Juvenile Life Without Parole: In Brief
June 13, 2022
Since the creation of separate courts for juveniles in the United States in 1899, the juvenile
justice system has generally operated under the broad understanding that the role of criminal
Emily J. Hanson
justice differs for juvenile offenders relative to adults. This understanding typically manifested in
Analyst in Social Policy
juvenile justice policies focused on the best interests of the child, and on rehabilitation rather than

punishment. In the 1980s, many states responded to the public perception that juvenile crime was
Joanna R. Lampe
increasing by passing more punitive laws for juvenile offenders. Some of these laws removed
Legislative Attorney
certain types of crimes from the juvenile court system altogether, instead mandating that they be

handled by the adult criminal system. This change accelerated in the 1990s, with a majority of
states passing laws expanding sentencing options for juveniles. However, in recent years, there

has been a resurgence of interest in rehabilitative programs and less punitive treatment of
juvenile offenders. Even when juvenile offenders are tried as adults there have been efforts in the United States to restrict the
use of the most punitive sentences.
In particular, there has been a movement in state legislatures, as well as rulings in the U.S. Supreme Court, to ban the death
penalty for juvenile offenders and ban or limit the use of juvenile life without parole (JLWOP) sentences. Several states have
passed legislation to ban JLWOP in some or all cases. As of May 2021, 25 states and Washington, DC, had banned JLWOP,
and in 10 states that allow JLWOP, no convicted offenders were serving such a sentence. A survey of state Departments of
Corrections conducted every four years by the Sentencing Project found that JLWOP sentences decreased by 38% between
2016 and 2020.
In the United States, the federal government manages a small juvenile justice system, and federal law authorizes the
imposition of JLWOP sentences. However, the juvenile justice system operates primarily under state and local control. The
federal government’s role in state and local juvenile justice includes (1) implementing federal grant programs supporting
state and local systems and (2) issuing federal court rulings interpreting the Constitution pertaining to juvenile justice.
The federal government administers grant programs that influence how states and localities organize and operate their
juvenile justice programs. For instance, in 1974 Congress passed the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act
(JJDPA; P.L. 93-415), which created a set of institutions within the federal government dedicated to coordinating and
administering federal juvenile justice efforts, established grant programs to assist the states with setting up and running their
juvenile justice systems, and set core requirements that states had to adhere to in order to be eligible to receive certain federal
grant funding. There are no limits on JLWOP included in the JJDPA or other federal juvenile justice legislation.
Of all federal courts, the U.S. Supreme Court in particular has issued rulings that have led to changes in juvenile justice
policy. In the 2005 case Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court held that the use of the death penalty for juveniles violates the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Roper
considered evidence of national consensus against the death penalty for juveniles, as well as differences between juveniles
and adults including juveniles’ lack of maturity and sense of responsibility, their vulnerability to negative influences and
outside pressures, and the fact that a juvenile’s character is not yet as well formed as that of an adult. The Supreme Court has
subsequently considered similar factors when ruling on challenges to JLWOP sentences in Graham v. Florida, Miller v.
Alabama, Montgomery v. Louisiana, and Jones v. Mississippi.
Policymakers, advocates, and the Supreme Court have all cited cognitive development as a key reason that juveniles are
treated differently from adults in the criminal justice system and why they should be subject to less harsh sentencing
practices. Since at least the 1990s, there has been an understanding among psychologists and neuroscientists that the
influence of brain development on the cognitive decisionmaking processes of juveniles has unique implications for their
criminal culpability.
Congress may consider actions to promote, maintain, limit, or prohibit the use of JLWOP at the federal or state levels.

