Designing Congressional Commissions:
May 2, 2022
Background and Considerations for Congress
Jacob R. Straus
Congressional advisory commissions are temporary entities established by Congress to provide
Specialist on the Congress
advice, make recommendations for changes in public policy, study or investigate a particular

problem or event, or perform a specific duty. Generally, commissions may hold hearings,
conduct research, analyze data, investigate policy areas, and/or make field visits as they perform

their duties. Most complete their work by delivering their findings, recommendations, or advice
in the form of a written report to Congress.
Advisory commission legislation generally has specific features that provide the commission with the authorities and
resources necessary to complete its mission. Using a dataset of statutorily authorized congressional commissions from the
101st Congress (1989-1990) to the 116th Congress (2019-2020), this report focuses on the legislative language used to
establish congressional commissions.
Policymakers face a number of choices when designing a commission. Statutes establishing congressional commissions
commonly provide a series of deadlines that outline the commission’s statutory lifecycle, including deadlines for appointment
of commissioners, the commission’s initial meeting, the submission of a final report and any interim reports, and the
commission’s termination. Additionally, commission statutes frequently include sections that establish the commission and
state its mandate; provide a membership structure and authority for making appointments; outline the commission’s duties;
grant the commission certain powers; define any rules of procedure; address hiring of commission staff; and prescribe how
the commission will be funded.
Congress has a variety of options available for each of these decisions. This report discusses the above-listed topics, along
with issues relevant to each. Legislators can tailor the composition, organization, and working arrangements of a commission
based on particular congressional goals. This report provides illustrative examples of statutory language for these topics,
discusses potential alternative approaches, and analyzes possible advantages or disadvantages of different choices in
commission design. The report focuses on congressional commissions created by statute and does not address entities created
by the President or other nonstatutory advisory bodies.
Congressional Research Service

Designing Congressional Commissions: Background and Considerations for Congress

Introduction
Congressional commissions are entities established by Congress to provide advice, make
recommendations for changes in public policy, study or investigate a particular problem or event,
or perform a specific duty.1 Generally, commissions may hold hearings, conduct research, analyze
data, investigate policy areas, and/or make field visits as they perform their duties. Most
commissions complete their work by delivering their findings, recommendations, or advice in the
form of a written report to Congress. For example, Congress created the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States to “examine and report upon the facts and causes
relating to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,” and to “investigate and report to the
President and Congress on its findings, conclusions, and recommendations for corrective
measures that can be taken to prevent acts of terrorism.”2 The commission ultimately submitted a
final report to Congress and the President containing its findings and conclusions, along with
numerous policy recommendations.3
This report begins by examining the statutory lifecycle of congressional commissions, including
common deadlines that define major milestones and mandate certain commission activities. Next,
the report describes the language commonly found in commission legislation, including
commission establishment, appointments, duties, powers, rules and procedures, staff, and
funding. This report also provides illustrative examples of statutory language, discusses different
approaches used in previous commission statutes, and analyzes possible advantages or
disadvantages of different choices in commission design.
This report focuses on congressional commissions created by statute and does not address entities
created by the President or other nonstatutory advisory bodies.4
Cataloging Congressional Commissions
While no formal definition exists, for the purposes of this report a congressional commission is
defined as a multimember independent entity that (1) is established by Congress, (2) exists
temporarily, (3) serves in an advisory capacity, (4) is appointed in part or whole by Members of
Congress, and (5) reports to Congress. This definition differentiates a congressional commission
from a presidential commission, an executive branch commission, or other bodies with
“commission” in their names, while including most entities that fulfill the role commonly
associated with commissions—studying policy problems and reporting findings to Congress.
This report analyzes statutory language used between the 101st Congress (1989-1990) and the
116th Congress (2019-2020) to establish congressional commissions. To identify commissions
established during this period, a Congress.gov database search was performed for enacted
legislation between the 101st Congress and the 116th Congress.5 CRS examined each piece of

1 For an overview of congressional commissions, see CRS Report R40076, Congressional Commissions: Overview and
Considerations for Congress, by Jacob R. Straus.
2 P.L. 107-306, §602, 116 Stat. 2408 (2002).
3 The 9/11 Commission report is publicly available and can be accessed at https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/
911Report_Exec.pdf.
4 For additional information on commissions covered by the Federal Advisory Committee Act, see CRS Report
R44253, Federal Advisory Committees: An Introduction and Overview, by Meghan M. Stuessy.
5 CRS conducted the search in two iterations. The first search used the subject term “Federal Advisory Bodies.” The
second search used a variety of search terms, including “commission,” “board,” “task force,” and “advisory
Congressional Research Service

1

link to page 7 link to page 7 Designing Congressional Commissions: Background and Considerations for Congress

legislation returned by the search to determine if (1) the legislation established a commission, and
(2) the commission was a congressional commission as defined by the five criteria above. If the
commission met the criteria, its name, public law number, Statutes-at-Large citation, and date of
enactment were recorded. This approach identified 168 congressional commissions established by
statute since 1989.6
Statutory Lifecycle of Congressional Commissions
A congressional commission’s statute commonly provides a series of deadlines that define its
major lifecycle milestones. The overall amount of time provided to a commission may vary
substantially depending on how deadlines are constructed.
Although the number and type of deadlines provided to commissions may vary, the most common
statutory deadlines are for
 the appointment of the commission members;
 the commission’s first meeting;
 submission of any interim/initial report(s) that may be required;
 submission of the commission’s final work product(s); and
 termination.
For example, Figure 1 visualizes the amount of time statutorily provided to a commission to
complete its tasks. Using the Veterans’ Disability Benefits Commission as an example, Figure 1
shows the commission’s statutory deadlines for commissioner appointment, first meeting,
issuance of its final report, and termination. The Veterans’ Disability Benefits Commission did
not issue an interim report.

committee.”
6 For more information on congressional advisory commissions and for a list of commissions, see CRS Report R40076,
Congressional Commissions: Overview and Considerations for Congress, by Jacob R. Straus.
Congressional Research Service

2

link to page 7 link to page 7

Designing Congressional Commissions: Background and Considerations for Congress

Figure 1. Example of the Statutory Lifecycle of a Congressional Commission
Veterans’ Disability Benefits Commission

Source: CRS analysis of P.L. 108-136, §§1501-1507, 117 Stat. 1676 (2003).
Deadline for Appointments
Commission statutes commonly contain an appointment deadline for commission members. As
shown in Figure 1, for example, the statute establishing the Veterans’ Disability Benefits
Commission provided for the appointment within 60 days of enactment.
In most cases, appointments are required to be made within some specific period following
enactment.7 A smaller number of statutes tie appointment deadlines to the commission receiving
appropriations. For example, appointments to the National Commission on Manufactured
Housing were required to be made “not later than 60 days after funds are provided” for the
commission.8
Deadline for First Meeting
Approximately half of commission statutes direct a particular time limit for the commission to
hold its first meeting. As displayed in Figure 1, the Veterans’ Disability Benefits Commission’s
statute instructed it to hold an initial meeting within 30 days of the appointment of a majority of
its members. Similar to appointment deadlines, statutes commonly tie deadlines for initial
meetings to another event. Most often, the first meeting is required to occur within some period

7 For commissions established since the 101st Congress, the amount of time provided for appointments has ranged from
15 days to 18 months. For example, the Task Force on Economic Development in Puerto Rico (P.L. 114-187) required
appointments within 15 days, while the Risk Assessment and Management Commission (P.L. 101-549) required
appointments within 18 months.
8 P.L. 101-625, §943(c)(1), 104 Stat. 4413 (1990).
Congressional Research Service

3

link to page 7 Designing Congressional Commissions: Background and Considerations for Congress

following the enactment of the legislation or appointment of commission members (the
appointment of all members,9 a majority of members,10 or some other number of members).11
Deadline for Final Report
Nearly all commission statutes include a deadline for final report submission. The amount of time
provided for final report submission varies substantially. Some commissions, such as the National
Commission on the Cost of Higher Education, were given less than six months to submit their
final reports to Congress.12 Other commissions, such as the Antitrust Modernization Commission,
had three or more years to complete their work products.13 The Veterans’ Disability Benefits
Commission was provided 15 months from its initial meeting to submit a final report, as shown in
Figure 1.
The deadline for a commission’s final report may be measured from different starting points.
Most commission statutes tied the deadline for final report submission to one of the following
events:
 the date of the commission’s first meeting;
 enactment of legislation creating the commission;
 appointment of commission members; or
 a specific calendar date.14
The overall length of time granted to a congressional commission for the completion of its final
work product is arguably one of the most important decisions when designing a commission. If
the commission is given a short amount of time, the quality of its work product may suffer or the
commission may not be able to fulfill its statutory mandate. Policymakers may also wish to
consider the amount of time necessary for “standing up” a new commission; the appointment of
commission members, recruitment of staff, arrangement of office space, and other logistical
matters may require six months or more from the date of enactment of commission legislation.
On the other hand, longer deadlines may undercut one of the primary goals of a commission: the
timely production of expert advice on a current policy matter. If legislators seek to create a
commission to expeditiously address a pressing policy problem, a short deadline may be
appropriate. Shorter deadlines could also conceivably reduce a commission’s overall cost.

