Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations
March 7, 2022
Mexico, the 10th most populous country and 15th largest economy in the world, is bound to the
United States by geography and strong economic, cultural, and historical ties. In addition to
Clare Ribando Seelke
sharing a nearly 2,000-mile border with the United States, Mexico is among the top U.S. trade
Specialist in Latin
partners and a major U.S. energy supplier. These ties frequently manifest themselves in
American Affairs
legislative activity and interest across a wide spectrum of issues in Congress.

Joshua Klein
Andrés Manuel López Obrador, the populist leader of the National Regeneration Movement
Presidential Management
(MORENA) party, which he created in 2014, took office for a six-year term in December 2018.
Fellow
President López Obrador has remained popular (54% approval in February 2022), likely as a

result of his delivery on social programs and ability to connect with voters, even as his
government has struggled to address organized crime-related violence, corruption, and the

Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. According to the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), Mexico’s economy contracted by 8.2% in 2020. The economy expanded 5.3% in 2021, but the IMF predicts 2.8%
growth this year.
U.S. Policy
U.S.-Mexico relations have remained generally cordial, with Mexico playing a key role in helping control U.S.-bound
irregular migration. Tensions have emerged, however, over trade policy and tariffs, border security issues, and U.S. arrests of
high-level former officials on drug trafficking and related charges. President Joe Biden and President López Obrador held
bilateral and trilateral (with Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau) meetings during the North American Leaders summit
in November 2021. U.S. policymakers remain concerned about synthetic drug flows from Mexico, implementation of the
U.S-Mexico-Canada Free Trade Agreement (USMCA), and a range of human rights issues, including recent killings of
Mexican journalists and enforced disappearances. Key issues of congressional interest discussed in this report include the
following:
 Security Cooperation: Members of Congress may continue to fund and oversee bilateral efforts to combat
cross-border crime, improve law enforcement cooperation, and strengthen the rule of law in Mexico under
the new Bicentennial Framework security partnership signed in October 2021.
 Irregular Immigration: Congress may continue to monitor efforts to reduce irregular U.S.-bound
migration, including policies that require bilateral cooperation, such as the Migrant Protection Protocols
(MPP) initiative.
 Human Rights: Members of Congress may continue to support Mexico’s effort to address human rights
challenges, including violence against journalists and human rights defenders for whom homicide rates in
Mexico are extremely elevated.
 USMCA: Congress may closely monitor both countries’ adherence to the USMCA, with particular interest
in labor conditions in Mexico and a proposed reform of Mexico’s electricity sector that may violate key
provisions of the agreement.
 Border Environmental Concerns: Members of Congress may continue to conduct oversight on attempts
to resolve long-standing transboundary pollution issues and water sharing on the southwest border and may
consider funding for infrastructure improvements to address such problems.
Legislative Action
Congress has appropriated foreign assistance for Mexico and has overseen bilateral efforts to address U.S.-bound
unauthorized migration, illegal drug flows, the COVID-19 pandemic, and USMCA implementation. Congress is considering
the Biden Administration’s FY2022 foreign assistance request for Mexico of $116.5 million, which is nearly 27% lower than
the estimated FY2021 appropriation of $158.9 million. The House-passed version of the FY2022 foreign aid appropriations
bill (H.R. 4373, H.Rept. 117-84) would provide $158.9 million for assistance to Mexico, with several reporting requirements.
The FY2022 foreign aid bill introduced in the Senate (S. 3075) would not stipulate a total funding level for Mexico. Other
legislation that would affect U.S. relations with Mexico includes H.R. 3524 reported by the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs in July 2021. The bill would require a report on how the United States, Mexico, and Canada could work together to
reduce methane and other emissions and implement Article 23.6 of the USMCA, which prohibits importation of goods
produced by forced labor. S. 1201, introduced in the Senate in April 2021, contains similar provisions.
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Introduction
Congress has maintained interest in Mexico, a neighboring country and top trading partner with
which the United States has a close but complex relationship (see Figure 1). In recent decades,
bilateral relations improved as the U.S. and Mexican economies became more integrated and the
countries worked together to address crime, migration, and other issues of shared concern.
Disagreements on these issues have emerged on occasion. In addition, the history of U.S. military
and diplomatic intervention in Mexico has periodically provoked tension.1
Congress remains concerned about the effects of organized crime-related violence in Mexico on
U.S. security interests and about U.S. citizens’ safety in Mexico. It has increased oversight of
U.S.-Mexican security cooperation and may continue to do so as the two nations implement the
US-Mexico Bicentennial Framework agreement.2 Congress has continued to appropriate foreign
assistance for Mexico and oversee bilateral efforts to address illegal drug flows, unauthorized
migration, environmental issues, and the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic.
Implementation of the United States-Mexico-Canada Free Trade Agreement (USMCA) and its
labor commitments, Mexico’s treatment of U.S. energy firms, and border environmental and
water issues may receive oversight attention.
This report provides an overview of political and economic conditions in Mexico, followed by
overviews of selected issues of congressional interest in Mexico—security and foreign aid;
extraditions; human rights, trade; migration; energy; and border environmental, water, and health
concerns.
Background
Over the past two decades, Mexico has transitioned from a centralized political system dominated
by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which controlled the presidency from 1929-2000,
to a true multiparty democracy.3 Since the 1990s, presidential power has become more balanced
with that of Mexico’s Congress and Supreme Court. Partially as a result of these new constraints
on executive power, the country’s first two presidents from the conservative National Action
Party (PAN)—Vicente Fox (2000-2006) and Felipe Calderón (2006-2012)—struggled to enact
some of the reforms designed to address Mexico’s economic and security challenges.
The Calderón government pursued an aggressive anticrime strategy and increased security
cooperation with the United States. Mexico extradited many drug kingpins, but some 60,000
people died due to organized crime-related violence. Security challenges overshadowed the
government’s achievements, including its economic stewardship during the global financial crisis,
health care expansion and management of the H1N1 pandemic, and efforts on climate change.
In 2012, the PRI regained control of the presidency after 12 years in the opposition with a victory
by Enrique Peña Nieto over Andrés Manuel López Obrador, then standing for the leftist
Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD). In 2013, Peña Nieto shepherded reforms addressing
energy, education, access to finance, and politics through the legislature by forming an agreement
among the PRI, PAN, and PRD. The energy reform opened Mexico’s energy sector to private

