Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief June 7, 2022
U.S. relations with Turkey take place within a complicated environment and—as of mid-2022—
with Turkey in economic distress. Existing U.S.-Turkey tensions that worsened after a failed
Jim Zanotti
2016 coup in Turkey—including via disagreements over Syrian Kurds and Turkey’s 2019
Specialist in Middle
procurement of a Russian S-400 surface-to-air defense system—have raised questions about the
Eastern Affairs
future of bilateral relations. Nevertheless, both countries’ officials emphasize the importance of

continued U.S.-Turkey cooperation and Turkey’s membership in the North Atlantic Treaty
Clayton Thomas
Organization (NATO). The following are major factors in the U.S.-Turkey relationship.
Specialist in Middle
Eastern Affairs
Erdogan’s rule and Turkey’s economic challenges. Many observers voice worries about

President Erdogan’s largely authoritarian rule. In late 2021, an ongoing currency crisis
accelerated after he installed a central bank governor who lowered interest rates, generating

major domestic concern about inflation and the country’s future financial stability. Presidential
and parliamentary elections are scheduled for June 2023, and public opinion polls suggest that Erdogan may be vulnerable to
defeat. Some observers debate whether (1) free and fair elections could take place, (2) opposition parties can attract support
across ideological lines, and (3) Erdogan would cede power after an electoral loss.
Turkey’s strategic orientation. Traditionally, Turkey has relied closely on the United States and NATO for defense
cooperation, European countries for trade and investment, and Russia and Iran for energy imports. Turkey’s ongoing
economic struggles highlight the risks it faces if it jeopardizes these ties. A number of complicated situations in Turkey’s
surrounding region affect its relationships with the United States and other key actors, as Turkey seeks a more independent
foreign policy. These include Russia’s 2022 renewed invasion of Ukraine, Syria’s civil war (during which more than 3.6
million refugees have come to Turkey), and other challenges involving Greece, Cyprus, and Libya. Since 2021, Turkey has
made some headway in easing tensions and boosting trade with Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia.
Key NATO Issues: Russia’s war on Ukraine and Swedish/Finnish accession. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has heightened
challenges Turkey faces in balancing relations with the two countries, with implications for U.S.-Turkey ties. Turkey has not
joined sanctions against Russia, with which it has close trade and energy ties, likely because it hopes to minimize spillover
effects to its national security and economy. However, U.S. and Turkish interests in countering Russian revisionist aims may
have converged, as Turkey has joined other NATO countries in strengthening Ukraine’s defense capabilities. Under Turkey’s
authority to regulate access to the Black Sea under the 1936 Montreux Convention, it has generally barred Russian and
Ukrainian warships from transiting the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits, drawing statements of support from U.S. officials.
Turkey also has advised other countries’ naval vessels to avoid the Straits, leading some observers to raise questions about
security and freedom of navigation for other Black Sea countries, and about NATO’s role in the region.
Turkey has sold several Turkish-origin Bayraktar TB2 drones to Ukraine as part of deepening bilateral defense cooperation,
and the drones appear to have successfully played a role in targeting Russian armored vehicle convoys, air defense batteries,
helicopters, and ships. These reported successes have bolstered the TB2’s already strong reputation from conflicts in Syria,
Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh, increasing the demand for Turkish defense exports from other countries, as well as
opportunities for Turkey to build broader ties with those countries.
As Sweden and Finland formally applied for NATO membership in May 2022, Turkish officials demanded that the two
countries address certain Turkish concerns before agreeing to their accession. These demands center on having Sweden,
Finland, and other NATO allies (including the United States) end support for Kurdish individuals or groups that Turkey
considers to be connected to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Kurdish acronym PKK, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization),
including a Syrian Kurdish group helping the anti-Islamic State coalition. Given the other NATO allies’ support for Sweden
and Finland’s access, continued Turkish objections might increase U.S.-Turkey tensions and Turkish isolation within NATO.
U.S.-Turkey arms sales issues (including F-16s). Turkey’s acquisition of a Russian S-400 surface-to-air defense system in
July 2019 has had significant repercussions for U.S.-Turkey relations, leading to Turkey’s removal from the F-35 Joint Strike
Fighter program and U.S. sanctions on Turkey’s defense procurement agency. The continuing U.S.-Turkey impasse over the
S-400 could prevent or complicate major Western arms sales to Turkey. In April 2022, the Biden Administration reportedly
notified Congress informally of its intent to upgrade Turkey’s aging F-16 fleet, with Members of Congress expressing mixed
views about the transaction. The potential sale could affect the military balance between Turkey and Greece.
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Introduction and Key U.S.-Turkey Considerations
This report provides background information and analysis on key issues affecting U.S.-Turkey
relations, including domestic Turkish developments and various foreign policy and defense
matters.
Under President Joe Biden, some existing U.S.-Turkey tensions have continued alongside
cooperation on other matters and opportunities to improve bilateral ties. He has limited his
meetings with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to the sidelines of multilateral
conferences. This approach may reflect a U.S. and European inclination to keep Turkey at arms’
length until after the 2023 elections.1 Nevertheless, Turkey’s geostrategic significance, cautious
support for Ukraine’s defense against Russia’s 2022 invasion, and openness to rapprochement
with Israel, some Arab states, and Armenia have somewhat improved U.S.-Turkey relations.2
For additional information, see CRS Report R41368, Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations, by
Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. See Figure A-1 for a map and key facts and figures about
Turkey.
Domestic Issues
Political Developments Under Erdogan’s Rule
President Erdogan has ruled Turkey since becoming prime minister in 2003, and has steadily
deepened his control over the country’s populace and institutions. After Erdogan became
president in August 2014 via Turkey’s first-ever popular presidential election, he claimed a
mandate for increasing his power and pursuing a “presidential system” of governance, which he
cemented in a 2017 referendum and 2018 presidential and parliamentary elections. Some
allegations of voter fraud and manipulation surfaced after the referendum and the elections.3
Since a failed July 2016 coup attempt by elements within the military, Erdogan and his Islamist-
leaning Justice and Development Party (Turkish acronym AKP) have adopted more nationalistic
domestic and foreign policy approaches, partly because of their reliance on parliamentary support
from the Nationalist Action Party (Turkish acronym MHP).
Many observers describe Erdogan as a polarizing figure, and elections have reflected roughly
equal portions of the country supporting and opposing his rule.4 The AKP won the largest share of
votes in 2019 local elections, but lost some key municipalities, including Istanbul, to candidates
from the secular-leaning Republican People’s Party (Turkish acronym CHP).

1 Sinem Adar, “Perceptions in Turkey about the War in Ukraine,” SWP Comment (German Institute for International
and Security Affairs (SWP)), April 6, 2022.
2 Alper Coskun, “Making the New U.S.-Turkey Strategic Mechanism Meaningful,” Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, May 12, 2022; Kali Robinson, “Turkey’s Growing Foreign Policy Ambitions,” Council on Foreign
Relations, May 19, 2022.
3 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Limited Referendum Observation Mission Final
Report, Turkey, April 16, 2017 (published June 22, 2017); OSCE, International Election Observation Mission,
Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, Turkey, Early Presidential and Parliamentary Elections, June 24,
2018 (published June 25, 2018).
4 Kemal Kirisci and Berk Esen, “Might the Turkish Electorate Be Ready to Say Goodbye to Erdoğan After Two
Decades in Power?” Just Security, November 22, 2021.
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U.S. and European Union (EU) officials have expressed a number of concerns about authoritarian
governance and erosion of rule of law and civil liberties in Turkey.5 In response to the 2016 coup
attempt, the government detained tens of thousands of its citizens, enacted sweeping changes to
military and civilian agencies, and took over or closed various businesses, schools, and media
outlets.6 Erdogan has argued, with considerable popular support, that the Fethullah Gulen
movement orchestrated the coup attempt, in which more than 250 people were killed and
thousands were injured.7 Forces and citizen groups loyal to the government ultimately thwarted
the apparent efforts of some renegade military personnel (which included airstrikes targeting
Turkey’s presidential palace and parliament building) to seize state control. Some leading
opposition figures in Turkey have accused Erdogan of planning, controlling, and/or using the
failed coup to suppress dissent and consolidate power.8
In April 2022, a Turkish court sentenced civil society figure Osman Kavala to life imprisonment
after convicting him of conspiring against the government. The European Court of Human
Rights, whose rulings are supposed to be binding for Turkey due to its Council of Europe
membership, had demanded Kavala’s release in 2019. The State Department spokesperson said
that Kavala’s “unjust conviction is inconsistent with respect for human rights, fundamental
freedoms, and the rule of law,” while also criticizing “continued judicial harassment of civil
society, media, political and business leaders in Turkey, including through prolonged pretrial
detention, overly broad claims of support for terrorism, and criminal insult cases.”9
With national elections scheduled for 2023 (discussed below), the Erdogan government has
pursued a Constitutional Court ruling to close down the Kurdish-oriented Peoples’ Democratic
Party (Turkish acronym HDP), the third largest party in Turkey’s parliament. The government
claims that the HDP has ties to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Kurdish acronym PKK, a U.S.-
designated terrorist organization).10 The State Department has said that banning the HDP “would
unduly subvert the will of Turkish voters, further undermine democracy in Turkey, and deny
millions of Turkish citizens their chosen representation.”11 How Kurds who feel politically
marginalized might respond to the HDP’s ban is unclear. Major violence between Turkish
authorities and PKK militants—which has taken place on and off since the 1980s—wracked
Turkey’s mostly Kurdish southeast in 2015 and 2016, and the Turkish military has continued
targeting PKK and PKK-aligned personnel in Iraq and Syria.12

