China’s Role in the Exploitation of Global
April 12, 2022
Fisheries
Bruce Vaughn,
China has emerged as the world’s largest exploiter of fisheries on a global, not just regional,
Coordinator
scale. Chinese fleets are active in waters far from China’s shores, and the growth in their harvests
Specialist in Asian Affairs
threatens to worsen the already dire depletion in global fisheries. China leads the world in

seafood production from aquaculture, inland (freshwater) fisheries, and marine fisheries. The
Ben Dolven, Coordinator
expansion and modernization of fisheries is a key part of China’s broader industrial policy goals
Specialist in Asian Affairs
of upgrading their agricultural industries and improving domestic food security. China has

developed the world’s largest fishing fleet of vessels operating in domestic and neighboring
coastal inshore and offshore areas, as well as a distant-water fleet (DWF) active in many parts of

the world. China is a major hub for value-added processing in seafood supply chains and it is the
world’s largest seafood processor; much of what China processes is exported to other countries. China is also the largest
importer and producer of fishmeal for use in aquaculture. The magnitude of China’s seafood production and consumption has
implications for international trade, fisheries conservation and management, and allocation of fishery resources among
fishing and coastal nations. Many in Congress are interested in China’s involvement in fisheries around the world because of
efforts to conserve marine resources globally, and the fishing industry’s intersection with regional conflicts and transnational
criminal activities that impact U.S. national security.
China’s fishing fleets have been implicated in illegal fishing activity in many parts of the world, and China is a leading
country responsible for Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing. The decline in China’s own coastal fisheries
from overfishing and habitat degradation has led, in part, to Beijing developing the world’s largest aquaculture industry and
DWF. Limits to China’s inshore fisheries also contributed to an increase in aquaculture production, measures to constrain
domestic inshore fisheries (increased regulation and curtailment of some subsidies), an increase in fishing in disputed areas
and adjacent nations’ waters, and an expansion of the DWF to other parts of the world. The expansion of the marine sector in
China is also driven by China’s broader industrial policy and efforts to improve domestic food security. China also uses its
fishing fleet to further geopolitical objectives. The expansion of China’s fishing interests is contributing to conflicts between
China and other countries who seek to protect their national fishing interests and to conserve fish stocks.
Congress and successive administrations have taken a number of actions to combat IUU fishing. These actions attempt to
influence the behavior of fishing fleets through international agreements and trade because most IUU activities occur outside
of U.S. jurisdiction. Many of these actions are applied to IUU fishing generally and applicable to illegal activities associated
with Chinese fleets and fishing companies. U.S. efforts to combat IUU fishing have included enforcement agreements, trade
monitoring, international treaties and agreements, and efforts to promote resource sustainability.
As Congress considers China’s maritime ambitions and the depletion of global fisheries, it may consider the ways in which
Chinese fishing—both legal and illegal—has affected global fisheries stocks. The U.S. policy response to IUU fishing and
China involves two general areas: the review of existing laws and administration efforts to improve efficacy, and the
identification of additional authorities that may be needed to combat IUU fishing activities. Given the prominent role of the
Chinese DWF in many regional and global fisheries, some have questioned whether U.S. actions should focus on the
behavior of China’s fishing fleets or continue to take a more general approach to combating IUU activity. Some potential
lines of effort to bolster global fisheries management and combat IUU fishing include improving coordination of U.S. agency
efforts, seafood traceability, surveillance and enforcement, and supporting existing international agreements. Related efforts
may include providing assistance to countries to enforce regional fishery management organization agreements and national
laws related to IUU fishing, and supporting efforts at the World Trade Organization (WTO) to negotiate reductions in
fisheries subsides.
Seafood obtained from IUU fishing feeds directly into the flow of seafood traded throughout the world and imported into the
United States. The United States is the largest importer of seafood by value and some analysts estimate that over 90% of the
seafood consumed in the United States is imported. According to some estimates, 11% of the total U.S. imports (valued at
$2.4 billion) were obtained from IUU fishing. The International Trade Commission estimates that China is the largest single
source of U.S. seafood imports from IUU fishing.
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Introduction
Illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing and the growing number of overfished global
fish stocks have raised environmental and national security issues for Congress and successive
U.S. Administrations (refer to the Appendix for IUU fishing definitions). In 2019, a
nongovernmental organization-led initiative (the Global Initiative Against Transnational Crime)
developed an IUU Fishing Index that identified China as the overall worst-scoring coastal country
(out of 152 total countries) with regard to IUU fishing practices.1 By a wide measure, China is the
largest single contributor to these concerns because of the scale, range, and behavior of its fishing
fleets. A recent Foreign Policy report states:
Though China isn’t alone in its destructive fishing practices, it stands apart by virtue of its
sheer size and the extent to which it pushes its highly subsidized fleet across the world’s
oceans. It’s also the only country whose fishing fleet has a geopolitical mission, taking
over weaker countries’ waters and expanding Beijing’s maritime territorial ambitions.2
Declining domestic fish stocks and an expanding fishing fleet encouraged by national policies are
two factors that may be driving IUU fishing by Chinese actors. A significant portion of China’s
domestic fish stocks have been depleted by overfishing and degradation of coastal habitat. As
production of inshore fisheries decreased, managers have attempted to rebuild domestic stocks by
employing more restrictive measures and regulations and limits to some subsidies. Natural and
regulatory constraints on inshore fisheries prompted China to adopt policies that encourage
development of aquaculture, fishing in neighboring jurisdictions, and expansion of distant-water
fisheries.3 China now leads the world in aquaculture production and distant-water landings of
fish.4 An apparent consequence of the expansion of China’s offshore fleet is an increase in illegal
fishing by China in many parts of the world.5
Addressing fisheries is a key component of China’s broader industrial policy goals of upgrading
China’s agricultural industries and improving domestic food security.6 Further expansion of
China’s aquaculture and distant-water fisheries are needed to satisfy increasing domestic
consumer demand, maintain employment in fishing and processing sectors, and to sustain export
markets. Demand for relatively low-valued fish is also likely to increase to support production
from aquaculture. Low-valued species are used to produce fishmeal and are a sometimes essential
ingredient of fish feed.
Congress and successive administrations have taken a number of actions to combat IUU fishing
including enforcement agreements with other countries, trade monitoring, participation in
international treaties and agreements, and general efforts to promote resource sustainability.
Congress may consider whether U.S. policies need to focus on China’s fishing activities because

1 The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and Poseidon Aquatic Research Management, “The
Illegal Unreported and Unregulated Fishing Index,” January 2019, https://globalinitiative.net.
2 Christopher Pala, “China’s Monster Fishing Fleet,” Foreign Policy, November 30, 2020.
3 Tabitha Grace Mallory, “Testimony Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,” January 26,
2012.
4 Fish landings are the catches of marine fish landed in foreign or domestic ports. Fisheries landings are subject to
changes in market demand and prices as well as long-term fish stock sustainability concerns.
5 Blake Herzinger, “China Is Fishing for Trouble at Sea,” Foreign Policy, November 20, 2020.
6 Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “ 十三五全国远洋渔业发展规划 (13th
Five-Year National Fishing Industry Development Plan),” December 21, 2017, http://www.moa.gov.cn/gk/ghjh_1/
201712/t20171227_6128624.htm.
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of its dominant role in many distant-water fisheries, or whether a more general approach to IUU
fishing that builds on current efforts is warranted.
After a brief overview of the state of the current global fisheries and international and regional
fisheries management, this report will examine China’s fishing practices, including IUU activities
and distant-water fishing in select regions. There is also a discussion of potential issues for
Congress, including U.S. responses to IUU fishing.
Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing
National and international efforts to manage fisheries are weakened by Il egal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU)
fishing, both within Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) and on the high seas. IUU fishing may diminish the benefits
of fisheries management and contribute to overfishing. IUU fishing generally refers to fishing activities that violate
national laws or international fisheries conservation and management measures. For example, licensed vessels may
operate in violation of national laws within EEZs, misreport harvest, or not comply with regional fisheries
management organization (RFMO) measures in high seas areas outside of national EEZs. Unlicensed vessels may
operate il egally within EEZs, or participate in unregulated fishing in areas managed by RFMOs (Figure 1). IUU
operations may violate basic safety standards and deny crew members’ fundamental rights, such as agreed-on
terms and conditions of their labor. IUU fishing is also sometimes associated with other il egal activities such as
drug trafficking, labor exploitation, and organized crime. However, the United Nations Food and Agriculture
Organization and U.S. definitions of IUU fishing are specific to fisheries laws and resources while other types of
il egal activities are subject to other national laws and international agreements.
According to the National Intelligence Council, IUU fishing, along with surging worldwide demand for seafood and
declining ocean health, pose an existential threat to global fisheries.7 Precise estimates of the global scale of IUU
fishing are difficult to quantify in financial terms, but the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
recognizes that “there is little disagreement that it is in the bil ions, or even tens of bil ions, of dol ars each year.”8
One recent study estimated that gross revenues associated with unreported fish catches worldwide potentially
generate $9 bil ion to $17 bil ion in il icit proceeds annually; the study further estimated corresponding economic
impact losses due to the diversion of fish from the legitimate trade as costing $26 bil ion to $50 bil ion annually
and potential losses to countries’ tax revenues worth approximately $2 bil ion to $4 bil ion annually.9
IUU activities can contribute to overfishing, deplete protected resources (e.g., endangered species and marine
mammals), and frustrate efforts to assess and manage marine populations. International cooperation is necessary
to manage many fish stocks because they move among different national zones of jurisdiction and the high seas.
Overfishing of the stock in one area affects the stock condition of the species in other parts of its range. IUU
fishing presents wide-ranging management and conservation challenges at both national and international levels.
Actions to combat IUU fishing activities are often hindered by the large areas in which fishing takes place, the lack
of resources for adequate enforcement, weak governance institutions, and inadequate international cooperation.

7 National Intelligence Council, Global Implication of Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing, NIC WP
2016-02, September 19, 2016.
8 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), “Understanding Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated
Fishing,” undated webpage, https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/insight/understanding-illegal-unreported-and-unregulated-
fishing.
9 U.R. Sumaila et al., “Illicit Trade in Marine Fish Catch and its Effects on Ecosystems and People Worldwide,”
Science Advances, Vol. 6, No. 9, February 26, 2020, eaaz3801, pp. 1-7. According to an earlier estimate, annual global
fisheries losses due to illegally caught fish amounted to approximately $10 to $23.5 billion annually. See David J.
Agnew et al., “Estimating the Worldwide Extent of Illegal Fishing,” PLoS ONE, vol. 4, iss. 2, February 25, 2009, pp. 1-
8. See also C. Nellemann, ed., The Rise of Environmental Crime—A Growing Threat to Natural Resource Peace,
Development, and Security, United Nations Environmental Programme and INTERPOL Rapid Response Assessment,
2016, p. 20.
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Figure 1. IUU Fishing Examples

Source: MRAG, Review of Impacts of Il egal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing on Developing Countries,
2005, at http://transparentsea.co/images/5/58/Il egal[1]fishing-mrag-report.pdf.
IUU activity undermines efforts to conserve and manage stocks and provides an unfair advantage to those entities
that engage in these activities. IUU fishing also “adversely impacts legitimate commercial fishers.”10 The decline of
common or shared stocks may then lead to lower harvests for legitimate fishermen. Vessels conducting IUU
fishing avoid operational costs by not complying with regulatory requirements such as gear restrictions, closed
areas, or harvest limits. Those fishing legally may be harmed by lower catch rates and higher associated fishing
costs, and shore-based businesses such as processors, dealers, and vendors may be harmed by the decrease in
supplies of fish. The combined effects of overfishing and disruption of traditional markets may contribute to food
scarcity. In addition, the harm to local and national economies may increase tensions within and between
countries and contribute to broader conflicts. Legal fishing could be further affected as rebuilding programs are
implemented and catches are reduced for fishermen who are fishing legally, while IUU related activity may
continue unabated and potentially the ratio of fish caught by IUU activities versus legal activities could increase.
Global Fisheries Overview
Most fish are harvested in areas under national jurisdiction; however, many fish stocks move
among internal waters (e.g., bays, such as the Chesapeake),11 territorial waters, Exclusive
Economic Zones (EEZs),12 and the high seas. The following provides a brief overview of global
marine fisheries production and management.
Marine Fisheries Production
Global fisheries provide economic benefits to fishing and processing sectors and are a source of
high quality protein to billions of people.13 From 1961 to 2017, global fish consumption grew by

10 “Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing,” PEW, February 25, 2013.
11 United Nations, Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 1958, at https://www.gc.noaa.gov/
documents/8_1_1958_territorial_sea.pdf. The Convention entered into force on September 10, 1964.
12 The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) includes the waters beyond and adjacent to territorial waters and extends up to
200 nautical miles as measured from the baseline (generally coastal states’ coastline). The high seas are comprised of
all parts of the sea that are not included in the EEZ, the territorial sea, or internal waters of a coastal state.
13 In this context fish includes marine invertebrates (shellfish) such as crustaceans, mollusks and others, but not marine
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an average annual rate of 3.1%, which was approximately twice the annual world population
growth rate of 1.6% during this period. Fish accounted for 17% of the global population’s intake
of animal protein in 2017.
In 2018, total world production, including inland capture fisheries, aquaculture, and marine
capture fisheries, was 179 million tons (mt) with a sale value of $401 billion.14 Of the overall
total, approximately 156 mt were used for human consumption and 22 mt were used to produce
fishmeal, fish oil, and other non-food uses. Aquaculture accounted for 46% of the total production
and 52% of fish for human consumption.15 Demand for low-valued fish to produce fishmeal and
oil is driven by the need to produce food for fish raised on farms. The need for fishmeal and oil
encourages targeting and retention of species of low value for human consumption and further
geographic expansion of the marine fishing sector. Since 1986, marine catch has been relatively
stable with landings ranging from 78 and 84 mt.16 However, wild production has varied by
species and region depending on environmental conditions, fishing pressure, and overfishing.
During the same period, aquaculture from both freshwater and marine sources increased from 15
to 84 mt.17
Exploitation of Fish Stocks
The number of fish stocks considered to be either fully exploited or overexploited has grown over
the last two decades (Figure 2). Secretary General of the United Nations António Guterres stated
in December 2020:
Overfishing must stop … marine reserves must increase significantly; and coastal areas
need greater protection.… We need urgent action on a global scale to … protect the world’s
seas and oceans from the many pressures they face.18
According to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO):
The state of marine fisheries resources … has continued to decline. The proportion of fish
stocks that are within biologically sustainable levels decreased from 90% in 1974 to 65.8%
in 2017 … with 59.6% classified as being maximally sustainably fished … the percentage
of stocks fished at biologically unsustainable levels increased from 10% in 1974 to 34.2%
in 2017.19
A study of the biomass of 1,300 species of marine fish and invertebrates over 60 years discovered
global declines of many traditional and high-demand species.20 Further, they reported that the
biomass of most major fisheries are “well below the level that can produce optimal caches.”21 The

plants.
14 United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, “The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2020:
Sustainability in Action,” p. 2, https://www.fao.org/3/ca9229en/ca9229en.pdf. Hereinafter cited as FAO, 2020.
15 FAO, 2020, p. 2.
16 FAO, 2020, p. 3.
17 FAO, 2020, p. 3.
18 António Guterres, “Secretary General’s Address at Columbia University: ‘The State of the Planet,’” United Nations,
December 2, 2020, https://www.un.org/sg/en/content.
19 FAO, 2020, p. 2.
20 M.L.D. Palomares et al., “Fishery Biomass Trends of Exploited Fish Populations in Marine Ecoregions, Climatic
Zones and Ocean Basins,” Journal of Estuarine, Coastal and Shelf Science, September 2020.
21 M.L.D Palomares, “Popular Seafood Species in Sharp Decline Around the World,” The Sea Around US: Fisheries,
Ecosystems & Biodiversity, July 21, 2020. http://www.seaaroundus.org.
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study noted that its findings support anecdotal evidence of systematic and widespread overfishing
of the coastal and continental shelf waters in much of the world over the past 60 years.22
Figure 2. Status of World Fish Stocks

Source: United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2020:
Sustainability in Action, 2020, at https://doi.org/10.4060/ca9229en; adapted by CRS.
According to some observers, distant-water fishing “is an opaque topic that is difficult to study
due to data limitations, yet these fleets are likely having a significant impact on marine fishery
resources.”23 The top five distant water fleets (DWFs)24—China (38%), Taiwan (22%), Japan
(10%), South Korea (10%), and Spain (10%)—account for 90% of all DWFs,25 and primarily
operate in the Pacific Ocean and off the coasts of East and West Africa. A recent Stimson Center
report argues
the current fishing industry is unsustainable. The challenges that [distant-water fishing]
fleets pose to coastal countries’ resources and the fishing industry, particularly the
expanding Chinese fleet, will persist unless there is a significant global shift towards
sustained fisheries management.26
China’s, and other nations’, exploitation of global fish stocks occur within a global context of
increased stress on fisheries due to the impacts of climate change. By some estimates, climate
change impacts are projected to decrease maximum catch potential in the world’s EEZs between