1 Peter H. Smith and Andrew Selee, eds., Mexico and the United States: the Politics of Partnership (Boulder, CO:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2013).
2 White House, “FACT SHEET: U.S.-Mexico High-Level Security Dialogue,” October 8, 2022; CRS Insight IN11859,
New U.S.-Mexico Security Strategy: Issues for Congressional Consideration.
3 Emily Edmonds Poli and David A. Shirk, Contemporary Mexican Politics. 4th ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2020).
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investment, prompting foreign companies to pledge hundreds of billions of dollars of new
investment in the country. During Peña Nieto’s term, Mexico continued to contend with high
levels of homicides, moderate economic growth (averaging 2% annually), and pervasive
corruption and impunity.
Figure 1. Mexico at a Glance

Sources: Created by CRS using data from CIA World Factbook (CIA), Mexico’s National Council for the
Evaluation of Social Development Policy (CONEVAL), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Mexico’s National
Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI), and the Trade Data Monitor (TDM).
Notes: Mexico’s 2020 census did not include ethnicity; two questions asked people whether they self-identify as
Indigenous language speakers (6.1% of the population) or as Afro-Mexican or Afro-descendant (2% of the
population). See the National Institute of Statistics and Geography, Así Se Contó México, 2021.
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Political and Economic Environment
On July 1, 2018, Mexican voters gave Andrés Manuel López Obrador and MORENA a mandate
to change the course of Mexico’s domestic policies. After campaigning on a platform pledging to
root out corruption while lifting up the poor, López Obrador and his MORENA coalition
dominated Mexico’s presidential and legislative elections. Originally from the southern state of
Tabasco, López Obrador, a former mayor of Mexico City (2000-2005), had run for president in
the past two elections. After his 2012 loss, he left the center-left PRD and founded MORENA.
MORENA, a leftist party, ran in coalition with the socially conservative Social Encounter Party
(PES) and the leftist Labor Party (PT). López Obrador won 53.2% of the presidential vote, more
than 30 percentage points ahead of his nearest rival. López Obrador won in 31 of 32 states,
demonstrating that he had broadened his support from his base in southern Mexico.
Four years into his term, President López Obrador has proven adept at connecting with his
constituents but has struggled to adjust his priorities, even as Mexico has yet to reduce organized
crime-related violence and recover from the COVID-19 pandemic. López Obrador has shaped
daily news coverage by convening early morning press conferences and traveling throughout the
country to attend large, campaign-style rallies. He also has attempted to take advantage of
electoral processes to increase his political capital; his MORENA party pushed to hold a costly
presidential recall election in April 2022 to demonstrate his broad popularity.4 Mexico’s
independent electoral body has maintained it lacks adequate funding for the referendum.5 Until a
recent corruption scandal involving his son, President López Obrador had an approval rating of
64% (January 2022), likely due to his delivery on social programs.6
President López Obrador has criticized media outlets that question his policies and reduced
funding for independent government entities and regulators that could check his presidential
power, alarming democracy experts.7 López Obrador’s administration has cut public sector
salaries and ministry budgets, especially those of autonomous institutions that he proposes to
eliminate or merge into existing bureaucracies. Leadership for some independent institutions has
been replaced in favor of those with ties to the president.8
On June 6, 2021, Mexico held local, state, and midterm legislative elections that many analysts
framed as a referendum on President López Obrador and his policies halfway through his six-year
presidential term. The PRI, PAN, and PRD formed an opposition coalition to challenge López
Orbrador and MORENA. MORENA candidates dominated the gubernatorial elections, winning
11 of 15 governorships. In legislative elections, López Obrador’s party lost its simple majority
and the absolute majority it held with allied parties. López Obrador received less support from the
middle class than he did when he won the presidency but more support from poorer voters who

4 A recall election is a procedure by which voters can remove an elected official from office (in this case the president)
through a referendum before that official’s term of office has ended.
5 “Mexico: SCJN Rejects INE’s Suspension of Recall Vote,” Latin News Daily, December 23, 2021. Budget cuts to the
National Electoral Institute (INE), Mexico’s independent electoral management body, prompted its leadership to
suspend a presidential recall election scheduled for April 2022 until the Mexican Supreme Court overturned INE’s
decision, leading some to question the court’s independence from the administration.
6 Carin Zissis, “Approval Tracker: Mexico’s President AMLO,” March 3, 2022.
7 See Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2021: Mexico, 2021; “Órganos Autónomos, AMLO no los ha Olvidado:
‘Apura’ Reforma para que Sean Eliminados,” El Financiero, November 4, 2021.
8 Francesco Manetto, “Del INE al Banco de México: la Tensión con los Órganos Autónomos Marca un año Clave para
López Obrador,” El País, January 9, 2022
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have benefitted from his administration’s social welfare policies.9 Despite violence throughout
the electoral process, the elections themselves reportedly ran smoothly, with no protests, evidence
of fraud, or challenges to the results. 10
Figure 2. Composition of the Mexican Congress by Party, as of March 2022

Source: Created by CRS using data from the Mexican chamber of deputies and Mexican senate.
Notes: MORENA = National Regeneration Movement; PVEM = Green Party; PT = Worker’s Party; PAN =
National Action Party; PRI = Institutional Revolutionary Party; MC = Citizen’s Movement; PRD = Democratic
Revolutionary Party; and PES = Social Encounter Party.
As of March 2022, MORENA controlled 60 of 128 seats in the senate and 202 of 500 seats in the
chamber (See Figure 2). The MORENA-led coalition, which is ad hoc but often includes the PT,
PES, and Green Party (PVEM), controls 277 seats in the chamber and 74 seats in the senate, short
of the two thirds majority needed to make constitutional amendments. This may pose challenges
for López Obrador’s plans to make constitutional reforms during the second half of his term.
Those reforms include a proposed energy reform that would severely limit private sector
involvement in the electricity sector. The government also plans to place the National Guard, a
military-led federal law enforcement body it created, under the authority of the defense ministry
and restructure the electoral authority.11
Security Conditions
From 2015 to 2018, the homicide rate in Mexico surged some 71%, reaching a record 29
homicides per 100,000 people.12 Homicides in Mexico have remained near those record-setting
levels, even during the COVID-19 pandemic.13 For over a decade, high levels of homicides have
been driven, in part, by increasing organized crime-related violence (see Figure 3).14

