Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and
April 13, 2022
Intelligence Aspects
Andrew S. Bowen
Russia’s full-scale invasion of neighboring Ukraine in February 2022 marked the start of
Analyst in Russian and
Europe’s deadliest armed conflict in decades. After a steady buildup of military forces
European Affairs
along Ukraine’s borders since 2021, Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, with

Russian ground forces attacking from multiple directions.

Initially, Russian forces made gains along all lines of advance. However, Russian forces ran into effective and
likely unexpected levels of Ukrainian resistance from the invasion’s outset. In addition, many analysts and
officials assess that the Russian military has performed poorly overall and has been hindered by specific tactical
choices, poor logistics, ineffective communications, and command-and-control issues. The Ukrainian military,
while at a quantitative and qualitative disadvantage in personnel, equipment, and resources, has proven more
resilient and adaptive, including by using guerrilla tactics effectively, than Russia appeared to expect.
Over the course of the first several weeks of the war, Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Russian military
had to adjust to various setbacks and other developments on the ground. In late March, Russian defense officials
announced the military operation would focus on eastern Ukraine, including the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk
(collectively known as the Donbas, where Russian-led separatists have been fighting since 2014) and Russia
would withdraw its forces around Kyiv and Chernihiv. Analysts have anticipated that the redeployment of Russian
military units would enable further offensives in the east. Meanwhile, Russia has been accused of repeated war
crimes by Ukraine, nongovernmental organizations, multiple states, and the Biden Administration. Russian forces
allegedly have targeted and bombed civilian targets, including a maternity hospital in Mariupol. Russian forces
also have been accused of causing indiscriminate killings, particularly after the discovery of mass graves and
killed civilians following the Russian military’s withdrawal from the Kyiv suburb of Bucha.
Congress is likely to continue to track these developments closely, especially as it considers U.S. and international
efforts to support Ukraine militarily and respond to events on the ground.
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Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects

Introduction
Russia’s full-scale invasion of neighboring Ukraine in February 2022 marked the start of
Europe’s deadliest armed conflict in decades. It also prompted intensive international efforts to
respond to the war. Multiple Members of Congress have engaged with U.S. and international
measures, including by considering sanctions against Russia, providing assistance to Ukraine, and
bolstering support to neighboring NATO countries. The immediate and long-term implications of
the war are likely to be far-reaching, affecting numerous policy dimensions of concern to
Congress.
This report addresses military and intelligence aspects of Russia’s war in Ukraine, which are of
interest to many in Congress as Congress considers various legislative measures and conducts
oversight of U.S. policy. It provides an overview of the conflict, including the run-up to the
invasion, the performance and conduct of the Russian and Ukrainian militaries, possible Russian
intentions, and recent developments. For information related to numerous implications of
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, including a wide array of U.S. policy dimensions, see CRS Report
R47054, Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine: Related CRS Products, by Zoe Danon and David A.
Blum.
Prelude to Invasion: Military Buildup and Force Posture
In mid-October 2021, social media and news outlets began to report significant movement by
Russian military forces, with limited Russian transparency, on or near the Ukrainian border and
within Ukraine’s occupied Crimea region. The buildup came after a sustained increase in Russia’s
permanent force posture on the Ukrainian border.1 Since 2014, Russia has created two new
Combined Arms Armies (CAAs), one in the Western Military District (20th CAA, headquartered
in Voronezh) and one in the Southern Military District (8th CAA, headquartered in Rostov-on-
Don and Novocherkassk) bordering Ukraine. Russia created these CAAs to oversee, coordinate,
and manage command and control of units transported to the border. The 8th CAA also reportedly
commands the separatist units in the Russia-controlled regions two Russia-controlled areas in
eastern Ukraine (the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, or DNR/LNR).
Throughout December 2021, Russia continued to build up its forces in the region. Prior to the
February 2022 invasion, Russia had mobilized between 150,000 and 190,000 personnel and 120
Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) on its border with Ukraine,2 in Belarus, and in Ukraine’s
occupied Crimea region, according to U.S. government estimates.3

1 Michael Kofman, “Putin’s Wager in Russia’s Standoff with the West,” War on the Rocks, January 24, 2022.
2 Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) are ad hoc, task-specific formations designed to operate autonomously as combined
arms formations. BTGs are built around infantry and armor units, with supporting air defense, artillery, and other units.
BTGs comprise the higher readiness units of the Russian military and are staffed by professional (also known as
contract) personnel. Each Russian regiment or brigade is intended to generate two BTGs. In August 2021, Russian
Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu stated the Russian military had 168 BTGs. Lester W. Grau and Charles K. Bartles, The
Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces (Leavenworth, KS:
Foreign Military Studies Office, 2016), pp. 34-40; Tass, “Russian Army Operates Around 170 Battalion Tactical
Groups—Defense Chief,” August 20, 2021; Sebastien Roblin, “Russian Battalion Groups Are Assembling Around
Ukraine. What Is Putin Up To?”19FortyFive, December 17, 2021; Conflict Intelligence Team, “‘Almost All Contract
Soldiers Are Going to the Border:’ Comments on Social Media Shed Light on Russian Troop Transfer,” January 19,
2022.
3 U.S. Mission to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, “U.S. Statement for the Vienna Document
Joint PC-FSC Chapter III Meeting,” February 12, 2022; Department of Defense, “Senior Defense Official Holds a
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During this buildup, analysts and observers documented the movement of Russian units from
across Russia toward Ukraine.4 The 41st and 2nd CAAs moved from the Central Military District
into Belarus and to Ukraine’s northeast border with Russia; the 1st Guards Tank Army and the 6th
CAA moved from the Western Military District to Ukraine’s eastern border with Russia; the 49th
and 58th CAAs moved from the Southern Military District to occupied Crimea and to Ukraine’s
southeast border with Russia; and the 35th and 36th CAAs (and elements of the 29th and 5th CAAs)
moved from the Eastern Military District to Belarus (see Figure 1).5 In addition, Russia deployed
elite units—such as Russian Airborne (VDV), Naval Infantry, and spetsnaz (elite light infantry
units used for reconnaissance and direct action)—around Ukraine’s borders.6
These forces included the full range of Russian military capabilities, including artillery and
support systems. The ground forces included air defense, artillery and rocket artillery, long-range
precision missile systems (Iskander-M short-range ballistic missile [SRBM] systems), electronic
warfare, support, and logistics units.7 Additionally, by February 2022, Russia had mobilized large
numbers of Aerospace Forces (VKS) fighter, fighter-bomber, and helicopter squadrons, which
some observers believed would play a key role in the initial invasion.8
On February 21, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia would recognize
the independence of the DNR/LNR. Russian recognition appeared to include the entire regions of
Donetsk and Luhansk (collectively known as the Donbas) and not just territory controlled by
DNR/LNR, most of which had remained under Ukrainian control since Russia’s first invasion of
Ukraine in 2014.
Shortly after February 21, Putin announced Russia would send “peacekeepers” into the
DNR/LNR, claiming they were to defend against Ukrainian plans for invasion and sabotage
attempts. These Russian charges had no basis in fact. Despite denials from Russian officials,
Russia had spent months amassing a significant portion of its military capabilities around
Ukraine.9
On February 24—following months of warning and concern from the Biden Administration,
European allies, NATO, and some Members of Congress—Russia invaded Ukraine. Russia
claimed its invasion was to conduct a “special military operation” to protect the civilian

