FY2022 National Defense Authorization Act:
May 20, 2022
Context and Selected Issues for Congress
Brendan W. McGarry
The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) is policy legislation typically introduced and
Analyst in U.S. Defense
reported each year by the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) and the Senate Armed
Budget
Services Committee (SASC). The act primarily sets policy and authorizes appropriations for

activities of the Department of Defense (DOD) and national security programs of the Department
of Energy (DOE). FY2022 marked the 61st consecutive year for which Congress enacted an

annual defense authorization.
On May 28, 2021, President Joseph R. Biden submitted to Congress a budget request for fiscal year (FY) 2022 that included
$768.3 billion for national defense-related activities, including discretionary and mandatory programs. Of that amount,
$743.1 billion fell within the scope of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (FY2022 NDAA; H.R.
4350; S. 2792; S. 1605; P.L. 117-81), with $714.8 billion for DOD activities, $27.9 billion for DOE activities, and $0.4
billion for other defense-related activities. The requested amount within the scope of the NDAA was $11.5 billion (1.6%)
more than the FY2021 authorized amount. On September 22, 2021, the SASC reported a version of the bill (S. 2792) that
would have authorized $767.7 billion. On September 23, 2021, the House passed a version of the NDAA (H.R. 4350) that
would have authorized $768.1 billion. On December 27, 2021, President Biden signed into law the FY2022 NDAA, which
authorized $768.2 billion—$25.1 billion (3.4%) more than the request.
The President’s budget request was the first in a decade not subject to statutory spending limits, or caps, set by the Budget
Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25; 2 U.S.C. §901), as amended. The request proposed discontinuing funding
designated for Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism (OCO/GWOT), a special type of funding that
was, in effect, exempt from the caps. Instead, the Administration requested funding for contingency operations in the regular,
or base, DOD budget (i.e., funding for planned or regularly occurring costs to staff, train, and equip the military).
Following the August 2021 collapse of the U.S.-backed Afghan government and its security forces and the withdrawal of
U.S. military personnel from Afghanistan, the FY2022 NDAA did not authorize funding for the Afghanistan Security Forces
Fund (ASFF). The legislation authorized funding for activities in support of the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI),
including $300 million for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, through which DOD provides lethal equipment and
other support to the Ukrainian military and security forces. The legislation also authorized $7.1 billion for activities in
support of the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI), an effort intended to strengthen U.S. defense posture in the Indo-Pacific
region, primarily west of the International Date Line.
The FY2022 NDAA authorized a military end-strength of 2.15 million personnel in the active and reserve components,
comparable to the requested level. The legislation supported a 2.7% military pay raise, in line with the formula in current law.
Among the programs for which Congress authorized more funding than requested were the Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class
destroyer; the F-35A Lightning II fighter jet, and a Homeland [missile] Defense Radar system (HDR-H) in Hawaii. The
legislation authorized a total of $437 million for 50 earmarks (also known as congressionally directed spending or
Community Project Funding items) within DOD research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) and military
construction (MILCON) accounts. Among the programs for which Congress authorized less funding than requested were the
Army’s next-generation night-vision technology (known as the Integrated Visual Augmentation System, or IVAS), naval
auxiliary vessels, and a type of ship-defense missile.
The legislation required the appointment of a special trial counsel within each of the armed services to deal with sexual
assault and military justice matters; directed policy changes and oversight requirements related to various environmental
matters, including per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS), burn pits, and fuel leaks; and established a commission to
review and issue recommendations to improve the effectiveness of DOD’s Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and
Execution (PPBE) process. Among the issues debated by one or both chambers during consideration of the bill but not
included in the enacted version were provisions that would have required women to register for the draft.
This report compares authorizations for major defense appropriations titles, programs, and policy matters in the
Administration’s FY2022 budget request, House-passed and SASC-reported versions of the FY2022 NDAA, and enacted
legislation. This report also provides references to other CRS reports that provide in-depth analysis and contextual
information on certain defense and foreign policy issues.
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Introduction
The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) is a defense policy bill, typically introduced
and reported each year by the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) and the Senate Armed
Services Committee (SASC). Unlike an appropriations act, the NDAA generally does not provide
funding (i.e., budget authority).1 The legislation sets policy and authorizes appropriations for the
Department of Defense (DOD), nuclear weapons and reactor programs of the Department of
Energy (DOE), and certain other defense-related activities.2
The NDAA is a vehicle through which Congress fulfills its responsibility as mandated in Article I,
Section 8, of the U.S. Constitution. This section of the Constitution provides Congress with the
authority to “provide for the common Defence,” “raise and support Armies,” “provide and
maintain a Navy,” and “make Rules for the ... Regulation of the land and naval Forces,” among
other powers.3
The legislation establishes or continues defense programs, projects, or activities, and provides
guidance on how appropriated funds are to be used in carrying out those efforts. While the NDAA
does not provide budget authority, historically it has provided an indicator of congressional intent
on funding for particular programs. The bill authorizes funding for DOD activities at the same
level of detail at which budget authority is provided by the corresponding defense and military
construction appropriations acts. As defense authorization and appropriations legislation can
differ on a line-item level, an authorization of appropriations can be reviewed as a funding target
rather than a ceiling.
The NDAA has a history of regular enactment; FY2022 marked the 61st consecutive year for
which an annual defense authorization was enacted.4 The bill sometimes serves as a vehicle for
legislation originating in committees other than the Armed Services committees. This report
focuses solely on defense-related matters in the legislation.
CRS Products on the NDAA
For more information on the NDAA, see CRS In Focus IF10515, Defense Primer: The NDAA Process and CRS In
Focus IF10516, Defense Primer: Navigating the NDAA. For historical information on defense authorizations, see CRS
Report 98-756, Defense Authorization and Appropriations Bills: FY1961-FY2021. For more information on the federal
budget process, see CRS Report R46240, Introduction to the Federal Budget Process. For more information on the
differences between authorizations and appropriations, see CRS Report R46497, Authorizations and the
Appropriations Process.

1 Budget authority is authority provided by law to a federal agency to obligate money for goods and services. For more
information, see Government Accountability Office (GAO), A Glossary of Terms Used in the Federal Budget Process,
September 2005, p. 20, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-05-734sp.pdf.
2 The national defense budget function (identified by the numerical notation 050) comprises three subfunctions:
Department of Defense (DOD)–Military (051); atomic energy defense activities primarily of the Department of Energy
(053); and other defense-related activities (054), such as FBI counterintelligence activities. For the most part, the
NDAA does not authorize funds for the national defense budget subfunction 054 (Other Defense-Related). For more
information on the national defense budget function, see the following section and CRS In Focus IF10618, Defense
Primer: The National Defense Budget Function (050).
3 U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Section 8, at https://www.senate.gov/civics/constitution_item/constitution.htm#a1_sec8.
4 For more information, see CRS Report 98-756, Defense Authorization and Appropriations Bills: FY1961-FY2021.
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Background
This section provides background on congressional action on FY2022 defense authorization
legislation, including the strategic and budgetary context in which it occurred, as well as details
on the FY2022 President’s budget request.
Strategic Context5
Congressional consideration of the FY2022 NDAA occurred as the Biden Administration was
developing strategies for national security and defense programs. By law, for example, the
President is required to submit to Congress a National Security Strategy (NSS; 50 U.S.C §3043)
and the Secretary of Defense a National Defense Strategy (NDS; 10 U.S.C. §113).6
The Biden Administration stated that efforts to align spending priorities with the President’s
Interim National Security Strategic Guidance (INSSG) helped shape its FY2022 defense budget
request.7 Officials said Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III planned to submit the NDS in
early 2022.8 In March 2021, the President released the INSSG, which stated that the United States
faces “growing rivalry” with China, Russia, and other authoritarian states, and would “work to
responsibly end America’s longest war in Afghanistan.”9
Elements of the INSSG appeared to build on aspects of the Trump Administration’s national
strategy documents, including the 2017 NSS and 2018 NDS.10 The 2018 NDS unclassified
summary emphasized retaining a U.S. strategic competitive edge relative to China and Russia
rather than countering violent extremist organizations.11 This emphasis and the call for “increased
and sustained investment” to counter evolving threats from China and Russia marked a change in
weight from previous strategy documents.12 While the INSSG included references to investment
in national defense, its pledge to “increase investments in technology research, development, and
deployment” occurred in the context of risks posed by climate change.13
The Trump Administration’s 2018 NDS, however, did not address the question of pandemics or
climate change as national security threats. The Biden Administration’s INSSG, by comparison,
referenced “pandemics and other biological risks, the escalating climate crisis, cyber and digital
threats, international economic disruptions, protracted humanitarian crises,” among other
threats.14

5 This section was coordinated with Kathleen J. McInnis, former CRS Specialist in International Security.
6 See 50 U.S.C. §3043.
7 Department of Defense (DOD), Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, May
2021, Defense Budget Overview, United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request, p. 1-3.
8 Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), Advance Policy Questions for Dr. Mara Karlin, Nominee to be Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities, released July 13, 2021, p. 6.
9 White House, Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, March 2021, pp. 6, 15.
10 For background and analysis on the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, see CRS In Focus IF11798, The
Interim National Security Strategic Guidance.
11 DOD, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American
Military’s Competitive Edge, p. 1.
12 Ibid., p. 4.
13 White House, Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, March 2021, p. 17.
14 Ibid., p. 7.
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The INSSG pledged to prioritize “new resources for diplomacy and development” and identified
defense priorities as follows:
 Military personnel. (“continue to invest in the people who serve in our all-
volunteer forces and their families.”);
 Readiness. (“sustain readiness and ensure that the U.S. Armed Forces remain the
best trained and equipped force in the world.”);
 Force structure. (“assess the appropriate structure, capabilities, and sizing of the
force, and, working with the Congress, shift our emphasis from unneeded legacy
platforms and weapons systems to free up resources for investments in the
cutting-edge technologies and capabilities that will determine our military and
national security advantage in the future.”);
 Acquisition processes. (“streamline the processes for developing, testing,
acquiring, deploying, and securing [cutting-edge technologies and
capabilities].”);
 DOD workforce. (“ensure that we have the skilled workforce to acquire,
integrate, and operate them.”);
 Ethical technology use. (“shape ethical and normative frameworks to ensure
[cutting-edge technologies and capabilities] are used responsibly.”);
 Special operations forces. (“maintain the proficiency of special operations
forces to focus on crisis response and priority counterterrorism and
unconventional warfare missions.”);
 Gray-zone capabilities. (“develop capabilities to better compete and deter gray
zone actions.”);15
 Climate resiliency. (“prioritize defense investments in climate resiliency and
clean energy.”); and
 Equal opportunity. (“work to ensure that the Department of Defense is a place
of truly equal opportunity where our service members do not face discrimination
or the scourge of sexual harassment and assault.”).16
In 2018, the National Defense Strategy Commission, established by Section 942 of FY2017
NDAA (P.L. 114-328; 130 Stat. 2367) to provide an independent assessment of the NDS,
recommended that policymakers increase defense spending by 3% to 5% per year in real terms
(i.e., adjusting for inflation)—or alter expectations of the strategy and America’s global strategic
objectives.17
In written responses prepared for the SASC in response to advance policy questions for his 2021
nomination as Defense Secretary, Austin wrote, “The most urgent challenge we face is the

15 The DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms does not define “gray zone.” In general, the term refers to
military actions short of war, such as cyber and information operations. For example, one academic states that DOD
officials “use the term to denote confrontations at the low end of the conflict spectrum in which war is not yet
underway, but military coercion is occurring to alter the status quo.” For more information, see James J. Wirtz, “Life in
the ‘Gray Zone’: Observations for Contemporary Strategists,” Defense and Security Analysis, vol. 33, no. 2, 2017: 106-
114.
16 White House, Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, March 2021, pp. 14-15, 22.
17 Eric Edelman and Gary Roughead (co-chairs), Providing for the Common Defense: The Report of the National
Defense Strategy Commission, United States Institute of Peace, November 2018, p. 52.
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pandemic,” referring to the outbreak of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19).18 Austin
described many of the concepts in the 2018 NDS as “fundamentally sound” and China as the
“pacing threat in most areas.”19 He wrote that the strategy “assumes sustained defense budget
growth, but that has not fully materialized.”20 Austin pledged to undertake a comprehensive
strategic review and called for DOD to be “prepared for modest growth in the coming years.”21
He wrote, “Given the fragile state of our economy and the large deficits required to combat the
impact of COVID, I expect fiscal pressure going forward.”22 Austin also pledged to review U.S.
nuclear posture and the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan.23
In written responses prepared for the same committee for her 2021 nomination as Deputy Defense
Secretary, Kathleen H. Hicks made related points, writing, “in light of COVID-19’s ongoing
impact, the Department must be fiscally pragmatic if it is to design a successful approach to
strategic competition.”24 In earlier writing, Hicks argued DOD could reduce its annual costs by
$20 billion to $30 billion without detracting from national security objectives “after some upfront
investment.”25 In her written responses for the SASC, Hicks described some of the upfront
investments that could yield future savings as “workforce incentives—from buy-outs to recruiting
bonuses, investments in technologies such as artificial intelligence and robotics, and cyber
defense.”26
In considering the FY2022 NDAA, some Members of Congress proposed increasing authorized
defense appropriations by 3% per year above inflation to prepare for long-term strategic
competition with China and Russia.27 Other Members of Congress recommended decreasing
defense spending to fund other priorities, such as response to the COVID-19 pandemic.28
Including amounts for national defense discretionary programs that were not in the jurisdiction of
HASC or SASC, discretionary programs that did not require additional authorization, and
national defense mandatory programs that were previously authorized, the total budget authority
implication of the enacted FY2022 NDAA was $790.6 billion.29 That amount was $25.1 billion

18 SASC, “Advance Policy Questions for Lloyd J. Austin, Nominee for Appointment to be Secretary of Defense,”
January 19, 2021, p. 3.
19 Ibid., pp. 7, 44.
20 Ibid., p. 7.
21 Ibid., p. 13.
22 Ibid., p. 14.
23 Ibid., pp. 67, 84.
24 SASC, “Advance Policy Questions for Dr. Kathleen Hicks, Nominee for Appointment to be Deputy Secretary of
Defense,” February 2, 2021, p. 18.
25 Kathleen Hicks, “Getting to Less: The Truth About Defense Spending,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2020, at
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2020-02-10/getting-less. At the time of the article, Hicks was Director of the
International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
26 SASC, “Advance Policy Questions for Dr. Kathleen Hicks,” p. 19.
27 See, for example, House Armed Services Committee (HASC), “Rogers Amendment to Increase Defense Budget
Topline Is Adopted,” minority press release, September 1, 2021, at https://republicans-
armedservices.house.gov/news/press-releases/rogers-amendment-increase-defense-budget-topline-adopted.
28 See, for example, Representative Ro Khanna, “Statement: Khanna Criticizes Defense Spending Increase in Biden’s
$1.5T 2022 Budget,” press release, April 9, 2021, at https://khanna.house.gov/media/press-releases/statement-khanna-
criticizes-defense-spending-increase-biden-s-15t-2022-budget; and letter from some Members of Congress to President
Joseph R. Biden, March 16, 2021, at
https://pocan.house.gov/sites/pocan.house.gov/files/documents/Biden%20Defense%20Cuts%20Letter_Final.pdf.
29 Explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA in Part 2 of the House section of the Congressional
Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7365.
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(3.3%) more than the President’s budget request and $38.2 billion (5.1%) more than the amount
authorized in FY2021.30 Adjusting for inflation, that amount was $24.3 billion (3.2%) more than
FY2021 (in constant FY2022 dollars).31
CRS Products on National Security and Defense Strategy
For more information on the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, see CRS In Focus IF11798, The Interim
National Security Strategic Guidance. For background and analysis on potential national-security implications of
COVID-19, see CRS Report R46336, COVID-19: Potential Implications for International Security Environment—Overview
of Issues and Further Reading for Congress. For background and analysis on great power competition, see CRS
Report R43838, Renewed Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress.
Budgetary Context32
Congressional consideration of the FY2022 NDAA occurred as federal spending was projected to
continue to exceed revenues. This trend raised questions about whether pressure to reduce the
federal deficit would affect defense budget plans.
In July 2021, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projected a federal deficit of $3.0 trillion
for FY2021, or 13.4% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).33 That percentage was the second-
highest since 1945.34 CBO attributed the size of the projected deficit in part to “the economic
disruption caused by the 2020-2021 coronavirus pandemic and the legislation enacted in
response.”35 CBO projected that spending would continue to exceed revenues over the next
decade (see Figure 1).36 From FY2022 to FY2031, CBO projected that discretionary defense
outlays would increase 23% and nondefense discretionary outlays 6%; while mandatory outlays
would increase 40% and net interest payments on the national debt 198%.37

30 Ibid., and conference report (H.Rept. 116-617) accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2021 (P.L. 116-283), p. 1939.
31 Based on CRS adjustment of figures to constant FY2022 dollars using GDP (chained) price index in Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), Historical Tables, Table 10.1, “Gross Domestic Product and Deflators Used in the
Historical Tables: 1940-2026.”
32 This section was coordinated with Megan S. Lynch, Specialist on Congress and the Legislative Process.
33 Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Additional Information About the Updated Budget and Economic Outlook:
2021 to 2031, July 2021, “At a Glance,” p. 2 of the PDF.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid., pp. 6, 16; and CBO, Budget and Economic Data, 10-Year Budget Projections, July 2021, Table 1-1, “CBO’s
Baseline Budget Projections, by Category,” and Table 1-4, “CBO’s Baseline Projections of Discretionary Spending.”
Outlays refer to money spent by a federal agency from authority provided by Congress.
37 Ibid.
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Figure 1. Outlays by Budget Enforcement Category and Revenues, FY2001-FY2031
(Projected)
(in trillions of nominal dollars)

Source: CRS analysis of Government Publishing Office (GPO), Budget of the U.S. Government Fiscal Year 2022,
Historical Tables, Table 1.4, “Receipts, Outlays, and Surpluses or Deficits (-) by Fund Group: 1934-2026,” and
Table 8.1, “Outlays by Budget Enforcement Act Category: 1962-2026,” and Congressional Budget Office, Budget
and Economic Data, 10-Year Budget Projections, July 2021, Table 1-1, “CBO’s Baseline Budget Projections, by
Category,” and Table 1-4, “CBO’s Baseline Projections of Discretionary Spending.”
Note: 2001 through 2020 reflect OMB amounts; 2021 through 2031 reflect CBO projections.
In recent decades, during periods of widening gaps between revenues and outlays, Congress has
sometimes enacted legislation intended to reduce the deficit in part by limiting federal spending,
including defense spending.
After the deficit reached nearly 6% of GDP in 1983,38 Congress enacted the Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (also known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act; P.L.
99-177). This legislation created annual deficit limits and stated that breaching them would
trigger automatic funding reductions equally divided between defense and non-defense
spending.39 In 1990, Congress passed the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (Title XIII of P.L.
101-508), which included statutory limits on discretionary spending. These limits were in effect
through 2002 and, in certain years, included a specific limit on defense spending.40
After the deficit reached nearly 10% of GDP in 2009,41 Congress enacted the Budget Control Act
of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25). The legislation reinstated statutory limits, or caps, on discretionary
spending for FY2012-FY2021 and resulted in separate annual limits for defense spending.42 The

38 OMB, Budget of the U.S. Government Fiscal Year 2022, Historical Tables, Table 1.2, “Summary of Receipts,
Outlays, and Surpluses or Deficits (-) as Percentages of GDP: 1930-2025.”
39 For background and analysis, see CRS Report R41901, Statutory Budget Controls in Effect Between 1985 and 2002.
40 Ibid. Defense spending limits under P.L. 101-508 were in place in FY1991, FY1992, FY1993, FY1998 and FY1999.
41 OMB, Budget of the U.S. Government Fiscal Year 2022, Historical Tables, Table 1.2, “Summary of Receipts,
Outlays, and Surpluses or Deficits (-) as Percentages of GDP: 1930-2025.”
42 For spending limits in FY2012 and FY2013, the BCA originally specified separate “security” and “nonsecurity”
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defense spending caps under BCA as amended applied to discretionary base budget authority for
the national defense budget function (050).43 The legislation effectively exempted certain other
types of funding from the caps, including funding designated for emergency requirements and
Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism (OCO/GWOT).44 Under the BCA,
discretionary spending limits were enforced through a mechanism called sequestration, which
automatically cancels previously enacted appropriations by an amount necessary to reach pre-
specified levels.45 Over the past decade, Congress enacted appropriations within BCA
discretionary spending limits except in FY2013, when President Barack Obama ordered the
sequestration of budgetary resources across nonexempt federal government accounts.46 BCA
discretionary spending limits expired in FY2021.47 As part of the FY2022 budget request, the
Biden Administration proposed discontinuing funding for OCO and, instead, requested funding
for contingency operations in the base budget.48
CRS Products on Discretionary Spending Caps
For background and analysis on the expiration of discretionary spending caps under the Budget Control Act, see
CRS Report R46752, Expiration of the Discretionary Spending Limits: Frequently Asked Questions. For more information
on the BCA, see CRS Video WVB00305, Budget Control Act: Overview and CRS Report R44039, The Defense Budget
and the Budget Control Act: Frequently Asked Questions.
Some observers have argued statutory spending limits disproportionately affect defense programs
and inadequately address projected growth in mandatory programs; others have argued they are
necessary in light of recurring deficits and increasing federal debt.49 In 2020, CBO identified
options for reducing the federal budget deficit through budgetary savings in both mandatory and
discretionary programs.50 Twelve options involved reducing funding for discretionary defense
programs (e.g., operation and maintenance, naval ship construction, aircraft).51 In 2021, CBO

categories. For more information, see CRS Report R44039, The Defense Budget and the Budget Control Act:
Frequently Asked Questions, by Brendan W. McGarry.
43 The term base budget generally refers to funding for planned or regularly occurring costs to man, train, and equip the
military force.
44 Technically, the BCA allowed for an upward adjustment of the limits for certain types of discretionary funding. For
more information, see CRS Report R44874, The Budget Control Act: Frequently Asked Questions, by Grant A.
Driessen and Megan S. Lynch. Since 2009, the term Overseas Contingency Operations, or OCO, has been used to
describe military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other countries. For more information, see CRS Report R44519,
Overseas Contingency Operations Funding: Background and Status, by Brendan W. McGarry and Emily M.
Morgenstern.
45 For background and analysis, see CRS Report R42972, Sequestration as a Budget Enforcement Process: Frequently
Asked Questions, by Megan S. Lynch.
46 Government Accountability Office (GAO), SEQUESTRATION: Observations on the Department of Defense’s
Approach in Fiscal Year 2013, GAO-14-177R, November 7, 2013, p. 13.
47 For background and analysis, see CRS Report R46752, Expiration of the Discretionary Spending Limits: Frequently
Asked Questions, by Megan S. Lynch and Grant A. Driessen. A relatively small share of the national defense budget is
for mandatory programs. For more information, see the following section.
48 OMB, FY 2022 Discretionary Request, p. 5.
49 For background and analysis, see CRS Report R44039, The Defense Budget and the Budget Control Act: Frequently
Asked Questions, by Brendan W. McGarry, p. 3.
50 CBO, Options for Reducing the Deficit: 2021 to 2030, December 2020, at https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2020-
12/56783-budget-options.pdf.
51 Ibid.
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published a report describing three options for carrying out national defense activities under a
smaller defense budget based on differing military strategies.52
For historical context, Figure 2 shows defense spending over time in both nominal and constant
FY2022 dollars, based on CRS analysis of Office of Management and Budget (OMB) figures.
The inflation-adjusted line shows the cyclical nature of defense spending during wartime. The
level of defense outlays requested for national defense in FY2022, when adjusted for inflation,
was higher than during the Cold War-era military buildup of the 1980s and lower than during the
height of post-9/11 operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. OMB projected defense outlays to remain
relatively flat through FY2026.53
Figure 2. National Defense Outlays, FY1940-FY2026 (projected)
(in billions of nominal and constant FY2022 dollars)