Congressional Research Service

Juvenile Life Without Parole: In Brief

ince the creation of separate courts for juveniles in the United States in 1899, the juvenile
justice system has generally operated under the broad understanding that the role of
S criminal justice differs for juvenile offenders relative to adults.1 This understanding often
manifested in juvenile justice policies and practices focused on the best interests of the child, and
on rehabilitation rather than punishment. In the 1980s, many states responded to the public
perception that juvenile crime was increasing by passing more punitive laws for juvenile
offenders.2 Some of these laws removed certain types of crimes from the juvenile court system
altogether, instead mandating that they be handled by the adult criminal system. This change
accelerated in the 1990s, with a majority of states passing laws expanding sentencing options for
juveniles.3 However, in recent years there has been a resurgence of interest in rehabilitative
programs and less punitive treatment of juvenile offenders. Even when juvenile offenders are
tried as adults, there have been efforts in the United States to restrict the use of the most punitive
sentences.
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) includes a similar sentiment
with regard to the unique status of juvenile offenders. Article 37 of the UNCRC provides, in part:
“Neither capital punishment nor life imprisonment without possibility of release shall be imposed
for offences committed by persons below eighteen years of age.”4 The UNCRC went into effect
in 1990 and, to date, all UN member states have ratified the agreement except for the United
States.5 Commonly discussed reasons as to why the United States has not ratified the UNCRC
include concerns about sovereignty, parental rights, and the limits of federal power on juvenile
justice systems, which are largely under state and local control.6 Some provisions in the UNCRC
align with federal legislation related to juvenile justice systems—for example, certain federal
grant funding requires states to separate incarcerated juveniles from adults,7 while the UNCRC
requires that “every child deprived of liberty shall be separated from adults unless it is considered
in the child's best interest not to do so.”8 However, other UNCRC provisions do not align with
current federal law. Most relevant to this report, the UNCRC prohibits sentencing juveniles to life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole (i.e., juvenile life without parole [JLWOP]), while

1 National Institute of Correction, Desktop Guide to Quality Practice for Working with Youth in Confinement,
Principles and Concepts, Chapter 1: Historical Perspective, “Advent of the Juvenile Court in 1899,”
https://info.nicic.gov/dtg/node/9.
2 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Juvenile Justice: A Century of
Change, National Report Series, December 1999, p. 2, (hereinafter, “A Century of Change”).
3 A Century of Change.
4 United Nations, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Convention on the Rights of The Child,
https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx (hereinafter, “Convention on the Rights of The Child”).
5 United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV Human Rights, Convention on the Rights of the Child,
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-11&chapter=4&clang=_en (hereinafter,
“UNCRC Status”); UNICEF, “What is the UN Convention,” https://www.unicef.org.uk/what-we-do/un-convention-
child-rights/. The United States signed the agreement in 1995, but no President has presented the treaty to the Senate
for ratification. At various points, resolutions have been introduced in the House and Senate related to the UNCRC;
however, most of these have not progressed further than committee referral.
6 See CRS Report R40484, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.
7 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, “Core Requirements,”
https://ojjdp.ojp.gov/about/core-requirements.
8 Convention on the Rights of The Child.
Congressional Research Service

1

link to page 7 link to page 7 Juvenile Life Without Parole: In Brief

the United States is the only country to allow life without parole sentences for crimes committed
by offenders who were under 18 at the time of the offense.9
In recent years, there have been efforts in the United States to restrict the use of certain types of
sentences for juvenile offenders. Several states have passed legislation to ban JLWOP in some or
all cases.10 As of May 2021, 25 states11 and Washington, DC, have banned JLWOP, and in 10
states12 that allow JLWOP, no convicted offenders were serving such a sentence.13 A survey of
state Departments of Corrections conducted every four years by the Sentencing Project found that
the population serving JLWOP sentences decreased by 38% between 2016 and 2020.14 The U.S.
Supreme Court has also issued decisions limiting the use of JLWOP.15
This report provides information on the federal role in juvenile justice, including the sentencing
of juvenile offenders, as well as implications from recent Supreme Court decisions concerning
juvenile sentencing. The report also discusses research related to cognitive development that is
commonly cited in policy debates about juvenile offenders. It concludes by presenting key issues
that may be of interest to Congress.
The Federal Role in the Juvenile Justice System
In the United States, juvenile justice systems operate primarily under state and local control.
However, the federal government plays a role in the juvenile justice system in two principal ways.
First, the federal government prosecutes a small number of juvenile cases that fall under federal
jurisdiction.16 As of April 2022, Bureau of Prisons (BOP) records indicated that BOP held five
federal inmates under age 18.17 This statistic does not include federal prisoners who were
juveniles at the time of sentencing but are now adults. According to BOP, the majority of juvenile
inmates in federal prisons are Native American youths who were convicted of crimes that