Background Briefing,” March 3, 2022, at https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2954139/
senior-defense-official-holds-a-background-briefing/.
4 For more on the Russian military buildup, see CRS Insight IN11806, Russian Military Buildup Along the Ukrainian
Border, by Andrew S. Bowen.
5 Units from all 11 Combined Arms Armies (CAAs) and one Tank Army (as well as the 14th and 22nd Army Corps)
were present on the borders of Ukraine in the run-up to the invasion. For more, see Konrad Muzyka, “Tracking Russian
Deployments near Ukraine—Autumn-Winter 2021-22,” Rochan Consulting, November 15, 2021; Dmitry Gorenburg
and Michael Kofman, “Here’s What We Know About Russia’s Military Buildup near Ukraine,” Washington Post,
January 15, 2022.
6 VDV include elite paratroop and air assault forces. VDV act as Russia’s elite rapid response forces. For more on
Russian military capabilities and structure see CRS In Focus IF11589, Russian Armed Forces: Capabilities, by Andrew
S. Bowen; Christian Haimet, “Russian Troop Buildup Continues on Ukrainian Borders,” Janes IHS, February 21, 2022.
7 Michael R. Gordon and Max Rust, “Russian Buildup near Ukraine Features Potent Weapons Systems, Well-Trained
Troops,” Wall Street Journal, February 14, 2022.
8 Russia’s Aerospace Forces include the air force, air defense, and space defenses forces. Russia merged these
organizations into the VKS in 2015. Julian E. Barnes, Michael Crowley, and Eric Schmitt, “Russia Positioning
Helicopters, in Possible Sign of Ukraine Plans,” New York Times, January 10, 2021; Tass, “Russia’s Su-35S Fighter
Jets Deployed in Belarus for Upcoming Drills-Ministry,” January 26, 20212.
9 Tara Copp, “They Could Go at Any Hour Now;’ U.S. Official Warns of Larger Russian Invasion of Ukraine,”
Defense One, February 23, 2022.
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population and to “demilitarize” and “de-Nazify” Ukraine; many observers understood the latter
term as a false pretext for overthrowing the democratically elected Ukrainian government.10
Initial Invasion
On February 24, 2022, hours after Putin’s televised address announcing a “special military
operation,” Russia invaded Ukraine with an air and missile attack, using precision-guided
munitions (PGMs) against key targets. These early targets included logistics centers, naval
installations, command and control centers, air defenses, and critical infrastructure.11 In the
opening stages of the attack, the Pentagon assessed that Russia launched over 100 SRBMs,
including Iskander-M SRBMs, and air- and sea-launched cruise missiles.12
Some observers believe Russia’s initial strategy was (or was intended) to achieve air superiority,
degrade Ukrainian air defenses, and undermine the Ukrainian military’s ability to coordinate
defenses and counterattacks. This initial bombardment, however, was more limited in duration
and scale than some analysts expected.13 In particular, analysts noted that the Russian air forces
(VKS) failed to conduct effective suppression of enemy air defense missions, either because of an
unwillingness to act or because of a lack of capability. Russia’s failure to degrade the Ukrainian
air force and air defenses, as well as Ukrainian command and control capabilities, allowed the
Ukrainian military to respond more successfully to Russia’s invasion than most observers
expected, both at the outset and subsequently.14
After the air assault, Russian ground forces attacked from multiple directions: north from
occupied Crimea in the direction of Kherson; limited incursions west from DNR/LNR; from
Russia’s Belgorod and Kursk toward Ukraine’s cities of Kharkiv and Sumy; and a strong two-
pronged thrust toward the capital of Kyiv from Belarus (see Table 1).15

10 Audrius Rickus, “Baseless Claims of ‘Denazification’ Have Underscored Russian Aggression Since World War II,”
Washington Post, March 9, 2022.
11 Isabelle Khurshudyan et al., “As West Unleashes Sanctions, Russian Military Pushes Toward Kyiv,” Washington
Post, February 24, 2022; Alex Kokcharov and John Raines, “Russia Begins ‘Blitzkrieg’ Invasion of Ukraine with
Objective of Quick Victory; Intensive Fighting Likely Across Country,” Janes IHS, February 25, 2022.
12 RFE/RL, “Zelenskiy Says Ukraine Has Suffered ‘Serious Losses’ After Russian Air Strikes Pound Dozens of
Targets,” February 24, 2022; Thomas Newdick, “These Are the Standoff Missiles Russia Used to Open Its War Against
Ukraine,” The Drive, February 24, 2022.
13 Michael Kofman and Jeffrey Edmonds, “Russia’s Shock and Awe: Moscow’s Use of Overwhelming Force Against
Ukraine,” Foreign Affairs, February 22, 2022.
14 Some analysts speculate that this result was due to Ukraine’s decision, possibly influenced by U.S. and Western
intelligence, to activate and disperse most of its units from their permanent bases in preparation for a possible Russian
invasion. Warren P. Strobel and Michael R. Gordon, “Biden Administration Altered Rules for Sharing Intelligence with
Ukraine,” Wall Street Journal, March 8, 2022.
15 Nicholas Fiorenza, Huw Williams, and Thomas Bullock, “Ukraine Conflict: Russia Launches Multipronged Attack
on Ukraine,” Janes IHS, February 24, 2022.
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Figure 1. Ukraine

Source: Congressional Research Service
Kyiv was an initial key Russian military target.16 Led by elite, but comparatively lightly
equipped, VDV, spetsnaz, and reconnaissance units, Russian forces advanced along the western
side of Kyiv and reached the outskirts of the city within days.17 In the early hours of the invasion,
Russian VDV units conducted a risky air assault to seize the Antonov International Airport in
Hostomel, on the outskirts of Kyiv.18 Analysts have argued that the Russian attack to seize the
airport was intended to allow the rapid introduction of follow-on VDV units to surround and seize
the Ukrainian capital.19 Ukrainian forces, however, responded and repulsed the attack, reportedly
causing heavy Russian casualties and shooting down several helicopters.20
Initially, Russian forces made gains along all lines of advance.21 Russia made the most progress in
the south from occupied Crimea, reportedly imposing significant casualties on Ukrainian forces
in the region. Russian forces advanced quickly toward Kherson (which they captured on March 2,