9 See, for example, the Commission on the Abolition of the Transatlantic Slave Trade (P.L. 110-183, §4(a)(4)(B), 122
Stat. 608, 2008).
10 See, for example, the Commission to Eliminate Child Abuse and Neglect Fatalities (P.L. 112-275, §3(d), 126 Stat.
2462, 2013).
11 See, for example, the Commission on Care (P.L. 113-146, §202(a)(4), 128 Stat. 1774, 2014).
12 P.L. 105-18, §40004(b), 111 Stat. 209 (1997).
13 P.L. 107-273, §11058, 116 Stat. 1859 (2002).
14 Other, less common arrangements include tying the deadline for submission of a final report to the selection of a
chairperson (see the National Commission on Financial Institution Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement; P.L. 101-647,
§2556(a), 104 Stat. 4892 (1990)), or the submission of an interim report (see the Foreign Intelligence and Information
Commission; P.L. 111-259, §606(a)(2), 124 Stat. 2744, (2010)). A small number of commissions were not provided a
final report deadline.
Congressional Research Service

4

link to page 7 Designing Congressional Commissions: Background and Considerations for Congress

Deadline for Commission Termination
Congressional commissions are usually statutorily mandated to terminate. As with other statutory
deadlines, termination dates for most commissions are usually linked to either the date of the
enactment of the commission statute, the selection of members, or the submission of the
commission’s final report. A smaller number of commission statutes establish a specific calendar
date as the deadline for termination. As shown in Figure 1, the Veterans’ Disability Benefits
Commission was instructed to terminate 60 days after the submission of its final report.15
Linking Deadlines to Specific Events
Statutory deadlines can help ensure that activities occur within a desired timeframe. However, the
amount of time provided to a commission to perform any particular activity depends on how the
particular deadline is established.
While a calendar date deadline for particular commission action may be established, commission
deadlines are more commonly tied to some other event in the commission’s lifecycle, such as
enactment, appointment of commissioners, first commission meeting, or issuance of a final
report. The decision to specify a particular calendar date as a deadline, or to tie the deadline to
another event, can have a significant effect on the time provided to the commission to carry out
its functions.
For instance, legislation requiring a commission to produce a final report by a specific calendar
date may ensure delivery of the report at a predictable time. However, the actual amount of time
the commission will have to create the report will differ depending on a variety of factors,
including the date the legislation is enacted, or the time needed to appoint commission members,
hire commission staff, and hold a first meeting. If a commission must submit a report by a
specified calendar date, any delays (including in the enactment of the legislation, or “standing up”
the commission) would have the practical effect of reducing the amount of time provided to the
commission to perform its duties. Linking the final report deadline to a flexible date, such as the
first meeting or the appointment of members, will often provide a more predictable amount of
time for the commission to complete its work. Tying a commission’s final report to a flexible
date, however, may delay the actual calendar submission date for the final report.
Commission Structure
Policymakers face a number of choices when designing a commission. Commission statutes
frequently include sections that
 establish the commission and state its mandate;
 provide a membership structure and authority for making appointments;
 outline the commission’s duties;
 grant the commission certain powers;
 define any rules of procedure;
 address hiring of commission staff; and
 prescribe how the commission will be funded.

15 P.L. 109-58, §1423(h), 119 Stat. 1067 (2005).
Congressional Research Service

5

Designing Congressional Commissions: Background and Considerations for Congress

The following sections discuss these commission legislation components. Legislators can tailor
the proposed commission’s composition, organization, and working arrangements based on
particular congressional goals. The following sections provide illustrative examples of statutory
language, discuss potential alternative approaches, and analyze possible advantages or
disadvantages of commission choices.
Establishment and Mandate
Commission legislation generally begins with a brief introductory paragraph, often with a single
sentence. For instance, the Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission’s legislation stated:
There is established an independent commission to be known as the “Western Hemisphere
Drug Policy Commission” (in this title referred to as the “Commission”).16
In some instances, this section will further specify that the commission is “established in the
legislative branch.” This can potentially resolve confusion about the commission’s administrative
location, especially if it is a hybrid commission—with members appointed by both legislative and
executive branch officials. For commissions not specifically established in the legislative or
executive branch, the manner in which the members of the commission are appointed may help
determine the commission’s legal status.17 A commission with a majority of appointments made
by the President may be treated as an executive branch entity for certain purposes. If Members of
Congress make a majority of appointments, it may be treated as a legislative branch entity.
Some commission bills will provide congressional “findings” that demonstrate congressional
intent and provide a justification for creating the panel. For example, the National Gambling
Impact Study Commission’s statute included five specific findings. It stated:
The Congress finds that—
(1) the most recent Federal study of gambling in the United States was completed in 1976;
(2) legalization of gambling has increased substantially over the past 20 years, and State,
local, and Native American tribal governments have established gambling as a source of
jobs and additional revenue;
(3) the growth of various forms of gambling, including electronic gambling and gambling
over the Internet, could affect interstate and international matters under the jurisdiction of
the Federal Government;
(4) questions have been raised regarding the social and economic impacts of gambling, and
Federal, State, local, and Native American tribal governments lack recent, comprehensive
information regarding those impacts; and
(5) a Federal commission should be established to conduct a comprehensive study of the
social and economic impacts of gambling in the United States.18
In other cases, legislation creating commissions may simply include a short “purpose” section
describing the justification for the commission, in lieu of a longer “findings” section. For

16 P.L. 114-323, §601, 130 Stat. 1936 (2016).
17 Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice. “Applicability of 18 U.S.C. §208 to National Gambling Impact
Study Commission,” Memorandum for the Acting General Counsel, General Services Administration, January 26,
1999, at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/1999/01/31/op-olc-v023-p0029_0.pdf.
18 P.L. 104-169, §2, 110 Stat. 1482 (1996).
Congressional Research Service

6

Designing Congressional Commissions: Background and Considerations for Congress

example, the United States Commission on North American Energy Freedom’s statute included a
statutory purpose. It states:
The purpose of this subtitle is to establish a United States commission to make
recommendations for a coordinated and comprehensive North American energy policy that
will achieve energy self-sufficiency by 2025 within the three contiguous North American
nation area of Canada, Mexico, and the United States.19
Commission Membership
Advisory commissions can have a variety of membership structures. Commission designers
commonly face decisions that involve how many members the commission should have, how
members will be appointed, whether to require a deadline for making appointments, whether to
require that members possess particular qualifications, whether to require a particular partisan
balance, how to address terms and vacancies, and whether (or how much) to compensate
commission members.
Size
The number of members who statutorily serve on congressional commissions varies significantly.
Of the commissions analyzed, the smallest commission had 5 members and the largest had 33
members.
Larger commissions have the potential advantage of surveying a wider range of viewpoints,
arguably allowing the commission to produce a more comprehensive final report. A large
commission may also aid the chances of legislative success of any policy recommendations a
commission must make, especially if the size allows for a greater number of interests to be
represented through the commission appointment process. Small commissions, however, likely
enjoy efficiency advantages in coordination, completing work products, and conducting hearings
and meetings. In addition, overall commission costs may be lower for small commissions,
particularly if commission members receive compensation. Smaller commissions may also incur
fewer travel and other expenses.
Appointment Methods
Congress has structured commission appointments in a variety of ways. Generally, congressional
leaders have the authority to recommend, appoint, or serve as a member of a commission. Most
often, appointments are made through some combination of methods, including the following:
 Congressional leaders, committee leaders, the President, or Cabinet officials
directly appoint commission members.
 Selected officials provide recommendations to, consult with, or jointly make
appointments with other selected officials.20
 The commission statute designates individuals holding specific positions as
commission members.

