The Philippines: Background and U.S. Relations March 28, 2022
The United States and the Republic of the Philippines have a deep relationship that includes a
bilateral security alliance, extensive military cooperation, close people-to-people ties, and many
Thomas Lum
shared strategic and economic interests. The Philippines, situated east of the South China Sea and
Specialist in Asian Affairs
south of Taiwan, has long played an important role in U.S. Asia policy as a close security and

counterterrorism partner. The Philippines is a democratic state where popular support for the
Ben Dolven
bilateral relationship and the alliance is strong.
Specialist in Asian Affairs

President Rodrigo Duterte, whose term ends June 2022, has received high approval ratings
despite some controversial actions and policies, including carrying out a violent anti-illegal drug
Christina L. Arabia
campaign, harassing journalists critical of his government, threatening to terminate the
Analyst in Security
Philippines-U.S. Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) before reversing course and recommitting to
Assistance, Security
it, and seeking a rapprochement with China, a potentially large source of foreign investment. U.S.
Cooperation and the
policymakers have sought to preserve the longstanding bilateral relationship, despite some of
Global Arms Trade
Duterte’s policy stances that appeared to strain U.S.-Philippine bonds.

The Philippines is the largest country recipient of U.S. military assistance in the East Asia-Pacific

region, including Foreign Military Financing and assistance under the Department of Defense’s
Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative. U.S. military personnel and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) hold
regular bilateral military exercises and maritime patrols, collaborate on counterterrorism efforts, and conduct joint
humanitarian activities. The U.S.-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, signed in 2014, allows for the
increased rotational presence of U.S. military forces, ships, and aircraft in the Philippines, although President Duterte had
expressed skepticism about expanding the U.S. presence in the Philippines. Duterte’s threat to terminate the VFA raised
doubts about bilateral military ties, as the agreement governs the legal status of U.S. military forces operating in the
Philippines and establishes rules by which U.S. troops, vessels, and aircraft may enter the country. On July 30, 2021,
Philippine Defense Secretary Delfin Loranzana announced the Philippines would recommit to the agreement and Defense
Secretary Lloyd Austin III reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to the bilateral Mutual Defense Treaty.
The Philippines has long battled Muslim armed separatist and terrorist groups in the south of the country. ISIS–East Asia
(ISIS-EA), a loose collection of groups that have pledged allegiance to the Islamic State, has around 300-500 mostly Filipino
and some foreign fighters who have carried out sporadic attacks in Mindanao and Sulu. The U.S. military has provided
advisory and intelligence gathering support to the AFP in counterterrorism operations.
Since 2016, Duterte’s “War on Drugs” has resulted in thousands of extrajudicial killings. Estimates of drug war-related
deaths range from Philippine government figures of roughly 6,000 to counts by human rights organizations of over 27,000.
According to human rights groups, virtually all of the killings, which have been carried out by police and armed vigilantes,
occurred without due process, and the vast majority of victims have been unarmed, poor, low-level offenders. In response,
the U.S. government has suspended counternarcotics assistance to Philippine National Police units since 2016.
The Philippines and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have long-standing disputes over waters and land features in the
South China Sea. In 2016, a tribunal convened under the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague concluded that
China’s “Nine Dash Line” territorial claims have no legal basis under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS). Since 2019, flotillas of PRC vessels have regularly massed around Philippine-occupied land features, and in
2019, a PRC vessel sank a Philippine fishing boat in disputed waters. The Duterte government has not focused on the tribunal
ruling in its diplomatic efforts with China to address the territorial disputes. However, the Philippines recently has intensified
its efforts to protest Chinese incursions into disputed areas of the South China Sea that Manila considers to be part of its
Exclusive Economic Zone.
The Philippine Constitution limits the President to one six-year term. Preparations for the next Presidential election,
scheduled for May 2022, have begun. A wide range of presidential candidates have filed for the election, including Ferdinand
“Bongbong” Marcos Jr., son of the longtime Philippines president Ferdinand Marcos, and current Vice-President Leni
Robredo, a vocal Duterte critic. President Duterte announced plans to run for the Senate before reversing course and
withdrawing.

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The Philippines: Background and U.S. Relations

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The Philippines: Background and U.S. Relations

Overview
The United States and the Republic of the Philippines have maintained a deep relationship that
includes a bilateral security alliance, extensive military cooperation, close people-to-people ties,
and many shared strategic and economic interests.1 U.S. past administration of the Philippines as
a colonial territory (1898-1946) also has shaped the relationship, by both forging bonds, on the
one hand, and, among some Filipinos,2 creating a wariness of drawing too close to the United
States, on the other. Filipino-Americans constitute the third-largest Asian-American group in the
United States, numbering over 4.2 million people, and comprise the most numerous foreign-born
group in the U.S. Armed Forces.3
During Rodrigo Duterte’s term as President of the
Philippines, which began in 2016, U.S. policymakers have
Colonial History
sought to preserve the longstanding bilateral relationship,
The Philippines was unified and
despite some of Duterte’s policy stances that have appeared
colonized by Spain in 1542. Filipinos
to strain U.S.-Philippine bonds. Many Philippine diplomatic
waged a rebellion against Spain in
1896, but their independence
and military officials have been eager to maintain or
movement was not recognized by the
strengthen cooperation with the United States; however,
United States, which acquired the
Duterte’s documented distrust of the United States,4
territory from Spain in 1898 fol owing
eagerness for greater cooperation with the People’s Republic
the Spanish-American War. U.S.
of China (PRC), and antipathy toward U.S. criticism of
forces then battled Filipino resistance
fighters until they were largely
human rights issues in the Philippines have complicated
subdued in 1902. The Philippines
those efforts.5
became independent in 1946.
The Philippines has long played an important role in U.S.
Asia policy, and it figures prominently in the Biden Administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy as one
of five regional treaty allies with which the United States has a deepening relationship.6 The
Philippines has been a treaty ally since 1951 and a major non-NATO ally since 2003. It is the
largest recipient of U.S. military assistance, equipment, and training in the region. The country
holds strategic importance as a part of what some experts refer to as the “first island chain” in the
Pacific,7 and its maritime territorial disputes with China are a potential flashpoint in the South

1 This report does not cover congressional issues related to WWII Filipino veterans who fought under U.S. military
command during World War II.
2 “Filipino” (male), “Filipina” (female), and “Filipinos” (plural, all genders) refer to citizens of the Philippines.
3 Abby Budiman, “Filipinos in the U.S. Fact Sheet,” Pew Research Center, April 29, 2021.
4 Prashanth Parameswaran, “Why the Philippines’ Rodrigo Duterte Hates America,” The Diplomat, November 1, 2016;
Trefor Moss, “Behind Duterte’s Break with the U.S., a Lifetime of Resentment,” Wall Street Journal, October 21,
2016.
5 Steve Mollman, “Rodrigo Duterte Preceded Hosting Trump with Tirades Against His Human Rights Critics,” Quartz,
November 13, 2017.
6 The White House, “Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States,” February 2022; Antony Blinken, “A Free and Open
Indo-Pacific,” Jakarta, Indonesia, December 14, 2021; Department of State, “A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing
a Shared Vision,” November 4, 2019.
7 The so-called first island chain includes southern Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines, enclosing the sea areas closest
to China. The second island chain also starts in Japan, but extends further out into the Pacific, enclosing the Philippine
Sea that separates the Philippines from Guam. In discussions of China’s military capabilities and foreign policy goals
for the Western Pacific, some security and foreign policy experts refer to the first and second island chains as areas that
China is perceived as wanting to influence or eventually dominate, and conversely as geographic features that the
United States and its allies and partners potentially can use to counter or contain Chinese military actions. See, for
example, Andrew S. Erickson and Joel Wuthnow, “Why Islands Still Matter in Asia: The Enduring Significance of the
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The Philippines: Background and U.S. Relations

China Sea. The Philippines also serves as an important U.S. counterterrorism partner in Southeast
Asia. Since the 1986 “People Power” movement that deposed former authoritarian President
Ferdinand Marcos, the country has also been one of the region’s most vibrant democracies,
although corruption and serious human rights problems continue to fester.8
Figure 1. Philippines at a Glance
Geography
Archipelago. Land area—298,000 square kilometers
(Slightly larger than Arizona).

People
Population: 110 mil ion (2021)
Ethnic Groups: Predominantly Malay (95%); other ethnic
groups include Chinese and mixed race (Filipino-Spanish,
Filipino-Chinese, and Filipino-American).
Religious Affiliations: Roman Catholic (81%); other
Christian (9%); Muslim (5%); other (5%).

Economy
Gross Domestic Product (GDP): $963 bil ion (purchasing
power parity, 2019). Global ranking: 28.
Per Capita GDP: $8,900 (purchasing power parity, 2019).
GDP Composition by Sector: Agriculture (9%); Industry
(31%); Services (60%) (2019).

