Intelligence Coordination on Domestic
September 1, 2022
Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Background Michael E. DeVine
and Issues for Congress
Analyst in Intelligence and
National Security
This report provides an overview of the evolution of domestic intelligence activities by the

intelligence and law enforcement communities, as well as the processes by which intelligence
Lisa N. Sacco
and law enforcement agencies coordinate their efforts and share intelligence on domestic
Analyst in Illicit Drugs and
extremist violence and terrorism. Congress, in its intelligence oversight responsibilities, has
Crime Policy
expressed interest in knowing that the intelligence and law enforcement communities are

coordinating on domestic threats appropriately: sharing information in a manner that is timely
and also protects civil liberties.
John W. Rollins
Specialist in Terrorism and
National Security
When the term intelligence is used informally to describe a function of government—involving

the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information in support of national security
priorities—there is the potential for confusion over what it actually means, which agencies are
For a copy of the full report,
involved, how coordination and intelligence sharing is conducted, and what legal authorities
please call 7-5700 or visit
guide intelligence activities. This is especially true of domestic intelligence activities to counter
www.crs.gov.
the threat of terrorism and extremist violence in the United States.
The term intelligence generally refers to activities authorized under Title 50 of the United States Code (U.S. Code or U.S.C.),
performed by the 18 statutory elements of the intelligence community, or described in guidelines for law enforcement
organizations outlined in Part 23 of Title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulation (28 C.F.R. §23), Criminal Intelligence
Systems Operating Policies. Intelligence activities in support of efforts to counter the threat of domestic terrorism or domestic
violent extremism can involve either agencies of the intelligence community or law enforcement. Domestic terrorism is
defined in statute as “acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any
State” and “appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; influence the policy of a government by
intimidation or coercion; or affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping”; and take
place primarily in the United States. Domestic violent extremism refers to violent criminal acts in furtherance of ideological
goals stemming from domestic influences, such as racial bias and anti-government sentiment.
The public has a reasonable expectation that, regardless of the activity or agency involved, officials conducting intelligence
activities in a domestic setting will respect the privacy and civil liberties of U.S. citizens. In a domestic environment, the
intelligence community must abide by the various oversight requirements established by Congress and the President,
including Attorney General Guidelines and the provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA, P.L.
95-511), as amended.
At the same time, it is incumbent upon both the intelligence and law enforcement communities to share information in a
manner that is timely and effective. The current structure for sharing information between the intelligence community and
law enforcement agencies is a legacy of the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001 (hereafter
referred to as 9/11). To break down long-standing cultural barriers between intelligence and law enforcement agencies, and to
enable more effective protection of the country, Congress included in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
of 2004 (IRTPA, P.L. 108-458) provisions to promote a culture of information sharing to mitigate the threat of international
terrorism. The IRTPA also included provisions to strengthen oversight to try to ensure the intelligence and law enforcement
communities, in sharing more information, do not overstep their authorities and violate civil liberties. Since 9/11, the
domestic terrorism and violent extremist threat has evolved to increasingly include U.S. persons conducting attacks in the
United States inspired by either foreign terrorist groups and ideologies, or domestic extremist ideologies or grievances.
As the threat of terrorism and violent extremism has evolved, coordination between the intelligence and law enforcement
communities has become more complex, and it remains a work in progress. Congressional action has focused on enhancing
intelligence-law enforcement coordination and threat mitigation while trying to ensure oversight provisions are sufficient to
protect civil liberties. This report is intended to assist Congress in its oversight responsibilities of the intelligence and law
enforcement communities by explaining the respective roles and responsibilities of different agencies that conduct
intelligence activities in a domestic environment under different authorities.
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Intelligence Coordination on Domestic Terrorism and Violent Extremism

Introduction
In the years leading up to the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001
(hereafter referred to as 9/11), the intelligence and law enforcement communities developed
habits that discouraged even the lawful sharing of information.1 The attacks of 9/11 revealed the
shortcomings of these practices. Through the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
of 2004 (IRTPA, P.L. 108-458), Congress instituted measures to break down cultural barriers and
encourage lawful information sharing and coordination between intelligence and law enforcement
agencies. Many experts considered the greatest threat to United States national security at that
time was international terrorism, particularly foreign terrorists planning attacks on the U.S.
homeland from bases overseas.2
The domestic extremist and terrorist environment has evolved since the attacks of 9/11,
increasingly involving threats from U.S. nationals. In March 2021, Director of National
Intelligence Avril Haines published an assessment that described as “elevated” the threat to the
homeland posed by domestic violent extremists.3 Such extremists, the assessment noted, could be
driven to violence by grievances or intolerance concerning race, ethnicity, religion, gender, sexual
orientation, abortion, government, animal rights, or the environment.4
Following this assessment, President Joseph R. Biden Jr. issued the National Strategy for
Countering Domestic Terrorism, which noted that the domestic terror threat was “persistent and
evolving” and had, in recent years, undergone a “resurgence.”5 The strategy also called for the

1 For background on the barriers that discouraged information sharing among intelligence and law enforcement
agencies, see National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final
Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Government Printing Office, July
2004, p. 79, at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-911REPORT/pdf/GPO-911REPORT.pdf.
2 Section 1801(c) of Title 50, pertaining to the Intelligence Community, defines international terrorism as activities that
(1) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or
of any state, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or any state;
(2) appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, to influence the policy of a government by
intimidation or coercion, or to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping; and (3) occur totally
outside the United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the
persons they appear intended to coerce or intimidate, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum
(some internal numbering omitted).
The definition in Section 2331(1) of Title 18, Crimes and Criminal Procedure, differs only in qualifying the location of
international terrorism as “primarily [vs. “totally”] outside the United States.”
3 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Domestic Violent Extremism Poses Heightened Threat in 2021
(unclassified summary), March 1, 2021, p. 2, at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
21_0301_odni_unclass-summary-of-dve-assessment-17_march-final_508.pdf. The assessment defined DVEs as,
U.S.-based actors who conduct or threaten activities that are dangerous to human life in violation of
the criminal laws of the United States or any state; appearing to be intended to intimidate or coerce
a civilian population; and influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or
affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination or kidnapping, as per the
definition of domestic terrorism in 18 U.S. Code 2331(5).
4 This report uses a number of terms describing a wide range of domestic extremist criminal activities that necessitate
close coordination between the intelligence and law enforcement communities. In many instances, this coordination
involves counterterrorist elements. Yet there is little consensus on what constitutes an act of domestic terrorism, nor is
there a federal criminal statute on domestic terrorism. Whether acts of domestic extremist violence are classified as acts
of terrorism, hate crimes, murder, seditious conspiracy, or some other violent offense, the requirement for intelligence
and law enforcement to effectively share information and coordinate their activities to mitigate the threat remains the
same.
5 White House, National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism, June 2021, p. 5, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/
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broader federal government to “coordinate and collaborate on programmatic aspects of
countering domestic terrorism, such as information sharing, training, prevention, and intervention
efforts.”6 On June 7, 2022, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) released a National
Terrorism Advisory System bulletin, which noted that the United States remained “in a
heightened threat environment” that in the coming months was expected “to become more
dynamic as several high-profile events could be exploited to justify acts of violence against a
range of possible targets.”7
Although the existence of domestic terrorist and extremist actors is not new, the current threat
environment arguably requires greater coordination between intelligence and law enforcement
agencies, which have, over the past two decades, increased their size and capabilities to
effectively respond to the threat. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI or Bureau) Director
Christopher Wray, testifying before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee on March 10, 2022,
commented on the impact the current threat has had on coordination:
With the kind of terrorist we’re talking about here: You’re talking about an individual
going after an easily accessible target with a very crude weapon which means there are a
lot less dots to connect.... That’s why the growth in the Joint Terrorism Task Forces with
task force officers from state and local police departments from all over the country has
been such an important development.”8
While the IRTPA included provisions to promote the sharing of information between law
enforcement entities and intelligence community elements, the growing domestic extremist threat
by U.S. nationals created a push for additional improvements in how the intelligence and law
enforcement communities share information. Flaws in the information-sharing process became
evident in the aftermath of the January 6, 2021, attack on the U.S. Capitol. A five-month
bipartisan investigation by the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, and the Committee on Rules and Administration, concluded that the intelligence
community, principally intelligence elements of the FBI and DHS, “did not issue a threat
assessment warning of potential violence targeting the Capitol” and needed to improve its use of
social media and online message boards in assessing such threats.9 The committees’ investigation
also concluded that the intelligence elements of the United States Capitol Police “failed to convey
the full scope of threat information they possessed.”10

wp-content/uploads/2021/06/National-Strategy-for-Countering-Domestic-Terrorism.pdf.
6 Ibid., p. 12.
7 Department of Homeland Security, “Summary of Terrorism Threat to the United States,” National Terrorism
Advisory System Bulletin, June 7, 2022, at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/ntas/alerts/22_0607_S1_NTAS-
Bulletin_508.pdf.
8 Testimony of FBI Director Christopher Wray, in U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Worldwide
Threats, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., March 10, 2022, at https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/hearings/open-hearing-
worldwide-threats-2.
9 See Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and Committee on Rules and Administration,
“Examining the U.S. Capitol Attack: A Review of the Security, Planning, and Response Failures on January 6,” United
States Senate Staff Report, June 2021, pp. 1-2 at https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/HSGAC&
RulesFullReport_ExaminingU.S.CapitolAttack.pdf. This staff report says, in part,
FBI and DHS officials stressed the difficulty in discerning constitutionally protected free speech
versus actionable, credible threats of violence. In testimony before the Committees, officials from
both FBI and DHS acknowledged that the Intelligence Community needs to improve its handling
and dissemination of threat information from social media and online message boards.
10 Ibid., p. 2.
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Congressional action has focused on enhancing intelligence-law enforcement coordination and
threat mitigation. In March 2021, the Senate Judiciary Committee introduced in the Senate the
Domestic Terrorism Prevention Act of 2021 (S. 964, 117th Congress), which would have
established in the DHS, Department of Justice (DOJ), and FBI offices dedicated to analyzing and
monitoring domestic terrorism activity. On May 18, 2022, the House of Representatives passed
the Domestic Terrorism Prevention Act of 2022 (H.R. 350), which included similar provisions to
those in S. 964. Appendix B outlines the intelligence and law enforcement entities involved in
the coordination and sharing of information on domestic terrorism and violent extremism.
Pressing the intelligence and law enforcement communities to share information more effectively,
the 117th Congress has expressed concern over the potential for incidental violations of civil
liberties.11 A provision in the Intelligence Authorization Act of 2022 (Division X of P.L. 117-103),
for example, explicitly prohibits the intelligence community from collecting information on
constitutionally protected activities.12
This report is intended to assist Congress in its oversight responsibilities of the intelligence and
law enforcement communities by explaining the respective roles and responsibilities of different
agencies that conduct intelligence activities in a domestic environment under various authorities.
By the “intelligence community” (IC), this report refers to the 18 elements designated as the
“intelligence community” in Title 50, U.S. Code, Section 3003, for the purpose of conducting
foreign intelligence and counterintelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination. These IC
elements must conduct intelligence activities in accordance with Executive Order 12333, “United
States Intelligence Activities,” and other intelligence oversight requirements.13 By “law
enforcement,” this report refers to organizations at the federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial
levels that are authorized to enforce criminal law or perform law enforcement activities, such as
crime prevention, control, or reduction, among other criminal justice matters. Guidelines for law
enforcement criminal intelligence activities are provided in 28 C.F.R. §23, Criminal Intelligence
Systems Operating Policies, rather than statute.14 See Appendix A for an outline of terminology
related to domestic intelligence and domestic extremism.