19 P.L. 109-58, §1422, 119 Stat. 1064 (2005).
20 This category encompasses a range of statutory frameworks. For instance, appointments may be made by an official
“in consultation” with another official, “upon the recommendation” of another official, based upon nominations made
by another official, or jointly with another official.
Congressional Research Service

7

link to page 12 link to page 12 link to page 12 link to page 12 link to page 12 Designing Congressional Commissions: Background and Considerations for Congress

Table 1 contains examples of each of the aforementioned appointment methods. The first entry in
Table 1, the Commission on the Abolition of the Transatlantic Slave Trade, demonstrates the
most common type of appointment method found in commission statutes—commission members
appointed by selected leaders. The example in Table 1 shows congressional appointments, but
appointments have also been made by noncongressional officials, including the President,21
Cabinet secretaries,22 the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,23 and state officials,24 among others.
The second entry in Table 1, the Commission on Wartime Contracting, shows another common
method of appointment—commission members appointed by selected officials, in concert with
other officials. In this instance, Members of House and Senate leadership were required to consult
with relevant House or Senate committee chairs, while the President was required to consult with
the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State prior to making appointments.
The third example in Table 1, the Thomas Jefferson Commemoration Commission, shows a
somewhat less common appointment structure—direct designation of specified officials. The
statute designated 10 specific officials to serve on the commission. The statute directly named the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Librarian of Congress, the Archivist of the United States,
and selected congressional leaders, among others, to the commission. In each case, the named
official could appoint a delegate to serve in their place.
Table 1. Selected Examples of Statutory Establishment
of Commission Appointment Authority
Commission Name
and Citation
Statutory Language Related to Appointment Authority
Commission on the
The Commission shall be composed of nine members, of whom—
Abolition of the
(i) three shall be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives;
Transatlantic Slave
Trade
(i ) two shall be appointed by the majority leader of the Senate;
P.L. 110-183, §4, 112
(i i) two shall be appointed by the minority leader of the House of Representatives; and
Stat. 607 (2008)
(iv) two shall be appointed by the minority leader of the Senate.

21 See, for example, the Commission on Evidence-Based Policymaking (P.L. 114-140, §3(a)(1), 130 Stat. 317 (2016)).
22 See, for example, the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves (P.L. 108-375, §513(b)(1)(E), 118 Stat. 1880
(2004)).
23 See, for example, the National Commission on Judicial Impeachment (P.L. 101-650, §411(a)(3), 104 Stat. 5125
(1990)).
24 See, for example, the Joint Federal-State Commission on Policies and Programs Affecting Alaska Natives (P.L. 101-
379, §12(b)(2)(A), 104 Stat. 478 (1990)).
Congressional Research Service

8

Designing Congressional Commissions: Background and Considerations for Congress

Commission Name
and Citation
Statutory Language Related to Appointment Authority
Commission on
The Commission shall be composed of 8 members, as fol ows:
Wartime Contracting
(A) 2 members shall be appointed by the majority leader of the Senate, in consultation
P.L. 110-181, §841(b),
with the Chairmen of the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Homeland
112 Stat. 231 (2008)
Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate.
(B) 2 members shall be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, in
consultation with the Chairmen of the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee
on Oversight and Government Reform, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
House of Representatives.
(C) 1 member shall be appointed by the minority leader of the Senate, in consultation
with the Ranking Minority Members of the Committee on Armed Services, the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate.
(D) 1 member shall be appointed by the minority leader of the House of
Representatives, in consultation with the Ranking Minority Member of the Committee
on Armed Services, the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and the
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
(E) 2 members shall be appointed by the President, in consultation with the Secretary of
Defense and the Secretary of State.
Thomas Jefferson
The Commission shall be composed of 21 members, including—
Commemoration
(A) the Chief Justice of the United States or such individual’s delegate;
Commission
(B) the Librarian of Congress or such individual’s delegate;
P.L. 102-343, §5, 106
Stat. 916 (1992)
(C) the Archivist of the United States or such individual’s delegate;
(D) the President pro tempore of the Senate or such individual’s delegate;
(E) the Speaker of the House of Representatives or such individual’s delegate;
(F) the Secretary of the Interior or such individual’s delegate;
(G) the Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution or such individual’s delegate;
(H) the Secretary of Education or such individual’s delegate;
(I) the Chairman of the National Endowment for the Humanities or such individual’s
delegate;
(J) the Executive Director of the Thomas Jefferson Memorial Foundation or such
individual’s delegate; and
(K) 11 citizens of the United States who are not officers or employees of any
government, except to the extent they are considered such officers or employees by
virtue of their membership of the Commission.
…
The individuals referred to in paragraph (1)(K) shall be appointed by the President.
Source: CRS analysis of listed statutes.
Commission statutes may provide for appointments according to a single method or multiple
methods. Similarly, appointment authority may be provided to a small number or a large number
of selected leaders or officials. Providing appointment authority to a wider range of individuals
may have the advantage of generating additional “buy-in” from selected leaders. On the other
hand, providing appointment authority to a greater number of individuals may increase the
potential for delays in completing the appointment process.
Congressional Research Service

9

Designing Congressional Commissions: Background and Considerations for Congress

Qualifications
Commission statutes may include qualifications or restrictions for appointments. Appointment
qualifications may be designed to ensure that the commission includes subject-matter experts,
represents particular groups, or includes a range of viewpoints.
Commission legislation frequently specifies that commissioners should possess certain
substantive qualifications, such as experience in a particular field or expertise in a relevant policy
matter. For example, the National Commission on the Future of the Army’s statute provided
appointment instructions. It said:
[i]n making appointments under this subsection, consideration should be given to
individuals with expertise in national and international security policy and strategy,
military forces capability, force structure design, organization, and employment, and
reserve forces policy.25
In other cases, Congress may specify qualifications designed to ensure the representation of
particular groups that are relevant to the commission’s purpose. For instance, the statute
establishing the Veterans’ Disability Benefits Commission required the appointment of a certain
number of decorated veterans,26 and the statute establishing the Commission on Indian and Native
Alaskan Health Care required the appointment of “[n]ot fewer than 10” Indians or Native
Alaskans to serve on the commission.27
Congress may also specify qualifications to ensure that a commission contains a wide range of
viewpoints. Congress may design a commission to review a policy issue that affects a variety of
interests or economic sectors, and legislators may place qualifications on appointments to ensure
representation of each interest. For instance, the statute creating the Motor Fuel Tax Enforcement
Advisory Commission mandated the appointment of a certain number of individuals to represent
the interests of highway construction, fuel distribution, state tax administration, state departments
of transportation, and relevant federal agencies, among other interests.28 Similarly, the act
creating the Commission on Long-Term Care required the appointment of individuals from
various health care sectors:
The membership of the Commission shall include individuals who—
(A) Represent the interests of—
(i) Consumers of long-term services and supports and related insurance products, as
well as their representatives;
(ii) Older adults;
(iii) Individuals with cognitive or functional limitations;
(iv) Family caregivers for individuals described in clause (i), (ii), or (iii);
(v) The health care workforce who directly provide long-term services and supports;
(vi) Private long-term care insurance providers;
(vii) Employers;

25 P.L. 113-291, §1702(b)(4), 128 Stat. 3665 (2014).
26 P.L. 108-136, §1501(b), 117 Stat. 1677 (2003).
27 P.L. 106-310, §3307(b)(3), 114 Stat. 1216 (2000).
28 P.L. 109-59, §11141(c)(1), 119 Stat. 1960 (2005).
Congressional Research Service

10

Designing Congressional Commissions: Background and Considerations for Congress

(viii) State insurance departments; and
(ix) State Medicaid agencies;
(B) Have demonstrated experience in dealing with issues related to long-term services and
supports, health care policy, and public and private insurance; and
(C) Represent the health care interests and needs of a variety of geographic areas and
demographic groups.29
Appointment qualifications or restrictions may help ensure that the commission consists of
genuine experts in a policy area, includes representatives of particular groups or sectors, or
contains members with a wide range of viewpoints. This may help improve the commission’s
final work product, increase its stature and credibility, ensure that the desired range of voices can
be heard during commission deliberations, or help obtain broader acceptance of the commission’s
recommendations or findings.
On the other hand, including appointment qualifications can have the effect of limiting the
appointing authority’s degree of autonomy. Additionally, the specificity of the language used to
establish qualifications might affect whether the qualifications achieve the intended goal. If the
qualifications language is too precise, certain individuals who might be valuable members of the
commission may be excluded from consideration. Conversely, if qualification provisions are too
vague, they may be difficult or impossible to enforce, and consequently less likely to
meaningfully restrict the appointment of any potential candidate.
Partisan Balance
Congress structures most congressional advisory commissions to be bipartisan. A small number
of commissions were designed to have a perfectly even split between the parties. Typically,
however, bipartisanship is accomplished by dividing commission appointment authority between
Members of the majority and minority parties in the House and Senate. A smaller number of
commission statutes ensure bipartisanship by detailing the partisan breakdown of individual
commission members. For instance, the 12-member Commission on Servicemembers and
Veterans Transition Assistance’s statute specified that “[n]ot more than seven of the members of
the Commission may be members of the same political party.”30 This approach, directly
specifying or limiting the partisan composition of commission membership, is less common and
likely more difficult to enforce; determining the political affiliation of some potential members
may not be possible, as some may have no official affiliation with a party.
Bipartisan arrangements may make congressional commissions’ findings and recommendations
more politically balanced. A bipartisan membership may also lend additional credibility to a
commission’s recommendations, both within Congress and among the public. A commission that
is perceived as partisan may have greater difficulty generating interest and support among the
public and gathering the necessary support in Congress.
In some cases, bipartisanship may arguably impede a commission’s ability to complete its
mission. In situations where a commission is tasked with studying potentially controversial or
partisan issues, the appointment of an equal number of commissioners by both parties may result
in a situation where the commission’s activities are stymied, with neither side able to garner a
majority to take action.