Source: CRS analysis of GPO, Budget of the U.S. Government Fiscal Year 2022, Historical Tables, Table 3.1 and
Table 10.1.
Note: FY2021 through FY2026 reflect projections. Figures adjusted to constant FY2022 dol ars using GDP
(chained) price index in Table 10.1.
Figure 3 shows defense spending over time as a share of both federal outlays and GDP, based on
OMB figures. Defense outlays steadily decreased from peaks of nearly 90% of federal outlays
and more than a third of GDP in the 1940s during World War II—to a projected 12.8% of federal
outlays and 3.3% of GDP in FY2022.54

52 CBO, Illustrative Options for National Defense Under a Smaller Defense Budget, October 2021, at
https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2021-10/57128-defense-cuts.pdf.
53 CRS analysis of GPO, Budget of the U.S. Government Fiscal Year 2022, Historical Tables, Table 3.1, “Outlays by
Superfunction and Function: 1940-2026,” and Table 10.1, “Gross Domestic Product and Deflators Used in the
Historical Tables: 1940-2026.”
54 CRS analysis of GPO, Budget of the U.S. Government Fiscal Year 2022, Historical Tables, Table 3.1, “Outlays by
Superfunction and Function: 1940-2026.”
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Figure 3. National Defense Outlays as Share of Total Federal Outlays and GDP,
FY1940-FY2026 (projected)
(in percentages)

Source: CRS analysis of GPO, Budget of the U.S. Government Fiscal Year 2022, Historical Tables, Table 3.1.
Note: FY2021 through FY2026 reflect projections.
For FY2022, Congress debated competing proposals regarding the overall size of the defense
budget. In August 2021, the Senate and House adopted an FY2022 budget resolution (S.Con.Res.
14), which recommended $765.7 billion in new budget authority for FY2022 national defense
programs and assumed “discretionary levels as proposed in the President’s budget request.”55 In
December 2021, Congress passed the FY2022 NDAA, with a total budget authority implication
of $790.6 billion.56
President’s Budget Request
The NDAA typically authorizes discretionary funding for nearly all DOD programs, national
security programs of the Department of Energy, and certain other defense-related activities. While
the NDAA does not appropriate funding (i.e., budget authority), the legislation establishes or
continues defense programs, projects, or activities, and provides guidance on how appropriated
funds are to be used in carrying out those efforts. (The statutory requirement for annual
authorization of appropriations for defense programs is codified at 10 U.S.C. §114.)
The FY2022 President’s budget requested more than $6 trillion in discretionary and mandatory
funding, of which $768.3 billion (12.4%) was for activities within the national defense budget
function.57 The national defense budget request was $14.3 billion (1.9%) more than the FY2021

55 S.Con.Res. 14, p. 4; and Senate Budget Committee, Concurrent Resolution on the Budget Fiscal Year 2022, S. Prt.
117-16, August 2021, p. 6.
56 Explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the
Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7365.
57 CRS analysis of GPO, Budget of the U.S. Government Fiscal Year 2022, Analytical Perspectives, Table 20.1, “Policy
Net Budget Authority by Function, Category, and Program.”
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level (excluding funds provided by the Emergency Security Supplemental Appropriations Act,
2021; P.L. 117-31).58
National defense is one of 20 major functions used by the OMB to organize budget data, and the
largest in terms of discretionary funding.59 Identified by the numerical notation 050, the national
defense budget function is the broadest measure by which the U.S. government categorizes
defense funding. The function comprises the following subfunctions:
 DOD-Military (identified by the notation 051), which includes military and
intelligence activities of the DOD;
 Atomic energy defense activities (053), which includes nuclear weapons and
reactor programs of the Department of Energy; and
 Defense-related activities (054), which includes national security activities of
several other agencies, such as Federal Bureau of Investigation
counterintelligence activities.
Historically, DOD has accounted for the bulk—approximately 95%—of funding within the
national defense budget function. For FY2022, the Biden Administration requested $727.9 billion
for DOD-Military (11.7% of the federal budget); $29.9 billion for atomic energy defense
activities (0.5%); and $10.5 billion for defense-related activities (0.2%) (see Figure 4).60
Figure 4. FY2022 Budget Request by National Defense Budget Function and
Subfunctions
(in percentages of total budget authority)

Source: CRS analysis of GPO, Budget of the U.S. Government Fiscal Year 2022, Historical Tables, Table 5.1,
“Budget Authority by Function and Subfunction: 1976-2026,” at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BUDGET-
2022-TAB/xls/BUDGET-2022-TAB-6-1.xlsx.

58 Ibid. P.L. 117-31 was signed into law after the release of the FY2022 President’s budget request in May 2021.
59 For more information on the national defense budget function, see CRS In Focus IF10618, Defense Primer: The
National Defense Budget Function (050).
60 CRS analysis of GPO, Budget of the U.S. Government Fiscal Year 2022, Analytical Perspectives, Table 20.1, “Policy
Net Budget Authority by Function, Category, and Program.”
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Note: Includes discretionary and mandatory funding; other budget functions include International Affairs (150);
General Science, Space, and Technology (250); Energy (270); Natural Resources and Environment (300);
Agriculture (350); Commerce and Housing Credit (370); Transportation (400); Community and Regional
Development (450); Education, Training, Employment, and Social Services (500); Health (550); Medicare (570);
Income Security (600); Social Security (650); Veterans Benefits and Services (700); Administration of Justice
(750); General Government (800); Net Interest (900); Allowances (920); and Undistributed Offsetting Receipts
(950).
The national defense budget request included $752.9 billion in discretionary funding and $15.4
billion for mandatory funding.61 In general, funding for discretionary programs is provided in
appropriations acts, while funding for mandatory programs (e.g., Social Security, Medicare, and
Medicaid) is controlled by other laws.62 For DOD, most discretionary programs are funded in
major appropriation titles, such as operation and maintenance (O&M), military personnel
(MILPERS), procurement, and research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E); while
mandatory programs include, among other things, certain retirement benefits (e.g., concurrent
receipt payments to the military retirement fund).63
The vast majority (approximately 97%) of funding in the national defense budget request falls
within the scope of the NDAA. The legislation generally authorizes discretionary funding for
almost all programs in the 051 and 053 subfunctions, and relatively few programs in the 054
subfunction. The 054 subfunction includes certain Department of Transportation (DOT) Maritime
Administration (MARAD) activities (e.g., Maritime Security Program).64
The national defense budget request included $743.1 billion for discretionary programs within the
scope of the NDAA.65
The House-passed NDAA would have authorized a total of $768.1 billion.66 The SASC-reported
version of the bill would have authorized a similar level, $767.7 billion, according to S.Rept. 117-
39.67 The enacted legislation authorized $768.2 billion—$25.1 billion (3.4%) more than the
request (see Table 1), according to the accompanying explanatory statement.68

61 CRS analysis of OMB, Budget of the U.S. Government Fiscal Year 2022, Analytical Perspectives, Table 20.1,
“Policy Net Budget Authority by Function, Category, and Program.”
62 For more information, see CRS Report R46240, Introduction to the Federal Budget Process.
63 Concurrent receipt in the military context typically means simultaneously receiving two types of federal monetary
benefits: military retired pay from the Department of Defense and disability compensation from the Department of
Veterans Affairs. After Congress authorized concurrent receipt in the early 2000s, DOD created additional accrual
payments to finance retirement benefits. For more information on this topic, see CRS Report R40589, Concurrent
Receipt of Military Retired Pay and Veteran Disability: Background and Issues for Congress.
64 The HASC typically authorizes appropriations for the Maritime Security Program and Tanker Security Program of
the Department of Transportation’s Maritime Administration. The SASC typically does not authorize appropriations for
these programs; however, the final version of the NDAA does.
65 Explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the
Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7364.
66 H.Rept. 117-118, p. 351.
67 S.Rept. 117-39, p. 381.
68 Explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the
Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7364.
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Table 1. Discretionary Authorizations within the FY2022 NDAA
(in billions of dollars of budget authority)
Budget Function
FY2022
House-
SASC-
Authorized
% Change
Name (Notation)
Request
passed
Reported
(P.L. 117-81)
(Authorized-
(H.R. 4350) (S. 2792)
Request)
Department of
$714.77
$739.5
$740.0
$740.0
3.5%
Defense-Military (051)
Atomic Energy Defense
$27.94
$28.2
$27.7
$27.8
-0.3%
Programs (053)
Defense-Related
$0.38
$0.4
$0.0
$0.4
0.0%
Activities (054)
National Defense
$743.09
$768.1
$767.7
$768.2
3.4%
(050), Total
Source: HASC report (H.Rept. 117-118; Part 1) accompanying H.R. 4350, p. 350; SASC report (S.Rept. 117-39)
accompanying S. 2792, pp. 380-381; and explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (S. 1605; P.L.
117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7364.
Note: For the defense-related activities budget subfunction (054), HASC typically authorizes appropriations for
certain Department of Transportation (DOT) Maritime Administration (MARAD) activities (e.g., Maritime
Security Program). While the Senate Armed Services Committee typically does not authorize appropriations for
these activities, the final version of the NDAA does. Dol ars rounded to nearest hundredth; percentages
rounded to nearest tenth. The “% Change" column is the percentage change between authorized and requested
amounts.
CRS Product on the FY2022 Defense Budget Request
For more information and analysis on the FY2022 defense budget request, see CRS Video WVB00391, FY2022
Defense Budget Request, by Kathleen J. McInnis et al.
Bill Overview
This section of the report provides an overview of legislative activity on the FY2022 NDAA,
including certain congressional actions with respect to the House-passed, SASC-reported, and
enacted versions of the bill.
Legislative Activity69
By law, the President is to send the federal budget request to Congress by the first Monday in
February.70 In practice, the President sometimes sends it later, particularly during presidential
transition years.71 On May 28, 2021, President Biden submitted the FY2022 budget request.72
Representative Adam Smith, Chair of the HASC, had said that a budget submitted on May 10 or

69 This section was coordinated with Valerie Heitshusen, Specialist on Congress and the Legislative Process.
70 31 U.S.C. §1105(a).
71 According to the Government Publishing Office (GPO), the FY2018 budget was submitted on May 23, 2017; the
FY2010 budget on February 26, 2009; and the FY2002 budget on April 9, 2001. For more information, see GPO,
Budget of the United States Government, at https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/budget. See also CRS Report
RS20752, Submission of the President’s Budget in Transition Years, by Taylor N. Riccard.
72 OMB, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2022, May 28, 2021, at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/budget_fy22.pdf.
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later could affect the timing for completion of the annual NDAA by the October 1 start of the
government’s fiscal year (FY).73
On July 28-29, the seven HASC subcommittees considered and reported draft legislative
proposals (known as marks) to the full committee with recommendations for matters in the
FY2022 NDAA under their jurisdiction.74 On August 25, Chairman Smith released each
subcommittee’s proposal in preparation of the full committee markup.75 On September 1, HASC
began considering and marking up the legislation.76 On September 2, the committee voted 57-2 to
order H.R. 4350 reported to the House with an amendment in the nature of a substitute reflecting
the work product of the two-day markup.77 On September 10, the committee filed its report,
H.Rept. 117-118, to accompany the legislation. (On September 17, the committee filed a
supplemental report that included the Congressional Budget Office’s cost estimate for the bill,
among other information.78) On September 21-23, the House debated and considered amendments
to H.R. 4350 and, on September 23, passed the measure by a vote of 316-113.79
Meanwhile, in the Senate, on July 19-20, the seven subcommittees of the SASC marked up draft
legislative proposals with recommendations for matters in the FY2022 NDAA under their
jurisdiction.80 Two of the markups were held in open sessions (Subcommittee on Readiness and
Management Support, and Subcommittee on Personnel), five were closed.81 On July 21, SASC
considered the legislation in a closed session and voted 23-3 to order reported an original bill
reflecting changes agreed to in markup.82 On September 22, SASC reported S. 2792 and filed the
accompanying report S.Rept. 117-39. The Senate did not vote on final passage of S. 2792. On
November 19, Senator Jack Reed, Chair of SASC, offered on the floor an amendment in the
nature of a substitute (S.Amdt. 3867) to H.R. 4350 to replace the text of the House-passed

73 Representative Adam Smith, transcript of remarks during American Enterprise Institute webinar hosted by
Mackenzie Eaglen, A conversation with House Armed Services Committee Chairman Adam Smith: Priorities for the
fiscal year 2022 defense budget, April 22, 2021, p. 3, at https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/210422-
House-Armed-Services-Committee-Chairman-Adam-Smith-Transcript.pdf?x91208.
74 HASC, Hearings website, accessed September 30, 2021, at https://armedservices.house.gov/hearings. The seven
HASC subcommittees are Tactical Air and Land Forces; Military Personnel; Readiness; Seapower and Projection
Forces; Strategic Forces; Intelligence and Special Operations; and Cyber, Innovative Technologies, and Information
Systems. Jurisdiction and membership of HASC and its subcommittees can be found at
https://armedservices.house.gov/committee-rules#0D456DEB-8D11-4DF4-A8E3-D4D778DFDA61.
75 HASC, “HASC Subcommittee Marks as Reported for H.R. 4350 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2022,” August 25, 2021, at https://armedservices.house.gov/press-releases?ID=B0078ABA-C9D1-4E33-99B5-
AACDC534106A.
76 Representative Adam Smith, in hearing transcript, “House Armed Services Committee Holds Markup on Fiscal 2022
National Defense Authorization Act, Part One,” CQ, September 1, 2021, at
https://plus.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-6333701?3.
77 HASC, “Chairman Smith on the Committee’s Passage of the FY22 NDAA,” press release, September 2, 2021, at
https://armedservices.house.gov/press-releases?ID=6E91A3BE-195E-4E51-82F7-FB897BC73CE5.
78 See H.Rept. 117-118, Part 2.
79 See House debate, Congressional Record, vol. 167, part 163 (September 21, 2021), pp. H4564-H4576, H4596-
H4861; vol. 167, part 164 (September 22, 2021), pp. H4880- H5078); and vol. 167, part 165 (September 23, 2021), pp.
H5103-H5104, H5115-H5128.
80 SASC, “Reed and Inhofe Announce FY 2022 NDAA Markup Schedule,” press release, July 8, 2021, at
https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/press-releases/reed-inhofe-announce-fy-2022-ndaa-markup-schedule.
81 Ibid., and SASC, “SASC Completes Markup of Fiscal Year 2022 National Defense Authorization Act,” press
release, July 22, 2021, at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/press-releases/-sasc-completes-markup-of-fiscal-year-
2022-national-defense-authorization-act.
82 Ibid.
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legislation with a modified version of the SASC-reported bill. The Senate did not agree to end
debate on the amendment (S.Amdt. 3867), as modified; cloture was not invoked by a vote of 45-
51. While the Senate did not pass S.Amdt. 3867, it became one basis of House-Senate
negotiations.
Unlike in most years, the House and Senate did not establish a conference committee to resolve
differences between the two versions of the bill. Instead, HASC and SASC leaders negotiated a
bicameral agreement based on the two versions. On December 7, the committees released the text
of the agreement, which was filed as a House amendment to an unrelated Senate-passed bill, S.
1605.83 The same day, an explanatory statement to accompany the House amendment to S. 1605
was published in Part 2 of the House section of the Congressional Record.84 The final text of the
NDAA made clear that this statement was to be treated as if it were the formal bicameral
statement issued by a conference committee. Also that day, the House agreed to S. 1605, as
amended, by a vote of 363-70. On December 15, the Senate agreed to the House amendment to S.
1605 by a vote of 88-11. On December 27, President Biden signed the legislation into law (P.L.
117-81).
Table 2 shows the status of legislative activity on the FY2022 NDAA.
Table 2. FY2022 NDAA: Status of Legislative Activity
Public
House
Senate
Law
Vote #
Vote #
(yeas,
HASC-
(yeas,
HASC-
nays),
SASC
nays),
SASC
P.L. #,
Bill #, Date
Report
Date
Negotiated
Bill #, Date
Report
Date
Negotiated
Date
Reported
#, Date
Passed
Proposal
Reported
#, Date
Passed
Proposal
Signed
H.R. 4350,
H.Rept.
293 (316-

09/10/21
117-118,
113),
09/10/21
09/23/21

S. 2792,
S.Rept.

09/22/21
117-39,
09/22/21
House

405 (363-
Explanatory
House

499 (88-
Explanatory
P.L. 117-
amendment
70),
statement
amendment
11),
statement
81,
to S. 1605,
12/07/21
published in
to S. 1605,
12/15/21
published in
12/27/21
12/07/21
Congressional
12/07/21
Congressional
Record.a
Record.a
Source: CRS analysis of selected actions in Congress.gov.
Note:
a. On December 7, 2021, the explanatory statement to accompany S. 1605 was published in Part 2 of the
House section of the Congressional Record.

83 See HASC, “HASC, SASC Release Text of FY22 NDAA Agreement,” press release, December 7, 2021, at
https://armedservices.house.gov/press-releases?ID=8F7F4622-D0E7-46A2-99CA-65F04EE652CD; and SASC,
“SASC, HASC Release Text of FY22 NDAA Agreement,” press release, December 7, 2021, at https://www.armed-
services.senate.gov/press-releases/sasc-hasc-release-text-of-fy22-ndaa-agreement.
84 Congressional Record, vol. 167, no. 211—Book II (December 7, 2021), pp. H7265-H7464, at
https://www.congress.gov/117/crec/2021/12/07/167/211/CREC-2021-12-07-bk2.pdf.
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Figure 5 shows the number of days between the start of the fiscal year and enactment of the
annual defense authorization act since FY1977, when the federal government transitioned to a
fiscal year beginning October 1, 1976.
Figure 5. Days between Start of Fiscal Year and Enactment of Annual Defense
Authorization Acts, FY1977-FY2022
(in days)

Source: CRS analysis of dates of enactment of public law from CRS Report 98-756, Defense Authorization and
Appropriations Bills: FY1961-FY2021, by Barbara Salazar Torreon and Sofia Plagakis; and P.L. 117-81.
Note: Negative values indicate number of days between enactment of annual defense authorization acts and
start of fiscal year. Annual defense authorization legislation for the fiscal years 1979, 1989, 1996, 2008, 2016, and
2021 was enacted over a presidential veto.
Summary of Discretionary Authorizations
Of the $768.3 billion requested in the FY2022 President’s budget for national defense programs,85
$743.1 billion was for discretionary programs falling within the scope of the FY2022 NDAA.86
The remainder of the national defense budget request was for discretionary programs that were
not within the jurisdiction of the HASC or SASC, discretionary programs that did not require
additional authorization, or mandatory programs that were previously authorized.87
The House-passed version of the bill (H.R. 4350) would have authorized a total of $768.1 billion
for discretionary programs—$25 billion (3.4%) more than the President’s request, according to
H.Rept. 117-118.88 During the HASC markup of its version of the bill, Representative Mike
Rogers, ranking minority member of the committee, offered an amendment to increase authorized

85 GPO, Budget of the U.S. Government Fiscal Year 2022, Analytical Perspectives, Table 20.1, “Policy Net Budget
Authority by Function, Category, and Program.”
86 Explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Congressional Record, vol. 167, no.
211—Book II (December 7, 2021), p. H7364 (link embedded in page number).
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.
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appropriations by $23.9 billion. He said the increase would “ensure defense spending grows by
3% above inflation, meeting the recommendations of the bipartisan National Defense Strategy
Commission.”89 Rogers also said the increase would support the unfunded priorities of the armed
services and combatant commands, as well as provide the resources necessary to counter the
growing threat from China and other adversaries.90 The committee voted to adopt the amendment,
42-17.91 Among those on the committee who voted against the amendment was, for example,
Chair Adam Smith, who said a smaller funding increase would encourage DOD to spend money
more wisely, improve acquisition and procurement practices, and better anticipate threats: “If we
give them another $23.9 billion, it takes the pressure off. It makes it easier for them to just keep
doing what they’ve been doing.”92
In response to the House-passed legislation, the White House stated it planned to work with
Congress “to set an appropriate and responsible level of defense spending to support the security
of the nation” while also providing “appropriate resources for non-security investments and
security investments outside the Department of Defense (DOD).” 93 The White House argued in
part, “The Administration opposes the direction to add funding for platforms and systems that
cannot be affordably modernized given the need to prioritize survivable, lethal, and resilient
forces in the current threat environment and eliminate wasteful spending.”94
The SASC-reported version of the bill (S. 2792) would have authorized a similar level for
discretionary programs, $767.7 billion, according to S.Rept. 117-39. In announcing the SASC’s
completion of marking up its version of the bill, Senator James Inhofe, ranking minority member
of the committee, said, “this year’s bipartisan National Defense Authorization Act increases the
defense topline to the National Defense Strategy Commission’s recommendation of 3% to 5%
real growth. This is a big win for our national security and sends a strong message to both our
allies and adversaries that America is prepared to stand up for ourselves and our friends.”95
Among the senators who opposed the committee reporting the legislation to the Senate was, for
example, Senator Elizabeth Warren.96 In speaking on the Senate floor in opposition to the
legislation, she argued, in part, “America’s spending priorities are completely misaligned with the
threats Americans are actually facing, the things are quite literally endangering their lives—like
COVID-19 and the climate crisis.”97