16 Yuliya Talmazan et al., “Russian Troops Advance Within 20 Miles of Ukraine Capital, Pentagon Says,” NBC News,
February 24, 2022; Katie Bo Lillis, Natasha Bertrand, and Barbara Starr, “U.S. Officials Fear the Worst Is Yet to Come
for Kyiv,” CNN, March 1, 2022.
17 Mark Galeotti, “Russian Airborne Forces Retool for an Expanded Role,” Janes IHS, October 25, 2021.
18 Haley Williams, Ainara Tiefenthaler, and Masha Froliak, “Russian Helicopters Attack an Airport Near Kyiv,” New
York Times, February 24, 2022.
19 Mason Clark, George Barros, and Kateryna Stepanenko, “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment,” Institute for the
Study of War, February 25, 2022.
20 James Marson, “Putin Thought Ukraine Would Fall Quickly. An Airport Battle Proved Him Wrong,” Wall Street
Journal, March 3, 2022.
21 CRS Insight IN11872, Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Issues and Aspects, by Andrew S.
Bowen.
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2022) and eventually turned toward the Ukrainian coastal city of Mariupol.22 Analysts argue that
Russian advances in the south were successful in part because they involved some of Russia’s
most modern and professional units from the Southern Military District and had better logistical
support than other units, due to rail access from Crimea.23 In other regions, Russia made slow but
initially steady progress, seeking to encircle rather than capture major urban centers such as
Sumy, Kharkiv, and Chernihiv.24 Logistics issues and other factors soon stalled most Russian
advances.25
Russian forces ran into effective Ukrainian resistance from the invasion’s outset.26 Despite not
announcing a general mobilization until February 25, after the invasion began, the Ukrainian
military immediately hindered, deflected, and imposed costs on Russian forces in personnel and
equipment. The Ukrainian military appeared to exploit numerous tactical and operational
deficiencies of Russian forces (which were overextended in many cases), allowing the Ukrainian
military to conduct ambushes and counterattacks. In addition, many analysts point to the role of
significant security assistance from the United States and other Western countries (including
weapons and equipment as well as military advice and training) in improving the Ukrainian
military’s capacity to defend against Russia’s invasion.27
Analysis of Russia’s Initial Military Performance
Despite Russian forces launching heavy attacks and advancing across Ukraine, the Russian
military overall performed poorly during the initial phases of the invasion, surprising many
observers and analysts.28 Reports indicated that Russia’s military and political
leadership appeared surprised by the military’s lack of progress and the level of resistance from
Ukrainian forces.29 As Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines stated to Congress, “We
assess Moscow underestimated the strength of Ukraine’s resistance and the degree of internal
military challenges we are observing, which include an ill-constructed plan, morale issues and
considerable logistical issues.”30

22 Michael Schwirtz and Richard Perez-Pena, “First Ukraine City Falls as Russia Strikes More Civilian Targets,” New
York Times, March 2, 2022.
23 Michael Kofman and Ryan Evans, “Into the Third Week: Will Russian Forces Need to Pause?,” War on the Rocks,
March 14, 2022.
24 Richard Perez-Pena, “Russia Batters and Encircles Ukrainian Cities, as Diplomacy Falters,” New York Times, March
10, 2022.
25 Bonnie Berkowitz and Artur Galocha, “Why Russia’s Military Is Bogged Down by Logistics in Ukraine,”
Washington Post, March 30, 2022.
26 Yaroslav Trofimov, “Ukrainian Forces Repel Russian Attack on Kyiv, Prepare for Next Assault,” Wall Street
Journal, February 26, 2022.
27 Brett Forrest and Alan Cullison, “How Ukraine Blunted the Russian Advance,” Wall Street Journal, March 6, 2022;
CRS In Focus IF12040, U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine, by Christina L. Arabia, Andrew S. Bowen, and Cory
Welt. In addition to the significant levels of security assistance, Western training for the Ukrainian military, specifically
Ukrainian special operations forces, has played a key role in defending against Russia’s invasion. For more, see
Andrew White, “Ukraine Conflict: Ukrainian Special Operations Forces in Focus,” Janes IHS, March 4, 2022.
28 Sam Jones, John Paul Rathbone, and Demetri Sevastopulo, “A Serious Failure’: Scale of Russian Military Blunders
Becomes Clear,” Financial Times, March 12, 2022.
29 Department of Defense, “Ukrainian Resistance, Logistics Nightmares Plague Russian Invaders,” press release,
March 1, 2022; Michael Schwirtz, “Proud Band of Ukrainian Troops Holds Russian Assault at Bay—for Now,” New
York Times, March 6, 2022.
30 U.S. Congress, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Worldwide Threats, 117th Cong., March 8, 2022.
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Some Russian forces invaded with apparently little preparation. Captured Russian soldiers and
intercepted communications revealed that many units were unaware they were to invade Ukraine
until shortly beforehand.31 Reports also indicated that many in the Russian military were
operating with poor morale, soon compounded by increasing casualties, poor leadership, and a
lack of supplies.32
According to Russian law, conscripts cannot be used in combat operations unless Russia declares
a national emergency and mobilization.33 Nevertheless, on March 9, 2022, the Russian Ministry
of Defense admitted conscripts had been involved in the invasion, contradicting Putin’s claim that
no conscripts would see combat.34
Russian units were operating with very little tactical sophistication and not as combined arms
formations, leaving units exposed and unprepared for Ukrainian resistance, according to by
observers and analysts.35 For example, elite but relatively lightly equipped units, such as VDV
and spetsnaz, conducted operations they were not trained or equipped to conduct, such as
advancing into urban areas, where they appeared to suffer heavy casualties due to the lack of
heavy armored support. Additionally, armored units advanced without infantry support in
numerous instances.36 In another example, Russian National Guard (Rosgvardiya) units
reportedly advanced alongside, and sometimes in front of, Russian military forces, apparently
with little coordination.37
During the initial phases of the invasion, the Russian military appeared not to use many of the
systems and capabilities it had amassed prior to the invasion. Observers noted little evidence of
Russia conducting electronic warfare or using advanced intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance assets, such as unmanned aerial vehicles.38 Additionally, despite having
significant artillery, rocket artillery, and air capabilities, Russian forces appeared restrained in
their use of these systems and capabilities during the initial phases of the invasion.39 Some
analysts speculated that this occurred because the Russian military underestimated the level of