5 State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021, Turkey; European Commission, Turkey
2021 Report, October 19, 2021.
6 Ibid.
7 Gareth Jenkins, “Five Years After July 15: Erdogan’s New Turkey and the Myth of Its Immaculate Conception,”
Turkey Analyst, July 15, 2021; Dorian Jones, “Turkey Looks Back at Failed Coup,” Voice of America, July 15, 2019.
Partly because of Gulen’s residence in the United States, many Turks reportedly subscribe to conspiracy theories about
possible U.S. involvement. Jenkins, “Five Years After July 15.” For more on Gulen, see CRS In Focus IF10444,
Fethullah Gulen, Turkey, and the United States: A Reference, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.
8 Jenkins, “Five Years After July 15”; “Turkey coup: Top officers given life terms in mass trial,” BBC News, April 7,
2021.
9 State Department, “Turkey’s Conviction of Osman Kavala,” April 25, 2022.
10 Alex McDonald, “Threat to close pro-Kurdish party echoes long tradition in Turkey’s politics,” Middle East Eye,
March 20, 2021.
11 State Department, “Actions in Turkey’s Parliament,” March 17, 2021.
12 Berkay Mandiraci, “Turkey’s PKK Conflict: A Regional Battleground in Flux,” International Crisis Group, February
18, 2022.
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Major Economic Challenges
Ongoing economic problems in Turkey have considerably worsened in the past year as its
currency, the lira, depreciated in value nearly 45% against the U.S. dollar in 2021 and has
continued its slide during 2022. In May 2022, official annual inflation in Turkey swelled to 73.5%
(see Figure A-2), the highest since 1998.13 Many analysts link the spike in inflation to the Turkish
central bank’s reduction of its key interest rate from 19% to 14% between September and
December 2021, with additional inflationary pressure possibly coming from external events such
as Russia’s war on Ukraine and interest rate hikes in the United States and other major
economies.14 The lira has been trending downward for more than a decade, with its decline driven
by broader concerns about Turkey’s rule of law and economy.15
Throughout this time, President Erdogan has assertively challenged the conventional economic
theory that higher interest rates stem inflation, attract foreign capital, and support the value of the
currency. In replacing Turkey’s central bank governor and finance minister in 2021, Erdogan
established greater control over Turkish fiscal and monetary policy. In public statements, Erdogan
has argued that lower interest rates boost production, employment, and exports.16 Erdogan also
has criticized high interest rates as contrary to Islamic teachings and as exacerbating the gap
between rich and poor.17
The currency and inflation crisis in Turkey has dramatically affected consumers’ cost of living
and the cost of international borrowing (mostly conducted in U.S. dollars) for banks and private
sector companies.18 The government has sought to stop or reverse inflation by providing tax cuts
and subsidies for basic expenses and borrowing incentives for banks that hold liras.19 According
to one source, by December 2021 almost 65% of Turkish bank deposits were in foreign
currencies20—up from around 41% at the time of the 2016 coup attempt.21 In that month, the
government announced a plan to insure lira-denominated bank accounts against currency
depreciation, in apparent coordination with a significant state-backed market intervention.22 It is
unclear whether the government’s credit and domestic savers’ confidence will be sufficient to
prevent future financial panic.23

13 Mustafa Sonmez, “Turkish consumer inflation soars to 73.5%,” Al-Monitor, June 3, 2022.
14 Baris Balci and Inci Ozbek, “Turkey Rewrites All Inflation Forecasts but Won’t Budge on Rates,” Bloomberg, April
28, 2022.
15 Mikolaj Rogalewicz, “Economic crisis in Turkey,” Warsaw Institute Review, April 25, 2022.
16 “EXPLAINER: Turkey’s Currency Is Crashing. What’s the Impact?” Associated Press, December 3, 2021; Carlotta
Gall, “Keeping His Own Counsel on Turkey’s Economy,” New York Times, December 11, 2021.
17 Mustafa Akyol, “How Erdogan’s Pseudoscience Is Ruining the Turkish Economy,” Cato Institute, December 3,
2021; Gall, “Keeping His Own Counsel on Turkey’s Economy.”
18 “EXPLAINER: Turkey’s Currency Is Crashing. What’s the Impact?” Associated Press.
19 “Turkey’s inflation surges to 70%, putting Erdogan in bind,” Reuters; Balci and Ozbek, “Turkey Rewrites All
Inflation Forecasts.”
20 Mustafa Sonmez, “Turkish lira sinks further with Erdogan’s latest rate cut,” Al-Monitor, December 16, 2021.
21 Capital Economics graphic, from Caitlin Ostroff, “Investors Fear Turkish Lira Has Further to Fall,” Wall Street
Journal, December 7, 2021.
22 “Turkish lira erodes last week’s gains,” Reuters, December 28, 2021.
23 Mustafa Sonmez, “Turkish taxpayers outraged at cost of lira protection scheme,” Al-Monitor, March 25, 2022.
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Future Elections
Turkey’s next presidential and parliamentary elections are scheduled to take place by June 2023.
Largely in the context of Turkey’s economic problems, public opinion polls suggest that support
for Erdogan and the AKP is at a historic low.24 Observers speculate about whether Erdogan and
the existing AKP-MHP parliamentary coalition can remain in power.25 How Kurdish citizens of
Turkey (numbering nearly 20% of the population) vote—with or without the HDP’s
participation—could impact the outcome.26 Additionally, some observers debate whether (1) free
and fair elections could take place under Erdogan,27 (2) opposition parties can convince potential
swing voters to side with them despite their personal or ideological affinity for Erdogan,28 or (3)
Erdogan would cede power after an electoral defeat.29
The CHP and some other opposition parties have agreed on some steps toward a joint platform
focused on strengthening legislative and judicial checks on executive power.30 However, it
remains unclear which opposition candidate will challenge Erdogan for president: CHP party
leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu (from the Alevi religious minority), or either of the two mayors who
won control of Istanbul and Ankara for the party in 2019 (Ekrem Imamoglu and Mansur Yavas,
respectively) and generally poll higher than Kilicdaroglu.31 In a sign to some of government
attempts to sideline opponents, Istanbul mayor Imamoglu could face a ban from political activity
because of criminal charges accusing him of insulting members of Turkey’s Supreme Electoral
Council in 2019.32
Erdogan controls whether to initiate elections before June 2023 and has thus far stated his
unwillingness to do so. Rather than compel elections in Turkey, domestic instability could lead
Erdogan’s cabinet to initiate a state of emergency with the potential to delay elections.33
How closely U.S. and other international actors engage Erdogan’s government ahead of elections
could depend on perceptions of his popular legitimacy, likely staying power, and the extent to
which a successor might change his policies in light of geopolitical and domestic considerations.