11 See, for instance, statements and questions by Members during the following hearings: U.S. Congress, House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Worldwide Threats, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., March 8, 2022, at
https://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventID=114469; and U.S. Congress, Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, Worldwide Threats, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., March 10, 2022, at
https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/hearings/open-hearing-worldwide-threats-2.
12 P.L. 117-103, §303, amends the National Security Act of 1947 (P.L. 80-253; 50 U.S.C. §3021 et seq.) by adding a
new section. “Sec. 105C, Prohibition on collection and maintenance of information of United States persons based on
First Amendment-Protected activities” states,
No element of the intelligence community may collect or maintain information concerning a United
States person (as defined in section 105A) solely for the purpose of monitoring an activity
protected by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
13 See Executive Order 12333, “United States Intelligence Activities,” 46 Federal Register 59941, December 4, 1981,
at https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12333.html; and Department of Defense,
Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities, (As amended by Executive Orders 13284 (2003), 13355
(2004) and 13470 (2008)), at https://dpcld.defense.gov/Portals/49/Documents/Civil/eo-12333-2008.pdf.
14 28 C.F.R. §23, Criminal Intelligence Systems Operating Policies, at
https://bja.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh186/files/media/document/28cfr_part_23.pdf. 28 C.F.R. §23 provides guidelines
for law enforcement agencies that operate federally-funded, multi- and intra-jurisdictional criminal intelligence systems
encompassing the submission, entry, security, inquiry, dissemination, review and purge of criminal intelligence
information. Many state and local law enforcement organizations have voluntarily adopted 28 C.F.R. §23 standards that
are otherwise not required to do so. See “28 C.F.R. Part 23 Frequently Asked Questions,” RISS, at
https://www.riss.net/policy/cfr/.
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Background
Intelligence and law enforcement coordination and information sharing have evolved in response
to changing perceptions of the most significant threats to national security. The FBI’s domestic
intelligence capability was established in 1936 to thwart espionage attempts by Germany, Japan,
and the Soviet Union. According to the DOJ Inspector General:
During the 1930s, President Franklin D. Roosevelt expressed concern over the growing
indications of subversive activities within the United States, especially those of communist
and fascist supporters. At the direction of President Roosevelt, the FBI began gathering
intelligence on the activities of such individuals and groups.15
The Administrations of Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt through Richard M. Nixon “permitted,
and sometimes encouraged” domestic intelligence collection of political figures or those they
viewed as extremist or subversive.16 During this time, Congress exercised relatively limited
oversight of intelligence agencies.17 In collecting information to guard against what the Bureau
perceived to be subversive threats to U.S. national security, the Attorney General and the FBI
made a practice of investigating Americans’ organizational memberships, political beliefs, and
national affiliations.18
Domestic Surveillance in the 1960s and 1970s
In 1974, the public was made aware of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) covert action
programs abroad and the intelligence and law enforcement communities’ systematic violation of
the privacy and civil liberties of American citizens through a story published in the New York
Times.19 In the wake of this report, some Members of Congress took a closer look at the sort of
domestic activities the intelligence and law enforcement agencies were conducting. Congress
became aware, for example, of the FBI’s Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO), a
domestic covert program intended to discredit Americans the Bureau viewed as subversive.

15 Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Special Report on the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s
Compliance with the Attorney General’s Investigative Guidelines (redacted), September 2005, at https://oig.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/archive/special/0509/chapter2.htm.
16 Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities, Intelligence
and the Rights of Americans, Book II: Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Government Operations
with respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate (Washington, DC: GPO, 1976), p. 8. This report
provides several examples of these activities, including
President Eisenhower received reports on purely political and social contacts with foreign officials
by Bernard Baruch, Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, and Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas.
The Kennedy Administration had the FBI wiretap a Congressional staff member, three executive
officials, a lobbyist, and a Washington law firm. Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy received the
fruits of a FBI “tap” on Martin Luther King, Jr., and a “bug” on a Congressman both of which
yielded information of a political nature.
17 James S. Van Wagenen, “A Review of Congressional Oversight,” Studies in Intelligence, vol. 40, no. 5 (1997),
archived at https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA524502.pdf.
18 Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Supplementary
Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, Book III, Final Report of the of the Select
Committee to Study Government Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate (Washington,
DC: GPO, 1976), pp. 374-377.
19 See Seymour M. Hersh, “Huge C.I.A. Operation Reported in U.S. against Antiwar Forces, Other Dissidents in Nixon
Years,” New York Times, December 22, 1974, at https://www.nytimes.com/1974/12/22/archives/huge-cia-operation-
reported-in-u-s-against-antiwar-forces-other.html.
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Targeted individuals included members of the Ku Klux Klan, anti-war protesters, and civil rights
leaders.20 In another instance, the National Security Agency’s (NSA’s) Project Shamrock
intercepted millions of telegrams to and from the United States at the request of the Bureau of
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (the predecessor to the Drug Enforcement Administration, DEA).
In taking a more active role in exercising oversight of the intelligence community, Members of
Congress established two select committees, informally known as the Church and Pike
committees after their Senate and House of Representatives’ chairmen, to investigate purported
abuses of American’s civil liberties. 21 In addition, then-President Gerald R. Ford established the
United States President’s Commission on CIA Activities (called the “Rockefeller Commission”
after its chairman, Nelson A. Rockefeller), an independent commission to investigate abuses of
civil liberties within the United States. One result of these inquiries was the dissolution of the
FBI’s Domestic Intelligence Division, which had been at the forefront of domestic intelligence
collection.22 The Church and Pike committees led to the establishment in the 1970s of a dedicated
intelligence oversight framework with the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and
the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI).
Findings of the Congressional Joint Inquiry and the
9/11 Commission:
The climate of concern about domestic intelligence abuses contributed to an institutional
reluctance on the part of the intelligence and law enforcement communities to collaborate and
share information on threats to U.S. national security that persisted up to the 9/11 attacks.
Following the attacks, two investigative efforts provided a number of findings on the negative
impact limited intelligence and law enforcement agency collaboration had on the domestic
counterterrorist posture of the United States at that time. These were the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (the “9/11 Commission”) and a joint inquiry of the
House and Senate intelligence committees (the “Joint Inquiry”), and they each reported a number
of concerns.
 The 9/11 Commission found significant “fault lines between foreign and
domestic intelligence, and between and within agencies,” and “pervasive
problems of managing and sharing information across a large and unwieldy

20 For accounts of the violations of civil liberties by the intelligence community and FBI during the 1960s and 1970s,
see Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities, Intelligence and the
Rights of Americans, Book II: Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Government Operations with respect to
Intelligence Activities, United States Senate (Washington, DC: GPO, 1976). See also Select Committee to Study
Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities, Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence
Activities and the Rights of Americans, Book III, Final Report of the of the Select Committee to Study Government
Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate (Washington, DC: GPO, 1976). For an example
of lingering concern about the role of intelligence in a domestic environment, see Jonathan Blanks, “The Dangerous
Incentive in a New Domestic Terror Unit,” The Week, January 14, 2022, at https://theweek.com/politics/1009006/the-
dangerous-incentive-in-a-new-domestic-terror-unit.
21 The committees were formally known as the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities, and the House Select Intelligence Committee. For a discussion of Congress taking a
more active role in the oversight of intelligence, see James S. Van Wagenen, “A Review of Congressional Oversight,”
Studies in Intelligence (published by the Central Intelligence Agency’s Center for the Study of Intelligence), vol. 40,
no. 5 (1997), p. 99, archived at https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA524502.pdf.
22 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Government Printing Office, July 2004, p. 75, at
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-911REPORT/pdf/GPO-911REPORT.pdf.
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government that had been built in a different era to confront different dangers.”23
Moreover, the commission found the IC lacked a focused, integrated
counterterrorism posture, particularly regarding the prospect of attacks within the
United States.24
 The Joint Inquiry found that from 1998 to 2001, the intelligence community
received a modest but steady stream of intelligence indicating a prospective
attack within the United States, but the analysis focused on prospective attacks
on U.S. personnel and interests abroad.25
 The Joint Inquiry also determined that the intelligence community analysis
focused mainly on foreign intelligence threats abroad.26 Moreover, the
intelligence community placed insufficient emphasis on terrorist financing.27
 FBI headquarters, according to the Joint Inquiry, did not act on internal
communications from the Bureau’s Phoenix Field Office expressing concern over
the number of “individuals of investigative interest” who were taking civil
aviation-related classes.28 Intelligence indicating a possible attack by aircraft was
not included in any known threat assessments.29
 The FBI lacked an effective intelligence collection effort, the 9/11 Commission
noted.30 Moreover, the FBI’s Deputy Assistant Director for Counterterrorism
Analysis noted that the Bureau lacked an effective data mining capability and
analytical tools, which inhibited the Bureau’s efforts to pursue leads of terrorist
activity.31
 Both the Joint Inquiry and 9/11 Commission cited institutional barriers between
intelligence and criminal investigative entities within the FBI, and between
intelligence and law enforcement agencies, that significantly slowed the flow of
intelligence, even in situations where there was a clear criminal predicate (as
there was with several of the 9/11 terrorists).32
In sum, the 9/11 Commission found that the intelligence community failed to focus on the
“collective significance” of the information it had.33 The Joint Inquiry concluded the intelligence
community lacked a culture conducive to sharing relevant information within and between
intelligence agencies, between the law enforcement and intelligence agencies, and between
intelligence agencies and non-intelligence organizations of the U.S. government.34

