Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process
May 3, 2022
This report reviews the process and procedures that apply to congressional consideration of
foreign arms sales proposed by the President. This includes consideration of proposals to sell
Paul K. Kerr
major defense equipment, defense articles and services, or the retransfer to third-party states of
Specialist in
such items. Under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), the President must formally notify
Nonproliferation
Congress 30 calendar days before the Administration can take the final steps to conclude a

government-to-government foreign military sale of major defense equipment valued at $14
million or more, defense articles or services valued at $50 million or more, or design and

construction services valued at $200 million or more. In the case of such sales to NATO member
states, NATO, Japan, Australia, South Korea, Israel, or New Zealand, the President must formally notify Congress 15
calendar days before the Administration can proceed with the transaction. However, the prior notice threshold values are
higher for sales to these destinations.
The President must formally notify Congress of commercially licensed arms sales 30 calendar days before Department of
State issuance of export licenses for sales of major defense equipment valued at $14 million or more, or defense articles or
services valued at $50 million or more. In the case of such sales to NATO member states, NATO, Japan, Australia, South
Korea, Israel, or New Zealand, the President must formally notify Congress 15 calendar days before proceeding with the
transaction. As with government-to-government sales, the prior notice threshold values are higher for sales to these
destinations. The President must formally notify Congress of commercially licensed sales of firearms controlled under
category I of the United States Munitions List and valued at $1 million or more 30 days prior to approval of the relevant
export license. In the case of proposed licenses for such sales to NATO members, Japan, Australia, South Korea, Israel, or
New Zealand, the AECA requires 15 days prior notification.
The AECA contains a mechanism for Congress to adopt a joint resolution of disapproval for arms sales notified by the
President; Congress has never successfully blocked a proposed arms sale via such a resolution. Congress may adopt
legislation to block or modify an arms sale at any time up to the point of delivery of the items involved.
This report will be updated if notable changes in these review procedures or applicable law occur.
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his report reviews the process and procedures that currently apply to congressional
consideration of foreign arms sales proposed by the President. This includes consideration
T of proposals to sell major defense equipment, defense articles and services, or the
retransfer to other states of such military items. In general, the executive branch, after complying
with the terms of applicable U.S. law, principally contained in the Arms Export Control Act1
(AECA) (P.L. 90-629, 82 Stat. 1320), is free to proceed with an arms sales proposal unless
Congress passes legislation prohibiting or modifying the proposed sale. The President has the
obligation under the law to submit the arms sale proposal to Congress, but only after he has
determined that he is prepared to proceed with any such notifiable arms sales transaction.
The AECA also contains the statutory authority for the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program,
under which the U.S. government sells U.S. defense equipment, services, and training on a
government-to-government basis. In addition, the law specifies criteria for Direct Commercial
Sales (DCS) of U.S.-government licensed defense articles and services directly from U.S. firms to
eligible foreign governments and international organizations.2
Congressional Review Process
Informal Notifications
The Department of State (on behalf of the President) submits to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee an informal notification of a prospective major
arms sale 20 calendar days before the executive branch takes further formal action. An August
2020 State Department Office of Inspector General report explains that, in addition to the AECA
formal notification process,
the Department has by long-standing practice submitted a preliminary or informal
notification of prospective major arms transfers in advance of their formal notification to
the congressional committees of jurisdiction.3
The informal notification practice began with a February 18, 1976, letter from the Department of
Defense making a commitment to give Congress these preliminary classified notifications.4
Beginning in 2012, the State Department implemented a new informal notification process, which
the department calls a “tiered review,” in which the relevant committees are notified between 20
and 40 calendar days before receiving formal notification, depending on the system and
destination in question.5