9 See UNCRC Status, and Natasja Sheriff, “UN expert slams US as only nation to imprison kids for life without
parole,” Al Jazeera America, March 9, 2015.
10 The Sentencing Project, “Juvenile Life Without Parole: An Overview”, May 24, 2021,
https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/juvenile-life-without-parole/ (hereinafter “JLWOP: Overview”); and
John Kelly, “Estimate Shows Adult Court Is Increasingly Rare Destination for Youth,” The Imprint News, November 9,
2021, https://imprintnews.org/youth-services-insider/estimate-shows-adult-court-is-increasingly-rare-destination-for-
youth/60281. There have also been shifts around the prosecution of juveniles as adults; however, that topic is outside
the scope of this report.
11 These states are Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont,
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
12 These states are Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, and Rhode
Island.
13 JLWOP: Overview.
14 JLWOP: Overview. Note that this decrease may reflect changes arising from the Supreme Court’s decisions in Miller
v. Alabama and Montgomery v. Louisiana limiting JLWOP sentences. See the “Supreme Court Rulings“ section of this
CRS report for more information on these decisions.
15 See the “Supreme Court Rulings“ section of this CRS report.
16 18 U.S.C. §5032.
17 Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), Inmate Statistics, https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/statistics_inmate_age.jsp.
Congressional Research Service

2

Juvenile Life Without Parole: In Brief

occurred on tribal lands and fell under federal jurisdiction.18 Under current federal law, juvenile
offenders may face life without parole sentences if tried as adults for certain offenses.19
Second, the federal government plays a role in juvenile justice via grant programs that influence
how states and localities organize and operate their juvenile justice systems. Third, decisions of
the U.S. Supreme Court have limited the ability of states to impose certain punishments on
juvenile offenders.
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA)
In 1974, Congress passed the JJDPA (P.L. 93-415), which included three main components. First,
the JJDPA created a set of institutions within the federal government dedicated to coordinating
and administering federal juvenile justice efforts. Second, it established grant programs to assist
the states with setting up and running their juvenile justice systems. Finally, it set core
requirements that states must adhere to in order to be eligible to receive certain federal grant
funding.20 Under current law, there are four core requirements:21
1. States must keep status offenders (e.g., truants, runaways, underage users of
alcohol) out of secure detention or correctional facilities.
2. States cannot detain or confine juveniles in facilities in which they would have
contact with adult inmates.
3. Subject to limited exceptions, juveniles cannot be detained or confined in any jail
or lockup for adults.22
4. States must show that they are working to address racial and ethnic disparities
within their juvenile justice systems.23
Three of the four core requirements set by Congress in JJDPA are grounded in the understanding
that juvenile offenders are different from adult offenders in ways that merit both unique
consideration and physical separation. However, there are no restrictions on JLWOP or other
limits on sentence length included in the JJDPA or other federal legislation addressing juvenile
justice.