31 Luke Harding, “Demoralized Russian Soldiers Tell of Anger at Being ‘Duped’ into War,” Guardian, March 4, 2022.
32 Helene Cooper, Eric Schmitt, and Julian E. Barnes, “As Russia’s Military Stumbles, Its Adversaries Take Note,”
New York Times, March 7, 2022.
33 Currently, Russia states it is conducting a “special military operation.”
34 Sarah Dean and Rob Picheta, “Russia Admits Conscripts Have Been Fighting in Ukraine, Despite Putin’s Previous
Denials,” CNN, March 9, 2022.
35 Liz Sly and Dan Lamothe, “The War in Ukraine Isn’t Working Out the Way Russia Intended,” Washington Post,
February 27, 2022; Jack Watling, “Just How Tall Are Russian Soldiers?” RUSI, March 11, 2022; Mark Galeotti,
“Echoes of Afghanistan in Russian Soldiers’ Poor Discipline in Ukraine,” Moscow Times, April 1, 2022.
36 Serguy Bobok and Frankie Taggart, “Russian Airborne Troops Land in Ukraine’s Second City Kharkiv,” Moscow
Times, March 2, 2022; James Marson and Daniel Michaels, “Ukraine’s Troops Fight War of Ambush and Skirmish
Against Russian Invaders,” Wall Street Journal, March 22, 2022; Mark Urban, “The Heavy Losses of an Elite Russian
Regiment in Ukraine,” BBC, April 2, 2022.
37 Rosgvardiya units are key internal security troops, neither equipped nor trained for conventional combat and likely
sent into Ukraine early in the invasion to prevent protests against any new pro-Russian Ukrainian leadership. See CRS
In Focus IF11647, Russian Law Enforcement and Internal Security Agencies, by Andrew S. Bowen; Vladimir
Sevrinovsky, “Refusing to Kill People Isn’t a Crime:’ The Russian National Guard Is Firing Officers Who Refuse to
Join the War in Ukraine,” Meduza, March 29, 2022; Tim Ripley, “Russian National Guard Deployed Across Ukraine,”
Janes IHS, April 4, 2022.
38 Mark Pomerleau, “Russia’s Lack of Electronic Warfare in Ukraine Puzzling to Experts,” Fedscoop, March 8, 2022;
Ander Eversden and Jaspreet Gill, “Why Hasn’t Russia Used Its ‘Full Scope’ of Electronic Warfare?,” Breaking
Defense, March 28, 2022.
39 Thomas Newdick, “A Rundown of Russia’s Arsenal of Artillery That Could Wreak Havoc on Ukraine’s Cities,” The
Drive, March 4, 2022.
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Ukrainian resistance, and that it indicated an initial hesitation to inflict collateral damage on
civilian targets.40
In particular, many analysts were surprised at the apparently limited role the VKS played at the
outset of the invasion, beyond the initial bombardment.41 Russian ground forces appeared to have
limited air cover, with Russia primarily relying on Iskander-M SRBMs or air-launched cruise
missiles launched from VKS bombers inside Belarus and Russia, especially to target Ukrainian
infrastructure and other targets in western Ukraine (see Figure 2).42 The Ukrainian air force
continued to operate over western Ukraine, and its air defenses shot down Russian aircraft and
challenged Russian air superiority.43 Specifically, Ukrainian forces used Turkish-manufactured
TB2 unmanned combat aerial vehicles in reconnaissance, targeting, and attack missions against
Russian forces.44

40 Helene Cooper and Eric Schmitt, “Russian’s Assault in Ukraine Slows After an Aggressive Start,” New York Times,
February 25, 2022.
41 Justin Bronk, “The Mysterious Case of the Missing Russian Air Force,” RUSI, February 28, 2022; Phil Stewart and
Idrees Ali, “What Happened to Russia’s Air Force? U.S. Officials, Experts Stumped,” Reuters, March 1, 2022.
42 Reuters, “Ukrainian Official Says Missiles Launched from Belarus to Ukraine,” February 27, 2022; Reuters,
“Ukraine Says It Downed Missile Launched by Russian Bomber Flying over Belarus,” February 27, 2022; Kyrylo
Ovsyaniy, “A Source of Death:’ Air Bases in Russia, Belarus, and Crimea Used in Moscow’s Assault on Ukraine,”
RFE/RL, March 24, 2022.
43 Media reports have documented the loss of Su-25 (SM/SM3), Su-30SM, and Su-34 fighters and fighter-bombers, as
well as numerous Mi-8, Mi-24, Mi-35, Mi-28N, and Ka-52 helicopters. Jack Siminski, “What the Air Campaign in
Ukraine Tells Us About the Current State of the Russian Air Force,” Aviationist, March 4, 2022.
44 Billy Perrigo, “Ukraine’s Secret Weapon Against Russia: Turkish Drones,” Time, March 2, 2022; Dave Phillips and
Eric Schmitt, “Over Ukraine, Lumbering Turkish-Made Drones Are an Ominous Sign for Russia,” New York Times,
March 22, 2022.
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Figure 2. Ukraine Airfields and Key Infrastructure

Sources: Congressional Research Service, Janes IHS.
The Russian military also appeared unprepared for many other critical aspects of the conflict.
Observers documented Russian units operating without encrypted communications, often using
civilian equipment to communicate.45 The lack of encrypted communications hampered the
Russian military’s ability to coordinate its operations and allowed the Ukrainian military to listen
and exploit intercepted information.46
The Russian military’s logistics issues limited its offensives in almost all sectors.47 Russian units
appeared poorly supplied (for example, some captured Russian food appeared expired and
inedible) and seemed to advance past available logistics support. Available logistics appeared too
limited to sustain multiple simultaneous offensives.48 For example, a 40-mile-long Russian supply
convoy on its way to Kyiv stalled, which undermined Russian advances on the Ukrainian

