link to page 1 link to page 1 
Updated May 26, 2022
Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV)
Background
The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) Family of
JLTV CTV
Vehicles (FoV) is an Army-led, joint-service program
Figure 1. JLTV Combat Tactical Vehicle Variant
designed to replace a portion of each service’s light tactical
(CTV)
wheeled vehicle fleets. The JLTV FoV consists of two
variants: the four-seat Combat Tactical Vehicle (CTV)
(Figure 1) and the two-seat Combat Support Vehicle (CSV)
(Figure 2). The CTV is to support the General Purpose,
Heavy Gun Carrier and Close Combat Weapon Carrier
missions. The CSV is to support the Utility/Shelter Carrier
mission. The JLTV is transportable by a range of lift assets,
including rotary-wing aircraft. Its maneuverability enables
activities across the spectrum of terrain, including urban
areas, while providing inherent and supplemental armor
against direct fire and improvised explosive device threats.
Current Program Status
The JLTV is currently being produced by Oshkosh
Defense, headquartered in Oshkosh, WI. In August 2015,
the Army awarded Oshkosh a $6.7 billion low-rate initial
Source: https://asc.army.mil/web/portfolio-item/cs-css-joint-light-
production (LRIP) contract to procure the initial 16,901
tactical-vehicle/, accessed December 30, 2020.
vehicles for the Army and Marines. In June 2019, the
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisitions, Logistics,
JLTV CSV
and Technology) approved Army JLTV full-rate production
Figure 2. JLTV Combat Support Vehicle Variant
(FRP). The Army plans for a follow-on full-rate production
(CSV)
contract to be awarded to a single vendor in the fourth
quarter of FY2022. It is planned to be a competitive five-
year contract with five one-year options for about 30,000
JLTVs and 10,000 JLTV trailers. The Army began fielding
LRIP JLTVs to units in April 2019, and Marine Corps units
received their first LRIP JLTVs in February 2019.
Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) is a programmatic
decision made when manufacturing development is completed
and there is an ability to produce a small-quantity set of
articles. It also establishes an initial production base and sets
the stage for a gradual increase in production rate to allow for
Ful -Rate Production (FRP) upon completion of Operational
Test and Evaluation (OT&E).
Full-Rate Production (FRP) is a decision made that allows
Source: https://asc.army.mil/web/portfolio-item/cs-css-joint-light-
for government contracting for economic production
tactical-vehicle/, accessed December 30, 2020.
quantities fol owing stabilization of the system design and
validation of the production process.
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV)
Budgetary Information
cost increase, Congress might review JLTV costs after the
Table 1. FY2023 DOD JLTV Budget Request
Army awards the follow-on contract in December 2023.
Total
Future of JLTV Procurement
Total Request
Request
The Army’s current modernization strategy is primarily
Funding Category
($M)
(Qty.)
focused on six modernization priorities that do not include
RDT&E USA
9.4
—
the JLTV. Furthermore, the Army announced in January
RDT&E USMC
2.9
—
2022 that under the Army 2030 Force Design Initiative, the
Procurement USA
734.9
2,909
Army would either redesignate existing divisions or create
new divisions into five new types of divisions:
Procurement USAF
60.8
138
Procurement USN
28.6
18
Standard Light;
Procurement USMC
222.3
656
Standard Heavy;
Source: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptrol er)/Chief Financial Officer, Program Acquisition Cost by
Penetration;
Weapon System: United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year
Joint Force Entry Air Assault; and
2023 Budget Request, April 2022, p. 3-2.
Notes: RDT&E = Research, Development, Test & Evaluation; $M =
Joint Force Entry Airborne.
U.S. dollars in mil ions; Qty. = FY2023 procurement quantities.
The Army also announced in May 2022 that it would create
Foreign Military Sales
a new Alaska-based division, the 11th Airborne Division, by
activating new units and reconfiguring two Alaska-based
The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notes
Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs). With the creation
approved JLTV sales to the United Kingdom ($1.035
of new division types and an additional division in Alaska,
billion for 2,747 JLTVs) and Lithuania ($170.8 million for
it is possible that the Army’s requirement for JLTVs could
500 JLTVs).
change significantly.
JLTV Follow-On Contract
With the Marine Corps downsizing in accordance with its
The Army originally planned to award a follow-on full-rate
March 2020 Force Design Initiative and adoption of a more
JLTV production contract to a single vendor in the fourth
expeditionary posture (possibly requiring fewer JLTVs),
quarter of FY2022. Reportedly, the Army pushed back the
original JLTV procurement plans for both the Army and
due date for companies to bid on the JLTV follow-on
Marine Corps might no longer be accurate. Despite the
contract to July 15, 2022, based on requests from industry.
Army’s intent to lower costs by competing a follow-on
The Army plans to award the single vendor contract in
contract with another vendor by FY2022, slowing
December 2022. Because the Army owns the technical data
production rates and extended procurement timelines could
for the JLTV, it is able to conduct a competition to see if
act to increase costs if current JLTV requirements are no
any vendors can build the vehicle at a lower price than
longer valid. In addition, different versions of the JLTV
Oshkosh, which was awarded the LRIP contract in 2015.
produced by another vendor could result in additional
The follow-on contract is reportedly estimated to be worth
operations and maintenance costs that can result from a
over $7.3 billion over a decade.
mixed fleet of vehicles. Taken collectively, these issues
Potential Issues for Congress
might merit DOD and policymakers examining the future of
JLTV procurement to help determine the current
requirement for JLTVs and associated cost implications.
Potential Post Follow-On Contract JLTV Cost
Increase
For a more detailed historical discussion of the JLTV Program,
Reportedly, the JLTV could become more expensive after
see CRS Report RS22942, Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV):
the follow-on contract is awarded in December 2022. Army
Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.
FY2023 budget documents suggest there might be “higher
estimated unit costs for the competitive follow-on contract,”
For additional information on Army 2030, see CRS In Focus
which could lead to a higher price per vehicle in FY2023
IF11542, The Army’s AimPoint and Army 2030 Force Structure
than in FY2022. If a new manufacturer other than Oshkosh
Initiatives, by Andrew Feickert.
is chosen in December 2022, the new manufacturer
For additional information on Marine Corps Force Design
reportedly could face higher costs than Oshkosh during the
2030, see CRS Insight IN11281, New U.S. Marine Corps Force
first year of its contract, as it would not have Oshkosh’s
Design Initiative: Force Design 2030, by Andrew Feickert.
experience building the JLTV. In such a case, it is
anticipated costs would decrease significantly after the first
year of the contract. The Army further notes that JLTV cost
elements could also fluctuate beyond the first year of the
Andrew Feickert, Specialist in Military Ground Forces
new contract based on unpredictable prices and strong
IF11729
commodity-related inflation. Given the potential for JLTV
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV)
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to
congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress.
Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has
been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the
United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be
reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include
copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you
wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.
https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11729 · VERSION 4 · UPDATED