89 Representative Mike Rogers, as quoted in “House Armed Services Committee Holds Markup on Fiscal 2022
National Defense Authorization Act, Part Two,” Congressional Quarterly, September 1, 2021, at
https://plus.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-6332853?5. For more information on DOD unfunded priorities, see
CRS In Focus IF11964, Defense Primer: Department of Defense Unfunded Priorities.
90 Ibid.
91 H.Rept. 117-118, p. 552.
92 Representative Adam Smith, as quoted in “House Armed Services Committee Holds Markup on Fiscal 2022
National Defense Authorization Act, Part Two,” Congressional Quarterly, September 1, 2021, at
https://plus.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-6332853?5.
93 White House, “Statement of Administration Policy, H.R. 4350 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2022,” September 21, 2021, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/SAP-HR-4350.pdf.
94 Ibid.
95 SASC, “SASC Completes Markup of Fiscal Year 2022 National Defense Authorization Act,” press release, July 22,
2021, at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/press-releases/-sasc-completes-markup-of-fiscal-year-2022-national-
defense-authorization-act.
96 S.Rept. 117-39, p. 555.
97 Senator Elizabeth Warren, “Warren Delivers Floor Speech in Opposition to the National Defense Authorization
Act,” November 18, 2021, at https://www.warren.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/warren-delivers-floor-speech-in-
opposition-to-the-national-defense-authorization-act.
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The enacted legislation (S. 1605; P.L. 117-81) authorized $768.2 billion for discretionary
programs—$25.1 billion (3.4%) more than the request, according to the accompanying
explanatory statement.98 In terms of major titles in the bill, more than half of the overall increase
was authorized for procurement programs (see Table 3).
Table 3. Summary of Discretionary Authorizations in FY2022 NDAA
(in billions of dollars, in order of appearance in act)
Title
FY2022
House-passed
SASC-
Authorized
% Change
Request
(H.R. 4350)
reported (S.
(P.L. 117-81)
(Authorized-
2792)
Request)
Procurement
$132.21
$147.06
$144.05
$146.88
11.1%
Research and
$111.96
$118.07
$116.11
$117.73
5.1%
Development
Operation and
$253.62
$253.03
$260.41
$255.40
0.7%
Maintenance
Military
$167.29
$166.86
$166.79
$166.90
-0.2%
Personnel
Defense Health
$39.85
$41.07
$39.88
$39.72
-0.3%
Program and
Other DOD
Military
$9.85
$13.42
$12.71
$13.35
35.5%
Construction
and Family
Housing
Subtotal,
$714.77
$739.52
$739.95
$739.99
3.5%
Department of
Defense-
Military (051)
Atomic Energy
$27.94
$28.21
$27.75
$27.84
-0.3%
Defense
Programs (053)
Defense-
$0.38
$0.38
$0.00
$0.38
0.0%
Related
Activities (054)
Total
$743.09
$768.11
$767.70
$768.21
3.4%
Source: HASC report (H.Rept. 117-118; Part 1) accompanying its version of the FY2022 NDAA (H.R. 4350),
pp. 346-349; SASC report (S.Rept. 117-39) accompanying its version of the FY2022 NDAA (S. 2792), pp. 378-
381; and explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (S. 1605) in Part 2 of the House section of the
Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, pp. H7362-H7364.
Note: Totals may not sum due to rounding. Dol ars rounded to nearest hundredth; percentages rounded to
nearest tenth. The “% Change" column is the percentage change between authorized and requested amounts.
Table 4 shows the percentage change between authorized and requested funding in the NDAA
over the past decade.

98 Explanatory statement accompanying P.L. 117-81 in Part 2 of the House section of the Congressional Record,
December 7, 2021, p. H7364.
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Table 4. Requested and Authorized Funding in the National Defense Authorization
Act, FY2013-FY2021
(in billions of nominal dollars of budget authority)
% Change
(Authorized-
Fiscal Year
Public Law (P.L.)
Request
Authorized
Request)
2013
P.L. 112-239
$631.60a
$633.34a
0.3%
2014
P.L. 113-66
$625.15b
$625.14b
0.0%
2015
P.L. 113-291
$577.15c
$577.15c
0.0%
2016
P.L. 114-92
$604.21d
$599.21d
-0.8%
2017
P.L. 114-328
$607.98e
$611.17e
0.5%
2018
P.L. 115-91
$665.72f
$692.10f
4.0%
2019
P.L. 115-232
$708.11g
$708.10g
0.0%
2020
P.L. 116-92
$741.93h
$729.93h
-1.6%
2021
P.L. 116-283
$731.61i
$731.61i
0.0%
2022
P.L. 117-81
$743.09j
$768.21j
3.4%
Source: CRS analysis of funding tables in conference reports or explanatory statements accompanying National
Defense Authorization Acts. Amounts include funding for Department of Defense-Military, atomic energy
defense programs, defense-related activities and, from FY2013 to FY2021, funding designated for Overseas
Contingency Operations (OCO).
Note: Dol ars rounded to nearest hundredth; percentages rounded to nearest tenth. The “% Change" column is
the percentage change between authorized and requested amounts. Links to reports or explanatory statements
are embedded in the page numbers below:
a. Conference report (H.Rept. 112-705) to accompany the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2013 (P.L. 112-239), p. 687.
b. Explanatory statement to accompany the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 (P.L.
113-66) in Committee Print No. 2, December 2013, p. 780;
c. Explanatory statement to accompany the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (P.L.
113-291) in Committee Print No. 4, December 2014, p. 994;
d. Explanatory statement to accompany the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (P.L.
114-92) in Committee Print No. 2, November 2015, p. 887;
e. Conference report (H.Rept. 114-840) to accompany the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2017 (P.L. 114-328), p. 1332;
f.
Conference report (H.Rept. 115-404) to accompany the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2018 (P.L. 115-91), p. 1111;
g. Conference report (H.Rept. 115-863) to accompany the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2019 (P.L. 115-232), p. 1143.
h. Conference report (H.Rept. 116-333) to accompany the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2020 (P.L. 116-92), p. 1545;
i.
Conference report (H.Rept. 116-617) to accompany the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
FY2021 (P.L. 116-283), p. 1938;
j.
Explanatory statement to accompany the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (P.L.
117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7364.
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Selected Policy Matters
This section of the report discusses various policy matters in the FY2022 NDAA, including those
that were the subject of debate between the House and Senate, or Congress and the
Administration; received a high level of media or constituent interest; or were impacted by global
events.
Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) Funding and Related
Matters
Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Congress provided funding designated for
emergency requirements and later for Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism
(OCO/GWOT) to support U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and other
countries, in addition to other activities.99 When statutory spending limits were enacted as part of
the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25),100 the law established an OCO/GWOT
funding exemption from the limits.101 Some observers argued OCO funding allowed for flexible
response to contingencies, and provided a “safety valve” to the spending caps.102 Others described
OCO as a loophole—evolving from an account for replacing combat losses of equipment,
resupplying expended munitions, and transporting troops through war zones, to a “slush fund” for
activities unrelated to contingency operations (e.g., planned or regularly occurring costs to staff,
train, and equip the military force typically requested in the base budget of the Department of
Defense).103 The BCA discretionary spending limits expired in FY2021.104
The FY2022 President’s budget request was the first in a decade not subject to the BCA caps. The
budget proposed discontinuing “requests for Overseas Contingency Operations as a separate
funding category, instead funding direct war costs and enduring operations in the DOD base
budget.”105 DOD budget documentation released in May 2021 requested $42.1 billion for
activities described as “contingency operations” (without the budgetary designation), including
funding for the planned drawdown of U.S. armed forces in Afghanistan and other military
activities abroad, as well as activities in the continental United States.106 Of that amount, $14.3
billion was for direct war requirements (i.e., combat or combat support costs that were not
expected to continue after combat operations end at major contingency locations), including $8.9

99 For background and analysis, see CRS Report R44519, Overseas Contingency Operations Funding: Background and
Status, by Brendan W. McGarry and Emily M. Morgenstern.
100 For background and analysis, see CRS Report R44874, The Budget Control Act: Frequently Asked Questions.
101 Technically, the BCA allowed for an upward adjustment of the limits for certain types of discretionary funding. For
background and analysis, see CRS Report R45778, Exceptions to the Budget Control Act’s Discretionary Spending
Limits.
102 See, for example, Mark Cancian, “Two Cheers for OCO: Grease For Budget Wheels,” Breaking Defense, October
20, 2016, at https://breakingdefense.com/2016/10/two-cheers-for-oco-grease-for-budget-wheels/.
103 See, for example, Todd Harrison, “The Enduring Dilemma of Overseas Contingency Operations Funding,” Center
for Strategic and International Studies, January 11, 2017, at https://defense360.csis.org/enduring-dilemma-oco-
funding/#1; and Sean Kennedy, “End the Pentagon’s OCO slush fund,” Defense News, October 14, 2020, at
https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/10/14/end-the-pentagons-oco-slush-fund/.
104 For background and analysis, see CRS Report R46752, Expiration of the Discretionary Spending Limits: Frequently
Asked Questions.
105 OMB, “FY2022 Discretionary Request,” press release, April 2021, p. 5.
106 DOD, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, May 2021, Defense Budget
Overview, United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request, p. 7-3.
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billion for Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS) in Afghanistan and $5.4 billion for Operation
Inherent Resolve (OIR) in Iraq and Syria.107 The remainder of contingency operations funding,
$27.8 billion, was requested for enduring requirements (i.e., costs for activities in theater and the
continental United States that were expected to remain after combat operations end).108
The House-passed version of the NDAA and the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC)-
reported version of the bill would have not authorized OCO funding. While neither version
included OCO funding, language in the legislation and accompanying documentation called for
continued transparency and DOD accountability in war spending.
Section 1065G of the House bill would have required the Secretary of Defense to submit to
Congress a report “on the obligation and expenditure of funds that were authorized to be
appropriated for overseas contingency operations for fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2019.”109
The SASC bill and the enacted legislation did not include the House provision. The explanatory
statement accompanying the enacted legislation noted that “transparency in expenditures for
overseas contingency operations is critical to congressional oversight of the Department of
Defense and effective budgeting for military operations.”110 The statement directed the DOD
Comptroller to continue to provide Congress with quarterly Cost of War Execution Reports
consistent with the reporting requirement in Section 1221(c) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (P.L. 109-163; 10 U.S.C. §113 note), as amended.111
The report accompanying the SASC bill included a provision on DOD budget documentation for
overseas contingency operations.112 The provision stated the exclusion of OCO funding from
certain documentation did “not provide the Congress and the public with the appropriate level of
detail and transparency regarding war-related costs.”113 The SASC encouraged the DOD
Comptroller “to provide separate budget exhibits for direct war-related costs and for enduring
war-related costs” in preparing the FY2023 budget request.114
The enacted legislation did not detail funding for contingency operations in separate tables. Table
5 lists requested and authorized amounts for selected DOD overseas activities previously
resourced with OCO funding (partially or fully).
Table 5. Authorizations for Selected DOD Overseas Activities in FY2022 NDAA
(in billions of dollars)
Activity (relevant
FY2022 Request
House-passed
SASC-reported
Authorized (P.L.
CRS product)
(H.R. 4350)
(S. 2792)
117-81)
Afghanistan Security
$3.33a
$0.33b
$3.33c
$0.00d
Forces Fund (ASFF;
R46879, R46955)

107 Ibid., p. 7-4.
108 Ibid., p. 7-3.
109 H.R. 4350, pp. 1067-1068.
110 Explanatory statement to accompany the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the
Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7322.
111 Ibid.
112 S.Rept. 117-39, p. 239.
113 Ibid.
114 Ibid.
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Activity (relevant
FY2022 Request
House-passed
SASC-reported
Authorized (P.L.
CRS product)
(H.R. 4350)
(S. 2792)
117-81)
Counter-ISIS Train
$0.52e
$0.52b
$0.52c
$0.52d
and Equip Fund
(CTEF; IF10328,
IF11677)
Ukraine Security
$0.25f
$0.30g
$0.30h
$0.30d
Assistance Initiative
(USAI; R45008,
IF10946)
European
$3.68f
n/ai
n/aj
n/ak
Deterrence
Initiative (EDI,
including USAI;
IF10946)
Pacific Deterrence
$5.09l
n/am
n/an
$7.11o
Initiative (PDI;
IF11719, IF10607)
Source: CRS analysis of FY2022 DOD budget documentation; legislation and reports on Congress.gov, including
H.Rept. 117-118; Part 1 accompanying H.R. 4350; S.Rept. 117-39 accompanying S. 2792; explanatory statement
accompanying P.L. 117-81 in Part 2 of the House section of the Congressional Record, December 7, 2021; HASC
and SASC executive summaries of the legislation.
Note: Dol ars rounded to nearest hundredth. Links to source documents are embedded in the page numbers
below:
a. DOD, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense Budget, Fiscal Year (FY) 2022, May 2021,
Justification for FY 2022 Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, p. 5.
b. H.Rept. 117-118, p. 346.
c. S.Rept. 117-39, p. 378.
d. Explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the
Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7362.
e. DOD, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense Budget, Fiscal Year (FY) 2022, May 2021,
Justification for FY 2022 Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) Train and Equip Fund (CTEF), p. 3.
f.
DOD, European Deterrence Initiative, Department of Defense Budget, Fiscal Year (FY) 2022, Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), June 2021, p. 2.
g. H.Rept. 117-118, p. 347.
h. S.Rept. 117-39, p. 250.
i.
H.R. 4350 and H.Rept. 117-118 did not identify a total for EDI; HASC, “Summary of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022,” September 11, 2021, p. 11, stated the legislation “ful y funds” EDI.
j.
S. 2792, S.Rept. 117-39, and SASC, “FY22 NDAA Executive Summary,” July 22, 2021, did not identify a total
for EDI.
k. P.L. 117-81 and the accompanying explanatory statement did not identify a total for EDI. HASC, “Final Text
Summary of the FY22 NDAA,” December 7, 2021, p. 9, stated the legislation “includes a total $4 bil ion for
the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) and additional investments for EDI purposes.”
l.
DOD, Pacific Deterrence Initiative, Department of Defense Budget Fiscal Year (FY) 2022, Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), May 2021, p. 15.
m. HASC, “Summary of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022,” September 11, 2021, p.
12, stated the legislation would have provided “at least” $8.8 bil ion for PDI.
n. S. 2792, S.Rept. 117-39, and SASC, “FY22 NDAA Executive Summary,” July 22, 2021, did not identify a total
for PDI; S. 2792 would have authorized “such sums as may be necessary” for PDI.
o. Explanatory statement to accompany the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the
Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, pp. H7328-H7330.
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CRS Products on Overseas Contingency Operations Funding
For background and analysis on funding for Overseas Contingency Operations, see CRS Report R44519, Overseas
Contingency Operations Funding: Background and Status and CRS In Focus IF10143, Foreign Affairs Overseas Contingency
Operations (OCO) Funding: Background and Current Status.
Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF)
In considering the FY2022 NDAA and other legislation, Congress expressed significant interest
in how developments in Afghanistan—including the collapse of the U.S.-backed Afghan
government and its security forces and the withdrawal of U.S. military personnel from the
country in August 2021—would change plans for the use of Afghanistan Security Forces Fund
(ASFF) amounts appropriated for FY2021 and prior years, and requested for FY2022.
In a May 2021 justification of its FY2022 budget request for the ASFF, DOD stated, given the
planned withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan, the $3.3 billion requested for ASFF was
“even more important than previously to maintain the viability of the Afghan forces and
strengthening the Afghan government leverage in negotiations to end the war on terms that
preserve a democratic form of government.”115
The SASC bill, marked up in July, would have authorized the requested amount of funding ($3.33
billion) for ASFF and limited the use of some funds until the Secretary of Defense provided a
report to congressional committees on aspects of the assistance and certified that the Afghan
government was meeting certain measures of progress.116
The House bill, passed in September, would have authorized a total of $325 million for ASFF for
“contract close-out and other close-out operations.”117
In response to the SASC-reported and House-passed legislation, the White House stated, in part,
that the termination of the ASFF “will involve, at a minimum, closing out several hundred
contracts and in many cases negotiating financial settlements with the contractors, developing a
full accounting for all ASFF-funded equipment and supplies that are outside Afghanistan, and
assessing potential contract settlement costs and the cost of transporting and storing ASFF-funded
materiel for purposes of treating it as DOD stocks.”118
The enacted legislation did not authorize funding for ASFF.119 The accompanying explanatory
statement noted “there are sufficient funds from the previous fiscal year that will remain available
for the termination of Operation Freedom’s Sentinel and related support to the security forces of
the Government of Afghanistan.” 120 The statement directed the Secretary of Defense to provide a
report to the congressional defense committees on the status of ASFF funds, contracts, and

115 DOD, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense Budget Fiscal Year (FY) 2022, May 2021,
Justification for the FY 2022 Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), p. 7.
116 S.Rept. 117-39, pp. 248, 485.
117 H.R. 4350, p. 1265.
118 White House, “Statement of Administration Policy, H.R. 4350 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2022,” September 21, 2021, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/SAP-HR-4350.pdf; and
White House, “Statement of Administration Policy, S. 2792 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2022,” November 17, 2021, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/S-2797-SAP.pdf.
119 Explanatory statement to accompany the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the
Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7362.
120 Ibid., p. H7338.
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equipment.121 Section 1092 of the enacted legislation required the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy to provide quarterly briefings to the congressional defense committees on the security
situation in Afghanistan and DOD’s efforts to counter terrorist groups in the country, among other
information.122 Section 1094 of the legislation, cited as the Afghanistan War Commission Act of
2021, established the Afghanistan War Commission to study U.S. involvement in the country
from 2001 to 2021, including key decisions pertaining to the war, and to develop lessons learned
and policy recommendations.123
CRS Products on Afghanistan
For background and analysis on Afghanistan, see CRS Report R46955, Taliban Government in Afghanistan:
Background and Issues for Congress and CRS Report R46879, U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in
Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions.
European Deterrence Initiative (EDI), including the Ukraine Security
Assistance Initiative (USAI)
The President’s budget requested $3.7 billion for activities associated with the European
Deterrence Initiative (EDI), a DOD effort intended to bolster the security of U.S. allies and
partners following Russia’s 2014 invasion and subsequent annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea
region.124 Of the total for EDI, $250 million was for Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative
(USAI), through which DOD and the State Department provide intelligence support, personnel
training, lethal equipment and logistics support, supplies and other service to the Ukrainian
military and security forces.125
DOD documentation supporting its FY2022 budget request allocated EDI funding across more
than 200 budget line items. However, HASC and SASC reports accompanying their versions of
the NDAA, and the explanatory statement accompanying the enacted legislation, did not single
out EDI activities within all such lines. Thus, in many cases, one could not determine how an
increase or decrease to a particular line affected the EDI activity. Certain reports described
adjustments as EDI-related but it was not clear how they compared to the original DOD
proposal.126
An executive summary of the House-passed legislation released by the HASC stated the bill
would have “fully” funded the EDI request and invested in “substantial additional capabilities
that support deterrence in the European Command area of operations.”127 The legislation would
have authorized $300 million for USAI.128

121 Ibid.
122 135 Stat. 1934.
123 135 Stat. 1935.
124 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10946, The European Deterrence Initiative: A Budgetary Overview, by
Paul Belkin and Hibbah Kaileh.
125 DOD, European Deterrence Initiative, Department of Defense Budget Fiscal Year (FY) 2022, Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), June 2021, p. 20.
126 See, for example, S.Rept. 117-39, p. 477.
127 HASC, “Summary of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022,” September 11, 2021, p. 11.
128 H.Rept. 117-118, p. 347.
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The SASC-reported bill would have authorized an unspecified amount of funding for EDI
activities and $300 million for USAI (of which $75 million would have been available for lethal
assistance).129
The enacted legislation and the accompanying explanatory statement did not identify a total
amount authorized for EDI.130 An executive summary of S. 1605 released by the HASC stated the
legislation included “a total $4 billion for the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) and additional
investments for EDI purposes.”131 The legislation authorized $300 million for USAI. Section
1303 of the enacted legislation directed the Secretary of Defense to submit to the congressional
defense committees a report on the U.S. defense investment in Europe, including EDI.132
CRS Products on the European Deterrence Initiative
For background on the European Deterrence Initiative, see CRS In Focus IF10946, The European Deterrence
Initiative: A Budgetary Overview and CRS In Focus IF11130, United States European Command: Overview and Key Issues.
Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI)
The FY2022 President’s budget requested $5.1 billion for activities associated with the Pacific
Deterrence Initiative, an effort intended to strengthen U.S. defense posture in the Indo-Pacific
region, primarily west of the International Date Line, in part by “providing survivable strike and
stand-off capability in a denied environment.”133 More than half of the funding was requested for
the Navy to procure ships, including an Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyer to conduct
offensive or defensive operations and a T-AO fleet oiler to supply fuel and dry cargo at sea.134
DOD has described the funding as a “subset of the Department’s FY 2022 budget request, not a
separate fund, in targeted investments for the Indo-Pacific region.”135 The HASC and SASC-
reported versions of the NDAA, like the aforementioned European Deterrence Initiative, did not
single out PDI activities within all relevant budgetary line items. Thus, in many cases, one could
not determine how an increase or decrease to a particular line affected the PDI activity. A
summary released by the HASC of the House-passed version of the NDAA stated the legislation
would have authorized “at least” $8.8 billion for PDI.136 The SASC-reported version of the bill
would have authorized “such sums as may be necessary” for PDI.137 A summary of S. 2792
released by the SASC stated the legislation would have extended and modified the initiative.138
The enacted legislation authorized $7.1 billion for activities associated with PDI, according to a
table in the accompanying explanatory statement that identified PDI activities within relevant