29 P.L. 112-240, §643(c)(2), 126 Stat. 2360 (2013).
30 P.L. 104-275, §701(b)(1)(C), 110 Stat. 3346 (1996).
Congressional Research Service

11

Designing Congressional Commissions: Background and Considerations for Congress

Terms and Vacancies
Because most advisory commissions are designed to last only for a set period of time,
appointments are usually made for the life of the commission. Many statutes note this explicitly,31
though some simply make no mention of appointment terms.
A smaller number of commissions have been created for longer lifespans, and have established
term limits for appointees. For instance, the Defense Base Closure and Realignment
Commission’s statute included term limits tied to the end of a congressional session.
(d) Terms.—
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), each member of the Commission shall serve until
the adjournment of Congress sine die for the session during which the member was
appointed to the Commission.
(2) The Chairman of the Commission shall serve until the confirmation of a successor.32
Similarly, the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom was originally
designed to last for four years and members served two-year terms.33
In nearly all cases, commission statutes provide that any vacancies on the commission “shall not
affect the powers of the Commission but shall be filled in the same manner in which the original
appointment was made.”34
Commission Member Compensation and Travel Expenses
Compensation
Most congressional commissions do not compensate their members for service time. For
example, the Evidence-Based Policymaking Commission prohibited its members from being paid
for their service. Its statute stated:
(f) COMPENSATION.—Members of the Commission shall serve without pay.35
A few commissions have compensated their members. Among these commissions, the statute
usually specifies a level of compensation, typically set in accordance with one of the federal pay
scales and prorated to the number of days of service. The most common level of compensation is
the daily equivalent of Level IV of the Executive Schedule, which has a basic annual rate of pay
of $176,300 in 2022.36 Additionally, these statutes commonly include language that prohibits a
current government employee serving on the commission from receiving additional compensation
for their commission service (though they may still receive reimbursement for travel expenses).
For example, the Antitrust Modernization Commission’s statute provided for member

31 See, for example, the Benjamin Franklin Tercentenary Commission (P.L. 107-202, §5(e), 116 Stat. 741 (2002)).
32 P.L. 101-510, §2902(d), 104 Stat. 1808 (1990).
33 P.L. 105-292, §201(c), 112 Stat. 2798 (1998). “(c) Terms.—The term of office of each member of the Commission
shall be 2 years. Members of the Commission shall be eligible for reappointment to a second term.” The United States
Commission on International Religious Freedom has been periodically reauthorized since its creation in the 105th
Congress (P.L. 106-55, P.L. 107-228, P.L. 112-75, P.L. 113-271, P.L. 114-71). During the 107th Congress, the statute
was amended to provide for two-year, staggered terms (P.L. 107-228; 2 U.S.C. §6431).
34 For example, see Route 66 Centennial Commission. P.L. 116-256, §5(e), 134 Stat. 1144 (2020).
35 P.L. 114-140, §3(f), 130 Stat. 319 (2016).
36 Office of Personnel Management, “Salary Table No. 2022-EX: Rates of Basic Pay for the Executive Schedule (EX),”
effective January 2022, at https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/salaries-wages/salary-tables/21Tables/
exec/html/EX.aspx.
Congressional Research Service

12

Designing Congressional Commissions: Background and Considerations for Congress

compensation (limited to Level IV of the Executive Schedule), included provisions related to
federal officials serving on the panel, and provided for the reimbursement of travel expenses:
(a) Pay.—

(1) Nongovernment employees.—Each member of the Commission who is not
otherwise employed by a government shall be entitled to receive the daily equivalent of
the annual rate of basic pay payable for level IV of the Executive Schedule under section
5315 of title 5 United States Code, as in effect from time to time, for each day (including
travel time) during which such member is engaged in the actual performance of duties
of the Commission.
(2) Government employees.—A member of the Commission who is an officer or
employee of a government shall serve without additional pay (or benefits in the nature
of compensation) for service as a member of the Commission.
(b) Travel Expenses.—Members of the Commission shall receive travel expenses,
including per diem in lieu of subsistence, in accordance with subchapter I of chapter 57 of
title 5, United States Code.37
Travel Expenses
Most statutorily created congressional commissions have not compensated their members; almost
all, however, have provided for reimbursement of expenses directly related to the service of
commission members, such as travel costs. For example, the United States Commission on
International Religious Freedom reimburses its members. Its statute states:
(i) Funding.—Members of the Commission shall be allowed travel expenses, including per
diem in lieu of subsistence, at rates authorized for employees under subchapter I of chapter
57 of title 5, United States Code, while away from their homes or regular places of business
in the performance of services for the Commission.38
The decision to compensate and reimburse commissioners can have consequences for the
commission’s makeup. Arguably, compensation may help entice qualified commission members
to serve who would otherwise not be willing to do so. Similarly, reimbursement for travel and
other expenses may help attract commission members to serve, particularly those whose
commission service would require travel. On the other hand, compensation of commission
members is likely to increase the overall cost of the commission, particularly among commissions
designed to last for a long period.
Duties
Statutes usually direct the commission to carry out specific tasks. These may include any
combination of studying a problem, fact-finding, assessing conditions, holding hearings,
conducting an investigation, reviewing policy proposals, making feasibility determinations,
crafting recommendations, issuing reports, or other tasks.
The duties statutorily assigned to a commission can range from brief and general to lengthy and
detailed. Some statutes include a relatively brief list of duties, while others may spell out in detail
the items a commission is tasked to research, investigate, or report upon. For example, the
Antitrust Modernization Commission statute included a brief section on four major duties
assigned to the commission:

37 P.L. 107-273, §11055, 116 Stat. 1858 (2002).
38 P.L. 105-292, §201(i), 112 Stat. 2798 (1998).
Congressional Research Service

13

Designing Congressional Commissions: Background and Considerations for Congress

The duties of the Commission are—
(1) To examine whether the need exists to modernize the antitrust laws and to identify
and study related issues;
(2) To solicit views of all parties concerned with the operation of the antitrust laws;
(3) To evaluate the advisability of proposals and current arrangements with respect to
any issues so identified; and
(4) To prepare and submit to Congress and the President a report in accordance with
section 11058.39
By contrast, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission was provided an extensive list of
instructions for material to be assessed by the commission, including direction to investigate and
report upon the role played by 22 specific factors in the then-recent economic downturn.40
Hearings
Commissions commonly hear testimony from outside experts or government officials in the
course of conducting a study, developing recommendations, or carrying out an investigation.
Accordingly, most commissions are statutorily authorized to hold hearings as needed. For
example, the Commission on Care’s statute states that
[t]he Commission may hold such hearings, sit and act at such times and places, take such
testimony, and receive such evidence as the Commission considers advisable to carry out
this section.41
Additionally, some commissions are also explicitly instructed to hold hearings as one of the
commission’s key duties. Further, some commissions have been instructed to hold hearings in
specific locations or receive testimony from particular groups of witnesses. For example, the
National Commission on Crime Control and Prevention was directed to
[convene] field hearings in various regions of the country to receive testimony from a cross
section of criminal justice professionals, business leaders, elected officials, medical
doctors, and other persons who wish to participate.42
Further, in some cases, Congress may require that a commission’s hearings must be open to the
public.43 The National Prison Rape Reduction Commission’s statute stated:
(g) HEARINGS.
(1) In General.—The Commission shall hold public hearings. The Commission may
hold such hearings, sit and act at such times and places, take such testimony, and
receive such evidence as the Commission considers advisable to carry out its duties
under this section.44

39 P.L. 107-273, §11053, 116 Stat. 1856 (2002).
40 P.L. 111-21, §5(c), 123 Stat. 1626 (2009).
41 P.L. 113-146, §202(c)(1), 128 Stat. 1775 (2014).
42 P.L. 103-322, §270004(b)(6), 108 Stat. 2092 (1994).
43 Commissions that are subject to the requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) may be required
to hold public hearings. For additional information on FACA, see CRS Report R44253, Federal Advisory Committees:
An Introduction and Overview, by Meghan M. Stuessy.
44 P.L. 108-79, §7(g)(1), 117 Stat. 984 (2003).
Congressional Research Service