22 M.L.D. Palomares, et al., “Fishery Biomass Trends of Exploited Fish Populations in Marine Ecoregions, Climate
Zones and Ocean Basins,” Journal of Estuarine, Coastal and Shelf Science, July 2020.
23 “Distant Water Fishing: Overview of Research Efforts and Current Knowledge,” California Environmental
Associates, October 2018.
24 “Distant-water fishing fleets are the fishing vessels that operate within the 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zones
(EEZs) of other countries, and less often further offshore, in what is known as the high seas.” As referenced in “What
Are Distant Water Fleets, and How Do They Affect Overfishing?” Oceana, October 21, 2013.
25 Sally Yozell and Amanda Shaver, “Shining a Light: The Need for Transparency Across Distant Water Fishing,”
Stimson, 2019.
26 Sally Yozell and Amanda Shaver, “Shining a Light: The Need for Transparency Across Distant Water Fishing,”
Stimson, 2019.
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2.8% and 12.1% by 2050 depending on different greenhouse gas emissions scenarios.27 These
impacts are expected to be more significant in tropical regions of Africa and Asia, where warming
is expected to decrease productivity.28 In addition, marine fish are shifting their regional and
global distributions in response to climate change.29
International Fisheries Management
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) established a comprehensive
international legal framework for governing the world’s oceans.30 The fisheries provisions of
UNCLOS provide the foundation for cooperative and sustainable national and international
fisheries management.31 UNCLOS articles recognize the broad authority of coastal states over
living resources within their territorial sea and EEZ to a maximum of 200 nautical miles seaward
from the baselines used to measure the territorial sea (Figure 3). In managing living resources,
coastal nations determine allowable catches and promote optimal resource use.
Figure 3. Areas of Ocean Jurisdiction

Source: Arctic Council, Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 2009 Report (Tromsø, Norway: 2009), p. 52.
UNCLOS includes provisions that address access of fishing nations to fisheries in other coastal
state EEZs. The treaty also preserves the freedom to fish on the high seas, subject to other treaty

27 United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, “Impacts of Climate Change on Fisheries and Aquaculture,”
Rome. 2018.
28 FAO, 2020, p. vii.
29 “Shifts in Species Distributions Associated with Climate Change,” Mid-Atlantic Regional Ocean Assessment,
https://roa.midatlanticocean.org/ocean-ecosystem-and-resources/status-trends-and-linkages/shifts-in-species-
distributions-associated-with-climate-change/; A. Perry et al, “Climate Change and Distribution Shifts in Marine
Fishes,” Science, June 24, 2005.
30 Division for Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea, United National Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December
1982, United Nations, December 10, 1982, http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/
convention_overview_convention.htm. Hereinafter cited as UNCLOS, 1982.
31 Although the United States has not ratified UNCLOS, in practice it follows most international norms codified in the
treaty, especially those related to fisheries.
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obligations and conveys an obligation to cooperate in conserving and managing high seas living
resources. Each country is responsible for keeping a register of ships (including fishing vessels)
that fly its flag and for exercising jurisdiction over its vessels and crew. Provisions specific to
fisheries and marine species include utilization of living resources (Article 62), transboundary
and straddling stocks (Article 63),32 highly migratory stocks (Article 64),33 and anadromous
stocks34 (Article 66).35 Additional international treaties and agreements have been established to
address specific fisheries management concerns (Table 1).36
Regional Fishery Management
Transboundary stocks such as straddling stocks and highly migratory species may be managed
cooperatively.
Table 1. U.S. and China Membership in Selected International Fisheries
Conventions and Agreements
International Convention or Agreement
China
United States
and Entry into Force
Party
Party
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 1982
Party
Signed, not
Senate Treaty Doc. 103-39 (November 16, 1994)
ratified
Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of UNCLOS of 10
Signed, not
Party
December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of
ratified
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (December 11,
2001)
The Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation
Non-party
Party
and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas (April 24,
2003)
International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas Rio de
Party
Party
Janeiro, (May 14, 1966)

Agreement for the Establishment of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission
Member
Non-member
(March 27, 1996)
Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish
Member
Member
Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (June 19, 2004)
1949 Inter-American Tropical Tuna Convention, original bilateral
Member
Member
convention (May 31, 1949), subsequent Antigua Convention (August 27,
2010)
Convention on the Conservation and Management of Pol ock Resources—
Party
Party
Central Bering Sea (December 8, 1995)

32 Straddling stocks occurs within the EEZs of two or more coastal States and the adjacent high seas, with a geographic
range typically limited to the continental shelf.
33 Highly migratory stocks (e.g., tuna, sharks, billfish) travel far distances and often cross domestic and international
boundaries.
34 Anadromous species live in freshwater in their early life stages and transition to the ocean to grow and mature as
adults. Anadromous species return from the ocean to their natal river or stream to spawn.
35 Related provisions include marine mammals (Article 65), rights of landlocked nations (Article 69), rights of
geographically disadvantaged nations (Article 70), non-applicability of Articles 69 and 70 (Article 71), restrictions on
transfer of rights (Article 72), enforcement by coastal nations (Article 73). Living resources on the high seas are
considered in Articles 116-120, and marine habitat protection is provided by Articles 192-196.
36 An additional example is the International Guidelines for the Management of Deep Sea Fisheries in the High Seas,
https://www.fao.org/in-action/globefish/publications/details-publication/en/c/346096/.
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International Convention or Agreement
China
United States
and Entry into Force
Party
Party
The Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources Party
Party
(April 7, 1982)
Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Il egal,
Non-party
Party
Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing (June 5, 2016)
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
Party
Party
and Flora, (July 1, 1975)
Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (May 20, 1994)
Non-member
Non-member
Convention on the Conservation and Management of the High Seas
Member
Member
Fisheries Resources in the North Pacific Ocean (July 15, 2015)
Convention on the Conservation and Management of High Seas Fishery
Member
Member
Resources in the South Pacific Ocean (August 24, 2012)
Source: United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, “Fisheries and Aquaculture Country Profiles,
China,” 2017, at https://www.fao.org/fishery/en/facp/chn?lang=en.
through bilateral or multilateral international agreements involving coastal nations through whose
waters these fish stocks range as well as any nations fishing these stocks. 37 In most regions of the
world’s oceans, fishing and coastal nations have negotiated international agreements that
establish regional fishery bodies (RFBs) to foster conservation and management of fisheries that
target these species.

37 U.N. Document, A/CONF.64/37, Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling
Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, September 8, 1995, https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?
symbol=A/CONF.164/37&Lang=E.
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Figure 4. Regional Fishery Management Organizations for Tuna
and Other Highly Migratory Species

Source: United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, Regional Fisheries Map Viewer, Fisheries and
Aquaculture Department, https://www.fao.org/figis/geoserver/factsheets/rfbs.html.
Notes: CCSBT = Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna; IATTC = Inter-American
Tropical Tuna Commission; ICCAT = International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas; IOTC =
Indian Ocean Tuna Commission; and WCPFC = Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission.

RFBs conduct activities to support international efforts to conserve fisheries that often include
collecting and analyzing data, coordinating management, and providing technical assistance and
policy development. Regional fishing management organizations (RFMOs) are a specific type of
RFB that operate under agreements that are binding upon their members. Parties to these
agreements are required to adhere to management and conservation measures developed and
agreed to by parties of the RFMO. There are 43 RFBs that provide coverage for most of the
world’s ocean and freshwater areas and 16 organizations that are RFMOs. The 16 RFMOs
manage transboundary stocks that include highly migratory species, straddling stocks, and
anadromous species. For example, the tuna RFMOs cover transboundary waters and the areas of
the high seas where the management of tuna fisheries is relevant (Figure 4). Many areas and
species are not covered by specialized RFMOs.
China Fishing Industry Overview
China has become the largest seafood producer in the world. In particular, China increased its
share of world landings from 10% in 1961 to 35% in 2018.38 In 2018, China’s total seafood
production was 62.2 mt, which was 35% of world seafood production.39 China led the world in
production from freshwater and marine aquaculture with 47.6 mt, marine capture fishery landings

38 FAO, 2020, p. 65.
39 FAO, 2020, p. 11.
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of 12.7 mt, and inland freshwater (rivers, lakes, ponds) landings of 2.0 mt. China’s marine
fisheries landings of 12.7 mt were from inshore, offshore, and distant-water fishing, and
accounted for 15% of world marine fish landings.40 Marine landings consisted of approximately
10.4 mt from China’s inshore and offshore waters, and 2.3 mt from distant-water landings.41
Figure 5. Aquaculture, Marine Fishing, and Fresh Water Fishing
in China (1980 to 2019)

Source: United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, “Fisheries and Aquaculture Country Profiles,
China,” 2017, at https://www.fao.org/fishery/en/facp/chn?lang=en.
Notes: Marine landings include inshore, offshore, and distant-water landings.
Over the last two decades, the two most significant shifts in China’s seafood industry are the
growth in aquaculture and movement of marine fishing effort from inshore to offshore and
distant-water fisheries (Figure 5).42 However, China’s marine landings declined from an average
of 13.8 mt per year between 2015 and 2017 to 12.7 mt in 2018.43 The decrease has been attributed
to lower production in inshore waters because of overfishing, stricter regulations, and a decrease

40 FAO, 2020, p. 13.
41 FAO, 2020, p. 10. China only provided details on species and fishing area for 40% of its distant-water catch. In the
absence of more complete information, the remaining 1.34 mt were entered in the FAO database under “marine fishes
not elsewhere included” in Major Fishing Area 61, the Northwest Pacific, possibly overstating the catches occurring in
this area.
42 Zhang Hongzhou, “China’s Fishing Industry: Current Status, Government Policies, and Future Prospects,” China as a
Maritime Power Conference, Arlington, VA, July 9, 2015. Inshore fishing includes inshore areas of the Bohari, Yellow
Sea, and the East China Sea; offshore fishing includes water outside of inshore areas of the East China Sea and the
South China Sea; and distant waters includes activities on the high seas and in areas under the jurisdiction of other
countries.
43 FAO, 2020, p. 10.
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in subsidies for inshore vessels.44 Overfishing and depleted coastal fish stocks appear to have led
the Chinese fishing industry to develop its DWF and to operate in more distant waters.
While estimates of the total number of vessels vary widely, China’s fishing fleet is the largest in
the world. Its fleet is diverse and ranges from small non-motorized vessels that operate in coastal
inshore areas to distant-water vessels that fish for extended periods across the world’s oceans.45
The International Trade Commission reported an estimate of China’s DWF ranging from 2,900 to
3,400 vessels.46 Another estimate identified a total of 16,966 vessels, including 12,490 observed
outside internationally recognized Chinese waters between 2017 and 2018.47 However, the report
cautioned that all of these vessels are not operating currently, simultaneously, or consistently in
other countries’ or international waters.
As the world’s largest processor, exporter, and consumer of seafood products, China is a major
hub for value-added processing in seafood supply chains. China is currently the world’s largest
seafood and fishmeal importer by volume, much of which is processed and then exported to other
countries, creating a large value-based trade surplus.48 In 2019, China exported fish and fish
products with a value of $21.6 billion, a decrease of 7% from 2018. In 2018, China’s exports
accounted for about 14% of global trade in fish and fish products.49 According to the FAO, the
decrease may be related in part to trade disputes between China and the United States and greater
domestic consumption.50
China’s seafood imports increased in 2019 both in terms of volume and value, with a 30%
increase in volume and up nearly 32% in value ($15.44 billion).51 Since 2011, China’s imports
have increased in recent years partly as a result of seafood landed in other countries that are
outsourced to China for processing. A large portion of these imports are subsequently exported as
processed products to third-country markets.

44 Yu Yani, “No Fish, Lower Subsidies—Where Next for China’s Coastal Fisheries?” China Dialogue Ocean, August
25, 2020.
45 China’s distant water fleet (DWF) operates in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans and in the Southern Ocean
surrounding Antarctica. FAO, “Fishery and Aquaculture Country Profiles, China,” 2017, at https://www.fao.org/
fishery/en/facp/chn?lang=en.
46 United States International Trade Commission (ITC), “Seafood Obtained via Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated
Fishing: U.S. Imports and Economic Impact on U.S.,” February 2021, p. 142, at https://www.usitc.gov/publications/
332/pub5168.pdf. Hereinafter cited as ITC, 2021.
47 Tabitha Mallory and Ian Ralby, “Evolution of the Fleet: A Closer Look at the Chinese Fishing Vessels off the
Galapagos,” Center for International Maritime Security, October 19, 2020, https://cimsec.org/evolution-of-the-fleet-a-
closer-look-at-the-chinese-fishing-vessels-off-the-galapagos/46116; Miren Gutierrez et al., “China’s Distant-Water
Fishing Fleet,” Overseas Development Institute, June 2020, https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-
documents/chinesedistantwaterfishing_web_1.pdf, p. 8.
48 Beatrice Crona et al., “China at a Crossroads: An Analysis of China’s Changing Seafood Production and
Consumption,” One Earth, vol. 3 (July 2020), pp. 32-44, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.oneear.2020.06.013.
49 Miren Gutierrez et al., “China’s Distant Water Fishing Fleet: Scale Impact and Governance,” Overseas Development
Institute, June 2020, https://www.odi.org.
50 FAO, 2020, p. 75.
51 Foreign Agricultural Service, USDA, Continued Seafood Import Growth, People’s Republic of China, May 8, 2020,
https://apps.fas.usda.gov/newgainapi/api/Report/DownloadReportByFileName?fileName=
Continued%20Seafood%20Import%20Growth%20in%202019_Beijing_China%20-
%20Peoples%20Republic%20of_05-08-2020.
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Analysts expect China to account for an estimated 38% of global fish consumption by 2030.52
From 1961 to 2018, China increased its share of world fish consumption from 10% to 36%.53
Although the bulk of distant-water landings are still exported, a growing portion is consumed
domestically. China has also become a large consumer of high-valued species that may not be
produced locally such as shrimp and salmon. Some analysts estimate that China’s seafood
consumption will outstrip production by 2030.54
China’s Fisheries Policies55
The growth of China’s fishing industry began in earnest following the Chinese government’s
publication of the No. 5 Central Document in 1985, which introduced measures to privatize
fishing vessels and encouraged the formation of new enterprises in aquaculture and distant-water
fishing.56 The rights of fishermen to own and operate their vessels were later codified in the 1986
Fisheries Law of the People’s Republic of China, which remains the primary statutory mechanism
in China for regulating the fishing industry.57 The privatization and expansion of China’s fishing
industry has led to significant growth in IUU fishing by China-flagged vessels, which in turn has
raised concerns regarding the sustainability of China’s fishing practices.58
Industrial Policy Support for Fisheries and Distant-Water Fishing Expansion
The Chinese government provides financial and policy support to China’s distant sea fishing,
domestic fishing, and aquaculture sectors.59 This support takes a variety of forms, including (but
not limited to) direct subsidies (e.g., fuel subsidies, vessel upgrading/replacement subsidies), tax
incentives, discounted insurance premiums, and discounts on loans used for fixed asset
investment in fisheries or new aquaculture product development.60 China reportedly provided