45 James Rands, “Doctrine, Tactics, and Technical Issues Underpin Russian Forces’ Communication Woes,” Janes IHS,
March 29, 2022.
46 Sergei Dobrynin and Mark Krutov, “Communication Breakdown: How Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Bogged
Down,” RFE/RL, March 19, 2022; Jack Detsch and Amy MacKinnon, “‘The Ukrainians Are Listening’: Russia’s
Military Radios Are Getting Owned,” Foreign Policy, March 22, 2022; Alex Horton and Shane Harris, “Russian
Troops’ Tendency to Talk on Unsecured Lines Is Proving Costly,” Washington Post, March 27, 2022.
47 Alex Vershinin, “Feeding the Bear: A Closer Look at Russian Army Logistics and the Fait Accompli,” War on the
Rocks, November 23, 2021; Ryan Baker, “The Russian Invasion Has Some Logistical Problems. That Doesn’t Mean
It’s Doomed,” Washington Post, February 28, 2022.
48 Polina Beliakova, “Russian Military’s Corruption Quagmire,” Politico.eu, March 8, 2022.
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capital.49 Moreover, the Ukrainian military appeared to prioritize ambushing Russian supply
columns, exacerbating Russian logistics issues.50
Reported Russian Casualties
Estimates of Russian casualties vary widely and may not be considered reliable. Due to the continuing state of war,
verifying exact numbers of Russian casualties is nearly impossible. Below are some of the estimates that had been
mentioned in various press reports by the end of March 2022.
Russia: Officially, the Russian government stated in late March that 1,351 soldiers had died and another 3,850 had
been wounded. On March 20, 2022, the pro-Kremlin newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda appeared to mistakenly
publish Russian Ministry of Defense figures that listed 9,861 deaths. This figure remains unconfirmed, and the
newspaper reported that it had been hacked.
United States: The U.S. government has largely declined to release specific estimates, but U.S. Under Secretary
of State Victoria Nuland stated in an interview on March 29, 2022, that Russia had sustained “incredible” losses
and “by our estimates, more than 10,000 Russians dead.”
NATO: NATO estimated that anywhere from 7,000 to 15,000 Russian soldiers had been kil ed.
Ukraine: Ukraine estimated that it had kil ed nearly 20,000 Russian troops since the war began.
Sources: Emily Rauhala et al., “Russia Could Have Lost as Many as 15,000 Troops in Ukraine War, NATO Official
Estimates,” Washington Post, March 24, 2022; RFE/RL, “Russia Says 1,351 of Its Soldiers Have Died in Ukraine, Well
Below Western Estimates,” March 25, 2022; Yury Baranyuk, “Russia ‘Taking Incredible Losses’ in Ukraine, Senior
U.S. Official Says,” RFE/RL, March 30, 2022.
In addition, analysts have noted that the Russian military appears to have issues with command
and control, both at the tactical and the operational levels. Russian commanders appeared
unprepared for many aspects of the invasion, as evidenced by a lack of coordination among
branches (such as VKS and Rosgvardiya) and between units.51 Reporting indicates that
communication problems compounded these command and control issues, contributing to higher-
ranking officers moving closer to the frontlines.52 This exposure reportedly has led to a significant
number of casualties among high-ranking officers, and especially mid-ranking officers, who are
crucial to tactical-level operations.53 Additionally, reports indicate there was no overall Russian
operational commander.54 As a result, it appears each CAA and axis of advance was operating
independently, with questionable levels of coordination.55 Recently, reports indicate that General

49 Bill Chappell, “Russia’s 40-Mile Convoy Has Stalled on Its Way to Kyiv, a U.S. Official Says,” NPR, March 1,
2022.
50 Julian Borger, “The Drone Operators Who Halted Russian Convoy Headed for Kyiv,” Guardian, March 28, 2022.
51 Sam Cranny-Evans and Thomas Withington, “Russian Comms in Ukraine: A World of Hertz,” RUSI, March 9,
2022.
52 Compared with Western militaries, Russian commanders have smaller staffs to assist command and generally are
closer to the frontlines, which makes casualties among Russian officers more likely. Many analysts, however, have
been surprised by the number and ranks of officers killed. The high number likely indicates that problems forced
Russian commanders to accept greater levels of exposure. Jack Detsch, “‘Winging It’: Russia Is Getting Its Generals
Killed on the Front Lines,” Foreign Policy, March 21, 2022.
53 Some reports indicate that Ukrainian forces specifically targeted Russian commanders by exploiting their use of
unsecured communications, possibly contributing to the high fatality rate. Alex Horton and Shane Harris, “Russian
Troops’ Tendency to Talk on Unsecured Lines Is Proving Costly,” Washington Post, March 27, 2022.
54 Katie Bo Lillis and Zachary Cohen, “Who Is Russia’s Top Field Commander in Ukraine? The U.S. Isn’t Sure.”
CNN, March 22, 2022; Helene Cooper and Eric Schmitt, “Russia’s War Lacks a Battlefield Commander, U.S. Officials
Say,” New York Times, March 31, 2022.
55 Reportedly, each CAA brought and set up its own headquarters structure rather than integrating under the command
of the Western or Southern Military Districts, as most analysts expected. Tim Ripley, “Russian Military Adapts
Command and Control for Ukraine Operations,” Janes IHS, March 7, 2022.
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Alexander Dvornikov, head of the Southern Military District, was given operational command of
Russia’s war to help streamline command and control.56
Analysis of Ukraine’s Initial Military Performance
Many observers and analysts have been surprised and impressed by Ukraine’s military resistance.
Despite having a smaller military than Russia, and a quantitative and qualitative disadvantage in
equipment and resources, the Ukrainian military has proven resilient and adaptive.57 Analysts
note the Ukrainian military has demonstrated greater flexibility than the Russian military and a
willingness to adapt to changing conditions to exploit Russian missteps and weaknesses.58 The
Ukrainian military also has been benefiting from high levels of motivation and recruitment.59
Initially, the Ukrainian military traded space to draw Russian forces in, as Russian units advanced
without sufficient convoy protection and logistical support. As Russian units advanced, Ukraine
emphasized guerrilla strategies, such as hit and run or ambushes, to attack supply lines.60 Ukraine
also isolated Russian units in an effort to tire and deplete Russian forces. Ukraine leveraged key
capabilities (such as the TB2 unmanned combat aerial vehicle for direct attack and targeting for
artillery strikes), security assistance, and knowledge to stymie Russian advances and undermine
Russian advantages, such as airpower.61 Easily deployable weapons systems (including foreign
and domestic anti-tank and anti-air systems) have been effective at stopping Russian forces and
imposing losses in Russian personnel and equipment.62 The Ukrainian military also appears to
have adopted a diffuse command structure, allowing each operational command to coordinate and
initiate operations according to local conditions.
Observers have been less clear on the state of Ukrainian losses, although most agree Ukraine has
suffered significant personnel and equipment losses.63 Ukraine has operated air defenses that play
a crucial role in the conflict, especially around Kyiv, but documented losses of strategic air-
defense systems have occurred. Other losses include tank, artillery, and rocket artillery systems.
Although Ukraine has effectively exploited person-operated weaponry and guerrilla tactics
against Russia, Ukrainian officials have pressed other countries to supply needed armor, artillery,
and rocket artillery systems to enable Ukraine to conduct larger-scale counteroffensives against
the Russian military.64 In addition, Ukraine will likely need logistics and supplies not only to
replace losses but also to sustain continued combat operations.