129 SASC, “FY22 NDAA Executive Summary,” July 22, 2021, p. 2; and S.Rept. 117-39, pp. 113, 250.
130 Explanatory statement to accompany the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the
Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7362.
131 HASC, “Final Text Summary of the FY22 NDAA,” December 7, 2021, p. 9.
132 135 Stat. 1998.
133 DOD, Pacific Deterrence Initiative, Department of Defense Budget Fiscal Year (FY) 2022, Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), May 2021, p. 1.
134 Ibid, p. 9. For more information, see the “Additional DDG-51 Destroyers” section below and CRS Report RL32109,
Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress.
135 Ibid., p. 1.
136 HASC, “Summary of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022,” September 11, 2021, p. 12.
137 S. 2792, p. 579.
138 SASC, “FY22 NDAA Executive Summary,” July 22, 2021, p. 2.
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budgetary line items.139 The explanatory statement criticized the Administration’s PDI request for
emphasizing weapon systems rather than force posture, capabilities, and activities in the region:
We note that the PDI budget request for fiscal year 2022 was improperly focused on
platforms, including the DDG-51, T-AO fleet oiler, and F-35, as opposed to improving the
joint posture and enabling capabilities necessary to enhance deterrence in the Indo-Pacific
region. Therefore, we identified approximately $7.1 billion in investments that support and
attempt to improve the current posture, capabilities, and activities of U.S. forces in the
Indo-Pacific region, as reflected in the budgetary display below, that more accurately
reflect a baseline from which to measure progress against the objectives of the PDI.140
CRS Products on the Pacific Deterrence Initiative
For background on the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, see CRS In Focus IF10607, China Primer: South China Sea
Disputes.
Procurement and Related Matters
The NDAA typically authorizes appropriations for the vast majority of DOD procurement
programs in Title I of Division A of the legislation.141 DOD procurement accounts fund the
purchase of new equipment and modifications to existing weapons, including ships, aircraft,
ground combat vehicles, munitions, and various other products and services.142 The Departments
of the Army, Navy, and Air Force have multiple procurement accounts, including those associated
with subordinate services (i.e., Marine Corps and Space Force). The Procurement, Defense-Wide
account supports Special Operations Command (SOCOM), the Missile Defense Agency, and
various other agencies reporting to the Office of the Secretary of Defense.143 Congress typically
appropriates,144 and in the FY2022 NDAA authorized, funding for the National Guard and
Reserve Equipment Account (NGREA) to procure items for the reserve components.145
President’s Budget Request
The FY2022 President’s budget requested $133.6 billion in discretionary funding for DOD
procurement programs—$8 billion (6%) less than the enacted FY2021 level.146 Of this amount,
$132.2 billion fell within Title I of the NDAA.147 In a memorandum to DOD employees, Defense
Secretary Austin identified among his priorities efforts to innovate and modernize the department,
including divesting “legacy systems and programs that no longer meet our security needs.”148 In

139 Explanatory statement to accompany the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the
Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, pp. H7328-H7330.
140 Ibid.
141 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10599, Defense Primer: Procurement.
142 For more information, see CRS Report R46965, The Department of Defense (DOD) Budget: An Orientation.
143 Ibid.
144 See, for example, 134 Stat. 1345.
145 135 Stat. 2266.
146 DOD, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, May 2021, Defense Budget
Overview, United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request, p. A-1.
147 Explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the
Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7362.
148 Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III to DOD employees, “Message to the Force,” March 4,
2021, at https://media.defense.gov/2021/Mar/04/2002593656/-1/-1/0/SECRETARY-LLOYD-J-AUSTIN-III-
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an overview of the FY2022 DOD budget request, the department identified $2.8 billion in
divestments among the military departments and SOCOM, including certain ships (e.g.,
Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruisers and Littoral Combat Ships),149 aircraft (e.g., A-10 close
air support aircraft and KC-10 and KC-135 refueling tankers),150 and other systems.151
House-Passed NDAA
The House-passed NDAA would have authorized $147.1 billion for procurement programs—
$14.9 billion (11.2%) more than the request.152 The House legislation would have authorized $17
billion in increases to the request (i.e., funding beyond the amounts for certain programs
requested in the budget or for programs not requested in the budget). The net effect of these
increases would have been offset by $2.15 billion in decreases to other programs.
The Biden Administration “strongly” opposed the House bill’s “restoration of funding to systems
that limit DOD’s ability to divest or retire lower priority platforms not relevant to tomorrow’s
battlefield.”153
SASC-Reported NDAA
The SASC-reported NDAA would have authorized $144.1 billion for procurement programs—
$11.8 billion (9.0%) more than the request.154 The legislation would have authorized $12.4 billion
in increases to the request. The net effect of these increases would have been offset by $0.6
billion in decreases to other programs.
The Biden Administration “strongly” opposed the SASC bill’s restoration of funding for certain
“vulnerable and costly platforms that no longer meet mission or security needs.”155
Enacted NDAA
The enacted NDAA authorized $146.9 billion for procurement programs—$14.7 billion (11.1%)
more than the request.156 The legislation authorized $16.4 billion in increases to the request,
including for certain DOD unfunded priorities.157 The net effect of these increases was offset by

MESSAGE-TO-THE-FORCE.PDF.
149 For additional background and analysis on these programs, see CRS Report RS22595, Navy Aegis Cruiser and
Destroyer Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress and CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship
(LCS) Program: Background and Issues for Congress.
150 For additional background and analysis on these programs, see CRS Report R43843, Proposed Retirement of A-10
Aircraft: Background in Brief and CRS Report RL34398, Air Force KC-46A Pegasus Tanker Aircraft Program.
151 DOD, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, May 2021, Defense Budget
Overview, United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request, p. 3-8.
152 CRS analysis of H.Rept. 117-118, p. 346, accompanying H.R. 4350; and the explanatory statement accompanying
the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p.
H7362.
153 White House, “Statement of Administration Policy, H.R. 4350 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2022,” September 21, 2021, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/SAP-HR-4350.pdf.
154 CRS analysis of S.Rept. 117-39, p. 378; and the explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L.
117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7362.
155 White House, “Statement of Administration Policy, S. 2792 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2022,” November 17, 2021, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/S-2797-SAP.pdf.
156 CRS analysis of the explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House
section of the Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7362.
157 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF11964, Defense Primer: Department of Defense Unfunded Priorities.
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$1.7 billion in decreases to other programs. Among the accounts with the biggest increases from
the requested levels were National Guard and Reserve Equipment, ground combat vehicles, ships,
and aircraft. Among those accounts with the biggest decreases were ammunition. See Table 6.
Table 6. Summary of Procurement Authorizations in the FY2022 NDAA
(in billions of dollars)
Account
FY2022
House-passed
SASC-reported Authorized
% Change
Request
(H.R. 4350)
(S. 2792)
(P.L. 117-
(Authorized
81)
-Request)
Aircraft Procurement,
$2.81
$3.31
$3.13
$3.36
19.6%
Army
Missile Procurement,
$3.56
$3.65
$3.69
$3.65
2.5%
Army
Weapons & Tracked
$3.88
$4.72
$4.53
$4.70
21.1%
Combat Vehicles, Army
Procurement of
$2.16
$2.44
$2.44
$2.46
13.8%
Ammunition, Army
Other Procurement,
$8.87
$8.93
$8.88
$8.99
1.3%
Army
Aircraft Procurement,
$16.48
$19.61
$19.18
$19.8
20.2%
Navy
Weapons
$4.22
$4.13
$4.34
$4.13
-2.0%
Procurement, Navy
Procurement of
$0.99
$0.98
$1.03
$0.90
-8.7%
Ammunition, Navy &
Marine Corps
Shipbuilding &
$22.57
$28.42
$25.12
$27.28
20.9%
Conversion, Navy
Other Procurement,
$10.88
$11.03
$11.52
$11.17
2.7%
Navy
Procurement, Marine
$3.04
$3.62
$3.72
$3.62
19.0%
Corps
Aircraft Procurement,
$15.73
$17.47
$18.6
$18.13
15.3%
Air Force
Missile Procurement,
$2.67
$2.57
$2.67
$2.58
-3.5%
Air Force
Procurement of
$0.80
$0.79
$0.80
$0.71
-10.1%
Ammunition, Air Force
Other Procurement,
$25.25
$25.79
$25.73
$25.75
2.0%
Air Force
Procurement, Space
$2.77
$2.77
$2.80
$2.79
0.7%
Force
Procurement, Defense-
$5.55
$5.89
$5.88
$5.92
6.8%
Wide
National Guard &
$0.00
$0.95
$0.00
$0.95
n/a
Reserve Equipment
Total
$132.21
$147.06
$144.05
$146.88
11.1%
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Source: CRS analysis of funding tables in H.Rept. 117-118, p. 346; S.Rept. 117-39, p. 378; and explanatory
statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the Congressional
Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7362.
Note: Totals for request and authorized amounts from explanatory statement; totals for House-passed and
SASC-reported from committee reports. Totals may not sum due to rounding. Dol ars rounded to nearest
hundredth; percentages rounded to nearest tenth. The “% Change" column is the percentage change between
authorized and requested amounts.
Selected Increases and Decreases
Among the largest line-item increases for procurement programs in the enacted NDAA from
requested amounts, in terms of dollar value, were
 $2.9 billion for the Navy to procure two more DDG-51 destroyers (for a total of
three ships);158
 $1.1 billion for the Air Force to modify F-35A conventional takeoff and landing
aircraft to the Block 4 software configuration (also called Continuous Capability
Development and Delivery, or C2D2);159
 $950 million for the military Departments to buy National Guard and Reserve
Equipment;160
 $889 million for the Navy to procure 12 F/A-18E/F fighter attack aircraft;161 and
 $749 million for the Navy to procure nine additional V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft (for a
total of 17 aircraft).162
Among the largest line-item decreases for procurement programs, in terms of dollar value, were
 $263.5 million for the Army to procure next-generation night vision devices
(mostly for the Integrated Visual Augmentation System, or IVAS);163
 $180 million for the Navy to procure three fewer auxiliary vessels—used
commercial cargo ships kept on reserve for military sealift (i.e., the transportation
by sea of equipment and supplies during combat operations);164
 $87.1 million for the Navy to modify the RIM-162 Evolved SeaSparrow Missile
(ESSM), a surface-to-air missile intended for ship defense;165
 $76.0 million in advance procurement (AP) funding for the Navy to procure a
TAO-205 John Lewis-class oiler in a future fiscal year;166 and

158 Explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the
Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7375.
159 Ibid., p. H7381.
160 Ibid., p. H7386.
161 Ibid., p. H7371. For additional background and analysis, see CRS Report RL30624, Navy F/A-18E/F and EA-18G
Aircraft Program.
162 Ibid., p. H7372. For additional background and analysis, see CRS Report RL31384, V-22 Osprey Tilt-Rotor Aircraft
Program.
163 Ibid., p. H7370. Note this amount includes a $50 million funding transfer to a line in the Research, Development,
Test, and Evaluation, Army account for engineering development of night vision systems.
164 Ibid., p. H7375. For additional background and analysis, see CRS Report R45725, Shipping Under the Jones Act:
Legislative and Regulatory Background.
165 Ibid., p. H7374.
166 Ibid., p. H7375. For additional background and analysis, see CRS Report R43546, Navy John Lewis (TAO-205)
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 $75.5 million for the Air Force’s Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), a GPS-
based guidance kit for bombs.167
Limitations on Aircraft, Ship Divestments
Various provisions in the enacted NDAA limited DOD’s ability to divest certain aircraft and
ships, either by prohibiting the use or limiting the availability of funds for their retirement or
inactivation, or by establishing minimum inventory requirements. For example, Section 134
prohibited the use of funds for the retirement of A-10 aircraft; Section 137 limited the number of
KC-135 tankers available for retirement; and Section 138 established a minimum inventory
requirement for tactical airlift aircraft (e.g., C-130 cargo aircraft). Similarly, Section 1018
prohibited the use of funds for the retirement of Mark VI patrol boats and Section 1019 limited
the availability of funds for the retirement of Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruisers.
CRS Products on Selected DOD Acquisition Programs
For additional background and analysis on A-10 aircraft, see CRS Report R43843, Proposed Retirement of A-10
Aircraft: Background in Brief; on C-130 aircraft, see CRS Report R43618, C-130 Hercules: Background, Sustainment,
Modernization, Issues for Congress; and on Ticonderoga-class cruisers, see CRS Report RS22595, Navy Aegis Cruiser
and Destroyer Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress.
Additional DDG-51 Destroyers
For FY2022, the Navy requested $2 billion for the procurement of one DDG-51 guided-missile
destroyer rather than two ships projected under the prior-year budget submission. While officials
described the change in part as an affordability measure, the Navy identified an additional $1.7
billion to procure a second destroyer in FY2022 on its unfunded priorities list.168 The service said
the additional funding was needed to complete a multi-ship procurement and to conduct missions
in a “demanding” environment.169 In recommending authorization for a multi-year procurement
of DDG-51 Flight III destroyers beginning in FY2023, the HASC expressed concern that “the
Navy is not adequately planning for the DDG(X) procurement” and noted the service’s most
recent shipbuilding proposal reduced a destroyer in FY2022 and violated the current multiyear
procurement contract. The enacted NDAA authorized $2.9 billion for the Navy to procure two
more DDG-51s than requested, for a total of $4.9 billion for three ships.170
CRS Products on Navy Destroyers
For additional background and analysis on Navy destroyer programs, see CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and
DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress; CRS In Focus IF11679, Navy DDG(X) Next-

Class Oiler Shipbuilding Program: Background and Issues for Congress.
167 Ibid., p. H7383. For additional background and analysis, see CRS Report R45996, Precision-Guided Munitions:
Background and Issues for Congress, by John R. Hoehn.
168 DOD unfunded priorities generally refer to reports submitted to Congress pursuant to United States Code provisions
(10 U.S.C. §222a and 10 U.S.C. §222b) listing military programs, activities, or mission requirements that were not
included in the President's annual budget request but that the department would fund with additional appropriations.
For more information, see CRS In Focus IF11964, Defense Primer: Department of Defense Unfunded Priorities.
169 Sam LaGrone, “Destroyer, Navy Tactical Grid Systems Top $5.5B FY 22 Navy Unfunded List,” USNI News,
updated June 5, 2021, at https://news.usni.org/2021/06/01/destroyer-navy-tactical-grid-systems-top-5-5b-fy-22-navy-
unfunded-list.
170 Explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the
Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7375.
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Generation Destroyer Program: Background and Issues for Congress; and CRS Report RS22595, Navy Aegis Cruiser and
Destroyer Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress.
F-35 Funding, Affordability Targets, and Transfer of Program Responsibilities
The enacted NDAA authorized more funding than requested for the F-35 aircraft, including an
additional $1.1 billion for the Air Force to modify F-35A conventional takeoff and landing
aircraft to the Block 4 software configuration (also called Continuous Capability Development
and Delivery, or C2D2).171 Section 141 of the enacted NDAA required the Secretaries of the Air
Force and Navy to limit their inventories of F-35 aircraft beginning in FY2029 unless they meet
certain affordability targets based on a “cost per tail” calculation, which is derived from operating
and support costs (not development and procurement costs).172 The Administration had described
such affordability targets as “outdated” and “unrealistic”—and cited as an example a $4.1 million
affordability target for the F-35A (in constant 2012 dollars).173 GAO recently put this figure at
$7.8 million—a difference estimated to result in a cost overrun for the Air Force of $4.4 billion in
2036.174 Section 142 of the legislation required the Secretary of Defense to transfer “all functions
relating to the management, planning, and execution of sustainment activities for the F-35 aircraft
program from the F-35 Joint Program Office” to the aforementioned service secretaries. Some
observers have previously argued that the overhead structure of a joint office is unnecessary after
production; and that the F-35 is, in effect, three separate aircraft with less commonality than
originally envisioned.175
CRS Products on F-35 Aircraft
For additional background and analysis on the F-35 program, see CRS Report RL30563, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)
Program; CRS Report R41131, F-35 Alternate Engine Program: Background and Issues for Congress; and CRS Podcast
WPD00003, The F-35.
Cost Estimate for B-52 Commercial Engine Replacement Program (CERP)
Section 135 of the enacted NDAA limited the availability of a portion of funding for the Air
Force’s B-52 Commercial Engine Replacement Program (CERP) to replace the TF33 engines on
the B-52H Stratofortress bomber fleet until the Secretary of Defense submits a report to the
congressional defense committees detailing a cost estimate for the program.176 The Biden
Administration had argued that establishing such an estimate was “premature” and “inadequate,”
and that limiting funds could delay the program.177

171 For additional background and analysis, see CRS Report RL30563, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program.
172 According to GAO, “Cost per tail per year is defined as the average annual operating and support cost per aircraft
(tail) in a given fleet. It is generally estimated by dividing total operating and support costs of an aircraft fleet by the
total number of aircraft.” For more information, see GAO, F-35 SUSTAINMENT: DOD Needs to Cut Billions in
Estimated Costs to Achieve Affordability, GAO-21-439, July 2021, p. 37, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-
439.pdf.
173 White House, “Statement of Administration Policy, H.R. 4350 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2022,” September 21, 2021, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/SAP-HR-4350.pdf.
174 Ibid.
175 For more information, see CRS Report RL30563, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program, p. 19.
176 For more information, see CRS Insight IN11413, B-52 Re-Engining Program Begins.
177 White House, “Statement of Administration Policy, H.R. 4350 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
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CRS Product on B-52 Engine Replacement Program
For more information on the B-52 engine replacement program, see CRS Insight IN11413, B-52 Re-Engining
Program Begins.
Reports on Integrated Visual Augmentation System (IVAS)
The enacted NDAA authorized $263.5 million less funding than requested for the Army to
procure next-generation night vision devices (mostly for the Integrated Visual Augmentation
System, or IVAS).178 In addition, Section 115 of the enacted NDAA limited the availability of a
portion of funding for the Army’s Integrated Visual Augmentation System (IVAS), a mixed-
reality headset based on the HoloLens developed by Microsoft Corporation,179 until the Secretary
of the Army submits a report to the congressional defense committees certifying that the
technology is reliable enough to meet operational needs and providing other information; and
until the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation submits an assessment of the
aforementioned report.
CRS Products on Soldier Enhancement Programs
For more information on Army night-vision programs, see CRS In Focus IF12010, Military Applications of Extended
Reality; and CRS In Focus IF11654, The Army’s Project Convergence.
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) and Related
Matters
The NDAA typically authorizes appropriations for most DOD research, development, test, and
evaluation (RDT&E) programs in Title II of Division A.180 The department’s RDT&E accounts
fund a range of activities, including basic research on emerging technologies, advanced research
on current or near-term operational needs, and, most recently, software and digital technology
pilot programs.181 Such efforts are carried out by DOD, as well as laboratories in other federal
agencies, universities, companies in the private sector, and other entities.182 The NDAA
authorizes appropriations for RDT&E accounts of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Space Force.
The Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Defense-Wide, account funds activities of the
Missile Defense Agency (MDA), Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), and
other agencies reporting to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The Operational Test and
Evaluation, Defense account funds the Office of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation
for oversight of major defense programs, live fire test and evaluation, and other activities.