1 Originally titled The Foreign Military Sales Act.
2 For more information, see CRS Report R46337, Transfer of Defense Articles: Sale and Export of U.S.-Made Arms to
Foreign Entities, by Nathan J. Lucas and Michael J. Vassalotti.
3 Review of the Department of State’s Role in Arms Transfers to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
Emirates, Department of State Office of Inspector General ISP-I-20-19, August 2020.
4 Letter of February 18, 1976 from Lt. Gen. H.M. Fish, USAF, Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency to
Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.
5 Prior to giving such notice, the State Department transmits to the committees any license applications for
commercially licensed arms sales as soon as the department receives them. The State Department does not provide the
same notice regarding government-to-government foreign military sales.
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During June 2017 testimony, Acting Assistant Secretary of State Tina Kaidanow described this
process as a
review period during which the Committees can ask questions or raise concerns prior to
the Department of State initiating formal notification. The purpose is to provide Congress
the opportunity to raise concerns, and have these concerns addressed, in a confidential
process with the Administration, so that our bilateral relationship with the country in
question is protected during this process.6
The State Department “generally will not formally notify an arms transfer if a member of
Congress raises significant concerns by placing a hold during the informal review stage,” the
Inspector General report states, noting that “the Department is not precluded from proceeding
with an arms transfer subject to a congressional hold.”7
Formal Notifications
The AEA contains provisions for congressional review and disapproval of arms sales. The
President may not proceed with a proposed FMS or DCS transaction if Congress adopts a joint
resolution of disapproval within the statutory review periods described below. It is worth noting
that a congressional recess or adjournment does not stop these review periods.
Foreign Military Sales
Section 36(b)(1) of the AECA requires the President formally to notify the Speaker of the House,
as well as the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee, 30
calendar days before issuing a Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) for an FMS transfer of
major defense equipment valued at $14 million or more, defense articles or services valued at $50
million or more, or design and construction services valued at $200 million or more.8 The
Defense Security Cooperation Agency transmits the notifications to Congress.9 In the case of such
sales to NATO member states, NATO, Japan, Australia, South Korea, Israel, or New Zealand, the
President must formally notify Congress 15 calendar days before proceeding with the sale.10 The
prior notice threshold values for transfers to these recipients are $25 million for the sale,
enhancement, or upgrading of major defense equipment; $100 million for the sale, enhancement,
or upgrading of defense articles and defense services; and $300 million for the sale, enhancement,

6 “Foreign Military Sales: Process and Policy,” Statement Before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and
Trade, House Foreign Affairs Committee, June 15, 2017.
7 Department of State Office of Inspector General, August 2020.
8 The Letter of Offer and Acceptance is the legal instrument used by the U.S. government for FMS transactions. (See
CRS Report R46337, Transfer of Defense Articles: Sale and Export of U.S.-Made Arms to Foreign Entities.) The
Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-559, 88 Stat. 1795) amended the Foreign Military Sales Act to add a $25
million dollar threshold for defense articles and services. The International Security Assistance and Arms Export
Control Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-329, 90 Stat. 729) added major defense equipment with a $7 million threshold. The
International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981 (P.L. 97-113, 95 Stat. 1519) changed the $7 million
threshold to $14 million and the $25 million threshold to $50 million. The International Security and Development
Cooperation Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-533, 94 Stat. 3131) added design and construction services with a $200 million
threshold.
9 See E.O. 13637, “Administration of Reformed Export Controls,” March 8, 2013.
10 For the Senate, these review periods appear to begin when the relevant Congressional notification notice is published
in the Congressional Record.
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or upgrading of design and construction services. Such sales to these countries must not include
or involve sales to a country outside of this group of states.11
Section 36(i) requires the President to notify both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and
House Foreign Affairs Committee at least 30 days in advance of a pending shipment of defense
articles subject to the 36(b) requirements if the chair and ranking member of either committee
request such notification. Certain articles or services listed on the Missile Technology Control
Regime Annex are subject to a variety of additional reporting requirements.12
Section 36(b)(5)(A) contains a reporting requirement for defense articles or equipment items
whose technology or capability has, prior to delivery, been “enhanced or upgraded from the level
of sensitivity or capability described” in the original congressional notification. For such exports,
the President must submit a report to the relevant committees at least 45 days before the exports’
delivery that describes the enhancement or upgrade and provides “a detailed justification for such
enhancement or upgrade.” This requirement applies for 10 years after the Administration has
notified Congress of the export.13 According to Section 36(b)(5)(C), the Administration must, in
the case of upgrades or enhancements meeting certain value thresholds, submit a new notification
to Congress and the export will be considered “as if it were a separate letter of offer ... subject to
all of the requirements, restrictions, and conditions set forth in this subsection.” The threshold
values are higher for sales to NATO members, Japan, Australia, South Korea, Israel, or New
Zealand.
Direct Commercial Sales
Section 36(c)(1) of the AECA requires the President formally to notify the Speaker of the House,
as well as the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee, of
DCS transactions 30 calendar days before State Department issuance of the relevant export
license; the State Department’s Bureau of Legislative Affairs submits such notices.14 The prior
notice threshold values for these sales is $14 million for major defense equipment and $50
million for defense articles or services or more.15 In the case of such sales to NATO member
states, NATO, Japan, Australia, South Korea, Israel, or New Zealand, the President must formally
notify Congress 15 calendar days before proceeding with such a sale. The prior notice threshold
values for transfers to these recipients are $25 million for the sale, enhancement, or upgrading of
major defense equipment, and $100 million for the sale, enhancement, or upgrading of defense
articles and defense services. Such sales to these countries must not include or involve sales to a
country outside of this group of states. The President must notify Congress 30 days prior to
issuing a license for exporting firearms listed on category I of the United States Munitions List;16
the AECA requires 15 days prior notice for such licenses concerning for sales to NATO members,
Japan, Australia, South Korea, Israel, or New Zealand.17