24 Laura Pitel, “Defeating Erdogan: Turkey’s opposition searches for a champion,” Financial Times, May 5, 2022.
25 Ozgur Unluhisarcikli, “It Is Not Too Early to Think About Political Change in Turkey,” German Marshall Fund of
the United States, January 10, 2022.
26 Mesut Yegen, “Erdogan and the Turkish Opposition Revisit the Kurdish Question,” SWP Comment (German
Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP)), April 2022.
27 Unluhisarcikli, “It Is Not Too Early to Think About Political Change in Turkey”; Kirisci and Esen, “Might the
Turkish Electorate Be Ready to Say Goodbye to Erdoğan After Two Decades in Power?”
28 Ozer Sencar of Metropoll, in Laura Pitel, “Will the ailing Turkish economy bring Erdogan down?” Financial Times,
November 1, 2021.
29 Unnamed Western diplomat quoted in Pitel, “Defeating Erdogan.”
30 Andrew Wilks, “Turkish opposition forms plan to oust Erdogan, restore parliament’s power,” Al-Monitor, February
15, 2022.
31 Ibid.; Pitel, “Defeating Erdogan.”
32 Andrew Wilks, “Cases against opposition politicians mount ahead of Turkish elections,” Al-Monitor, June 2, 2022.
33 “Professor says Turkey may declare state of emergency following economic crisis,” Duvar English, December 14,
2021.
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Turkey’s Strategic Orientation: Foreign Policy and
Defense
General Assessment
Turkey’s strategic orientation is a major consideration for the United States. Trends in Turkey’s
relations with the United States and other countries reflect changes to this orientation, as Turkey
has sought greater independence of action as a regional power within a more multipolar global
system. Turkish leaders’ interest in reducing their dependence on the West for defense and
discouraging Western influence over their domestic politics may partly explain their willingness
to coordinate some actions with Russia, such as in Syria and with Turkey’s purchase of a Russian
S-400 surface-to-air defense system. Nevertheless, Turkey retains significant differences with
Russia—with which it has a long history of discord—including in political and military crises
involving Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh (a region disputed by Armenia and Azerbaijan).
In recent years, Turkey has involved its military in the Middle East, Eastern Mediterranean, and
South Caucasus in a way that has affected its relationships with the United States and other key
actors. U.S. officials have sometimes encouraged cooperation among other allies and partners to
counter Turkish actions.34 In the past year, however, Turkey has taken some steps to ease tensions
with major U.S. partners in the Middle East—namely Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi
Arabia (see Appendix B). U.S. and Turkish officials maintain that bilateral cooperation on
regional security matters remains mutually important.35
Turkish leaders appear to compartmentalize their partnerships and rivalries with other influential
countries as each situation dictates, partly in an attempt to reduce Turkey’s dependence on these
actors and maintain its leverage with them.36 Traditionally, Turkey has relied closely on the
United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for defense cooperation,
European countries for trade and investment (including a customs union with the EU since the
late 1990s), and Russia and Iran for energy imports. Without a means of global power projection
or major natural resource wealth, Turkey’s military strength and economic well-being appear to
remain largely dependent on these traditional relationships. Turkey’s ongoing economic struggles
(discussed above) highlight the risks it faces if it jeopardizes these ties.37
Turkey’s compartmentalized approach may to some extent reflect President Erdogan’s efforts to
maintain power domestically. Because Erdogan’s control over parliament depends on the AKP’s
coalition with the more traditionally nationalist MHP, efforts to preserve support from core
constituencies may imbue Turkish policy with a nationalistic tenor. A largely nationalistic foreign
policy also has precedent from before Turkey’s Cold War alignment with the West.38 Turkey’s
history as both a regional power and an object of great power aggression contributes to wide

34 Ahmed Qandil, “East Med Gas Forum turns into regional organisation, in blow to Turkey,” Arab Weekly, September
23, 2020.
35 State Department, “Joint Statement on the Meeting of Secretary Blinken and Turkish Foreign Minister Cavusoglu,”
May 18, 2022.
36 Nur Ozcan Erbay, “Ankara to use compartmentalization in managing relations,” Daily Sabah, June 24, 2021;
Stephen J. Flanagan et al., Turkey’s Nationalist Course: Implications for the U.S.-Turkish Strategic Partnership and the
U.S. Army, RAND Corporation, 2020.
37 Rich Outzen and Soner Cagaptay, “The Third Age of Erdoğan’s Foreign Policy,” Center for European Policy
Analysis, February 17, 2022.
38 William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774, New York: Routledge, 2013 (3rd edition).
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domestic popularity for nationalistic political actions and discourse, as well as sympathy for
Erdogan’s “neo-Ottoman” narrative of restoring Turkish regional prestige.
Turkish Hard Power and “Drone Diplomacy”
During Erdogan’s first decade as prime minister (2003-2012), Turkey’s main approach in its surrounding region
(with the exception of its long-running security operations against the PKK in southeastern Turkey and northern
Iraq) was to project political and economic influence, or “soft power,” backed by diplomacy and military
deterrence. As regional unrest increased near Turkey’s borders with the onset of conflict in Syria, however,
Turkey’s approach shifted dramatically in light of newly perceived threats. This was especial y the case after
Erdogan (elected president in 2014) began courting Turkish nationalist constituencies in 2015 and consolidating
power fol owing the July 2016 coup attempt.
Under this modified approach, Turkey has relied more on hard power to affect regional outcomes. Specifically,
Turkey has focused on a relatively low-cost method of using armed drone aircraft and/or proxy forces
(particularly Syrian fighters who oppose the Syrian government and otherwise have limited sources of income) in
theaters of conflict including northern Syria and Iraq, western Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh.39 Partly because the
drones and proxy forces limit Turkey’s political and economic risk, Turkish leaders have shown less restraint in
deploying them, and they have reportedly proven effective at countering other actors’ more expensive but less
mobile armored vehicles and air defense systems (such as with Russian-origin equipment in Syria, Libya, and
Nagorno-Karabakh).40
Turkey’s demonstrated battlefield successes with its drones have significantly increased demand for exports to
other countries.41 The growing global popularity of the Bayraktar TB2 drone in particular (see Figure A-3) has
prompted one Western arms industry figure to call it the “Kalashnikov [rifle] of the 21st century.”42 One analyst
explained the TB2’s appeal by saying that it “strikes a favorable balance between price and capability, being more
affordable and accessible compared to US drones while being far more reliable and effective than Chinese
models.”43 At the same time Turkey markets drones to other countries with fewer constraints than Western
countries, it generally seeks to broaden military, political, and economic linkages with them.44
While this “drone diplomacy” appears to be helping Turkey build important regional and global connections, some
observers have raised concerns. One worry is that Turkey may enable human rights violations; an example is the
Ethiopian government’s use of TB2s (alongside drones originally from Iran and China) against Tigrayan rebels.45
Another concern is that without greater oversight and transparency, exporting drones broadly could result in
unintended, adverse consequences for Turkey’s interests or those of its allies and partners.46
U.S./NATO Strategic Considerations
The United States has valued Turkey’s geopolitical importance to and military strength within the
NATO alliance, while viewing Turkey’s NATO membership as helping anchor Turkey to the
West. For Turkey, NATO’s traditional importance has been to mitigate Turkish concerns about