Source: Map created by CRS using data from the U.S. State Department, Global Admin, and ESRI. Fact
information from Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, 2021.
Congressional Interests
Congress has shown interest in the Philippines in several key policy areas over which it has
provided oversight, policy direction, and funding. It has also occasionally placed restrictions on
foreign assistance in order to pressure the Philippine government to improve human rights
conditions.
Strategic Interests
The Philippines holds strategic importance for the United States as part of what some experts
refer to as the “first island chain” in the Pacific, as it is located less than 800 miles south of
Taiwan and 900 miles southeast of China’s Hainan province, an island with a major naval base.9
U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) reportedly aims to broaden the U.S. force posture
in East Asia, deploying and rotating military assets to Southeast Asia and the southern Pacific.
Experts contend that the Philippines could play a key role in a contingency with China in the

Pacific ‘Island Chains,’” The National Interest, February 6, 2016.
8 Department of State, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Philippines, March 30, 2021.
9 Damen Cook, “China’s Most Important South China Sea Military Base,” The Diplomat, March 9, 2017.
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region.10 The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for 2022 calls on the Secretary of
Defense to strengthen U.S. ties with security partners in the Indo-Pacific region, including with
U.S. allies the Philippines and Thailand, and increases funding for the Pacific Deterrence
Initiative, which involves the Philippines, Japan, and other allies.11
Regional Counterterrorism Efforts
The Philippines, which is home to not only indigenous extremist groups but also at times to
foreign terrorist fighters,12 has “enjoyed close counterterrorism cooperation with the United
States,” according to the State Department.13 The Philippines was designated a major non-NATO
ally in 2003 as part of the George W. Bush Administration’s Global War on Terror.14 U.S.-
Philippine counterterrorism efforts have included the Joint Special Operations Task Force–
Philippines (2002-2014) and Operation Pacific Eagle-Philippines (2017-2020). In 2019, the two
countries signed an agreement to establish a new regional counterterrorism facility in the
Philippines.15
South China Sea Disputes
The United States has aimed to partner with the Philippines in carrying out strategies to counter
Chinese military assertiveness in the South China Sea and to build “support for rules-based
approaches to the maritime domain, including in the South China Sea and the East China Sea.”16
The Philippines is the only country with territorial disputes with China that has challenged
China’s maritime territorial claims under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS).17 Through the Department of Defense’s Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative
(MSI),18 which Congress extended in 2021,19 the United States has sought to improve the ability
of the Philippines, Vietnam, and other Southeast and South Asian countries to maintain maritime
domain awareness and patrol their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs).

10 Todd Lopez, “For Contingencies in Indo-Pacom, Army Will Serve as ‘Linchpin’ for Joint Force,” DOD News,
December 1, 2021; Michael J. Green and Gregory B. Poling, “The U.S. Alliance with the Philippines,” Center for
Strategic and International Studies,” December 3, 2020.
11 The National Defense Authorization Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-81, Sections 1242 and 1252). Benjamin Rimland and
Patrick Buchan, “Getting the Pacific Deterrence Initiative Right,” The Diplomat, May 2, 2020.
12 Foreign fighters mostly have come from other countries in Southeast Asia. Thomas M. Sanderson and Maxwell B.
Markusen, “A Call to Battle in the Philippines: Investigating Foreign Fighters in Marawi,” Center for Strategic and
International Studies, October 31, 2017.
13 Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2020: Philippines, December 16, 2021. See also Ashley L.
Rhoades and Todd C. Helmus, “Countering Violent Extremism in the Philippines,” RAND, 2020.
14 Designation of the Philippines as a Major Non-NATO Ally, Presidential Determination No. 2004-02 of October 6,
2003, 68 Federal Register 59855. For further information, see Department of State, “Major Non-NATO Ally Status,”
fact sheet, January 20, 2021.
15 U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, “New Regional Counterterrorism Training Center to Boost U.S.-Philippine and
Regional Cooperation,” October 11, 2019.
16 The White House, “Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States.”
17 Some Members of Congress have sponsored legislation calling on the U.S. Senate to ratify UNLCOS. See H.Res.
361 and S.Res. 220. There is debate about the effectiveness of signing onto the agreement in furthering U.S. interests in
the South China Sea. William Gallo, “Why Hasn’t the US Signed the Law of the Sea Treaty,” Voice of America, June
6, 2016.
18 Formerly the South China Sea Initiative. See the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2016 (P.L. 114-92,
Section 1263).
19 The NDAA, 2022 (P.L. 117-81, Section 1241) extended the MSI through 2027.
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Human Rights Concerns
The Philippines long has attracted congressional concern related to its human rights violations,
particularly extra-judicial killings. At various times during the past decade and a half, Congress
has restricted military and other security assistance to the Philippines in order to encourage
improvements in human rights practices of the Philippine military, police, and government. The
Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (ARIA, P.L. 115-409) supports a multipronged U.S.
strategy for advancing a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” including the promotion of human rights
in the Indo-Pacific region. ARIA and other legislation restrict counternarcotics assistance to the
Philippine National Police (PNP) due to human rights violations related to the drug war.20
Philippine Politics
The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) ranks the Philippines 54th out of 167 countries in terms of
its level of democracy, placing it in the “flawed democracy” category and ranking it the second-
most democratic country in Southeast Asia after Malaysia. Although the EIU gives the
Philippines relatively high scores on electoral process and pluralism, political participation, and
civil liberties, the country receives relatively low scores on the functioning of government and
political culture.21
Many aspects of institutional democracy are practiced to the fullest in the Philippines. Philippine
citizens generally can exercise political and civil rights with few restrictions, openly criticize
national leaders, and enjoy academic freedom and religious liberties. The country has a robust
civil society and a lively press. International and national observers considered national midterm
elections held in 2019 “generally free and fair.”22 Some aspects of Philippine politics, however,
long have undermined democratic institutions and government effectiveness and led to human
rights abuses. These include the existence of corruption; concentrations of power among
socioeconomic elites and local clans; the lack of democratic control over the security forces; and
a weak judicial system and culture of impunity.23
During the democratic era that began in 1986, the legislative branch and Supreme Court have not
served as strong checks on presidential power. Political parties and groupings tend to be fluid and
shifting, driven more by individual personalities, interests, and loyalties than by unifying
ideologies, policy platforms, and goals.24 Some experts argue that the Supreme Court has become
less independent over the course of the past three administrations.25 The court generally has not

20 See also the Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2021 (P.L. 116-260, Section 7043(g)).
21 Economist Intelligence Unit, “Democracy Index 2021,” February 10, 2022. By comparison, the United States ranks
26th, also in the “flawed democracy” category.
22 Department of State, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Philippines.
23 Nicole Curato, “Democratic Expressions Amidst Fragile Institutions: Possibilities for Reform in Duterte’s
Philippines,” Brookings, January 22, 2021; David G. Timberman, “Philippines Politics Under Duterte: A Midterm
Assessment,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,” January 10, 2019; Christia Marie Ramos, “‘Culture of
Impunity’ Made Filipinos Afraid of Voicing Criticism vs. Admin—Pangilinan,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 19,
2021.
24 Paul D. Kenny, “Why Is There No Political Polarization in the Philippines?” Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, August 18, 2020.
25 Edcel John A. Ibarra, “The Philippine Supreme Court Under Duterte: Reshaped, Unwilling to Annul, and Unable to
Restrain,” Social Science Research Council. November 10, 2020.
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attempted to restrain the actions of President Duterte, who has appointed 12 of the Supreme
Court’s 15 Justices.26
Duterte’s Legacy and the 2022 Elections
The Philippines is scheduled to hold presidential, congressional, and local elections on May 9,
2022, with a new president and legislature slated to take office on July 1, 2022. President Duterte
is not seeking reelection, as the Philippine Constitution limits the President to one six-year term
without the possibility of reelection. Some observers view the polls as a referendum on President
Duterte’s policies and actions, including what some refer to as an erosion of democracy under his
rule.27
Duterte remains popular domestically, according to opinion polls, despite an economic downturn
caused by the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, his violent antidrug campaign,
and his controversial foreign policy stances. In one poll conducted in March 2021, Duterte had an
approval rating of 65%.28
Prominent candidates for the presidency include Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr., son of the
longtime Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos; Vice-President Maria Leonor “Leni” Robredo,
a prominent Duterte critic; and Senator Emmanuel “Manny” Pacquaio, a prominent boxing
champion. Duterte’s daughter, Sara Duterte-Carpio, formerly Mayor of Davao, is running for
Vice President, allied with Marcos. (The Philippines President and Vice-President are elected
separately, and frequently come from competing political factions, as is true of President Duterte
and Vice-President Robredo.)
Many political observers see the 2022 polls as an important test of the Philippines’ democratic
institutions, which some experts argue have weakened under Duterte. Analysts point to the
Philippines as an example of growing authoritarian tendencies in countries that still practice
electoral democracy. Such trends include the increasing use of police and military in all levels of
governance; attacks against the political opposition, judiciary, and media; and disinformation
campaigns that have lessened the public’s ability to influence decisionmaking.29
U.S.-Philippines Relations
In contrast to his predecessor, Benigno Aquino III, who steered the Philippines strategically
towards the United States, President Duterte sought to strengthen ties with China, which he
viewed as a potentially large source of foreign investment.30 According to some analysts, Duterte
attempted to institute a policy of “equi-balancing” between the United States, its principal

26 Philippine Supreme Court Justices are required to retire at 70 years of age. “Duterte Appoints New Supreme Court
Justice,” BusinessWorld, November 16, 2021; David G. Timberman, “Philippines Politics Under Duterte: A Midterm
Assessment.”
27 David Hutt, “Next Philippine Election Looms as an Institutional Stress Test,” The Diplomat, November 12, 2020.
28 Azer Parrocha, “PRRD Maintains High Approval, Trust Ratings Amid COVID-19 Surge,” Philippine News Agency,
April 8, 2021; “September 17-20, 2020 National Mobile Phone Survey—Report No. 15: Filipinos Have Mixed
Expectations on Personal Quality-of-Life in the Next 12 Months,” Social Weather Stations, November 6, 2020.
29 Nicole Curato, “Democratic Expressions Amidst Fragile Institutions: Possibilities for Reform in Duterte’s
Philippines,” Brookings Institution. January 22, 2021; Sheila Coronel, “This Is How Philippine Democracy Dies,” The
Atlantic, June 16, 2020.
30 Derek Grossman, “Duterte’s Dalliance with China Is Over,” The RAND Blog, November 2, 2021.
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diplomatic and security partner, and China, its largest trading partner.31 The Philippines under
Duterte also expanded its sources of military assistance, including from U.S. allies and strategic
partners Australia, Japan, South Korea, and India, as well as from China and Russia.32 Between
2016 and 2019, Duterte made annual trips to China, including two in 2019, as well as two trips to
Russia and three to Japan, the Philippines’ largest foreign aid donor, as part of his policy of
reducing the Philippines’ reliance on the United States.33 President Duterte met with then-U.S.
President Donald Trump at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit in
Manila in November 2017, but he has not visited the United States as President.
In some respects, the U.S.-Philippines relationship hit a low point in February 2020, when the
Duterte government notified the United States of its intent to terminate the Philippines-U.S.
Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), which serves as the legal foundation for bilateral military
cooperation in the Philippines’ territory. As tensions between the Philippines and China over
disputed territory in the South China Sea continued to fester, however, the Philippines sought
closer security cooperation with the United States.34 In July 2021, the Philippine government
renewed its adherence to the VFA. (See “Visiting Forces Agreement,” below.)
Among Filipinos, popular support for the U.S.-Philippines relationship is strong. According to a
July 2020 survey conducted by Philippines-based Social Weather Stations, net trust in the United
States was +42 (60% much trust, 18% little trust), compared to +67 in December 2019. By
contrast, net trust in China fell from -27 in December 2019 to -36 in July 2020 (22% much trust,
58% little trust).35 A January 2020 Pew poll found that Filipinos had the highest favorable opinion
of the United States (80%) of 31 countries surveyed.36 In a June 2021 survey, 47% of respondents
indicated that the “the government is not doing enough to assert the country’s rights in the West
PH [South China] Sea” while 24% disagreed and 29% were undecided.37 Some analysts argue,
however, that South China Sea issues are not a primary factor determining the way Filipinos vote
in national elections.38