11 The Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (P.L. 107-228, 116 Stat. 1350), added these thresholds.
12 For more information about the regime, see CRS Report RL33865, Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of
Treaties and Agreements, by Amy F. Woolf, Paul K. Kerr, and Mary Beth D. Nikitin.
13 This provision also applies to defense services and design and construction services.
14 See E.O. 13637.
15 22 U.S.C. 2776(c).
16 On January 23, 2020, the Departments of State and Commerce published rules stipulating that the export of some
Category I firearms will be regulated by the Department of Commerce pursuant to the Export Administration
Regulations. Such exports will not be subject to a congressional notification requirement.
17 These notification requirements and reporting thresholds also apply to prospective retransfers of United States-origin
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Section 38(f)(6) of the AECA requires that “any major defense equipment” on the 600 series of
the Commerce Control List (CCL) “shall continue to be subject to the notification and reporting
requirements” contained in AECA Sections 36(b), 36(c), and 36(d). The CCL is the list of specific
dual-use commodities, technologies, and software controlled by the Export Administration
Regulations.18 AECA Section 36(c)(4) stipulates that the AECA Section 36(b) provisions
concerning enhancements and upgrades to defense articles or equipment also apply to such items
sold via the DCS process.
Table 1. Congressional Notification Requirements for Sales of Defense Articles

Transactions and Value Thresholds
Type of
Notification
Major Defense Defense
Design and
Destination
transaction
time (Cal. days)
Equipment
Articles
Construction
Firearms
NATO +5
FMS
15 days
$25 mil ion
$100
$300 mil ion
—
mil ion

DCS
15 days
$25 mil ion
$100
—
$1 mil ion
mil ion
Other
FMS
30 days
$14 mil ion
$50 mil ion
$200 mil ion
—
Destinations

DCS
30 days
$14 mil ion
$50 mil ion
—
$1 mil ion
Source: Arms Export Control Act (P.L. 94-329).
Notes: All of the transactions include “sale, enhancement, or upgrading” of the relevant items. FMS: Foreign
Military Sales; DCS: Direct Commercial Sales.
The AECA and Joint Resolutions of Disapproval19
The AECA contains procedures for congressional joint resolutions of disapproval concerning
notified FMS and DCS transactions.20 Section 36(b)(1) of the AECA prohibits the U.S.
government from issuing an LOA if Congress “enacts a joint resolution prohibiting the proposed
sale.” AECA Section 36(c)(2) prohibits the U.S. government from issuing an export license for a
commercial transaction if Congress “enacts a joint resolution prohibiting the proposed export.”
As noted, the President must notify the Speaker of the House, as well as the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee, of potential FMS and DCS
transactions subject to congressional review. The AECA does not require that a companion
measure be introduced in either chamber.
Congress has never successfully blocked a proposed arms sale via a joint resolution of
disapproval. Nevertheless, Congress has, by expressing strong opposition to prospective arms
sales, during consultations with the executive branch, affected the timing and the composition of