2022,” September 21, 2021, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/SAP-HR-4350.pdf.
178 Explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the
Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7370.
179 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF12010, Military Applications of Extended Reality and CRS In Focus
IF11654, The Army’s Project Convergence.
180 Title XIV of the NDAA typically authorizes appropriations for various other research and development activities,
including those associated with the destruction of chemical agents and munitions, Defense Health Program, and Office
of the Inspector General.
181 For more information, see CRS Report R46965, The Department of Defense (DOD) Budget: An Orientation.
182 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10553, Defense Primer: RDT&E.
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President’s Budget Request
The FY2022 President’s budget requested $112 billion in discretionary funding for the
department’s RDT&E programs—$5.5 billion (5%) more than the enacted FY2021 level.183 All
of this funding fell within Title II of Division A of the NDAA.184 In a memorandum to DOD
employees, Defense Secretary Austin said DOD’s ability to innovate “at a speed and scale” to
counter threats depends in part on “a commitment to rapid experimentation and fielding of
capabilities.”185 In an overview of the FY2022 budget request, DOD described the level of
RDT&E funding as “the most ever.” 186 The document also identified amounts for certain
advanced technologies, including
 $3.8 billion for hypersonic technologies (e.g., the Army’s Long Range
Hypersonic Weapon, or LRHW; the Navy’s Conventional Prompt Strike, or CPS;
and the Air Force’s Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon, or ARRW);187
 $2.3 billion for various microelectronics efforts;
 $874 million for artificial intelligence activities;188 and
 $398 million for 5G wireless networks.189
House-Passed NDAA
The House-passed NDAA would have authorized $118.1 billion for RDT&E programs—$6.1
billion (5.5%) more than the request.190 The House legislation would have authorized $7.4 billion
in increases to the request (i.e., funding beyond the amounts for certain programs requested in the
budget or for programs not requested in the budget). The net effect of these increases would have
been offset by $1.3 billion in decreases to other programs.
SASC-Reported NDAA
The SASC-reported NDAA would have authorized $116.1 billion for RDT&E programs—$4.2
billion (3.7%) more than the request.191 The SASC legislation would have authorized $4.4 billion

183 DOD, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, May 2021, Defense Budget
Overview, United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request, p. A-1.
184 Explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the
Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7362.
185 Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III to DOD employees, “Message to the Force,” March 4,
2021, at https://media.defense.gov/2021/Mar/04/2002593656/-1/-1/0/SECRETARY-LLOYD-J-AUSTIN-III-
MESSAGE-TO-THE-FORCE.PDF.
186 DOD, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, May 2021, Defense Budget
Overview, United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request, p. A-1. For additional background
and analysis, see CRS Report R46869, Federal Research and Development (R&D) Funding: FY2022.
187 For additional background and analysis, see CRS Report R45811, Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for
Congress.
188 For additional background and analysis, see CRS Report R45178, Artificial Intelligence and National Security.
189 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF11251, National Security Implications of Fifth Generation (5G) Mobile
Technologies.
190 CRS analysis of H.Rept. 117-118, p. 346, accompanying H.R. 4350; and the explanatory statement accompanying
the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p.
H7362.
191 CRS analysis of S.Rept. 117-39, p. 378; and the explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L.
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in increases to the request. The net effect of these increases would have been offset by more than
$0.2 billion in decreases to other programs.
Enacted NDAA
The enacted NDAA authorized $117.7 billion for RDT&E programs—$5.8 billion (5.1%) more
than the request.192 The legislation authorized $6.5 billion in increases to the request, including
for certain DOD unfunded priorities.193 The net effect of these increases was offset by $0.7 billion
in decreases to other programs. Among the accounts with the biggest increases from the request
were Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Defense-Wide and Operational Test and
Evaluation, Defense. See Table 7.
Table 7. Summary of Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Authorizations in
the FY2022 NDAA
(in billions of dollars)
Account
FY2022
House-passed
SASC-reported
Authorized
% Change
Request
(H.R. 4350)
(S. 2792)
(P.L. 117-81)
(Authorized-
Request)
RDT&E, Army
$12.80
$13.41
$13.11
$13.31
4.0%
RDT&E, Navy
$22.64
$23.18
$23.77
$23.10
2.0%
RDT&E, Air
$39.18
$39.44
$40.10
$40.50
3.4%
Force
RDT&E, Space
$11.27
$11.60
$11.80
$11.79
4.6%
Force
RDT&E,
$25.86
$30.25
$27.13
$28.78
11.3%
Defense-Wide
OT&E, Defense
$0.22
$0.22
$0.24
$0.24
9.2%
Total
$111.96
$118.11
$116.14
$117.73
5.1%
Source: CRS analysis of funding tables in explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81)
in the Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, pp. H7362, H7386-H7416.
Note: Totals may not sum due to rounding. Dol ars rounded to nearest hundredth; percentages rounded to
nearest tenth. The “% Change" column is the percentage change between authorized and requested amounts.
Selected Increases and Decreases
Among the largest increases, in terms of dollar value, for RDT&E line items from the budget
request to the enacted NDAA, were
 $315 million for defense-wide information and communications technology to implement
recommendations from the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence and
accelerate applied research into quantum computing, among other activities;194

117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7362.
192 CRS analysis of the explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House
section of the Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7362.
193 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF11964, Defense Primer: Department of Defense Unfunded Priorities.
194 Explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the
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 $263 million for Air Force aerospace sensors to conduct applied research on
microelectronics, among other activities;195
 $257 million for Air Force advanced engine development of prototype turbines for next-
generation combat aircraft;196
 $246.3 million for the defense-wide manufacturing science and technology program for
biotechnology innovation, among other activities;197 and
 $218 million for defense-wide technology analysis to support research into using existing
radiofrequency signals, such as those from commercial satellites—so-called signals of
opportunity—for the purpose of obtaining position, navigating, and timing (PNT)
information, among other activities.198
Among the largest decreases, in terms of dollar value, for RDT&E line items from the budget
request to the enacted NDAA, were
 $89.8 million for Army technology maturation initiatives (conferees described most of
the reduction as an “[i]nsufficient justification”);199
 $64.6 million for the ballistic missile defense segment that develops programs intended to
destroy short- to intermediate-range missiles during their final phase of flight (conferees
described the reduction as “[u]njustified request, lacking acquisition strategy”);200
 $60.1 million for Navy [Take Charge and Move Out] TACAMO modernization to
develop a replacement for E-6 command-and-control aircraft, designed to provide a
secure communications platform during a nuclear attack (conferees described the
reduction as “[u]njustified air vehicle acquisition strategy”);201
 $55 million for Air Force B-52 squadrons to improve the bomber fleet’s weapons systems
through development and testing of hardware and software (conferees described the
reduction as a “rapid prototyping materiel contract delay” associated with the
Commercial Engine Replacement Program (CERP);202 and
 $47 million for Navy unmanned surface vehicle enabling capabilities, including
autonomy development, machinery qualification efforts, and sensor acquisition, among
other activities (conferees described the reduction as “USV machinery qualification
insufficient justification”).203

Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7409.
195 Ibid., p. H7400.
196 Ibid., p. H7401.
197 Ibid., p. H7410.
198 Ibid., p. H7414.
199 Ibid., p. H7390.
200 Ibid., p. H7412.
201 Ibid., p. H7397.
202 Ibid., p. H7403.
203 Ibid., p. H7396.
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Homeland Defense Radar
The House-passed and SASC-reported NDAAs would have authorized funding for the defense-
wide Homeland Defense Radar-Hawaii, a missile defense radar intended to help defend Hawaii
from long-range ballistic missile threats and to address operational requirements identified by
U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM). The enacted NDAA
authorized $75 million for the radar. INDOPACOM had requested a total of $60 million (in both
RDT&E and military construction funding) on its unfunded priorities list for the radar and related
infrastructure as part of a plan to begin operating the system in FY2024.204 The Administration
had opposed additional funding for the radar in part because other associated systems have been
delayed or canceled.205 It argued, “Hawaii is currently defended against missile threats to the
same extent as the rest of the United States, and DOD is currently investing in other capabilities,
such as the Next Generation Interceptor, which will support the long-term defense of Hawaii.”206
Software and Digital Technology Pilot Programs
For FY2022, DOD requested $2.3 billion for 13 software and digital technology pilot programs
within a relatively new budget activity in various RDT&E accounts. This budget activity, known
as 6.8 and created in FY2021, is intended to provide DOD with greater acquisition and budgetary
flexibility for modern software development in part by allowing such funding to be used for
“agile research, development, test and evaluation, procurement, production, modification, and
operation and maintenance.”207 The enacted NDAA supported the Administration’s request for
software and digital technology pilot programs, including authorizing an additional $36 million
for the defense-wide Algorithmic Warfare Cross Functional Team initiative, formerly known as
Project Maven, which seeks to accelerate the integration of artificial intelligence into DOD
systems in part by automating tasks associated with object identification and tracking.208
RDT&E Earmarks
For RDT&E accounts, the enacted NDAA authorized $98 million for 29 earmarks (also known as
congressionally directed spending or Community Project Funding items).209 The vast majority of
such funding was for universities, where DOD typically spends nearly half of its basic research
budget.210 Specific items included aerospace composite research, a deployable launch facility, and
microfabrication technology, among others.

204 Jason Sherman, “INDOPACOM ranks additional funding for Guam defense system, Hawaii missile defense radar
on FY-22 wish list,” Inside Defense, June 11, 2021, at https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/indopacom-ranks-
additional-funding-guam-defense-system-hawaii-missile-defense-radar-fy-22.
205 White House, “Statement of Administration Policy, S. 2792 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2022,” November 17, 2021, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/S-2797-SAP.pdf.
206 Ibid.
207 134 Stat. 1335. For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10553, Defense Primer: RDT&E.
208 CRS analysis of the explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House
section of the Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7416. For additional background and analysis, see CRS
Report R45392, U.S. Ground Forces Robotics and Autonomous Systems (RAS) and Artificial Intelligence (AI):
Considerations for Congress.
209 Ibid., pp. H7462-H7463. (Note that certain Community Project Funding Items are repeated in the table.) For
additional background and analysis on earmarks, see CRS Report R45429, Lifting the Earmark Moratorium:
Frequently Asked Questions.
210 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10553, Defense Primer: RDT&E.
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CRS Products on Congressional Earmarks
For additional background and analysis on congressional earmarks, see CRS Report RS22866, Earmark Disclosure
Rules in the House: Member and Committee Requirements; and CRS Report RS22867, Earmark Disclosure Rules in the
Senate: Member and Committee Requirements.
Operation and Maintenance (O&M) and Related Matters
The NDAA typically authorizes appropriations for most DOD Operation and Maintenance
(O&M) activities in Title III of Division A.211 DOD O&M accounts cover the operating costs of
the active and reserve components of the armed services, including fuel; supplies; spare parts;
routine maintenance of aircraft, ships, ground vehicles, electronic equipment, and facilities;
recruiting; training; professional education; administrative activities; and headquarters and supply
operations.212 O&M accounts also fund the pay and benefits of DOD civilian employees; various
overseas activities (i.e., the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative; Counter-ISIS Train and
Equipment Fund; Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid),213 environmental restoration
activities; and the DOD Acquisition Workforce Development Fund; among other efforts. DOD
has identified certain O&M line items (also known as Sub-Activity Groups, or SAGs) as related
to military readiness, which DOD defines as “the ability of military forces to fight and meet the
demands of assigned missions.”214
President’s Budget Request
The FY2022 President’s budget requested $290.4 billion in discretionary funding for the
department’s O&M programs—$7.0 billion (2.5%) more than the enacted FY2021 level.215 Of
this amount, $255.4 billion fell within Title III of Division A of the NDAA.216 In a memorandum
to DOD employees, Defense Secretary Austin said, “The Department will prioritize China as our
number one pacing challenge and develop the right operational concepts, capabilities, and plans
to bolster deterrence and maintain our competitive advantage.”217 Austin also said force readiness
is enhanced when department officials “fully embrace a diversity of backgrounds, experiences,
and thought.”218 In an overview of the FY2022 budget request, DOD described the provision of
reliable, predictable, and on-time funding from Congress as a “critical” factor for sustaining

211 Ibid., pp. H7362-H7363. Appropriations for the Defense Health Program and certain other activities funded in DOD
O&M accounts are typically authorized in Title XIV of the NDAA.
212 For additional background and analysis, see CRS Report R46965, The Department of Defense (DOD) Budget: An
Orientation.
213 For more information on FY2022 authorizations for contingency operations, see the “Overseas Contingency
Operations (OCO) Funding and Related Matters” section.
214 For additional background and analysis, see CRS Report R46559, The Fundamentals of Military Readiness,
Summary and Appendix C.
215 DOD, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, May 2021, Defense Budget
Overview, United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request, p. A-1.
216 Explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the
Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7363.
217 Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III to DOD employees, “Message to the Force,” March 4,
2021, p. 1.
218 Ibid., p. 2.
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readiness, in part by allowing the armed services to “properly plan training events and exercises,
order long-lead depot supplies and parts, and make other key readiness investments.”219
House-Passed NDAA
The House-passed NDAA would have authorized $253 billion for O&M activities in Title III of
Division A—effectively flat from the request ($0.6 billion, or 0.2%, less than the request).220
SASC-Reported NDAA
The SASC-reported NDAA would have authorized $260.4 billion for O&M activities in Title III
of Division A—$6.8 billion (2.7%) more than the request.221
Enacted NDAA
The enacted NDAA authorized $255.4 billion for O&M activities in Title III of Division A—$1.8
billion (0.7%) more than the request.222 The legislation authorized $6.4 billion in increases to the
request, including for certain DOD unfunded priorities.223 The net effect of these increases was
offset by $4.6 billion in decreases to other programs. See Table 8.
Table 8. Summary of Operation and Maintenance Authorizations in the FY2022
NDAA
(in billions of dollars)
Account
FY2022
House-passed SASC-
Authorized
% Change
Request
(H.R. 4350)
reported
(P.L. 117-
(Authorized-
(S. 2792)
81)
Request)
Operation and Maintenance,
$54.62
$52.54
$57.14
$55.6
1.8%
Army
Operation and Maintenance,
$3.00
$3.00
$2.99
$2.99
-0.3%
Army Reserve
Operation and Maintenance,
$7.65
$7.69
$7.62
$7.61
-0.5%
Army National Guard
Afghanistan Security Forces Fund
$3.33
$0.33
$3.33
$0.00
-100.0%
Counter ISIS Train and Equip
$0.52
$0.52
$.52
$0.52
0.0%
Fund (CTEF)
Operation and Maintenance,
$60.44
$61.81
$61.86
$61.92
2.4%
Navy
Operation and Maintenance,
$9.02
$9.07
$9.19
$9.19
1.8%
Marine Corps

219 DOD, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, May 2021, Defense Budget
Overview, United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request, p. 4-1.
220 CRS analysis of H.Rept. 117-118, p. 346, accompanying H.R. 4350; and the explanatory statement accompanying
the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p.
H7362.
221 CRS analysis of S.Rept. 117-39, p. 379; and the explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L.
117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7362.
222 CRS analysis of the explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House
section of the Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7362.
223 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF11964, Defense Primer: Department of Defense Unfunded Priorities.
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Account
FY2022
House-passed SASC-
Authorized
% Change
Request
(H.R. 4350)
reported
(P.L. 117-
(Authorized-
(S. 2792)
81)
Request)
Operation and Maintenance,
$1.15
$1.15
$1.13
$1.15
-0.2%
Navy Reserve
Operation and Maintenance,
$0.29
$0.33
$.32
$0.33
16.1%
Marine Corps Reserve
Operation and Maintenance, Air
$53.88
$53.42
$56.12
$54.49
1.1%
Force
Operation and Maintenance,
$3.44
$3.75
$3.75
$3.61
4.9%
Space Force
Operation and Maintenance, Air
$3.35
$3.19
$3.32
$3.31
-1.1%
Force Reserve
Operation and Maintenance, Air
$6.57
$6.55
$6.56
$6.57
-0.1%
National Guard
Operation and Maintenance,
$44.92
$46.62
$45.08
$45.71
1.8%
Defense-Wide
Ukraine Security Assistance
$0.00
$0.30
$0.00a
$0.30
n/a
United States Court of Appeals
$0.02
$0.02
15,589
$0.02
0.0%
for the Armed Forces
DOD Acquisition Workforce
$0.05
$0.05
$0.05
$0.05
0.0%
Development Fund
Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster,
$0.11
$0.65
$0.14
$0.15
36.3%
and Civic Aid
Cooperative Threat Reduction
$0.24
$0.34
$0.24
$0.34
43.8%
Account
Environmental Restoration
$1.03
$1.70
$1.03
$1.55
50.3%
Total
$253.62
$253.03
$260.41
$255.40
0.7%
Source: CRS analysis of funding tables in H.Rept. 117-118, pp. 346-347; S.Rept. 117-39, pp. 378-379, 476-505;
and explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the
Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, pp. H7362-H7363, H7416-H7434.
Note: Totals for request and authorized amounts from explanatory statement; totals for House-passed and
SASC-reported from committee reports. Totals may not sum due to rounding. Dol ars rounded to nearest
hundredth; percentages rounded to nearest tenth. The “% Change" column is the percentage change between
authorized and requested amounts.
a. The SASC-reported legislation would have authorized $300 mil ion for Ukraine Security Assistance as part
of the Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide account in the table. For more information on this
assistance, see the “Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) Funding and Related Matters” section earlier
in this report.
Selected Increases and Decreases
Among the largest increases, in terms of dollar value, for O&M line items from the budget
request to the enacted NDAA, were
 A combined total of $1.6 billion for several line items associated with the armed
services’ facilities sustainment, restoration, and modernization (FSRM) activities,
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which includes facility maintenance and repair projects typically costing less than
$2 million each;224
 $316.9 million for Air Force contractor logistics support and system support,
mainly to sustain F-35 fighter aircraft and maintain F-35 aircraft and A-10 close-
air support aircraft;225
 $280.4 million for Navy mission and other flight operations to expand the flying
hour program, which funds fuel and other consumable items for aircraft;226
 $247 million for Navy combatant commanders direct mission support, mostly for
program increases and unfunded priorities of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command
(INDOPACOM);227 and
 $222.2 million for Navy aircraft depot maintenance for several dozen airframes
and hundreds of engines and engine modules for E-2 airborne command-and-
control aircraft, E-6B airborne command post aircraft, F/A-18E/F/G fighter-
attack aircraft, and P-8A maritime surveillance aircraft, and MH-60R/S
helicopters.228
Among the largest decreases, in terms of dollar value, for O&M line items from the budget
request to the enacted NDAA, were
 A combined total of $3.3 billion for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund;229
 $100 million for Army theater level assets (conferees described the reduction as
“[u]njustified growth”);230
 $70 million for Air Force base support (conferees described the reduction as
“[u]njustified growth”);231
 $66.9 million for defense-wide classified programs (conferees described the
reduction as a “[c]lassified adjustment”);232 and
 A combined total of $55.3 million for Air Force and Air Force Reserve primary
combat forces (conference described the reductions as “[u]njustified growth”).233

224 See, for example, the explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House
section of the Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, pp. H7418, H7424, H7426. For more information on FSRM,
see CRS Report R44710, Military Construction: Authorities, Process, and Frequently Asked Questions.
225 Ibid., pp. H7426-H7427.
226 Ibid., p. H7422.
227 Ibid., p. H7423.
228 Ibid., p. H7422.
229 Ibid. For more information on this topic, see the “Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) Funding and Related
Matters” section earlier in this report.
230 Ibid., p. H7417.
231 Ibid., p. H7427.
232 Ibid., p. H7432.
233 Ibid., pp. H7426, H7429.
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Per- and Polyfluoroalkyl Substances (PFAS) Contamination and Related
Issues234
Congress has included provisions to address per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) in each
NDAA for the past five fiscal years from FY2018 through FY2022. PFAS are a large, diverse
group of fluorinated compounds that have been used for several decades in numerous
commercial, industrial, and U.S. military applications including use as an ingredient in aqueous
film forming foam (AFFF) for extinguishing petroleum-based liquid fuel fires. Some studies of a
subset of PFAS have identified potential associations with various health effects at certain
exposure levels, but the toxicity of most PFAS is less studied.235
Some PFAS—primarily perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA) and perfluorooctane sulfonate (PFOS)—
have been detected in drinking water sources, other environmental media, and dairy milk at
various locations, some of which have been associated with releases of these chemicals from the
use of AFFF at U.S. military facilities. The production and civilian uses of PFAS also have
released some of these chemicals into the environment.236 The disposal of AFFF and other
materials containing PFAS, procurement of materials containing these chemicals, and the
development of non-fluorinated alternatives to AFFF have presented additional issues for DOD
and others.
DOD has identified known or suspected releases of PFAS at 700 DOD and National Guard
facilities from the use of AFFF, as of the end of FY2021.237 DOD has been investigating these
releases under the Defense Environmental Restoration Program to determine whether actions are
warranted to protect human health and the environment.238 In July 2021, DOD estimated $1.1
billion obligated through FY2020 and $2.1 billion in future costs to investigate and remediate
these releases, but noted uncertainties in these costs given pending investigations, future federal
and state standards, and challenges in separating costs at sites with multiple contaminants.239
Congress included multiple provisions to address PFAS in the FY2022 NDAA,240 some of which
originated in the House and others in the Senate. The House and Senate proposed additional
PFAS provisions that were not adopted, some of which in the House-passed bill focused on the
regulatory role of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).241 PFAS provisions in the enacted
FY2022 NDAA build upon certain requirements in prior NDAAs:
 Section 341 codified the membership and functions of the DOD PFAS Task
Force and requires DOD to complete Preliminary Assessments and Site

234 David M. Bearden, Specialist in Environmental Policy, authored this section. For information on PFAS
contamination and related issues, contact David M. Bearden at 7-2390, dbearden@crs.loc.gov.
235 For more information, see: Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, Toxicological Profile for
Perfluoroalkyls, May 2021, at https://wwwn.cdc.gov/TSP/ToxProfiles/ToxProfiles.aspx?id=1117&tid=237.
236 For additional information about PFAS and related issues, see CRS Report R45986, Federal Role in Responding to
Potential Risks of Per- and Polyfluoroalkyl Substances (PFAS).
237 DOD, Progress at the 700 Installations Being Assessed for PFAS Use or Potential Release, September 30, 2021, at
https://media.defense.gov/2022/Jan/24/2002926249/-1/-1/0/DOD-PFAS-PROGRESS-AS-OF-SEPT-30-2021.PDF.
238 The Defense Environmental Restoration Program is authorized at 10 U.S.C. §§2700-2715, and is subject to the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§9601-9675).
239 DOD, Per-and Polyfluoroalkyl Substances Cleanup Costs, July 2021, at https://www.denix.osd.mil/derp/featured-
content/reports/pfas-cleanup-cost/PFAS%20Cleanup%20Costs.pdf.
240 P.L. 117-81, Division A, Title III, Operation and Maintenance, Subtitle D, Treatment of Perfluoroalkyl Substances
and Polyfluoroalkyl Substances, §§341-349.
241 H.R. 4350, Division E, Title LXIV—Other Matters, §§6419-6422.
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Inspections242 within two years of enactment at DOD and National Guard
facilities in the United States where DOD has identified PFAS releases as of
March 31, 2021.
 Section 342 extended the authority for DOD to transfer funding through FY2023
to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and Agency for Toxic
Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) for an ongoing PFAS multi-site health
effects study and PFAS exposure assessments, pursuant to the FY2018 NDAA.243
 Section 343 required DOD to establish a temporary moratorium, to begin no later
than 120 days after enactment, on the use of incineration to dispose of AFFF and
certain other PFAS-containing materials until DOD issues guidelines for
implementing incineration criteria and EPA interim guidance on the destruction
and disposal of PFAS directed in the FY2020 NDAA,244 or if earlier, until EPA
promulgates a final rule for the destruction and disposal of PFAS.
 Section 344 required DOD to complete a review, within 180 days of enactment,
of its practices for the prevention and mitigation of spills of AFFF, and issue
guidance within 90 days after this review to establish best practices.
 Section 345 required public disclosure of DOD testing results for PFAS in
contaminated water, pursuant to the FY2020 NDAA.245
 Section 346 required DOD to complete a review, within 180 days of enactment,
of its mutual support agreements with other entities that provide fire suppression
services at DOD facilities, and issue guidance within 90 days after completion of
this review to establish best practices to prevent and mitigate spills of AFFF.
 Section 347 directed the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to conduct a
study of certain materials procured by DOD that contain various PFAS.
 Section 348 required DOD to report, within 270 days of enactment, on the
estimated schedule and costs of remediating PFAS releases at DOD and National
Guard facilities, and Formerly Used Defense Sites (FUDS), in the United States
at which DOD identified PFAS releases as of March 31, 2021.
 Section 349 required DOD to report, within 60 days of enactment, on the status
of investigating and remediating PFAS releases at 50 DOD and National Guard
facilities in the United States listed in that provision.
 Section 4201 authorized $20 million for continued research and development of
AFFF alternatives and AFFF remediation and disposal technologies, and an
additional $25 million for other PFAS remediation and disposal technologies.
 Section 4301 authorized $357.1 million in the DOD Environmental Restoration
accounts for the continuing investigation and remediation of PFAS releases
($175.0 million for the Air Force, $98.8 million for the Army, $167.3 million for
the Navy, and $74.0 million for FUDS).