31 Renato Cruz De Castro, “The Duterte Administration’s Foreign Policy: Unravelling the Aquino Administration’s
Balancing Agenda on an Emergent China,” Journal of Southeast Asian Affairs, Vol. 35, No. 3 (2016).
32 Andreo Calonzo, “Philippines Buys Two Warships as South China Sea Tensions Fester,” Bloomberg, December 28,
2021; Michael Punongbayan, “Philippines, Australia Affirm Defense Cooperation,” Philippine Star, February 27,
2021; Marc Calumba, “PHL Military Receives Offer from Japan for Official Development Assistance,” Alpha News
Philippines, May 5, 2021; Derek Grossman, “China Has Lost the Philippines Despite Duterte’s Best Efforts,” Foreign
Policy, May 3, 2021; Frances Mangosing, “China to Give Philippines Military Additional P1-Billion Aid,” Philippine
Daily Inquirer, March 28, 2019; Manuel Mogato, “Philippines, Russia Sign Two Military Deals,” Reuters, October 25,
2017.
33 Pia Ranada, “Duterte Arrives in Russia for Second Visit,” Rappler, Oct 2, 2019; Nestor Corrales, “Breaking: Duterte
to Visit China in August for 5th Time,” Philippine Daly Inquirer, August 4, 2019; Arianne Merez, “Duterte Arrives in
Japan for 3rd Visit,” ABS-CBN News, May 28 2019.
34 “US-Philippines Alliance Back on Track as Duterte’s China Charm Offensive Crumbles,” South China Morning
Post, October 23, 2021.
35 Most recent survey on this topic available. “SWS July 3-6, 2020 National Mobile Phone Survey—Report No. 4: Net
trust of Filipinos is ‘Good’ +42 for the United States, ‘Moderate’ +27 for Australia, and ‘Bad’ -36 for China,” Social
Weather Stations, July 19, 2020.
36 Among 31 countries, Filipinos had the highest confidence in U.S. President Trump (77%); they also had the highest
confidence in Russian President Vladimir Putin (61%) and third highest in Chinese leader Xi Jinping (58%) “to do the
right thing regarding world affairs.” “Trump Ratings Remain Low Around Globe, While Views of U.S. Stay Mostly
Favorable,” Pew Research Center, January 19, 2020.
37 “Second Quarter 2021 Social Weather Survey on the West PH Sea,” Social Weather Stations, July 28, 2021.
38 “Looking South, Looking West: Manila Views Security Threats to the Philippines,” Zoom webinar, US-Philippines
Society, June 30, 2021.
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In November 2021, during a period of renewed commitment to the relationship, the United States
and the Philippines held the ninth Bilateral Strategic Dialogue. The two sides pledged to engage
in cooperative efforts in various areas including responding to the COVID-19 pandemic,
upholding the “rules-based maritime order” in the South China Sea, strengthening interoperability
of the U.S. and Philippine armed forces, and fostering respect for human rights.39 Secretary of
Defense Lloyd Austin III and Philippines Secretary of National Defense Delfin Lorenzana spoke
on the phone on November 19, 2021, to discuss recent events in the South China Sea and
“welcomed recent bilateral efforts to continue strengthening the U.S.-Philippines
alliance.” Secretary Austin reaffirmed the “strong U.S. commitment” to the Philippines under the
Mutual Defense Treaty.40
U.S. Foreign Assistance
U.S. assistance to the Philippines, totaling an estimated $154.9 million in FY2021, includes U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID) and Department of State-funded development
and security assistance. (See Table 1.) Development assistance includes programs aimed at
promoting inclusive socio-economic development, the rule of law, and human rights, and
improving family health, basic education, and environmental management.41 In addition, USAID
committed $63.6 million for humanitarian and recovery efforts in Marawi, a city destroyed during
a battle between Filipino and foreign Islamist insurgents and government forces in 2017.42
Table 1. Department of State Assistance to the Philippines, FY2017-FY2021
Current $ in thousands
Account
FY2017
FY2018
FY2019
FY2020
FY2021
Development Assistance
51,889
70,000
70,000
70,000
70,000
Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
40,000
40,000
40,000
40,000
40,000
Global Health Programs–USAID
33,000
28,500
26,000
27,500
30,000
Global Health Programs–State
—
—
—
5,305
—
International Military Education and
1.981
2,000
1,900
2,147
2,000
Training (IMET)
International Narcotics Control and
7,000
6,500
7,000
7,000
7,000
Law Enforcement (INCLE)
Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism,
6,090
5,800
5,800
5,940
5,940
De-mining and Related Programs
TOTAL
139,960
152,906
150,700
157,892
154,940
Source: State and USAID Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations.
Note: FMF and IMET are implemented by the Defense Department through the Defense Security Cooperation
Agency (DSCA). The U.S. government has suspended INCLE assistance to the PNP for counternarcotics
activities, while assistance for other activities continues.

39 Department of State, “9th U.S.-Philippines Bilateral Strategic Dialogue,” media note, November 16, 2021.
40 Department of Defense, “Readout of Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin III Phone Call with Philippines Secretary of
National Defense Delfin Lorenzana,” November 19, 2021.
41 Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, Appendix 2, FY2022.
42 USAID, “Marawi Assistance,” July 8, 2021.
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As of February 2, 2022, USAID had provided $21 million in humanitarian assistance to help
communities affected by Typhoon Odette.43 Also known as Rai, the cyclone struck the Visayas
region in central Philippines and parts of Mindanao island beginning on December 16, 2021.
Odette’s destruction affected nearly 5 million people, and the Philippine government reported
over 400 deaths and 580,000 people displaced due to the super typhoon.44
The Philippines is a “priority recipient” in East Asia for security assistance and the largest
recipient of U.S. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) in the region. FMF primarily has supported
maritime security, disaster response, military professionalization, and the procurement of
equipment for counterterrorism operations.45 Anti-terrorism programs provide training and
equipment grants for the Philippine National Police.46 The Philippines also receives
counterterrorism support through the Department of State East Asia and Pacific Regional program
and the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund.47
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in the Philippines
The Philippines, with the second-highest numbers of both COVID-19 infections and deaths in Southeast Asia, after
Indonesia, was among the last in the region to provide mass vaccinations.48 As of February 2022, the World
Health Organization reported approximately 3.6 mil ion confirmed COVID-19 cases in the Philippines, and roughly
54,200 deaths.49 About 60% of the population was ful y vaccinated as of February 2022.50 The U.S. government has
provided $39 mil ion in pandemic response assistance to the Philippines to facilitate testing, crucial care,
communication campaigns, protection and training of health workers, vaccine deployment, and essential equipment
and supplies.51 China and the United States have been the largest suppliers of vaccines, including those both
purchased and donated.52 The United States, the largest contributor to the COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access
(COVAX) program, has facilitated the delivery of over 65 mil ion vaccine doses to the Philippines as of January 10,
2022, including nearly 25 mil ion doses provided by the United States.53
Since 2016, the U.S. government has suspended International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement (INCLE) assistance to PNP units for counternarcotics activities, although it has