9 Maria Verza, “Head of Mexico’s Governing Party Cites Middle Class Failings,” AP, June 11, 2021.
10 Etellekt: Séptimo Informe de Violencia Política en México Proceso Electoral 2020-2021, June 2021.
11 Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), “AMLO Outlines Three Constitutional Reforms,” June 22, 2021
12 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Global Homicide database, at https://dataunodc.un.org/
content/Country-profile?country=Mexico.
13 Laura Y. Calderón et al., Organized Crime and Violence in Mexico: 2021 Special Report, Justice in Mexico,
University of San Diego, October 2021. Hereinafter Calderón et al., Organized Crime and Violence in Mexico, 2021.
14 Infighting among criminal groups has intensified since the rise of the Jalisco New Generation, or CJNG, cartel. See
CRS Report R41576, Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations, by June S. Beittel.
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Figure 3. Estimated Organized Crime-Related Homicides in Mexico
(2008-2021)

Source: Created by CRS. Information from Lantia Consultores, a Mexican security firm.
Femicides (targeted killing of women) and disappearances have increased in recent years. Mexico
recorded over 940 femicides each year in 2019 and 2020, an increase of approximately 129%
from 2015 levels.15 In November 2021, the U.N. Committee on Enforced Disappearances
conducted a fact-finding mission in Mexico and announced that more than 95,000 people had
been reported missing.16 Many people have been missing since former president Calderón
launched a “drug war” in 2006.17
U.S. drug demand, as well as bulk cash smuggling and weapons smuggling into Mexico from the
United States, have fueled drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico for over a decade. Recent
violence may be attributable to competition for the production and trafficking of synthetic
opioids.18 In November 2019, drug traffickers killed nine women and children from an extended
family of dual U.S.-Mexican citizens in Sonora, prompting significant U.S. concern.19
President López Obrador has rejected calls for a “war” on transnational criminal organizations.
Instead, his administration’s security strategy includes a focus on addressing the socioeconomic
drivers of violent crime and other novel policies.20 The administration launched a program that
provides scholarships to youth to attend university or complete internships. No one has evaluated
the program’s effects on youth employability or crime prevention,21 and auditors have uncovered
irregularities in the program’s implementation.22 Mexico’s senate passed legislation to

15 Calderón et al., Organized Crime and Violence in Mexico, 2021.
16 “Mexico: Over 95,000 Registered as Disappeared, Impunity ‘Almost Absolute,’” U.N. News, November 29, 2021.
See CRS In Focus IF11669, Human Rights Challenges in Mexico: Addressing Enforced Disappearances.
17 Maritza Pérez, “Segob Reporta 77,171 Personas Desaparecidas en México al Corte de Septiembre de 2020,” El
Economista, October 7, 2020.
18 Steve Dudley, “The End of the Big Cartels: Why There Won’t be Another El Chapo,” Foreign Affairs, February 27,
2019; Eimhin O’Reilly, “Fentanyl Trade Fuels Cartel Battle in Central Mexico,” InSight Crime, March 2, 2020.
19 Lizbeth Diaz, “Nine Americans Killed in Mexican Ambush, Trump Urges Joint war on Drug Cartels,” Reuters,
November 5, 2019.
20 Vanda Felbab-Brown, AMLO’s Security Policy: Creative Ideas, Tough Reality, Brookings Institution, March 2019.
21 Alán Lopez, “Jovenes Perdiendo su Futúro,” Nexos, February 17, 2020.
22 Zenyazen Flores, “Estas son las Irregularidades que la ASF Encontró en Jóvenes Construyendo el Futuro,” El
Financiero, February 21, 2021.
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decriminalize marijuana production and distribution to comply with a Mexican Supreme Court
ruling; it is before the chamber.23
At the same time, President López Obrador abandoned a key campaign promise by expanding,
rather than limiting, the military’s role in public security and in a broad array of other public
sector tasks.24 In 2019, López Obrador backed constitutional reforms that created a National
Guard, and in May 2020 he signed a decree to allow military involvement in public security to
continue for five more years, under civilian supervision.25 Mexico’s National Guard (composed
mostly of military police units of the army and navy, as well as former federal police) has been
tasked with reasserting territorial control in high-crime areas, border and immigration
enforcement, and communications interception.26 However, military and law enforcement forces
reportedly have been prohibited from undertaking operations that involve a visible show of force
in an effort to reduce civilian deaths caused by firefights between security forces and organized
crime.27 Reports suggest that as federal operations have declined, criminal organizations have
begun to use increasingly lethal technology, such as drone-mounted bombs, to expand their
territory.28 State and local police forces charged with investigating most crimes, including
homicides, have received less federal support from the López Obrador government than they
received under prior administrations.29
Addressing Corruption and Impunity
Corruption is an issue at all levels of government and among all political parties in Mexico. At
least 20 former governors (many from former president Peña Nieto’s PRI party) are under
investigation for corruption. In December 2019, Genaro García Luna, who served as public
security minister during the PAN administration of President Calderón, was arrested in the United
States on charges of accepting millions of dollars in bribes from the Sinaloa Cartel; he is pending
trial in New York.30 In October 2020, the U.S. arrest of former Mexican Defense Minister
Salvador Cienfuegos (2012-2018) on drug and money-laundering charges surprised and angered
the Mexican government. Responding to Mexican pressure, the United States agreed to drop the
case and allow Cienfuegos to return to Mexico, where he was exonerated of all charges.31
President López Obrador has taken steps to combat corruption, but the key institutions to detect
and address corrupt offenses—such as the new criminal justice system, the Prosecutor General’s
Office, and the National Anti-corruption System—remain underfunded. President López Obrador