23 Ibid., p. xvi.
24 Ibid., pp. 263-264.
25 House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Report of the
Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, 107th Cong., 2nd Sess., S.Rept. 107-351, December
2002, pp. 198-201, at https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/CRPT-107srpt351-5.pdf.
26 Ibid., p. 379. See also the 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 204, 258.
27 Ibid., pp. 113-114, 308. See also the 9/11 Commission Report, p. 185.
28 Ibid., p. 20.
29 Ibid., p. 9.
30 9/11 Commission Report, p. 77.
31 Joint Inquiry, pp. 331, 358.
32 Ibid., p. 363. See also the 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 78-80.
33 Ibid., pp. 10-11, 59.
34 Joint Inquiry, p. 363.
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Selected Reform Measures
The terrorist attacks of 9/11 resulted in renewed congressional interest in how U.S. government
agencies could be better prepared to prevent similar attacks in the future. This included
congressional interest in how to better organize law enforcement and intelligence community
agencies, and facilitate information sharing that would both enhance domestic security and
protect the civil liberties of Americans.
The bulk of the efforts immediately following the 9/11 attacks reflected a widespread assumption
that the threat of terrorism would come largely—although not exclusively—from abroad,
including Salafist terrorists aligned with Al Qaeda or like-minded religiously motivated
extremists. Consequently, the presidential and congressionally mandated reforms included
significant changes to how the intelligence community was organized to collect and integrate
foreign intelligence and counterintelligence in support of countering the threat of foreign or
foreign-inspired terrorism.35
Director of National Intelligence (DNI)
One of the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations was creation of a central coordinating authority
among the then-16 component organizations of the IC to mitigate administrative and operational
barriers, and promote the sharing of information and intelligence. Congress acted on this
recommendation, creating the position of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) through
passage of the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (P.L. 108-458, or IRTPA).
The law also eliminated the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) position, which had existed
since 1946. Through a "triple-hatted" arrangement, the DCI simultaneously served as community
manager of the intelligence community, Director of the CIA, and chief intelligence advisor to the
President. With the passage of IRTPA, the DNI assumed responsibility as manager of the
intelligence community and principal intelligence advisor to the President, leaving leadership of
the CIA to the Director of the CIA. The IRTPA also established an Office of the DNI (ODNI) to
support the execution of the DNI’s responsibilities.
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)
To address the threat of international terrorism, then-President George W. Bush established the
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) with Executive Order 13354 in 2004, at the
recommendation of the 9/11 Commission.36 Congress codified NCTC in the IRTPA as part of the
ODNI “[t]o serve as the primary organization in the United States Government for analyzing and
integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired by the United States Government pertaining to
terrorism and counterterrorism, excepting intelligence pertaining exclusively to domestic
terrorists and domestic counterterrorism.”37 Although the 9/11 Commission recommended that
NCTC address foreign and domestic terrorist threats, its statutory authority is limited to terror
threats originating abroad; the law specifically excludes domestic-based terrorism from the

35 50 U.S.C. §3003(2) defines foreign intelligence as “information relating to the capabilities, intentions, or activities of
foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities.”
50 U.S.C. §3003(3) defines counterintelligence as “information gathered, and activities conducted, to protect against
espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or
elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities.”
36 E.O. 13354, National Counterterrorism Center, August 27, 2004, at https://www.dni.gov/files/NCTC/documents/
RelatedContent_documents/eo13354.pdf
37 50 U.S.C. §3056(d)(1).
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NCTC purview. NCTC, however, can receive and retain intelligence related to domestic terrorism
threats “from any Federal, State, or local government or other source necessary to fulfill its
responsibilities,” and disseminate this or other relevant domestic terrorism information to any
agency with a counterterrorism mission that requests it from NCTC “to assist it in its
responsibilities.”38
Because its statutory authority was limited to international terrorism, the establishment of NCTC
did not resolve questions over which intelligence or law enforcement organization(s) would be
responsible for conducting intelligence activities related to domestic terrorist and criminal
extremist threats. Some experts had previously raised the idea of creating a new domestic
intelligence organization independent of the FBI, approximately resembling Britain’s MI-5.
Those who advocated for a new organization argued that the FBI’s traditional focus on solving
crimes could potentially detract from employing intelligence in a more forward-looking manner
to mitigate threats before they manifested as acts of violence.39
The 9/11 Commission determined, however, that oversight of a large separate domestic
intelligence bureaucracy would be difficult and could potentially increase the risk of abuses.40
Further, the commission concluded that since the FBI had the most experience with sensitive
domestic intelligence activities, its role should mirror the CIA’s abroad: “interviewing
informants, conducting surveillance and searches, tracking individuals, working collaboratively
with local authorities ... operating under the U.S. Constitution and quite different laws and
rules.”41 Rather than creating a separate domestic intelligence organization, the 9/11 Commission
recommended promoting a culture of information sharing that would help to break down the
cultural barriers between intelligence and law enforcement agencies: “The removal of ‘the wall’
that existed before 9/11 between intelligence and law enforcement, has opened up new
opportunities for cooperative action within the FBI.”42
Information Sharing Environment
Acting on the 9/11 Commission’s recommendation, Congress included in the IRTPA
authorization to establish the Information Sharing Environment (ISE), an “approach that
facilitates the sharing of terrorism information” across appropriate federal, state, local, and tribal
entities, and the private sector, to share terrorism information “in a manner consistent with
national security and with applicable legal standards relating to privacy and civil liberties.”43
An ISE program manager and an Information Sharing Council were both established within the
ODNI. They were responsible for implementing the ISE concept and managing the sharing of
information across the federal government without compromising security.44

38 50 U.S.C. §3056(e)(1)-(2).
39 Peter Chalk and William Rosenau, Confronting the Enemy Within: Security Intelligence, the Police, and
Counterterrorism in Four Democracies (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2002), p. XI. See also Robert A. Fein and
Bryan Vossekuil, Protective Intelligence and Threat Assessment Investigations: A Guide for State and Local Law
Enforcement Officials, National Institute of Justice, January 2000, p. 7 at https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/179981.pdf.
40 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 423-424.
41 Ibid., p. 423.
42 Ibid., p. 424.
43 P.L. 108-458, §1016(a)(2)-(b)(1)(A).
44 P.L. 108-458, §1016(f)-(g).
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Consistent with the statutory definition of domestic terrorism, law enforcement agencies—chiefly
the FBI—continue to lead on the collection and analysis of intelligence related to domestic
terrorism and violent extremism, as well as the enforcement of federal criminal laws, including
hate crime statutes, and the prosecution of individuals violating such laws.45
Evolving Domestic Terrorist and Violent Extremist
Threat Environment
After the post-9/11 reforms, the intelligence community continued to be careful about how it
describes its responsibilities vis-a-vis domestic terrorism and violent extremism, according to a
former ODNI official.46 In 2005 and 2009, for example, ODNI excluded the term “domestic
intelligence” from the National Intelligence Strategy.47 Iterations of the National Intelligence
Strategy over the years similarly make little reference to domestic terrorism as a priority. The
2014 and 2019 National Intelligence Strategies do not refer to domestic intelligence.48
In 2016, then-DNI James Clapper directed his office to prepare a report that described how
intelligence collection and sharing was conducted in a manner that also protected the privacy and
civil liberties of American citizens. This report stated that

45 At the federal level, prosecutors can use a variety of statutes to prosecute hate crimes, including 18 U.S.C. §249
(offenses involving actual or perceived race, color, religion, or national origin), 18 U.S.C. §241 (conspiracy against
rights), 18 U.S.C. §242 (deprivation of rights under color of law), 18 U.S.C. §245 (violent interference with rights), 18
U.S.C. §247 (destruction of religious real property/interference with free exercise of religion), 18 U.S.C. §249 (hate
crime acts), and 42 U.S.C. §3631 (violent interference with federal housing rights). Hate crimes can also be prosecuted
at the state level.
18 U.S.C. §2331(5)(A)-(C) defines domestic terrorism as “activities that involve acts dangerous to human life that are a
violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State” and “appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a
civilian population; to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or to affect the conduct of a
government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping”; and “occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction
of the United States” (some internal numbering omitted).
46 Patrick Neary, former Principal Deputy Director and Chief Strategist at ODNI, recounted that while working on the
first two iterations of the NIS, “Domestic intelligence was the phrase we dare not speak aloud.... We had to find ways
to craft it to get to that point without saying it.” See “Domestic Intelligence Gathering,” C-SPAN, October 6, 2010, at
https://www.c-span.org/video/?295849-3/domestic-intelligence-gathering&event=295849&playEvent.
47 The 2005 NIS included an objective for the intelligence community to “build an integrated intelligence capability to
address threats to the homeland, consistent with U.S. laws and the protection of privacy and civil liberties.” See The
National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America: Transformation through Integration and Innovation,
October 2005, p. 5, at https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/reports-publications/reports-publications-2005. The
2009 NIS was similar: “The IC,” it stated, “will deliver actionable intelligence to support diplomats, military units,
interagency organizations in the field and domestic law enforcement organizations at all levels.” See The National
Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America, August 2009, p. 5, at https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/
reports-publications/reports-publications-2009?start=15.
48 The 2014 NIS states, “Violent extremist groups and transnational criminal networks threaten U.S. security and
challenge the U.S. both in the homeland and abroad.... The IC will increasingly serve homeland security as well as
military and foreign policy objectives.” See National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America, 2014, p. 4,
at https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/reports-publications/reports-publications-2014/item/1114-dni-unveils-
2014-national-intelligence-strategy. The most recent NIS, published in 2019, indirectly references the role of
intelligence in a domestic environment: “The IC supports broader U.S. Government efforts to counter the spread of
violent extremist ideology that drives terrorist actions and to leverage domestic and foreign partnerships and
capabilities to strengthen our own capacity and resilience.” See National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of
America, 2019, p. 12, at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/National_Intelligence_Strategy_2019.pdf.
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inconsistent practices, absence of doctrine, and a lack of unity of effort across levels of
government still characterize the domestic landscape. This domestic enterprise is more ad
hoc and independent than organized and enterprise-oriented, and often depends more on
personal or preexisting relationships than defined engagement protocols.49
The following year, in 2017, the Intelligence Community Inspector General, along with the
Inspectors General of the DOJ and the DHS, published A Review of Domestic Sharing of
Counterterrorism Information, which concluded that while the DHS, DOJ, and intelligence
community were committed to sharing information, implementation of the 2012 National
Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding was “uneven.”50 They also recognized a need
to “update intelligence information sharing standards and processes among the departments.”51
The DOJ and DHS inspectors general also emphasized the importance of each of the information
sharing enterprise partners’ ability to understand each other’s roles and responsibilities.52
Over the last approximately seven years, the threat to U.S. national security has increasingly
shifted from international terrorism, represented by the 9/11 attacks, to domestic terrorism and
violent extremism. FBI Director Christopher Wray, testifying before the House Appropriations
Committee in April 2019, described domestic violent extremism as a “persistent ... pervasive”
threat.53 That month, the FBI elevated domestic violent extremism to its highest threat priority, on
par with the threat posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (hereafter Islamic State)
terrorism and Homegrown Violent Extremism (HVE).54 Two years later, in March 2021, Director
Wray testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee that the January 6, 2021, attack on the U.S.
Capitol was an act of domestic terrorism.55 Subsequent to the attack on the Capitol, at the request
of President Biden, the ODNI published an assessment that described the threat of domestic
terrorism as “elevated,” pointing to domestic violent extremists motivated by “biases against
minority populations, ... government overreach, ... [and] narratives of fraud in the [2020] general