52 H. Zhang et al., “Seafood Consumption Patterns and Affecting Factors in Urban China,” Aquaculture Reports, March
2021.
53 FAO, p. 70.
54 B. Crona et al., “China at a Cross Roads: An Analysis of China’s Changing Seafood Production and Consumption,”
One Earth, July 2020.
55 This section authored by Michael Sutherland.
56 Ling Cao et al., “Opportunity for Marine Fisheries Reform in China,” Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences of the United States of America, vol. 114 (January 2017), pp. 435-442, https://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/
114/3/435.full.pdf.
57 For a history of subsequent revisions and amendments to 1986 Fisheries Law, see “Fisheries Law of the People’s
Republic of China,” NPC Observer, https://npcobserver.com/legislation/fisheries-law/.
58 Zhang Chun, “China Targets Distant-Water Criminals with New Fisheries Law,” China Dialogue, January 21, 2020,
https://chinadialogueocean.net/12714-china-fisheries-law-distant-water-fishing/; Whitley Saumweber and Ty Loft,
“Distant-Water Fishing Along China’s Maritime Silk Road,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, Stephenson
Ocean Security Project, July 31, 2020, https://ocean.csis.org/commentary/distant-water-fishing-along-china-s-
maritime-silk-road/.
59 Miren Gutierrez et al., China’s Distant-Water Fishing Fleet, ODI, June 2020; Whitley Saumweber and Ty Loft,
“Distant Water Fishing Along China’s Maritime Silk Road,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, Stephenson
Ocean Security Project, July 31, 2020, https://ocean.csis.org/commentary/distant-water-fishing-along-china-s-
maritime-silk-road/.
60 “2021 年渔业补贴政策是怎样的？补贴项目有哪些？(What Are the Types of Official Subsidy Policies in 2021?
What Are the Official Subsidy Programs?),” Tuliu, January 4, 2021, https://www.tuliu.com/read-130055.html; Ministry
of Agriculture and Rural Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “农业农村部公厅关于修订国内渔业捕捞和养殖
业，远洋渔业油价补贴政策调整实施地方方案的通知 (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs Notice Regarding
Domestic Fishing, Aquaculture, and Distant Sea Fishing Industry Fuel Price Subsidy Adjustment Implementation
Plan),” May 20, 2019, http://www.moa.gov.cn/nybgb/2019/201905/201906/t20190625_6319221.htm.
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$7.2 billion in subsidies to its fishing industry in 2018.61 Some analysts argue that some types of
distant-water fishing, such as squid fishing, would be unprofitable for Chinese vessel operators
without the subsidies.62 The European Union (EU), United States, South Korea, Japan, and Russia
also subsidize their fishing industries, though by amounts significantly less than China.63
Fuel price subsidies have served as a central pillar of the Chinese government’s support for the
fishing industry.64 Subsidies allowed the Chinese fishing industry to be more competitive
internationally, powering the industry’s expanding geographic reach and employment, and
lowering prices for a key source of protein. Those impacts now likely make it politically difficult
for the Chinese government to modify the subsidies.65
World Trade Organization and Fisheries Subsidies66
During the 1990s, several multilateral organizations, including the United Nations’ Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO), raised concerns regarding the impact of fisheries subsidies on overfishing and overcapacity.67
Studies found that subsidies threaten the economic and environmental sustainability of fisheries as
overcapitalization leads to the depletion of global fish stock and threatens the livelihood of communities that
depend on fisheries. In response to those concerns, World Trade Organization (WTO) members agreed to
“clarify and improve WTO disciplines on fisheries subsidies” at the 2001 Doha Ministerial Conference.68 In 2005,
the WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong issued a mandate that called for the prohibition of certain
fisheries subsidies that contribute to overcapacity and overfishing, as well as the establishment of disciplines for
those subsidies, and noted the need for special and differential treatment (SDT) for developing country members.
The Chairman of the WTO Negotiating Group on Rules introduced a first draft of rules in November 2007, but
WTO members’ lack of consensus on key issues and decline of interest in the Doha round of negotiations
reportedly slowed the negotiation process between 2010 and 2015.
The ongoing negotiations have been focused largely on the issues specified in the 2017 Ministerial Decision and
SDG Target 14.6, which states that an agreement should prohibit certain subsidies that contribute to overcapacity
and overfishing, eliminate subsides that contribute to il egal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, and that SDT for
developing and least-developed countries be an integral part of the negotiations.69 Some prohibited subsidies in
the November 2020 revised draft include subsidies for the construction, acquisition, renovation, or upgrade of
fishing vessels; subsidies for fuel, ice, or bait; and subsidies covering operating losses of fishing-related activities.
The draft also included provisions for SDT for developing countries, technical assistance and capacity building,
notification and transparency, and dispute settlement.
One longstanding issue between WTO members in the negotiations is the provisions on SDT. Developing
countries argue that SDT is needed so that they have the flexibility to provide subsidies to small and artisanal
fisheries and that any SDT should take into account the livelihood of people that depend on fisheries.70 China has

61 Philip Heijmans, “Global Fishing Talks Blow 2020 Deadline as China, India Balk,” Bloomberg, December 15, 2020.
62 Ian Urbina, “How China’s Expanding Fishing Fleet is Depleting the World’s Oceans,” August 17, 2020.
63 David Adam, “Majority of Global Fishing Subsidies ‘Harmful,’ Report Finds,” China Dialogue Ocean, November
11, 2019.
64 “China’s Fisheries Subsidies Propel Distant-Water Fleet,” Oceana, October, 2021.
65 Ling Cao et al., “Opportunity for Marine Fisheries Reform in China,” Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences of the United States of America vol. 114:3, (January 2017), 435-442,
66 This section authored by Liana Wong.
67 William E. Schrank, Introducing Fisheries Subsidies, United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization, FAO
Fisheries Technical Paper No. 437, 2003, http://www.fao.org/3/Y4647E/Y4647E00.htm.
68 World Trade Organization, “Ministerial Declaration (WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1),” Doha WTO Ministerial 2001,
November 14, 2001, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm#rules.
69 United Nations, “Goal 14: Targets and Indicators,” accessed February 11, 2021, https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal14.
WTO, “Fisheries Subsidies (WT/MIN(17)/64),” December 18, 2017.
70 Mark Godfrey, "WTO Talks Stuck on Opt-Outs for Artisinal, Developing Fisheries," Seafood Source, March 3,
2021, https://www.seafoodsource.com/news/supply-trade/wto-talks-stuck-on-opt-outs-for-artisinal-developing-
fisheries.
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supported SDT for developing countries and reasserted the need for “meaningful” SDT in the fisheries subsidies
negotiations in October 2020. Although the United States supports SDT for developing economies, it does not
support a blanket approach or complete exclusion from certain prohibitions, as there would stil be harmful
subsidies provided to the fishing sector.71 U.S. trade officials and some Members of Congress have also raised
concerns with blanket exemptions that benefit more advanced economies, like China, that stil self-designate as a
developing economy under the WTO, but may not warrant SDT flexibilities.72 Talks reportedly faltered after the
United States refused to support a proposal to exempt developing countries, including India and China, from plans
to “eliminate subsidies of fishing activities that are linked to overcapacity and overfishing.”73
Although subsidies for fisheries development have persisted, the Chinese government appears to
recognize the need to rein in the growth of its fishing fleet and seems to be taking steps to
consolidate the fishing industry under the control of larger firms and operators. In 2017, China’s
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs (MARA) published the “13th Five-Year National
Fishing Industry Development Plan,” a planning document outlining modernization and reform
goals for China’s fishing sector during China’s 13th Five-Year Plan cycle (2016-2020).74 A central
theme of the document was the need for China to shift away from a focus on pure expansion of
overseas fishing operations and toward downsizing and upgrading existing fleets and enterprises.
The Plan called for raising market entry standards for small and medium enterprises operating
fishing vessels, and established a target of reducing the overall size of China’s DWF to 3,000
registered vessels by the end of 2020. The government introduced several ship dismantling and
retirement subsidy programs in an effort to meet this target, but it is unclear if the target was
met.75
The 13th Five-Year National Fishing Industry Development Plan’s other central focus is
expanding investment in overseas fishing capacity. It specifically outlines goals of establishing
new overseas tuna and squid fisheries worldwide using what the document calls a “Base + Boat”
model of capacity building. The plan also highlights China’s Belt and Road Initiative as a
framework under which MARA will pursue bilateral fisheries cooperation agreements with other
countries. Additionally, the Plan calls for the construction of three to five national offshore fishing
bases that can facilitate, among other things, “fishing, processing, logistics and trade, ship
maintenance, and personnel training” to improve fisheries trade with countries that have signed
on to cooperate with “One Belt, One Road.”
In March 2021, the Chinese government published its 14th Five-Year Plan (FYP), which includes
several sections outlining broad goals for the development of China’s local and distant-water
fishing industries through 2025. Although the Article 23 of the 14th FYP includes references to the
construction of “sustainable pelagic fisheries” building a “sustainable marine ecological

71 U.S. Trade Representative, "Ambassador Katherine Tai's Remarks at WTO Ministerial meeting on the Fisheries
Subsidies Negotiations," press release, July 2021, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/speeches-and-
remarks/2021/july/ambassador-katherine-tais-remarks-wto-ministerial-meeting-fisheries-subsidies-negotiations.
72 CRS Report R45417, World Trade Organization: Overview and Future Direction, by Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs and
Rachel F. Fefer.
73 Bryce Baschuk, “A Once Promising Global Deal to Prevent Overfishing Runs Aground,” Bloomberg, December 9,
2020.
74 Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “ 十三五全国远洋渔业发展规划 (13th
Five-Year National Fishing Industry Development Plan),” December 21, 2017, http://www.moa.gov.cn/gk/ghjh_1/
201712/t20171227_6128624.htm.
75 Ministry of Finance of the People’s Republic of China, “船舶报废拆解和船型标准化补贴 (Ship Scrapping,
Dismantling, and Standardization Subsidies),” accessed February 12, 2021, http://jjs.mof.gov.cn/zxzyzf/
cbbfcjhcxbzhbt/.
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environment,” the plan does not appear to include any measures that address sustainability issues
related to China’s distant-water fishing activities, instead focusing largely on pollution mitigation
and biodiversity preservation goals in China’s territorial waters.76 The 14th FYP does call on the
Chinese government to increase its participation in global ocean governance and includes
language that indicates the Chinese government plans to “advance legislation concerning basic
maritime law in an orderly manner” at some point in the 14th FYP cycle (i.e., before 2025).77
China’s IUU Activities
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 2019 Report to Congress on
Improving International Fisheries Management described multiple reports of illegal fishing by
Chinese-flagged vessels, as well as numerous instances of IUU fishing by stateless vessels that
had characteristics of being Chinese-flagged vessels but for which China denied responsibility.78
These activities include illegal fishing in other nation’s EEZs, unreported or incomplete reporting
of fishing activities, and unregulated fishing by vessels flagged under other nations or fishing in
unregulated areas of the high seas. Chinese fleets have conducted IUU fishing in areas under the
jurisdiction of neighboring nations, such as in the South China Sea, Yellow Sea, and Sea of Japan,
and in distant-water fishing grounds, such as the Eastern Pacific and Western Atlantic off South
America, the Western and Central Pacific, the Southeastern Atlantic, and the Indian Ocean off
Africa.79
Coast Guard reports have noted that IUU activities in some regions are being concealed by
questionable reporting, reflagging vessels, or turning off vessel tracking instruments (Table 2).
The Chinese fleet, as well as other DWFs, reportedly take advantage of a lack of enforcement on
the high seas or in adjacent EEZs.80 RFMOs depend on national parties to police their vessels.
Often Chinese fishing practices also take advantage of the asymmetric relationship with
developing countries when negotiating agreements for access to national EEZs. In some cases
reporting, surveillance, and enforcement are inadequate to fully enforce the terms of access
agreements while in other cases agreements are subject to corruption.81 These activities have a
direct relationship to the sustainability of fishery resources, allocation of benefits among fishing
nations, and general issues related to security and international influence. Often these
arrangements hurt local fishing interests, markets, and the supply of protein to local populations.

76 Xinhua, “中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展十四个五年规划和 2035 年远景目标纲要 (Outline of the
People’s Republic of China 14th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development and Long-Range
Objectives for 2035),” March 12, 2021, translation available at https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/
t0284_14th_Five_Year_Plan_EN.pdf, p. 81.
77 Ibid., p. 82.
78 Examples described in the report include vessels with the word “CHINA” or the name of a Chinese port painted on
its side, or vessels broadcasting a Maritime Mobile Service Identity (MMSI) with maritime identification digits (MIS)
that are allocated to China via their Automatic Identification Systems (AIS). National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), Improving International Fisheries Management, Report to Congress, September 2019, pp.
22-23. Hereinafter cited as NOAA, 2019.
79 Dan Collyns, “‘It’s Terrifying’: Can Anyone Stop China’s Vast Armada of Fishing Boats?” The Guardian, August
25, 2020.
80 Brian Palmer, “High Seas: Few Rules, Fewer Sheriffs,” Natural Resources Defense Council, January 16, 2019.
81 Y. Tan and A. Graycar, “New Research Reveals the True Extent of Corruption in Fisheries,” World Economic
Forum, May 22, 2020.
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Table 2. Vessel Tracking Instruments

Automatic Identification System (AIS)
Vessel Monitoring System (VMS)
Purpose
Exchange navigation information (including
Remote monitoring of fishing vessel
vessel’s identity, type, course, speed) in real-
position in relation to regulatory areas
time, via ship-to-ship or ship-to-shore
and maritime boundaries, via a
communication.
scheduled or manual ship-to-shore
communication.
System Type/Use
Digital VHF-based radio system; Line of
Satellite-based; long-range potential
Sight (20-40 nautical miles)
Service Provider
Open, non-proprietary
Closed, proprietary protocols
Applicability
Required—per SOLAS V/19—on all oil
Required—by NOAA via its regional
tankers, passenger vessels, and cargo ships
Fisheries Councils—for vessels
(over 300 GT internationally and 500 GT
engaged in fishing certain highly
domestically).
migratory species.
Source: CRS modified from U.S. Coast Guard, “How Does AIS Compare and Contrast with VMS,” at
https://www.navcen.uscg.gov/pdf/AIS/Q_AIS_vs_VMS_Comparison.pdf.
Notes: VHF = very high frequency; SOLAR V/19 = Chapter V, Regulation 19 of the Safety of Life at Sea
Convention; GT = gigaton.
China may also be implicated in IUU activity due to its lack of transparency when reporting
landings, fleet size, and fishing activities. This causes the FAO to allocate many of China’s
catches in the category “marine fishes not elsewhere included” to area 61, the Northwest Pacific,
as a catch-all, although a significant proportion of catches include fish caught in other areas.82
The FAO generally considers estimates of total marine catches for China to be complete, but
notes that “improvements are needed to more accurately assign China’s distant-water fishery
catches by area, and to disaggregate catch by species.”83 China defines a large amount of this
fishing activity as offshore, but not as distant-water fisheries. In 2017, China published plans to
control the size of the DWF and, in 2018, published a list of DWF companies and vessels that it
penalized in 2017.84
Geopolitical Dimensions of China’s Fishing Fleet
China’s maritime militia, the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM),85 plays a key
role in Beijing’s strategy to enforce its sovereignty claims in the South China Sea (see Figure 6)
and in the East China Sea.86 China uses its fishing vessels to further its geopolitical aims.87
China’s national and local governments recruit some commercial fishing vessels into maritime
militia activity through subsidy programs, and require them to operate in specified waters to
defend national sovereignty rights, participate in training and sovereignty defense, and provide

82 FAO, 2020, p. 15.
83 FAO, 2020, p. 10.
84 Zhang Chun, “China Cracks Down on Illegal Distant Water Fishing,” China Dialogue Ocean, September 4, 2018.
85 For more information on the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) see CRS Report R42784, U.S.-
China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
86 Derek Grossman and Logan Ma, “A Short History of China’s Maritime Militia and What It Might Tell Us,” Rand
Corporation Commentary, April 6, 2020.
87 Vietnam reportedly also has a maritime militia. See T. Onishi, “Vietnam Expands Maritime Militia off Southern
Coast,” Nikkei Asia, June 12, 2021.
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support to the PLA88 in combat.89 More aggressive actions, such as ramming other fishing
vessels, interfering with the navigation of foreign warships, and other types of physical
confrontation appear to be tasked to professional militia vessels.90 Many analysts view PAFMM
as a key enabler for China’s prosecution of maritime “gray zone”91 operations that use coercion
short of war.92 Some analysts have stated that the PAFMM is of unknown strength,93 while others
have speculated that the PAFMM may have thousands of vessels with tens of thousands of
personnel.94 Some report that PAFMM vessels have water cannon and small arms and in some
cases machine guns and rocket propelled grenades.95

88 See CRS Report R46808, China’s Military: The People’s Liberation Army (PLA), by Caitlin Campbell.
89 China’s maritime militia has been observed operating in both the South China Sea and the East China Sea, although
they appear more numerous and active in the South China Sea. CRS is not aware of maritime militia involvement with
China’s distant water fleets, but identifying militia vessels as distinct from ordinary fishing vessels and tracking them is
generally seen as difficult. See also Greg Polling and Harrison Pretat, Pulling Back the Curtain on China’s Maritime
Militia, The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Center for Advanced Defense Studies, November
2021, p. 17, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/
211118_Poling_Maritime_Militia.pdf?Y5iaJ4NT8eITSlAKTr.TWxtDHuLIq7wR.
90 Gregory B. Poling, Tabitha Grace Mallory, and Harrison Pretat, Pulling Back the Curtain on China’s Maritime
Militia, The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Center for Advanced Defense Studies, November
2021, p. 17, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/
211118_Poling_Maritime_Militia.pdf?Y5iaJ4NT8eITSlAKTr.TWxtDHuLIq7wR.
91 Some have defined gray zone tactics as situations where “unconventional forces and methods are used to pursue
strategic interests while trying to avoid the possibility of conflict.” “Chinese Maritime Militia Threatens Order in South
China Sea,” Radio Free Asia, November 20, 2021.
92 Andrew Erickson, “Understanding China’s Third Sea Force: The Maritime Militia,” Fairbank Center, September 8,
2017.
93 Derek Grossman and Logan Ma, “A Short History of China’s Fishing Militia and What It May Tell US,” RAND,
April 6, 2020.
94 Ryan Martinson, “Manila’s Images Are Revealing the Secrets of China’s Maritime Militia,” Foreign Policy, April
19, 2021.
95 “Maritime Militia Give China the Edge in the South China Sea,” IANS, June 1, 2021.
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Figure 6. South China Sea Claims

Sources: Flanders Marine Institute, International Mapping, Sovereign Limits, U.S. Department of State, and other
sources. Map prepared by CRS. Map is unofficial. CRS is unable to verify the accuracy of indicated boundaries
and areas of territorial control. Boundaries are not necessarily authoritative.
China has used its militia fishing vessels in conjunction with its coast guard and navy to advance
its sovereignty claims in the South and East China Seas.96 China’s increasing use of fishing
vessels as part of a maritime militia has led to an increase in the presence of Chinese vessels in
disputed and foreign waters and an uptick in hostile or violent interactions between claimant
nations’ fishing vessels and between fishing vessels and coastal law enforcement agencies. This
has contributed to increasing tension between China and other countries in regions such as the
South China Sea and East China Sea.