23 Juan Montes, “Mexico Set to Become World’s Largest Legal Cannabis Market,” Wall Street Journal, December 29,
2020.
24 Craig Deare, Militarization a la AMLO: How Bad Can It Get?, Wilson Center, September 2021.
25 Those reforms contradict a 2018 Mexico Supreme Court ruling that prolonged military involvement in public
security violated the Mexican Constitution.
26 Iñigo Guevara, Mexico’s National Guard: When Police are not Enough, Woodrow Wilson Center’s Mexico Institute,
January 2020. “Vigila Guardia Nacional 84 Hospitales de IMSS,” Reforma, April 15, 2020.
27 Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Crime and Anti-crime Policies in Mexico in 2022: A Bleak Outlook,” Brookings Institution,
January 2022.
28 Felbab-Brown, op. cit.
29 Maureen Meyer, Police Reform and Security Strategies in Mexico in the Context of the war on Drugs and U.S.
Support of These Efforts, WOLA, July 2020.
30 U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), “Former Mexican Secretary of Public Security Genaro Garcia Luna Charged with
Engaging in a Continuing Criminal Enterprise,” July 30, 2020.
31 Oscar Lopez, “Mexico Exonerates Ex-Defense Chief Who Was Freed by the U.S.,” New York Times, January 14,
2021.
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has been unwilling to allow prosecutors to investigate allegations involving his family and
allies.32 His focus on reducing government expenditures and his administration’s efforts to punish
tax evaders have won praise from some citizens, while others have dismissed them as symbolic
actions. Many observers worry cuts in public sector salaries have made officials more susceptible
to bribes.
Key Institutions for Strengthening the Rule of Law
New Criminal Justice System. By the mid-2000s, most Mexican legal experts had concluded that reforming
Mexico’s corrupt and inefficient criminal justice system was crucial for combating criminality and strengthening the
rule of law. In June 2008, Mexico implemented constitutional reforms mandating that by 2016, trial procedures at
the federal and state levels had to move from a closed-door process based on written arguments presented to a
judge to an adversarial public trial system, with oral arguments and the presumption of innocence. These changes
aimed to create a new, more transparent, impartial, and efficient criminal justice system.
Under then-President Enrique Peña Nieto, Mexico technically met the June 2016 deadline for adopting the new
system, with states that received technical assistance from the United States showing, on average, better results
than others. Nevertheless, problems in implementation occurred and public opinion turned against the system, as
judges released criminals due to flawed police investigations or weak cases presented by prosecutors. According
to the World Justice Project, the new system has produced better courtroom infrastructure, more capable judges,
and faster case resolution than the old system, but more training for police and prosecutors is needed.
President López Obrador has not dedicated significant resources to strengthening the justice system. His
administration attempted to implement some reforms, including mandatory pre-trial detention for more crimes,
which would have contradicted the new system’s goals. Mexico’s Supreme Court struck down those reforms.
Building an Independent Prosecutor General’s Office. Analysts who study Mexico’s legal system have long
highlighted the inefficiency of the attorney general’s office (known as the PGR). The PGR struggled with limited
resources, corruption, and a lack of political wil to resolve high-profile cases, including those involving corruption
or human rights abuses. Many civil society groups that pushed for the new criminal justice system also lobbied the
Mexican Congress to create an independent prosecutor’s office. Amid petitions from civil society organizations,
Mexico’s senate was to appoint an independent individual to lead the new prosecutor general’s office for a nine-
year term under 2014 constitutional reforms.
President López Obrador downplayed the importance of the new office during his campaign, but Mexico’s
Congress established the office, now known as the Prosecutor General’s Office (FGR), after López Obrador’s
inauguration. In January 2019, Mexico’s senate named Dr. Alejandro Gertz Manero, a close associate and former
security adviser to López Obrador, as prosecutor general. Gertz Manero directed prosecutors to focus on
emblematic cases, but few have progressed. Critics maintain Gertz Manergo has been slow to implement the
reforms enacted by the Mexican Congress to strengthen the FGR.
National Anti-corruption System. In July 2016, Mexico’s Congress approved legislation that contained several
proposals put forth by civil society to ful y implement the National Anti-corruption System (NAS) created by a
2015 constitutional reform. The legislation gave the NAS investigative and prosecutorial powers and a civilian
board of directors; increased administrative and criminal penalties for corruption; and required three declarations
(taxes, assets, and conflicts of interest) from public officials and contractors. Under the Peña Nieto government,
federal implementation of the NAS lagged and state-level implementation varied.
In February 2019, Prosecutor General Gertz Manero named a special anti-corruption prosecutor, who received a
significant budget for 2020 and 2021 amid generalized budget cuts for the institution. Cases involving corruption in
the social development ministry and corrupt payments from the Brazilian construction company Odebrecht to the
head of Petróleos de México (Pemex) during the Peña Nieto administration are moving forward. However, some 500
reports of corruption referred to the FGR by the Ministry of Public Administration in the current administration
have yet to be presented before a judge. In January 2022, the López Obrador administration proposed to
eliminate NAS’s technical support arm charged with evaluating the country’s anti-corruption activities as part of a
larger consolidation strategy to reduce public spending.
Sources: Octavio Rodríguez Ferreira and David Shirk, Criminal Procedure Reform in Mexico, 2008-2016: The
Final Countdown to Implementation, Justice in Mexico, October 2015; World Justice Project México, Mexico’s
New Criminal Justice System: Substantial Progress and Persistent Challenges, June 2018; “AMLO Asegura que
Respetará Decisión de Prisión Preventiva Oficiosa por Defraudación Fiscal,” El Economista, October 26, 2021;