242 Preliminary Assessments and Site Inspections are the initial steps of the site investigation phase for remedial actions
under CERCLA, pursuant to 40 C.F.R. §300.420.
243 P.L. 115-91, §316, as amended.
244 P.L. 116-92, §330 (incineration criteria) and §7361 (EPA guidelines).
245 P.L. 116-92, §331.
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In the debate prior to enactment, DOD procurement of PFAS-containing materials also received
attention. The FY2021 NDAA prohibited DOD, as of April 1, 2023, from procuring certain items
containing PFOA or PFOS (nonstick cookware, cooking utensils, and upholstered furniture,
carpets, and rugs that have been treated with stain-resistant coatings).246 The House-passed
FY2022 NDAA (section 317) would have broadened this prohibition to include additional items
and applied it to any PFAS.247 The Administration expressed concern with this broader House
provision and argued in part that it “would prohibit DOD from procuring a wide range of items
that may contain PFAS” and, if implemented, “would not be feasible for DOD to test all of these
items to determine if they contain PFAS.”248 The enacted FY2022 NDAA did not include this
House provision and instead directed GAO in Section 347 to conduct a study as noted above, and
provide a briefing to HASC and SASC on DOD procurement of certain items containing PFAS.
In lieu of certain other provisions that were not adopted, the explanatory statement for the
FY2022 NDAA also included language directing DOD to continue research of phytoremediation
and other remediation technologies, and to report to HASC and SASC on the acquisition and
remediation of off-base properties contaminated with PFOA or PFOS from Air Force activities.249
The FY2020 NDAA authorized the criteria for these property acquisitions.250
PFAS Contamination
For additional information about PFAS and related issues, see CRS Report R45986, Federal Role in Responding to
Potential Risks of Per- and Polyfluoroalkyl Substances (PFAS), coordinated by David M. Bearden; CRS Report R45793,
PFAS and Drinking Water: Selected EPA and Congressional Actions, by Elena H. Humphreys; and CRS Report R45998,
Contaminants of Emerging Concern Under the Clean Water Act, by Laura Gatz.
Exemption for Burn Pit Use in U.S. Military Contingency Operations251
Congress has included provisions in multiple NDAAs to address the use of “burn pits” to manage
waste during U.S. military contingency operations in foreign nations,252 and to assess potential
health effects that may be associated with burn pit emissions. The FY2022 NDAA authorized
additional criteria for the continued use of burn pits.253
As amended, the FY2010 NDAA restricted the use of burn pits to manage certain “covered”
wastes during U.S. military contingency operations in foreign nations, unless waste disposal

246 P.L. 116-283, §333.
247 H.R. 4350, §317.
248 White House, “Statement of Administration Policy, H.R. 4350 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2022,” September 21, 2021, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/SAP-HR-4350.pdf.
249 Congressional Record, Vol. 167, No. 211, December 7, 2021, Book II, p. H7278.
250 P.L. 116-92, §344.
251 David M. Bearden, Specialist in Environmental Policy, authored this section. For information on DOD burn pit use
and related issues, contact David M. Bearden at 7-2390, dbearden@crs.loc.gov.
252 For example, see National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Respiratory Health Effects of
Airborne Hazards Exposures in the Southwest Asia Theater of Military Operations, 2020.
253 For many years, DOD has managed wastes during combat or other field deployments in foreign nations through the
use of open burning in pits. Although open burning can offer a practical and efficient method to reduce the volume of
wastes for disposal, the combustion process may emit pollutants that could present health risks from inhalation or other
exposures. Concern about the use of burn pits has heightened over the past two decades during operations in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and certain other nations. Studies of potential health risks that may be associated with burn pit emissions
have been ongoing.
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alternatives are infeasible.254 In an April 2019 report, DOD identified the continued use of burn
pits at nine locations (seven in Syria, one in Afghanistan, and one in Egypt).255 In this report,
DOD observed that burn pits may continue to be the only feasible alternative to manage wastes at
some contingency locations in the future, given available technologies and the practical feasibility
of field conditions. The FY2020 NDAA required DOD to develop a plan for phasing out the use
of burn pits at the nine locations identified in the April 2019 report, and to identify all locations
where burn pits have been used during U.S. military operations.256
Section 316 of the FY2022 NDAA amended the FY2010 NDAA authorizing the Secretary of
Defense to exempt a contingency location in a foreign nation from the general prohibition on the
use of burn pits if doing so “is in the paramount interest of the United States.” Otherwise, the
general prohibition that has been in place would continue to apply under which burn pits may be
used at a contingency location if alternative waste disposal methods are infeasible. If the new
exemption is used, the Secretary is required to report to HASC and SASC to identify the location,
size and duration of burn pit operations, number of personnel assigned to the location, efforts to
mitigate potential health risks, and the need and rationale for the exemption. After signing the
final bill, President Biden noted his opposition to the use of burn pits and requested that the
Secretary seek presidential approval prior to exercising the exemption authority.257
The enacted exemption is a modified version of the SASC-reported bill (Section 314)258 with a
reporting requirement added. The House-passed bill (Section 314) would have repealed the
general prohibition and exceptions for the use of burn pits in the FY2010 NDAA, and more
broadly prohibited the use of burn pits unless the President exempted a location if doing so was in
the “paramount interest of the United States.”259 This provision also included reporting
requirements for such an exemption that are similar to those added in the final bill. Another
provision in the House-passed bill (Section 323) would have required DOD to include a budget
line item for alternatives to burn pits in its annual budget requests, which was not adopted.260
The FY2022 NDAA included two other provisions (Section 725 and Section 6602) related to burn
pits. Section 725 required the Secretary of Defense to provide mandatory training to medical
providers of DOD on potential health effects that may be associated with exposures to burn pit
emissions.261 Section 6602 required the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to add Egypt and Syria to
the scope of the Airborne Hazards and Open Burn Pit Registry.262

254 P.L. 111-84, Section 317, as amended (codified at 10 U.S.C. §2701 note), including the definition of “covered
waste” that identifies which wastes are prohibited from disposal through open burning unless alternatives are infeasible.
255 DOD, Open Burn Pit Report to Congress, April 2019, at
https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/Downloads/Congress/Open%20Burn%20Pit%20Report-2019.pdf.
256 P.L. 116-92, §333-334.
257 White House, “Statement by the President on S. 1605, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2022,” press release, December 27, 2021, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-
releases/2021/12/27/statement-by-the-president-on-s-1605-the-national-defense-authorization-act-for-fiscal-year-2022/.
258 S. 2792, §314.
259 H.R. 4350, §314.
260 H.R. 4350, §323.
261 The House-passed bill (H.R. 4350, §719) and SASC-reported bill (S. 2792, §724) included identical provisions.
262 This provision originated in the House-passed bill (H.R. 4350, §6409).
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Fuel Tank Leaks at the Red Hill Bulk Fuel Storage Facility263
Congress has included bill or report language in each NDAA for the past eight fiscal years from
FY2015 through FY2022 to address fuel tank leaks, environmental contamination, and impacts
on drinking water sources at the Red Hill Bulk Fuel Storage Facility in Hawaii. The U.S. Navy
and Defense Logistics Agency administer this facility as part of Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam.
The Red Hill facility has supplied fuel for the Pacific Fleet since the World War II era.264
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department of Health of the State of
Hawaii entered into an Administrative Order on Consent with the U.S. Navy and Defense
Logistics Agency for investigating and remediating contamination from fuel tank leaks at the Red
Hill facility in January 2014.265 The parties entered into this Consent Order pursuant to the Solid
Waste Disposal Act (often referred to as the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act or
RCRA)266 and applicable state law. RCRA Subtitle I applies to the regulation of underground
storage tanks and the remediation of petroleum contamination from tank leaks. Potential health
risks associated with more recent fuel tank leaks at the Red Hill facility discovered in November
2021 led to an interruption of the water supplies at the facility and temporary relocation of
affected individuals.267 Contamination from these leaks would add to existing challenges from
past leaks.
Section 318 of the FY2022 NDAA included a modified provision from the House-passed bill
(Section 331)268 directing the Naval Facilities Engineering Command to take the following
actions at the Red Hill facility to address the fuel tank leaks:
 an independent inspection of the “pipeline system, supporting infrastructure, and
appurtenances, including valves and any other corrosion prone equipment”; and
 a life-cycle sustainment plan, which shall consider the “current condition and
service life of the tanks, pipeline system, and support equipment.”
Section 318 also required the Secretary of Defense to assess possible alternatives to the Red Hill
facility for bulk fuel storage, including consideration of at least three locations outside of Hawaii.
Section 318 required this alternatives assessment to be based on needs to support the fuel
requirements of the Pacific Fleet, the costs and timeline for recapitalization of the Red Hill
facility to attain certain industry inspection standards specified in Section 318, and the costs and
timeline to establish an alternative location for secure bulk fuel storage.
Within one year of enactment, Section 318 required the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to
the congressional defense committees on the independent inspection, life-cycle sustainment plan,

263 David M. Bearden, Specialist in Environmental Policy, authored this section. For information on fuel tank leaks at
the Red Hill facility and related issues, contact David M. Bearden at 7-2390, dbearden@crs.loc.gov.
264 For information on the operational history of the Red Hill facility, see Commander Navy Region Hawaii, “About
Red Hill,” at https://www.cnic.navy.mil/regions/cnrh/om/red-hill-tank/about-red-hill.html.
265 For the Administrative Order on Consent and supporting documents, see U.S. EPA, “Red Hill Administrative Order
on Consent,” at https://www.epa.gov/red-hill/red-hill-administrative-order-consent.
266 42 U.S.C. §§6901 et seq.
267 For more information, see: (1) U.S. Navy Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, “JBPHH Water Updates,” at
https://www.cpf.navy.mil/JBPHH-Water-Updates; (2) U.S. EPA, “Drinking Water Emergency at Joint Base Pearl
Harbor-Hickam, Honolulu, Hawaii,” at https://www.epa.gov/red-hill/drinking-water-emergency-joint-base-pearl-
harbor-hickam-honolulu-hawaii-november-2021; and (3) Hawaii Department of Health, “DOH Investigation into Navy
Water System,” at https://health.hawaii.gov/about/navy-water-system-quality-updates.
268 H.R. 4350, §331.
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alternatives assessment, and “options on improving the security and maintenance of the Red Hill
Bulk Fuel Storage Facility.”
Subsequent to enactment of the FY2022 NDAA, Secretary of Defense Austin announced the
planned closure of the Red Hill facility in a memorandum issued on March 7, 2022, outlining
certain conditions for the closure decision.269 The decommissioning of the fuel tanks, and
investigation and remediation of environmental contamination from the tank leaks, would be
subject to RCRA Subtitle I and applicable state law.
Responsibility and Strategy for Global Bulk Fuel Management
The House-passed NDAA included a provision (Section 342) that would have required the
Secretary of Defense to designate a single combatant command to be responsible for global bulk
fuel management and delivery.270 The provision also would have required the combatant
commander of the so-designated command to submit a strategy on the matter to the congressional
defense committees. The Biden Administration “strongly” opposed the provision, arguing in part
that it would “not address the challenges posed by the degraded availability and survivability of
assets supporting the distribution of fuel to dispersed and austere operating locations and the need
for rapid decision-making in support of changing operational environments.”271 The enacted
NDAA included a provision (Section 352) that identified U.S. Transportation Command
(TRANSCOM) as the entity responsible for the department’s management and delivery of bulk
fuel on a global basis and required the TRANSCOM commander to prepare and submit the
strategy document.272
CRS Products on Military Logistics
For more information on military logistics, see CRS Video WVB00325, Defense Logistics 101; CRS In Focus
IF11543, Defense Primer: The Defense Logistics Agency; and CRS In Focus IF11479, Defense Primer: United States
Transportation Command.
Military Personnel (MILPERS) and Related Matters
The NDAA typically authorizes military end-strengths for DOD components and appropriations
for Military Personnel (MILPERs) compensation in Title IV of Division A.273 MILPERS accounts
fund cash compensation for military personnel, including basic pay, housing allowances, and
special pays and bonuses for which some personnel are eligible.274 MILPERS accounts also fund
deferred (i.e., post-retirement) compensation—including military retired pay, Thrift Savings Plan

269 DOD, “Statement by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III on the Closure of the Red Hill Bulk Fuel Storage
Facility,” March 7, 2022, at https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2957825/statement-by-secretary-
of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-on-the-closure-of-the-red/.
270 H.R. 4350, §342.
271 White House, “Statement of Administration Policy, H.R. 4350 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2022,” September 21, 2021, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/SAP-HR-4350.pdf.
272 135 Stat. 1653; 10 U.S.C. §2927.
273 Explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the
Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7363.
274 For additional background and analysis, see CRS Report R46965, The Department of Defense (DOD) Budget: An
Orientation.
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contributions, and the retiree health care plan known as TRICARE for Life—as well as
permanent change of station travel and other expenses.275
President’s Budget Request
The FY2022 President’s budget requested $167.3 billion in discretionary funding for the
department’s MILPERS accounts—$5 billion (3%) more than the enacted FY2021 level.276 In a
memorandum to DOD employees, Defense Secretary Austin described “taking care of our
people” as a key priority.277 In an overview of the FY2022 budget request, DOD stated, “As the
Department focuses on long-term structural reform to divest of outdated activities and lower
priority programs to provide the warfighters more of what they need to deter, fight, and win in
today’s complex security environment, it must efficiently manage its Total Force of active and
reserve military personnel, government civilian personnel, and contracted services.”278
House-Passed NDAA
The House-passed NDAA would have authorized $166.9 billion for MILPERS activities—
effectively flat from the request ($0.4 billion, or 0.2%, less than the request).279 The legislation
would have authorized $74 million in increases to the request, mostly for “manpower costs
associated with retaining two cruisers.”280 The net effect of these increases would have been
offset by a decrease of $500 million due to “historical underexecution,”281 which generally refers
to past spending that was lower than projected.282
SASC-Reported NDAA
The SASC-reported NDAA would have authorized $166.8 billion for MILPERS activities—
effectively flat from the request ($0.5 billion, or 0.3%, less than the request).283 The legislation
would have authorized $454 million in increases to the request, including for Army reserve

275 Funding tables in reports accompanying the NDAA typically include amounts for the Medicare Eligible Retiree
Health Care Fund to pay for the TRICARE for Life medical insurance program for certain military retirees.
Discretionary funding for TRICARE for Life is not provided by the annual defense appropriations act but rather is
automatically appropriated each year on the basis of permanent law (10 U.S.C. §§1111-1117).
276 DOD, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, May 2021, Defense Budget
Overview, United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request, p. A-1.
277 Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III to DOD employees, “Message to the Force,” March 4,
2021, p. 1.
278 DOD, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, May 2021, Defense Budget
Overview, United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request, p. 5-1.
279 CRS analysis of H.Rept. 117-118, p. 346, accompanying H.R. 4350; and the explanatory statement accompanying
the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p.
H7362.
280 Explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the
Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7434.
281 Ibid.
282 For more information on this term and others, see Mark Cancian, “Congress Traded Operations & Maintenance For
Modernization In 19 Appropriations,” Breaking Defense, October 11, 2018, at
https://breakingdefense.com/2018/10/congress-traded-om-for-rdte-in-19-approps-bill/.
283 CRS analysis of S.Rept. 117-39, p. 379; and the explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L.
117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7434.
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component homeland security operations and other unfunded priorities.284 The net effect of these
increases would have been offset by $950.7 million in decreases due to “[m]ilitary personnel
historical underexecution.”285
Enacted NDAA
The enacted NDAA authorized $166.9 billion for MILPERS activities—effectively flat from the
request ($0.4 billion, or 0.2% less than the request).286 The legislation authorized $147 million in
increases to the request, mostly for active-duty maintainers of A-10 close air support and F-35
fighter aircraft, and for manpower costs associated with retaining two Navy cruisers. The net
effect of these increases was offset by $527.7 million in decreases due to “[h]istorical
underexecution.”287 See Table 9.
Table 9. Summary of Military Personnel Authorizations in FY2022 NDAA
(in billions of dollars)
Account
FY2022
House-passed
SASC-
Authorized
% Change
Request
(H.R. 4350)
reported (S.
(P.L. 117-81)
(Authorized-
2792)
Request)
Military
$157.95
$157.52
$157.45
$157.57
-0.2%
Personnel
Appropriations
Medicare-
$9.34
$9.34
$9.34
$9.34
0.0%
Eligible Retiree
Health Fund
Contributions
Total
$167.29
$166.86
$166.79
$166.9
-0.2%
Source: CRS analysis of funding tables in H.Rept. 117-118, p. 347; S.Rept. 117-39, p. 379, 476-505; and
explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the
Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7434.
Note: Totals for request and authorized amounts from explanatory statement; totals for House-passed and
SASC-reported from committee reports. Totals may not sum due to rounding. Dol ars rounded to nearest
hundredth; percentages rounded to nearest tenth. The “% Change" column is the percentage change between
authorized and requested amounts.
Military End-Strength
The FY2022 President’s budget requested a military end-strength of 2.1 million personnel,
including approximately 1.35 million personnel in the active components and about 806,000
personnel in the reserve components—5,400 fewer personnel than the projected FY2021 level
(but with additional active-duty personnel in the Space Force).288 According to DOD, the

284 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF11964, Defense Primer: Department of Defense Unfunded Priorities.
285 CRS analysis of S.Rept. 117-39, p. 379; and the explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L.
117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7434.
286 CRS analysis of the explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House
section of the Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7434.
287 Ibid.
288 DOD, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, May 2021, Defense Budget
Overview, United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request, p. A-4.
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requested reduction was “a function of the divestment of outdated platforms across multiple
Services and components (e.g., older F-16s, Landing Ship Docks, tank companies, and Helicopter
Sea Combat Squadrons) in order to invest in future capabilities.”289 The House-passed NDAA
would have authorized the requested end-strength levels, while the SASC-reported NDAA would
have authorized an increase of 920 personnel to the Air Force’s active component end-strength.
The enacted NDAA authorized an increase of 1,640 personnel to requested active component
end-strength levels, including an increase of 920 personnel to the Air Force’s end-strength and an
increase of 720 personnel to the Navy’s end-strength. See Table 10.
Table 10. Military End-Strengths Authorized in the FY2022 NDAA
(number of personnel)
Component
FY2022 Request
House-passed
SASC-reported
Authorized (P.L.
(H.R. 4350)
(S. 2792)
117-81)
Army
485,000
485,000
485,000
485,000
Navy
346,200
346,200
346,200
346,920
Marine Corps
178,500
178,500
178,500
178,500
Air Force
328,300
328,300
329,220
329,220
Space Force
8,400
8,400
8,400
8,400
Subtotal, Active
1,346,400
1,346,400
1,347,320
1,348,040
Components
Army National
336,000
336,000
336,000
336,000
Guard
Army Reserve
189,500
189,500
189,500
189,500
Navy Reserve
58,600
58,600
58,600
58,600
Marine Corps
36,800
36,800
36,800
36,800
Reserve
Air National Guard
108,300
108,300
108,300
108,300
Air Force Reserve
70,300
70,300
70,300
70,300
Coast Guard
7,000
7,000
7,000
7,000
Reserve
Subtotal, Reserve
806,500
806,500
806,500
806,500
Components
Total
2,152,900
2,152,900
2,153,820
2,154,540
Source: CRS analysis of H.R. 4350 (§401 and §411), S. 2792 (§401 and §411), and P.L. 117-81 (§401 and §411).
Note: The Coast Guard is part of the Department of Homeland Security.
CRS Products on Military End-Strengths
For additional background and analysis on military end-strengths, see CRS Insight IN11857, FY2022 NDAA: Active
Component End-Strength; CRS Report R43808, Army Active Component (AC)/Reserve Component (RC) Force Mix:
Considerations and Options for Congress; and CRS Report R44612, How Big Should the Army Be? Considerations for
Congress.