96 Connor Kennedy and Andrew Erickson, “China’s Third Sea Force, The People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia:
Tethered to the PLA,” China Maritime Studies Institute, March 2017. Andrew Ericson, “The South China Sea’s Third
Sea Force: Understanding and Countering China’s Maritime Militia,” Testimony Before the House Armed Service
Committee, Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee, September 21, 2016.
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The maritime militia has operated in China’s coastal waters since 1949, and has played an
important role in conflicts, including China’s seizure of the Paracel Islands from the government
of South Vietnam (1974), and its assertion of control over Mischief Reef (1995) and Scarborough
Shoal (2012) from the Philippines.97 Some analysts have speculated that in the event of hostilities
the maritime militia could be used to support China’s military missions and that the PAFMM may
“be a driving force behind the decade-long expansion in the Chinese fishing fleet.”98
In one 2009 incident, 75 miles off China’s island province of Hainan, located in the South China
Sea near China’s southeastern coast, the U.S. Navy ocean surveillance ship Impeccable was
harassed by several Chinese vessels, including two fishing trawlers, a Fisheries Law Enforcement
Command patrol vessel,99 a China Maritime Surveillance cutter, and a People’s Liberation Army
naval intelligence ship. According to one analysis, “the chief of China’s South China Sea Bureau
of the Fisheries Law Enforcement Command directed this cross-agency harassment operation” of
the Impeccable, which at the time was thought to be conducting hydrographic surveys related to
China’s Yulin ballistic submarine base.100 In other incidents, both U.S. and Australian military
pilots operating in the East and South China Seas have apparently had lasers focused on them
from Chinese fishing vessels.101
China’s maritime militia continues to be active in various disputes, including the Senkaku Islands
in the East China Sea and the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea,102 where China asserts
sovereignty claims. In 2016 as many as 300 Chinese fishing vessels, accompanied by PRC
government vessels, gathered in the contiguous zone of the Senkaku Islands. Japan’s coast guard
regularly warns Chinese fishing vessels to stay away from Japan’s claimed territorial waters and
has issued exclusion orders to Chinese fishing vessels suspected of illegally operating in these
areas.103 In March 2021, approximately 200 Chinese fishing vessels massed for several weeks
around Whitsun Reef, a feature in the Spratly Archipelago which the Philippines claims is in its
EEZ. (China, Vietnam, and Taiwan also claim the Spratlys.)104 One think tank expert estimated
that approximately 300 militia vessels operate in the Spratly Archipelago on any given day.105
China’s construction of artificial islands at seven disputed features in the Spratly Archipelago
from 2013 to 2016, including four in the Philippines’ claimed EEZ, violated Philippine rights,
including by illegally destroying the marine environment, an UNCLOS arbitral tribunal ruled in
2016.106 These construction activities have negatively impacted fisheries in the immediate area of

97 Andrew S. Erickson and Conor F. Kennedy, “Trailblazers in Warfighting: The Maritime Militia of Danzhou,” Center
for International Maritime Security,” February 1, 2016.
98 See for example James Kraska, “China’s Maritime Militia Vessels May Be Military Objectives During Armed
Conflict,” The Diplomat, July 7. 2020.
99 In 2013 China created the China Coast Guard Bureau which united previously separate maritime law enforcement
agencies. S. Sakamoto, “China’s New Coast Guard Law and Implications for Maritime Security in the East and South
China Seas,” Lawfare, February 16, 2021.
100 Michael Green, “Counter-Coercion: Harassment of the USNS Impeccable,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative,
CSIS, May 9, 2017.
101 Lisa Martin, “Australian Navy Pilots Hit with Lasers During South China Sea Military Exercise,” The Guardian,
May 28, 2019. J. Seidel, “Chinese Fishing Boats Are Blinding US Military Pilots with Lasers,” News Corp Australia,
June 25, 2018.
102 The Senkaku Islands are also known as the Diaoyu Islands.
103 “Japan Issues Exclusion Orders to 80 Chinese Fishing Ships in 2021,” Kyodo News, August 12, 2021.
104 Samir Puri and Greg Austin, “What the Whitsun Reef Incident Tells Us About China’s Future Operations at Sea,”
Institute of International Strategic Studies, April 9, 2021.
105 Greg Polling et al., “Pulling Back the Curtain on China’s Maritime Militia,” CSIS, November 2021.
106 International Court of Justice “Ruling in The Philippines vs. China.” See, U.S. Department of State, “Fifth
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the reclamation sites and may have a negative impact in a broader area of the South China Sea.107
China rejected the court’s ruling, arguing that the tribunal did not have legal standing to rule in
the case.108 In an October 29, 2015, ruling, the tribunal considered each of China’s objections but
ruled that the tribunal did have jurisdiction to address the claims made by the Philippines.109
There is concern that disagreements could escalate as states move to secure their sovereignty and
fisheries resources against China’s actions. Further conflicts may arise from the continued or
expanded use of the maritime militia to assert China’s claims to maritime environments, through
competition for fisheries resources found in contested waters or if nations seek to more
assertively protect fisheries resources from illegal fishing.110
Chinese Fishing by Region
Chinese vessels have been linked to IUU fishing in many parts of the world, both on the high seas
and in the EEZs of Asian, Pacific Island, South American, and African nations. (see Figure 8 or
map of major fishing areas).
Domestic Fishing and Fishing in the Western Pacific
Southeast and East Asian coastal and offshore marine areas are among some of the most
productive ecosystems in the world and support extensive marine fisheries.111 The region’s
territorial seas and EEZs include broad, relatively shallow, and productive continental shelf areas
composed of semi-enclosed waters, including the East China Sea, South China Sea, Yellow Sea,
and Bohai Sea. The East China Sea is the most productive area and may account for
approximately 40% of landings from China’s waters.112
The depletion of domestic fishery resources has changed the composition of China’s domestic
fishery landings.113 A study published in 2021 found that fishery subsidies promoted rapid
development of the DWF, but also contributed to domestic overcapacity and to overfishing of
domestic fishery resources.114 To some degree, total domestic landings are maintained by
increasing fishing in neighboring countries EEZs and changing the composition of targeted
species, from generally high value species to species of low value.115 Lower-valued marine

Anniversary of the Arbitral Tribunal Ruling on the South China Sea,” press release, July 11, 2021, at
https://www.state.gov/fifth-anniversary-of-the-arbitral-tribunal-ruling-on-the-south-china-sea/.
107 U.S. China Economic and Security Review Commissions, “China’s Island Building in the South China Sea:
Damage to the Marine Environment, Implications, and International Law,” April 12, 2016.
108 “Beijing Rejects Tribunal’s Ruling in South China Sea Case,” The Guardian, July 12, 2016, at
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/12/philippines-wins-south-china-sea-case-against-china.
109 CRS Report R44555, Arbitration Case Between the Philippines and China Under the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), by Ben Dolven et al.
110 Kate Higgens-Bloom, “Food Fight,” Foreign Policy, September 12, 2018.
111 Robert Pomeroy, “Improving Marine Fisheries Management in Southeast Asia,” Science Direct, March 2016; and
“East Asian Seas,” UN Environment Programme, https://www.unep.org/explore-topics/oceans-seas/what-we-do/
working-regional-seas/regional-seas-programmes/east-asian.
112 “Status, Trends, and the Future of Fisheries in the East and South China Seas,” Fisheries Centre Research Reports,
vol. 27, 2019.
113 Jinkai Yu and Qingchao Han, “Exploring the Management Policy of Distant Water Fisheries in China: Evolution,
Challenges, and Prospects,” Fisheries Research, vol. 236 (2021). Hereinafter cited as Yu, 2021.
114 Yu, 2021.
115 ITC, 2021, p. 140. “The growing harvest of fish from lower trophic levels robs the higher-level species of the food
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species caught in domestic fisheries are generally consumed domestically. In addition, fishmeal
produced from low-valued fish is needed for the expanding aquaculture industry in China.
Research of catch composition indicates that these shifts have resulted from targeting and
overfishing of higher-valued predatory fish.116
Fishing in Neighboring Nations’ EEZs
Chinese vessels fish in neighboring territorial waters and EEZs where Chinese jurisdictional
claims overlap with those claimed by adjacent countries.117 In other cases, Chinese vessels fish
illegally in areas that are undisputedly under the national jurisdiction of other countries.118 These
fishing efforts have led to overfishing of fish stocks and increased landings of Chinese vessels at
the expense of countries that share straddling stocks that occur in adjoining EEZs. Chinese
vessels accounted for about 20.8% of the total fishing activity in disputed areas and EEZs in areas
adjacent to Chinese waters in the East and South China seas, Yellow Sea, and Sea of Japan.119
East China Sea
Control of the uninhabited Senkaku Islands (see Figure 7 below) in the East China Sea, called the
Diaoyu Islands by the People’s Republic of China, is disputed between China, Taiwan, and
Japan.120 Some analysts speculate that incidents associated with the dispute could escalate into
conflict.121 Japan maintains administrative control over the islands, while both China and Taiwan
have made claims that the islands fall under their jurisdiction. There is fishing in the disputed
area, but potential oil and gas resources near the islands and issues of nationalist pride may play a
larger role in the dispute. Japan claims its EEZ extends from the Ryukyu Islands to a median line
between the Chinese and Japanese continental shelves in the East China Sea. China, however,
maintains that their EEZ includes nearly all of the East China Sea, including the Senkaku Islands,
based on extended continental shelf claims.122

they need to reproduce and maintain their populations.” P. Haque, D Hossain, “The Impact of Overfishing on Fish
Population,” Aquafind, http://aquafind.com/articles/Overfishing-Report.php.
116 Cody S. Szuwalski et al., “High Fishery Catches Through Trophic Cascades in China,” Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, vol. 114, no. 4 (January 24, 2017), pp. 717-721.
117 ITC, 2021, p.152.
118 The jurisdictional claims of China and neighboring nations overlap because the distance between their opposite
coastlines is considerably less than 400 nautical miles, the combined potential width of the nations’ EEZs, thereby
requiring delimitation of marine boundaries between these nations. The jurisdictional boundaries of national EEZs that
overlap in these areas are disputed because there has been no agreement on the location of these boundaries. Questions
have arisen concerning the international legal basis of China’s claims and China’s reluctance to settle these
disagreements through third party arbitration.
119 ITC, 2021, p. 155.
120 CRS Report R42761, The Senkakus (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) Dispute: U.S. Treaty Obligations, by Mark E. Manyin.
121 Global Conflict Tracker, “Tensions in the East China Sea,” Council on Foreign Relations, January 3, 2022.
122 Under Article 76 of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), nations can make a submission
to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (hereinafter referred to as the Commission) concerning the
extent of their continental shelves. (UNCLOS, 1982.) China’s maritime claims are based on the extent of their
continental shelf as opposed to Japan’ claim that is based on the EEZ as projected from the Ryukyu Islands and an
equidistant line drawn between the two countries.
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Figure 7. Map of Senkaku (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) Islands and Surrounding Region

Source: CRS, using data provided by the Database of Global Administrative Areas (GADM).
Notes: This map reflects geographic place name policies set forth by the United States Board on Geographic
Names pursuant to P.L. 80-242. In applying these policies to the case of the sea separating the Korean Peninsula
and the Japanese Archipelago, the Board has determined that the “Sea of Japan” is the appropriate standard
name for use in U.S. Government publications. The Republic of Korea refers to this body of water as the “East
Sea.” It refers to the “Yellow Sea” as the “West Sea.”
Chinese fishing is extensive in both in its waters in the East China Sea and the disputed areas
discussed above. The Chinese government limits fishing in the East China Sea for much of the
year, but the annual fishing ban typically ends each summer with large numbers of Chinese
fishing vessels venturing into the East China Sea, including disputed areas near the Senkaku
Islands.123 China also regularly sends Chinese Coast Guard vessels into the disputed area to

123 Xinhua, “Annual Fishing Ban Lifted in East China,” September 16, 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-
09/16/c_139373140.htm.
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support their claims that they administer the area. These incursions have caused ongoing friction
between the China and Japan. Often Chinese fishing vessels and Coast Guard vessels have been
reported to chase or harass Japanese fishing boats as likely attempts to challenge the status quo of
Japan’s claim.124
Yellow Sea
Fishing disputes in the Yellow Sea are related in part to maritime claims of China and South
Korea that result in the overlapping of the two countries’ EEZs. In 2001, the two countries agreed
to create the China-South Korea Provisional Measure Zone for the area where their EEZs overlap.
The provisional measure was adopted without the delimitation of the maritime boundary between
the two countries. According to South Korean officials, the agreement was an attempt to control
the number of illegal Chinese fishing vessels that dominated fishing activities in the region.125
Despite this effort, incidents of illegal fishing by Chinese fishermen remain an ongoing source of
friction between the two countries.
Over the last decade there has been a series of fisheries-related incidents between the South
Korean Coast Guard and Chinese fishing vessels operating within South Korea’s EEZ.126
According to South Korean observers, widespread illegal fishing by Chinese vessels in the
Yellow Sea causes severe harm to South Korea by depleting its resources.127 Some progress has
resulted from talks, joint enforcement patrols, and educational efforts that have helped to decrease
arrests of Chinese vessels in South Korean waters.128
Another source of illegal fishing is related to Chinese fishing in the Han River estuary along the
North Korean side of the Northern Limit Line in the Yellow Sea—a neutral and demilitarized
zone decided on by the parties of the Korean Armistice Agreement.129 South and North Korea
manage the jurisdiction jointly under the supervision of the Military Armistice Commission.
Chinese fishing vessels reportedly have often fished on the North Korean side of the Han River
estuary and at times crossed the border to fish illegally in South Korean waters. These vessels
make incursions into South Korean waters at night, but retreat to North Korean waters if
confronted by South Korean authorities. The situation is complicated by the relations among the
three parties, and by the fact that the South Korean authorities cannot pursue the Chinese vessels
into North Korean waters.
Squid Fishing in North Korean Waters
Large numbers of Chinese fishing vessels reportedly are targeting Japanese flying squid in North
Korean waters. The Chinese “dark fleet” in this region operates without broadcasting positions
with public monitoring systems while engaging in widespread illegal fishing activity.130 A 2021

124 Ankit Panda, “Japan Protests China Coast Guard Harassment of Fishing Vessel Near Senkaku Islands,” The
Diplomat, May 11, 2020.
125 Young Kil Park, The Role of Fishing Disputes in China-South Korea Relations, National Bureau of Asian Research,
April 23, 2020, https://www.nbr.org/publication/the-role-of-fishing-disputes-in-china-south-korea-relations/.
126 “China Rebuffs South Korea Over Sinking of Coast Guard Vessel,” Reuters, October 12, 2016.
127 S. Um, “China’s Illegal Fishing Causes Hardship for South Korea,” Maritime Fairtrade, January 6, 2021.
128 Young Kil Park, “The Role of Fishing Disputes in China-South Korea Relations,” National Bureau of Asian
Research, April 23, 2020, https://www.nbr.org/publication/the-role-of-fishing-disputes-in-china-south-korea-relations/.
129 Ian Urbina, “China’s Illicit Squid Fishery Has Deadly Impact on North Korea,” The Maritime Executive, September
27, 2021.
130 Jaeyoon Park et al., “Illuminating Dark Fishing Fleets in North Korea,” Science Advances, vol. 6, no. 30 (July 22,
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study identified 700 to 900 Chinese vessels illegally fishing for Japanese flying squid in North
Korean waters between 2017 and 2018.131 According to a report by the Korea Maritime Institute,
a think tank funded by the South Korean government, the amount of squid caught by South
Korean fishers declined from 163,886 tons in 2014 to 46,274 tons in 2018.132
The South China Sea
In the South China Sea, where territorial and sovereignty disputes among China and numerous
other claimants have heightened in recent years, many analysts believe that competition over
fisheries resources has become a key driver of disputes and tension.133 The South China Sea is a
major source of fish resources for each of the littoral claimants that border it, and the largest
source of fish protein for many of them. China has territorial disputes in the South China Sea with
the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan, and a related dispute over maritime
rights with Indonesia.
Analysts claim that overfishing has dramatically depleted fish stocks in the South China Sea. One
2017 report estimated that fish stocks in the South China Sea may have fallen by 70%-95% since
the 1950s. The report states that the South China Sea fishery “is now in danger of collapse unless
claimants act urgently to arrest the decline.”134 Other fisheries have also experienced significant
loss of fish stocks. For example, the northwest cod fishery in the Atlantic Ocean fell to 1% of
historical levels by 1992 largely due to overfishing.135
The interplay between resource depletion and maritime rights disputes has made it difficult to
manage and protect fisheries resources as fleets and law enforcement vessels from several
claimants have become active in the wider parts of the South China Sea. This is illustrated by the
Chinese fishing fleet—the largest in the region—and Chinese maritime enforcement vessels
venturing further and in greater numbers from China’s mainland coast.136
Chinese fishing vessels, for instance, increasingly operate in southern parts of the South China
Sea, areas that are furthest from its mainland. The Indonesian government, which prioritizes a
fight against what it claims is illegal fishing in Indonesian waters, has made numerous protests
against Chinese vessels operating in Indonesian waters, echoing protests that Vietnam and the
Philippines have made for decades.137
There is no RFMO for the South China Sea, and no consensus on which claimant has rights to
manage fisheries resources in its waters. As a result, one 2020 report says, “as competition over
dwindling fish stocks intensifies, it … risks sparking a conflict that further inflames tensions