32 See, for example, Andrés Bello, “Why Allegations About His Son Could Hurt Mexico’s President,” The Economist,
February 19, 2022.
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Arturo Angel, “Gertz en Tres Años con FGR: Despidos, Opacidad e Incumpliendo Plazos de su Propia Ley,”
Animal Político, January 27, 2022; and Jorge Monroy, Pedro Vil a y Caña y Alberto Morales, “Va AMLO por
Fusionar 16 órganos en Dependencias,” El Universal, January 28, 2022.
In December 2020, the Mexican Congress passed and President López Obrador signed a law to
limit foreign law enforcement activity in Mexico, including the work of the U.S. Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA). Drafted in response to the U.S. investigation of General
Cienfuegos, the law originally required foreign law enforcement officials to share with Mexican
officials any information obtained on Mexican soil and local officials to report any interactions
with foreign agents. U.S. concerns that the new law would impede U.S.-Mexico security
cooperation led the Mexican government to soften the rule with respect to some sensitive
information; reportedly, cooperation still suffered.33
Human Rights
Criminal groups, sometimes in collusion with state actors, have continued to commit serious
human rights violations against civilians in Mexico.34 The vast majority of those abuses have
gone unpunished, whether they were prosecuted in the military or civilian justice systems. Under
Mexico’s new justice system, judges have had to let many defendants go free, even if they may
have been guilty, due to police misconduct in gathering evidence.35 The government continues to
receive criticism for not protecting journalists, human rights defenders, migrants, and others.36
Critics of President López Obrador have accused him of promoting an environment of
intimidation and media self-censorship by continuing to attack journalists verbally.37
For years, human rights groups and the U.S. State Department’s Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices have chronicled cases of Mexican security officials’ involvement in extrajudicial
killings, torture, and “enforced disappearances.”38 The unresolved case of 43 missing students
who disappeared in Iguala, Guerrero, in September 2014—which allegedly involved the local
police and federal authorities—galvanized global protests. Experts from the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights disproved much of the attorney general’s investigation, and in
2018, a federal judge dismissed that investigation as biased. President López Obrador established
a truth commission, and Prosecutor General Gertz Manero created a special prosecutor’s office to
focus on the case. By January 2021, trials had begun for two former federal security officials

33 “Mexico Softens Rules for Controversial New Foreign Agents Law,” Reuters, January 14, 2021; “US Envoy: US
Asking Mexico to let in DEA and Other Agents,” AP, October 9, 2021.
34 See U.S. Department of State, 2020 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Mexico, March 2021. Hereinafter
U.S. Department of State, 2020 Country Report, March 2021.
35 World Justice Project, Almanac: Achievements and challenges of the New Criminal Justice System, October 25,
2019, at https://worldjusticeproject.mx/almanaque-enpol16/.
36 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2022: Mexico, available at https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-
chapters/mexico.
37 “IAPA asks López Obrador to ‘Immediately Suspend’ his attacks on Journalists,” Voz de América, February 17,
2022.
38 U.S. Department of State, 2020 Country Report, March 2021. According to the United Nations, enforced
disappearances occur when “persons are arrested, detained or abducted against their will or otherwise deprived of their
liberty by officials of different branches or levels of Government, or by organized groups or private individuals acting
on behalf of, or with the support, direct or indirect, consent or acquiescence of the Government.” See
http://www.un.org/en/events/disappearancesday/background.shtml.
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accused of involvement in the disappearances.39 As of February 2022, prosecutors have yet to
secure any convictions.
Among the human rights challenges facing Mexico, President López Obrador has prioritized
enforced disappearances.40 His administration has met regularly with families of the missing,
launched an online portal for reporting missing persons, registered thousands of clandestine
graves, and increased the budget for Mexico’s national search commission. The government has
sought international assistance to identify tens of thousands of bodies that have been exhumed.
Still, in November 2021, the U.N. Committee on Enforced Disappearances criticized the
“structural impunity” that continues for perpetrators of disappearances and the involvement of
public officials from all levels of government in such crimes.41
Human rights organizations have urged the López Obrador administration to fully enact the
country’s 2017 law against torture, investigate and punish cases of torture, and take steps to
ensure that state agents do not commit acts of torture. After an April 2019 review of Mexico, the
U.N. Committee against Torture welcomed the passage of the 2017 law, but stated that torture by
state agents occurred in a “generalized manner” and found torture to be “endemic” in detention
centers.42 López Obrador has spoken out against torture, but his government has yet to develop a
system to track statistics on torture cases as required by the 2017 law.
Analysts maintain that efforts to protect journalists, human rights defenders, and migrants remain
insufficient and, in some cases, have worsened under López Obrador.43 Some 150 journalists and
media workers have been killed in Mexico since 2000, including seven in 2021 and seven through
early March 2022.44 Mexico ranks among the top 10 countries globally with the highest rates of
unsolved journalist murders as a percentage of population, according to the nongovernmental
Committee to Protect Journalists’ 2021 Global Impunity Index.
Mexico is also a dangerous country for human rights defenders. In 2021, an estimated 42 human
rights defenders were killed.45 As politicians discredited some human rights groups and
questioned their sources of funding, police periodically used excessive force against human rights
defenders protesting against femicide and other issues.46 The López Obrador government has not
strengthened the mechanism intended to protect human rights defenders and journalists nor
ensured an adequate budget for prosecutors charged with investigating those crimes.
Migrants in Mexico are vulnerable to abuse by criminal groups and corrupt officials, including
human trafficking, extortion, kidnapping, and murder. In January 2021, U.S.-trained state police
reportedly killed 18 migrants in Tamaulipas, Mexico.47 Between January 2019 and January 2021,
the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP) program, an initiative started during the Trump