major defense equipment, defense articles, or defense services as stipulated in Section 3(d) of the Arms Export Control
Act (AECA); and leases or loans of defense articles from U.S. Defense Department stocks (see Sections 62 and 63
AECA). Section 36(d) contains similar notification requirements, though not reporting thresholds, for commercial
technical assistance or manufacturing licensing agreements. As with arms sales, Congress can block any of these
reportable transactions by enacting a joint resolution of disapproval as stipulated in the Arms Export Control Act
(AECA) (see 22 U.S.C. 2753, 2776, 2796).
18 For more information on the dual-use export control system, see CRS Report R41916, The U.S. Export Control
System and the Export Control Reform Initiative, by Ian F. Fergusson and Paul K. Kerr.
19 The House and Senate parliamentarians are the authorities with respect to interpreting legislative procedure.
20 Christina L. Arabia, Analyst in Security Assistance, Security Cooperation and the Global Arms Trade, and
Christopher M. Davis, Analyst on Congress and the Legislative Process, contributed to this section.
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some arms sales, and may have dissuaded the President from formally proposing certain arms
sales (see “AECA Resolutions of Disapproval: Selected Examples”).
Senate Procedures
Section 36(b)(2) of the AECA stipulates that Senate consideration of any resolution of
disapproval for an FMS transaction shall be “in accordance with the provisions of Section 601(b)
of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976” (P.L. 94-329, 90
Stat. 729). AECA Section 36(c)(3)(A) applies this procedure to resolutions of disapproval
concerning DCS transactions. According to the rules specified by Section 601(b), which
supersede the standing rules of the Senate, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee must, within
10 calendar days after introduction of a resolution of disapproval, report to the Senate the
committee’s recommendation on any such resolution (certain adjournment periods are excluded
from computation of the 10 days).
These rules also:
 Make it in order for a Senator favoring a disapproval resolution to move to
discharge the committee from further consideration of the matter if the committee
fails to report back to the Senate by the end of the 10-calendar-day period
described above. Such a motion is to be privileged, with floor debate limited to
one hour. The rules also prohibit amendments to the motion, as well as
subsequent motions to reconsider the related vote. AECA Section 36(b)(2)
expressly permits a discharge motion after five calendar days for FMS transfers
to NATO, NATO countries, Japan, Australia, South Korea, Israel, and New
Zealand.21
 Make the motion to proceed to consider a resolution of disapproval privileged
and preclude efforts to amend or to reconsider the vote on such motion.
 Limit the overall time for debate on the resolution of disapproval to 10 hours and
preclude efforts to amend or recommit the resolution of disapproval.
 Limit the time (one hour) to be used in connection with any debatable motion or
appeal; provide that a motion to further limit debate on a resolution of
disapproval, debatable motion, or appeal is not debatable.
The Senate may change these provisions in whole or in part by unanimous consent.
House Floor Procedures
With regard to FMS transactions, AECA Section 36(b)(3) requires the House of Representatives
to treat as “highly privileged” a motion to proceed to the consideration of a joint resolution of
disapproval reported by the House Foreign Affairs Committee. AECA Section 36(c)(3)(B) applies
this procedure to resolutions of disapproval concerning DCS transactions. Generally, highly
privileged resolutions receive precedence over most other legislative business of the House and
may be called up on the floor without a special rule reported by the Rules Committee.
The AECA does not include a provision for discharging a joint resolution from the House Foreign
Affairs Committee. If the committee reports such a resolution and the resolution is called up, the
House will consider the measure in the Committee of the Whole, at which time members have the
opportunity to offer amendments under the “five-minute rule.” In current practice, however, the
House would likely consider any disapproval resolution under the terms of a special rule from the

21 The AECA has no comparable provision governing DCS transactions.
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Rules Committee in order to set a time limit for debate, exclude any amendments to the
resolution, and waive any points of order against the measure. Such a rule, if adopted by the
House, would govern the manner in which the legislation would be considered, superseding the
statutory provision.
Presidential Waiver Authority
The President has the authority to waive the AECA statutory review periods. For example, if the
President states in the formal notification to Congress under AECA Sections 36(b)(1), 36(c)(2),
36(d)(2) that “an emergency exists” which requires the sale (or export license approval) to be
made immediately “in the national security interests of the United States,” the President is free to
proceed with the sale without further delay. The President must provide Congress at the time of
this notification a “detailed justification for his determination, including a description of the
emergency circumstances” that necessitated his action and a “discussion of the national security
interests involved.” AECA Section 3(d) (2)(A) provides similar emergency authority with respect
to retransfers of U.S.-origin major defense equipment, defense articles, or defense services.
Section 614(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), as amended,22 also allows the
President to waive provisions of the AECA, the FAA, and any act authorizing or appropriating
funds for use under either the AECA or FAA in order to make available, during each fiscal year,
up to $750 million in cash arms sales and up to $250 million in funds. Not more than $50 million
of the $250 million limitation on funds use may be made available to any single country in any
fiscal year through this waiver authority unless the country is a “victim of active aggression.” Not
more than $500 million of cash sales (or cash sales and funds made available combined) may be
provided under this waiver authority to any one country in any fiscal year. To waive the
provisions of these acts related to arms sales, the President must determine and notify Congress in
writing that it is “vital” to the “national security interests” of the United States to do so. Before
exercising the authority granted in Section 614(a), the President must “consult with” and “provide
a written policy justification to” the House Foreign Affairs and the Senate Foreign Relations
Committees and House and Senate Appropriations Committees.
2019 Sales to Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates
On May 24, 2019, then-Secretary of State Michael Pompeo stated that he had directed the State
Department “to complete immediately the formal notification of 22 pending arms transfers” to
Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).23 In a determination to Congress,
Pompeo invoked the AECA Section 36 emergency provisions described above. The transfers
included a variety of defense articles and services, as well as an agreement to coproduce and
manufacture components of Paveway precision-guided munitions in Saudi Arabia. On June 20,
2019, the Senate passed S.J.Res. 36, which prohibited both the Paveway coproduction agreement
described above and the transfer of additional such munitions, and S.J.Res. 38, which prohibited
transfers of “defense articles, defense services, and technical data to support the manufacture of
the Aurora Fuzing System for the Paveway IV Precision Guided Bomb Program.” The same day,