18 BOP, Juveniles, https://www.bop.gov/inmates/custody_and_care/juveniles.jsp.
19 See, for example, Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). Generally, a person who was under 18 at the time of the
offense will be tried in juvenile delinquency proceedings, but minors as young as 13 may be tried as adults under
certain circumstances. See 18 U.S.C. §5032.
20 See archived CRS Report RL33947, Juvenile Justice: Legislative History and Current Legislative Issues.
21 See CRS Report R44879, Juvenile Justice Funding Trends.
22 Under JJDPA, these exceptions include six hours for processing or release, awaiting transfer to a juvenile facility, or
the periods immediately before or after a court hearing. There is also a 48-hour (excluding weekends and holidays)
exception for locations outside of metropolitan statistical areas and locations where conditions of distance to travel do
not allow for court appearances within 48 hours. There are also exceptions for periods when safety concerns limit court
appearances. In each of these cases, the exception requires that there is sight and sound separation from adult inmates
and that staff, including those who work with adult and juvenile inmates, have been trained to work with juveniles.
23 The requirement to address disproportionate minority contact does not require states to establish or meet numerical
standards or quotas.
Congressional Research Service

3

Juvenile Life Without Parole: In Brief

Supreme Court Rulings24
Of all federal courts, the U.S. Supreme Court in particular has issued rulings that have led to
changes in juvenile justice policy. Those rulings establish that a state may impose sentences of
life without parole on juvenile offenders, but only for homicide offenses, and only when the
sentencing judge or jury has discretion to impose a lesser sentence.
In the 2005 case Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court held that sentencing juvenile offenders to
death violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.25 Justice
Kennedy’s majority opinion in Roper considered “evidence of national consensus against the
death penalty for juveniles”26 and also “acknowledge[d] the overwhelming weight of international
opinion against the juvenile death penalty.”27 The majority further noted that “the death penalty is
the most severe punishment” and thus “must be limited to those offenders who commit ‘a narrow
category of the most serious crimes’ and whose extreme culpability makes them ‘the most
deserving of execution.’”28 The Court considered differences between juveniles and adults,
including juveniles’ lack of maturity and sense of responsibility, their vulnerability to “negative
influences and outside pressures,” and the fact that “the character of a juvenile is not as well
formed as that of an adult.”29 In light of these differences, the Court concluded that juvenile
offenders are less culpable than adults, such that “the death penalty is disproportionate
punishment for offenders under 18.”30
Although Roper involved the juvenile death penalty, the Supreme Court has also relied on the
factors it considered in Roper when ruling on challenges to JLWOP sentences. For instance, in the
2010 case Graham v. Florida, the Court held that juveniles may not be sentenced to life without
parole for non-homicide offenses.31 Following its approach in Roper and related cases, the Court
considered the rarity of JLWOP sentences for non-homicide offenses and the lesser culpability of
juveniles as compared to adults.32 Based on those factors, plus the lesser gravity of non-homicide
offenses, the Court concluded that imposing a JLWOP sentence for a non-homicide offense is
cruel and unusual in violation of the Eighth Amendment.33
In the 2012 case Miller v. Alabama, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment forbids
any sentencing scheme that mandates life without parole for juvenile offenders upon conviction
for certain offenses; however, the Court held that sentencers (i.e., judges or juries) who consider
an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics may impose discretionary juvenile life without

24 This section was authored by Joanna Lampe, a Legislative Attorney in CRS’s American Law Division (ALD). It uses
citation and other editorial styles consistent with ALD’s reports.
25 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005).
26 Id. at 564. The majority opinion stated that, at the time, 30 states prohibited death sentences for juveniles, and that
“even in the 20 States without a formal prohibition on executing juveniles, the practice is infrequent.” Id.
27 Id. at 578.
28 Id. at 568 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002)).
29 Id. at 569-70.
30 Id. at 575.
31 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
32 Id. at 62-69.
33 Id. at 74.
Congressional Research Service

