiatives
High Energy Laser
Air Force
2017
0601108F
14,168
14,168
13,224
Research Initiatives
Large Aircraft IR
Air Force
2023
0401134F
2,909
—
—
Countermeasures
(LAIRCM)
LAIRCM
Air Force
2022
0401134F
5,504
5,504
5,504
LAIRCM
Air Force
2021
0401134F
5,507
5,507
5,507
LAIRCM
Air Force
2020
0401134F
5,424
5,424
5,247
LAIRCM
Air Force
2019
0401134F
4,334
4,334
4,334
LAIRCM
Air Force
2018
0401134F
5,283
5,283
5,095
LAIRCM
Air Force
2017
0401134F
5,166
5,166
5,011
Threat Simulator
Air Force
2023
0604256F
21,607
—
—
Development
Threat Simulator
Air Force
2022
0604256F
41,909
41,909
46,909
Development
Threat Simulator
Air Force
2021
0604256F
57,725
57,725
57,725
Development
Threat Simulator
Air Force
2020
0604256F
59,693
59,693
58,906
Development
Threat Simulator
Air Force
2019
0604256F
34,256
34,256
34,206
Development
Threat Simulator
Air Force
2018
0604256F
35,405
35,405
35,405
Development
Threat Simulator
Air Force
2017
0604256F
21,630
21,630
21,377
Development
Air and Missile
Army
2023
0603466A
11,147
—
—
Defense Advanced
Technology
Air and Missile
Army
2022
0603466A
48,826
68,826
145,826
Defense Advanced
Technology
Air and Missile
Army
2021
0603466A
58,130
73,630
182,630
Defense Advanced
Technology
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Requested
Authorized
Appropriated
Fiscal
Program
($ in
($ in
($ in
Title
Agency
Year
Element
thousands)
thousands)
thousands)
Air and Missile
Army
2020
0603466A
60,613
60,613
79,817
Defense Advanced
Technology
Weapons and
Army
2019
0603004A
102,686
122,686
241,581
Munitions Advanced
Technology
Weapons and
Army
2018
0603004A
84,709
84,079
84,079
Munitions Advanced
Technology
Weapons and
Army
2017
0603004A
68,714
68,714
198,245
Munitions Advanced
Technology
Air and Missile
Army
2023
0602150A
27,016
—
—
Defense Technology
Air and Missile
Army
2022
0602150A
19,316
72,566
93,566
Defense Technology
Air and Missile
Army
2021
0602150A
56,298
66,298
109,298
Defense Technology
Air and Missile
Army
2020
0602150A
50,771
50,771
19,316
Defense Technology
Common Infrared
Army
2023
0605035A
11,523
—
—
Countermeasures
(CIRCM)
CIRCM
Army
2022
0605035A
16,630
16,630
16,630
CIRCM
Army
2021
0605035A
23,321
28,321
28,321
CIRCM
Army
2020
0605035A
46,258
11,770
22,226
CIRCM
Army
2019
0605035A
53,848
2,670
33,809
CIRCM
Army
2018
0605035A
127,318
21,540
97,746
CIRCM
Army
2017
0605035A
107,877
10,900
127,318
Electronics and
Army
2019
0602705A
58,283
58,283
96,760
Electronic Devices
Electronics and
Army
2018
0602705A
58,352
60,352
90,613
Electronic Devices
Electronics and
Army
2017
0602705A
56,322
56,322
72,979
Electronic Devices
Maneuver - Short
Army
2023
0604117A
225,147
—
—
Range Air Defense
(M-SHORAD)
M-SHORAD
Army
2022
0604117A
39,376
39,376
39,376
M-SHORAD
Army
2021
0604117A
4,995
4,995
4,995
M-SHORAD
Army
2020
0604117A
39,100
29,400
41,690
M-SHORAD
Army
2019
0604117A
118,085
23,000
79,016
M-SHORAD
Army
2018
0604117A
20,000
20,000
19,201
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Department of Defense Directed Energy Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress

Requested
Authorized
Appropriated
Fiscal
Program
($ in
($ in
($ in
Title
Agency
Year
Element
thousands)
thousands)
thousands)
M-SHORAD
Army
2017
0604117A
—
—
95,085
Directed Energy and
Navy
2023
0603925N
65,080
—
—
Electric Weapon
System
Directed Energy and
Navy
2022
0603925N
71,803
81,803
81,803
Electric Weapon
System
Directed Energy and
Navy
2021
0603925N
128,845
128,845
126,895
Electric Weapon
System
Directed Energy and
Navy
2020
0603925N
118,169
118,169
136,535
Electric Weapon
System
Directed Energy and
Navy
2019
0603925N
223,344
142,412
142,814
Electric Weapon
System
Directed Energy and
Navy
2018
0603925N
107,310
122,310
92,856
Electric Weapon
System
Directed Energy and
Navy
2017
0603925N
32,700
32,700
34,039
Electric Weapon
System
Tact Air Dir Infrared
Navy
2023
0604272N
15,028
—
—
CM (TADIRCM)
TADIRCM
Navy
2022
0604272N
33,246
33,246
33,246
TADIRCM
Navy
2021
0604272N
59,776
52,026
50,281
TADIRCM
Navy
2020
0604272N
68,346
58,449
54,175
TADIRCM
Navy
2019
0604272N
47,278
47,278
47,278
TADIRCM
Navy
2018
0604272N
46,589
46,844
51,311
TADIRCM
Navy
2017
0604272N
72,910
34,920
59,753
High Energy Laser
OSD
2023
0603924D8Z
111,149
—
—
Advanced
Development
High Energy Laser
OSD
2022
0603924D8Z
107,397
107,397
83,497
Advanced
Development
High Energy Laser
OSD
2021
0603924D8Z
105,410
92,270
112,910
Advanced
Development
High Energy Laser
OSD
2020
0603924D8Z
85,223
85,223
78,057
Advanced
Development
High Energy Laser
OSD
2019
0603924D8Z
69,533
69,533
74,364
Advanced
Development
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Department of Defense Directed Energy Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress

Requested
Authorized
Appropriated
Fiscal
Program
($ in
($ in
($ in
Title
Agency
Year
Element
thousands)
thousands)
thousands)
High Energy Laser
OSD
2018
0603924D8Z
—
—
—
Advanced
Development
High Energy Laser
OSD
2017
0603924D8Z
—
—
—
Advanced
Development
High Energy Laser
OSD
2023
0602890D8Z
48,587
—
—
Development
High Energy Laser
OSD
2022
0602890D8Z
45,997
115,997
45,997
Development
High Energy Laser
OSD
2023
0601108D8Z
16,257
—
—
Research Initiatives
High Energy Laser
OSD
2022
0601108D8Z
15,390
15,390
20,390
Research Initiatives
Source: CRS analysis of FY2017-FY2022 Army, Air Force, Navy, and Defense-Wide Research, Development,
Test and Evaluation and Procurement Budget Justifications, P.L. 114-328, P.L. 115-91, P.L. 115-232, P.L. 116-92,
and P.L. 116-93.
Notes: Blank cells represent data that were not available at the time of publication. Tact Air Dir Infrared stands
for Tactical Aircraft Directable Infrared.
a. Funding transferred to OSD High Energy Laser Development (0602890D8Z) in FY2022.
b. Funding transferred to OSD High Energy Laser Research Initiatives (0601108D8Z) in FY2022.

Author Information

Kelley M. Sayler, Coordinator
John R. Hoehn
Analyst in Advanced Technology and Global
Analyst in Military Capabilities and Programs
Security

Andrew Feickert
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Military Ground Forces
Specialist in Naval Affairs

Congressional Research Service

33

Department of Defense Directed Energy Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress

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Congressional Research Service
R46925 · VERSION 3 · UPDATED
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