22 22 U.S.C. 2364(a).
23 Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State, “Emergency Notification of Arms Sales to Jordan, the United Arab Emirates,
and Saudi Arabia,” Press Statement, May 24, 2019. Exports to Australia, France, Israel, Italy, South Korea, Spain, and
United Kingdom were also included in some of the notifications.
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the Senate passed en bloc another 20 resolutions of disapproval prohibiting the remaining notified
transfers.24
The House passed S.J.Res. 36 and S.J.Res. 38 on July 17, 2019. The same day, the House also
passed S.J.Res. 37, which prohibited the transfer to the UAE of “defense articles, defense
services, and technical data to support the integration, operation, training, testing, repair, and
operational level maintenance” of the Maverick AGM-65 air-to-surface guided missile and
several Paveway systems for use on a number of Emirati-operated aircraft. The resolution also
prohibited the transfer of a number of Paveway munitions to the UAE. President Donald Trump
vetoed the three bills on July 24. A July 29 Senate vote failed to override these vetoes.
2022 Sale to Ukraine
On April 24, 2022, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of Secretary of
State Antony Blinken’s determination that “an emergency exists requiring the sale of non-
standard ammunition” to Ukraine “in the national security interest of the United States.” Blinken
invoked the aforementioned AECA Section 36 emergency waiver provisions.
AECA Resolutions of Disapproval: Selected Examples
On October 14, 1981, the House adopted a resolution (H.Con.Res. 194) objecting to President
Reagan’s proposed sale to Saudi Arabia of E-3A airborne warning and control system (AWACS)
aircraft, Sidewinder missiles, Boeing 707 refueling aircraft, and defense articles and services
related to F-15 aircraft. An October 28, 1981, Senate vote on identical legislation failed, however,
after President Reagan made a series of written commitments to Congress regarding the proposed
sale. Congress later enacted legislation requiring the President to certify that the commitments
made in 1981 regarding the proposed sale had been met prior to the delivery of the AWACS
planes (Section 127 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985; P.L.
99-83).
On April 8, 1986, President Ronald Reagan formally proposed the sale to Saudi Arabia of 1,700
Sidewinder missiles, 100 Harpoon missiles, 200 Stinger missile launchers, and 600 Stinger
missile reloads. On May 6, 1986, the Senate passed legislation to block these sales (S.J.Res. 316)
by a vote of 73-22. The House concurred with the Senate action on May 7, 1986, by passing
H.J.Res. 589 by a vote of 356-62. The House then passed S.J.Res. 316 by a voice vote and (in lieu
of H.J.Res. 589) sent it to the President. On May 21, 1986, President Reagan vetoed S.J.Res. 316.
But, in a letter that day to then-Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole, President Reagan said he
would not include the controversial Stinger missiles and launchers in the sales proposal. On June
5, 1986, the Senate, by a 66-34 vote, sustained the President’s veto of S.J.Res. 316, and the sale
of the Sidewinder and Harpoon missiles to Saudi Arabia proceeded.
More recently, on March 10, 2016, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee rejected a motion to
discharge a joint resolution (S.J.Res. 31) prohibiting the sale of several defense articles,
particularly eight F-16 Block 52 aircraft.25 H.J.Res. 82 was the House companion bill. On May 5,
2016, a State Department spokesperson, noting congressional objections to using Foreign
Military Financing funds for the aircraft, told reporters that the United States had “told the