43 USAID, “USAID Announces $1 Million in Additional Funding for People Affected by Super Typhoon Rai in the
Philippines,” February 2, 2022; USAID, “U.S. Assistance for Typhoon Odette Tops PHP1 Billion with New Major
Announcement,” January 5, 2022.
44 Jeannette I. Andrade, “Odette Leaves P 24.5-Billion Damage; Death Toll Hits 407,” Philippine Daily Inquirer,
January 3, 2022; United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Philippines: Super Typhoon Rai
(Odette): Situation Report No. 1,” December 30, 2021.
45 FMF equipment includes communications items, night vision devices, unmanned aerial systems, vehicles, precision
guided munitions, and related integration work. Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, “Operation Pacific
Eagle-Philippines: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, July 1, 2020-September 30, 2020,”
November 10, 2020.
46 The Department of State provides anti-terrorism assistance through the Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining
and Related Programs (NADR) account.
47 Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, Appendix 2, FY2022.
48 Jim Gomez, “Philippines Launches Virus Vaccinations amid Supply Problems,” ABC News, March 1, 2021; Center
for Strategic and International Studies, “Southeast Asia Covid-19 Tracker,” at https://www.csis.org/programs/
southeast-asia-program/southeast-asia-covid-19-tracker-0.
49 World Health Organization, “WHO Coronavirus (COVID-19) Dashboard,” at https://covid19.who.int/.
50 Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Southeast Asia Covid-19 Tracker.”
51 U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, “U.S. Provides 2.7 Million More Pfizer COVID-19 Vaccines to the Philippines,”
January 10, 2022.
52 “Philippines’ Duterte Thanks China for More COVID-19 Vaccines amid Surging Infections,” CGTN, August 20,
2021; “Tracker: The Philippines’ COVID-19 Vaccine Distribution,” Rappler, April 1, 2021.
53 U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, “U.S. Provides 2.7 Million More Pfizer COVID-19 Vaccines to the Philippines.”
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increased assistance for maritime law enforcement, drug demand reduction programs, and
transnational interdiction efforts.54 Other legislative measures mandate reporting on Philippine
security forces related to human rights violations.55 (See “Selected Legislation,” below.)
The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) rewards countries that have demonstrated good
governance, investment in health and education, and sound economic policies. In 2010, the MCC
approved a five-year, $507 million compact with the Philippine government. The agreement
aimed to help modernize the Bureau of Internal Revenue to increase revenue collection and
reduce tax evasion; expand a community-driven, poverty-reduction program; and promote
economic growth through investment in infrastructure.56 In December 2015, the MCC awarded
the Philippines a second compact. In 2016, the MCC indicated that it would reevaluate its
decision in light of human rights concerns. In December 2017, the Philippine government
withdrew from the process, stating that it wanted to focus resources on rebuilding Marawi rather
than committing money to the counterpart funding required with MCC projects. The government
denied that the decision to withdraw from the program was made in response to human rights
criticism.57
U.S.-Philippines Defense Ties
The U.S.-Philippines defense relationship is deeply rooted in a history of shared security interests
and priorities that dates back to the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty and has continuously evolved to
address new and developing threats. Since 2015, the Philippines has received over $1 billion in
U.S. military assistance, making it the largest recipient of U.S. military equipment and training in
the Indo-Pacific.58 U.S. security cooperation activities in the Philippines have included
counterterrorism assistance, maritime domain awareness, joint military exercises, and transfers of
U.S. military equipment. Security cooperation programs also have enhanced the capacity of the
Philippine Armed Forces (AFP) to provide humanitarian assistance and to engage in disaster
response operations. The Philippines was designated a major non-NATO ally in 2003, which
allows the country certain defense trade and security cooperation privileges.59
Security Cooperation
As a security partner in the Pacific, the Philippines has received military assistance through the
Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s (DSCA) Section 333 Building Partner Capacity program

54 INCLE assistance is provided through the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs (INL). U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, “U.S. Strengthens Drug Demand Reduction Programs in
the Philippines Through Support for Outreach and Drop-In Centers,” November 27, 2020.
55 See P.L. 115-409 and P.L. 116-260.
56 Millennium Challenge Corporation, “Philippines Compact: Closed Compact Report,” April 2018.
57 Jenny Lei Ravelo, “Philippines Withdraws from MCC, Citing Marawi Crisis as a Priority,” Devex, December 19,
2017; Jenny Lei Ravelo, “Second MCC Philippine Compact Under Review Due to Rule of Law, Human Rights
Concerns,” Devex, December 16, 2016; Millennium Challenge Corporation, “Philippines Selected for Second
Compact,” at https://www.mcc.gov/news-and-events/video/video-052516-philippines-second-compact.
58 U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, “U.S. Military Delivers Advanced Unmanned Aerial System to Philippine Air
Force,” press release, October 14, 2021; U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, “U.S. Delivers Php48.5 Million in Weapons
and Munitions to AFP,” press release, July 8, 2021.
59 Designation of the Philippines as a Major Non-NATO Ally, Presidential Determination No. 2004-02 of October 6,
2003, 68 Federal Register 59855. For further information, see Department of State, “Major Non-NATO Ally Status,”
fact sheet, January 20, 2021.
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and the Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative.60 Section 333 activities have focused on the
development and enhancement of critical AFP capabilities including intelligence, maritime and
border security operations, counterterrorism, and counter-improvised explosive device.61
Equipment deliveries under Section 333 have included precision guided munitions and tactical
equipment. MSI activities in the Philippines have aimed to improve the AFP’s maritime ISR
capabilities and support the Philippines’ participation in multilateral engagements and other
trainings, such as visit, board, search and seizure.62
The Philippines participates in U.S. defense institution capacity-building programs that have
included defense strategy courses and policy workshops that aim to improve security sector
governance, resource management, and legal capacity building.63 In addition, the Philippines is
partnered with the Guam and Hawaii National Guards through the State Partnership Program,
which is a unique civil-military program that the National Guard says aims to cultivate personal
relationships through a series of tailored engagements.64
U.S.-Philippines bilateral exercises aim to strengthen interoperability through subject matter
exchanges and training events. In 2015-2020, the United States and the Philippines engaged in
1,321 bilateral military exercises.65 Both sides curtailed security cooperation in 2020 due to the
uncertainty over possible termination of the VFA and to the COVID-19 pandemic. In October
2021, the two governments announced plans to return to full-scale military drills in 2022, and
stated that they would likely invite military observers from Australian, Japan, and the United
Kingdom.66 In 2022, approximately 3,800 AFP and 5,100 U.S. soldiers participated in Balikatan
(“Shoulder-to-Shoulder”), the premier annual bilateral exercise, across Luzon, the largest
Philippine island. The 2022 exercise, described as the “largest ever” by military officials, focused
on improving interoperability and joint defense capabilities and engaged in humanitarian and
civic assistance projects.67
Other notable exercises include Maritime Training Activity “Sama Sama” (“Together”), which
was held in October 2021, and Kamandag (“Cooperation of Warriors of the Sea”), which was

60 Section 333 Building Partner Capacity is authorized under Title 10, U.S.C. §333. The Indo-Pacific Maritime Security
Initiative (MSI) was authorized by Section 1263 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2016 (P.L. 114-92,
as amended by P.L. 114-328 and P.L. 115-232 and P.L. 116-92).
61 Data from ForeignAssistance.gov, November 7, 2021; U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, “U.S. Military Security
Assistance in the Philippines,” press release, at U.S. Military Security Assistance in the Philippines REV29
(usembassy.gov). Note: DOD security cooperation program details are not made publicly available in a consistent or
comprehensive manner; such activities provided in this report are not meant to be an exhaustive list.
62 Data from ForeignAssistance.gov, November 7, 2021; U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, “U.S. Military Security
Assistance in the Philippines.”
63 Institutional capacity-building activities are conducted through the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security
Studies, Defense Institute of International Legal Studies, and the DSCA’s Institute for Security Governance. Data from
ForeignAssistance.gov, November 7, 2021; U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, “U.S. Military Security Assistance in the
Philippines.” See also, DSCA, Institutional Capacity Building, accessed November 15, 2021, at https://www.dsca.mil/
institutional-capacity-building.
64 For more information, see State Partnership Program, U.S. National Guard, at https://www.nationalguard.mil/
Leadership/Joint-Staff/J-5/International-Affairs-Division/State-Partnership-Program/. See also, U.S. National Guard,
“Guam, Hawaii Share COVID Best Practices with the Philippines,” press release, December 10, 2020; Hawaii Air
National Guard, “HIANG Brings High Level Air Defense Expertise to Philippine Engagement,” press release, August
29, 2018.
65 U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, “U.S. Military Security Assistance in the Philippines.”
66 Andreo Calonzo, “U.S., Philippines Seek to Return to Full Military Drills in 2022,” Bloomberg, October 14, 2021.
67 “Largest-Ever PH-US Balikatan Exercise to Being Next Week,” CNN Philippines, March 22, 2022.
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conducted in September 2021.68 Exercises also have included the Philippine Navy, which
participated in the first joint sail through the South China Sea in 2019 with the United States,
Japan, and India.69 In addition, between April and June of 2021, the U.S. 5th Security Force
Assistance Brigade conducted their first bilateral training events with various Philippine Army
units.70
Counterterrorism Efforts
The U.S. military and the AFP have conducted bilateral counterterrorism operations since at least
2001. In 2017, following the reassertion of control over Marawi by Philippine military forces—
with assistance from U.S. special operations forces (SOF) advisors—the Department of Defense
(DOD) and Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) initiated Operation Pacific Eagle-Philippines
(OPE-P) to help the AFP overcome counterterrorism capability gaps identified by U.S. advisors
during operations in Marawi.71 U.S. SOF also provided logistical support, intelligence sharing,
and operational planning, including the integration of airborne intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) for intelligence gathering.72 In 2020, the last year of OPE-P efforts, DOD
committed $85.4 million for OPE-P, in which approximately 200 U.S. military personnel served
in advisory roles.73
Although the OPE-P overseas contingency operation designation has been removed,
INDOPACOM continues both security cooperation under DOD authorities as well as “advise and
assist” operations with Philippine security forces. Whereas OPE-P primarily focused on
counterterrorism operations, “by, with, and through” Philippine partners, the scope of continued
bilateral security cooperation programs in the Philippines is to be “significantly larger than the
relatively narrow counterterrorism effort.”74
U.S. Defense Equipment Transfers
In addition to receiving military equipment through the U.S. FMF program, the Philippines is
eligible to purchase U.S. defense articles at discounted rates through the Excess Defense Articles
grant program.75 In some cases, the Philippines supplements U.S. grant assistance with its