14

Designing Congressional Commissions: Background and Considerations for Congress

Reports
Commission statutes commonly require the commission to produce one or more reports that
outline their activities, findings, and/or legislative recommendations. In most cases, a single
report is required; in other cases, commissions are required to make one or more initial or interim
reports before the issuance of a final report. Commissions may be directed to submit their reports
to Congress, the President, an executive agency, or some combination of Congress, the President,
and an executive agency.
Final Reports
Most congressional commissions are required to issue a final report. For example, the National
Commission on the Structure of the Air Force was directed to issue a single final report:
Not later than February 1, 2014, the Commission shall report to the President and the
congressional defense committees a report which shall contain a detailed statement of the
conclusions of the Commission as a result of the study required by subsection (a), together
with its recommendations for such legislation and administrative actions it may consider
appropriate in light of the results of the study.45
If a commission is required to make policy recommendations, Congress may direct that the final
report contain legislative language to implement any recommendations. For example, the
Commission to Study the Potential Creation of a National Women’s History Museum was
required to submit draft legislation for Congress’s consideration:
(3) Legislation to carry out plan of action.—Based on the recommendations contained in
the report submitted ... the Commission shall submit for consideration to the Committees
on Transportation and Infrastructure, House Administration, Natural Resources, and
Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Committees on Rules and
Administration, Energy and Natural Resources, and Appropriations of the Senate
recommendations for a legislative plan of action to establish and construct the Museum.46
In addition to directing a commission to produce legislative language to implement its
recommendations, Congress has sometimes enacted expedited, or “fast track,” rules in law
providing for the consideration of legislation in one or both chambers. These statutory provisions
contemplate that the House and Senate will consider certain bills or resolutions under expedited
procedures instead of the regular parliamentary procedures used to consider most legislation.47
Such expedited procedures are sometimes included in the authorizing language creating
congressional advisory commissions, and establish special procedures for committee and floor
action on the commission’s recommendations.48 Such procedures establish strict deadlines on
committee consideration of a bill embodying the commission’s recommendations and limit
debate and amendment on the measure when it is considered on the chamber floor. Significantly,
such “fast track” procedures allow a simple majority of the Senate to call up and reach a final
vote on a commission bill without having to assemble a supermajority to end debate (invoke
cloture).

45 P.L. 112-239, §363(b), 126 Stat. 1704 (2013).
46 P.L. 112-240, §643(f)(1)(A), 126 Stat. 2361 (2013).
47 For more information on expedited or “fast-track” legislative procedures, see, Expedited or “Fast-Track” Legislative
Procedures, by Christopher M. Davis.
48 For example, see, “Fast Track” Legislative Procedures Governing Congressional Consideration of a Defense Base
Closure and Realignment (BRAC) Commission Report.
Congressional Research Service

15

Designing Congressional Commissions: Background and Considerations for Congress

In some instances, the statute may additionally specify that minority or dissenting views may be
included in the final report upon an individual member’s request. For example, the Human Space
Flight Independent Investigation Commission’s statute provided that the final report “shall
include any minority views or opinions not reflected in the majority report.”49
Initial or Interim Reports
Some commission statutes require the commission to issue one or more initial or interim reports.
Initial or interim reports may be designed to provide updates on the progress of a study, to share
preliminary findings, to ensure federal agencies comply with the commission’s requests, and/or to
provide Congress with information about the commission’s expenses.
For example, the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan’s statute
instructed the commission to “submit to Congress an interim report on the study… including the
results and findings of the study as of [March 1, 2009].”50 Similarly, other commission statutes
have required the commission to issue interim reports on a regular basis prior to issuing a final
report, or to provide other interim reports as deemed necessary by the commission. For example,
the Creating Options for Veterans’ Expedited Recovery Commission’s statute directed the
commission to submit interim reports both on a regular schedule and on an as-needed basis:
(1) Interim Reports.—
(A) In General.—Not later than 60 days after the date on which the Commission first
meets, and each 30-day period thereafter ending on the date on which the
Commission submits the final report under paragraph (2), the Commission shall
submit to the Committees on Veterans’ Affairs of the House of Representatives and
the Senate and the President a report detailing the level of cooperation the Secretary
of Veterans Affairs (and the heads of other departments or agencies of the Federal
Government) has provided to the Commission.
(B) Other Reports.—In carrying out its duties, at times that the Commission
determines appropriate, the Commission shall submit to the Committee on Veterans’
Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Senate and any other appropriate
entities an interim report with respect to the findings identified by the Commission.51
Report Submission
Approximately half of commissions submit their work product to both Congress and the
President. Others typically submit to some combination of Congress, the President, and/or an
executive branch official and executive agency. In some limited cases, the commission’s statute
does not specify to whom the report must be submitted.
When a commission reports to Congress, the statute may require that the report be transmitted to
Congress generally;52 to relevant committees; or to specific individuals, such as chamber or
committee leaders. In some cases, these statutes also mandate that the commission make the final
report publicly available. For example, the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the
United States Intelligence Community was directed to make an unclassified version of its final

49 P.L. 109-155, §829(b), 119 Stat. 2944 (2005).
50 P.L. 110-181, §841(d)(1), 122 Stat. 232 (2008).
51 P.L. 114-198, §931(e)(1), 130 Stat. 722 (2016).
52 In practice, reports that are directed to be submitted to Congress (without naming a specific individual or officer) are
generally delivered to the Clerk of the House and the Secretary of the Senate.
Congressional Research Service

16

Designing Congressional Commissions: Background and Considerations for Congress

report publicly available, with classified material made separately available to the President and
the House and Senate intelligence committees:
[T]he Commission shall submit to the President and to congressional intelligence
committees a report setting forth the activities, findings, and recommendations of the
Commission, including any recommendations for the enactment of legislation that the
Commission considers advisable. To the extent feasible, such report shall be unclassified
and made available to the public. Such report shall be supplemented as necessary by a
classified report or annex, which shall be provided separately to the President and the
congressional intelligence committees.53
Powers
Commission statutes generally provide the commission with authority to perform certain actions
that help carry out its mission. Some of these powers, such as holding hearings, or obtaining
administrative support from the General Services Administration (GSA) or another federal
agency, are commonly granted to all commissions. The decision to grant other types of powers
likely depends on the goal of the commission in question. For example, a commemorative
commission may require the explicit authority to solicit or receive gifts or other commemorative
items in order to carry out its mission, while a commission designed to perform an investigation
may not.54 By contrast, authority to obtain data from federal agencies may be of particular
importance for a commission designed to investigate an event or issue, but less so for a
commemorative commission.
Obtaining Information from Government Agencies
Frequently, Congress tasks commissions with studying a public policy issue or conducting an
investigation that requires information or data held by federal agencies. To these ends, Congress
commonly statutorily authorizes commissions to obtain information from government agencies
that may be necessary to carry out the commission’s goals. For instance, the Commission on
Care’s statute authorized it to
secure directly from any Federal agency such information as the Commission considers
necessary to carry out this section. Upon request of the Chairperson of the Commission,
the head of such agency shall furnish such information to the Commission.55
Although this authority may require government entities to cooperate with the commission, an
enforcement mechanism is not typically specified. Absent an enforcement mechanism, such as
subpoena authority, the commission might not have recourse against a government entity that did
not comply with its requests.
In at least one instance, a commission was required to notify a standing committee of jurisdiction
in either the House or Senate of any difficulty in obtaining information from government
agencies. The Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan’s statute included the
following instruction:

53 P.L. 103-359, §904(c), 108 Stat. 3459 (1994).
54 For additional information on commemorative commissions, see CRS Report R41425, Commemorative
Commissions: Overview, Structure, and Funding, by Jacob R. Straus.
55 P.L. 113-146, §(c)(2), 128 Stat. 1775 (2014).
Congressional Research Service

17

link to page 22 Designing Congressional Commissions: Background and Considerations for Congress