49 Office of the Director or National Intelligence, Domestic Approach to National Intelligence, December 2016, p. 9, at
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/DomesticApproachtoNationalIntelligence.PDF.
50 Inspectors General of the: Intelligence Community, Department Of Homeland Security, Department Of Justice,
Review of Domestic Sharing of Counterterrorism Information, Offices of the Inspectors General of the Intelligence
Community, Department of Homeland Security, and Department of Justice, March 2017, p. i, at https://www.dni.gov/
files/documents/Newsroom/Domestic_Sharing_Counterterrorism_Information_Report.pdf.
51 Ibid. For the 2012 National Strategy of Information Sharing and Safeguarding by the Department of Homeland
Security, see https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/15_1026_NSI_National-Strategy-Information-
Sharing-Safeguarding.pdf.
52 Ibid.
53 Testimony of FBI Director Christopher Wray in U.S. Congress, Committee on Appropriations, United States House
of Representatives, FBI Fiscal Year 2020 Budget Request, April 4, 2019, C-SPAN https://www.c-span.org/video/?
459339-1/fbi-director-wray-tells-lawmakers-read-mueller-report.
54 Testimony of FBI Director Christopher Wray before the Committee of the Judiciary, United States Senate, “FBI
Director Christopher Wray Testified on January 6 Capitol Attack,” March 2, 2021, at C-SPAN, 24:18, https://www.c-
span.org/video/?509033-1/fbi-director-christopher-wray-testifies-january-6-capitol-attack. See also Statement of
Christopher Wray, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States
Senate, March 2, 2021, p. 2: “Overall, the FBI assesses that the January 6th siege of the Capitol Complex demonstrates
a willingness by some to use violence against the government in furtherance of their political and social goals,” at
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/SJC%20Oversight%20Hearing%20-
%20FBI%20Director%20Wray%20SFR%20-%203.2.2021.pdf..
55 FBI Director Wray testified about January 6, 2021, “That attack, that siege, was criminal behavior, plain and simple,
and it’s behavior that we, the FBI, view as domestic terrorism.” See testimony of FBI Director Christopher Wray
before the Committee of the Judiciary, United States Senate, “FBI Director Christopher Wray Testified on January 6
Capitol Attack,” March 2, 2021, at C-SPAN, 24:18, https://www.c-span.org/video/?509033-1/fbi-director-christopher-
wray-testifies-january-6-capitol-attack. The comment does not appear in Director Wray’s prepared statement.
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election.”56 The assessment also described the role intelligence community elements had in
supporting efforts to mitigate domestic terror threats:
The FBI and DHS lead the IC’s [intelligence community’s] counter DVE missions—and
are thus positioned to bring domestic collection to bear in understanding and addressing
this issue—while the NCTC supports them. Other IC elements, such as CIA and DIA,
contribute their unique accesses or expertise, including on ties that foreign elements have
to DVEs. All agencies are mindful of the duty to respect privacy, civil rights, and civil
liberties and to act within the authorities granted to them as they seek to put together as
complete an intelligence and analytic picture as is possible.57
On the basis of this assessment, President Biden published in June 2021 the National Strategy for
Countering Domestic Terrorism, which described the importance of law enforcement making
“investigatory and prosecutorial decisions,” but called for the broader federal government to
“coordinate and collaborate on programmatic aspects of countering domestic terrorism, such as
information sharing, training, prevention, and intervention efforts.”58
Most recently, on June 7, 2022, DHS released a National Terrorism Advisory System bulletin that
noted that the United States remains “in a heightened threat environment,” which in the coming
months was expected “to become more dynamic as several high-profile events could be exploited
to justify acts of violence against a range of possible targets.”59 See Appendix C for a summary
of the current international terrorist threat environment.
The bulleted list below provides violent incidents since 2015 that underscore the continuing
challenge to intelligence and law enforcement agencies of coordinating their activities to mitigate
the threat of additional attacks. No federal criminal statute exists for domestic terrorism.
Perpetrators were charged under different federal and state laws covering hate crimes, murder,
attempted murder, assault, and seditious conspiracy, among other offenses.
Selected Domestic Violent Incidents
2015-2022
 June 2015: An American citizen, later convicted of hate crimes, murdered nine members of the Emanuel
AME Church in Charleston, SC.60
 December 2015: In an attack the FBI classified as an act of terrorism, two Americans, who claimed to be
acting on behalf of ISIS, according to then-FBI Director James Comey Jr., kil ed 14 people in the Inland
Regional Center in San Bernardino, CA.61

56 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Domestic Violent Extremism Poses Heightened Threat in 2021,”
March 1, 2021, p. 2, at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/UnclassSummaryofDVEAssessment-
17MAR21.pdf.
57 Ibid., p. 3.
58 National Security Council, “National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism,” June 2021, at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/National-Strategy-for-Countering-Domestic-Terrorism.pdf.
59 Department of Homeland Security, “National Terrorism Advisory System Bulletin: Summary of Terrorism Threat to
the United States,” June 7, 2022, at https://www.dhs.gov/ntas/advisory/national-terrorism-advisory-system-bulletin-
june-7-2022.
60 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Homeland Security, “FBI-Designated Significant Domestic
Terrorism Incidents in the United States from 2015 through 2019,” p. 30; Strategic Intelligence Assessment and Data
on Domestic Terrorism, May 2021, at https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/fbi-dhs-domestic-terrorism-strategic-
report.pdf/view.
61 Testimony of FBI Director James Comey, Jr., in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, December 9,
2015, at https://www.c-span.org/video/?401606-1/fbi-director-james-comey-oversight-hearing-testimony.
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 June 2016: An individual who reportedly had pledged allegiance to the Islamic State kil ed 49 patrons of the
Pulse nightclub in Orlando, FL.62
 September 2016: An American citizen who the Islamic State claimed was “a soldier of the Islamic State”
stabbed 10 people in a St. Cloud, MN, shopping mall.63
 June 2017: During a practice session in Alexandria, VA, for a congressional baseball game for charity, an
individual wounded five people, two critically, including Representative Steve Scalise of Louisiana. The FBI
subsequently described the perpetrator as an individual with “a personalized violent ideology,” and classified
the incident as an act of domestic terror.64
 August 2017: An individual drove his vehicle into a crowd protesting the Unite the Right rally in
Charlottesvil e, VA, kil ing one person.65
 October 2018: An individual, who was subsequently charged with federal hate crimes, kil ed 11 members of
the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh, PA.66
 August 2019: An individual the FBI described as a racially-motivated violent extremist kil ed 22 people at a
Walmart in El Paso, TX.67
 May 2020: An individual “aligned .. with an anti-government ideology,” kil ed a DHS Federal Protective
Service officer during a George Floyd/Black Lives Matter (BLM) protest in Oakland, CA. The same attacker
kil ed a second law enforcement officer in Santa Cruz days later.68
 January 2021: Thousands of Americans attacked the U.S. Capitol in Washington, DC, on January 6, 2021,
including fol owers of over a dozen extremist groups such as the Proud Boys and the Oath Keepers.69 Many