39 Moses Ngong and Stephanie Brewer, “Seventh Anniversary of the Ayotzinapa Disappearances in Mexico: Advances
and Challenges in the Search for Truth and Justice,” WOLA, September 23, 2021.
40 CRS In Focus IF11669, Human Rights Challenges in Mexico: Addressing Enforced Disappearances, by Clare
Ribando Seelke and Rachel L. Martin.
41 “Mexico: Over 95,000 Registered as Disappeared, Impunity ‘Almost Absolute,’” U.N. News, November 29, 2021.
42 U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Committee Against Torture Reviews the Report of
Mexico,” April 26, 2019.
43 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2022: Mexico.
44 Article 19, “Periodistas Asesinados en México,” accessed on February 17, 2022, available at https://articulo19.org/
periodistasasesinados/; and “Journalist Killed in Mexico, 7th Slain So Far This Year,” Associated Press, March 5, 2022.
45 Frontline Defenders, Global Analysis 2021, February 2022.
46 Ibid.
47 Parker Asmann, “US-Trained Police Implicated in Mexico Migrant Massacre,” InSight Crime, February 3, 2021.
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Administration, required many asylum-seekers to wait in Mexico while U.S. immigration courts
processed their cases; migrants’ rights advocates documented 1,500 cases of migrants returned to
northern Mexico under this program who had been raped, kidnapped, or attacked as of January
2021.48
Economic and Social Conditions
Beginning in the late 1980s, Mexico transitioned from a closed, state-led economy to an open
market economy that has entered into free trade agreements with 50 countries.49 The transition
accelerated after the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) entered into force in 1994.
Since NAFTA, Mexico has increasingly become an export-oriented economy, with the value of
exports equaling 40% of Mexico’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 2020, up from 12% of GDP
in 1993.50 Mexico remains a U.S. crude oil supplier, but its top exports to the United States are
vehicles and auto parts, electrical machinery and equipment, and machinery and mechanical
appliances.51
From 2010 to 2019, Mexico recorded an average annual economic growth rate of 2.7%, but its
economy contracted 8.2% in 2020.52 Although the global pandemic was the principle cause for
the 2020 contraction, Mexico’s economy also shrank by 0.2% in 2019.53 Increased U.S. demand
for goods and services and reopening of businesses after the pandemic powered a strong
economic recovery of 5.3% in 2021.54 Nevertheless, concerns about tightening monetary policy
and a reduction in U.S. growth projections led the IMF to lower its 2022 growth forecast for
Mexico to 2.8%.55
Mexico’s future growth projections are mixed. According to the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), financial exclusion, a lack of competitiveness,
employment in the informal sector, corruption, and low female participation in the workplace are
impediments to Mexico’s medium-term economic performance.56 Lingering pandemic-related
effects, energy sector reforms that discourage foreign investment, and new challenges related to
technological innovation and climate change also could hinder long-term growth.57 Experts have
posited that Mexico’s traditional economic assets—plentiful natural resources, a relatively young
labor force, and proximity and preferential access to markets in the United States—strategically

48 Human Rights First, “Delivered to Danger,” at https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/campaign/remain-mexico.
49 U.S. Department of State, 2021 Investment Climate Statements: Mexico, at https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-
investment-climate-statements/mexico/.
50 World Bank, “World Development Indicators,” accessed February 14, 2022.
51 Trade Data Monitor, “Mexico Exports to the United States, All Commodities, November, 2019-2021,” accessed
February 14, 2022.
52 International Monetary Fund (IMF), “IMF DataMapper: Real GDP Growth,” accessed February 22, 2022,
https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDP_RPCH@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD/MEX
53 IMF, World Economic Outlook Update, January 2022, p. 6, at https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/
2022/01/25/world-economic-outlook-update-january-2022.
54 IMF, World Economic Outlook Update, January 2022, p. 6.
55IMF, World Economic Outlook Update, January 2022, p. 6.
56 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), OECD Economic Surveys: Mexico, February
2022.
57 IMF, Mexico: Article IV Consultation-Press Release; and Staff Report, Country Report 2021/240, November 2021.
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position it to take advantage of potential nearshoring opportunities as policymakers from the
United States and other countries seek to diversify supply chains away from Chinese markets.58
Despite attempts to diversify its economic ties and build its domestic economy, Mexico remains
heavily dependent on the United States as an export market (roughly 78% of Mexico’s exports in
2021 were U.S.-bound) and as a source of remittances, tourism revenues, and investment.59
Remittances reached a record of nearly $52 billion in 2021, defying experts’ predictions that they
would fall due to the pandemic.60 Total U.S. foreign direct investment in Mexico stood at $100.9
billion in 2019, a 12% decrease from 2018; the United States remained Mexico’s top source of
foreign direct investment, accounting for 39.1% of all (stock) inflows.61
López Obrador Government’s Economic and Energy Policies
President López Obrador promised to govern austerely and bolster economic growth, but a lack
of public investment hurt Mexico’s pre-pandemic growth rate and the government’s limited fiscal
response to the pandemic worsened its economic impact on Mexico. López Obrador worked with
the Trump Administration to renegotiate the USMCA, which updated and modernized the
NAFTA agreement, assuaging some investor concerns about López Obrador’s economic policies.
However, his handling of other policy measures with significant economic implications,
particularly in the energy sector, have caused concerns. In the second year of the pandemic, the
government increased budget allocations for education and public investment but otherwise
maintained the fiscally conservative approach it had previously taken, refraining from providing
as much budgetary support to its population as some other nations.62
Reduced spending on public administration and several tax settlements with large companies
since October 2019 have allowed the López Obrador government to devote significant resources
to social programs and major infrastructure projects without adding to public debt.63 Many of
those infrastructure projects have proven costly for the country. Upon assuming the presidency,
López Obrador paid $1.8 billion to cancel the construction of a new airport outside of Mexico
City, opting to build in a different location at an estimated cost of $2.6 billion.64 His government
has continued to construct the Maya Train, a $9.7 billion railroad line to promote tourism in five
southeastern states, despite criticism that it would damage the environment and opposition from
indigenous groups in the area.65 His government devoted $8 billion to build the Dos Bocas coal-
powered refinery in Tabasco, but cost overruns, worker strikes, and operational setbacks have
derailed the project’s budget and timeline.66