(2) Inability to obtain documents or testimony.—In the event the Commission is unable to
obtain testimony or documents needed to conduct its work, the Commission shall notify
the committees of Congress of jurisdiction and appropriate investigative authorities.56
Subpoena Authority
On occasion, Congress has granted a commission the authority to issue subpoenas. Commission
subpoena authority is relatively rare. Since the 101st Congress (1989-1990), 12 congressional
commissions have been identified as having subpoena authority. Table 2 lists these commissions.
Table 2. Congressional Commissions with Subpoena Authority
101st Congress to 117th Congress, First Session
Commission Name
Statutory Citation
Commission on the State of the U.S. Olympics and Paralympics
P.L. 116-189, 134 Stat. 943 (2000)
Cyberspace Solarium Commission
P.L. 115-232, 132 Stat. 2140 (2018)
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
P.L. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1628 (2009)
Human Space Flight Independent Investigation Commission
P.L. 109-155, 119 Stat. 2943 (2005)
National Prison Rape Reduction Commission
P.L. 108-79, 117 Stat. 985 (2003)
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
P.L. 107-306, 116 Stat. 2410 (2002)
National Commission for the Review of the Research and Development
P.L. 107-306, 116 Stat. 2440 (2002)
Programs of the United States Intelligence Community
National Commission for the Review of the National Reconnaissance
P.L. 106-120, 113 Stat. 1622 (1999)
Office
National Gambling Impact Study Commission
P.L. 104-169, 110 Stat. 1485 (1996)
National Commission on Restructuring the Internal Revenue Service
P.L. 104-52, 109 Stat. 509 (1995)
Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy
P.L. 103-236, 108 Stat. 527 (1994)
National Commission on Financial Institution Reform, Recovery, and
P.L. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4890 (1990)
Enforcement
Source: CRS analysis of Congress.gov database query, 101st Congress to 117th Congress.
The apparent infrequency with which policymakers have given subpoena authority to
congressional commissions may stem from concerns about the misuse of the authority; private
citizens are not subject to the check of periodic elections the way that Members of Congress are,
and thus may have fewer incentives to use subpoena authority in an appropriate manner. For
example, the National Gambling Impact Study Commission’s statute authorized the use of
subpoenas for documents, but not to compel the testimony of witnesses.57 Supporters of the
legislation noted that providing for limited subpoena authority in this manner “should satisfy
those who are concerned that the commission might misuse its subpoena authority to create some
sort of public spectacle,”58 and “will allow the Commission to conduct its study while, at the

56 P.L. 110-181, §841(e)(2), 122 Stat. 233 (2008).
57 P.L. 104-69, §5(b), 110 Stat. 1485 (1996).
58 Sen. John Glenn, “The National Gambling Impact Study Commission Act,” remarks in the Senate, Congressional
Record, daily edition, vol. 142 (July 17, 1996), p. S7976.
Congressional Research Service

18

link to page 24 Designing Congressional Commissions: Background and Considerations for Congress

same time, it allays the fears of those who thought the subpoena power would be overly
intrusive.”59
Alternatively, legislators may be concerned that a commission might use subpoenas for political
purposes. Supporters of the proposed legislation creating the Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission, for instance, emphasized that by requiring the concurrence of at least one minority-
appointed member to issue a subpoena, the legislation would “[provide] additional assurance that
the examination undertaken by the commission, and in its exercise of subpoena authority, will not
be politicized.”60
On the other hand, if a commission is likely to need information, documents, or testimony from
agencies, firms, or individuals who may not be cooperative, subpoena authority may be a
valuable tool.
Other Powers
Congress has frequently granted past commissions other powers intended to facilitate their day-
to-day operations. Many of these powers are intended to ease the logistical burden of finding
meeting or office space, procuring equipment, or obtaining other necessary services. Some of the
most common provisions permit commissions to
 use the U.S. mail system in the same manner as federal agencies;
 enter into contracts;
 obtain services from outside experts and consultants;
 request the detail of federal employees to the commission;
 obtain administrative support (such as assistance with human resources,
obtaining office and meeting space, and procuring equipment) from the General
Services Administration or another federal agency; and
 accept gifts, donations, and/or volunteer services.61
For example, the Virgin Islands of the United States Centennial Commission was granted some
version of each of the aforementioned authorities, using statutory language common to
commission statutes. Table 3 reports the Virgin Islands of the United States Centennial
Commission’s power and the authorizing language.

59 Rep. Henry Hyde, “National Gambling Impact and Policy Commission Act,” remarks in the House, Congressional
Record, daily edition, vol. 142 (July 22, 1996), p. H8035.
60 Rep. Ted Poe, “Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009,” remarks in the House, Congressional Record, daily
edition, vol. 155 (May 18, 2009), p. H5687.
61 Commissions without the statutory authority to solicit funds or accept donations are generally prohibited from
engaging in those activities. See U.S. Government Accountability Office, Principles of Federal Appropriations Law:
Third Edition, Volume II, GAO-06-382SP, February 2006, pp. 6-162, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-06-382sp.pdf.
Congressional Research Service

19

Designing Congressional Commissions: Background and Considerations for Congress

Table 3. Example Statutory Language of Other Commission Powers
Virgin Islands of the United States Centennial Commission
Power
Statutory Language
Request detail of federal
(c) Detail of Federal Employees.—Upon request of the Commission, the
employees
Secretary of the Interior or the Archivist of the United States may detail, on a
reimbursable basis, any of the personnel of the Department of the Interior or
the National Archives and Records Administration, respectively to the
Commission to assist the Commission to perform the duties of the
Commission.
Obtain services from outside
(d) Experts and Consultants.—The Commission may procure such temporary
experts and consultants
and intermittent services from experts and consultants as are necessary to
enable the Commission to perform the duties of the Commission.
Use of the U.S. Mail
(b) Mails.—The Commission may use the United States mails in the same
manner and under the same conditions as other Federal agencies.
Accept gifts, donations, and/or
(d) Gifts, Bequests, Devises.—The Commission may solicit, accept, use, and
volunteer services
dispose of gifts, bequests, or devises of money, services, or property, both real
and personal, for the purpose of aiding or facilitating the work of the
Commission.
Obtain administrative support
(e) Available Space.—Upon request of the Commission, the Administrator of
General Services shall make available to the Commission, at a normal rental rate
for Federal agencies, such assistance and facilities as may be necessary for the
Commission to perform the duties of the Commission.
Enter into contracts
(f) Contract Authority.—The Commission may enter into contracts with and
compensate the Federal Government, State and local government, private
entities, or individuals to enable the Commission to perform the duties of the
Commission.
Source: CRS analysis of the Virgin Islands of the United States Centennial Commission (P.L. 114-224, §§5-6, 130
Stat. 922 (2016)).
Most commission statutes typically specify that the General Services Administration (GSA) may
provide administrative support services, upon request of the commission. The GSA, however,
need not be the source of administrative support for the commission. Some commissions may
employ the services of Washington Headquarters Services, an organization within the Department
of Defense that provides administrative and other services to defense-related commissions.62 In
some cases, administrative support may be provided by other, specified entities. For example, the
Commission on Servicemembers and Veterans Transition Assistance’s statute provided that
The Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, and the Secretary of Labor
shall, upon the request of the chairman of the Commission, furnish the Commission, on a
reimbursable basis, any administrative and support services as the Commission may
require.63
Rules and Procedures
Most commission statutes do not include a detailed set of rules and procedures that the
commission must follow when conducting its business. However, the statutory language often
provides a general structure, including a mechanism for selecting a chair, specifying the size of a
quorum, and procedures for creating rules.

62 For more information, see http://www.whs.mil.
63 P.L. 104-275, §704(c), 110 Stat. 3349 (1996).
Congressional Research Service

20

Designing Congressional Commissions: Background and Considerations for Congress

Selection of Chair
Commission statutes specify a process for the selection of the commission chair, vice chair, or
cochairs. Most commonly, the commission votes to select the chair or cochair. For example, the
Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission’s statute directed that “[a]t the initial meeting, the
Commission shall select a Chairperson from among its members.”64
When the commission does not select its chair, the next most frequent arrangement is for the
President, congressional leaders, or a designated executive branch official to appoint the chair(s).
In many cases, a single individual is provided the power to appoint the chair(s). For example, the
President appointed the chair of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United
States.65 In contrast, the Senate majority leader, the Senate minority leader, the Speaker of the
House, and the House minority leader jointly appointed the chair of the Commission on the
Abraham Lincoln Study Abroad Fellowship Program.66
In a smaller number of cases, the authorizing statute designates the chair(s). For example, the
Commission on Indian and Native Alaskan Health Care’s statute directed that the Secretary of
Health and Human Services serve as the chair.67
Arrangements that provide for singular chairs may improve the commission’s efficiency,
particularly if partisan or ideological divisions become an issue in organizational decisionmaking.
On the other hand, cochair arrangements may lend partisan or ideological balance to the activities
of the commission, and allow for “buy-in” from a greater range of stakeholders.
Quorum Requirements
Most commission statutes specify a quorum threshold for the commission’s meetings. Most
commission statutes set a quorum at a majority of members, though a small number of statutes
have established quorum thresholds of less than a majority,68 and others a supermajority.69 In
some cases, statutes have permitted commissions to conduct hearings and receive testimony with
less than a quorum present.70
Supermajority Requirements
Most commission statutes are silent on whether a majority is required to approve a final report or
other commission actions. Some statutes, however, state explicitly that the commission’s final
report shall contain only those recommendations agreed to by a majority of its members.71