68 U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, “Philippine-U.S. Exercise MTA Sama Sama Kicks-off with Japan, France,” press
release, October 12, 2021; Seth Robson, “Kamandag Drills Kick Off in the Philippines with a Focus on Shore-Based
Weapons,” Stars and Stripes, September 30, 2021.
69 Ankit Panda, “US, India, Japan, Philippine Navies Demonstrate Joint Presence in South China Sea,” The Diplomat,
May 11, 2019.
70 U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, “U.S. Army 5th Security Force Assistance Brigade and Philippine Army Conduct
Bilateral Training in Nueva Ecija,” press release, April 28, 2021.
71 DOD Inspector General, DoD Efforts to Train, Advise, Assist, and Equip the Armed Forces of the Republic of the
Philippines, DODIG-2019-048, January 31, 2019, at https://media.defense.gov/2019/Feb/04/2002085730/-1/-1/1/
DODIG-2019-048.PDF; Roy Ramos, “Duterte Thanks Nations for Helping to Liberate Marawi,” Anadolu Agency,
October 25, 2017.
72 Ibid.
73 By comparison, funding for OPE-P was $108 million in 2019 and $100 million in 2018. Lead Inspector General (IG)
reporting responsibilities terminated at the end of FY2020 since none of the appropriated funding for OPE-P was
associated with an Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO). See the 12th and final quarterly IG report for OPE-P:
Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, “Operation Pacific Eagle-Philippines: Lead Inspector General
Report to the United States Congress, July 1, 2020-September 30, 2020.”
74 Ibid.
75 U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, “U.S. Military Delivers Php183 Million in New Weapons and Equipment to AFP,”
press release, June 22, 2021. See also, U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, “U.S. Military Delivers Advanced Unmanned
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national funds. In 2020 and 2021, the State Department notified Congress of six potential Foreign
Military Sales (FMS) cases for the Philippines with a combined total over $4.5 billion. These
items include missiles, F-16 aircraft, missiles, light military boats and attack helicopters.76 Some
Members of Congress opposed the proposed FMS cases and other military assistance for human
rights reasons, and sponsored legislation that would suspend security assistance to the
Philippines.77 (See “Selected Legislation,” below.) The Philippines also purchases U.S. defense
articles and services through the Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) program.78
Mutual Defense Treaty
Under the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT), the United States and the Philippines committed
to help defend each other against external armed attack. Some analysts note that the MDT does
not explicitly obligate the United States to defend maritime areas that are disputed by the
Philippines and other nations, and U.S. officials have not confirmed whether the Treaty applies to
disputed features in the South China Sea.79 Article IV of the Treaty states: “Each Party recognizes
an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace
and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its
constitutional processes.” Article V refers to an armed attack on the “metropolitan territory of
either of the Parties,” the “island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific Ocean,” or its
“armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft in the Pacific.”80
Some analysts contend that U.S. assurances have been getting stronger, particularly regarding the
defense of Philippine forces and military equipment in disputed areas. In March 2019, then-
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stated, “As the South China Sea is part of the Pacific, any armed
attack on Philippine forces, aircraft or public vessels in the South China Sea would trigger mutual
defense obligations under Article IV of our Mutual Defense Treaty.”81 In a January 27, 2021,
phone conversation between Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Philippine Secretary of
Foreign Affairs Teodoro Locsin, Jr., Blinken stressed the importance of the MDT and “its clear

Aerial System to Philippine Air Force”; U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, “U.S. Delivers Php48.5 Million in Weapons
and Munitions to AFP.”
76 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Major Arms Sales: “Philippines—AIM-9X Sidewinder Block II Tactical
Missiles,” June 24, 2021; “Philippines—AGM-84L-1 Harpoon Air Launched Block II Missiles,” June 24, 2021;
“Philippines—F-16 Block 70/72 Aircraft,” June 24, 2021; “Philippines—Scout, Assault, and Light Support Boats with
Armaments and Accessories,” July 30, 2020; “Philippines—AH-1Z Attack Helicopters and Related Equipment and
Support,” April 30, 2020; “Philippines—AH-64E Apache Attack Helicopters and Related Equipment and Support,”
April 30, 2020.
77 Ed Adamczyk, “Philippines’ Human Rights Record an Issue in Pending $2.6B Military Sale,” UPI, June 25, 2021.
78 Details about proposed DCS are confidential; however, executive communications to the appropriate congressional
committees are periodically published in the Federal Register. For example, see, Department of State, “Bureau of
Political-Military Affairs, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls: Notifications to the Congress of Proposed
Commercial Export Licenses,” 84 Federal Register, November 27, 2019, at https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2019-
25491/p-427.
79 “Will the US Defend ‘A Few Rocks’ in Our Sea?” Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 6, 2014; Ricardo Saludo, “Big
Holes in the Philippines-US Defense Treaty,” The Manila Times, March 20, 2014; Julie M. Aurelio, “PH-US Defense
Pact Doesn’t Apply in Spratlys Dispute, Says Ex-UP Law Dean,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 29, 2011.
80 The MDT can be found at http://www.chanrobles.com/mutualdefensetreaty.htm.
81 Mark Nevitt, “The US-Philippines Defense Treaty and the Pompeo Doctrine on South China Sea,” Just Security,
March 11, 2019.
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application to armed attacks against the Philippine armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft in the
Pacific, which includes the South China Sea.”82
Visiting Forces Agreement
The Visiting Forces Agreement governs the legal status of U.S. military forces operating in the
Philippines. It creates rules by which U.S. troops, vessels, and aircraft may enter the country and
establishes criminal jurisdiction over U.S. military personnel.83 The VFA has been in effect since
1999, eight years after the Philippines rejected a treaty that would have extended the U.S. lease of
Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Base, and ordered the withdrawal of all U.S. troops from the
Philippines.
On February 10, 2020, the Government of the Philippines submitted to the U.S. Embassy in
Manila a “notice of termination” of the Philippines-U.S. Visiting Forces Agreement.84 On
February 11, 2020, Presidential Spokesperson Salvador Panelo quoted President Duterte as saying
“It’s about time we rely on ourselves. We will strengthen our own defenses and not rely on any
other country.”85 Some analysts believe that Duterte may have initiated the termination as a
response to U.S. actions barring entry into the United States of a Duterte political ally involved in
human rights abuses; others say that he intended to leverage the VFA to negotiate better terms in
the bilateral security relationship or that the action was part of an effort to orient the Philippines
strategically away from the United States.86 Many in the Philippines, particularly in the defense
and foreign policy establishments, however, opposed the move.87 The Philippine government
suspended the termination three times (for six months each), in June 2020, November 2020, and
June 2021.88 On July 30, 2021, Philippine Secretary of National Defense Delfin Lorenzana
announced that the Philippines had agreed to recommit to the VFA.89

82 Department of State, “Secretary Blinken’s Call with Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Locsin,” readout,
January 27, 2021.
83 John Schaus, “What Is the Philippines-United States Visiting Forces Agreement, and Why Does It Matter?” Center
for Strategic and International Studies, February 12, 2020.
84 See Arellano Law Foundation, Philippines Law and Jurisprudence Databank, Visiting Forces Agreement, at
https://www.lawphil.net/international/treaties/vfa_1998.html.
85 Scott Neuman and Julie McCarthy, “Philippines Says It Will End U.S. Security Agreement,” NPR, February 11,
2020.
86 Renato Cruz De Castro, “Duterte Finally Admits to the Importance of the U.S. Alliance,” Asia Maritime
Transparency Initiative, February 24, 2021; Christopher Woody, “A Major Ally’s Decision to Scrap an Important
Military Deal with the US Raises the Stakes in Competition with China,” Insider, February 23, 2020.
87 Richard Javad Heydarian, “US Outlasts Duterte’s Failing Dalliance with China,” Asia Times, May 19, 2021.
88 Sofia Tomacruz, “US Welcomes Philippines’ Decision to Suspend VFA Termination Again,” Rappler, June 15,
2021; “Philippines Again Suspends Scrapping of VFA Troop Pact with US, Amid South China Sea Tensions, Covid-19
Vaccine Donations,” South China Morning Post, June 14, 2021.
89 Rene Acosta, “Philippines Reverses Course and Commits to U.S. Visiting Forces Agreement,” USNI News, July 30,
2021. Some Filipino groups and policymakers long have objected to what they perceive as favorable treatment that the
VFA may allow for U.S. military personnel accused of committing crimes in the Philippines, compared to Philippine
personnel arrested in the United States. See Philippines-U.S. Visiting Forces Agreement, Article V, Section 6. In
August 2021, U.S. and Philippine officials reportedly agreed to a “technical side agreement” to the VFA that clarified
procedures related to criminal jurisdiction, although details were not made available. Andrea Chloe Wong “Unresolved
Issues with the VFA’s Return,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 12, 2021; Sofia Tomacruz, “VFA Side
Agreement on Custody of Troops Now in Effect, Locsin Says,” Rappler, August 31, 2021; Andrea Chloe Wong,
“Duterte’s Back-Down on US Forces in Philippines,” The Interpreter, Lowy Institute, August 24, 2021.
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U.S.-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement
In 2014, the U.S. and Philippine governments signed the U.S.-Philippines Enhanced Defense
Cooperation Agreement (EDCA). The agreement allows for the increased rotational presence of
U.S. military forces, ships, and aircraft in the Philippines and greater U.S. access to Philippine
military bases, including the ability to store U.S. defense materials and equipment.90 Under
EDCA, U.S. military personnel in the Philippines are deployed on a rotational or non-permanent
basis. Philippine bases, including U.S.-built facilities and improvements, are to be utilized rent-
free by the Americans but owned by the Philippines.91 In addition, EDCA “facilitate[s]
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in the Philippines and the region; improve[s]
opportunities for bilateral training; and support[s] the long-term modernization of the [AFP] as it
works to establish a minimum credible defense.”92
In 2016, President Duterte called for reassessing EDCA and reducing the number of U.S. troops
and joint military exercises in the Philippines. The Philippines eventually allowed EDCA to
proceed, but limited its mission and delayed facilities construction until 2018, when a
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief storage facility was built at Basa Air Base.93 Other
projects were delayed in 2019, and the uncertainties over the VFA and COVID-19 restrictions
further delayed EDCA’s progress.94 In October 2021, following the Philippines’ recommitment to
the VFA and other improvements in the bilateral relationship, the AFP announced that
construction work related to EDCA would “intensify.”95
Philippines-China Relations
The Duterte government initially focused on finding ways to cooperate with China in the South
China Sea, including through joint energy exploration that would shelve questions of sovereignty,
and sought PRC development loans, investment, and assistance with large infrastructure projects
in the Philippines. The two sides, however, did not come to agreement on how to resolve their
territorial disputes or on joint resource exploration, and relations between the Philippines and
China worsened during the second half of Duterte’s term.96
Duterte eagerly sought PRC financing for infrastructure projects throughout the country as part of
his “Build, Build, Build” program.97 In 2016, China pledged $6 billion in official development
assistance and $3 billion in loans to the Philippines. China also pledged $24 billion in
investments.98 However, local observers report that only a small fraction of that financing and