4

Juvenile Life Without Parole: In Brief

parole sentences in homicide cases.34 Relying in part on cases such as Roper and Graham, the
Court required that the sentencing judge or jury in a JLWOP case consider “how children are
different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in
prison.”35 The Court further stated that the sentencing judge or jury should consider each juvenile
offender’s chronological age and maturity level, his home environment, the circumstances of the
homicide offense, the ways in which the “incompetencies associated with youth” may have
hampered the juvenile’s criminal defense, and the possibility of rehabilitation.36 In the 2016 case
Montgomery v. Louisiana, the Court held that Miller’s prohibition on mandatory life without
parole sentences for juvenile offenders applied retroactively to convictions that were final before
Miller was decided.37 Justice Kennedy, joined by five other Justices, explained that Miller had
announced a new substantive rule by “bar[ring] life without parole ... for all but the rarest of
juvenile offenders, those whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility.”38
Most recently, in the 2021 case Jones v. Mississippi, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth
Amendment does not require an explicit finding that a juvenile offender is permanently
incorrigible before imposition of a JLWOP sentence.39 Rather, a state sentencing scheme that
gives the sentencing judge or jury discretion whether to impose a life without parole sentence for
a juvenile homicide offender “is both constitutionally necessary and constitutionally sufficient.”40
The Court’s decision in Jones did not articulate any new Eighth Amendment protections but
stated that it “carefully follow[ed] both Miller and Montgomery.”41
The Supreme Court’s decisions interpreting the Eighth Amendment apply to both the federal and
state justice systems. Thus, under the foregoing decisions, an individual tried in federal or state
court for offenses committed before age 18 may not be sentenced to death, and may not be
sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for a non-homicide offense. A juvenile
who has committed homicide may not be subject to a mandatory sentence of life without parole.
However, a JLWOP sentencing regime may be constitutional if the sentencing judge or jury had
the discretion to consider mitigating factors including and related to the offender’s age and
nonetheless determined that the most severe sentence was warranted.
De Facto or Virtual JLWOP
A related area of legal and policy discussion concerns the use of “de facto” or “virtual” JLWOP, meaning
sentences that do not expressly impose life imprisonment without the possibility of parole but nonetheless make it
likely offenders wil die while incarcerated or wil spend the majority of their lives incarcerated. A sentence may be
considered a de facto life without parole sentence because “the length of sentence imposed is so long that the
sentence is, for all practical purposes, a life sentence and likely was intended to be such by the judge who imposed

34 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
35 Id. at 480.
36 Id. at 477-78.
37 577 U.S. 190 (2016).
38 Id. at 209.
39 141 S. Ct. 1307 (2021).
40 Id. at 1313.
41 Id. at 1321. Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment but argued that the majority opinion had “[o]verrule[d]
Montgomery in substance but not in name.” Id. at 1327 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Sotomayor,
joined by Justices Breyer and Kagan, filed a dissent arguing that the majority’s decision was inconsistent with the
Court’s prior decisions in Miller and Montgomery. Id. at 1328-41 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Congressional Research Service

5

Juvenile Life Without Parole: In Brief

it.”42 For instance, in cases where the relevant statutes do not authorize life imprisonment, a sentencing judge or
jury may order “consecutive sentences for multiple counts of conviction in order to achieve the lengthy period of
incarceration imposed.”43 In other cases, a sentence may be considered virtual life without parole because the
sentence is longer than the average life expectancy, even if it is unclear whether the sentencing judge intended the
offender to die while imprisoned.44 The Supreme Court has not ruled on the use of de facto JLWOP.
Research on Juvenile Cognitive Development
Certain policymakers, advocates, and the Supreme Court have all cited juvenile cognitive
development as a key reason why youthful offenders should be handled differently than adults by
the justice system. Research has demonstrated that there are age-related changes in the brain,
which does not reach “full physical or functional development” until the mid-twenties.45 Further,
structures and functions of the brain do not all develop at the same time.46
One of the major theories in developmental neuroscience is the dual systems model, which posits
that higher levels of risky behaviors and choices among juveniles may be the result of the socio-
emotional system developing before the cognitive control system.47 The socio-emotional system
is related to the “emotional state of the brain” and increases juveniles’ need for sensation or
reward-seeking behavior as well as their emotional reactivity.48 This system develops in the brain
before the cognitive control system, which is connected to impulse control and emotional
regulation.49 Stated another way, “the brain is essentially being given the ‘gas’ of the socio-
emotional system without having the mature ‘brakes’ of the cognitive control system.”50
Since at least the 1990s, there has been an understanding among many psychologists and
neuroscientists that the influence of brain development on the cognitive decisionmaking
processes among juveniles has unique implications for their criminal culpability.51 Juveniles are