289 Ibid., p. 5-2.
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Military Pay Raise
Title 37, Section 1009, of the U.S. Code provides a permanent formula for an automatic annual
increase in basic pay based on the annual increase in the Employment Cost Index (ECI). The
statutory formula relies on the ECI for wages and salaries of private industry workers based on
surveys conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The FY2022 President’s budget requested a
2.7% increase in basic pay, in line with the formula in current law.290 The House-passed NDAA,
the SASC-reported NDAA, and the enacted NDAA did not contain provisions specifying the
increase in basic pay, leaving the 2.7% automatic adjustment in place.291
CRS Products on the Military Pay Raise
For additional background and analysis on the military pay raise, see CRS In Focus IF10260, Defense Primer: Military
Pay Raise; CRS Video WVB00429, Pay and Allowances of the Armed Forces; and CRS Report RL33446, Military Pay:
Key Questions and Answers.
Sexual Assault in the Military
In July 2021, DOD published recommendations of the Independent Review Commission on
Sexual Assault in the Military.292 Among the 18 key recommendations was a proposal to “[c]reate
the Office of the Special Victim Prosecutor in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and
shift legal decisions about prosecution of special victim cases out of the chain of command.”293
The House-passed NDAA included multiple provisions related to the commission’s
recommendations.294 Section 532 of the House-passed NDAA would have required each service
Secretary to appoint a special victim prosecutor at the rank of O-6 and assistant special victim
prosecutors as appropriate.295 The SASC-reported NDAA included similar provisions related to
the commission’s recommendations.296 Section 533 of the SASC-reported NDAA would have
required each military department Secretary to appoint a lead special victim prosecutor for each
service.297 The enacted NDAA included an amended version of the SASC provision (§532) that
“would clarify that the lead special trial counsel be in a grade of O-7 or above, and that the lead
special trial counsel report directly to the Secretary concerned, without intervening authority,”
among other provisions.298
CRS Products on Military Sexual Assault and Justice Reform

290 DOD, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, May 2021, Defense Budget
Overview, United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request, p. 5-1.
291 H.Rept. 117-118, p. 546; SASC, “Executive Summary of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2022,” press release, July 22, 2021, p. 2; and HASC, “Final Text Summary of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2022,” press release, December 6, 2021, p. 1.
292 DOD, Hard Truths and the Duty to Change: Recommendations from the Independent Review Commission on Sexual
Assault in the Military, July 2, 2021, at https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jul/02/2002755437/-1/-1/0/IRC-FULL-
REPORT-FINAL-1923-7-1-21.PDF/IRC-FULL-REPORT-FINAL-1923-7-1-21.PDF.
293 Ibid., p. 7.
294 H.R. 4350, Title V, Subtitle D.
295 Ibid., §532.
296 S. 2792, title V, subtitles C and D.
297 Ibid., §533.
298 Explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the
Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7284.
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For additional background and analysis on military sexual assault and justice reform, see CRS Report R46940,
Military Justice Disposition Delimitation Legislation in the 117th Congress; CRS Insight IN11680, Sexual Assault, the
Military Justice System and Commanders‘ Authority: Recent Developments; CRS Insight IN11787, Military Criminal Justice
System, by Alan Ott; and CRS Report R44944, Military Sexual Assault: A Framework for Congressional Oversight.
Requiring Women to Register for the Draft
The House-passed NDAA included a provision (Section 513) that would have required women to
register for the draft and made other changes to the Military Selective Service Act.299 The SASC-
reported NDAA included a similar provision (Section 511).300 The enacted NDAA did not include
either provision. Some news organizations reported that lawmakers dropped the language as part
of a negotiation to adopt military justice reform.301
CRS Products on Selective Service
For additional background and analysis on selective service, see CRS Insight IN11780, FY2022 NDAA: Selective
Service and Draft Registration and CRS Report R44452, The Selective Service System and Draft Registration: Issues for
Congress.
Extremism in the Military
The House-passed NDAA included multiple provisions related to servicemember support for or
participation in extremist activities. One of the provisions (Section 525) would have created a
punitive article on violent extremism, among other requirements.302 The SASC-reported NDAA
included a provision (Section 527) that would have required the Defense Secretary to provide a
report to HASC and SASC with recommendations for establishing a separate punitive article in
the Uniform Code of Military Justice on violent extremism.303 The enacted NDAA included the
SASC provision (Section 549M).304
CRS Products on Extremism in the Military
For additional background and analysis on extremism in the military, see CRS Insight IN11779, FY2022 NDAA:
Extremism in the Military and CRS Insight IN11086, Military Personnel and Extremism: Law, Policy, and Considerations for
Congress.
Defense Health Program and Other Matters
The NDAA typically authorizes appropriations for the Defense Health Program, DOD working
capital funds, and certain other activities (i.e., destruction of chemical agents and munitions, drug
interdiction and counterdrug activities, and the Office of the Inspector General) in Title XIV of

299 H.R. 4350, §513; 50 U.S.C. §3801 et seq.
300 S. 2792, §511.
301 See, for example, Connor O’Brien, “Lawmakers drop proposal to add women to the draft as defense bill headaches
mount,” Politico, December 6, 2021, at https://www.politico.com/news/2021/12/06/ndaa-women-draft-dropped-
523829.
302 H.R. 4350, §§525, 529A.
303 S. 2792, §527.
304 135 Stat. 1733.
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the legislation.305 The Defense Health Program is part of a system that serves 9.6 million eligible
beneficiaries including servicemembers, retirees, and dependents—making it one of the largest
healthcare institutions in the country.306 In general, working capital funds are intended to provide
price stability for budgeting purposes and support business-like activities of DOD components
(e.g., bulk fuel purchases).307 While these activities are typically funded in DOD Operation and
Maintenance (O&M) accounts, they can include Procurement and Research, Development, Test,
and Evaluation (RDT&E) funding and are typically addressed in a separate title of the legislation.
President’s Budget Request
The FY2022 President’s budget requested $39.8 billion in discretionary funding for the
department’s Defense Health Program and certain other activities.308 In an overview of the
FY2022 budget request, DOD attributed the projected 5.3% increase in the broader medical
budget in part to rising healthcare costs based on private-sector care requirements and additional
funding for anticipated COVID-19 requirements.”309
House-Passed NDAA
The House-passed NDAA would have authorized $41.06 billion in discretionary funding for the
department’s Defense Health Program and certain other activities—$1.2 billion, or 3%, more than
the request.310 The legislation would have authorized increases for COVID-related shortfalls
($600 million); infectious disease and vaccine research, pandemic response, and supply chain
independence ($360 million); and anomalous health incidents ($115 million); among other
activities.311
SASC-Reported NDAA
The SASC-reported NDAA would have authorized $39.9 billion in discretionary funding for the
department’s Defense Health Program and certain other activities—effectively flat from the
request ($0.03 billion, or 0.1%, less than the request).312

305 For more information, see CRS Report R46965, The Department of Defense (DOD) Budget: An Orientation, by Pat
Towell.
306 For additional information, see CRS In Focus IF10530, Defense Primer: Military Health System.
307 According to GAO, A Glossary of Terms Used in the Federal Budget Process, GAO-05-734SP Budget Glossary, p.
101, a working capital fund is a “type of intragovernmental revolving fund that operates as a self-supporting entity” and
functions “entirely from the fees charged for the services they provide consistent with their statutory authority.” For
additional information, see CRS In Focus IF11233, Defense Primer: Defense Working Capital Funds.
308 Explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the
Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7363.
309 DOD, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, May 2021, Defense Budget
Overview, United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request, p. 5-5.
310 CRS analysis of H.Rept. 117-118, p. 346, accompanying H.R. 4350; and the explanatory statement accompanying
the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p.
H7362.
311 Explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the
Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7435.
312 CRS analysis of S.Rept. 117-39, p. 379; and the explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L.
117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7434.
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Enacted NDAA
The enacted NDAA authorized $39.7 billion in discretionary funding for the department’s
Defense Health Program and certain other activities —effectively flat from the request ($0.13
billion, or 0.3%, less than the request).313 See Table 9.
Table 11. Summary of Other Authorizations in FY2022 NDAA
(in billions of dollars)
Account
FY2022
House-passed
SASC-
Authorized
% Change
Request
(H.R. 4350)
reported (S.
(P.L. 117-81)
(Authorized-
2792)
Request)
Working Capital
$0.38
$0.38
$0.38
$0.38
0.0%
Fund, Army
Working Capital
$0.15
$0.15
$0.15
$0.15
0.0%
Fund, Navy
Working Capital
$0.08
$0.08
$0.08
$0.08
0.0%
Fund, Air Force
Working Capital
$0.13
$0.13
$0.13
$0.13
0.0%
Fund, Defense-
Wide
Working Capital
$1.16
$1.16
$1.16
$1.16
0.0%
Fund, Defense
Commissary
Agency
Chemical
$1.09
$1.09
$1.09
$1.09
0.0%
Agents and
Munition
Destruction
Drug
$0.82
$0.82
$0.82
$0.82
0.0%
Interdiction and
Counterdrug
Activities
Office of the
$0.44
$0.44
$0.44
$0.44
0.0%
Inspector
General
Defense Health
$35.59
$36.81
$35.62
$35.46
-0.4%
Program
Total
$39.85
$41.06
$39.88
$39.72
-0.3%
Source: CRS analysis of explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the
House section of the Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, pp. H7434-H7435.
Note: Totals may not sum due to rounding. Dol ars rounded to nearest hundredth; percentages rounded to
nearest tenth. The “% Change" column is the percentage change between authorized and requested amounts.

313 CRS analysis of the explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House
section of the Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7434.
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COVID-19 Vaccine Requirement
The House-passed NDAA included multiple provisions related to the vaccination of
servicemembers against COVID-19. One of the provisions (Section 716) would have prohibited
military leaders from taking certain adverse actions against servicemembers who did not follow
orders to get the COVID–19 vaccine, for example, by only allowing such personnel to receive an
“honorable discharge.”314 The Administration “strongly opposed” the House provision, arguing in
part that it would “detract from readiness and limit a commander’s options for enforcing good
order and discipline. 315 The SASC-reported NDAA did not include a similar provision. The
enacted NDAA included an amended version of the House provision (Section 736) to allow such
personnel to receive an “honorable discharge” or a “general discharge under honorable
conditions.”316
CRS Product on COVID-19 Military Vaccinations
For additional information, see CRS Insight CRS Insight IN11842, FY2022 NDAA: COVID-19 Vaccination-related
Provisions; CRS In Focus IF11816, Defense Health Primer: Military Vaccinations; and CRS Insight IN11764, The Military’s
COVID-19 Vaccination Mandate.
Anomalous Health Incidents (“Havana Syndrome”)
The House-passed NDAA included multiple provisions related to “anomalous health incidents.”
Such incidents refer to instances in which U.S. government employees, particularly those
overseas, report unexplained medical symptoms from sensory disturbances. The health effects,
sometimes described as “Havana Syndrome,” were first reported in 2016 by American personnel
in Havana, Cuba. The House-passed NDAA would have authorized $115 million for healthcare
related to anomalous health incidents.317 The SASC-reported NDAA would have authorized $30
million for such care.318 The enacted NDAA authorized $30 million for such care.319
CRS Products on Anomalous Health Incidents
For additional information, see CRS Insight IN11850, FY2022 NDAA: Care for Anomalous Health Incident Victims; and
CRS Report R42107, The Federal Employees’ Compensation Act (FECA): Workers’ Compensation for Federal Employees.
Selected Budgetary and Acquisition Matters
Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) Commission
Congressional consideration of the FY2022 NDAA involved debate about the speed and
effectiveness of the DOD’s Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE)

314 H.R. 4350, §513.
315 White House, “Statement of Administration Policy, H.R. 4350 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2022,” September 21, 2021, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/SAP-HR-4350.pdf.
316 135 Stat. 1800; 10 U.S.C. §1161 note prec.
317 H.Rept. 117-118, p. 480.
318 S.Rept. 117-39, p. 512.
319 Explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the
Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7435.
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process.320 PPBE is the department’s annual process for allocating resources among the armed
services, defense agencies, and other components based on strategic objectives.321 Some
observers have criticized the process as too slow and outdated, particularly for addressing the
types of challenges posed by strategic competitors, such as China and Russia.322 The House-
passed NDAA included a provision (Section 1079) that would have established a “Defense
Resource Budgeting and Allocation Commission to develop a consensus on an effective and
strategic approach to Department of Defense resource budgeting and allocation, including by
conducting an examination of the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution methodology
of the Department; and by considering potential alternatives to such methodology to maximize
the ability of the Department to equip itself in a timely manner to respond to current and
emerging threats.”323 The SASC-reported NDAA included a similar provision (Section 1002) that
would have established a “Commission on Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution
Reform tasked with providing an independent review and assessment of the PPBE process of the
Department of Defense (DOD).”324 The enacted FY2022 NDAA included an amended version of
the SASC provision (Section 1004).325 The legislation required the commission to compare the
process “with similar processes of private industry, other Federal agencies, and other countries,”
assess the “efficacy and efficiency of all phases and aspects” of the process; and propose
recommendations to improve the effectiveness of the process.326 The enacted language also
required the commission to issue an interim report by February 6, 2023, and a final report by
September 1, 2023.327
The legislation also included other provisions related to the PPBE process, including
requirements for the Secretary of Defense to establish a pilot program to identify ways to more
quickly meet the operational needs of combatant commands (Section 871);328 for the Secretary of
Defense to establish pilot programs within the Strategic Capabilities Office to close “significant”
capability gaps in theater (Section 872);329 and for the DOD Comptroller to submit a plan to the

320 See, for example, SASC, Hearings, “Planning, Programming, Budget, and Execution Process of the Department of
Defense,” March 18, 2021, at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/21-03-18-planning-programming-
budget-and-execution-process-of-the-department-of-defense.
321 For additional information on the PPBE process, see CRS In Focus IF10429, Defense Primer: Planning,
Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) Process and CRS In Focus IF10428, Intelligence Planning,
Programming, Budgeting, and Evaluation (IPPBE) Process.
322 See, for example, Eric M. Lofgren, The DoD Budget Process: The Next Frontier of Acquisition Reform, George
Mason University, School of Business, Center for Government Contracting, July 29, 2020, at
https://business.gmu.edu/news/2021-10/no-5-dod-budget-process-next-frontier-acquisition-reform; Dan Patt and
William Greenwalt, Competing in Time: Ensuring Capability Advantage and Mission Success through Adaptable
Resource Allocation, The Hudson Institute, February 25, 2021, at https://www.hudson.org/research/16717-competing-
in-time-ensuring-capability-advantage-and-mission-success-through-adaptable-resource-allocation; Thomas Spoehr
and Frederico Bartels, Reforming the Defense Department’s Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution
Process, The Heritage Foundation, January 14, 2022, at https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/reforming-the-
defense-departments-planning-programming-budgeting-and-execution.
323 H.R. 4350, §1079; and H.Rept. 117-118, p. 234.
324 S. 2792, §1002; and S.Rept. 117-39, p. 227.
325 135 Stat. 1884; and explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House
section of the Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7314.
326 Ibid.
327 Ibid.
328 135 Stat. 1855; and Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7308.
329 135 Stat. 1859.
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congressional defense committees to consolidate the information technology systems used to
manage data and support the process (Section 1003).330
Extension of Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs)
The House-passed NDAA included a provision (Section 815) that would have extended the
requirement for the Secretary of Defense to submit reports, known as Selected Acquisition
Reports (SARs), at the end of each fiscal-year quarter on major defense acquisition programs and
any program in excess of $300 million.331 SARs summarize the program’s latest cost, schedule,
and performance status. The SASC-reported NDAA included a similar provision (Section 854)
that would have extended the SAR reporting requirement for two years through FY2023.332 The
SASC provision also would have required a demonstration of the replacement reporting system
and a plan to implement such a system.333 The enacted NDAA included an amended version
(Section 805) of the SASC provision.334
Military Construction (MILCON) and Related Matters
The NDAA typically authorizes appropriations for DOD military construction projects in
Division B of the legislation. In general, DOD military construction accounts fund military
construction projects; major infrastructure improvements; land acquisition; construction and
operation of military family housing; privatized housing through the Family Housing
Improvement Fund and the Military Unaccompanied Housing Improvement Fund; construction
and environmental cleanup projects required by the base closure and realignment commission
(BRAC) process; and contributions to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Security
Investment Program, which funds infrastructure projects and cost-sharing expenses for collective
defense.335
President’s Budget Request
The FY2022 President’s budget requested $9.8 billion in military construction and related
discretionary funding—$1.3 billion (15%) more than the enacted FY2021 level.336 The request
included $8.4 billion in military construction accounts and $1.4 billion in family housing
accounts.337 Among the largest requested stand-alone projects, in terms of dollar value, were:
$250 million to build a dry dock addition at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in Kittery, Maine, for
the maintenance and overhaul of the Navy’s fleet of Virginia-class fast-attack submarines;338

330 135 Stat. 1884; and explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House
section of the Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7314.
331 H.R. 4350, §815; and H.Rept. 117-118, p. 209.
332 S. 2792, §854; and S.Rept. 117-39, p. 212.
333 Ibid.
334 135 Stat. 1816; 10 U.S.C. §2432(j); and explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in
Part 2 of the House section of the Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7303.
335 For additional information on military construction funding, see CRS Report R46965, The Department of Defense
(DOD) Budget: An Orientation. For more information on the military construction process, see CRS Report R44710,
Military Construction: Authorities, Process, and Frequently Asked Questions.
336 DOD, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, May 2021, Defense Budget
Overview, United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request, p. A-1.
337 Ibid.
338 For more information on this project, see DOD, Department of the Navy Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates,
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$207.9 million to construct a maintenance hangar at Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point,
North Carolina, to support two squadrons of F-35 Lightning II stealth fighter aircraft scheduled to
arrive at the installation in FY2024 and FY2025;339 and, $168 million to construct a helicopter
rescue operations maintenance hangar at Kadena Air Base in Japan to support missions of
INDOPACOM and Pacific Air Forces.340
House-passed NDAA
The House-passed NDAA would have authorized $13.4 billion for military construction projects
and related funding—$3.6 billion (36%) more than the request.341 The House legislation would
have authorized $4.8 billion in increases to the request (i.e., funding beyond the amounts for
certain projects requested in the budget or for projects not requested in the budget).342 Among
these increases, the House bill would have authorized 21 earmarks, also known as
congressionally directed spending or Community Project Funding items, totaling $370 million.343
The net effect of these increases in the House legislation would have been offset by $1.2 billion in
decreases to other programs.344
SASC-reported NDAA
The SASC-reported version of the bill would have authorized $12.7 billion in military
construction projects and related funding—$2.9 billion (29%) more than the request.345 The
SASC legislation would have authorized $4.1 billion in increases to the request. Unlike the House
version, the SASC report did not reference congressionally directed spending items.346 The net
effect of these increases in the SASC legislation would have been offset by $1.3 billion in
decreases to other programs.
The White House opposed provisions in the House-passed and SASC-reported bills to realign
military construction funding “from priority projects to other projects.”347 It also argued that

Justification of Estimates, May 2021, Military Construction, Active Force (MCON) and Family Housing, pp. 43-50.
For more information on the Virginia-class submarines, see CRS Report RL32418, Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class
Attack Submarine Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress.
339 For more information on this project, see DOD, Department of the Navy Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates,
Justification of Estimates, May 2021, Military Construction, Active Force (MCON) and Family Housing, pp. 69-74.
For more information on the F-35 program, see CRS Report RL30563, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program.
340 DOD, Department of the Air Force, Military Construction Programs, Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates,
Justification Data Submitted to Congress, May 2021, pp. 195-202.
341 CRS analysis of H.Rept. 117-118, p. 498, accompanying H.R. 4350; and the explanatory statement accompanying
the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p.
H7448.
342 Ibid., pp. H7436-H7448.
343 CRS analysis of H.Rept. 117-118, pp. 541-545. For more information on earmarks and congressionally directed
spending items, see CRS Report R46722, Community Project Funding: House Rules and Committee Protocols and
CRS Report RS22867, Earmark Disclosure Rules in the Senate: Member and Committee Requirements.
344 CRS analysis of H.Rept. 117-118, pp. 541-545.
345 CRS analysis of S.Rept. 117-39, p. 538; and the explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L.
117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7448.
346 SASC did not issue public guidance for congressionally directed spending items. The panel submitted internal
guidance to Members for congressionally directed funding item requests related to military construction (MILCON)
projects, in accordance with guidance released by the Chair of the Senate Appropriations Committee.
347 White House, “Statement of Administration Policy, H.R. 4350 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2022,” September 21, 2021, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/SAP-HR-4350.pdf; and
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incrementally funding certain projects would require nearly $1 billion in additional funding to
complete them.348 Military construction programs have made regular use of incremental funding.
Enacted NDAA
The enacted NDAA included a Division B, the Military Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2022, which authorized $13.3 billion in military construction projects and related funding—
$3.5 billion (36%) more than the request (see Table 12).349
Table 12. Summary of Military Construction Authorizations in FY2022 NDAA
(in billions of dollars)
Account
FY2022
House-passed
SASC-reported
Authorized
% Change
Request
(H.R. 4350)
(S. 2792)
(P.L. 117-81)
(Authorized
-Request)
Military Construction,
$0.83
$1.48
$1.63
$1.73
107%
Army
Military Construction,
$2.37
$3.54
$3.70
$3.90
64%
Navy
Military Construction,
$2.10
$3.28
$2.33
$2.49
18%
Air Force
Military Construction,
$1.96
$2.09
$2.01
$2.03
4%
Defense-Wide
NATO Security
$0.21
$0.21
$0.21
$0.21
0%
Investment Program
Military Construction,
$0.26
$0.33
$0.35
$0.39
52%
Army National Guard
Military Construction,
$0.06
$0.15
$0.12
$0.12
90%
Army Reserve
Military Construction,
$0.07
$0.07
$0.07
$0.07
0%
Navy Reserve
Military Construction,
$0.20
$0.26
$0.36
$0.38
93%
Air National Guard
Military Construction,
$0.08
$0.12
$0.16
$0.16
109%
Air Force Reserve
Unaccompanied
<$0.01
<$0.01
<$0.01
<$0.01
0%
Housing Improvement
Fund
Base Realignment and
$0.07
$0.12
$0.07
$0.12
77%
Closure, Army
Base Realignment and
$0.11
$0.16
$0.11
$0.16
45%
Closure, Navy

White House, “Statement of Administration Policy, S. 2792 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2022,” November 17, 2021, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/S-2797-SAP.pdf.
348 Ibid.
349 CRS analysis of explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House
section of the Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, pp. H7436-H7448.
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Account
FY2022
House-passed
SASC-reported
Authorized
% Change
Request
(H.R. 4350)
(S. 2792)
(P.L. 117-81)
(Authorized
-Request)
Base Realignment and
$0.10
$0.15
$0.10
$0.10
0%
Closure, Air Force
Base Realignment and
<$0.01
<$0.01
<$0.01
<$0.01
0%
Closure, Defense-Wide
Military Construction,
$8.42
$11.95
$11.23
$11.86
41%
Subtotal
Family Housing
$0.10
$0.15
$0.13
$0.16
62%
Construction, Army
Family Housing
$0.39
$0.39
$0.39
$0.39
0%
Operation and
Maintenance, Army
Family Housing
$0.08
$0.08
$0.08
$0.08
0%
Construction, Navy
Family Housing
$0.36
$0.36
$0.36
$0.36
0%
Operation and
Maintenance, Navy
Family Housing
$0.12
$0.12
$0.12
$0.12
0%
Construction, Air
Force
Family Housing
$0.33
$0.33
$0.33
$0.33
0%
Operation and
Maintenance, Air Force
Family Housing
$0.05
$0.05
$0.05
$0.05
0%
Operation and
Maintenance, Defense-
Wide
Family Housing
<$0.01
<$0.01
<$0.01
<$0.01
0%
Improvement Fund
Family Housing,
$1.42
$1.47
$1.45
$1.48
4%
Subtotal
Total
$9.85
$13.42
$12.68
$13.35
36%
Source: CRS analysis of funding tables in H.Rept. 117-118, pp. 482-498; S.Rept. 117-39, pp. 516-538; and
explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the
Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, pp. H7436-H7448.
Note: Totals may not sum due to rounding. The “% Change" column is the percentage change between
authorized and requested amounts.
Selected Increases and Decreases
The enacted NDAA authorized funding for virtually all of the Administration’s requested
projects, including the dry dock extension at the Portsmouth Navy Shipyard. The act authorized
$4.9 billion in increases to the request.350 Among these increases were all of the earmarks, or