90 See Agreement Between the United States of America and the Philippines Signed at Quezon City, April 28, 2014, at
https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/14-625-Philippines-Defense-Cooperation.pdf.
91 Carl Thayer, “Analyzing the US-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement,” The Diplomat, May 2,
2014.
92 The White House, “United States-Philippines Bilateral Relations,” fact sheet, April 28, 2014.
93 “US, PH Officials Lead Groundbreaking of First Major EDCA Project,” Asian Journal, April 19, 2018.
94 Renato Cruz De Castro, “The Death of EDCA and Philippine-U.S. Security Relations,” Perspective, ISEAS Yusof
Ishak Institute, May 11, 2020.
95 William Cheng, “Philippine-US EDCA Activities to ‘Intensify’: AFP Chief,” ABS-CBN News, October 14, 2021.
96 Derek Grossman, “Duterte’s Dalliance with China Is Over,” The RAND Blog; Myrna M. Velasco, “No ‘Legal Deal’
Yet with China on Joint Oil Exploration at WPS—DOE,” Manila Bulletin, September 6, 2021.
97 “China’s Infrastructure Investments in the Philippines,” US-Philippines Society, August 2, 2018.
98 China Pledges $9B in Aid, Loans to Philippines: Finance Chief,” ABS-CBN, November 2, 2016.
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investment materialized.99 Major proposed projects with Chinese funding, technical, and
construction assistance include the $940 million Subic-Clark freight railway and the $241 million
Kaliwa dam project.100 In June 2021, the Philippines House of Representatives halted
construction of the dam pending an investigation into alleged corruption in securing government
permits.101 Plans reportedly are underway for a bridge to be funded by China and built by a
Chinese company that would connect Samal Island to Davao in Mindanao, where Duterte once
served as mayor.102
PRC military assistance remains limited in terms of funding and scope, especially compared to
U.S. and Australian military assistance.103 Cooperation in sensitive areas, such as intelligence
sharing and joint drills, are in their early stages.104 Territorial disputes and the lack of trust and
familiarity between the two sides creates further obstacles to greater military cooperation.105
The Philippines’ Maritime Disputes with China
The Philippines and China have long-standing disputes over waters and land features in the South
China Sea, which the Philippines calls the West Philippine Sea.106 Tensions have risen since 2012,
as China has enlarged and placed new military assets on several disputed features in the Spratly
archipelago, and increasingly interfered with Philippine commercial and military activities in
what the Philippines, citing UNCLOS, considers its Exclusive Economic Zone. DOD’s 2020
report on PRC military and security developments stated that the PRC’s Spratly Island outposts
“allow China to maintain a more flexible and persistent military and paramilitary presence in the
area,” which “improves China’s ability to detect and challenge activities by rival claimants or
third parties and widens the range of response options available to China.”107
The previous Aquino government sought arbitration under UNCLOS against aspects of China’s
maritime claims and behavior in the South China Sea. In 2016, an UNCLOS tribunal concluded
that China’s “Nine Dash Line” claims to areas overlapping the Philippines EEZ have no legal

99 Catalina Ricci S. Madarang, “China’s Unmet Pledges to Philippines Seen as Reason for Duterte’s Shift in Tone,”
Interaksyon, September 28, 2020.
100 “China to Fund $940m Philippine Railway Linking Former US Bases,” Nikkei Asia, January 17, 2021; Pia Ranada,
“China-Funded Kaliwa Dam to Benefit from Duterte Order Fast-Tracking Water Projects,” Rappler, September 3,
2020.
101 Barbara Fraser, “Philippine Bishops Welcome Halt to Mega-Dam Construction Project,” Catholic News Service,
June 14, 2021.
102 Antonia Colina IV, “Fate of Davao-Samal Bridge Now in the Hands of DOF,” Manila Bulletin, June 16, 2021;
“Chinese Envoy Still Optimistic China-Funded Samal-Davao Bridge to Break This Year,” BusinessWorld, January 4,
2021.
103 Maria Siow, “Philippines’ Move to Keep US Military Pact Reveals Shift in South China Sea Calculations,” South
China Morning Post, June 6, 2020.
104 “Chinese, Philippine Coast Guards Hold Joint Exercises to Achieve Interoperability at Sea,” China Military Online,
January 16, 2020; Philip Tubeza, “Lorenzana: Intelligence Sharing with China Can Be Done Immediately,” Philippine
Daily Inquirer, July 3, 2017.
105 Prashanth Parameswaran, “The Truth About China’s New Military Aid to the Philippines,” The Diplomat, June 30,
2017.
106 For further information, see CRS Report R42784, U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke, and CRS In Focus IF10607, China Primer: South China
Sea Disputes, by Ben Dolven, Susan V. Lawrence, and Ronald O’Rourke.
107 Department of Defense, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020,
November 3, 2020.”
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basis.108 The tribunal also found that China violated its UNCLOS obligations by blocking
Philippine access to Scarborough Shoal, interfering with Philippine oil and gas exploration at
Reed Bank, and damaging the marine environment by reclaiming land. The United States has
urged China, which declared the verdict “null and void,” to abide by the ruling, and the
Philippines to try to enforce it.109 (See Figure 2.)
Figure 2. Contested Boundaries in the South China Sea

Source: Created by CRS. Exclusive Economic Zones from Flanders Marine Institute (2020).
Duterte has downplayed the UNCLOS ruling while engaging in bilateral discussions with China
on maritime disputes.110 The Philippines suspended U.S.-Philippines joint maritime patrols in
2016, a move many analysts said was aimed at stabilizing relations with China, although the joint
patrols were resumed two years later. More recently, however, in the wake of multiple instances

108 The full text of the ruling can be accessed at https://pca-cpa.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/175/2016/07/PH-CN-
20160712-Award.pdf.
109 “Full Text of Statement of China’s Foreign Ministry on Award of South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by
Philippines,” Xinhua, July 12, 2016; Robert D. Williams, “What Did the U.S. Accomplish with Its South China Sea
Legal Statement?” Brookings Institution, July 22, 2020; Renato Cruz de Castro, “After Four Years, the Philippines
Acknowledges the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal Award,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, July 27, 2020. See also
Department of State, “Limits in the Seas, No. 150. People’s Republic of China: Maritime Claims in the South China
Sea,” January 2022.
110 “Duterte Wants to Liberate Philippines from U.S. Shackles: Foreign Minister,” Reuters, October 6, 2016; Ernesto
M. Hilario, “Bilateral Talks on South China Sea Dispute,” Manila Standard, August 21, 2021.
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of PRC vessels interfering with Philippine commercial and coast guard vessels and massing near
Philippine-occupied landmasses, the Duterte government has objected more vocally to Chinese
actions. For example, in November 2021, Philippine Foreign Secretary Locsin condemned “in the
strongest terms” actions by PRC vessels to block Philippine Coast Guard vessels attempting to
resupply a Philippine military garrison at Second Thomas Shoal.111
Violent Extremism in the Philippines
The Philippines has battled Muslim armed separatist and terrorist movements on the southern
islands of Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago for over 30 years. The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG),
which the United States designated as a foreign terrorist organization in 1997, has carried out
hostage-takings for ransom, killings, and bombings since the early 1990s. In 2002, DOD
established the Joint Special Operations Task Force–Philippines (JSOTF-P) as part of Operation
Enduring Freedom to support “the comprehensive approach of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines in their fight against terrorism,”112 including a large humanitarian component.
Philippine military efforts, supported by U.S. assistance, reduced the size of the ASG from 1,000-
2,000 militants in the mid-1990s to an estimated 400 members in the mid-2010s.113 The U.S.
government deactivated JSOTF-P in 2015, citing the diminishing strength of the ASG, but
launched OPE-P in 2017 in response to the rise of Islamic State (IS) affiliates in the
Philippines.114
The Marawi Seige
In May 2017, a coalition of Filipino Islamist extremist groups that had pledged allegiance to the
Islamic State, along with dozens of foreign fighters, laid siege to Marawi, a provincial capital in
Mindanao.115 With U.S. and other foreign assistance, the AFP retook the city in October 2017.
U.S. military personnel provided technical support, including ISR training, aerial surveillance,
and communications assistance.116 The conflict reportedly resulted in the deaths of over 900
militants, over 165 Philippine troops, and roughly 50 civilians, as well as the destruction of much
of the city.117