56 Miriam Berger and Bryan Pietsch, “What to Know About Russia’s Top Commander in Ukraine,” Washington Post,
April 10, 2022.
57 CRS In Focus IF11862, Ukrainian Armed Forces, by Andrew S. Bowen.
58 Nabih Bulos, “Ukraine’s Army, Vastly Outgunned, Inflicts Losses on More Powerful Russian Forces,” Los Angeles
Times, March 9, 2022; Tim Judah, “How Kyiv was Saved by Ukrainian Ingenuity as Well as Russian Blunders,”
Financial Times, April 10, 2022.
59 Stefanie Glinski, “In Ukraine, Refugees Flee West—and Volunteer Fighters Flood to the East,” Foreign Policy,
March 7, 2022.
60 John Paul Rathbone, Roman Olearchyk, and Henry Foy, “Ukraine Uses Guerrilla Counter-Attacks to Take Fight to
Russia,” Financial Times, April 1, 2022.
61 Dave Phillips and Eric Schmitt, “Over Ukraine, Lumbering Turkish-Made Drones Are an Ominous Sign for Russia,”
New York Times, March 11, 2022.
62 Henry Foy and Ian Bott, “How Is Ukraine Using Western Weapons to Exploit Russian Weaknesses?,” Financial
Times, March 16, 2022.
63 Sam Jones and John Paul Rathbone, “Russian Losses Mask Ukraine’s Vulnerabilities,” Financial Times, March 20,
2022.
64 William Booth, Emily Rauhala, and Michael Birnbaum, “What Weapons to Send to Ukraine? How Debate Shifted
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Possible Russian Intentions and Expectations
Observers continue to speculate about Russia’s initial objectives and plans in launching its
offensive against Ukraine. Many analysts believe Russia’s expectations were based on faulty
assumptions that undermined Russia’s conduct of the invasion.65 If this is the case, these incorrect
political assumptions possibly determined and imposed unrealistic objectives and timetables onto
the Russian military. This in turn may partially explain the Russian military’s unpreparedness and
initial poor performance.66
On February 25, 2022, the Pentagon assessed that Russia had committed one-third of its available
troops into Ukraine. U.S. officials and some analysts believe Russia’s initial operation was to
“decapitate” the Ukrainian government and rely on fast-moving, elite units to quickly seize key
junctures, similar to Russia’s seizure of Crimea in 2014.67 Some analysts speculate that Russia
may have based such a strategy on assumptions that the Ukrainian military would be ineffective
and the Ukrainian political leadership could be easily replaced.68 As Central Intelligence Agency
Director William J. Burns testified before the House Intelligence Committee in early March 2022,
Putin “was confident that he had modernized his military and they were capable of a quick,
decisive victory at minimal cost. He’s been proven wrong on every count. Those assumptions
have proven to be profoundly flawed over the last 12 days of conflict.”69
Analysts speculate that Putin and other Russian policymakers may have held these faulty
assumptions in part due to poor intelligence and a willingness by subordinates to convey only
positive information to Russian decisionmakers.70 Reportedly, several Russian intelligence and
security officers have been arrested, which some analysts suspect occurred in response to the
officers’ poor or misleading provision of intelligence.71 Additionally, many observers speculate a
relatively small circle of advisers may have outsized influence on Putin and may have contributed

from Helmets to Tanks,” Washington Post, April 9, 2022.
65 Zach Beauchamp, “Why the First Few Days of War in Ukraine Went Badly for Russia,” Vox, February 28, 2022;
Jack Detsch and Amy MacKinnon, “How Putin Bungled His Invasion of Ukraine,” Foreign Policy, March 18, 2022.
66 Michael Kofman and Ryan Evans, “11 Days In: Russia’s Invasion Stumbles Forward,” War on the Rocks, March 7,
2022; Isaac Chotiner, “The Russian Military’s Debacle in Ukraine,” New Yorker, March 11, 2022.
67 Helene Cooper, “Pentagon Gives a Grim Assessment of the First Stages of the Russian Invasion,” New York Times,
February 24, 2022.
68 Nick Reynolds and Jack Whatling, “The Plot to Destroy Ukraine,” RUSI, February 15, 2022.
69 U.S. Congress, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Worldwide Threats, 117th Cong., March 8, 2022.
70 See Mark Galeotti, “The West Thinks Putin Is Russia’s Spymaster. But Are the Spies Controlling Him?” Guardian,
June 20, 2019; Todd Prince, “Eyeing Ukraine, Putin Huddles in a Tight, Hawkish Circle,” RFE/RL, February 15, 2022;
Henry Foy and John Paul Rathbone, “Intelligence Failures Hamper Russia’s Ukraine Mission,” Financial Times,
March 1, 2022; David V. Gioe and Huw Dylan, “Putin’s KGB Past Didn’t Help Him with Intelligence on Ukraine,”
Washington Post, March 17, 2022; Julian E. Barnes, Lara Jakes, and John Ismay, “U.S. Intelligence Suggests That
Putin’s Advisors Misinformed Him on Ukraine,” New York Times, March 30, 2022; Steve Holland and Andrea Shalal,
“Putin Misled by ‘Yes Men’ in Military Afraid to Tell Him the Truth, White House and EU Officials Say,” Reuters,
March 31, 2022.
71 Irina Borogan and Andrei Soldatov, “Putin Places Spies Under House Arrest,” CEPA, March 11, 2022; Isaac
Chotiner, “The Purges in Putin’s Shrinking Inner Circle,” New Yorker, March 22, 2022.
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to potentially unrealistic assumptions.72 Observers believe this circle includes Minister of Defense
Sergei Shoigu, who may have overstated the Russian military’s capabilities.73
Subsequent Developments
Since early March 2022, Russian forces have attempted to adapt to the reality of effective
Ukrainian resistance. Analysts have noted some changes in Russian military operations, including
more coordination between units and a greater capacity to operate as combined arms formations,
increased air support, and significantly higher levels of artillery and rocket artillery fire.74 Russian
forces made slow, incremental advances but continued to suffer heavy losses in both personnel
and equipment.75 By March 7, 2022, U.S. officials believed Russia had committed “nearly 100
percent” of its available forces into Ukraine.76 Observers also noted that the Russian VKS
increased its number of sorties and operations, although most missions appeared to employ
unguided weaponry rather than PGMs.77 The increased sortie rate also meant heavier losses for
the VKS, including some of its most advanced helicopter, fighter, and fighter-bombers.78
At this stage of the conflict, instead of concentrating on one area of operations, the Russian
military appeared to continue multiple lines of advance.79 In the north, Russian forces attempted
to break through Ukrainian defenses around Kyiv, from both the northwest and the east. In the
east, Russian forces surrounded Kharkiv and attacked toward Izyum. In the south, Russian forces
conducted an offensive to seize Mykolaiv in the southwest and Mariupol in the southeast.80 Each
advance appeared to compete against the others for increasingly limited reinforcements, logistics,
and air support. Gradually, most Russian offensives began to stall due to a number of factors,
including continued logistics issues, mounting casualties and a lack of available reinforcements,
and increasing Ukrainian counterattacks.81