350 Ibid.
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Community Project Funding items, in the House bill.351 The net effect of these increases in the act
was offset by $1.4 billion in decreases to other programs.352 Among these decreases was a $150
million reduction to the requested level of funding for the maintenance hangar at Marine Corps
Air Station Cherry Point.353 In recommending a similar reduction in its version of the legislation,
HASC noted its support for the project; however, it questioned the Navy’s ability to fully expend
the requested funding in FY2022.354 Also among these decreases, the legislation did not authorize
the $48.3 million requested to acquire land for a training range at the Naval Air Station Fallon,
Nevada.355
The enacted NDAA also provisions that prohibited DOD from conducting another BRAC round
(Section 2702);356 mandated the public dissemination of information on Facilities Sustainment,
Restoration, and Modernization (FSRM) projects costing more than $15 million (Section
2801);357 continued various military housing reforms (Sections 2811-2822);358 required GAO to
report on DOD contracting to upgrade military installations in the United States (Section
2882);359 and extended authorizations for certain military construction projects previously
identified for a redirection of funding for the construction of barriers along the U.S.-Mexico
border (see, for example, Section 2304).360
Incremental Funding for Large Projects
Congress has supported the use of incremental funding for certain types of military construction
projects.361 The explanatory statement accompanying the enacted FY2022 NDAA defended the
authorization of incremental funding for large and complex military construction projects.362
Doing so, it argued, “enables the Department to execute additional infrastructure projects in a
fiscal year, enables continuous congressional oversight, serves to reduce the significant
unobligated MILCON balance, and provides opportunities to adjust the authorization of
appropriations level for projects should issues arise or requirements change over the course of
construction.”363

351 Ibid., pp. H7462-H7464.
352 Ibid., pp. H7436-H7448.
353 Ibid., p. H7438.
354 H.Rept. 117-118, p. 304.
355 Explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the
Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7438.
356 135 Stat. 2180.
357 135 Stat. 2184.
358 135 Stat. 2191.
359 135 Stat. 2216.
360 See, for example, 135 Stat. 2169; and CRS Report R45937, Military Funding for Southwest Border Barriers, Table
E-1.
361 For more background and analysis, see CRS Report RL31404, Defense Procurement: Full Funding Policy—
Background, Issues, and Options for Congress.
362 Explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the
Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7352.
363 Ibid.
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Selected Projects in South Korea and Poland
The enacted NDAA authorized the Secretary of Defense to accept six military construction
projects in South Korea with a combined value of $505.2 million and two military construction
projects in Poland with a combined value of $37 million—projects that were paid for by the host
governments pursuant to bilateral security agreements with the United States requiring in-kind
contributions (Sections 2511-2512).364
MILCON Earmarks
For military construction accounts, the enacted NDAA authorized $339 million for 21
earmarks.365 Projects included a wastewater treatment plant, new entrance road and gate complex,
and a wellfield expansion, among others.
Prohibitions Related to Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility (GTMO)366
Beginning with the FY2011 NDAA, Congress has each year included a ban on the transfer of
detainees from the detention facility at Naval Station Guantanamo Bay in Cuba (known as
GTMO) to the United States and restrictions on transfers to other countries, as well as restrictions
on constructing or modifying facilities within the United States to house GTMO detainees.367 In
the FY2016 NDAA, Congress added a ban on transferring detainees to certain countries.368 In the
FY2017 NDAA, Congress began to prohibit the use of funds for closure or realignment of
GTMO.369 These counterterrorism restrictions have varied over the years, but have been a
consistent feature of NDAAs.
For FY2022, the House-passed NDAA included only a provision (Section 1023) in Title X,
“General Provisions,” that would have extended the prohibition on the use of funds to transfer
detainees from GTMO to certain countries,370 but would not have prohibited transfer to the
United States. The SASC-reported NDAA included a similar provision (Section 1033),371 but also
included the panoply of other restrictions. The SASC legislation included provisions that would
have extended prohibitions on the use of funds to transfer GTMO detainees to the United States
(Section 1031), construct or modify facilities in the United States to house transferred GTMO
detainees (Section 1032), and to close or abandon GTMO (Section 1034).372 The Administration
“strongly opposed” the provisions, arguing they would “interfere with the President’s ability to
determine the appropriate disposition of GTMO detainees and to make important foreign policy
and national security determinations regarding whether and under what circumstances to transfer

364 135 Stat. 2176, 135 Stat. 2177.
365 Explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the
Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, pp. H7462-H7463. (Note that certain Community Project Funding Items are
repeated in the table.)
366 This section was coordinated with Jennifer K. Elsea, Legislative Attorney.
367 P.L. 111-383, §§1032-1034; 124 Stat. 4351-54.
368 P.L. 114-92, §1033; 129 Stat. 968-69 (banning GTMO detainee transfers to Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen).
369 P.L. 114-328, §1035; 130 Stat. 2391.
370 H.R. 4350, §1023. It would have left in place a permanent requirement for certification of certain criteria prior to
transferring GTMO detainees to other countries. P.L. 114-92, §1034 (codified at 10 U.S.C. §801 note).
371 S. 2792, §1033.
372 Ibid., §§1031, 1032, 1034.
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detainees to the custody or effective control of foreign countries.”373 The enacted NDAA included
the SASC provisions. After signing the legislation, President Biden argued the provisions “unduly
impair the ability of the executive branch to determine when and where to prosecute Guantánamo
Bay detainees and where to send them upon release” and urged Congress to eliminate them “as
soon as possible.”374
CRS Products on Guantanamo Bay
For additional background and analysis on Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, see CRS Report R44137, Naval Station
Guantanamo Bay: History and Legal Issues Regarding Its Lease Agreements and CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10654, Due
Process Rights for Guantanamo Detainees.
Department of Energy and Related Programs
The House-passed NDAA included several provisions related to DOE defense-related programs
and DOD strategic nuclear forces. The House-passed NDAA would have prohibited funding to
extend the service life of the B83 gravity bomb, the largest thermonuclear bomb in the U.S.
arsenal and carried by the B-2 stealth bomber.375 The legislation also would have prohibited DOD
from reducing the quantity of deployed Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)
below 400 missiles, or their responsiveness or alert level.376 The legislation also would have
prohibited the Administrator of the DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
from reconverting or retiring W76-2 warheads, a low-yield variant of the W76-1 warhead and
carried by a small portion of Trident D5 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM).377 The
Biden Administration opposed these provisions, arguing that they would “prejudge the outcome”
of the Nuclear Posture Review then underway.378 The SASC-reported version of the legislation
would have prohibited DOD from reducing the quantity of deployed Minuteman III
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) below 400 missiles, or their responsiveness or alert
level.379 The Administration opposed this provision, arguing in part that it “would constrain the
President’s ability to propose the nuclear force he determines is necessary.”380 The enacted
NDAA did not authorize funding to extend the service life of the B83 bomb;381 prohibited the
availability of funding for the NNSA to reconvert or retire a W76-2 warhead, unless the
Administrator issues a waiver (Section 3120);382 and prohibited DOD from reducing the quantity

373 White House, “Statement of Administration Policy, S. 2792 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2022,” November 17, 2021, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/S-2797-SAP.pdf.
374 White House, “Statement by the President on S. 1605, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2022,” press release, December 27, 2021, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-
releases/2021/12/27/statement-by-the-president-on-s-1605-the-national-defense-authorization-act-for-fiscal-year-2022/.
375 H.R. 4350, §4701.
376 Ibid., §1626.
377 Ibid., §3166.
378 White House, “Statement of Administration Policy, H.R. 4350 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2022,” September 21, 2021, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/SAP-HR-4350.pdf.
379 S. 2792, §1543.
380 White House, “Statement of Administration Policy, S. 2792 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2022,” November 17, 2021, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/S-2797-SAP.pdf.
381 Explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) in Part 2 of the House section of the
Congressional Record, December 7, 2021, p. H7448.
382 135 Stat. 2228. The Under Secretary for Nuclear Security of the Department of Energy serves as the Administrator
of the National Nuclear Security Administration.
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of deployed ICBMs or their responsiveness or alert level, with certain exceptions (Section
1639).383
CRS Products on Strategic Nuclear Forces
For additional background and analysis on strategic nuclear forces, see CRS In Focus IF10519, Defense Primer:
Strategic Nuclear Forces; CRS In Focus IF11681, Defense Primer: Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD); and CRS
Report RL33640, U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues.
Outlook
The congressional debate on the FY2022 NDAA and subsequent events raised a number of longer
term issues facing that Congress may consider, among them were the following.
Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine and U.S. Defense Budget Plans
The FY2022 NDAA authorized—and the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2022
(Division C of P.L. 117-103) provided—funding for activities intended to support the European
Deterrence Initiative (EDI), including $300 million for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative,
through which DOD provides lethal equipment and other support to the Ukrainian military and
security forces.384 On February 24, 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine.385 As
part of the Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022 (Division N of P.L. 117-103),
Congress provided $13.6 billion in emergency funding for the situation in Ukraine and for related
expenses, including $6.528 billion for DOD.386 The DOD funding included $3.028 billion for
European Command (EUCOM) operations mission support, the deployment of personnel to the
region, and intelligence support, and $3.5 billion to replenish U.S. stocks of equipment sent to
Ukraine.387 To replenish U.S. and allied stocks of Stinger short-range air-defense (SHORAD)
missile systems, some Members have urged DOD to accelerate development of an exportable
version of the system.388 Some observers have called for a higher level of U.S. defense spending
as a share of U.S. GDP and deploying additional U.S. military personnel to Eastern Europe in

383 135 Stat. 2091.
384 For additional information on the European Deterrence Initiative, see CRS In Focus IF10946, The European
Deterrence Initiative: A Budgetary Overview. For additional information on Ukraine security assistance, see CRS In
Focus IF12040, U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine.
385 For additional information, see CRS Insight IN11869, Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: Overview of U.S. Sanctions
and Other Responses; and CRS Insight IN11872, Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Issues and
Aspects.
386 P.L. 117-103, Division N, Title III.
387 House Committee on Appropriations, “Summary of the Ukraine Supplemental,” March 15, 2022, at
https://appropriations.house.gov/sites/democrats.appropriations.house.gov/files/Ukraine%20Supplemental%20Summar
y.pdf.
388 HASC, “Smith, Rogers Urge Defense Department to Replenish U.S. and Allied Stocks of Stingers,” press release,
March 18, 2022, at https://armedservices.house.gov/press-releases?ID=3D96CE66-74C9-4CFC-B9CB-
7A0769545A06.
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response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.389 Others have argued for maintaining U.S. strategic
focus on competition with China in the Indo-Pacific region.390
Inflation Assumptions in Defense Budget Plans391
Prices in the U.S. economy have continued to rise faster than projected for FY2022.392 In May
2021, OMB estimated inflation in national defense prices at 1.9% for FY2022.393 In February
2022, the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Economic Analysis estimated such inflation at an
annualized rate of 5.5% for the first quarter of FY2022.394 In March 2022, OMB estimated such
inflation at 4.0% for FY2022.395 In March 2022, Chair of the Federal Reserve Jerome Powell
said, “The expectation going into this year was that we would basically see inflation peaking in
the first quarter, then maybe leveling out. That story has already fallen apart.”396 Higher inflation
reduces the real purchasing power of a given level of defense spending. In January 2022, DOD
Comptroller Michael McCord said, “Inflation is ... eating into our resources ... I have had to
approve two increases in our FY2022 fuel prices—a first increase on October 1, 2021, and a
second on January 1, 2022—to keep our working capital fund solvent in response to higher fuel
prices. This has created a bill of $1.5 billion for the services in FY2022.”397 Some Members have
called for increases to the defense budget in part to offset inflationary effects on DOD’s
purchasing power.398 Other Members have proposed decreasing defense spending to focus on

389 See, for example, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (also known as the U.S. Helsinki
Commission), “Doing More: Assessing Ukraine’s Defensive Needs,” March 18, 2022, at
https://www.csce.gov/international-impact/events/doing-more.
390 See, for example, Elbridge Colby and Oriana Skylar Mastro, “Ukraine Is a Distraction From Taiwan,” The Wall
Street Journal, February 13, 2022, at https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-is-a-distraction-from-taiwan-russia-china-
nato-global-powers-military-invasion-jinping-biden-putin-europe-11644781247.
391 This section was coordinated with Marc Labonte, Specialist in Macroeconomic Policy.
392 For additional background and analysis on this topic, see CRS Insight IN11832, Breaking Down the U.S. Inflation
Rate; CRS Report R46890, Inflation in the Wake of COVID-19; and CRS Insight IN11868, The Federal Reserve and
Inflation.
393 GPO, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2022, Table 10.1 - Gross Domestic Product and
Deflators Used in the Historical Tables: 1940-2026, Composite Outlay Deflators for Total Defense, at
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BUDGET-2022-TAB/xls/BUDGET-2022-TAB-11-1.xlsx.
394 Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Table 1.1.7. Percent Change From Preceding Period in
Prices for Gross Domestic Product,” updated March 30, 2022, at
https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?reqid=19&step=3&isuri=1&1921=survey&1903=11#reqid=19&step=3&isuri=
1&1921=survey&1903=11.
395 OMB, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2023, Table 10.1 - Gross Domestic Product and
Deflators Used in the Historical Tables: 1940-2027, at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BUDGET-2023-
TAB/xls/BUDGET-2023-TAB-11-1.xlsx.
396 Jeanna Smialek, “Powell Says Fed Could Raise Rates More Quickly to Tame Inflation,” The New York Times,
March 21, 2022, at https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/21/business/economy/powell-fed-inflation.html.
397 House Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, “Testimony of Michael McCord,” January 12,
2022, at https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AP/AP02/20220112/114316/HHRG-117-AP02-Wstate-McCordM-
20220112.pdf.
398 Representative Mike Rogers, Senator Jim Inhofe et al., “GOP Armed Services Committee Members Press Biden to
Boost Defense Budget by 5% Above Inflation,” press release, March 23, 2022, at https://republicans-
armedservices.house.gov/news/press-releases/gop-armed-services-committee-members-press-biden-boost-defense-
budget-5-above.
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domestic priorities, the COVID-19 pandemic, and climate change.399 The Federal Reserve and
most private sector forecasters have projected lower levels of inflation for FY2023.400
National Defense Strategy (NDS) Funding Priorities401
While the Trump Administration’s 2018 National Defense Strategy did not address the question
of pandemics or climate change as national security threats, the Biden Administration’s Interim
National Security Strategic Guidance (INSSG) referenced “pandemics and other biological risks,
the escalating climate crisis, cyber and digital threats, international economic disruptions, [and]
protracted humanitarian crises,” among other threats.402 On March 28, 2022, the Biden
Administration transmitted the classified 2022 National Defense Strategy to Congress and
published a two-page fact sheet on the guidance.403 According to the 2022 NDS Fact Sheet, DOD
“for the first time” incorporated other strategic reviews (i.e., Nuclear Posture Review and Missile
Defense Review) into the National Defense Strategy.404 The fact sheet described China as the
“most consequential strategic competitor and the pacing challenge” for DOD and Russia as
posing “acute threats, as illustrated by its brutal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine.”405 The
document also identified North Korea, Iran, and violent extremist organizations as threats—and
global climate change and pandemics as “transboundary threats.”406 According to the fact sheet,
DOD intends to advance its strategic goals in part through a concept known as integrated
deterrence (i.e., integrating warfighting domains, other instruments of national power, and
alliances and partners).407 Among the potential issues for Congress are the budgetary implications
of resourcing and executing the NDS.
Tradeoffs between Shorter- and Longer-Term Defense Budget
Priorities
The annual DOD budget process provides an opportunity for DOD and Congress to make
tradeoffs among funding for operating and maintaining the force; paying for personnel; procuring
weapons, equipment, and services; researching and developing new technology; and carrying out
other activities. The 2018 National Defense Strategy Commission recommended that Congress
balance funding for DOD to emphasize readiness, capacity, and capability across the force.408

399 Letter from Representatives Mark Pocan and Barbara Lee to President Joseph R. Biden, Jr., March 18, 2022, at
https://lee.house.gov/imo/media/doc/Pocan-
Lee%20Defense%20Spending%20Reduction%20Letter%20to%20POTUS%203-18-2211.pdf.
400 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Summary of Economic Projections, March 16, 2022 , at
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20220316.pdf; and Blue Chip, Economic Indicators,
Vol. 47, No. 3, March 11, 2022.
401 This section was coordinated with Kathleen J. McInnis, former CRS Specialist in International Security. For
additional background and analysis on this topic, see CRS In Focus IF11798, The Interim National Security Strategic
Guidance and CRS In Focus IF11525, COVID-19: National Security and Defense Strategy.
402 White House, Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, March 2021, p. 7.
403 DOD, “DoD Transmits 2022 National Defense Strategy,” press release, March 28, 2022, at
https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2980584/dod-transmits-2022-national-defense-strategy/.
404 DOD, Fact Sheet: 2022 National Defense Strategy, March 28, 2022, at
https://media.defense.gov/2022/Mar/28/2002964702/-1/-1/1/NDS-FACT-SHEET.PDF.
405 Ibid., p. 1.
406 Ibid.
407 Ibid., p. 2.
408 Eric Edelman and Gary Roughead (co-chairs), Providing for the Common Defense: The Report of the National
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Others have used the terms “force structure” for capacity and “modernization” or “investment”
for capability. Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen H. Hicks has previously described these three
elements as the “iron triangle of painful trade-offs.”409 The Biden Administration “strongly”
opposed provisions in the FY2022 versions of the NDAA to authorize funding for “systems that
limit DOD’s ability to divest or retire lower priority platforms not relevant to tomorrow’s
battlefield.”410 As Congress reviews the FY2023 President’s budget request, it may consider
questions about the implications of funding existing systems on efforts to adopt emerging
technologies. As the 2020 report by the HASC Future of Defense Task Force concluded, in part,
“To remain competitive, the United States must prioritize the development of emerging
technologies over fielding and maintaining legacy systems. This will require significant changes
to the Pentagon’s force structure, posture, operational plans, and acquisition system and must be
complemented by a tough and fulsome review of legacy systems, platforms, and missions.”411
Deficits and Long-Term Defense Budget Plans
The increase in the federal deficit in FY2020 and FY2021 associated with the economic
disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic raised questions about whether pressure to reduce
the gap between revenues and outlays will impact defense budget plans. While CBO has reported
a smaller deficit so far in FY2022 than during the same period in the two prior fiscal years,412
some Members have opposed legislation due to fiscal concerns over rising inflation and debt.413
In recent decades, during periods of widening gaps between revenues and outlays, Congress has
sometimes enacted legislation intended to reduce the deficit in part by limiting defense
spending.414
Balancing Budgetary Oversight and Flexibility
The 2018 National Defense Strategy Commission made a series of recommendations related to
defense budget flexibility. The commission recommended that Congress consider producing five-
year defense budget agreements “to permit greater stability and flexibility for DOD” and to
authorize the department to “expend Operations and Maintenance funds from any given fiscal
year across that fiscal year and the subsequent one.”415 It also recommended Congress enact on-
time annual appropriations and fund whole-of-government efforts to address the challenges posed

Defense Strategy Commission, United States Institute of Peace, November 2018.
409 Kathleen Hicks, Defense Strategy and the Iron Triangle of Painful Tradeoffs, Center for Strategic and International
Studies, June 21, 2017, at https://defense360.csis.org/defense-strategy-and-the-iron-triangle-of-painful-tradeoffs/.
410 White House, “Statement of Administration Policy, H.R. 4350 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2022,” September 21, 2021, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/SAP-HR-4350.pdf, p. 1; and
White House, “Statement of Administration Policy, S. 2792 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2022,” November 17, 2021, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/S-2797-SAP.pdf, p. 1.
411 HASC, Future of Defense Task Force Report 2020, September 29, 2020, p. 5, at
https://armedservices.house.gov/_cache/files/2/6/26129500-d208-47ba-a9f7-
25a8f82828b0/424EB2008281A3C79BA8C7EA71890AE9.future-of-defense-task-force-report.pdf.
412 CBO, Monthly Budget Review: February 2022, March 8, 2022, at https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2022-03/57841-
MBR.pdf.
413 See, for example, Senator Joe Manchin, “Why I Won’t Support Spending Another $3.5 Trillion,” The Wall Street
Journal, September 2, 2021, at https://www.wsj.com/articles/manchin-pelosi-biden-3-5-trillion-reconciliation-
government-spending-debt-deficit-inflation-11630605657.
414 For more information, see the “Budgetary Context” section.
415 Eric Edelman and Gary Roughead (co-chairs), Providing for the Common Defense: The Report of the National
Defense Strategy Commission, United States Institute of Peace, November 2018.
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by great power competition. An advisory panel, known as the Section 809 Panel and appointed to
recommend defense acquisition reforms, has recommended increasing DOD reprogramming
thresholds to allow the department to shift more funds within appropriations accounts. Congress
has acted on a recommendation from the Defense Innovation Board, a DOD advisory board, to
establish a multi-year appropriation for digital technology and has authorized and appropriated
funding for Software and Digital Technology Pilot Programs. As previously discussed, Congress
has established a commission to study and provide recommendations to improve the effectiveness
of the DOD Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process.

Author Information

Brendan W. McGarry

Analyst in U.S. Defense Budget

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