111 “Philippines Tells China to ‘Back Off’ After South China Sea Standoff,” Reuters, November 18, 2022.
112 Joint Special Operations Task Force–Philippines Fact Sheet, July 1, 2011, at http://jsotf-p.blogspot.com/2011/.
113 Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2018: Philippines, November 1, 2019; Linda Robinson, Patrick
B. Johnston, and Gillian S. Oak, “U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines,” 2001-2014, RAND, 2016.
114 Sam LaGrone, “U.S. Officially Ends Special Operations Task Force in the Philippines, Some Advisers Remain,”
USNI News, February 27, 2015.
115 Joseph Hincks, “What the Siege of a Philippine City Reveals About ISIS’ Deadly New Front in Asia,” Time, May
25, 2017.
116 Neil Jerome Morales and Simon Lewis, “U.S. Forces Give Technical Assistance as PH Takes Losses in Marawi,”
ABS-CBN, June 11, 2017.
117 “Philippines: ‘Battle of Marawi’ Leaves Trail of Death and Destruction,” Amnesty International, November 17,
2017.
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Bangsamoro Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
For two decades, Manila and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, an armed separatist group, engaged in on-again,
off-again negotiations on a settlement and political arrangement that would provide substantial autonomy to
Muslims in Mindanao and put an end to the decades-old military conflict. In 2018, the Duterte government and the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front reached an agreement that formed a new, Muslim-majority administrative area in
Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, called the Bangsamoro Automomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (BARMM).
The BARMM, which encompasses five provinces and 4 mil ion people in Western Mindanao and Sulu, was
approved by voters in the region and established in 2019.
Previous peace agreements have successful y reduced the number of separatists engaged in armed conflict with the
central government, and some observers expect the new political arrangement similarly to result in the
disarmament of militants, fewer attacks, and the growth of investment in the historically poor region.118 However,
the COVID-19 pandemic has led to delays in the creation of new government institutions, demobilization and
disarmament of Moro fighters, and provision of socioeconomic benefits to former militants.119 According to
experts, the slow transition could strengthen armed extremist groups, such as the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom
Fighters, and undermine the upcoming BARMM elections to be held in 2022.120
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)-East Asia
In 2018, the Department of State added ISIS–Philippines (ISIS-P), a loose collection of groups
who had pledged allegiance to the Islamic State, to its list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations.121
The network, now renamed ISIS–East Asia (ISIS-EA), has around 300-500 fighters.122 Although
weakened in the AFP counteroffensive in Marawi, the Abu Sayyaf Group and other IS-affiliated
groups have continued to carry out sporadic attacks in Mindanao and Sulu.123 In April 2020, ISIS-
EA ambushed AFP forces on the island of Jolo, killing 12 soldiers.124 Some U.S. officials and
analysts argue that “efforts to reduce extremism in the Philippines do not appear to have made a
substantial difference since the launch of OPE-P.”125 Force rotations, uncertainty over the VFA,
and COVID-19 restrictions appear to have also have hindered U.S. assistance.126 According to
U.S. Special Operations Command-Pacific (SOCPAC), despite progress in executing large-scale
counterterrorism operations in difficult terrains since 2017, the AFP as of 2020 had not
demonstrated the capacity to sustain gains by further degrading terrorist groups or preventing
them from reconstituting.127

118 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Philippines, June 11, 2021.
119 Georgi Engelbrecht, “The Normalization Process in the Bangsamoro Faces Rising Uncertainty,” The Diplomat,
April 26, 2021.
120 Nick Aspinwall, “Thousands of Families Are Being Displaced by Violent Clashes in Mindanao,” The Diplomat,
April 2, 2021.
121 Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism, “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” at https://www.state.gov/
foreign-terrorist-organizations/.
122 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, “Operation Pacific Eagle-Philippines: Lead Inspector General
Report to the United States Congress, July 1, 2020-September 30, 2020.”
123 State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism 2020: Philippines; Bong Sarmiento, “ISIS Thrives in Covid-19
Shadows in Philippines,” Asia Times, May 22, 2020.
124 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, “Operation Pacific Eagle-Philippines: Lead Inspector General
Report to the United States Congress, April 1, 2020-June 30, 2020,” August 11, 2020.
125 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, “Operation Pacific Eagle-Philippines: Lead Inspector General
Report to the United States Congress, April 1, 2020-June 30, 2020,” August 11, 2020.
126 Ibid.; Jeff Seldin, “Islamic State Holding on in Philippines, Despite Millions in US Spending,” VOA, August 12,
2020.
127 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, “Operation Pacific Eagle-Philippines: Lead Inspector General
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Other Security Threats: Communist Party of the Philippines
The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), which the government long has viewed as its principal security
threat, has waged an insurgency since the late 1960s. Over 100,000 combatants and civilians have died in fighting
related to the insurgency since 1969. The CPP’s military arm, the New People’s Army (NPA), reached over 25,000
fighters in the early 1980s, but declined after President Ferdinand Marcos fell from power and democracy was
restored in 1986. It now has an estimated 4,000 fighters and remains active throughout the Philippines.128
The U.S. government placed the CPP and the NPA on its list of terrorist organizations in 2002 under Executive
Order 13224 (to block terrorist financing), but does not provide direct military support to the Philippine military
in its war against the NPA. The AFP has continued to battle communist insurgents, and the NPA has continued
attacks on security forces, property, and civilians.129 In 2017, peace talks held in Norway between the Philippine
government and the National Democratic Front, which represents the CPP, broke down, and President Duterte
signed a proclamation declaring the CPP and NPA as terrorist organizations.130
Human Rights Issues
The Drug War
Since President Rodrigo Duterte’s election in 2016, human rights groups have criticized the
Philippine government for extrajudicial killings related to its “War on Drugs,” as well as for other
human rights violations.131 Drug war-related deaths range from Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency numbers of approximately 6,000 to estimates by human rights organizations of nearly
30,000.132 At the height of the drug war in 2016-2017, human rights groups reported that virtually
all of the killings were carried out by police or by armed vigilantes and occurred without due
process, and that the vast majority of victims were unarmed, poor, low-level offenders. They
further alleged that police collaborated with vigilantes, planted evidence at the scenes of killings,
fabricated reports, and held suspected drug offenders for ransom.133 Impunity from prosecution
that generally protects government and government-backed perpetrators of violence has long
been a problem in the Philippines. Of police officers involved in killings in the anti-drug war
since 2016, only three have been convicted of murder.134

Report to the United States Congress, July 1, 2020-September 30, 2020.”
128 Prashanth Parameswaran, “What’s Next for the Philippines Communist Insurgency Under Duterte?” The Diplomat,
March 31, 2020.
129 According to AFP sources, between 2016 and 2020, 443 Philippine soldiers were killed by CPP insurgents.
Rigoberto D. Tiglao, “Not an Enemy? CPP-NPA Killed 50,000 Filipinos—and Continues to Kill,” Manila Times,
November 27, 2020; Frances Mangosing, “AFP, Citing Its Data, Says Civilian Property Destroyed in 532 NPA Attacks
Since 2010,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 8, 2021; Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2020:
Philippines; Jack Broome, “An End in Sight for the Philippines’ Maoist Insurgency?” The Diplomat, February 19,
2021.
130 Pursuant to Republic Act No. 10168, the Terrorism Financing Prevention and Suppression Act of 2012. “Duterte
Declares Philippine Communist Rebels ‘Terrorists,’” Agence France Presse, December 5, 2017. Formal and informal
peace talks between the government and the communists also had been attempted under five prior administrations.
131 See, for example, Human Right Watch, “Philippines: Events of 2021.”
132 Stefano Vechhia, “Duterte’s ‘War on Drugs’ Enters Its Final Phase,” Asia News, March 16, 2022; “How Many
People Have Been Killed in Rodrigo Duterte’s War on Drugs?” The Economist, November 22, 2021.
133 Human Rights Watch, “’License to Kill’: Philippine Police Killings in Duterte’s ‘War on Drugs,’” March 1, 2017;
Amnesty International, “If You Are Poor, You Are Killed: Extrajudicial Executions in the Philippines’ ‘War on
Drugs,’” January 2017.
134 Karen Lema, “Relatives of Philippine Drug War Victims Alarmed by Duterte’s Talk of Staying On,” Reuters,
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In March 2018, President Duterte announced that the Philippines would withdraw from the
International Criminal Court (ICC) after the tribunal launched a preliminary investigation into
possible “crimes against humanity” related to the antidrug campaign.135 In June 2020, the United
Nations Human Rights Council released a report on the human rights situation in the Philippines,
with a focus on the drug war. The report stated, “Persistent impunity for human rights violations
is stark and the practical obstacles to accessing justice are almost insurmountable.”136 In
December 2020, the ICC found a “reasonable basis to believe” that crimes against humanity were
committed under the anti-drug campaign.137
Other Human Rights Issues
Some experts argue that the space for voices critical of the government narrowed under Duterte.
In 2017, Philippine authorities arrested Senator Leila De Lima, a critic of Duterte’s drug war, on
charges that she had accepted money from drug lords while she was Justice Secretary.138 In June
2020, journalist Maria Ressa, founder of the online news site Rappler, which has reported
critically on the anti-drug campaign, was found guilty of “cyber libel.”139 Some observers view
both cases as politically motivated.140 Ressa, who is free on bail as she appeals her verdict, was
awarded the 2021 Nobel Peace Prize for her efforts to safeguard freedom of expression.141
The State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2020 cited “serious
restrictions on free expression and the press, including violence, threats of violence, and
unjustified arrests or prosecutions of journalists, censorship, and the use of criminal libel laws to
punish journalists.”142 The Philippines was the seventh most dangerous country for journalists in
2020, according to the Committee to Project Journalists, and ranks 138 out of 180 countries on
Reporters Without Borders’ World Press Freedom Index.143 The Philippines enacted a new Anti-
Terrorism Law in 2020 that analysts say contains broad and vague provisions that the government
and security forces can use arbitrarily to target political opponents and silence dissent, and that
weakens legal protections for the accused.144