42 United States Sentencing Commission, “Life Sentences in the Federal Criminal Justice System,” February 2015, p.
10, https://www.ussc.gov/research/research-publications/life-sentences-federal-criminal-justice-system (hereinafter,
“Life Sentences in the Federal Criminal Justice System”).
43 Id.
44 Life Sentences in the Federal Criminal Justice System, p. 15.
45 Kathryn Monahan, Laurence Steinberg, and Alex R. Piquero, “Juvenile Justice Policy and Practice: A
Developmental Perspective,” Crime and Justice, vol. 44, no. 1 (September 2015) (hereinafter, “Juvenile Justice Policy
and Practice”); and Arian Petoft, Mahmoud Abbasia, and Alireza Zalib, “Toward children’s cognitive development
from the perspective of neurolaw: implications of Roper v Simmons,” Psychiatry, Psychology, and Law, preprint (2022)
(hereinafter, “Toward children’s cognitive development”).
46 See Toward children’s cognitive development. There are also individual differences in cognitive development
trajectories and timelines.
47 Elizabeth P. Shulman, Ashley R. Smith, and Karol Silva et al., “The dual systems model: Review, reappraisal, and
reaffirmation,” Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience, vol. 17 (February 2016).
48 American Bar Association, Understanding the Adolescent Brain and Legal Culpability, August 2015,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_interest/child_law/resources/child_law_practiceonline/child_law_practice/
vol-34/august-2015/understanding-the-adolescent-brain-and-legal-culpability/ (hereinafter, “Understanding the
Adolescent Brain and Legal Culpability”).
49 Toward children’s cognitive development.
50 Understanding the Adolescent Brain and Legal Culpability.
51 Juvenile Justice Policy and Practice.
Congressional Research Service

6

Juvenile Life Without Parole: In Brief

less capable than adults of exercising restraint, planning ahead, anticipating outcomes (i.e., risks
and rewards), regulating their emotions, and understanding social cues.52 Juveniles also display a
heightened sensitivity to rewards, are more susceptible to peer pressure, have less developed
moral perceptions, and have personalities that are still developing.53
As stated in a peer-reviewed article summarizing the relationship between developmental
neuroscience and juvenile criminal culpability:
Relative to adults, adolescents are more impulsive, more likely to focus on potential
rewards in lieu of potential costs of a risky situation, and more likely to be short-sighted in
their decision making ... especially “in the heat of the moment, under potential threat, and
in the presence of peers thereby increasing the likelihood of reckless behavior”....
Particularly in emotionally charged situations that involve similar-aged peers, emotional
regulation is compromised, resulting in a failure of self-control and a higher probability of
poor decision making and involvement in risky behavior.54
Juvenile cognitive development is also affected by individual and environmental factors including
exposure to, and experiences with, violence and material deprivations. Children are uniquely
vulnerable in that they are generally dependent upon others for their material, emotional, and
social needs and are often unable to remove themselves from harmful or risky environments.55
However, most juvenile offenders do not continue to commit crimes as adults, perhaps, in part,
due to reaching full cognitive maturity.56
Typically, criminal responsibility may be mitigated if the action fell outside of the offender’s
control, be it for biological, psychological, or environmental reasons.57 Based on findings
regarding the limits of juvenile control as described above, the American Psychological
Association has argued in legal briefs that “juveniles’ immaturity, vulnerability, and changeability
make them less culpable than adults and ... as a result of their lower responsibility and ability to
change, they should be deemed less responsible and thus less punishable.”58
Considerations for Congress
The legal and policy questions that Congress may consider in determining whether and how to act
with respect to JLWOP vary depending on whether proposed legislation would apply to the
federal or state justice systems.
Congress possesses significant authority to pass legislation to alter JLWOP sentencing under
federal law. However, any legislation Congress might enact would be subject to the constitutional