2020).
131 ITC, 2021, p.156.
132 Young Kil Park, “The Role of Fishing Disputes in China-South Korea Relations,” National Bureau of Asian
Research, April 23, 2020, https://www.nbr.org/publication/the-role-of-fishing-disputes-in-china-south-korea-relations/.
133 “Fishing Dispute in the South China Sea,” Climate Diplomacy, https://climate-diplomacy.org/case-studies/fishing-
dispute-south-china-sea.
134 Center for Strategic and International Studies, “A Blueprint for Fisheries Management and Environmental
Cooperation in the South China Sea,” September 13, 2017.
135 Lawrence Hamilton and Melissa Butler, “Outport Adaptations: Social Indicators Through Newfoundland’s Cod
Crisis,” Human Ecology Review, Winter 2001.
136 Other claimants’ fleets and law enforcement vessels have also become active in wider parts of the South China Sea.
137 Hannah Beech and Muktita Suhartono, “China Chases Indonesia’s Fishing Fleets, Staking Claim to the Sea’s
Riches,” New York Times, March 31, 2020.
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between China and the rest of the world.”138 Increasing harassment by regional law enforcement
agencies and other vessels have led many fishing vessels to operate in larger groups, and to
operate in stealth, either switching off automatic tracking systems or operating without them.139
The disputed waters are policed by coast guards and local maritime agencies of several countries,
and according to one 2012 analysis, “the claims of sovereignty also serve to justify greater
civilian patrols in the sea—opening up still more possibilities of run-ins with fishing vessels.”140
Some analysts argue that the South China Sea disputants would benefit from greater multilateral
dialogue to manage the marine environment and preserve fisheries. Some have called for a set of
measures to protect the South China Sea’s marine resources, including the establishment of a
Fishery and Environmental Management Area in the South China Sea; an agreement to split
enforcement responsibilities; an agreement not to use subsidies to encourage fishing within
already overfished areas; and a coordinated effort to reintroduce giant clams and other threatened
species such as sea turtles to depopulated reefs in the region.141
Regions Exposed to China’s Distant-Water Fishing
China’s DWF employs extensive fishing efforts in many parts of the world. In the Pacific, fishing
activities are generally concentrated in the Western Central Pacific and Southeast Pacific FAO
regions.142 The landings from China’s distant-water fisheries originate from vessels operating
both in the EEZs of other countries and on the high seas. Numerous reports have been made of
IUU fishing by Chinese DWF vessels that operated without authorization to fish in Pacific island
nations’ EEZs or violated measures required in high seas areas managed by RFMOs.143

138 Kevin Varley et al., “Fight over Fish Fans a New Stage of Conflict in the South China Sea,” Bloomberg, September
1, 2020.
139 Ibid.
140 Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, “Fish Story,” Foreign Policy, June 25, 2012.
141 Center for Strategic and International Studies, “A Blueprint for Fisheries Management and Environmental
Cooperation in the South China Sea,” September 13, 2017.
142 Miren Guterrez et al., China’s Distant-Water Fishing Fleet, Over Seas Development Institute, London.
143 Miren Gutierrez, Guy Jobbins, “China’s Distant Water Fleet: Scale, Impact and Governance,” ODI, June 2, 2020.
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Figure 8. FAO Major Fishing Areas

Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, https://www.fao.org/fishery/en/area/search.
Pacific Tuna Fisheries (Pacific Island Countries’ EEZs)
The largest and most productive tuna stocks in the world are found in the South and Western
Central Pacific Ocean. Pacific island EEZs and adjacent high seas areas in the region are among
the most heavily fished areas in the world by DWF fleets. Access to tuna stocks is controlled in
part by Pacific island states which project large EEZs into the surrounding Pacific Ocean.
The region’s island nations also have established regional associations to coordinate their
approach to regulating access to the region’s fishery resources by foreign fishing fleets. The
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) is an RFMO established by the
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Convention to conserve and manage the region’s highly
migratory tuna stocks and other migratory marine resources targeted by high seas fisheries.144 The
Fisheries Forum Agency (FFA) was established to help Pacific countries develop and implement

144 The Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission is composed of 26 members that include both fishing
nations with DWF targeting tuna and island nations where tuna resources are caught.
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conservation and management measures for the fishery resources passing within their EEZs,145 by
providing technical support and facilitating regional cooperation.
The Nauru Agreement is a subregional agreement among eight parties to provide the terms of
access agreements for distant-water tuna fleets.146 The agreement facilitates cooperation and
collaboration among the parties to establish measures to sustain regional fisheries and engage in
activities that will increase and diversify socioeconomic benefits from the fisheries in their
waters.147 The EEZs of the parties to the Nauru agreement collectively control 20%-30% of the
world’s tuna supply. The agreement introduced a Vessel Day Scheme148 with sustainable fishing
targets that reportedly earns the group $500 million a year.149 Fishing fees paid by foreign fishing
vessels for access to fishery resources within the region’s EEZs are significant sources of revenue
for many South Pacific nations.
While Pacific island nations target tuna, most tuna are harvested by DWF that are from outside
the region including China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the United States, and others.150 China
has one of the largest fleets registered with WCPFC to operate in the region. A large portion of
fishing activity by China’s fishing vessels is in the EEZs of Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, and
Micronesia.151 Chinese fishing includes vessels registered to China that operate under access
agreements and Chinese vessels that are registered and/or flagged to Pacific island countries for
more favorable terms of access.152 These arrangements may complicate or obscure the activities
of reflagged vessels that commit IUU and labor violations.153
The FFA regularly conducts surveillance to detect and counter illegal fishing activities and on
multiple occasions authorities have identified Chinese vessels engaging in IUU fishing. For
example, in 2018 and again in 2019, three Chinese-flagged vessels were caught fishing illegally
in the high seas areas of the North Pacific Ocean.154 A recent analysis found that a number of
Chinese vessels flagged in Fiji are suspected of engaging in IUU fishing, though this may reflect
an above-average detection rate rather than a concentration of IUU activity.155 Foreign vessels,
including Chinese vessels, operating in Vanuatu’s EEZ have also been linked to under-reporting
their catch.156

145 For additional information related to the FFA see, https://www.ffa.int/.
146 The Parties to the Nauru Agreement (formed in 1982) includes Micronesia, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Nauru,
Palau, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, and Tokelau.
147 “The Parties to the Nauru Agreement,” https://www.pnatuna.com/index.php/content/about-pna.
148 The Vessel Day Scheme (VDS) is a scheme where vessel owners can purchase and trade days fishing at sea in
places subject to the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA). Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency, “Introduction,”
https://www.ffa.int/vds.
149 Christopher Pala, “The Mice That Roared: How Eight Tiny Countries Took on Foreign Fishing Fleets,” The
Guardian, June 15, 2021.
150 Less than one percent of the average tuna catch from the EEZs of Pacific Island Countries (PIC) is estimated to be
used currently for local consumption in the Pacific region. Most fish currently consumed in the Pacific are caught from
coral reefs. Lucy Towers, “Local Tuna Consumption in the Pacific Important,” The Fish Site, February 5, 2015.
151 ITC, p. 158.
152 ITC, p. 158.
153 ITC, p. 157.
154 NOAA, 2019, pp. 22-23.
155 Miren Gutierrez et al, “China’s Distant Water Fishing Fleet Scale, Impact and Governance,” Overseas Development
Institute, June 2020, and ITC, p. 158.
156 ITC, p. 158.
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The resources needed to enforce existing access agreements and regional arrangements is cited as
one of the main constraints to stopping IUU fishing in the region. To combat IUU fishing in the
region, the U.S. Coast Guard partners with 11 Pacific island nations through bilateral enforcement
arrangements known as shiprider agreements. The agreements allow local law enforcement
officers to embark on U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Navy vessels to observe, protect, board, and
search vessels suspected of violating laws or regulations within their EEZs or on the high seas.157
South American Squid Fisheries
Extensive squid fisheries are in the Pacific Ocean off the west coast of South America and in the
Southwest Atlantic Ocean off the southeast coast of South America. These areas are fishing
grounds for both South American and distant-water fishing vessels for Humboldt (jumbo flying
squid) off Ecuador, Peru, and Chile; and shortfin squid and jumbo flying squid in the Southwest
Atlantic off Argentina. Ecuadorans, Peruvians, and Chileans fish for flying squid primarily in
their own EEZs. Argentina fishes for both squid species in the Southwest Atlantic, while Chinese
and other Asian fishing vessels operate in high seas areas adjacent to Argentina’s EEZ. A U.S.-
based nongovernmental organization (NGO) focused on protecting the world’s oceans asserted in
June 2021 that between January 2018 and April 2021, over 800 Chinese, Taiwanese, South
Korean, and Spanish vessels may have been fishing within Argentina’s EEZ.158 One analysis of
fishing activity in the Galapagos EEZ identified 344 Chinese fishing vessels operating around the
Galapagos EEZ in August 2020 alone.159
High seas fisheries in the southern Pacific are managed by the South Pacific Regional Fisheries
Management Organization (SPRFMO) (Figure 4); no RFMO manages high seas fisheries in the
southwest Atlantic. The main objective of SPRFMO is the long-term conservation and sustainable
use of resources under the Convention on the Conservation and Management of High Seas
Fishery Resources in the South Pacific Ocean (the Convention).160 The Convention covers the
high seas areas from South America to Australia. The main commercial fishery resources within
the area include jack mackerel, chub mackerel, jumbo flying squid (including other squid
species), and orange roughy.161 The Convention is open to nations with an interest in fishery
resources within the region.
Chinese deep water fleets operating off the coast of South America appear to focus their efforts
primarily on the high seas near or reportedly within the EEZs of Ecuador, Peru, and Argentina.
According to the SPRFMO record of authorized fishing vessels, China has the largest fleet with
722 registered vessels.162 Some Chinese fishing vessels reportedly transship their catch to Chinese
refrigerated cargo vessels that land their catch in Chinese ports.163 This allows the fleet to fish in

157 Lt. Com. Lauren L. Wright, “Shiprider Program,” Indo-Pacific Defense FORUM, January 27, 2020,
athttps://ipdefenseforum.com/2020/01/shiprider-program/.
158 OCEANA, Now You See Me, Now You Don't: Vanishing Vessels Along Argentina’s Waters, June 2021,
https://usa.oceana.org/reports/oceana-finds-hundreds-vessels-vanishing-along-argentinas-waters/.
159 Tabitha Mallory and Ian Ralby, “Evolution of the Fleet: A Closer Look at the Chinese Fishing Vessels off the
Galapagos,” Center for International Maritime Security, October 19, 2020.
160 On November 4, 2009, national parties adopted the Convention on the Conservation and Management of High Seas
Fishery Resources in the South Pacific Resources in the South Pacific Ocean, and on August 14, 2012, the Convention
entered into force, which established the Commission.
161 Highly migratory tuna species in the Eastern Tropical Pacific are managed by the Inter-American Tropical Tuna
Commission and in the Western and Central Pacific by the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission.
162 ITC, 2021, p. 155.
163 “Small Fry: Peru’s Fishermen Battle China’s Overseas Fleet,” US News and World Report, September 24, 2021. K.
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the region for long periods without interruption. Most of the vessels operating in the region are
Chinese, but other DWFs registered by the SPRFMO include Taiwan (55 vessels) and South
Korea (44 vessels). Regional fleets (especially fishermen from Peru) target squid in their EEZs
and are composed of large numbers of vessels that are generally smaller in size and capacity.
There have been numerous reports of IUU fishing in these areas. For example, according to
Global Fishing Watch, there are a number of cases where vessels have broadcasted inconsistent
Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) information by switching off their transponders when
close to EEZ boundaries, and manipulating data to broadcast false locations (Table 2).164
Examples of IUU fishing in this region include a Chinese refrigerator vessel detained within the
waters of the Galapagos Marine Reserve with 6,000 sharks in its hold.165 Reports from the seizure
of this vessel by the Ecuadorian Navy suggested that Chinese fishing vessels targeted sharks, an
activity that is not allowed under Ecuadorian regulations.166 In 2020, China responded that it has
zero tolerance for IUU fishing and that it would not fish in waters near the Galapagos Marine
Reserve between September and November.167 Chinese vessels reportedly shut off tracking
instruments and entering Ecuador’s EEZ to fish illegally in 2020.168 Also in 2020, Chile reported
Chinese vessels were operating in high seas areas within and around its EEZ.169
Chinese fishing activity occurs off the EEZ of Argentina and the Falkland Islands, with
approximately 400 Chinese fishing vessels reported off Argentina’s EEZ. Incursions by Chinese
fishing vessels into Argentina’s EEZ and illegal fishing by China in the region have been
documented.170 In 2019, distant-water vessels fishing in the Southwest Atlantic area during the
peak season turned off their vessel tracking instruments. Most of the “dark” vessels appeared to
have their AIS off for one to four days at a time and in most cases disappeared about five nautical
miles from the boundary of Argentina’s EEZ.171 The U.S.-based NGO Oceana also detected more
than 6,000 “gap events” during that period, when vessels were not visible on electronic trackers
for more than 24 hours, possibly because they disabled their AIS.172 In 2019 China issued new
regulations prohibiting Chinese-flagged vessels from turning off their vessel tracking instruments
in the region.

Boerder, N. Miller and B. Worm, “Global Hotspots of Transshipment of Fish Catch at Sea,” Science Advances, July 25,
2018.
164 Eloy Aroni, Follow the Lights: Squid Fishing in the Southeast Pacific Ocean, Global Fishing Watch, October 13,
2020.
165 C. Middlehurst, “Ecuador Shark Seizure Exposes Illegal Fishing Network,” Dialogo China, August 25, 2017.
“Countries Step up Efforts to Protect Marine Wildlife,” U.S. Embassy and Consulates in Italy,
https://it.usembassy.gov/countries-step-up-efforts-to-protect-marine-wildlife/.
166 ITC, p. 167.
167 “Chilean Navy Ships Monitor Huge Chinese Fishing Fleet,” BBC News, December 15, 2020, at
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-55316326.
168 Christian Molinari, “Four South American Countries Prepare to Challenge Chinese Fishing Abuses at COMM9,”
SeafoodSource, January 5, 2021, at https://www.seafoodsource.com/news/environment-sustainability/four-south-
american-countries-prepare-to-challenge-chinese-fishing-abuses-at-comm9.
169 “Chilean Navy Ships Monitor Huge Chinese Fishing Fleet,” BBC News, December 15, 2020.
170 ITC, p. 161.
171 “Fleets of Fishing Ships Are Going ‘Dark’ in the South Atlantic and China Is the Leading Culprit,” Business
Insider, June 2, 2021, at https://www.businessinsider.com/chinese-fishing-vessels-going-dark-off-argentina-waters-
2021-6.
172 “Oceana Finds Hundreds of Vessels Vanishing Along Argentina’s Waters,” Oceana, June 2021.
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In 2020, the SPRFMO adopted its first management measures for jumbo flying squid in the
international waters covered by the convention. To protect overfished squid stocks, the regulation
adopted conservation management measures for squid fishing.173 In the wake of the latest Chinese
incursion into the waters of these South American nations, the four member nations of the
Permanent Commission for the South Pacific—Ecuador, Chile, Colombia, and Peru—issued a
joint statement promising to work together.174
West Africa175
Fisheries overexploitation and IUU fishing in West Africa have attracted growing international
attention amid rising concern over the status of fish stocks and coastal livelihoods in the region.
The FAO considers several species in the Eastern Central Atlantic zone to be overfished.176 The
Eastern Central Atlantic zone hosts some of the richest and most diverse fisheries in the world,
with a variety of species used as food or in the production of fishmeal and fish oil. The FAO
reports that over 40% of assessed fish stocks in the region were harvested at biologically
unsustainable levels in 2017 (latest data), among the highest rates in the world.177 Observers
generally agree that IUU fishing is “heavily implicated” in this overexploitation.178 Such trends
have been socioeconomically devastating for local fishing sectors and have reduced access to
ocean fish, a critical source of protein for large coastal populations across West Africa.179
Chinese DWFs—alongside other foreign fleets, notably from the European Union (EU)—have
reportedly played key roles in overfishing and IUU fishing in West African waters. While the
scale and scope of Chinese fishing in the region have not been definitively documented, West
Africa reportedly has become a major focus of Chinese DWF operations in recent decades.180
This includes activity by Chinese-owned or -operated vessels flagged to other countries, which
reportedly constitute a small share of Chinese DWF operations globally but are disproportionately
flagged to West African countries: according to the Overseas Development Institute (ODI),