62 “Director Provides Update on Orlando Shootings Investigation,” FBI News, June 13, 2016, at
https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/director-provides-update-on-orlando-shootings-investigation.
63 Stephen Montemayor, “One year later, motive of St. Cloud mall attacker remains unclear,” Star Tribune, September
17, 2017, at https://www.startribune.com/one-year-later-motive-of-st-cloud-mall-attacker-remains-unclear/444894453/.
64 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Homeland Security, “FBI-Designated Significant Domestic
Terrorism Incidents in the United States from 2015 through 2019,” p. 35; Strategic Intelligence Assessment and Data
on Domestic Terrorism, May 2021, at https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/fbi-dhs-domestic-terrorism-strategic-
report.pdf/view.
65 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Homeland Security, “FBI-Designated Significant Domestic
Terrorism Incidents in the United States from 2015 through 2019,” p. 36; Strategic Intelligence Assessment and Data
on Domestic Terrorism, May 2021, at https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/fbi-dhs-domestic-terrorism-strategic-
report.pdf/view.
66 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Homeland Security, “FBI-Designated Significant Domestic
Terrorism Incidents in the United States from 2015 through 2019,” p. 38, Strategic Intelligence Assessment and Data
on Domestic Terrorism, May 2021, at https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/fbi-dhs-domestic-terrorism-strategic-
report.pdf/view.
67 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Homeland Security, “FBI-Designated Significant Domestic
Terrorism Incidents in the United States from 2015 through 2019,” p. 40, Strategic Intelligence Assessment and Data
on Domestic Terrorism, May 2021, at https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/fbi-dhs-domestic-terrorism-strategic-
report.pdf/view.
68 “Steven Carrillo Sentenced to 41 Years in Prison for Murder and Attempted Murder for Role in Drive-By Shooting
at Federal Courthouse in Oakland,” United States Department of Justice U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern District of
California News, June 3, 2022, at https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndca/pr/steven-carrillo-sentenced-41-years-prison-
murder-and-attempted-murder-role-drive. DHS has also documented dozens of incidents in 2020 by “violent
anarchists” in the city of Portland, OR, such as vandalism, assault, and trespassing. These incidents have as of yet not
been prosecuted under domestic terrorism or hate crime statutes but have energized the debate over what sort of activity
constitutes an act of domestic terrorism. See “Acting Secretary Wolf Condemns the Rampant Long-Lasting Violence in
Portland,” DHS press release, July 16, 2020, at https://www.dhs.gov/news/2020/07/16/acting-secretary-wolf-
condemns-rampant-long-lasting-violence-portland.
69 Masood Farivar, “Researchers: More Than a Dozen Extremist Groups Took Part in Capitol Riots,” VOA, January 16,
2021, at https://www.voanews.com/a/2020-usa-votes_researchers-more-dozen-extremist-groups-took-part-capitol-riots/
6200832.html.
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were also proponents of QAnon conspiracy theories, which the FBI has cited as possibly serving as a
“catalyst” for violence.70
 November 2021: A high school student kil ed four of his classmates, and wounded seven others, in Oxford,
Michigan. Along with charges that included first degree murder, he was charged with one count of terrorism
under the Michigan Anti-Terrorism Act for apparent psychological trauma to survivors of the attack.71
 January-August 2022: During the first eight months of 2022, the Department of Homeland Security
reported 49 bomb threats targeting Historically Black Col eges and Universities (HCBU), and 19 targeting
Predominantly Black Institutions.72
 May 2022: An individual at a supermarket in east Buffalo, NY, shot 13 people, kil ing 10, in what the FBI
characterized as a “targeted attack, a hate crime, and an act of racially-motivated violent extremism.”73
 June 2022: A federal grand jury indicted an individual for allegedly attempting to assassinate Supreme Court
Justice Brett Kavanaugh at his home.74
 August 2022: Fol owing the FBI execution of a search warrant in the Florida residence of former President
Donald Trump, the FBI and DHS issued a joint bul etin reporting “an increase in threats to law enforcement
and, to a lesser extent, other law enforcement officials.”75 On August 11, 2022, a gunman was fatally shot by
FBI agents during an attempt to breach the Bureau’s Cincinnati Field Office.76
Selected Legislative Responses
The intelligence community has changed its approach to counterterrorism in the context of
increasingly blurred distinctions between international and domestic threats to U.S. national
security.77 Coordination between the intelligence and law enforcement communities has become
more complex, and it remains a work in progress. Congress has acted to enable intelligence and

70 Federal Bureau of Investigation and Department of Homeland Security Office of Intelligence and Analysis,
Adherence to QAnon Conspiracy Theory by Some Domestic Violent Extremists, June 4, 2021, at
https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/20889411/adherence-to-qanon-conspiracy-theory-by-some-domestic-violent-
extremists4.pdf.
71 Michigan Compiled Law (MCL) defines an act of terrorism as, “a willful and deliberate act that is all of the
following: (i) An act that would be a violent felony under the laws of this state, whether or not committed in this state.
(ii) An act that the person knows or has reason to know is dangerous to human life. (iii) An act that is intended to
intimidate or coerce a civilian population or influence or affect the conduct of government or a unit of government
through intimidation or coercion.” MCL 750.543b(a)(i)-(iii) (emphasis added).
72 “Addressing Bomb Threats at Historically Black Colleges and Universities,” Department of Homeland Security,
August 30, 2022, at https://www.dhs.gov/news/2022/08/30/addressing-bomb-threats-historically-black-colleges-and-
universities.
73 “Statement on the FBI Response to the Shooting in Buffalo, New York,” FBI National Press Office, May 16, 2022,
at https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/press-releases/statement-on-the-fbi-response-to-the-shooting-in-buffalo-
new-york.
74 “California Man Facing Federal Indictment in Maryland for the Attempted Murder of a Supreme Court Justice,”
Department of Justice, United States Attorney’s Office, District of Maryland, June 15, 2022, at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-md/pr/california-man-facing-federal-indictment-maryland-attempted-murder-supreme-
court-justice.
75 David Shepardson, “FBI, DHS Warn U.S. Enforcement of Threats after Trump Search,” Reuters, August 14, 2022, at
https://www.reuters.com/world/us/fbi-dhs-warn-us-law-enforcement-threats-after-trump-search-2022-08-14/.
76 “FBI Cincinnati Statement,” FBI Cincinnati, August 12, 2022, at https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-
offices/cincinnati/news/press-releases/fbi-cincinnati-statement-081122.
77 See, for example, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Domestic Approach to National Intelligence,
December 2016, at https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/DomesticApproachtoNationalIntelligence.PDF.
See also the comment by John Gannon on the blurred distinction between foreign and domestic intelligence, Domestic
Intelligence Gathering, C-SPAN, October 6, 2010, at https://www.c-span.org/video/?295849-3/domestic-intelligence-
gathering.
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law enforcement agencies to improve their evaluation and coordination of intelligence on
terrorism and violent extremism.
Following the January 6, 2021, attack on the U.S. Capitol, an investigation by the Senate
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Senate Committee on Rules
and Administration recommended that the intelligence community review the criteria for issuing
and communicating intelligence assessments to law enforcement and other consumers of
intelligence.78 The investigation further recommended improvements in how intelligence is
shared among law enforcement organizations such as the U.S. Capitol Police.79 In March 2021,
the Senate Judiciary Committee considered the Senate the Domestic Terrorism Prevention Act of
2021 (S. 964,117 Congress), which would establish offices in DHS, DOJ, and FBI dedicated to
analyzing and monitoring domestic terrorism activity. The bill would also create an interagency
task force to analyze and combat white supremacist and neo-Nazi infiltration of the Armed Forces
and federal law enforcement agencies, and it would require a review of federal law enforcement
training programs to ensure that they are equipped to understand, detect, and deter acts of
domestic terrorism. On May 18, 2022, the House of Representatives passed the Domestic
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2022 (H.R. 350, 117th Congress), which includes similar provisions
to those in S. 964. The legislation closely followed the May 14, 2022, attack at a supermarket in
Buffalo, NY by an avowed white supremacist, who killed 10 people and wounded three. All 10 of
those fatally shot were African American.
Some observers have urged Congress to protect civil liberties while pushing for enhanced
coordination between the intelligence community and law enforcement.80 Several Members of
Congress have also sought assurances that intelligence coordination on domestic terrorism and
violent extremism be done in a manner that respects civil liberties. Congress, for example,
enacted a provision in the Intelligence Authorization Act for 2022 (Division X of P.L. 117-103)
that amended the National Security Act of 1947 (P.L. 80-253; 50 U.S.C. §3021 et seq.) to
explicitly prohibit the intelligence community from collecting information on U.S. persons
engaged in constitutionally protected activities.
Issues for Congress
As Congress confronts an evolving terrorist threat in the homeland and evaluates the
government’s ability to gather and coordinate intelligence to combat this threat, it may consider a
number issues. It may choose to evaluate First Amendment issues and whether any intelligence
gathering, such as monitoring of social media, violates First Amendment-protected free speech. It
may also evaluate how effective intelligence information-sharing standards and processes are in
addressing the current threat of domestic terrorism and violent extremism.

78 Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and Committee on Rules and Administration,
“Examining the U.S. Capitol Attack: A Review of the Security, Planning, and Response Failures on January 6,” United
States Senate Staff Report, June 2021, p. 11, at https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/HSGAC&
RulesFullReport_ExaminingU.S.CapitolAttack.pdf.
79 Ibid., p. 5.
80 See for example, Shane Harris, “DHS Compiles ‘Intelligence Reports’ on Journalists who Published Leaked
Documents,” Washington Post, July 30, 2020, at https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/dhs-compiled-
intelligence-reports-on-journalists-who-published-leaked-documents/2020/07/30/5be5ec9e-d25b-11ea-9038-
af089b63ac21_story.html. See also Zolan Kanno-Youngs, Sergio Olmos, Mike Baker, and Adam Goldman, “From the
Start Federal Agents Demanded a Role in Suppressing Anti-Racism Protests,” New York Times, July 28, 2020, at
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/28/us/federal-agents-portland-seattle-protests.html.
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Combating the Domestic Terrorist Threat While Protecting
Constitutionally Protected Speech
A perennial issue for federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies is distinguishing between
constitutionally protected speech and threat-related activity subject to enforcement action.81
Federal investigations may be conducted for an authorized national security, criminal, or foreign
intelligence collection purpose and in pursuit of a clearly defined objective. Investigative activity
may not monitor activities that are solely the exercise of First Amendment rights.82 This issue is
especially relevant for domestic anti-terrorism policy. Both DHS and the FBI had warned of
potential violence at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, but law enforcement reportedly did not
act on that intelligence, partly because they decided that some of the cases in question were
protected by First Amendment rights.83 In a subsequent congressional hearing, and in light of the
heightened domestic terrorism threat, then-DHS Acting Undersecretary for Intelligence and
Analysis (I&A) John Cohen stated that DHS is “redoubling efforts to augment intelligence
analysis and information sharing capabilities, while also reviewing how to better access and use
publicly available information to inform our analysis.”84 Further, he indicated that DHS would
establish a dedicated domestic terrorism branch within I&A to combat the domestic terrorism
threat. Congress may balance its support for DHS and the FBI in their newly concentrated efforts
to combat domestic terrorism with First Amendment limitations.85

Social Media and Intelligence Gathering
In 2021, DHS began to gather and analyze intelligence about security threats, including domestic terrorism threats,
from public social media posts.86 The FBI has given conflicting responses to questions on whether it relies on
social media for this purpose and has repeated concerns over First Amendment protections.87 According to the
FBI Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide, the FBI is permitted to proactively search publicly available