58 Daniel Zega, Alessandra Ortiz, “Mexico At the Cusp of Recovery,” Deloitte Insights, December 10, 2021
59 Trade Data Monitor, “Mexico Exports to the World, All Commodities, November, 2019-2021,” accessed February
14, 2022.
60 Banco de México, Sistema de Información Económica, accessed February 14, 2022.
61 U.S. Department of State, 2021 Investment Climate Statements: Mexico, at https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-
investment-climate-statements/mexico/.
62 IMF, Mexico: Article IV Consultation-Press Release; and Staff Report, Country Report 2021/240, November 2021.
63 Javier Martínez, Leonardo Núñez, “Análisis del Paquete Económico 2022: El Presupuesto de un Solo Hombre,”
Mexicanos Contra la Corrupción, September 13, 2021; OECD, OECD Economic Outlook, May 2021.
64 Sonia Corona, “El Nuevo Aeropuerto de México, a Punto del Despegue,” El País, February 12, 2022.
65 “El Tren Maya de López Obrador Arranca el Año Con Tropiezos y Dudas,” Los Angeles Times, February 4, 2022.
66 Amy Stillman, Lucia Kassai, Max de Haldevang, “Mexico’s Crown-Jewel Oil Refinery Is $3.6 Billion Over
Budget,” Bloomberg News, January 21, 2022; Jon Martín Cullell, “Trabajadores de la Refinería de Dos Bocas Chocan
Con la Policía en Su Segundo Día de Paro,” El País, October 13, 2021.
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Proposed Energy Reform
In October 2021, President López Obrador submitted a proposal to amend the Mexican constitution to reduce
private sector participation in the power sector and eliminate some independent regulatory agencies. The reform
would affect the electricity market by cancelling existing contracts with private generators, awarding the Federal
Electricity Commission (CFE) 56% of power generation contracts, and cancelling long-term energy supply
contracts and clean energy preferential buying programs. As written, the reform also would eliminate several
independent regulatory agencies. Outside of the electricity market, the upstream oil and gas regulator National
Hydrocarbon Commission (CNH) would be absorbed into the Secretariat of Energy, causing uncertainty around
the permitting process for future private oil and gas projects. The reform also includes provisions to prevent
foreign companies from exploiting the country’s lithium deposits by labeling them a “strategic” mineral.
Observers have criticized the initiative on economic, environmental, and legal terms. While López Obrador has
been adamant that the reform wil lower energy prices for Mexicans, skeptics maintain that less private sector
participation in an industry that requires significant capital investment wil increase rates. Experts contend that the
reform wil inhibit Mexico from reaching its climate mitigation commitments by prioritizing CFE power
generation—64% of which is nonrenewable—and discouraging privately funded clean energy projects from
entering the market; a U.S. Department of Energy analysis estimates that annual CO2 emissions would increase
between 26% and 65%. International observers have questioned the reform’s compliance with the USMCA, as it
appears to give advantages to state companies and undermine existing investments.
Sources: “What Would AMLO’s Power Sector Plan Mean for Mexico?” Inter-American Dialogue, February 10,
2022; “Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s Energy Policy Wil Hurt Mexico,” The Economist, January 8th, 2022;
“Mexico’s Energy Reform Strains Ties with US,” Associated Press, January 22, 2022; “¿Cuáles son los Puntos Clave
de la Reforma Eléctrica de AMLO y por qué ha Causado Polémica?” El Siglo Torreón, February 4, 2022; “Why
Controversial Energy Reforms Could Be ‘Devastating’ For Mexico’s Economy,” BNAmericas, February 4, 2022;
Ricardo Bracho et al., Impact Analysis of Amendments to Mexico's Unit Commitment and Dispatch Rules, National
Renewable Energy Laboratory, 2022, p. 33.
COVID-19
Health experts have criticized the López Obrador government’s failure to coordinate “a coherent
and unified national response” to the COVID-19 pandemic.67 Mexico waited several weeks after
the U.S.-Mexico border had closed to nonessential travel before declaring a public health
emergency on March 30, 2020.68 While the government implemented some measures to
ameliorate the economic impacts caused by the virus, including sending advance payments of
pensions to senior citizens, observers have characterized Mexico’s fiscal response to the
pandemic as “modest.”69 Throughout the pandemic, President López Obrador has downplayed the
threat posed by COVID-19, flouting public health guidelines in his own behavior. His
administration’s budget cuts reduced public health system personnel, testing availability, and
hospital capacity. As of March 7, 2022, Mexico reported roughly 320,000 COVID-19 deaths; the
actual total is likely higher since there were an estimated 650,000 “excess deaths” from
unidentified causes in Mexico from 2020 through October 2021.70 Mexico had fully vaccinated
some 62% of its population as of March 7, 2022.71 Mexico has been both a recipient and

67 UCSF Institute for Global Health Sciences, Mexico’s Response to COVID-19: a Case Study, April 2021.
68 IMF, Policy Responses to COVID-19 Policy Tracker, accessed March 7, 2022.
69 Swarnali Ahmed Hannan, Keiko Honjo, and Mehdi Raissi, IMF Working Paper: Mexico Needs a Fiscal Twist:
Response to COVID-19 and Beyond, IMF, October 2020.
70 Johns Hopkins University, Coronavirus Research Center, “Mexico,” accessed March 7, 2021, at
https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/region/mexico; “Tracking covid-19 excess deaths across countries,” The Economist,
February 9, 2022, using data from EuroMOMO, a group of European epidemiologists tracking COVID-19 and
mortality.
71 Johns Hopkins University, Coronavirus Research Center, “Mexico,” accessed March 7, 2022.
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benefactor of vaccine diplomacy; the country has received vaccines from the United States,
Russia, and others, while more recently donating vaccines to smaller countries.
Social Conditions
Mexico has long had relatively high poverty rates for its level of economic development, a
problem exacerbated by the pandemic. Experts estimate nearly 10 million Mexicans fell into
poverty in 2020, widening the poverty rate to 43.9%.72 Traditionally, poverty has been most acute
among those in southern Mexico’s rural regions, indigenous populations, and those employed in
subsistence agriculture or in the informal sector.73 Despite predictions to the contrary, poor and
working class household incomes have been supported by continued remittances sent from family
members abroad. Even amid the pandemic, remittances sent to Mexico have reached record
levels, increasing by 11% from 2019 to 2020 and 27% from 2020 to 2021.74
Mexico also has experienced high levels of income inequality. According to the 2022 World
Inequality Report, 57% of Mexico’s wealth was concentrated in 10% of the population, a figure
that has stayed between 55% and 60% over the past century. Inequality has historically been due,
in part, to the country’s regressive tax system, oligopolies that dominate particular industries, a
relatively low minimum wage, and a lack of targeting in some social programs.75
Economists have asserted that reducing the untaxed and unregulated informal sector, in which
workers lack job protections and benefits, is crucial for addressing poverty, while also expanding
Mexico’s low tax base. Under the Peña Nieto administration, a financial sector reform aimed to
increase access to credit for small and medium size businesses (SMEs), which employ a majority
of Mexican workers. A fiscal reform also sought to incentivize SMEs’ participation in the formal
economy. Barriers to formalization remain, however, including complex and sometimes costly
state and local regulations.76
López Obrador has improved many Mexicans’ socioeconomic conditions amid the deepest
recession in decades by increasing pensions for the elderly and raising the minimum wage by
95%, in nominal terms, over the first three years of his administration.77 His program to provide
monthly payments to youth aged 18-29 to attend school or complete internships has enrolled over
300,000 individuals, despite reported administrative and financial irregularities.78 However, he
has ended Prospera, Mexico’s largest social program, which had won international praise for
targeting those most in need.79