173 “8th Scientific Committee Meeting Report,” South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organization
(SPRFMO), October 3-8, 2020.
174 P. Schechter and J. Cortinas, “Fishing in Dangerous Waters: A Flashpoint for Latin America and China,”
Brinknews, May 5, 2021.
175 This section authored by Tomás F. Husted.
176 This section focuses on the FAO’s Eastern Central Atlantic zone (Major Fishing Area 34), which spans Western
Africa’s littoral and deep-sea waters from northern Morocco to northern Angola.
177 FAO, 2020.
178 Daniels et al., West Africa’s Missing Fish: The Impacts of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing and Under-
Reporting Catches by Foreign Fleets, ODI, June 2016. Estimates of IUU fishing in West Africa vary considerably, and
its prevalence reportedly differs between countries, but observers agree that such practices are pervasive across the
region. For instance, a 2009 study found that illegal and unreported catches in the Eastern Central Atlantic were
equivalent to 37% of the legal reported catch of the case study species, on average, over 2000-2003 (Agnew et al.,
“Estimating the Worldwide Extent of Illegal Fishing,” PLoS ONE vol. 4, no. 2 [2009]). A 2017 study of six West
African countries—Mauritania, Senegal, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Guinea, and Sierra Leone—estimated that illegal
catches were equivalent to 65% of the legal reported catch between 2010 and 2015, though rates varied between
countries (Doumbouya et al., “Assessing the Effectiveness of Monitoring Control and Surveillance of Illegal Fishing:
The Case of West Africa,” Frontiers in Marine Science vol. 4, no. 50 [2017]).
179 One Earth Future, Stable Seas: Gulf of Guinea, March 2020.
180 The Pew Charitable Trusts and the Sea Around Us initiative at the University of British Columbia estimated that
West Africa accounted for 64% of average annual Chinese DWF catch (by ton) over 2000-2011. See Pew Charitable
Trusts and Sea Around Us, “China’s Foreign Fishing Is Largely Unreported,” 2013.
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Ghana, Mauritania, and Côte d’Ivoire are the three most common foreign-flag states for Chinese
DWF vessels worldwide.181
Chinese DWF operations in West Africa have come under scrutiny from analysts and U.S.
officials, including some Members of Congress.182 According to various observers, the opacity of
Chinese vessel ownership and fishery access agreements in West Africa may enable exploitative
fishing practices and hinder monitoring of Chinese DWF operations by African governments and
publics.183 Meanwhile, as in other regions, Chinese state subsidies and other official support for
Chinese DWFs in West Africa may encourage overcapacity and contribute to unsustainable catch
levels, while disadvantaging African domestic fishing industries and foreign competitors.
(Analysts have expressed similar concerns over the implications of EU DWF subsidies.184)
Observers have contended that Chinese DWFs may misrepresent their vessel sizes to secure
licenses and favorable fisheries access, and under-declare their official catch levels, though the
extent of such practices is unclear due to gaps in publicly available information.185
Observers have implicated Chinese entities in IUU fishing and other predatory or ecologically
destructive activities in West African waters.186 For instance, researchers have accused Chinese
companies of extensive involvement in Ghana’s “saiko” trade—an illegal practice whereby
industrial trawlers transfer by-catch (the incidental capture of non-targeted species) and other
ostensibly untargeted fish to intermediaries for sale onshore.187
West African governments have sought to curtail predatory fishing by Chinese and other foreign
vessels in their maritime domains, as artisanal fishing associations and coastal communities have
expressed concern over the impacts of foreign fishing for local livelihoods.188 Some West African
governments have denied or revoked licenses awarded to Chinese and other foreign trawlers, in
some cases citing sustainability concerns.189 Regional navies and maritime law enforcement
agencies—at times working in tandem or with the support of international conservation
organizations—also have episodically interdicted or imposed fines on Chinese vessels found
responsible for IUU fishing. Weak maritime security capacities, limited cross-border
coordination, and under-resourced port and fishing authorities, among other challenges, continue
to inhibit sustainable fisheries management and enable predatory fishing across the region. More

181 Gutiérrez et al., China’s Distant Water Fishing Fleet: Scale, Impact and Governance, ODI, June 2020.
182 House Foreign Affairs Committee Minority, “China Regional Snapshot: Sub-Saharan Africa,” n.d., accessed
February 17, 2021; State Department, “Telephonic Press Briefing on U.S. Coast Guard and Navy Operations in
Africa,” October 5, 2020.
183 Daniels et al., West Africa’s Missing Fish: The Impacts of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing and Under-
Reporting Catches by Foreign Fleets, ODI, June 2016; Belhabib et al., “Euros vs. Yuan: Comparing European and
Chinese Fishing Access in West Africa,” PLoS ONE, vol. 10, no. 3 (2015); Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF),
China’s Hidden Fleet in West Africa: A Spotlight on Illegal Practices Within Ghana’s Industrial Trawl Sector, 2018.
184 Ifesinachi Okafor-Yarwood and Dyhia Belhabib, “The Duplicity of the European Union Common Fisheries Policy
in Third Countries: Evidence from the Gulf of Guinea,” Ocean and Coastal Management 184 (2020).
185 Greenpeace, Africa’s Fisheries: Paradise at a Crossroads, 2015; Belhabib et al., “Euros vs. Yuan: Comparing
European and Chinese Fishing Access in West Africa,” PLoS ONE, vol. 10, no. 3 (2015).
186 Charles Clover, “How China’s Fisherman are Impoverishing Africa,” The Spectator, June 9, 2020.
187 EJF and Hen Mpoano, Stolen at Sea: How Illegal ‘Saiko’ Fishing Is Fueling the Collapse of Ghana’s Fisheries,
2019.
188 See, for example, Holly Eva Ryan, “Anti-Chinese Protests in a Gambian Fishing Village Show Conflict of Foreign
Investment in Africa,” Quartz, June 27, 2019; and Joelle Philippe, “Liberian Fishers Protest Against the Potential
Issuance of Fishing Licenses to Six Chinese Supertrawlers,” Coalition for Fair Fisheries Arrangements, July 23, 2020.
189 Eric Olander, “Q&A: Liberia’s Decision to Deny Fishing Permits to 6 Chinese Super Trawlers ‘Sends a Powerful
Message,’” October 19, 2020.
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broadly, observers have expressed concern that the opacity of Chinese and other foreign fishing
activity in West Africa—as well as power imbalances between foreign governments and West
African states and between foreign DWFs and local fishing sectors—may render West African
fisheries vulnerable to foreign predation.190
China’s Efforts to Address IUU Fishing and Promote Sustainable
Fisheries191
The Chinese government is taking certain steps to address concerns expressed by both Chinese
and international experts regarding the sustainability of China’s inshore and distant-water fishing
practices and the involvement of Chinese fishing vessels in IUU fishing practices. To meet
China’s Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs’ (MARA) 13th Five-Year National Fishing
Industry Development Plan’s stated goal of promoting more sustainable fishing practices,
authorities in China have taken steps that include the imposition of closed seasons for distant-
water fishing and inshore fishing operations.192 In May 2020, the Chinese government extended
these measures to disputed waters in the South China Sea it claims as its own and imposed a 15-
week ban on all fishing in the South China Sea north of the 12th parallel (the circle of latitude that
is 12 degrees north of the equator). The governments of Vietnam and the Philippines protested the
move, which ostensibly bans fishing by their nationals in waters both countries also claim as part
of their territory.193
The Chinese government is also promoting the development of blockchain and cloud-based
applications to monitor ocean fishery populations and improve supply chain traceability, which
Chinese experts claim will inform more sustainable fishing practices. The China Fisheries
Association, the largest industry association in China, is reportedly working to develop single-
species data platforms, which it claims will be able to be tied to mobile applications to help firms
and regulators monitor fish populations.194 In 2017, MARA issued new regulations obligating the
coastal provinces of Liaoning, Shandong, Zhejiang, and Fujian to establish total allowable catch
(TAC) pilot programs. According to an evaluation of the China’s TAC pilot programs conducted
by the Natural Resources Defense Council and Environmental Defense Fund in partnership with
the Qingdao Marine Conservation Society and Zhejiang Marine Fisheries Research Institute in
China, at least one fishery in each of China’s coastal provinces had implemented a TAC pilot by
the end of 2020.195 The evaluation’s findings indicated that although the TAC pilots created new

190 Belhabib et al., “The Fisheries of Africa: Exploitation, Policy, and Maritime Security Trends,” Marine Policy, vol.
101 (2019).
191 This section authored by Michael Sutherland.
192 Zhang Chun, “China Imposes Its First Closed Season for Distant-Water Fishing Fleet,” Maritime Executive, June
21, 2020, at https://www.maritime-executive.com/editorials/china-imposes-its-first-closed-season-for-distant-water-
fishing-fleet.
193 Drake Long, “China Announces Summer Fishing Ban in the South China Sea,” Radio Free Asia, May 1, 2020, at
https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/scs-fishing-05012020194131.html; Drake Long, “Chinese Fishing Boats
Return as South China Sea Fishing Ban Ends,” Eurasia Review, August 20, 2020, at https://www.eurasiareview.com/
20082020-chinese-boats-return-as-south-china-sea-fishing-ban-ends/.
194 The China Fisheries Association works alongside the government to set and enforce industry standards. See Dong
Xin, “手机 APP 即可远程养鱼，大数据促渔业全流程信息化 (A Cell Phone App That Can Remotely Raise Fishing
Populations, Promoting the Informationization of the Fishing Industry Through Big Data),” Yicai News, June 25, 2018;
中国渔业开展大数据研究，你吃的鱼将能追根溯源 (China Fisheries Launches Big Data Research Institute, The
Fish You Eat Will Soon Be Traceable),” Sohu, May 11, 2018, at https://www.sohu.com/a/231260424_561670.
195 Willard Wei, et al., “Progress of China’s TAC System: Evaluation for Zhejiang and Fujian Pilots,” Environmental
Defense Fund, May 2021, at https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/documents/
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tools that allow both the Chinese government and international organizations increased visibility
into total catch numbers, significant shortcomings in catch verification methodology, loopholes
created by the role of transshipment vessels, and a lack of concrete enforcement measures pose
significant obstacles.196
MARA and the National People’s Congress, China’s national legislative body, are also taking
steps to update various administrative measures and laws to deter IUU fishing and establish
stricter management standards in China’s distant-water fishing sector.197 In August 2019, MARA
issued Measures for the Supervision and Location Monitoring of Distant Ocean Fishing Vessels
(hereinafter referred to as “the Measures”), requiring all fishing vessels “approved by the
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs to engage in offshore fisheries production” to install
location monitoring equipment.198 The Measures obligate vessels incorporated into the new
position monitoring system to report their positions multiple times per day to MARA and
provincial fishing authorities, and entrust the China Fisheries Association with the equipment
maintenance, technical training, and standards-setting required to implement the new position
monitoring system.
Enforcement measures outlined in the Measures are vague—the only specific enforcement
mechanism states that vessels that falsify location data or improperly remove monitoring
equipment forfeit all “policy subsidies” for the year in which the violation occurred.199 In
February 2020 MARA issued additional Regulations on the Management of Distant Ocean
Fisheries including the provision that vessels engaged in IUU fishing or failed to accurately
report their positions risk being placed on a “blacklist” which prohibits violators from applying
for fishing licenses for five years.200
MARA also published in August 2019 a draft revision of China’s 1986 Fisheries Law. The new
version aims to clarify penalties for IUU fishing, outline new enforcement mechanisms, and
establish law enforcement powers and standards for investigating and punishing IUU violations.
Enforcement measures in the proposed revision include vessel confiscation, revocation of

Progress%20of%20Chinas%20TAC%20System%20report%2C%20English%2C%20May%202021.pdf?_gl=
1*s9n34t*_ga*MTMwMjcwMTIxMS4xNjQxNTk0OTM0*_ga_WE3BPRQKW0*MTY0MTU5NDkzNC4xLjAuMTY
0MTU5NDkzNy41Nw.., p. 3.
196 Ibid., pp. 8-15.
197 Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, “农业部关于加快推进渔业转方式调结构的指导意见 (Guiding
Opinions of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs on Accelerating and Promoting Fishery Transformation and
Structural Adjustment),” May 4, 2016, http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2016/content_5109351.htm; Standing
Committee of the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China, “全国人民代表大会常务委员会执
法检查组关于检查《中华人民共和国渔业法》实施情况的报告 (Report of the Law Enforcement and Examination
Group of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress Examining the Implementation of the Fisheries
Law of the People’s Republic of China),” December 24, 2019, http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c30834/201912/
022a2e6da6374d1dab4cb4606c54092d.shtml.
198 Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “农业农村部关于印发《远洋渔船船
位监测里办法》的通知 (Notice Regarding the Publication of Measures for the Supervision and Location Monitoring
of Distant Ocean Fishing Vessels),” August 19, 2019, at http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2019-08/19/content_5422285.htm.
199 Refer to Article 28 in the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “农业农村部
关于印发《远洋渔船船位监测里办法》的通知 (Notice Regarding the Publication of Measures for the Supervision
and Location Monitoring of Distant Ocean Fishing Vessels).”
200 Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “中华人民共和国农业农村部令 2020
第 2 号《远洋渔业管理规定》 (Order No. 2 of 2020 of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, Regulations on
the Management of Distant Ocean Fisheries),” February 10, 2020, at http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/2020-03/
13/content_5490763.htm.
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company fishing licenses, and the recording of severe violations in China’s Corporate Social
Credit databases, which could expose violators to a wide range of additional administrative
penalties.201 This proposed revision has yet to enter into force, and several experts contend that
the Chinese government lacks the administrative capacity to enforce these new provisions given
the size of China’s DWF and the government’s apparent unwillingness to acknowledge the true
size of its DWF.202
International and U.S. Responses to IUU Fishing
International bodies, Congress, and successive administrations have taken a number of actions to
combat IUU fishing. These actions attempt to influence the behavior of fishing fleets through
international agreements and trade because most IUU activities occur outside of U.S.
jurisdiction.203
International and National Plans of Action
In 2001, the International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported,
and Unregulated Fishing was adopted by the Committee on Fisheries of the FAO.204 The
International Plan of Action (IPOA) is a voluntary instrument that specifies and advances national
and regional measures to prevent, deter, and eliminate IUU fishing. According to the IPOA,
management measures should be consistent with the conservation and long-term sustainable use
of fish stocks and protection of the environment. The IPOA provides nations and RFMOs with a
framework that outlines the responsibilities of coastal and flag states.205 The responsibilities of
flag states outlined in the IPOA include
 ensuring fishing vessels flying a state’s flag do not engage in or support IUU
fishing;
 maintaining a record of vessels entitled to fly the state’s flag; and
 adopting measures to ensure no vessel be allowed to fish unless authorized in a
manner consistent with international law for the high seas.
The IPOA calls on all nations to voluntarily develop and adopt their own national plans of action.
The IPOA also encourages additional actions to be taken by nations, such as port state, market-

201 Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “中华人民共和国渔业法订修订草案
（征求意见稿）(Amendment to the Fisheries Law of the People’s Republic of China (Draft for Public Comment),”
August 2019, available at http://www.moa.gov.cn/hd/zqyj/201908/t20190828_6323271.htm. For more on China’s
Corporate Social Credit System, see CRS In Focus IF11342, China’s Corporate Social Credit System, by Michael D.
Sutherland.
202 Miren Gutierrez et al., “China’s Distant-Water Fishing Fleet,” Overseas Development Institute, June 2020,
https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/chinesedistantwaterfishing_web_1.pdf; Zhang Chun,
“China Targets Distant-Water Criminals with New Fisheries Law,” China Dialogue, January 21, 2020; Ian Urbina,
“How China’s Expanding Fishing Fleet Is Depleting the World’s Oceans,” Yale Environment 360, August 17, 2020,
https://e360.yale.edu/features/how-chinas-expanding-fishing-fleet-is-depleting-worlds-oceans.
203 Actions to combat IUU fishing have included enforcement agreements with partner countries, trade monitoring,
implementation and enforcement of international treaties, and broad efforts to promote resource sustainability.
204 United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate
Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing, Rome, Italy, 2001, http://www.fao.org/port-state-measures/resources/
detail/en/c/1113476/.
205 United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate
Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated, Rome, Italy, 2001, http://www.fao.org/fishery/ipoa-iuu/legal-text/en.
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related, and coastal state measures, to ensure that nations do not support or engage in IUU
fishing. The FAO lists 14 national plans of action and 3 regional plans of action.206 In 2004, the
United States adopted a plan of action that complement the measures identified in the IPOA.207
International Port State Measures Agreement
The Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported, and
Unregulated Fishing (PSMA) is the first binding international agreement to target IUU fishing.
The agreement was approved by the FAO at its Thirty-sixth Session on November 22, 2009.208
The PSMA provides port states with the authority to restrict port access of vessels engaged in
IUU fishing, thereby seeking to prevent illegally caught fish from entering international markets.
In addition, some countries have also decided to prohibit trade with countries that do not have
port state measures in place.209
Under the terms of the treaty,
 foreign vessels are required to provide advance notice and request permission for
port entry;
 port countries conduct regular inspections in accordance with universal minimum
standards;
 offending vessels may be denied use of port or certain port services; and
 information sharing networks will be established.
The United States signed the agreement on November 22, 2009. The President transmitted it to
the Senate on November 14, 2010, and the Senate agreed to a resolution of advice and consent to
ratification on April 3, 2014. Congress subsequently enacted implementing legislation, the Illegal,
Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing Enforcement Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-81) on November
5, 2015. President Obama signed the treaty on February 10, 2016.210 In 2016, the agreement
entered into force with approval of 30 parties and according to the FAO there are now 69 parties
to the agreement.211 As of October 2021, China has not become a party or ratified the PSMA.212