81 See Christopher Wray, Threats to the Homeland: Evaluating the Landscape 20 Years After 9/11, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Statement Before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, September 21,
2021.
82 See Department of Justice, The Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations, 2008.
83 Devlin Barrett, “Homeland Security official: Jan. 6 changed how we handle online intelligence,” The Washington
Post, November 3, 2021, at https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/homeland-security-official-jan-6-
changed-how-we-handle-online-intelligence/2021/11/03/108484f0-3cb7-11ec-bfad-8283439871ec_story.html.
84 U.S. Congress, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism,
Counterintelligence, and Counterproliferation, Countering Domestic Terrorism, Testimony of John Cohen, Senior
Official Performing the Duties of the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, 117th Cong., 1st sess., November 3, 2021.
85 For example, lawmakers have previously expressed interest in designating organizations as domestic terrorist
organizations, but doing so may infringe on First Amendment protections. See discussion in CRS In Focus IF10839,
Are Antifa Members Domestic Terrorists? Background on Antifa and Federal Classification of Their Actions, by Lisa
N. Sacco.
86 Ken Dilanian, “DHS Launches Warning System to Find Domestic Terrorism Threats on Public Social Media,” NBC
News, May 10, 2021, at https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/dhs-launches-warning-system-find-
domestic-terrorism-threats-public-social-n1266707.
87 Quinta Jurecic, “Why Didn’t the FBI Review Social Media Posts Announcing Plans for the Capitol Riot?,” Lawfare,
June 29, 2021, at https://www.lawfareblog.com/why-didnt-fbi-review-social-media-posts-announcing-plans-capitol-
riot.
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information.88 Director Wray, however, stated that the FBI is allowed to monitor social media “[w]ith proper
predication and an authorized purpose.. ” but clarified that the FBI is not allowed “just sit and monitor social
media, and look at one person's posts, just looking to see if maybe something would happen just in case.”89
In its National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism, the Biden Administration stated that
DOJ is examining whether new legislative authorities that balance safety and the protection of
civil rights and liberties are “necessary and appropriate.”90 It is unclear what those new legislative
authorities might be.
Congress might consider the effectiveness of safeguards for protecting civil liberties that exist
within the processes for coordinating and sharing intelligence between intelligence and law
enforcement agencies.91 For example, it could request the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) to examine whether the intelligence and law enforcement workforces are sufficiently
trained on the protection of civil liberties in an environment that promotes intelligence sharing.
Coordination between Intelligence and Law Enforcement Agencies
This report has cited the 2016 ODNI report, Domestic Approach to National Intelligence, which
determined that insofar as the domestic environment was concerned, the intelligence community
engaged in “inconsistent practices, absence of doctrine, and a lack of unity of effort.”92 Similarly,
the Intelligence Community Inspector General, in 2017, found that information sharing standards
required updating, and information sharing itself was “uneven.”93 Congress’ investigation into the
indications and warning of the January 6, 2021 attack on the Capitol also indicated a need to
improve information sharing standards.94 These findings raise questions about how effective
intelligence information-sharing standards and processes are in addressing the current threat of
domestic terrorism and violent extremism.
As this report previously mentioned, in 2021 and 2022, respectively, the Senate and House
introduced legislation intended to improve the ways government agencies monitor, analyze, and
coordinate information on domestic violent extremist threats. Congress could continue to explore
options for enhancing interagency coordination on domestic violent extremism, which could
include training and exercises, balanced by emphasizing the responsibility of intelligence and law
enforcement entities to respect civil liberties.

88 Federal Bureau of Investigation, FBI Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide, p. 77.
89 U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Judiciary, House Judiciary Committee Holds Hearing on FBI Oversight,
Response of FBI Director Wray to question asked by Congressman Swalwell., 117th Cong., 1st sess., June 10, 2021.
90 The White House, National Security Council, National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism, June 2021, pp.
25-26, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/National-Strategy-for-Countering-Domestic-
Terrorism.pdf.
91 Examples of safeguards include the NCTC’s Civil Liberties and Privacy Intelligence Community Enterprise Strategy
2019-2024 and the role of the Civil Liberties Protection Officer for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
92 Office of the Director or National Intelligence, Domestic Approach to National Intelligence, December 2016, p. 9, at
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/DomesticApproachtoNationalIntelligence.PDF.
93 Inspectors General of the Intelligence Community, Department Of Homeland Security, Department Of Justice,
Review of Domestic Sharing of Counterterrorism Information, Offices of the Inspectors General of the Intelligence
Community, Department of Homeland Security, and Department of Justice, March 2017, p. i, at https://www.dni.gov/
files/documents/Newsroom/Domestic_Sharing_Counterterrorism_Information_Report.pdf.
94 Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and Committee on Rules and Administration,
“Examining the U.S. Capitol Attack: A Review of the Security, Planning, and Response Failures on January 6,” United
States Senate Staff Report, June 2021, pp. 5, 39-49 at https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/HSGAC&
RulesFullReport_ExaminingU.S.CapitolAttack.pdf.
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Appendix A. Intelligence, Domestic Terrorism, and
Related Terms
The intelligence community and law enforcement agencies frequently use the terms
“intelligence,” “domestic terrorism,” “homegrown violent extremism (HVE),” and “domestic
violent extremism (DVE)” in testimony and documents addressing the domestic threat
environment. This appendix provides definitions and context for these terms.
Intelligence
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence has defined intelligence as
information gathered within or outside the U.S. that involves threats to our nation, its
people, property, or interests; development, proliferation, or use of weapons of mass
destruction; and any other matter bearing on the U.S. national or homeland
security. Intelligence can provide insights not available elsewhere that warn of potential
threats and opportunities, assess probable outcomes of proposed policy options, provide
leadership profiles on foreign officials, and inform official travelers of counterintelligence
and security threats.95
In statute, the term “intelligence” includes foreign intelligence and counterintelligence. Foreign
intelligence is defined as “information relating to the capabilities, intentions, or activities of
foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or
international terrorist activities.” Counterintelligence is defined as “information gathered, and
activities conducted, to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or
assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign
organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities.”96
Intelligence or Information Supporting Homeland Security
No statutory definition exists for domestic intelligence. However, Title 6 of the U.S. Code, which
provides the statutory authority and organization for domestic security, broadly defines
intelligence components supporting homeland security as authorized to engage in the collection,
processing, analysis, production, and dissemination of intelligence information “within the scope
of the information sharing environment, including homeland security information, terrorism
information, and weapons of mass destruction information, or national intelligence.”97
In statute, the term “homeland security information” refers to
any information possessed by a Federal, State, or local agency that: relates to the threat of
terrorist activity; relates to the ability to prevent, interdict, or disrupt terrorist activity;
would improve the identification or investigation of a suspected terrorist or terrorist
organization; or, would improve the response to a terrorist act.98

95 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “What is Intelligence?” at https://www.dni.gov/index.php/what-we-
do/what-is-intelligence#:~:text=
Intelligence%20is%20information%20gathered%20within,U.S.%20national%20or%20homeland%20security.
96 50 U.S.C. §3003(2)-(3).
97 6 U.S.C. §101(11).
98 6 U.S.C. §482(f)(1)(A)-(D). (some internal numbering omitted)
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A 2009 RAND study offered the following definition of domestic intelligence: “Efforts by
government organizations to gather, assess, and act on information about individuals or
organizations in the United States or U.S. persons elsewhere that are not related to the
investigation of a known past criminal act or specific planned criminal activity.”99
Domestic Terrorism
The statutory definition of domestic terrorism is as follows:
Activities that involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws
of the United States or of any state [and] appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a
civilian population; to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping;
and occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.100
The FBI defines domestic terrorism as “violent, criminal acts committed by individuals and/or
groups to further ideological goals stemming from domestic influences, such as those of a
political religious, social, racial, or environmental nature.”101
Homegrown Violent Extremism and Domestic Violent Extremism
The FBI defines Homegrown Violent Extremists (HVE) as individuals who “have been
radicalized primarily in the United States, and who are inspired by, but not receiving
individualized direction from, foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs).”102
Domestic Violent Extremists (DVE), on the other hand, generally do not have a foreign nexus.
The FBI defines DVEs as “individuals who commit violent criminal acts in furtherance of
ideological goals stemming from domestic influences, such as racial bias and anti-government
sentiment.”103 FBI Director Christopher Wray, testifying before the House Appropriations
Committee in April 2019, described white supremacists and similar domestic violent extremists
as “less structured, less organized ... more uncoordinated, one-off individuals as opposed to some
structured hierarchy”:104
The top threat we face from domestic violent extremists stems from those we identify as
racially/ethnically motivated violent extremists [who] were the primary source of

99 Brian A. Jackson, ed., “The Challenge of Domestic Intelligence in a Free Society: A Multidisciplinary Look at the
Creation of a U.S. Domestic Counterterrorism Intelligence Agency” (Santa Monica: RAND, 2009), pp. 3-4, at
https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG804.html.
100 18 U.S.C. §2331(5)(A)-(C). Within DHS, the term “terrorism” is based on a definition in 6 U.S.C. §101(18)(A)-(B):
“An act that: is dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of critical infrastructure or key resources; and, Is a
violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State or other subdivision of the United States; and, appears
to be intended: to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or
coercion; or to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping” (some internal
numbering omitted).
101 See “What We Investigate: Terrorism,” at https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/terrorism. The Bureau defines
international terrorism as “violent, criminal acts committed by individuals and/or groups who are inspired by, or
associated with, designated foreign terrorist organizations or nations.”
102 Christopher Wray, Worldwide Threats to the Homeland, Statement before the Senate Homeland Security and
Government Affairs Committee, September 24, 2020, at https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/worldwide-threats-to-the-
homeland-092420.
103 Ibid.
104 See Christopher Wray before the House Appropriations Committee, April 4, 2019, at https://www.c-
span.org/video/?459339-1/fbi-director-wray-tells-lawmakers-read-mueller-report.
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ideologically motivated lethal incidents and violence in 2018 and 2019 and have been
considered the most lethal of all domestic extremists since 2001.105
In its March 2021 assessment, the intelligence community definition of a DVE as
an individual based and operating primarily in the United States without direction or
inspiration from a foreign terrorist group or other foreign power and who seeks to further
political or social goals wholly or in part through unlawful acts of force or violence.106
The term does not include individuals engaged solely in activities protected by the First
Amendment and other constitutional protections.107