39 See, e.g., Rich Outzen, Deals, Drones, and National Will: The New Era in Turkish Power Projection, Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, July 2021.
40 James Marson and Brett Forrest, “Low-Cost Armed Drones Reshape War and Geopolitics,” Wall Street Journal,
June 4, 2021; Mitch Prothero, “Turkey’s Erdogan has been humiliating Putin all year—here’s how he did it,” Business
Insider, October 22, 2020.
41 Sinan Tavsan, “Turkish drone success in Ukraine sets stage for Asia roadshow,” Nikkei Asia, March 16, 2022.
42 Ibid. For background information on the initial development of Turkey’s drone aircraft industry, see CRS Report
R41368, Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.
43 Gabriel Honrada, “The Turkish drones winning the Ukraine war,” Asia Times, May 12, 2022.
44 Rich Outzen, “Ukraine’s Security Model Should be Turkey,” New/Lines Magazine, April 26, 2022.
45 Salem Solomon, “Ethiopia Ups Use of Drone Strikes in Conflict Prompting Worries About Civilian Toll,” Voice of
America, February 2, 2022.
46 Federico Borsari, “Turkey’s drone diplomacy: Lessons for Europe,” European Council on Foreign Relations, January
31, 2022; Alper Coskun, “Strengthening Turkish Policy on Drone Exports,” Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, January 18, 2022.
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encroachment by neighbors, such as the Soviet Union’s aggressive post-World War II posturing
leading up to the Cold War. In more recent or ongoing arenas of conflict like Ukraine and Syria,
Turkey’s possible interest in countering Russian objectives may be partly motivating its military
operations and arms exports.47
Turkey’s location near several conflict areas has made the continuing availability of its territory
for the stationing and transport of arms, cargo, and personnel valuable for the United States and
NATO. In addition to Incirlik Air Base near the southern Turkish city of Adana, other key
U.S./NATO sites include an early warning missile defense radar in eastern Turkey and a NATO
ground forces command in Izmir (see Figure A-4).
Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine
Overview
Russia’s 2022 renewed invasion of Ukraine—a country Russia first invaded and partly occupied
in 2014—has heightened challenges Turkey faces in balancing its relations with the two countries
and managing Black Sea access, with implications for U.S.-Turkey ties. In recent years, Turkey’s
links with Russia—especially its 2019 acquisition of a Russian S-400 surface-to-air defense
system—have fueled major U.S.-Turkey tensions, triggering sanctions and reported informal
congressional holds on arms sales (discussed below). However, following the renewed Russian
invasion of Ukraine, U.S. and Turkish interests in countering Russian revisionist aims—including
along the Black Sea coast—may have converged as Turkey has participated alongside other
NATO countries to strengthen Ukraine’s defense capabilities.48
While Turkey has denounced Russia’s invasion and supplied Ukraine with armed drone aircraft
(see text box below) and humanitarian assistance, Turkey likely hopes to minimize spillover
effects to its national security and economy. The Turkish government has not joined economic
sanctions against Russia or closed its airspace to Russian civilian flights. As mentioned above, the
conflict appears to have worsened Turkey’s ongoing inflation crisis. Additionally, decreases in
Russian and Ukrainian tourism are likely to hurt Turkey’s economy, as could cutoffs of imported
Russian natural gas and wheat, or Russian military actions in Syria that create new refugee
flows.49 Turkey has engaged in mediation between Russia and Ukraine, including some
involvement in broader international efforts seeking a corridor through Russian-blockaded waters
for Ukrainian grain exports that could alleviate global supply concerns.50
With Turkish officials arguably motivated to improve the country’s economic profile while
anticipating closely contested national elections in 2023, they have welcomed sanctioned Russian
oligarchs as tourists and investors. Turkey’s actions raise questions about whether it can and will
prevent Russian investors from evading Western sanctions.51

47 Dimitar Bechev, “Russia, Turkey and the Spectre of Regional Instability,” Al Sharq Strategic Research, April 13,
2022; Prothero, “Turkey’s Erdogan has been humiliating Putin all year.”
48 Saban Kardas, “The War in Ukraine and Turkey’s Cautious Counter-Balancing Against Russia,” German Marshall
Fund of the United States, March 3, 2022.
49 Adar, “Perceptions in Turkey about the War in Ukraine.”
50 William Mauldin et al., “The Ukraine Crisis: Talks Press Plan to Free Shipments of Grain,” Wall Street Journal, June
2, 2022.
51 Giacomo Tognini, “Why Turkey Could Become the Next Haven for Russian Oligarchs Fleeing Sanctions,”
forbes.com, May 3, 2022; Karen Gilchrist, “Turkey may become the new playground for Russian oligarchs – but it’s a
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Ukraine’s Use of Bayraktar TB2 Drones and Broader Implications
Turkey has sold several Turkish-origin Bayraktar TB2 drones to Ukraine as part of deepening bilateral defense
cooperation since 2019,52 and some reports have suggested that the manufacturer has periodically delivered
additional TB2s to Ukraine since Russia’s invasion.53 Multiple accounts have surfaced of Ukraine’s successful use of
TB2s to target Russian armored vehicle convoys, air defense batteries, helicopters, and ships—often in
coordination with other Ukrainian weapons platforms. A May 2022 report stated that Russia may have destroyed
Ukrainian TB2s in sufficient number to significantly reduce their likely future impact on the war.54
Because the Turkish defense industry has made deals with Ukrainian contractors to provide engines for newer
combat drone platforms, as well as various manned aircraft projects, threats posed to Ukraine’s manufacturing
capacity from Russia’s invasion could delay some of Turkey’s plans.55 Ukraine became an important alternative
source for Turkey in procuring engines after a 2019-2020 decrease in Western supply due to concerns about
Turkish actions against Syrian Kurds and Armenians.56
Expanding Turkish defense cooperation—including drone exports—with countries near Russia may present
opportunities to renew common cause between the West and Turkey in countering Russia.57 Alternatively,
Turkey’s interactions with these other countries could possibly check both U.S. and Russian ambitions,58 or
increase regional tensions potentially leading toward conflict.59
Black Sea Access
Turkey’s power to regulate access to the Black Sea via the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits (see
Figure A-5) under the 1936 Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits (the “Montreux
Convention”) is important to U.S. interests.60 In February 2022, Turkey acknowledged a state of
war between Russia and Ukraine, invoking Article 19 of the Montreux Convention, which
generally bars belligerent countries’ warships from traversing the Straits (except if they are
returning to their base of origin).61 Shortly after Turkey’s decision, Secretary of State Antony
Blinken expressed appreciation for Turkey’s implementation of the Convention and support for
Ukraine.62 (The United States is not a party to the Convention, but has complied with its terms
since it went into effect in 1936 as a treaty that is reflective of customary international law.)
Turkey’s invocation of Article 19 for the first time since World War II may limit Russia from
replenishing ships it loses in battle. While Ukrainian coastal defenses have dealt losses to some

risky strategy,” CNBC, March 30, 2022.
52 Dorian Jones, “Turkey Strengthens Defense Industry with Its Ukraine Partnership,” Voice of America, February 4,
2022.
53 David Hambling, “New Bayraktar Drones Still Seem to Be Reaching Ukraine,” forbes.com, May 10, 2022.
54 Stephen Witt, “Weapon of Influence,” New Yorker, May 16, 2022.
55 Fehim Tastekin, “Will Ukraine crisis help Turkey dodge Western arms embargoes?” Al-Monitor, March 28, 2022.
56 Aykan Erdemir and Ryan Brobst, “Engines of Influence: Turkey’s Defense Industry Under Erdogan,” Foundation for
Defense of Democracies, March 24, 2022.
57 Suat Kiniklioglu, “Necessary friends: Turkey’s improving relationship with the West,” European Council on Foreign
Relations, April 7, 2022.
58 Outzen, “Ukraine’s Security Model Should be Turkey.”
59 Aaron Stein, “From Ankara with Implications: Turkish Drones and Alliance Entrapment,” War on the Rocks,
December 15, 2021.
60 Maximilian Hess, “Welcome to the Black Sea Era of War,” foreignpolicy.com, April 25, 2022. Text of the
Convention is available at https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/formidable/18/1936-Convention-Regarding-the-
Regime-of-the-Straits.pdf.
61 “Turkey recognises Russia-Ukraine ‘war’, may block warships,” Agence France Presse, February 27, 2022.
62 State Department, “Secretary Blinken’s Call with Turkish Foreign Minister Cavusoglu,” February 28, 2022.
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Russian ships, Russia’s existing Black Sea fleet remains powerful, now controls the key
Ukrainian port of Mariupol, and has essentially disabled Ukraine’s navy.63
In March 10 correspondence with CRS, a Turkish official explained that (under the Montreux
Convention) Turkey has only formally closed the Straits to Russia and Ukraine as belligerent
countries, while advising all other countries to refrain from sending warships through the Straits.
Some naval analysts have expressed concern that discouraging other countries from transit could
put NATO at a disadvantage.64 One has asserted that Black Sea access is “essential for the
alliance’s presence and security as well as to reassure” allies Romania and Bulgaria.65 It is
unclear what might lead Turkey and other Black Sea littoral countries (aside from Russia) to take
direct action or seek third-party help in asserting their interests and freedom of navigation, and
how that could affect regional security.
Conditions on NATO Accession for Sweden and Finland
When Sweden and Finland formally applied to join NATO in May 2022 (sparked by growing
security concerns in light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine), President Erdogan indicated that
Turkey has objections that he wants the two countries to overcome before Turkey will agree to
their accession. Under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the admission of new allies can
only happen with the unanimous agreement of existing members. Addressing Turkey’s parliament
on May 18, Erdogan said, “The expansion of NATO is meaningful for us, in proportion to the
respect that is shown to our sensitivities.”66
Erdogan and other Turkish officials have complained that Sweden and Finland support or harbor
sympathies for groups that Turkey deems to be terrorist organizations, namely the PKK and the
Fethullah Gulen movement.67 (The United States and EU also classify the PKK as a terrorist
group.) Turkey is demanding that both countries lift the arms embargoes they have maintained
against Turkey since its 2019 incursion into Syria against a PKK-linked Kurdish group (the
People’s Protection Units—Kurdish acronym YPG) that has partnered with the U.S.-led anti-
Islamic State coalition (see “Syria”).68 Turkish officials also have requested the extradition of
alleged PKK members from Sweden and Finland, and reportedly seek to have both countries
curtail PKK- and Gulen movement-related activities on their territory.69
After meeting with Secretary of State Antony Blinken in New York on May 18, Turkish Foreign
Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said that Turkey expected more support from all NATO allies related
to its concerns about the PKK and YPG. He called for U.S. officials to remove the sanctions