24 S.J.Res. 27, S.J.Res. 28, S.J.Res. 29, S.J.Res. 30, S.J.Res. 31, S.J.Res. 32, S.J.Res. 33, S.J.Res. 34, S.J.Res. 35,
S.J.Res. 37, S.J.Res. 39, S.J.Res. 40, S.J.Res. 41, S.J.Res. 42, S.J.Res. 43, S.J.Res. 44, S.J.Res. 45, S.J.Res. 46, S.J.Res.
47, and S.J.Res. 48.
25 K. Alan Kronstadt, Specialist in South Asian Affairs, contributed to this paragraph.
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Pakistanis that they should put forward national funds for the purchase.”26 In late May, the U.S.
offer expired after Islamabad failed to submit a letter of acceptance by the required deadline.
On June 13, 2017, the Senate voted to reject a motion to discharge from the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee a joint resolution (S.J.Res. 42) prohibiting certain proposed exports of
defense articles and related information to Saudi Arabia, such as “technical data, hardware, and
defense services” to support the Royal Saudi Air Force’s deployment of the Joint Direct Attack
Munition and integration of the FMU-152A/B JPB Fuze System into several warhead types. The
bill also would have prohibited the transfer of “defense articles, defense services, and technical
data to support the assembly, modification, testing, training, operation, maintenance, and
integration” of specific precision guided munitions for certain Royal Saudi Air Force planes.
H.J.Res. 102 was the House companion bill.
On December 9, 2020, the Senate voted to reject a motion to discharge from the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee a joint resolution (S.J.Res. 77) prohibiting certain proposed exports of
defense articles, services, and related information to the UAE. The proposed exports include
Weapons-Ready MQ–9B Remotely Piloted Aircraft, certain precision-guided munitions, and
Anti-Submarine Warfare mission kits and sensors. H.J.Res. 101 was the House companion bill.
The same day, the Senate voted to reject a similar motion (S.J.Res. 78) prohibiting the proposed
export of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and related services and information to the UAE. H.J.Res.
100 was the House companion bill.
On January 15, 2021, Representative Gregory Meeks introduced H.J.Res. 15, a joint resolution
prohibiting a transfer of GBU–39/B Small Diameter Bomb I munitions, as well as related parts,
components, and support services, to Saudi Arabia. The same day, Representative Meeks also
introduced H.J.Res. 16, a joint resolution prohibiting certain transfers of defense articles, defense
services, and technical data to support the “[a]ssembly, design, development, intermediate level
maintenance, manufacture, modification, operation, repair, testing, and demilitarization of
components for and full systems” of specified precision guided munitions for certain Royal Saudi
Air Force planes. H.J.Res. 16 also prohibits the transfer of Paveway IV munitions to Saudi
Arabia.
On May 20, 2021, Senator Bernard Sanders introduced S.J.Res. 19, a joint resolution prohibiting
a transfer of certain air-delivered munitions, as well as related defense services and technical data,
to Israel. The same day, Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez introduced a companion bill,
H.J.Res. 49.
Congressional Use of Other Legislation
Congress can use the regular legislative process to prohibit or modify a proposed FMS or DCS
transaction; a properly drafted law could block or modify an arms sale transaction if the items
have not been delivered to the recipient country. There are potentially important practical
advantages to prohibiting or modifying a sale, if Congress seeks to do so, prior to the date when
the formal contract with the foreign government is signed—which could occur at any time after
the statutory 30-day period. These likely advantages include (1) limiting political damage to
bilateral relations that could result from signing a sales contract and later nullifying it with a new
law; and (2) avoiding financial liabilities which the U.S. Government might face for breaking a
valid sales contract. The legislative vehicle designed to prohibit or modify a specific arms sale

26 Mark Toner, State Department Regular News Briefing, May 5, 2016.
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can take a variety of forms, ranging from a rider to any appropriation or authorization bill to a
freestanding bill or joint resolution. The only essential features that the vehicle must have are (1)
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that it is legislation passed by both houses of Congress and presented to the President for his
signature or veto, and (2) that it contains an express restriction on the sale and/or the delivery of
military equipment (whether it applies to specific items or general categories) to a specific
country or countries.

Author Information

Paul K. Kerr

Specialist in Nonproliferation

Acknowledgments
Richard F. Grimmett, former CRS Specialist in International Security, was the original author of this report.

Disclaimer
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