105 Christopher Wray, Worldwide Threats to the Homeland, Statement before the Senate Homeland Security and
Government Affairs Committee, September 24, 2020, at https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/worldwide-threats-to-the-
homeland-092420.
106 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Domestic Violent Extremism Poses Heightened Threat in 2021,
March 2021, at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/UnclassSummaryofDVEAssessment-
17MAR21.pdf.
107 Ibid.
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Appendix B. Intelligence Community and Law
Enforcement Domestic Threat Organization
Counterterrorism organizations created in the wake of the 9/11 attacks were initially conceived to
address the threat of international rather than domestic terrorism. They were also intended to
address some of the concerns highlighted in the findings of the Joint Inquiry and 9/11
Commission that also apply to the threat of domestic terrorism: greater collaboration between law
enforcement (LE) entities and intelligence community elements, and the timely sharing of
relevant information across the departments and agencies of the federal government and with
state, local, tribal, territorial (SLTT) LE entities. Following are the missions and functions of the
NCTC’s Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team, the FBI’s National Security Branch and
Intelligence Branch, and the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS’s) Office of Intelligence
and Analysis (I&A).
NCTC’s Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team
Within NCTC, the Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team (JCAT) is responsible for
disseminating relevant counterterrorism intelligence, classified at an appropriate level and in a
useable format, to SLTT entities with responsibility for counterterrorism in their respective
jurisdictions. JCAT is staffed by SLTT first responders, serving on rotational assignments from
their home agencies, alongside analysts from the FBI, DHS, and NCTC.108
FBI National Security Branch
In 2005, the FBI created the National Security Branch (NSB) in accordance with then-President
George W. Bush’s directive to establish a national security service to “ensure that the FBI’s
intelligence elements are responsive to the Director of National Intelligence.”109 The NSB was
established to fully integrate the FBI’s intelligence elements into the intelligence community, and
it includes the Counterintelligence and Counterterrorism divisions, as well as the Terrorist
Screening Center.110
In its intelligence role, the NSB produces and circulates intelligence products to federal, state,
local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement partners and disseminates trends in threat reporting
and criminal activity involving domestic violent extremism. For example, in August 2020, the
NSB released an intelligence report informing partners that “domestic violent extremists with
partisan political grievances likely posed an increased threat related to the 2020 election.”111

108 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “About Us: Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team,” at
https://www.dni.gov/index.php/nctc-how-we-work/joint-ct-assessment-team.
109 The White House, President George W. Bush, President Bush Administration Actions to Implement WMD
Commission Recommendations, at https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/06/20050629-
5.html June 29, 2005.
110 In addition to the components listed above, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate is also part of the NSB.
Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Security Branch, at https://www.fbi.gov/about/leadership-and-structure/
national-security-branch.
111 Jill Sanborn, Examining the January 6 Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Statement
Before the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee and Rules and Administration Committee, March
3, 2021, at https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Testimony-Sanborn-2021-03-03.pdf p. 2.
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Terrorist Screening Center
The Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) is located within the NSB. The TSC is a multiagency
organization created by presidential directive in 2003112 and administered by the FBI, which is
responsible for managing the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB; also known as the Terrorist
Watchlist). Through the TSDB, the TSC disseminates identity information for individuals
suspected or known to have engaged in terrorism (including domestic terrorism) to screening
partners such as the Department of State; DHS; federal, state, and local law enforcement; and
select international partners.113
The TSDB is designed to help prevent terrorism, but the information in it is generally only useful
when the appropriate entities access it. Dozens of watchlisted individuals were reportedly in
Washington, DC, on the day of the January 6 terrorist attack on the U.S. Capitol.114 The
watchlisting information on these individuals was of little use to law enforcement that day
because they would not have had access to it unless an individual had an encounter with law
enforcement involving a TSDB record check.
FBI Intelligence Branch
The FBI’s Intelligence Branch (IB) leads the FBI’s intelligence program and supports intelligence
operations across FBI field offices and divisions at FBI headquarters through the Directorate of
Intelligence, Office of Partner Engagement, and Office of the Private Sector.115 These divisions
manage the FBI intelligence strategy, resources, policies, and programs. The IB gathers
intelligence through a variety of techniques—including interviews, wiretaps, and data analysis—
and engages with intelligence partners in law enforcement and fusion centers.116 Further, the IB
engages with the private sector and academic institutions to increase collaboration and mitigate
threats through “mutually beneficial partnerships.”117
Within the IB, the Strategic Intelligence Issues Group (SIIG) provides FBI leaders with an
integrated perspective on threats, including domestic terrorism threats. The SIIG is composed of
senior national intelligence officers with “subject-matter expertise on geographic and functional
programs who help integrate the FBI’s understanding of priority threat issues.”118
DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis
The DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) accesses, receives, and analyzes intelligence
from federal, state, and local government agencies and private sector entities and disseminates

112 Homeland Security Presidential Directive-6, “Directive on Integration and Use of Screening Information to Protect
Against Terrorism,” September 16, 2003, at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PPP-2003-book2/pdf/PPP-2003-
book2-doc-pg1174.pdf.
113 For more information, see https://www.fbi.gov/about/leadership-and-structure/national-security-branch/tsc.
114 Devlin Barrett, Spenser S. Hsu, and Marissa J. Lang, “Dozens of People on FBI Terrorist Watch List Came to D.C.
the Day of Capitol Riot,” The Washington Post, January 14, 2021, at https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-
security/terror-watchlist-capitol-riot-fbi/2021/01/14/07412814-55f7-11eb-a931-5b162d0d033d_story.html.
115 Federal Bureau of Investigation, FY 2023 President’s Budget Request, March 2022, p. 7.
116 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Leadership & Structure: Intelligence,” https://www.fbi.gov/about/partnerships/
office-of-private-sector.
117 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Partnerships: Office of the Private Sector,” https://www.fbi.gov/about/leadership-
and-structure/intelligence-branch.
118 Federal Bureau of Investigation, FY 2023 President’s Budget Request, March 2022, pp. 21-22.
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intelligence to those partners. I&A intelligence officers, reports officers, and regional directors are
deployed nationwide to manage information sharing with state and local entities as part of I&A
field operations.119 I&A is responsible for producing intelligence reports for the intelligence
community based on counterterrorism information from state and local authorities.120 I&A
collects publicly available information in furtherance of national and departmental missions,
including its domestic terrorism missions.121
DOJ Domestic Terrorism Unit
On January 11, 2022, Assistant Attorney General Matthew Olsen announced that DOJ would
establish a new unit to focus on domestic terrorism. Citing the rise in the threat of domestic
extremism and the sharp increase in the number of FBI domestic terrorism investigations,122
Olsen stated that DOJ is creating the new unit to ensure that domestic terrorism cases are
“properly handled and effectively coordinated.”123 The extent to which this unit will be involved
in the collection, consumption, and dissemination of intelligence remains unclear.
Coordination of Intelligence in a Domestic Threat Environment
Law enforcement (federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial) and intelligence agencies across the
country coordinate to confront the persistent and rising domestic terrorist threats in the United
States. The FBI is the lead law enforcement and intelligence agency that confronts these threats,
and it uses “all available lawful investigative techniques and methods to combat these threats
while continuing to collect, analyze, and share intelligence.”124 The FBI shares intelligence with
numerous partners through its Joint Terrorist Task Forces (JTTFs) and FBI Field Intelligence
Groups (FIGs). Other means through which government entities coordinate intelligence to
confront the domestic terrorist threat include the state and locally run National Network of Fusion

119 Department of Homeland Security, “Operational and Support Components: Office of Intelligence and Analysis,”
https://www.dhs.gov/office-intelligence-and-analysis; Inspectors General of the Intelligence Community, Department
of Homeland Security, and Department of Justice, Review of Domestic Sharing of Counterterrorism Information,
Department of Justice OIG Audit Division Report 17-21, March 2017, p. 4.
120 Inspectors General of the Intelligence Community, Department of Homeland Security, and Department of. Justice,
Review of Domestic Sharing of Counterterrorism Information, Department of Justice OIG Audit Division Report 17-
21, March 2017, pp. 17-18.
121 U.S. Congress, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism,
Counterintelligence, and Counterproliferation, Countering Domestic Terrorism, Testimony of John Cohen, Senior
Official Performing the Duties of the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, 117th Cong., 1st sess., November 3, 2021, at https://oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/
files/Cohen%20Testimony.pdf.
122 Assistant Attorney General Olsen stated in his testimony that the number of FBI domestic terrorism investigations
has more than doubled over the past two years. See U.S. Department of Justice, “Assistant Attorney General Matthew
G. Olsen Delivers Opening Remarks Before U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary,” Justice News, January 11, 2022,
at https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-matthew-g-olsen-delivers-opening-remarks-us-senate-
committee.
123 See remarks by Assistant Attorney General Matthew Olsen during oral testimony at U.S. Congress, Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, The Domestic Terrorism Threat One Year After January 6, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., January
11, 2022, at https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-matthew-g-olsen-delivers-opening-remarks-
us-senate-committee.
124 Christopher Wray, Threats to the Homeland: Evaluating the Landscape 20 Years After 9/11, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Statement Before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, September 21,
2021, at https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/threats-to-the-homeland-evaluating-the-landscape-20-years-after-911-
wray-092121.
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Centers, Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN), Law Enforcement Enterprise Portal
(LEEP), and Domestic Security Alliance Council.
Joint Terrorism Task Force and Field Intelligence Group
Coordination
The interagency National Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) operates out of FBI headquarters
and is responsible for intelligence sharing to and among local JTTFs. According to the FBI,
JTTFs conduct law enforcement operations such as investigating and responding to terrorism, but
they also collect and share intelligence, and ensure the intelligence “flows freely among the local
JTTFs and beyond.”125 There are 200 JTTFs in the United States, including at least one in each of
the FBI’s 56 domestic field offices, with hundreds of participating state, local, and federal
agencies.126
The FBI’s Field Intelligence Groups (FIGs) “coordinate, manage, and execute all functions of the
intelligence cycle, including collection, analysis, production, and dissemination, for the FBI in
field offices throughout the country.”127 All FBI field offices operate a FIG, and they are primarily
staffed with FBI intelligence analysts who provide direct operational and analytical support to
JTTF officers. The FBI established mandatory coordination requirements among all FIGs and
JTTFs.128
National Network of Fusion Centers
Fusion centers are state- and locally-run organizations that receive, analyze, collect, and share
intelligence related to threats to the homeland. Fusion centers help law enforcement and
homeland security partners prevent, protect against, and respond to terrorism and other crimes.
Fusion center information-gathering initiatives have disrupted potential domestic terrorist threats.
For example, according to testimony from Assistant Director of the FBI Jill Sanborn, the Orange
County Intelligence Assessment Center (a fusion center in California) provided information to the
FBI that led the Bureau to open cases resulting in the arrests of seven members of The Base (a
group that supports white supremacy) across four states.129 Fusion centers also coordinate
intelligence on threats between state, local, tribal, territorial, federal, and private-sector partners.
The National Network of Fusion Centers, as well as the Regional Information Sharing Systems