63 Jon Jackson, “Russia Risks Losing Its Power in the Black Sea,” Newsweek, May 2, 2022.
64 Cornell Overfield, “Turkey Must Close the Turkish Straits Only to Russian and Ukrainian Warships,” Lawfare Blog,
March 5, 2022.
65 James Kraska, “Can Turkey Legally Close Its Straits to Russian Warships? It’s Complicated,” foreignpolicy.com,
March 1, 2022.
66 Emily Rauhala et al., “Turkey blocks start of NATO talks on Finland, Sweden,” Washington Post, May 19, 2022. See
also “Recep Tayyip Erdogan on NATO expansion,” Economist, May 30, 2022.
67 Semih Idiz, “How long can Erdogan sustain threat to veto Finnish, Swedish NATO bids?” Al-Monitor, May 17,
2022.
68 Sources citing links between the PKK and YPG (or PKK affiliates in Syria) include State Department, Country
Reports on Terrorism 2020, Syria; Mandiraci, “Turkey’s PKK Conflict: A Regional Battleground in Flux”; Barak
Barfi, Ascent of the PYD and the SDF, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2016.
69 Ragip Soylu, “Turkey demands extradition of PKK members from Sweden, Finland for Nato bid,” Middle East Eye,
May 16, 2022; Richard Milne and Laura Pitel, “Erdoğan blocks Nato accession talks with Sweden and Finland,”
Financial Times, May 18, 2022.
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placed on Turkey for its acquisition of an S-400 system from Russia and suspend their support for
the YPG in Syria.70 Such calls, which Cavusoglu did not explicitly say were conditions of
Swedish and Finnish accession, may be connected with Turkey’s proposed plans to expand its
areas of control in northern Syria at the YPG’s expense (see “Syria”).
Many U.S. and NATO officials, including President Biden, strongly support Swedish and Finnish
accession and have voiced confidence that Turkey will not block it.71 In 2009, Turkey ultimately
withdrew objections it had to former Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen serving as
NATO Secretary General, and in 2019 NATO countries resolved a Turkish delay to defense
planning—with both cases at least partly related to Kurdish issues.72 Erdogan might be adopting a
nationalistic tone on a globally prominent issue for domestic political gain.73
Some observers express concern that Turkish actions to delay accession could increase its
isolation within NATO at a time when the Russia-Ukraine war has presented opportunities to
highlight Turkey’s value to NATO and bolster the alliance’s strength.74 Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Chairman Bob Menendez has called on the Administration to tell Erdogan “you’ve
got to act in a different way if you want consideration for anything,” such as the upgrade to its
fleet of F-16 aircraft that Turkey is seeking from the United States (discussed below). Senator
Thom Tillis, Co-Chair of the Senate NATO Observer Group, has said that the United States could
act to compel Turkey’s cooperation, but expressed a preference for not escalating tensions.75
U.S.-Turkey Arms Sales Issues
How Turkey procures key weapons systems is relevant to U.S. policy in part because it affects
Turkey’s partnerships with major powers and the country’s role within NATO. For decades,
Turkey has relied on certain U.S.-origin equipment such as aircraft, helicopters, missiles, and
other munitions to maintain military strength.76 Turkey’s purchase of a Russian S-400 surface-to-
air defense system (discussed below) has raised questions about whether Turkey can remain
closely integrated with the United States and NATO on defense matters. However, after Russia’s
invasion of Ukraine, Turkey appears less inclined to consider purchases of additional Russian
arms. One source quoted a senior Turkish diplomat as saying, “The war has practically killed all
potential Turkish-Russian deals in strategic weapons systems.”77

70 Jared Szuba, “US assures Sweden, Finland of military support as Turkey delays NATO entry,” Al-Monitor, May 19,
2022.
71 Rauhala et al., “Turkey blocks start of NATO talks on Finland, Sweden”; State Department, “Secretary Antony J.
Blinken and NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg at a Joint Press Availability,” June 1, 2022.
72 Idiz, “How long can Erdogan sustain threat to veto Finnish, Swedish NATO bids?”; Zaman, “Turkey continues to
play hard ball over Sweden, Finland NATO membership.”
73 Amberin Zaman, “Turkey continues to play hard ball over Sweden, Finland NATO membership,” Al-Monitor, May
16, 2022.
74 Idiz, “How long can Erdogan sustain threat to veto Finnish, Swedish NATO bids?”; Zaman, “Turkey continues to
play hard ball over Sweden, Finland NATO membership.”
75 Rauhala et al., “Turkey blocks start of NATO talks on Finland, Sweden.”
76 Turkey also has procurement and co-development relationships with other NATO allies, including Germany
(submarines), Italy (helicopters and reconnaissance satellites), and the United Kingdom (a fighter aircraft prototype).
77 Burak Ege Bekdil, “Russian invasion of Ukraine is reviving Euro-Turkish fighter efforts,” Defense News, March 9,
2022.
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Russian S-400 Acquisition: Removal from F-35 Program and U.S. Sanctions
Turkey’s acquisition of the Russian S-400 system, which Turkey ordered in 2017 and Russia
delivered in 2019,78 has significant implications for Turkey’s relations with Russia, the United
States, and other NATO countries. As a direct result of the transaction, the Trump Administration
removed Turkey from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program in July 2019, and imposed sanctions
under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA, P.L. 115-44) on
Turkey’s defense procurement agency in December 2020.79 In explaining the U.S. decision to
remove Turkey from the F-35 program, then-Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Sustainment Ellen Lord said, “Turkey cannot field a Russian intelligence collection platform
[within the S-400 system] in proximity to where the F-35 program makes, repairs and houses the
F-35. Much of the F-35’s strength lies in its stealth capabilities, so the ability to detect those
capabilities would jeopardize the long-term security of the F-35 program.”80
Before Turkey’s July 2019 removal from the F-35 program, it had planned to purchase at least
100 U.S.-origin F-35s and was one of eight original consortium partners in the development and
industrial production of the aircraft.81 Section 1245 of the FY2020 National Defense
Authorization Act (P.L. 116-92) prohibits the use of U.S. funds to transfer F-35s to Turkey unless
the Secretaries of Defense and State certify that Turkey no longer possesses the S-400. Turkish
officials continue to publicly express hope that they can acquire the F-35 at some future time.
Turkish interest in procurement deals that feature technology sharing and co-production—thereby
bolstering Turkey’s domestic defense industry—may have affected its S-400 decision.
Strengthening its defense industry became a priority for Turkey after the 1975-1978 U.S. arms
embargo over Cyprus.82 Over time, Turkish companies have supplied an increased percentage of
Turkey’s defense needs, with equipment ranging from armored personnel carriers and naval
vessels to drone aircraft. While Turkey’s S-400 purchase reportedly did not feature technology
sharing,83 one reason Turkish officials favored the S-400 was a hope that it could open the door
for future technology sharing on air defense with Russia.84 Lack of agreement between the United
States and Turkey on technology sharing regarding the Patriot system possibly contributed to
Turkey’s interest in considering non-U.S. options for air defense, including an abortive attempt
from 2013 to 2015 to purchase a Chinese system.85