72 Analysts have debated the balance between advisers providing false or misleading information to Putin and the
leadership itself imposing unrealistic objectives and limitations onto the Russian government and military. Adam E.
Casey and Seva Gunitsky, “The Bully in the Bubble,” Foreign Affairs, February 4, 2022; Mark Galeotti, “The Personal
Politics of Putin’s Security Council Meeting,” Moscow Times, February 22, 2022; Amanda Taub, “Putin Seems to
Sideline Advisers on Ukraine, Taking a Political Risk,” New York Times, March 1, 2022.
73 Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, “The Man Behind Putin’s Military,” Foreign Affairs, February 26, 2022;
Thomas Grove, “Russia’s Military Chief Promised Quick Victory in Ukraine, But Now Faces a Potential Quagmire,”
Wall Street Journal, March 6, 2022.
74 Steven Erlanger, “After a Fumbled Start, Russian Forces Hit Harder in Ukraine,” New York Times, February 28,
2022; Dan Lamothe, “Russia’s Invasion Began with Precision Missiles, But Weapons Are Changing as Siege War
Begins,” Washington Post, March 1, 2022.
75 Griff Witte et al., “After More Than Two Weeks of War, the Russian Military Grinds Forward at a Heavy Cost,”
Washington Post, March 11, 2022.
76 Quint Forgey, “Putin Sends ‘Nearly 100 Percent’ of Russian Forces at Border into Ukraine,” Politico, March 7,
2022.
77 Alan Cullison and Alexander Osipovich, “Russian General Is Killed in Ukraine as Airstrikes Intensify,” Wall Street
Journal, March 11, 2022; Abraham Mahsie, “Air War Ramps Up in Russia-Ukraine Conflict as Russian PGMs Run
Out,” Air Force Magazine, March 21, 2022; Dan Lamothe, “Russian Air Force Action Increases Despite Flood of
Antiaircraft Missiles into Ukraine,” Washington Post, March 22, 2022.
78 David Axe, “The Russian Air Force Is Losing Its Best Jets over Ukraine,” Forbes, March 29, 2022.
79 For specific tracking of the conflict, see Konrad Muzyka, “Ukraine Conflict Monitor,” Rochan Consulting.
80 Financial Times, “How Russia’s Mistakes and Ukrainian Resistance Altered Putin’s War,” March 18, 2022.
81 John Paul Rathbone, Sam Jones, and Daniel Dombey, “Why Russia Is Deploying More Troops to Ukraine,”
Financial Times, March 17, 2022; Andrew E. Kramer, “Ukraine’s Troops Begin a Counteroffensive That Alters Shape
of the Battle with Russia,” March 24, 2022; Alex Horton, “Why Russian Troops Are Using Tree Branches for
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Throughout mid-March 2022, the Ukrainian military conducted effective counterattacks across
most axes of advance, defeating repeated Russian offensives outside of Kyiv, outside of Kharkiv
and Sumy, and in Mykolaiv.82 Ukraine also attacked captured infrastructure, such as the airbase in
Kherson and the port of Berdyansk, and destroyed key Russian assets.83
Russia has been accused of repeated war crimes by Ukraine, nongovernmental organizations,
multiple states, and the Biden Administration.84 Russian forces allegedly have targeted and
bombed civilian targets, including a maternity hospital and theater in Mariupol, regional
administration offices in Mykolaiv, and a railway station in Kramatorsk. Russian forces also have
been accused of indiscriminate killings, particularly after the discovery of mass graves and
murdered civilians following the Russian military’s withdrawal from the Kyiv suburb of Bucha.85
Although it is not yet possible to tally the total number of Ukrainian civilians killed, dozens and
sometimes hundreds of victims reportedly have been identified at various targeted locations or
mass graves. Ukrainian officials say that in Mariupol, which has been under sustained attack,
civilian deaths could number in the thousands.86
Russian Shift in Objectives and Operations
Toward the end of March 2022, Russian offensives around Kyiv stalled. Ukrainian forces
launched multiple sustained counteroffensives and pushed back Russian forces.87 Observers noted
that, after failing to achieve a decisive victory quickly, Russia was reevaluating its objectives and
strategy toward achieving territorial gains in the south and east of Ukraine.88 After Kyiv, one of
Russia’s key objectives appeared to be the coastal city of Mariupol.89 On March 25, the Russian

Camouflage in Ukraine,” Washington Post, March 30, 2022; Stephen Fidler and Thomas Grove, “Behind the Front
Lines, Russia’s Military Struggles to Supply Its Forces,” Wall Street Journal, April 1, 2022.
82 Yaroslav Trofimov, “A Ukrainian Town Deals Russia One of the War’s Most Decisive Routs,” Wall Street Journal,
March 16, 2022; Yaroslav Trofimov, “Ukrainian Counteroffensive near Mykolaiv Relieves Strategic Port City,” Wall
Street Journal, March 18, 2022; David Stern et al., “Ukraine Claims It Had Retaken Key Town Outside Kyiv, as
Defenses Hold Against Fierce Russian Onslaught,” Washington Post, March 22, 2022.
83 Most analysts believe Ukraine launched Tochka-U short-range ballistic missile systems during the attacks on
Kherson Airbase and the port of Berdyansk. Analysts cite this occurrence as another failure of the VKS to target and
destroy such key strategic weapon systems. Joseph Trevithick and Tyler Rogoway, “Barrage Leaves Russian-Occupied
Kherson Airbase in Flames,” The Drive, March 15, 2022; Andrew Carey et al., “Ukrainians Claim to Have Destroyed
Large Russian Warship in Berdyansk,” CNN, March 25, 2022.
84 International Criminal Court (ICC), Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Karim A. A. Khan QC, on the Situation in
Ukraine: Receipt of Referrals from 39 States Parties and the Opening of an Investigation, March 2, 2022; Steve
Holland, “U.S. Begins Collecting Material for Russia War Crimes Inquiry,” Reuters, March 7, 2022.
85 Alan Cullison, “Russian Airstrike Hits Maternity Hospital in Ukrainian City of Mariupol,” Wall Street Journal,
March 10, 2022; Carlotta Gall and Andrew E. Kramer, “In Kyiv Suburb, ‘They Shot Everyone They Saw,’” New York
Times, April 3, 2022; Max Bearak and Louisa Loveluck, “In Bucha, the Scope of Russian Barbarity is Coming Into
Focus,” Washington Post, April 6, 2022; Carlotta Gall and Daniel Berehulak, “Bucha’s Month of Terror,” New York
Times, April 11, 2022.
86 Yuras Karmanau, Adam Schreck, and Cara Anna, “Mariupol Mayor Says Siege Has Killed More Than 10k
Civilians,” AP, April 12, 2022.
87 Andrew E. Kramer, “In Kyiv Suburb, Ukrainian Military Claims a Big Prize,” New York Times, March 29, 2022;
John Paul Rathbone, Roman Olearchyk, and Henry Foy, “Ukraine Uses Guerrilla Counter-Attacks to Take Fight to
Russia,” Financial Times, March 31, 2022.
88 Michael R. Gordon and Alex Leary, “Russia, Failing to Achieve Early Victory in Ukraine, Is Seen Shifting to ‘Plan
B,’” Wall Street Journal, March 20, 2022.
89 Alan Cullison, Brett Forrest, and Bojan Pancevski, “Russia Ramps Up Ukraine Attacks in Effort to Seize
Strategically Key Port City,” Wall Street Journal, March 10, 2022.
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Ministry of Defense held a press conference asserting that Russia had mostly met its initial
objectives and would move on to the second phase of the operation, focusing on eastern Ukraine,
including the Donbas.90 Russia soon announced it was withdrawing forces from around Kyiv and
Chernihiv; analysts speculated that this was aimed at allowing the redeployment of units for
further offensives in the east.91 U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan stated on April 4,
2022, “Russia is repositioning its forces to concentrate its offensive operations in eastern and
parts of southern Ukraine.... All indications are that Russia will seek to surround and overwhelm
Ukrainian forces in eastern Ukraine.”92
Mariupol apparently has become a key Russian objective. Russian forces have gradually
surrounded and advanced into Mariupol against stiff Ukrainian resistance.93 Russia has employed
artillery, rocket artillery, and air attacks to defeat the Ukrainian defenders of Mariupol.94 Russia’s
effort to seize the city has benefited from Russia appearing to shift operations away from
attempting to seize all of the Kherson region (which includes Mykolaiv).95
Observers note that Russia also appears to be redirecting forces to support operations in the east
to cut off Ukrainian military units in the Donbas.96 On April 12, President Putin stated that
Russia’s “military operation will continue until its full completion” but said, “Our goal is to help
the people in the Donbas, who feel their unbreakable bond with Russia.”97 Consequently, the
Russian military is likely reinforcing units (many of which reportedly have sustained heavy
personnel and equipment losses) and expected to focus on linking up Russian units advancing
from the northeast (moving south from Kharkiv) with units moving north from the coast (if they
capture Mariupol).98 The terrain favors Russian forces, with its advantages in armored and
artillery units, and makes it more difficult for Ukrainian forces to conduct guerrilla-style attacks.99
Russia has increased its use of long-range PGMs against targets in western Ukraine, but analysts
have not seen indications of the VKS attempting to impose further air superiority.100 Russia may