125 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Joint Terrorism Task Forces,” at https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/terrorism/joint-
terrorism-task-forces.
126 Ibid.
127 Inspectors General of the Intelligence Community, Department of Homeland Security, and Department of Justice,
Review of Domestic Sharing of Counterterrorism Information, Department of Justice OIG Audit Division Report 17-
21, March 2017, p. 6.
128 Ibid., p. 312.
129 See transcript from U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence and
Counterterrorism, Confronting the Rise in Anti-semitic Domestic Terrorism, Part II, 116th Cong., 2nd sess., February 26,
2020. For further information on the arrests of members of The Base, see Alexander Mallin and Luke Barr, “Inside the
neo-Nazi hate group ‘The Base,’ which is the center of an FBI investigation,” ABC News, January 23, 2020. For
description of The Base and associates, see, for example, Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Office, District of
Maryland, Two Members of the Violent Extremist Group “The Base” Each Sentenced to Nine Years in Federal Prison
for Firearms and Alien-Related Charges, October 28, 2021, at https://www.justice.gov/usao-md/pr/two-members-
violent-extremist-group-base-each-sentenced-nine-years-federal-prison.
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(RISS; see discussion below), are the primary state and local counterterrorism information-
sharing organizations.130
FBI Role with Fusion Centers
In January 2007, the FBI’s Directorate of Intelligence established an Interagency Integration Unit
to provide FBI headquarters oversight of FBI field office relationships with fusion centers.131 The
FBI’s role in and support of individual fusion centers varies, and FBI efforts to support centers
include assigning FBI special agents and intelligence analysts to fusion centers, providing office
space for fusion centers, providing security clearances to fusion center personnel, conducting
security certification of facilities, and “providing direct or facilitated access to the FBI.”132 As
part of their intelligence mission, FBI personnel assigned to fusion centers provide for a two-way
flow of intelligence between the fusion center and the FBI and support the timely flow of
intelligence between the fusion center and the local JTTF and FBI FIG.133

FBI Office of Partner Engagement
The FBI’s Office of Partner Engagement (OPE; part of the FBI’s IB) manages programs for the
FBI’s work with state and local fusion centers as part of its intelligence support for the Domestic
Information-Sharing Architecture.134 OPE administers intelligence training to fusion center
personnel. Training includes
 intelligence-centric courses (designed by OPE) to educate law enforcement on a
common set of practices in producing and disseminating intelligence products
within their departments and communities;
 intelligence-leadership training for future intelligence commanders and other
intelligence personnel; and
 training on common intelligence practice and lexicon shared by federal, state,
and local law enforcement.135

130 Inspectors General of the Intelligence Community, Department of Homeland Security, and Department of Justice,
Review of Domestic Sharing of Counterterrorism Information, Department of Justice OIG Audit Division Report 17-
21, March 2017, p. 6; and Department of Homeland Security, National Network of Fusion Centers Fact Sheet,
September 30, 2021, at https://www.dhs.gov/national-network-fusion-centers-fact-sheet.
131 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Homeland Security: Federal Efforts Are Helping to Alleviate Some
Challenges Encountered by State and Local Information Fusion Centers, GAO-08-35, November 29, 2007, p. 11,
https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-08-35.
132 Ibid.
133 Ibid., p. 11.
134 Federal Bureau of Investigation, FY 2023 President’s Budget Request, March 2022, p. 23.
135 Ibid., p. 4-10.
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Further, the FBI and the National Fusion Center Association (along with other federal partners)
developed the Enhanced Engagement Initiative (EEI) to ensure that state and local fusion centers
have a complete understanding of the terrorism threat.136 In support of the EEI, the FBI provides
training and other resources on the intelligence process and writing “to ensure greater continuity
and standardization of terrorism information sharing efforts.”137
Regional Information Sharing Systems Centers
The Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS) program supports law enforcement efforts to
combat organized and violent crime, terrorism, drug trafficking, and other crimes. The program is
composed of six regional centers across the United States and the RISS Technology Support
Center.138 Among other functions, it maintains a criminal intelligence database to enable law
enforcement to conduct a “real-time, online federated search of more than 60 RISS and partner
intelligence databases, including state intelligence systems, fusion centers, and systems connected
via the National Virtual Pointer System (NVPS).”139 The intelligence user interface, known as
RISSIntel, is meant to facilitate the exchange of information and coordination among member
agencies investigating the same individuals or organizations.140
Homeland Security Information Network
The DHS Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) is used to share sensitive but
unclassified information among federal, state, local, territorial, tribal, international, and private
sector partners. Through HSIN, operators access homeland security data, send secure requests to
other agencies, coordinate event safety and security, and respond to incidents related to securing
the homeland.141 According to DHS, “HSIN-Intel is utilized by over 4,000 professionals across
the country and includes over 40,000 products on a range of Homeland Security threat issues, and
that includes domestic terrorism.”142
Law Enforcement Enterprise Portal
Administered by the FBI, the Law Enforcement Enterprise Portal (LEEP) is a single sign-on,
secure platform used by intelligence, law enforcement, and other criminal justice agencies to
access a host of information systems relevant to criminal cases, including RISS. LEEP enables
participants to set up a Virtual Command Center: a critical-incident management system used to
share information such as suspect profiles, maps and floorplans, event schedules, and threat

136 Kerry L. Sleeper, Assistant Director, Office of Partner Engagement, From Boston to Austin: Lessons Learned on
Homeland Threat Information Sharing, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Statement Before the House Homeland
Security Committee, April 18, 2018.
137 Ibid.
138 Regional Information Sharing Systems, About Us and Criminal Intelligence Database Solving Cases Through
Information Sharing, at https://www.riss.net/.
139 See Regional Information Sharing Systems, Criminal Intelligence Database Solving Cases Through Information
Sharing, at https://www.riss.net/.
140 Ibid.
141 Department of Homeland Security, “Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN),” at https://www.dhs.gov/
homeland-security-information-network-hsin.
142 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Confronting the Rise of Domestic Terrorism in the
Homeland, Statement of Brian Murphy, Principal Deputy Under Secretary for the Office of Intelligence and Analysis,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 116th Cong., 1st sess., May 8, 2019.
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monitoring for incidents such as domestic terrorist attacks and threats.143 Time-sensitive threat
information may be shared widely with law enforcement through LEEP.144
Domestic Security Alliance Council
In 2005, the FBI set up the Domestic Security Alliance Council (DSAC) at the request of
corporate chief security officers from around the country. It is a partnership between the FBI,
DHS, and private sector executives designed to advance the FBI’s mission of detecting,
preventing, and deterring criminal acts, including domestic terrorist acts, by facilitating
relationships among its private sector member companies, FBI Headquarters and field offices,
DHS Headquarters, fusion centers, and other federal government entities.145 Reportedly, the
DSAC enables a two-way exchange of intelligence, which can include information related to
counterintelligence and terrorism, and helps the FBI learn of new threats and information related
to existing threats.146

143 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Criminal Justice Information Services: Law Enforcement Enterprise Portal
(LEEP),” at https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/leep.
144 For example, prior to the Capitol breach on January 6, 2021, the Norfolk FBI field office reportedly posted threat
information warning of violence at the Capitol on LEEP. See Mark Mazzetti and Adam Goldman, “Muddled
Intelligence Hampered Response to Capitol Riot,” The New York Times, February 5, 2021, updated April 13, 2021, at
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/05/us/politics/capitol-riot-domestic-terrorism.html.
145 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Domestic Security Alliance Council,” https://www.dsac.gov/.
146 Dave Ress, “America’s enemies are targeting businesses. This FBI office focuses on corporate security and fraud,”
Daily Press, March 20, 2021.
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Appendix C. The Current Transnational Terrorism
Threat Environment as It Pertains to the Homeland
In March 2021, the Biden Administration released its Interim National Security Strategic
Guidance (INSSG).147 The INSSG states that among the risks to the security of the United States,
“violent extremism and terrorism pose profound and, in some cases, existential dangers.”148 The
INSSG further asserts that “terrorism and violent extremism, both domestic and international,
remain significant threats” and that “despite significant successes against international terrorism,
a diffuse and dispersed threat to Americans remains.”149 In focusing on threats within the
homeland, the INSSG finds that “domestic violent extremism challenges core principles of our
democracy and demands policies that protect public safety while promoting our values and
respecting our laws.”150
Current assessments suggest threats to the U.S. homeland from foreign actors remain a viable and
possibly growing likelihood. In its 2021 annual assessment of global threats, the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) reported that Iran has often voiced a desire to retaliate
against the U.S. for the January 2020 strike that killed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds
Force Commander Qasem Soleimani. The ODNI assessed Iran as desiring to “conduct lethal
operations in the United States” in response to this killing.151 This assessment also suggested that
“ISIS-inspired attacks will very likely remain the primary ISIS threat to the U.S. homeland this
year—rather than plots operationally supported or directed by ISIS.”152 The intelligence
community’s long-term assessment regarding threats from the Middle East finds that “Iran’s and
Lebanese Hizballah’s efforts to solidify a Shia ‘axis of resistance’ also might increase the threat
of asymmetric attacks on the U.S.”153
Some experts have commented that the U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan will increase
the likelihood of the country becoming a base once again for Salafi-Jihadi groups that could pose
a threat. At a September 14, 2021, meeting of intelligence community professionals, Lt. Gen.
Scott D. Berrier, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, stated, “The current assessment
probably conservatively is one to two years for Al Qaeda to build some capability to at least
threaten the homeland.”154 The Director of National Intelligence, Avril Haines, however, has
commented that Yemen, Somalia, Syria, and Iraq pose more serious terrorist threats to the United
States than the possibility of Salafi-Jihadi terrorists to threaten the United States from bases in
Afghanistan.155

147 Joseph R. Biden Jr., Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, Executive Office of The President, Washington
DC, March, 2021, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf.
148 Ibid.
149 Ibid.
150 Ibid.
151 Office of Director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, April 9,
2021, at https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2021-04-
09%20Final%20ATA%202021%20%20Unclassified%20Report%20-%20rev%202.pdf
152 Ibid.
153 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2040, A More
Contested World, March 2021, at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/GlobalTrends_2040.pdf.
154 Julian E. Barnes, “Al Qaeda Could Rebuild in Afghanistan in a Year or Two, U.S. Officials Say,” New York Times,
September 14, 2021, at https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/14/us/politics/al-qaeda-afghanistan.html.
155 Ibid.
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Author Information

Michael E. DeVine
John W. Rollins
Analyst in Intelligence and National Security
Specialist in Terrorism and National Security

Lisa N. Sacco

Analyst in Illicit Drugs and Crime Policy

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