78 “Turkey, Russia sign deal on supply of S-400 missiles,” Reuters, December 29, 2017. According to this source,
Turkey and Russia reached agreement on the sale of at least one S-400 system for $2.5 billion, with the possibility of a
second system to come later.
79 CRS Insight IN11557, Turkey: U.S. Sanctions Under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act
(CAATSA), by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.
80 Defense Department, “Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Ellen M. Lord and Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy David J. Trachtenberg Press Briefing on DOD’s Response to Turkey Accepting
Delivery of the Russian S-400 Air and Missile Defense System,” July 17, 2019.
81 A 2007 memorandum of understanding among the consortium participants is available at https://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/102378.pdf, and an earlier 2002 U.S.-Turkey agreement is available at https://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/196467.pdf. For information on the consortium and its members, see CRS Report RL30563, F-
35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program, by Jeremiah Gertler.
82 Omar Lamrani, “Facing Sanctions, Turkey’s Defense Industry Goes to Plan B,” Stratfor, November 7, 2019.
83 Aaron Stein, “Putin’s Victory: Why Turkey and America Made Each Other Weaker,” Foreign Policy Research
Institute, July 29, 2019.
84 Burak Ege Bekdil, “West’s reluctance to share tech pushes Turkey further into Russian orbit,” Defense News,
January 10, 2020.
85 Flanagan et al., Turkey’s Nationalist Course.
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Other factors may have influenced Turkey’s decision to purchase the S-400. One is Turkey’s
apparent desire to diversify its foreign arms sources.86 Another is Turkish President Erdogan’s
possible interest in defending against U.S.-origin aircraft such as those used by some Turkish
military personnel in the 2016 coup attempt.87
Turkey has conducted some testing of the S-400 but has not made the system generally
operational. President Erdogan stated in September 2021 that Turkey expected to purchase a
second S-400 system.88 Secretary of State Blinken warned Turkey that acquiring an additional
system could lead to more U.S. sanctions under CAATSA.89 Turkey may need to forgo possession
or use of the S-400 in order to have CAATSA sanctions removed.
Possible F-16 Upgrades and Congressional Views
In the fall of 2021, Turkish officials stated that they had requested to purchase 40 new F-16
fighter aircraft from the United States and to upgrade 80 F-16s from Turkey’s aging fleet.
President Biden reportedly discussed the F-16 request with Erdogan during an October 2021 G20
meeting in Rome, indicating that the request would go through the regular arms sales consultation
and notification process with Congress.90
Turkey’s value as a NATO ally amid a new crisis implicating European security—Russia’s war
on Ukraine—may have boosted the Administration’s interest in moving forward with an F-16
transaction with Turkey. Responding to criticism of a possible F-16 sale from 53 Members of
Congress in a February 2022 letter,91 a State Department official wrote in March that Turkey’s
support for Ukraine was “an important deterrent to malign influence in the region.”92 While
acknowledging that any sale would require congressional notification, the official added, “The
Administration believes that there are nonetheless compelling long-term NATO alliance unity and
capability interests, as well as U.S. national security, economic and commercial interests that are
supported by appropriate U.S. defense trade ties with Turkey.”93
In April 2022, the Administration reportedly notified Congress informally of its intent to upgrade
some of Turkey’s existing F-16 fleet and provide short- and medium-range air-to-air missiles
(Sidewinder AIM-9X and AMRAAM AIM-120D) at a total cost to Turkey of around $500
million.94 In November 2021, a Turkish defense expert described what upgrades of Turkey’s F-16

86 “Turkey is buying Russian missiles to diversify supply,” Oxford Analytica, January 26, 2018.
87 Nicholas Danforth, “Frustration, Fear, and the Fate of U.S.-Turkish Relations,” German Marshall Fund of the United
States, July 19, 2019; Ali Demirdas, “S-400 and More: Why Does Turkey Want Russian Military Technology So
Badly?” nationalinterest.org, July 14, 2019.
88 Humeyra Pamuk, “Erdogan says Turkey plans to buy more Russian defense systems,” Reuters, September 27, 2021.
89 Tal Axelrod, “Blinken warns Turkey, US allies against purchasing Russian weapons,” The Hill, April 28, 2021.
90 “Biden talks F-16s, raises human rights in meeting with Turkey’s Erdogan,” Reuters, October 31, 2021; Diego
Cupolo, “In troubled US-Turkey relations, F-16 deal seen as path for dialogue,” Al-Monitor, November 1, 2021. For
background information, see CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr.
91 Text of letter available at
https://pallone.house.gov/sites/pallone.house.gov/files/20220123%20Letter%20on%20Turkey%20F-
16%20Request.pdf.
92 Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Naz Durakoglu, quoted in Humeyra Pamuk, “U.S. says
potential F-16 sale to Turkey would serve U.S. interests, NATO – letter,” Reuters, April 6, 2022.
93 Ibid.
94 Jared Malsin, “Biden Administration Asks Congress to Approve New Weapons Deal with Turkey,” Wall Street
Journal, May 11, 2022; Daniel Flatley and Selcan Hacaoglu, “Turkey Wins Biden Backing for Its F-16 Fighter Jets
Upgrades,” Bloomberg, May 12, 2022. For information on informal and formal congressional notifications, see CRS
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aircraft to the Block 70/72 Viper configuration could entail, including a new radar, other software
and hardware enhancements, and structural improvements that significantly extend each aircraft’s
service life.95 Other countries that may receive new or upgraded F-16 Block 70/72 Vipers include
Greece, Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, Morocco, Bahrain, Bulgaria, the Philippines, and
Slovakia.96
U.S. sales to boost the capabilities and extend the lifespan of Turkey’s F-16 fleet would provide
Turkey time to develop its long-planned indigenous fifth-generation fighter aircraft, dubbed the
TF-X and expected to come into operation over the next decade. Turkey is apparently seeking to
partner with the United Kingdom (including companies BAE Systems and Rolls-Royce) to
develop technology for the TF-X.97 If unable to procure F-16s or F-16 upgrades to boost the
Turkish air force’s capabilities during the transition to the TF-X, Turkish officials had previously
hinted that they might consider purchasing Russian Su-35 fighter aircraft.98 After the outbreak of
the Russia-Ukraine war, Turkey’s calculus reportedly changed. According to a Turkish defense
analyst, “Security needs and politics dictate Ankara to remain within the NATO scope in its
fighter jet inventory. The only viable options before Turkey flies the TF-X are the [Eurofighter]
Typhoon, Saab [Gripen] and F-16 Block 70.”99
Turkey’s support for Ukraine may be inclining some key Members of Congress toward accepting
a possible U.S. upgrade or sale of F-16s for Turkey. After the S-400 transaction, some Members
reportedly placed informal holds on major new U.S.-origin arms sales to Turkey, in the biggest
disruption to U.S.-Turkey arms sales since the 1975-1978 embargo over Cyprus.100 However, in
the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a May 2022 article interviewed some congressional
committee leaders with oversight responsibilities for arms sales.101 Most signaled openness to
considering F-16 transactions. Chairman Menendez remained skeptical, saying, “[Turkey] acts in
ways that are contrary to our interests in a whole host of things. I think the administration has to
stop seeing … the aspirational part of what we would like Turkey to be and realize that Turkey is
under Erdogan.”102 In a later interview after Turkey announced conditions on its support for
Swedish and Finnish NATO accession, House Foreign Affairs Committee Ranking Member Mike
McCaul indicated that this Turkish stance could present problems for upgrading Turkey’s F-
16s.103
With U.S. officials already having notified a possible upgrade of F-16s for Greece to Congress in
2021,104 U.S. willingness to upgrade Turkish F-16s could have significant implications for the

Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr.
95 Arda Mevlutoglu, “F-16Vs Instead of F-35s: What’s behind Turkey’s Request?” Politics Today, November 22, 2021.
96 Ibid.
97 Bekdil, “Russian invasion of Ukraine is reviving Euro-Turkish fighter efforts.”
98 Paul Iddon, “Here Are Turkey’s Stopgap Options Until It Can Acquire Fifth-Generation Fighters,” forbes.com,
March 15, 2021.
99 Bekdil, “Russian invasion of Ukraine is reviving Euro-Turkish fighter efforts.”
100 Valerie Insinna et al., “Congress has secretly blocked US arms sales to Turkey for nearly two years,” Defense News,
August 12, 2020.
101 Bryant Harris, “Congress signals openness to Turkey F-16 sale amid Ukraine cooperation,” Defense News, May 4,
2022.
102 Ibid.
103 Bryant Harris, “Greece seeks to join F-35 program as it lobbies against Turkey F-16 sale,” Defense News, May 17,
2022.
104 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Greece – F-16 Sustainment Materiel and Services, Transmittal No. 21-49,”
August 3, 2021.
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security balance between Turkey and Greece, and for relations involving the three countries.105
Erdogan announced in May 2022 that he would no longer deal with Greek Prime Minister
Kyriakos Mitsotakis, after Mitsotakis appeared to raise concern about U.S.-Turkey arms
transactions while addressing a May 17 joint session of Congress.106 Turkey and Greece have
long-standing disputes over maritime and airspace boundaries, energy exploration, and the status
of Cyprus (see text box). A recent 2019-2020 spike in tensions has somewhat subsided, but during
that time Greece strengthened its relations with the United States and a number of regional
countries such as France, Israel, and Egypt.107
Turkish Disputes Regarding Greece and Cyprus: Historical Background108
Since the 1970s, disputes between Greece and Turkey over territorial rights in the Aegean Sea and broader
Eastern Mediterranean have been a major point of contention, bringing the sides close to military conflict on
several occasions. The disputes, which have their roots in territorial changes after World War I, revolve around
contested borders involving the two countries’ territorial waters, national airspace, exclusive economic zones, and
continental shelves (see Figure A-6). These tensions are related to and further complicated by one of the
region’s major unresolved conflicts, the de facto political division of Cyprus along ethnic lines that dates from the
1974 military clash in which Turkish forces invaded parts of the island to prevent the ethnic Greek leadership
from unifying Cyprus with Greece. The internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus, which has close ties to
Greece, claims jurisdiction over the entire island, but its effective administrative control is limited to the southern
two-thirds, where Greek Cypriots comprise a majority. Turkish Cypriots administer the northern third and are
backed by Turkey, including a Turkish military contingent there since the 1974 clash.109 In 1983, Turkish Cypriot
leaders proclaimed this part of the island the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, although no country other
than Turkey recognizes it.
Syria110
Turkey’s involvement in Syria’s conflict since 2011 has been complicated and costly and has
severely strained U.S.-Turkey ties.111 Turkey’s priorities in Syria’s civil war have evolved during
the course of the conflict. While Turkey still opposes Syrian President Bashar al Asad, it has
engaged in a mix of coordination and competition with Russia and Iran (which support Asad) on
some matters since intervening militarily in Syria starting in August 2016. Turkey and the United
States have engaged in similarly inconsistent interactions in northern Syria east of the Euphrates
River where U.S. forces have been based.
Turkey’s chief objective has been to thwart the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG)
from establishing an autonomous area along Syria’s northern border with Turkey. Turkey’s

105 Aaron Stein, “You Go to War with the Turkey You Have, Not the Turkey You Want,” War on the Rocks, May 30,
2022.
106 Greek Prime Minister’s website, “Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis’ address to the Joint Session of the U.S.
Congress,” May 17, 2022.
107 See CRS Report R41368, Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.
108 Ibid.
109 Turkey retains between 30,000 and 40,000 troops on the island (supplemented by several thousand Turkish Cypriot
soldiers). This presence is countered by a Greek Cypriot force of approximately 12,000 with reported access to between
50,000 and 75,000 reserves. “Cyprus - Army,” Janes Sentinel Security Assessment - Eastern Mediterranean, February
3, 2021. The United Nations maintains a peacekeeping mission (UNFICYP) of approximately 900 personnel within a
buffer zone headquartered in Cyprus’s divided capital of Nicosia. The United Kingdom maintains approximately 3,000
personnel at two sovereign base areas on the southern portion of the island at Akrotiri and Dhekelia.
110 See CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, coordinated by Carla E. Humud.
111 For background, see Burak Kadercan, “Making Sense of Turkey’s Syria Strategy: A ‘Turkish Tragedy’ in the
Making,” War on the Rocks, August 4, 2017.
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government considers the YPG and its political counterpart, the Democratic Union Party (PYD),
to be a major threat to Turkish security because of Turkish concerns that YPG/PYD gains have
emboldened the PKK (which has links to the YPG/PYD) in its domestic conflict with Turkish
authorities.112 The YPG/PYD has a leading role within the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), an
umbrella group including Arabs and other non-Kurdish elements that became the main U.S.
ground force partner against the Islamic State in 2015. Turkish-led military operations in October
2019 to seize areas of northeastern Syria from the SDF—after President Trump agreed to have
U.S. Special Forces pull back from the border area—led to major criticism of and proposed action
against Turkey in Congress.113
In May 2022, Erdogan said that Turkey was considering a military operation to expand areas of
Turkish control in Syria as a means of countering YPG influence.114 In response, the State
Department spokesperson recognized Turkey’s “legitimate security concerns” but condemned any
escalation and said that the United States supports maintenance of the current ceasefire lines to
avoid destabilization and putting U.S. forces at risk in the campaign against the Islamic State.115
In early June, Turkey announced plans that involve areas west of the Euphrates River away from
U.S. forces, which are concentrated on the river’s east side (see Figure A-7).116 Russian officials
also have raised some concerns about how a new Turkish offensive might escalate tensions and
may seek to encourage greater Turkish coordination with Syrian government forces.117
In areas of northern Syria that Turkey has occupied since 2016, Turkey has set up local councils.
These councils and associated security forces provide public services in these areas with funding,
oversight, and training from Turkish officials. Questions persist about future governance and
Turkey’s overarching role.
The Turkish military remains in a standoff with Russia and the Syrian government over the future
of Syria’s northwestern province of Idlib, the last part of the country held by anti-Asad groups
(including some with links to Al Qaeda). Turkey deployed troops to Idlib to protect it from Syrian
government forces and prevent further refugee flows into Turkey. A limited outbreak of conflict
in 2020 displaced hundreds of thousands of Syrian civilians and caused several Turkish and
Syrian casualties. Russian willingness to back Syrian operations in Idlib perhaps stems in part
from Turkey’s unwillingness or inability to enforce a 2018 Turkey-Russia agreement by removing
heavy weapons and “radical terrorist groups” from the province.118 Questions related to the
Russia-Ukraine war about the effect of Turkish measures to limit Russian military access to Syria

112 See, e.g., Soner Cagaptay, “U.S. Safe Zone Deal Can Help Turkey Come to Terms with the PKK and YPG,”
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 7, 2019. For sources linking the PKK to the YPG (or PKK affiliates
in Syria), see footnote 68.
113 Rachel Oswald, “Sanctions on Turkey go front and center as Congress returns,” rollcall.com, October 15, 2019.
114 Fehim Tastekin, “The stumbling blocks facing Turkey’s new operation plan in Syria,” Al-Monitor, May 30, 2022.
115 State Department Press Briefing, May 24, 2022. The United States and Russia established separate arrangements
with Turkey in October 2019 for managing certain areas of northeast Syria. White House, “The United States and
Turkey Agree to Ceasefire in Northeast Syria,” October 17, 2019; State Department, “Special Representative for Syria
Engagement James F. Jeffrey Remarks to the Traveling Press,” October 17, 2019; President of Russia, “Memorandum
of Understanding Between Turkey and the Russian Federation,” October 22, 2019.
116 Nazlan Ertan, “Erdogan announces military operations in Syria's Manbij, Tal Rifaat,” Al-Monitor, June 1, 2022.
117 Fehim Tastekin, “Ukraine, Syria top Lavrov’s agenda in Turkey,” Al-Monitor, June 6, 2022.
118 Text of agreement available at https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/full-text-of-turkey-russia-memorandum-on-
idlib-revealed-1.771953.
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by air and sea,119 and possible Russian moves to limit humanitarian access, could affect future
developments.120
Refugees in Turkey
Turkey hosts about 3.6 mil ion Syrian refugees—more than any other country—along with hundreds of thousands
from other countries.121 A few weeks after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine began, Turkey estimated that 20,000
Ukrainians had come to Turkey.122 Refugees’ and other migrants’ living situations, effect on Turkey’s population,
and access to employment, education, and public services vary based on the differing circumstances that they face.
Turkey closed off most access to migrants from Syria in 2015123 and has sought to repatriate refugees who are
wil ing to return,124 with a few hundred thousand reportedly having done so to date.125 Reportedly, Turkish
authorities have forcibly returned some refugees to Syria.126
Per a 2016 Turkey-EU agreement to minimize the flow of migrants to the EU, Greece can return Syrian migrants
to Turkey that come to its islands. As part of a structured process, the deal calls for the same number of people
to be resettled from Turkey in EU countries.127 The agreement also mandated EU economic assistance for
refugees in Turkey. During some times of crisis, President Erdogan has threatened to open Turkey’s borders to
allow migrants into Greece and Bulgaria. Those countries implement security measures—with the assistance of
the EU’s border and coast guard agency—to minimize the number of crossings via land or sea, and some sources
have criticized them for alleged ethical or international legal violations related to the treatment of refugees or
migrants.128