64 P.L. 114-323, §603(f)(2), 130 Stat. 1938 (2016).
65 P.L. 107-306, §603(a)(1), 116 Stat. 2408 (2002).
66 P.L. 108-199, §104(c)(1), 118 Stat. 436 (2004).
67 P.L. 106-310, §3307(b)(4), 114 Stat. 1216 (2000).
68 For example, the statute creating the Commission on Broadcasting to the People’s Republic of China established a
quorum of one-half of appointed members (P.L. 102-138, §248(a)(4), 105 Stat. 705 (1991)).
69 For example, the statute creating the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation
and Terrorism established a quorum of two-thirds (six of its nine members; P.L. 110-53, §1853(e), 121 Stat. 502,
(2007)).
70 See, for example the United States Semiquincentennial Commission (P.L. 114-196; §4(e), 130 Stat. 686 (2016)).
71 See, for example, the Commission on Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism (P.L.
110-53, §1857, 121 Stat. 504 (2007)).
Congressional Research Service

21

Designing Congressional Commissions: Background and Considerations for Congress

Without specific guidance or vote thresholds, commissions generally operate by simple majority
agreement.
In a smaller number of cases, Congress specified that the commission must adopt its report or
agree to particular actions with agreement from greater than a majority of commissioners. For
example, the National Bipartisan Commission on the Future of Medicare’s statute required that
the commission’s report include only “those recommendations, findings, and conclusions of the
Commission that receive the approval of at least 11” of its 17 commissioners—a threshold of
approximately two-thirds.72
Supermajority thresholds may guarantee the incorporation of the views of a minority of
commissioners, thereby helping to ensure a final report that is more widely supported than might
otherwise be the case. This may improve the commission’s standing in the eyes of legislators and
the public, ensure some degree of bipartisan support for the final work product, and result in a set
of recommendations with a wider base of support in Congress.
On the other hand, the lack of a supermajority requirement does not preclude the achievement of
a bipartisan or nonpartisan work product from the commission. In fact, some commissions have
delivered their recommendations with more than a majority, even when their statutory language
did not require such an outcome. For example, all members of the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission) and the Commission on the
Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction unanimously agreed to the respective final reports.73
Supermajority requirements cannot fully guarantee widespread agreement among commissioners.
If the commission’s policy recommendation is particularly partisan or ideological in nature, a
commission may simply reflect such divisions rather than overcome them. This may ultimately
lead to a report where commissioners are unable to agree on recommendations to address the
most critical topics. Alternatively, the commission may produce final work products with fewer
specific, concrete findings or recommendations, and more general statements that are less likely
to generate wide dissent.
Formulating Other Rules of Procedure
Commission statutes do not generally prescribe many operational rules or internal procedures.
Some statutes have explicitly granted the commission the right to establish its own rules. For
example, the National Gambling Impact Study Commission was authorized to “establish by
majority vote any other rules for the conduct of the Commission’s business, if such rules are not
inconsistent with this Act or other applicable law.”74
Without explicit direction, the commission may adopt formal rules, choose to adopt rules on a
more informal or as-needed basis, or operate without formal rules and instead rely on collegiality
as the basis for proceedings. Whether the commission ultimately adopts a set of formal, written
rules or instead relies on informal norms may be determined by a variety of factors, including the
size of the commission, frequency of meetings, member preferences, the level of collegiality, and
any statutory procedural guidance.

72 P.L. 105-33, §4021(f), 111 Stat. 350 (1997).
73 The final reports can be obtained at National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11
Commission Report, at https://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf; and Commission on the Prevention of
Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism,” World At Risk (New York: Vintage Books, 2008), at
https://policy.defense.gov/portals/11/Documents/hdasa/references/world-at-risk-study.pdf.
74 P.L. 104-169, §3(c), 110 Stat. 1483 (1996).
Congressional Research Service

22

Designing Congressional Commissions: Background and Considerations for Congress

Staff
Most commission statutes authorize the commission to hire staff. Often, commissions are
explicitly authorized to hire a lead staffer (i.e., a “staff director,” or “executive director”) and
additional staff as needed. Rather than a specifically mandated staff size, many commissions are
instead authorized to appoint a staff director and other personnel as necessary, subject to the
limitations of available funds.
Most congressional commissions are also authorized to hire consultants, procure intermittent
services, and request that federal agencies detail personnel to aid the commission’s work.
Commission Staff Hiring, Compensation, and Benefits
Typically, commission statutes provide authority to hire staff and set salaries. Most commission
statutes specify who on the commission may make hiring decisions. Most commonly, hiring
authority is provided to the entire commission.75 In some circumstances, the chair(s) may hire
staff either on their own or upon the approval of the rest of the commission,76 or a designated lead
staffer is tasked with hiring, often upon the approval of the commission.77
In most cases, the commission determines staff compensation. However, commission statutes
frequently establish a maximum rate of pay for commission staff, typically a particular level of
the Executive Schedule or General Schedule. In cases where staff compensation limits are
specified, Level V of the Executive Schedule is the most common limit chosen for
commissions.78 In 2022, positions at level V of the Executive Schedule carried annual pay rates of
$163,500.79
In order to facilitate the hiring process, Congress authorizes most commissions to hire without
regard to certain laws that govern pay rates and the competitive service. For example, the
National Commission for the Review of the Research and Development Programs of the United
States Intelligence Community’s statute authorized the commission to hire a staff director and
other personnel without regard to particular sections of the U.S. Code, but with a specified limit
on the rate of pay:
The co-chairs of the Commission, in accordance with rules agreed upon by the
Commission, shall appoint and fix the compensation of a staff director and such other
personnel as may be necessary to enable the Commission to carry out its duties, without
regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in the
competitive service, and without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III
of chapter 53 of such title relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates, except
that no rate of pay fixed under this subsection may exceed the equivalent of that payable

75 See, for example, the Congressional Oversight Panel (P.L. 110-343, §125(d)(1), 122 Stat. 3792 (2008)).
76 See, for example, the Human Space Flight Independent Investigation Commission (P.L. 109-155, §827(a), 119 Stat.
2944 (2005)) and the Commission on Ocean Policy (P.L. 106-256, §3(d), 114 Stat. 646 (2000)).
77 See, for example, The National Bipartisan Commission on the Future of Medicare (P.L. 105-33, §4021(d)(2), 111
Stat. 349 (1997)).
78 Other staff pay ceilings used in commission statutes include Level IV of the Executive Schedule (see, for example,
the Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission, P.L. 114-323, §605(b)(1), 130 Stat. 1939 (2016)); and the
maximum rate payable for grade GS-15 of the General Schedule (see, for example, the Commission on the National
Military Museum, P.L. 106-65, §2908(c)(2), 113 Stat. 884 (1999)).
79 Office of Personnel Management, “Salary Table No. 2022-EX: Rates of Basic Pay for the Executive Schedule (EX),”
effective January 2022, at https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/salaries-wages/salary-tables/22Tables/
exec/html/EX.aspx.
Congressional Research Service

23

Designing Congressional Commissions: Background and Considerations for Congress

to a person occupying a position at level V of the Executive Schedule under section 5316
of such title.80
Some (but not all) statutes additionally provide that commission staff shall be considered federal
employees for the purpose of benefits. For example, the Presidential Advisory Commission on
Holocaust Assets in the United States’ statute stated the following:
(5) Employee benefits.—
(A) In General.—An employee of the Commission shall be an employee for the
purposes of chapters 83, 84, 85, 87, and 89 of title 5, Untied States Code, and service
as an employee of the Commission shall be service for purpose of such chapters.
(B) Nonapplication to members.—This paragraph shall not apply to a member of the
Commission.81
Decisions related to staff size and compensation will likely have a significant effect on the overall
cost of the commission. Reducing staff compensation or size may arguably result in considerable
cost savings. On the other hand, reducing staff compensation may make it more difficult to hire
qualified staff and limiting staff size could negatively affect the ability of a commission to
function efficiently, resulting in a lower-quality work product or increasing the amount of time
needed for the commission to complete its mission.
Other Staff
In addition to hiring staff, Congress grants many commissions the authority to obtain services
from detailees, consultants, and volunteers.
Detailees
Congress authorizes most commissions to request detailees from federal agencies. In almost all
cases, the statute also specifies that any individual detailee “shall retain the rights, status, and
privileges of his or her regular employment without interruption.”82
Some commission statutes provide the authority to request detailees, but place limits on which
federal employees may be detailed. For example, the Virgin Islands of the United States
Centennial Commission had the authority to request detailees from only the Department of the
Interior and the National Archives and Records Administration.83 Conversely, some commission
statutes specifically prohibit the detail of certain employees. For example, the Human Space
Flight Independent Investigation Commission cannot receive detailees from NASA.84
Statutes granting detailee authority also generally specify whether or not an agency will be
reimbursed by the commission for the cost of the detail. Providing for detailees on a reimbursable
basis may make agencies more willing to comply with a commission’s detail requests, but may
also increase the overall cost of the commission.