August 25, 2021.
135 The Philippines officially withdrew from the ICC in March 2019. Jason Gutierrez, “Philippines Officially Leaves
the International Criminal Court,” New York Times, March 17, 2019.
136 United Nations Human Rights Council, “Philippines: UN Report Details Widespread Human Rights Violations and
Persistent Impunity,” at https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25924&LangID=
E.
137 International Criminal Court, “Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2020,” December 14, 2020.
138 Vince Ferreras, “TIMELINE: De Lima’s Four-Year Struggle in Prison,” CNN Philippines, March 16, 2021;
“Muntinlupa Court Junks 1 of 3 Charges vs. De Lima,” CNN Philippines, February 17, 2021; “List of De Lima’s
‘Persecutors’ Sent to US Gov’t,” CNN Philippines, February 25, 2020.
139 “Philippine American Journalist Maria Ressa Convicted in Cybercrime Case,” MSN, June 15, 2020.
140 Human Rights Watch, “Philippines: Drop Charges Against Rappler, Editor,” November 30, 2018.
141 Ressa won the prize along with Russian journalist Dmitry Muratov. “Maria Ressa: Facts,” The Nobel Prize, at
https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2021/ressa/facts/; Robyn Dixon et al., “Journalists Known for Taking on
Governments of Philippines and Russia Win Nobel Peace Prize,” Washington Post, October 8, 2021; Rebecca Ratcliffe
and Jon Henley, “‘War Reporting Was Easier’: Maria Ressa’s Journey to Nobel Prize Winner,” The Guardian, October
8, 2021.
142 Department of State, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Philippines.
143 Committee to Protect Journalists, Global Impunity Index 2020, October 28, 2020; Reporters Without Borders, World
Press Freedom Index 2021.
144 Nick Aspinwall, “After Signing Anti-Terrorism Law, Duterte Names His Targets,” Foreign Policy, July 10, 2020;
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In 2018, the Securities and Exchange Commission of the Philippines revoked the license of
online news site Rappler due to an issue related to alleged foreign control, which Rappler has
disputed; the media company was allowed to continue operations pending a final decision by the
SEC and the Court of Appeals.145 Critics decried the license revocation as a violation of press
freedom, particularly since Rappler had published reports on the drug war.146 In July 2020, the
Philippines House of Representatives voted to reject the renewal of the broadcast license of ABS-
CBN, the country’s largest broadcasting network, which had aired an opposition political
advertisement in 2016 that reportedly offended Duterte. The network also was a major source of
critical reporting on the drug war.147
In 2019 and 2020, extrajudicial killings of leftist and human rights activists increased, reportedly
often carried out by unidentified assailants linked to security forces and government-backed
militias.148 Many of the victims were targeted as alleged members of, or linked to, communist or
terrorist organizations. Between 2015 and 2020, there were over 200 such killings, according to
the U.S.-based NGO Human Rights Watch.149
Economics and Trade
The Philippines, one of the fastest growing economies in Southeast Asia prior to the COVID-19
pandemic, recorded annual economic expansion averaging 6.6% annually between 2016 and
2019.150 GDP contracted by 9% in 2020, largely due to the economic effects of the pandemic, but
rebounded to 4.5% in 2021.151
Philippines trade with the United States, its third-largest trading partner and second largest export
market, totaled $16.3 billion in 2020, including $9.7 billion in exports and $6.6 billion in imports.
Major Philippine export items to the United States include electrical machinery, equipment, and
parts; other machinery and appliances; leather goods and handbags; agricultural goods; medical
devices; and apparel. The largest U.S. exports to the Philippines are electrical machinery,
equipment, and parts and agricultural goods.152 Under the Aquino administration, the Philippines
had expressed strong interest in joining the (then) Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in order to gain
greater access to U.S. markets and investment opportunities. The Philippines recently has
expressed interest in joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific
Partnership, which evolved from the TPP without U.S. participation.153

Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Philippines.
145 “SEC Stands by Decision to Revoke Rappler’s License,” CNN Philippines, November 22, 2021.
146 Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, “State of Media Freedom in the Philippines,” May 5, 2021.
147 “ABS-CBN Says Sorry to Duterte for Airing Controversial Political Ad in 2016 Polls,” CNN Philippines, February
24, 2020; Human Rights Watch, “Philippines: Duterte Seeks to Shut Network, Case Against ABS-CBN Attacks Media
Freedom,” February 10, 2020.
148 United Nations Human Rights Council, “Philippines: UN Report Details Widespread Human Rights Violations and
Persistent Impunity,” June 29, 2020; Human Rights Watch, “Philippines: Spate of Killings of Leftist Activists,” June
18, 2019.
149 Human Rights Watch, “World Report 2021, Philippines: Events of 2020.”
150 World Bank, “GDP Growth (Annual %)—Philippines.”
151 Asian Development Bank, “ADB Maintains 2021 Forecast for Philippine Economy; COVID-19 Vaccination Key to
Growth,” news release, September 22, 2021; Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Philippines.
152 Trade Data Monitor.
153 The United States withdrew from the TPP in 2017. Shannon Hayden and Javiera Heine, “CPTPP: Can We Expect
Additional Southeast Asian Members Soon?” The Diplomat, March 10, 2022.
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The Philippines is home to the largest business process outsourcing sector in the world,
generating over $26 billion annually.154 Filipino workers continue to emigrate for jobs abroad
despite economic growth at home. Remittances from over 10 million overseas Filipino workers
(OFWs) rose to a high of nearly $33.5 billion in 2019, the biggest share coming from the United
States at 40.9%.155 Over 600,000 OFWs returned to the Philippines in 2020-2021 due to the
COVID-19 pandemic.156
Considerations for Congress
 Given the significance of the Philippines to U.S. strategic interests in the region,
Congress may consider how best to support the defense relationship, including
how to help the Armed Forces of the Philippines address its most critical
capability gaps and capacity shortfalls. Congress may consider how to apportion
U.S. security assistance among the areas of responding to external threats and
counterterrorism. Congress may consider what combination of military and
development or humanitarian assistance might best counter extremist movements
in the southern Philippines.
 As the United States and the Philippines have common interests in maintaining a
“free and open Indo-Pacific,” Congress may consider how the United States
might provide support to the Philippines in its efforts to protect its sovereignty
and interests in its maritime domain. Policy tools include U.S. official statements
of support for the 2016 UNCLOS tribunal decision declaring China’s territorial
claims to have no legal basis; cultivating multilateral support, including from
ASEAN, for countering PRC assertiveness in the South China Sea; and providing
greater security assistance to the Philippines. Congress may also consider the
possible consequences for U.S. interests of ratifying UNCLOS.157
 As the problems of extrajudicial killings and a culture of impunity have
continued in the Philippines, Congress may consider how the United States might
assist the Philippine government in strengthening its oversight of its police and
military forces and enhancing the efficacy of its judicial system. Previous U.S.
assistance efforts, for example, have included strengthening the rule of law and
improving judicial processes.158 Given past, present, and proposed congressional
restrictions on U.S. security assistance to the Philippines due to human rights
concerns, Congress may consider their impact, if any, on human rights conditions
in the Philippines and on U.S.-Philippines relations, and adjust accordingly.
Given China’s economic engagement and influence in the region and Philippine interest in
strengthening economic ties with the United States, Congress may consider how best to promote
closer U.S.-Philippines economic ties and provide alternatives to Chinese infrastructure
financing, whether through bilateral trade arrangements, the U.S. International Development

154 Jessica Fenol, “BPO Industry Eyes $29-Billion Revenue, More Jobs by 2022,” ABS-CBN, June 25, 2021.
155 Remittances fell to $33.2 billion in 2020. Lawrence Agcaoili, “OFW Remittances Decline 1.7% to $2.89 Billion in
January,” Philippine Star, March 16, 2021.
156 Ferdinand Patinio, “600K Pandemic-Affected OFWs Repatriated in 12 Months,” Philippine News Agency, July 12,
2021.
157 In the 117th Congress, H.Res. 361 and S.Res. 220 would call on the United States Senate to give its advice and
consent to the ratification of UNCLOS.
158 See, for example, USAID’s Judicial Strengthening to Improve Court Effectiveness (JUSTICE) Project, at
https://2012-2017.usaid.gov/philippines/partnership-growth-pfg/justice.
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Finance Corporation or other financial entities, a second Millennium Challenge Corporation
compact, or the Indo-Pacific Strategy’s proposed Indo-Pacific economic framework.
Selected Legislation
 The Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2021 (P.L. 116-260, Section 7043(g))
states: “None of the funds appropriated by this Act may be made available for
counternarcotics assistance for the Philippines, except for drug demand
reduction, maritime law enforcement, or transnational interdiction.” In addition,
P.L. 116-260 mandated that the Administration submit a report describing steps
taken by the Government of the Philippines to prosecute armed forces personnel
who have been involved in extrajudicial killings, strengthen judicial institutions,
and ensure that the armed forces and paramilitary groups are not engaging in acts
of intimidation or violence against journalists, human rights and other social
activists. The act also barred entry “to foreign government officials involved in
threatening, wrongfully imprisoning, or otherwise depriving of liberty
independent journalists who speak out or publish about official corruption or
other abuses, including Maria Ressa in the Philippines.”159
 The Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (ARIA, P.L. 115-409) restricts
counternarcotics assistance to the PNP, with the exception of drug demand
reduction, maritime, and interdiction programs, unless the Philippines has
adopted and is implementing a counternarcotics strategy that is consistent with
international human rights standards.
 H.R. 3884 (introduced 6/14/21, 117th Congress), the Philippine Human Right Act,
would suspend U.S. security assistance to the Philippines until the Government
the Philippines has met certain conditions related to the protection of human
rights and prosecution of members of the police and military who have violated
human rights, among other provisions.160
 S. 1657 (introduced 5/17/21, 117th Congress), the South China Sea and East
China Sea Sanctions Act of 2021, would impose sanctions on Chinese persons
and entities that participate in certain activities related to China’s territorial
disputes in the South China Sea and the East China Sea and addresses other
related issues.
 H.Res. 724 (introduced 10/19/21, 117th Congress) and S.Res. 432 (introduced
10/28/21, 117th Congress) would recognize the month of October 2021 as
Filipino American History Month and celebrate the history and culture of
Filipino Americans and their immense contributions to the United States.

159 See Joint Explanatory Statement to the Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2021, Division K (Department of State,
Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Act, 2021) and S.Rept. 116-126. Between 2008 and 2013, the U.S. Congress
placed conditions upon a portion of Foreign Military Financing (FMF) to the Philippines (withholding $2 million-$3
million annually) in order to encourage human rights improvements related to extra-judicial killings by members of the
AFP. These restrictions applied only to the Army.
160 The main provisions of this bill have been incorporated into H.R. 4521, the America COMPETES Act of 2022 (Sec.
30229A).
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Author Information

Thomas Lum
Christina L. Arabia
Specialist in Asian Affairs
Analyst in Security Assistance, Security

Cooperation and the Global Arms Trade

Ben Dolven

Specialist in Asian Affairs

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