119 Dorian Jones, “Ankara Tightens Russian Access to Syria,” Voice of America, May 10, 2022.
120 Lara Jakes, “Fear That Russia Plans to Leverage Syrian Aid for an Edge in Ukraine,” New York Times, June 1, 2022.
121 See https://reporting.unhcr.org/turkey#toc-narratives.
122 Nazlan Ertan, “Erdogan steps up pro-refugee rhetoric as 20,000 Ukrainians come to Turkey,” Al-Monitor, March 17,
2022.
123 Ceylan Yeginsu and Karam Shoumali, “Turkey Moves to Close All Gates at Border With Syria,” New York Times,
March 29, 2015.
124 “Turkey talks with UN over returning Syrian refugees,” Associated Press, September 12, 2021.
125 Durrie Bouscaren, “Syrian refugees and migrants in Turkey face a difficult decision to return home,” The World,
September 23, 2021.
126 Sultan al-Kanj, “Turkey forcibly deports dozens of Syrians,” Al Monitor, February 8, 2022.
127 Text of agreement available at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkey-
statement/.
128 “Greece: Pushbacks and violence against refugees and migrants are de facto border policy,” Amnesty International,
June 23, 2021; “Bulgaria: Pushbacks Escalate as Government Discusses Reinforcements at Borders,” European
Council on Refugees and Exiles, September 10, 2021.
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Appendix A. Maps, Facts, and Figures
Figure A-1. Turkey at a Glance

Geography
Area: 783,562 sq km (302,535 sq. mile), slightly larger than Texas
People
Population: 83,047,706
Most populous cities: Istanbul 15.6 mil, Ankara 5.3 mil, Izmir 3.1 mil, Bursa 2.1 mil, Adana 1.8 mil,
Gaziantep 1.8 mil.
% of Population 14 or Younger: 23.4%
Ethnic Groups: Turks 70%-75%; Kurds 19%; Other minorities 6%-11% (2016)
Religion: Muslim 99.8% (mostly Sunni), Others (mainly Christian and Jewish) 0.2%
Literacy: 96.7% (male 99.1%, female 94.4%) (2019)
Economy
GDP Per Capita (at purchasing power parity): $37,488
Real GDP Growth: 2.7%
Inflation: 60.5%
Unemployment: 11.3%
Budget Deficit as % of GDP: 4.8%
Public Debt as % of GDP: 43.3%
Current Account Deficit as % of GDP: 5.7%
Sources: Graphic created by CRS. Map boundaries and information generated by Hannah Fischer using
Department of State Boundaries (2011); Esri (2014); ArcWorld (2014); DeLorme (2014). Fact information (2022
estimates or forecasts unless otherwise specified) from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook
Database; Economist Intelligence Unit; and Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook.

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Figure A-2. Turkey: Annual Inflation Rate

Sources: Reuters (May 2022) using data from the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey and Turkish Statistical
Institute.

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Figure A-3. Bayraktar TB2 Drone

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Figure A-4. Map of U.S. and NATO Military Presence in Turkey

Sources: Created by CRS using data gathered from the Department of Defense, NATO, and various media
outlets since 2011.
Note: All locations are approximate.

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Figure A-5. Map of Black Sea Region and Turkish Straits

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Figure A-6. Competing Claims in the Eastern Mediterranean

Source: Main map created by The Economist, with slight modifications by CRS.
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Figure A-7. Syria Conflict Map

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Appendix B. Relations with Israel and Arab States
Since the 2010s, Turkey’s relations with Israel and with Sunni Arab governments that support
traditional authoritarian governance models in the region—notably Saudi Arabia, the United Arab
Emirates (UAE), and Egypt—have been fraught with tension. Under President Erdogan, Turkey
and Israel have clashed politically over Israel’s handling of Palestinian issues and Turkey’s
support for the Sunni Islamist group Hamas (a U.S.-designated terrorist organization), even
though the countries have continued to expand trade ties.129 The Sunni Arab governments have
regarded Turkey with suspicion largely because of the Turkish government’s sympathies for
Islamist political groups and its close relationship with Qatar.130
Developments in Libya increased the overlap between Turkey’s disputes in the Eastern
Mediterranean and its rivalries with the Sunni Arab governments because they supported
opposing sides in Libya’s civil war. In late 2019, Turkey signed an agreement with Libya’s then-
Government of National Accord (GNA) on maritime boundaries, complicating the legal and
economic picture in the Eastern Mediterranean. Tensions spiked further after Greece and Egypt
reached a maritime boundary agreement in August 2020 that ignores the 2019 Turkey-Libya deal.
In the past year, however, Turkey has sought rapprochement with some of its regional rivals. The
potential economic benefits could help alleviate Turkey’s financial crisis ahead of closely
contested presidential and parliamentary elections in 2023. For example, Erdogan and UAE
President Shaykh Mohammad bin Zayid al Nuhayyan have visited each other in recent months,
and the two countries have signed a currency swap deal along with many other agreements on
economic cooperation and investment.131 Additionally, figures indicate that Turkish trade with
Saudi Arabia increased year-on-year by 25% in the first quarter of 2022.132 In April 2022,
Erdogan visited Saudi Arabia after Turkey transferred jurisdiction to the Saudis over the trial
Turkey had previously convened for Jamal Khashoggi’s murder. One media report anticipates
UAE investment in Turkey’s defense industry and Turkish defense exports to the Gulf—
potentially including drones, air defense systems, and various air, sea, and land platforms.133
Moreover, Israel and Turkey have shown signs of improving ties over the past year. The two
countries maintain diplomatic relations but have not had ambassadors stationed in each other’s
country since 2018.
Israeli openness to rapprochement with Turkey may stem from a confluence of factors, including
 Potentially greater Turkish willingness to reduce its support for Hamas in hopes
of better political and economic relations with Israel and other key U.S. partners
in the region (Sunni Arab governments such as the UAE and Saudi Arabia)—
partly to improve Turkey’s image in Washington. Some reports from early 2022

129 Kemal Kirisci and Dan Arbell, “President Herzog’s visit to Ankara: A first step in normalizing Turkey-Israel
relations?” Brookings Institution, March 7, 2022.
130 Flanagan et al., Turkey’s Nationalist Course; Andrew England, et al., “UAE vs Turkey: the regional rivalries pitting
MBZ against Erdogan,” Financial Times, October 26, 2020.
131 “UAE and Turkey central banks seek further co-operation after currency swap deal,” The National, February 17,
2022.
132 Sinem Cengiz, “Echoes from President Erdoğan's Saudi Arabia Visit: A Fresh Start?” Politics Today, May 5, 2022.
133 Burak Ege Bekdil, “Turkey’s policy changes could see defense biz grow with Gulf rivals,” Defense News, March 1,
2022.
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 hinted at Turkey’s willingness to expel Hamas members allegedly involved in
militant operations from its territory.134
 Increasing Israeli focus on how relations with Turkey and other regional
countries might help counter Iran.
 The 2021 leadership change from the Netanyahu government to the Bennett-
Lapid power-sharing government.
In March 2022, Israeli President Isaac Herzog visited Turkey. In May, Turkish Foreign Minister
Mevlut Cavusoglu visited Israel (and the West Bank), and the two countries anticipate future
bilateral meetings and steps to improve political and economic relations. President Erdogan and
other top Turkish officials have made public statements expressing interest in energy cooperation
with Israel. However, Israeli officials reportedly remain skeptical about prospects for a subsea
Israel-Turkey natural gas pipeline.135 While Israel has pursued greater high-level interaction with
Turkey, it may be cautious about significant near-term improvements in bilateral relations, and
appears to remain committed to close strategic ties with Greece and the Republic of Cyprus.136

Author Information

Jim Zanotti
Clayton Thomas
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
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copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

134 Ariel Kahana, “Report: Israel, Turkey working to deport Hamas officials from Ankara,” Israel Hayom, February 15,
2022; Ofer Bengio, “Turkey Finds Israel Useful Again,” Tablet, March 13, 2022.
135 Lazar Berman, “FM’s visit shows Turkey eager to accelerate reconciliation, but Israel more cautious,” Times of
Israel, May 24, 2022. While such a pipeline may be the most feasible pipeline option for transporting Eastern
Mediterranean natural gas to Europe, political and economic obstacles may make liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports
from liquefaction terminals in Egypt a more practical option. “Turkey best option for East Med gas transit to Europe:
Experts,” Daily Sabah, March 10, 2022; Sean Mathews, “Russia-Ukraine war: Conflict boosts hopes for East
Mediterranean energy, experts say,” Middle East Eye, April 5, 2022.
136 “Summit in Ankara: Turkey is wooing a reluctant Israel,” Americans for Peace Now, March 14, 2022.
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