80 P.L. 107-306, §1004(a)(1), 116 Stat. 2441 (2002).
81 P.L. 105-186, §5(c)(5), 112 Stat. 615 (1998).
82 See, for example, the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (P.L. 110-181, §841(e)(5), 122
Stat. 234 (2008)).
83 P.L. 114-224, §5(c), 130 Stat. 922 (2016).
84 P.L. 109-155, §827(c), 119 Stat. 2944 (2005).
Congressional Research Service

24

Designing Congressional Commissions: Background and Considerations for Congress

Experts and Consultants
In addition to detailees, Congress often grants commissions the authority to procure services from
experts and consultants in accordance with specific laws, and subject to certain limitations on pay.
As with commission staff, the pay of experts and consultants is often limited to a particular level
of either the Executive Schedule or General Schedule. For example, the Guam War Claims
Review Commission’s statute included language that allowed for the procurement of experts and
consultants, with a limitation on compensation. The statute said:
(c) Experts and Consultants.—The Commission may procure temporary and intermittent
services under section 3109(b) of title 5, United States Code, but at rates for individuals
not to exceed the daily equivalent of the maximum annual rate of basic pay for GS-15 of
the General Schedule. The services of an expert or consultant may be procured without
compensation if the expert or consultant agrees to such an arrangement, in writing, in
advance.85
Volunteer Services
Some commission statutes authorize the commission to accept volunteer and uncompensated
services. For example, the John F. Kennedy Centennial Commission’s statute provided for the
commission to accept these services. It stated:
Volunteer and Uncompensated Services.—Notwithstanding section 1342 of title 31,
United States Code, the Commission may accept and use voluntary and uncompensated
services as the Commission determines necessary.86
Costs and Funding
Aggregate costs of congressional commissions vary widely, ranging from several hundred
thousand dollars to over $10 million. Expenses for any individual commission are difficult to
predict and depend on a variety of factors, the most important of which include the number of
paid staff and the duration of the commission. Some commissions have few or no full-time staff;
others, such as the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11
Commission), employ a large staff.87 The 9/11 Commission received more than $10 million in
appropriations and employed a full-time staff of approximately 75.88
Secondary factors contributing to commission expenses include the number of commissioners,
how often the commission meets or holds hearings, and the number and size of publications
produced by the commission. Although Congress funds many commissions through congressional

85 P.L. 107-333, §6(c), 116 Stat. 2874 (2002).
86 P.L. 114-215, §5(e), 130 Stat. 831 (2016). 31 U.S.C. §1342 places limitations on voluntary services. It states, “An
officer or employee of the United States Government or of the District of Columbia government may not accept
voluntary services for either government or employ personal services exceeding that authorized by law except for
emergencies involving the safety of human life or the protection of property. This section does not apply to a
corporation getting amounts to make loans (except paid in capital amounts) without legal liability of the United States
Government. As used in this section, the term ‘emergencies involving the safety of human life or the protection of
property’ does not include ongoing, regular functions of government the suspension of which would not imminently
threaten the safety of human life or the protection of property.”
87 According to the 9/11 Commission’s archived website, it employed approximately 75 individuals over the course of
its existence. For more information, see National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,
“Commission Staff,” at https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/about/bios_staff.htm.
88 P.L. 108-11, 117 Stat. 591 (2003); P.L. 108-207, 118 Stat. 556 (2004).
Congressional Research Service

25

Designing Congressional Commissions: Background and Considerations for Congress

appropriations, some commissions, especially commemorative commissions, are statutorily
authorized to accept donations of money and volunteer labor, which may offset costs.
Authorization of Funds
Congress may choose to authorize the appropriation of funds for the operations of a commission.
Commission statutes that authorize funding often choose a dollar amount, without additional
specific qualifications. For example, the Guam War Claims Review Commission’s statute states,
“[t]here is authorized to be appropriated $500,000 to carry out this act.”89 Other commission
statutes provide for authorizations that correspond to fiscal years, or otherwise limit how long
funding may be available to the commission. The Commission to Study the Potential Creation of
a National Museum of the American Latino received the following authorization:
There are authorized to be appropriated for carrying out the activities of the Commission
$2,100,000 for the first fiscal year beginning after the date of enactment of this Act and
$1,100,000 for the second fiscal year beginning after the date of enactment of this Act.90
In other cases, statutes may authorize the appropriation of “such sums as necessary” for the
expenses of a commission rather than a specific dollar amount.91
A smaller number of commission statutes—usually for commemorative commissions—explicitly
prohibited the commission from receiving federal funds. In lieu of federal funding, Congress
typically authorizes these commissions to fundraise and accept donations, gifts, and/or volunteer
efforts. Section 10 of the statute creating the John F. Kennedy Centennial Commission simply
reads, “[n]o Federal funds may be obligated to carry out this Act.”92 Similarly, the World War I
Centennial Commission’s statute provided that
[g]ifts, bequests, and devises of services or property, both real and personal, received by
the Centennial Commission under section 6(g) shall be the only source of funds to cover
the costs incurred by the Centennial Commission under this section.93
Sources of Funding
Congress funds some commissions through specific appropriations. For example, the Helping to
Enhance the Livelihood of People Around the Globe Commission’s statute authorized the
appropriation of “such sums as may be necessary.”94 The FY2004 and FY2005 appropriations
acts included specific line items for the commission.95
Congress funds other commissions through an agency appropriation or another mechanism. For
example, the Commission on the Implementation of the New Strategic Posture of the United
States’ statute directed that the commission’s funding be “provided from amounts appropriated
for the Department of Defense.”96 The statute creating the Motor Fuel Tax Enforcement Advisory

89 P.L. 107-333, §7, 116 Stat. 2875 (2002).
90 P.L. 110-229, §333(e), 122 Stat. 787 (2008).
91 See, for example, the Helping to Enhance the Livelihood of People Around the Globe Commission (P.L. 108-199,
§637(i)(1), 118 Stat. 105 (2004)).
92 P.L. 114-215, §10, 130 Stat. 833 (2016).
93 P.L. 112-272, §7(f), 126 Stat. 2452 (2013).
94 P.L. 108-199, §637(i)(1), 118 Stat. 105 (2004).
95 P.L. 108-199, 118 Stat. 89 (2004); and P.L. 108-447, 118 Stat. 2909 (2004).
96 P.L. 109-163, §1051(e), 119 Stat. 3433 (2006).
Congressional Research Service

26

Designing Congressional Commissions: Background and Considerations for Congress

Commission provided that “[s]uch sums as are necessary shall be available from the Highway
Trust Fund for the expenses of the Commission.”97
FACA Applicability
The Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) mandates certain structural and operational
requirements, including formal reporting, administration, and oversight procedures, for certain
federal advisory bodies that advise the executive branch.98
Whether FACA requirements apply to a particular advisory commission may depend on a number
of factors, including whether most commission appointments are made by members of the
legislative or the executive branch, and to which branch of government the commission must
issue its report, findings, or recommendations.
Often, a statute will direct whether FACA shall apply to a given commission. For example, the
Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism (P.L.
110-53) was explicitly exempted from FACA. Its statute stated, “[t]he Federal Advisory
Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall not apply to the Commission.”99 Some commission statutes
exempt a commission from FACA, but still mandate FACA-like requirements, such as holding
public hearings or making available a public version of the final report.100

Author Information

Jacob R. Straus

Specialist on the Congress

Acknowledgments
This report was initially authored by William T. Egar, former Analyst on the American National
Government. The listed author is available to congressional staff to answer questions about its content.
Jamie Hutchinson provided graphics assistance for this report.

97 P.L. 109-59, §11141(d), 119 Stat. 1960 (2005).
98 For more information on FACA requirements and factors affecting FACA applicability, see CRS Report R44253,
Federal Advisory Committees: An Introduction and Overview, by Meghan M. Stuessy.
99 P.L. 110-53, §1856(a), 121 Stat. 504 (2007).
100 See, for example, the Joint Federal-State Commission on Policies and Programs Affecting Alaska Natives (P.L. 101-
379, 104 Stat. 478 (1990)), the Presidential Advisory Commission on Holocaust Assets in the United States (P.L. 105-
186, 112 Stat. 611 (1998)), and the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and
Terrorism (P.L. 110-53, 121 Stat. 501 (2007)).
Congressional Research Service

27

Designing Congressional Commissions: Background and Considerations for Congress

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to
copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

Congressional Research Service
R45328 · VERSION 5 · UPDATED
28