90 Konrad Muzyka, “Ukraine Conflict Monitor: March 25, 2022,” Rochan Consulting, March 26, 2022.
91 Jim Sciutto, “U.S. Intel Assess ‘Major’ Strategy Shift by Russia as It Moves Some Forces away from Kyiv,” CNN,
March 31, 2022; David Axe, “Ukraine’s Best Tank Brigade Has Won the Battle for Chernihiv,” Forbes, March 31,
2022; Anjali Singhvi et al., “How Kyiv Has Withstood Russia’s Attacks,” New York Times, April 2, 2022.
92 White House, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan,” press
briefing, April 4, 2022.
93 Bermet Talant, “Why Is Mariupol So Important to Russian Forces?” Guardian, March 22, 2022.
94 Valerie Hopkins, Marc Santora, and Catherine Porter, “Russia Broadens Mariupol Assault as Signs of Stalemate
Take Shape,” New York Times, March 20, 2022.
95 Nick Paton Walsh et al., “Russia Could Be Losing Ground in Battle for Mykolaiv, But It Still Seeks to Crush What It
Cannot Have,” CNN, March 21, 2022.
96 The Joint Forces Operation (JFO) is Ukraine’s term for its military operation against the Russian-controlled Donetsk
and Luhansk People’s Republics. Most analysts consider Ukrainian military forces in the JFO to be Ukraine’s best
units. Barbara Starr et al., “Russia Shifting Focus to Show a Victory by Early May in Eastern Ukraine, U.S. Officials
Say,” CNN, April 2, 2022.
97 Anton Troianovski, “Putin Says Peace Talks Are at a ‘Dead End’ and Calls Atrocities in Bucha ‘Fake,’” New York
Times, April 12, 2022.
98 Konrad Muzyka, “Ukraine Conflict Monitor: April 3, 2022,” Rochan Consulting, April 4, 2022.
99 Liz Sly and Dan Lamothe, “Battles May Be Tougher for Ukrainians as War Shifts to Wide-Open Terrain in East,”
Washington Post, April 9, 2022; Jack Watling, “Why the Battle for Donbas Will Be Very Different from the Assault on
Kyiv,” Guardian, April 9, 2022.
100 Natalia Zinets and Mari Saito, “Multiple Rockets Hit Lviv City in Western Ukraine,” Reuters, March 26, 2022;
Thomas Grove, Evan Gershkovich, and Brett Forrest, “Ukraine and Russia Prepare for Talks in Turkey as Russian
Missiles Hit Cities,” Wall Street Journal, March 28, 2022.
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focus further long-range PGM strikes against the Ukrainian defense industry in an attempt to
cripple it and undermine the Ukrainian military’s long-term capability.
Outlook
In the coming weeks, Russia is likely to continue to reconsolidate its forces for an offensive to
surround and cut off Ukrainian forces in the east.101 Russia may try to reinforce its control of
Kherson to ensure water supplies to Crimea and the rest of the southern coast, including
Mariupol. Few expect Russia to agree to a political settlement or cease-fire unless it believes it
has realized enough territorial gains to achieve its revised objectives and present a victorious
narrative to domestic audiences. Russia’s redeployment of forces away from Kyiv and toward
eastern Ukraine likely indicates the Russian military’s need to rest and resupply after using most
of its combat-effective units. Analysts question whether Russia has enough combat-effective units
to achieve its political objectives without a national mobilization, the calling up of reserves, and
the further use of conscripts in combat.102 Analysts also expect Russia to continue its use of
indiscriminate bombing, using both airpower and missile strikes, likely leading to continued
civilian casualties and accusations of war crimes.
Although Ukraine has been successful at defending against Russian advances and launched some
counterattacks, it is unclear whether the Ukrainian military will have the resources or capabilities
to prevent an encirclement of its forces in the east.
Congress is likely to continue to track these developments closely, especially as it considers U.S.
and international efforts to support Ukraine militarily and respond to events on the ground.

Author Information

Andrew S. Bowen

Analyst in Russian and European Affairs

101 Felicia Schwartz, Roman Olearchyk, and Sam Jones, “U.S. and Kyiv Warn of New Russian Offensive in Eastern
Ukraine,” Financial Times, April 11, 2022.
102 Department of Defense, “Senior Defense Official Holds a Background Briefing,” press release, April 8, 2022.
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