52 Toward children’s cognitive development.
53 Toward children’s cognitive development.
54 Juvenile Justice Policy and Practice, pp. 587-588.
55 The Supreme Court recognized this factor in Miller v. Alabama. 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012) (stating that children
“have limited control over their own environment and lack the ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crime-
producing settings”) (internal quotes and alterations omitted).
56 Juvenile Justice Policy and Practice; and Laurence Steinberg, “Give Adolescents the Time and Skills to Mature, and
Most Offenders Will Stop,” MacArthur Foundation, https://nicic.gov/give-adolescents-time-and-skills-mature-and-
most-offenders-will-stop.
57 Juvenile Justice Policy and Practice.
58 Juvenile Justice Policy and Practice, p. 599.
Congressional Research Service

7

Juvenile Life Without Parole: In Brief

limits articulated in Miller, Montgomery, and any other applicable cases. Thus, Congress could
place additional limits on JLWOP sentencing but could not narrow the scope of Eighth
Amendment protections announced by the U.S. Supreme Court. For example, Congress could
enact legislation requiring federal courts to make certain explicit findings before imposing a
JLWOP sentence or otherwise limiting the availability of such sentences under federal law.
Congress could also expand resentencing options for federal offenders serving JLWOP sentences.
For example, a proposal from the 116th Congress entitled the Next Step Act of 2019 would have
allowed courts to reduce the sentence of a federal juvenile offender tried as an adult if the
offender had served at least 20 years in prison and the court found that (1) the offender did not
pose a safety risk and (2) the interests of justice warranted a sentence modification.59 Similarly,
the Second Look Act of 2019, also introduced in the 116th Congress, would have allowed federal
inmates sentenced to more than 10 years in prison to petition for sentence reductions.60 The act
would not have limited such petitions to juvenile offenders, but it would have directed courts to
consider factors including “the diminished culpability of juveniles as compared to that of adults,
and the hallmark features of youth, including immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate
risks and consequences, if the defendant was a juvenile at the time of the offense.”
With respect to state JLWOP sentencing, Congress lacks the constitutional authority to directly
alter state criminal law, which is traditionally considered an area of state and local concern.61
Nonetheless, Congress may consider legislation that would indirectly influence state and local
governments’ policies regarding JLWOP. For example, Congress may consider amending state
formula grant programs in JJDPA to promote, limit, or prohibit the use of JLWOP or it could
provide an incentive for states to pass legislation regarding the use of JLWOP.62 Alternatively,
Congress may consider continuing current practices. Regardless of whether Congress acts on this
subject, U.S. Supreme Court decisions articulating substantive constitutional rights would
continue to bind the states.

Author Information

Emily J. Hanson
Joanna R. Lampe
Analyst in Social Policy
Legislative Attorney

59 H.R. 1893/S. 697.
60 H.R. 3795/S. 2146.
61 See the “Constitutional Authorities for Congressional Action on Police Reform” section of CRS Report R46530,
Police Reform and the 116th Congress: Selected Legal Issues.
62 A similar strategy of providing an incentive for states to pass legislation was used in the Rape Survivor Child
Custody Act (Title IV of the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015; P.L. 114-22).
Congressional Research Service

8

Juvenile Life Without Parole: In Brief

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to
copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

Congressional Research Service
R47158 · VERSION 1 · NEW
9