206 United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate
Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing, National and International Plans of Action, Rome, http://www.fao.org/
fishery/ipoa-iuu/npoa/en.
207 U.S. Department of State, National Plan of Action of the United States of America to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate
Illegal, Unregulated, and Unreported Fishing, Washington, DC, 2004.
208 United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and
Eliminate Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing, Rome, Italy, 2016, http://www.fao.org/documents/card/en/c/
915655b8-e31c-479c-bf07-30cba21ea4b0/.
209 See United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, Agreement on Port State Measures, Rome, Italy,
http://www.fao.org/port-state-measures/en/.
210 P.L. 114-81 included implementing legislation that directs federal agencies to carry out U.S. obligations under the
treaty. The law also includes provisions related to duties of the Secretary of Commerce, procedures for vessels entering
U.S. ports, denial of port services, inspections, prohibited acts, and enforcement.
211 “To become Party to the PSMA, an original instrument of adherence should be deposited with the FAO Director-
General. For PSMA signatories, this instrument could be one of acceptance, ratification or approval while for non-
signatories, this is an instrument of accession.” United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, Agreement on Port
State Measures to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing, Rome, Italy, May
2018, http://www.fao.org/port-state-measures/resources/detail/en/c/1113476/.
212 United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, Agreement on Port State Measures, Parties to the Agreement,
http://www.fao.org/port-state-measures/background/parties-psma/en/.
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Moratorium Protection Act
The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Reauthorization Act of 2006 (P.L.
109-479) amended the High Seas Driftnet Fishing Moratorium Protection Act (Moratorium
Protection Act, P.L. 104-43) to address IUU fishing and bycatch of protected living marine
resources (PLMR).213 The Shark Conservation Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-348) also amended the
Moratorium Protection Act to address issues related to the conservation and management of
sharks, including shark finning. Management of transboundary stocks such as highly migratory
species and shared stocks depend on international conservation and management efforts. The
Moratorium Protection Act seeks to strengthen these efforts by providing a mechanism for
identifying and sanctioning foreign vessels engaged in IUU fishing activities. NOAA’s National
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) developed regulations to implement the IUU, PLMR, and
shark-related amendments to the act.
The Moratorium Protection Act also requires the Secretary of Commerce to identify nations
whose fishing vessels are engaged in IUU fishing or in activities that result in taking PMLRs.
Identification of IUU fishing under the Moratorium Protection Act and implementing regulations
only apply to violations in the U.S. EEZ waters or violations of conservation and management
measures of RFMOs to which the United States and nation in question are contracting parties.214
The Secretary is required to establish procedures to certify whether identified nations take actions
to address their IUU activities. Identified nations are notified by the Secretary of State.
After a nation is identified, the Secretary of Commerce consults and negotiates with the identified
nation to address the reasons why it was identified. A positive certification is issued if the fishing
nation has addressed the problems associated with its identification. If the identified nation does
not adopt conservation measures that are comparable to those of the United States, it may be
negatively certified. A negatively certified nation becomes subject to sanctions such as denial of
port access and prohibitions on importing certain fish and fish products.
The Moratorium Protection Act requires NMFS to submit biennial reports to Congress concerning
implementation and enforcement of the act. The report is required to include the following:
 the state of knowledge on the status of international living marine resources
shared by the United States or managed under treaties or agreements to which the
United States is a party;
 a list of identified nations that are or have been engaged in IUU fishing or
bycatch of PMLRs;
 a description of corrective efforts taken by identified nations to address the IUU
fishing activities of their flagged vessels;
 progress made to strengthen RFMOs and to end IUU fishing;

213 In 1992, Congress passed the High Seas Driftnet Fisheries Enforcement Act (P.L. 102-582) and in 1995, Congress
passed the High Seas Driftnet Fishing Moratorium Protection Act (Title VI of the Fisheries Act of 1995) (P.L. 104-43)
to implement the United Nations moratorium on high seas driftnet fishing.
214 While several RFMOs to which the United States and China are both contracting parties do have prohibitions on
unauthorized fishing in areas under the jurisdiction of another party, the protocols for action largely place responsibility
on the aggrieved party to initiate discussion on a bilateral basis, and if unresolved, to bring the matter before the
RFMO.
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 steps taken by the Secretary of Commerce to encourage the adoption of
international measures comparable to the United States to reduce the impact of
fishing on PLMRs; and
 whether nations identified in the previous report have taken actions to address
IUU fishing or bycatch of PLMRs.
According to the most recent biennial report to Congress, the Secretary of Commerce identified 7
nations with vessels engaged in IUU fishing activities and 29 nations that lack a regulatory
program to reduce the bycatch of protected marine life that is comparable in effectiveness to U.S.
programs.215 China was identified both for engaging in IUU activities and for the lack of a
regulatory bycatch program for protected marine living resources. According to the report,
Chinese fishing vessels violated conservation measures adopted by the North Pacific Fisheries
Commission (NPFC), the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC), the Inter-
American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC), and the International Commission for the
Conservation and Atlantic Tuna (ICCAT).216 NMFS identified violations related to harvest by
unauthorized vessels, and violations of shark-related conservation measures and transshipment.217
According to the 2021 report,
Following identification in this report, China’s 2023 certification will be based on evidence
that China is upholding its flag State duties under Article 13 of the NPFC Convention on
flag State duties, as there are currently at least 30 vessels on the NPFC IUU vessel list with
evidence of Chinese registration. China’s 2023 certification decision will also be based on
evidence that China has taken steps to investigate these violations of WCPFC, IATTC, and
ICCAT Conservation Management Measures, and evidence that corrective actions were
taken to address any substantiated violations.
IUU Task Force and Seafood Import Monitoring
On June 17, 2014, President Obama released a presidential memorandum entitled,
“Comprehensive Framework to Combat Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing and
Seafood Fraud,”218 calling on executive departments and agencies to use existing authorities to
combat IUU fishing and seafood fraud, such as the Magnuson-Stevens Act and Lacey Act.219 The
memorandum established a task force composed of senior level federal agency representatives to
develop recommendations for a comprehensive framework that targets IUU fishing and seafood

215 National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), Improving International Fisheries Management, Developed pursuant to
the High Seas Driftnet Fishing Moratorium Protection Act, August 2021, https://media.fisheries.noaa.gov/2021-08/
2021ReporttoCongressonImprovingInternationalFisheriesManagement.pdf. Hereinafter cited as NMFS, 2021.
216 NMFS, 2021.
217 Although these activities were not evaluated through the WCPFC, IATTC, or ICCAT compliance evaluation
processes, they constitute violations of the conservation and management measures of the three RFMOs. Thus, NMFS
identified China for having vessels that engage in IUU fishing.
218 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Presidential Memorandum—Comprehensive Framework to
Combat Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing and Seafood Fraud,” press release, June 17, 2014, at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/17/presidential-memorandum-comprehensive-framework-
combat-illegal-unreporte.
219 The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (16 U.S.C. 1857(1) (Q)) prohibits the import
and trade, in interstate or foreign commerce, of fish taken, possessed, transported or sold in violation of any foreign law
or regulation or in contravention of a treaty or a binding conservation measure of a regional fishery organization to
which the United States is a party. The Lacey Act (16 U.S.C. 3371-3378) makes it unlawful for any person to import,
export, transport, sell, receive, acquire, or purchase any fish or wildlife or plant taken, possessed, transported or sold in
violation of any law, treaty, or regulation of the United States or in violation of any Indian tribal law.
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fraud. On March 15, 2015, the task force released 15 final recommendations organized according
to the following categories:
 International. Work with international governments, regional fisheries
management organizations, and others to combat IUU fishing and seafood fraud
at the international level.
 Enforcement. Strengthen enforcement tools to combat IUU fishing.
 Partnerships. Create and expand partnerships with U.S. state and local
governments, industry, and nongovernmental organizations to identify and
eliminate seafood fraud and IUU seafood in U.S. commerce.
 Traceability. Create a risk-based traceability program to track seafood from
harvest to entry into U.S. commerce to prevent entry of illegal product into the
supply chain and better inform retailers and consumers.
IUU fishing occurs throughout the world, and a portion of seafood entering the United States
reportedly is obtained from IUU fishing activities. The U.S. International Trade Commission
estimated that in 2019 about $2.4 billion (or 11%) worth of U.S. seafood imports were products
of IUU fishing, of which about $204.3 million were obtained from Chinese IUU fishing.220 Those
who harvest seafood illegally may attempt to avoid detection by concealing its origin or
mislabeling seafood, but seafood fraud can occur whether seafood products are harvested legally
or illegally. Some have recommended that IUU fishing be addressed at the source, before the
product enters the market system.
The Seafood Import Monitoring Program (SIMP) is a risk-based traceability program managed by
NOAA and U.S. Customs that tracks imported fish and fish products. 221 The program’s authority
is based on the Magnuson-Stevens Act’s prohibition on the import and trade of fish taken,
possessed, transported, or sold in violation of any foreign law or regulation.222 On December 9,
2016, the Final Rule providing the operational and data requirements for SIMP was published by
NOAA.223 SIMP requires seafood importers to follow specific reporting and recordkeeping
procedures for 13 at-risk (priority) species groups, which includes over 1,100 unique species.224
Each seafood importer is required to obtain an annually renewable International Fisheries Trade
Permit from NOAA’s NMFS. The permit holder is then responsible for collecting and entering
accurate information for these 13 species, which can be used to verify that products have been
lawfully acquired.

220 ITC, “Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing Accounts for More Than $2 Billion of U.S. Seafood Imports,
Reports USITC,” press release, March 18, 2021, at https://www.usitc.gov/press_room/news_release/2021/
er0318ll1740.htm.
221 NOAA Fisheries, “Seafood Monitoring Program,” https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/international/seafood-import-
monitoring-program.
222 16 U.S.C. 1857(1)(Q).
223 NMFS, “Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act,” 81 Federal Register 88975-88998,
December 9, 2016.
224 NOAA’s Final Rule identified at-risk (i.e., vulnerable to IUU, seafood fraud, or both) imported species. On January
1, 2018, compliance for 11 at-risk import species or species groups went into effect. On December 31, 2018, shrimp
and abalone were added, bringing the list to 13 at-risk imported species and species groups. See NOAA, “Seafood
Import Monitoring Program,” at https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/international/seafood-import-monitoring-program.
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Compliance and Enforcement Measures
The IUU task force and subsequent administration and legislative actions have supported
compliance and enforcement measures through agreements with other coastal nations,
surveillance and boarding measures adopted by RFMOs, and interagency cooperation.
Maritime Security and Fisheries Enforcement Act
The Maritime Security and Fisheries Enforcement Act (Maritime SAFE Act; P.L. 116-92),
enacted in 2019, supports a whole-of-government approach to counter IUU fishing and related
threats to maritime security. The Maritime SAFE Act established the U.S. Interagency Working
Group on IUU fishing, which serves as the lead body for providing member federal agencies with
a means to share information and coordinate efforts, strengthen maritime enforcement, and
advance public-private partnerships, and provide technical assistance on IUU fishing.
The working group is comprised of 21 agencies and the group’s chair and deputy chair rotate
among NOAA, the Department of State, and the U.S. Coast Guard. Member agencies developed
priorities and identified activities that included issues such as maritime intelligence, public-
private partnerships, and human trafficking. A related effort was the Executive Order on
Promoting American Seafood Competitiveness and Economic Growth (E.O. 13921). Section 5 of
the E.O. 13921 set a deadline for proposed rulemaking to implement Port State Measures and
provided support for a variety of efforts related to public private partnerships, training and
technical assistance, and existing enforcement capabilities to combat IUU fishing.225
Transnational Crime and IUU Fishing226
Il egal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing is a potentially lucrative form of transnational organized crime
that can be associated with a broad range of transnational criminal activity, including marine life poaching (e.g.,
il egal catches of Patagonian toothfish, Mexican totoaba and vaquita, South African abalone and rock lobsters,
Scottish razor clams, Missouri paddlefish); fraud (e.g., fishing vessel, catch documentation, product labeling fraud);
and financial crimes (e.g., tax and customs evasion, money laundering, bribery).227 More broadly, crime in the
fisheries sector can also include labor-related abuses (e.g., worker’s rights violations and human trafficking,
including forced labor or modern slavery); maritime contraband smuggling (e.g., il egal drugs, migrants, weapons,
fuel derived from oil bunkering activities), and other forms of maritime insecurity (e.g., piracy, armed robbery at
sea, ship hijackings, hostage-taking, kidnapping for ransom, terrorism).228

225 Executive Order E.O. 13921, “Executive Order on Promoting American Seafood Competitiveness and Economic
Growth,” May 7, 2020.
226 This section authored by Liana Rosen and Katarina O’Regan.
227 Emma Witbooi et al., Organized Crime in the Fisheries Sector, High Level Panel for a Sustainable Ocean Economy,
2020; INTERPOL, Fraudulent Abuse of Flag State Registries for Fishing Vessels, Purple Notice, November 14, 2018;
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Evading the Net: Tax Crime in the Fisheries Sector, 2013;
Cathy Haenlein, Below the Surface: How Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing Threatens Our Security,
occasional paper, Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security Studies, 2017; Teale N. Phelps Bondaroff,
The Illegal Fishing and Organized Crime Nexus: Illegal Fishing as Transnational Organized Crime, The Global
Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and The Black Fish, April 2015.
228 NOAA, Human Trafficking in the Seafood Supply Chain, Section 3563 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2020 (P.L. 116-92), Report to Congress, December 23, 2020; INTERPOL, Human Trafficking and
Modern Slavery in the Fisheries Sector, Purple Notice, January 2, 2017; INTERPOL, Human Trafficking and Forced
Labour: The Deceptive and Coercive Practices Undertaken Within the Recruitment Process to Work on Fishing
Vessels, Purple Notice, as updated July 8, 2019; Mary Mackay et al., “The Intersection Between Illegal Fishing, Crimes
at Sea, and Social Well-Being,” Frontiers in Marine Science, vol. 7, October 12, 2020, pp. 1-9; International Labour
Office, Caught at Sea: Forced Labour and Trafficking in Fisheries, 2013; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime,
Transnational Organized Crime in the Fishing Industry, Focus On: Trafficking in Persons, Smuggling of Migrants,
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Although crime in the fisheries sector is not a new phenomenon, international attention to the relationship
between IUU fishing and transnational crime has grown due to the scale and impact of IUU fishing on the global
economy and human security.229 IUU fishing thrives in and between jurisdictions characterized by legal, regulatory,
and enforcement capability gaps throughout the fisheries value chain, high levels of corruption, and overall weak
governance. Even among countries with stronger anti-IUU fishing capabilities, enforcement efforts to date have
had limited deterrent effect due to the often remote and vast maritime operating environment. According to the
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, a key contributing factor to criminality in the fisheries sector is “a
general lack of governance and rule of law in the fishing industry,” particularly with respect to at-sea surveillance
of fishing vessel movements and transshipments, transparency of fishing vessels’ beneficial ownership and identity,
and use of flags of convenience (i.e., frequent changes in vessel color, name, and flag state) to evade regulatory
oversight and law enforcement investigations.230 The inherently transnational nature of fisheries crimes
complicates efforts to bring perpetrators to justice.231
China’s significant demand for and production of fish products, coupled with an extensive and global fishing fleet,
makes its participation central to the sustainable management of global fish stocks. Chinese-flagged vessels are
alleged to engage in il egal fishing in the EEZs of other countries, including Argentina, Senegal, Guinea, Sierra
Leone, Guinea Bissau, Vanuatu, Micronesia, Ecuador, and Peru, as well as littoral states in the East and South China
Seas.232
Enforcement Efforts
Shiprider agreements are cooperative enforcement arrangements between the United States and
other coastal nations. Under these agreements U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) personnel and host
country counterparts participate in joint at-sea enforcement actions and training programs.
Shiprider agreements improve enforcement and compliance by closing maritime gaps, improving
coordination, cooperation, and interoperability, and building enforcement capacity.233 Assistance
often includes maritime surveillance and boarding of fishing vessels in waters under the host
nation’s authority. The USCG has 16 bilateral agreements with countries in the Pacific and West
Africa.234 The U.S. Navy has also supported maritime domain awareness to support USCG

Illicit Drugs Trafficking, 2011.
229 See, for example, World Bank, Turning the Tide Saving Fish and Fishers, 2005; United Nations General Assembly,
Resolution 63/112 adopted on December 5, 2008, A/RES/63/112, February 25, 2009; United Nations Commission on
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Report on the 20th Session, E/2011/30, E/CN.15/2011/21, Resolution 20/5,
“Combating the Problem of Transnational Organized Crime Committed at Sea,” pp. 45-48; Ministers’ Declaration on
Transnational Organised Crime in the Global Fishing Industry, October 15, 2018, https://bluejustice.org/copenhagen-
declaration/; United Nations Security Council, “High Seas Crime Becoming More Sophisticated, Endangering Lives,
International Security, Speakers Tell Security Council,” SC/13691, February 5, 2019.
230 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Transnational Organized Crime in the Fishing Industry, Focus On:
Trafficking in Persons, Smuggling of Migrants, Illicit Drugs Trafficking, 2011, p. 4. See also Dyhia Belhabib and
Philippe Le Billion, “Editorial: Illegal Fishing as a Trans-National Crime,” Frontiers in Marine Science, vol. 7, March
2020, pp. 1-3.
231 As described by INTERPOL, fisheries crimes and complicit actors may involve a multitude of jurisdictions,
including the flag state(s) of the fishing vessel(s); the coastal state in whose waters the crimes occurred, as applicable;
the port state where illegal catches were landed; the nationalities of the individuals, crew, operators, and companies; the
import and/or export states; wherever the vessel insurers operate; where the beneficial owners reside; from where and
to where corrupt proceeds and laundered funds originate and are funneled. INTERPOL, International Law Enforcement
Cooperation in the Fisheries Sector: A Guide for Law Enforcement Practitioners, February, 2018, p. 16.
232 See, for example, Reniel B. Cabral et al., “Rapid and Lasting Gains from Solving Illegal Fishing,” Nature Ecology
& Evolution, vol. 2 (2018), pp. 650-658; NOAA, Improving International Fisheries Management, Report to Congress,
September 2019, pp. 37-38.
233 U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Coast Guard Fisheries Enforcement Shiprider Operations,
January 5, 2008, https://rmportal.net/biodiversityconservation-gateway/legality-sustainability/fisheries-development/
project-search/add-a-project-activity/u.s.-coast-guard-fisheries-enforcement-shiprider-operations.
234 The United States has signed bilateral shiprider agreements with 5 West African countries (Cape Verde, The
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enforcement operations in Oceania. Naval ships are also used as a base to launch boarding parties
composed of USCG and host country enforcement personnel. Goals of the initiative are to combat
transnational crime including drug trafficking, human trafficking, and IUU fishing.
In September 2020, the USCG released a new strategy to combat IUU fishing.235 At the time of
the strategy’s release, Commandant of the USCG Admiral Karl Schultz stated that “we are
committed to working with our allies and like-minded partners to strengthen the international
fisheries enforcement regime and counter this pervasive threat.… [T]he Coast Guard has a
responsibility to help build a coalition of partners willing to identify and address IUU fishing bad
actors.”236
Fisheries Compliance and Enforcement
The main objective of fishery enforcement is to improve compliance by deterring fishermen from conducting il egal
fishing activities. Measures that may improve compliance include the use of on-board compliance inspectors
(observers), air patrols, ship patrols and vessel boarding, vessel monitoring systems (VMS), and dock-side
enforcement. Enforcement efforts can include a variety of measures depending on regulations, participants,
geographic extent of fishing, and fishery resources.
Compliance and enforcement of fisheries management measures are often difficult to enact because of the vast
ocean areas where Il egal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) activities occur and the high associated costs of
surface or aerial patrols. VMS are widely used to monitor vessel location and movements from remote locations.
These systems employ electronic transmitters that are installed on fishing vessels and send information to
satellites. Data are then relayed to enforcement personnel who monitor information such as vessel identification,
date, time, and location. VMS can support law enforcement by indicating whether fishing vessels have entered
fishing zones or closed areas and by allowing patrols to focus on areas with the highest potential for violations.
Some Regional Fisheries Management Organizations such as the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries
Commission require the use of VMS for vessels fishing in their convention areas. The costs of VMS can be high and
all vessels do not necessarily carry a VMS transmitter, especial y those that may be operating il egally. The efficacy
of these systems depends on whether they are used consistently and provide information on a real-time basis. It
also depends on whether data such as vessel name, class, flag operator, and owner are available and matched to
vessel databases.
Port state measures focus on vessel inspections, which may limit transport of il egally harvested products through
certain ports. These measures also may be a disincentive to il egal activity because they can make transshipments
of fish and the resupply of fishing vessels more costly. Enforcement of port state measures and VMS depend on
being able to identify vessels. Identification of individual vessels is often challenging because of the different
databases that are maintained and the different types of information that is kept by each.237 Many fishing vessels
that are involved in IUU activities are registered in flag of convenience states that do not hold their vessels
accountable.238 These vessels add to confusion by frequently changing their name, ownership, and nationality.
Another challenge is related to the tracking of transshipments that take place at sea and identifying refrigerated
cargo vessels that transship fishery products.
An ongoing effort to standardize data for the world’s fishing vessels is the United Nations Food and Agriculture
Organization’s Global Record of fishing vessels, refrigerated transport vessels, and supply vessels.239 The goal of
the Global Record is to enhance transparency and traceability of vessel and vessel-related data. Each vessel is

Gambia, Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Senegal) and 10 Pacific island countries (Kiribati, Palau, Marshall Islands,
Micronesia, Cook Islands, Tonga, Nauru, Tuvalu, Samoa, and Vanuatu).
235 United States Coast Guard, “Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing Strategic Outlook,” at
https://www.uscg.mil/iuufishing/.
236 Mathew West, “Coast Guard Releases New Plan to Combat Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing
Worldwide,” September 18, 2020, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.
237 Miren Gutierrez, Alfonso Daniels, and Guy Jobbins, Fishing for Data, Overseas Development Institute, Briefing
Note, London, January 2018.
238 National Intelligence Council, Global Implications of Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing, NIC WP
2016-02, September 19, 2016.
239 United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, Global Record of Fishing Vessels, Refrigerated Transport
Vessels, and Supply Vessels, Rome, Italy, January, http://www.fao.org/global-record/en/.
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provided a unique identifier that remains constant regardless of changes in name, ownership, or flag of the vessel.
These data are to be made available in an online repository of vessels that can be used in support of enforcement
activities such as port state measures.
Issues for Congress
Issues for Congress related to IUU fishing and China may involve two general areas—review of
existing laws and administration efforts, and identification of additional authorities that may be
needed to combat IUU fishing activities and their associated impacts. Areas for congressional
action may include improving seafood traceability, increasing surveillance and enforcement, and
supporting existing international agreements. Given the prominent role of the Chinese DWF in
many regional and global fisheries, Congress may consider whether U.S. actions should focus on
the behavior of China’s fishing fleets or continue to take a more general approach to combating
IUU activity.
Many enforcement and regulatory issues related to IUU fishing cut across different federal
agencies. The Obama Administration’s establishment of the IUU Task Force and the Trump
Administration’s creation of the U.S. Interagency Working Group on IUU fishing attempted to
meet this challenge and improve interagency information-sharing and coordination. Although
IUU fishing as defined by the FAO and U.S. law does not include activities related to human
trafficking and transnational crime (see the Appendix), vessels responsible for IUU fishing may
also commit other types of illegal activities. Congress may also wish to consider whether U.S.
efforts to combat IUU fishing should coordinate with agencies focused on these related issues.
Congress may also examine whether sufficient support and resources have been dedicated to
enforcement efforts such as capacity-building assistance to coastal nations and joint efforts, such
as shiprider agreements. Often the seafood sector is related to other national and international
concerns such as security, stability, and potential conflict. IUU fishing may intensify disputes and
conflicts by affecting the livelihoods of fishermen in coastal nations and local supplies of
seafood. Efforts may encourage programs that strengthen governance in developing countries—
such as information collection (including resources for the application of technologies, such as
Vessel Monitoring Systems), development of management measures, and enforcement—which
are applicable across a range of economic and security issues.
Congress may also explore ways to improve seafood traceability to verify information currently
collected on the origin and the route taken by seafood before its entry into the United States.
Almost half of the fish that China catches in its DWF operations is sold abroad, mostly to
developed countries, including the United States. Some U.S. programs, such as SIMP and
existing customs enforcement measures, have attempted to provide greater scrutiny over seafood
imports. For example, NOAA’s SIMP could be expanded to include all species imported by the
United States. Congress may also consider increasing customs enforcement at the border and
whether greater resources are needed to fully account for the seafood entering the country.
Increased efforts to trace seafood may also serve several other purposes such as improving
seafood safety, stopping seafood fraud, and identifying seafood production related to human
trafficking.
Congress may also consider lending greater diplomatic support to the adoption and
implementation of international treaties and agreements. Given the number of nations involved in
many regional fisheries, multilateral approaches that strengthen international institutions and their
enforcement are often needed. Congress may also weigh in on the ongoing WTO negotiation
concerning fisheries subsides. Fisheries subsidies are an economic driver that increases the
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fishing effort of DWF. Decreasing fisheries subsidies could make marginal fishing operations
unprofitable, potentially decreasing fishing effort and improving conservation and management
efforts. In particular, Congress may provide guidance for WTO negotiations on fishery subsidies
and whether exceptions for LDCs including China are appropriate or necessary to reach an
agreement.
Congress might consider whether more resources and greater diplomatic support could help in the
coordination of fishery management in adjacent territorial waters or establishment of new
RFMOs in contested waters or overfished areas. Scientists contend that because fish populations
often move freely among neighboring jurisdictions, management and conservation of
transboundary, straddling, or highly migratory fish stocks requires limits on harvest irrespective
of where stocks are caught.240 Given that the habitat and migration areas of certain fish
populations can span the territorial waters of two or more nations, bilateral or multilateral
dialogues involving such nations (in the absence of RFMOs) could benefit from the coordinated
establishment of fishery and environment management areas. The establishment of new RFMOs
(e.g., in the South China Sea) could help reduce the number of fisheries conflicts between
neighboring nations.
Congress may also consider whether the Moratorium Protection Act provides an adequate means
to identify and sanction vessels, companies, or countries that participate or condone IUU
activities, or if such efforts could be strengthened. Although implementation of the Moratorium
Protection Act has led to identification of certain IUU activity of other nations, identification
seldom results in a negative certification or sanctions on offending parties. Congress may also
consider whether the Moratorium Protection Act should be expanded to include other types of
illegal activities associated with fishing operations such as human trafficking, or whether these
concerns should be handled through other existing laws such as the Tariff Act of 1930.
In addition, Congress may consider how such issues fit into broader U.S. policy towards China.
Environmental protection previously has been an area of U.S-China cooperation; management
and conservation of fisheries resources could potentially provide an additional area for productive
engagement. Congress may conduct oversight that focuses on U.S. government efforts to address
China’s role in IUU fishing. China has demonstrated a willingness to ratify international
agreements and participate in international institutions; thus, the United States might continue to
work with China on a multilateral and bilateral levels to manage global fisheries. Congress may
consider whether to encourage the U.S. agencies to consider whether joint enforcement and data
collection efforts might be implemented on bilateral and multilateral levels.

240 The United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (in force as from 11 December 2001), https://www.un.org/depts/los/
convention_agreements/convention_overview_fish_stocks.htm. Gordon Munroe, “The Conservation and Management
of Shared Fish Stocks: Legal and Economic Aspects,” Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations,
Rome, 2004.
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Appendix. Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated
Fishing Definitions
The Moratorium Protection Act provided guidelines to define IUU fishing. The following is from
16 U.S.C. 1826j(e).
(e) ILLEGAL, UNREPORTED, OR UNREGULATED FISHING DEFINED.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—In this Act the term ‘illegal, unreported, or unregulated fishing’ has
the meaning established under paragraph (2).
(2) SECRETARY TO DEFINE TERM WITHIN LEGISLATIVE GUIDELINES.—
Within 3 months after the date of enactment of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery
Conservation and Management Reauthorization Act of 2006, the Secretary shall publish a
definition of the term ‘illegal, unreported, or unregulated fishing’ for purposes of this Act.
The Secretary shall include in the definition, at a minimum—
(A) fishing activities that violate conservation and management measures required under
an international fishery management agreement to which the United States is a party,
including catch limits or quotas, capacity restrictions, bycatch reduction requirements, and
shark conservation measures;
(B) overfishing of fish stocks shared by the United States, for which there are no applicable
international conservation or management measures or in areas with no applicable
international fishery management organization or agreement, that has adverse impacts on
such stocks; and
(C) fishing activity that has an adverse impact on seamounts, hydrothermal vents, and cold
water corals located beyond national jurisdiction, for which there are no applicable
conservation or management measures or in areas with no applicable international fishery
management organization or agreement.
The term was defined in 2011241 and in 2013, NMFS made changes to the IUU definition by
clarifying some parts and making some additions.242 The definition as it now appears in 50 CFR §
300.201 is
Illegal, unreported, or unregulated (IUU) fishing means:
(1) In the case of parties to an international fishery management agreement to which the
United States is a party, fishing activities that violate conservation and management
measures required under an international fishery management agreement to which the
United States is a party, including but not limited to catch limits or quotas, capacity
restrictions, bycatch reduction requirements, shark conservation measures, and data
reporting;
(2) In the case of non-parties to an international fishery management agreement to which
the United States is a party, fishing activities that would undermine the conservation of the
resources managed under that agreement;
(3) Overfishing of fish stocks shared by the United States, for which there are no applicable
international conservation or management measures, or in areas with no applicable

241 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “High Seas Driftnet Fishing Moratorium Protection Act;
Identification and Certification Procedures to Address Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing Activities and
Bycatch of Protected Living Marine Resources,” 76 Federal Register 2024, January 12, 2011.
242 NMFS, “High Seas Driftnet Fishing Moratorium Protection Act; Identification and Certification Procedures to
Address Shark Conservation,” 78 Federal Register 3338-3346, January 16, 2013.
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international fishery management organization or agreement, that has adverse impacts on
such stocks; or,
(4) Fishing activity that has a significant adverse impact on seamounts, hydrothermal vents,
cold water corals and other vulnerable marine ecosystems located beyond any national
jurisdiction, for which there are no applicable conservation or management measures or in
areas with no applicable international fishery management organization or agreement.
(5) Fishing activities by foreign flagged vessels in U.S. waters without authorization of the
United States.
The definition of IUU fishing that is provided by the FAO is the following.243
Illegal fishing refers to activities:
•
conducted by national or foreign vessels in waters under the jurisdiction of a State,
without the permission of that State, or in contravention of its laws and regulations;
•
conducted by vessels flying the flag of States that are parties to a relevant regional
fisheries management organisation but operate in contravention of the conservation and
management measures adopted by that organisation and by which the States are bound, or
relevant provisions of the applicable international law; or
•
in violation of national laws or international obligations, including those undertaken
by cooperating States to a relevant regional fisheries management organization.
Unreported fishing refers to fishing activities:
•
which have not been reported, or have been misreported, to the relevant national
authority, in contravention of national laws and regulations; or
•
are undertaken in the area of competence of a relevant regional fisheries management
organisation which have not been reported or have been misreported, in contravention of
the reporting procedures of that organisation.
Unregulated fishing refers to fishing activities:
•
in the area of application of a relevant regional fisheries management organization that
are conducted by vessels without nationality, or by those flying the flag of a State not party
to that organization, or by a fishing entity, in a manner that is not consistent with or
contravenes the conservation and management measures of that organization; or
•
in areas or for fish stocks in relation to which there are no applicable conservation or
management measures and where such fishing activities are conducted in a manner
inconsistent with State responsibilities for the conservation of living marine resources
under international law.

243 U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization, International Plan of Action to prevent, deter, and eliminate illegal,
unreported, and unregulated fishing, Rome, IT, 2001, https://www.fao.org/3/y1224e/Y1224E.pdf.
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China’s Role in the Exploitation of Global Fisheries: Issues for Congress

Author Information

Bruce Vaughn, Coordinator
Katarina C. O'Regan
Specialist in Asian Affairs
Analyst in Foreign Policy

Ben Dolven, Coordinator
Liana W. Rosen
Specialist in Asian Affairs
Specialist in International Crime and Narcotics

Tomás F. Husted
Michael D. Sutherland
Analyst in African Affairs
Analyst in International Trade and Finance

Caitlin Keating-Bitonti
Liana Wong
Analyst in Natural Resources Policy
Analyst in International Trade and Finance

Acknowledgments
Former CRS analyst Harry Upton was a major contributor to and coordinator of this report.

Disclaimer
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under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
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