72 Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social (CONEVAL), Informe de la Política de
Desarrollo Social 2020, February 9, 2021.
73 This figure is from Mexico’s National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policy (CONEVAL) and is
available in Spanish at https://www.coneval.org.mx/Medicion/MP/Paginas/Pobreza-2018.aspx.
74 Banco de México, Sistema de Información Económica, accessed February 14, 2022.
75 Gerardo Esquivel Hernandez, Concentration of Economic and Political Power, Oxfam Mexico, 2015.
76 Jorge Alvarez and Cian Ruane, Informality and Aggregate Productivity: the Case of Mexico, IMF Country Report,
November 2019; OECD, Economic Surveys: Mexico, February 2022.
77 Sitio Oficial de Andrés Manuel López Obrador, “Porcentaje de Aumento del Salario Mínimo Nominal y Real (1989-
2019),” December 19, 2018; Comision Nacional de los Salarios Minimos, “Incremento a los Salarios Minimos para
2022,” press release, December 1, 2021,
78 Zenyazen Flores, “Estas son las irregularidades que la ASF encontró en Jóvenes Construyendo el Futuro,” El
Financiero, February 21, 2022.
79 Stephen Kidd, “The Demise of Mexico’s Prospera Programme: a Tragedy Foretold,” Development Pathways, June 2,
2019.
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Foreign Policy
In contrast to his predecessor, President López Obrador generally has maintained that the best
foreign policy is a strong domestic policy. He has rarely traveled outside the country since
assuming office. He did meet in Washington, DC, with President Trump in July 2020 and with
President Biden and Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau for the North American Leaders
Summit in November 2021.
Foreign Minister Marcelo Ebrard (former mayor of Mexico City) has represented Mexico in
global fora and led a return to Mexico’s historic noninterventionist and independent approach to
foreign policy (the so-called “Estrada doctrine”). The current administration reversed Mexico’s
recognition of Juan Guaidó as Interim President of Venezuela but then hosted Norway-led
negotiations between officials representing Nicolás Maduro and the political opposition in
August-September 2021. The López Obrador government also granted temporary asylum to
ousted Bolivian President Evo Morales and has established closer relations with Cuba. Some
observers have questioned the López Obrador government’s decision not to endorse Organization
of American States resolutions criticizing human rights abuses by the Daniel Ortega government
in Nicaragua.80
Despite these changes, Mexico continues to participate in multilateral institutions and support
development in Central America. Mexico held a seat on the U.N. Security Council for 2021-2022.
In addition to working within trade fora, such as the Pacific Alliance, Mexico continues to
promote its exports and seek new trade partners.81 The López Obrador administration shares the
view of prior Mexican governments that the best way to stop illegal immigration from the
Northern Triangle of Central America (Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras) is to address the
lack of opportunity and insecurity in that region. In 2019, Mexico proposed a $100 million
program focused on promoting sustainable development in the Northern Triangle.82 In December
2021, the United States and Mexico jointly announced Sembrando Oportunidades, a new effort to
coordinate development projects in the Northern Triangle.83
U.S.-Mexican Relations and Issues for Congress
Mexican-U.S. relations generally have grown closer over the past two decades. A range of
bilateral mechanisms and institutions have helped the Mexican and U.S. federal governments—as
well as stakeholders in border states, the private sector, and nongovernmental organizations—find
common ground on difficult issues, such as migration and water management. In 2021, the Biden
and López Obrador governments restarted the U.S.-Mexico High-Level Economic Dialogue
(HLED), the High-Level Security Dialogue (HLSD), and the North American Leaders Summit
(NALS) with Canada. Those meetings did not occur during the Trump Administration.
Congressional interest in Mexico has focused on encouraging economic linkages; cooperating on
managing migration flows to the United States; combating illicit flows of people, weapons, drugs,
and currency; targeting assistance to Mexico on addressing corruption and human rights abuses;
and managing environmental resources, particularly at the border. The U.S.-Mexico

80 “OAS Assembly Condemns Nicaragua’s Election as ‘Not Free,’” AP, November 12, 2021.
81 CRS Report R43748, The Pacific Alliance: A Trade Integration Initiative in Latin America, by M. Angeles
Villarreal.
82 “México Destina 100 mdd para Exportar el Plan Sembrando Vida a Centroamérica,” Forbes, June 21, 2019.
83 U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), “U.S.-Mexico Joint Statement on Sembrando Oportunidades,”
December 1, 2021.
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Interparliamentary Group (IPG), first convened in 1961, has provided a forum through which
legislators from both countries can address issues such as trade, migration, and security. The
House of Representatives met with their Mexican counterparts virtually in July 2020; the Senate
has not met with Mexican senators since 2013.
U.S.-Mexican relations under the López Obrador administration generally have remained cordial.
Nevertheless, periodic tensions have emerged over trade disputes and tariffs; immigration and
border security issues, including President Trump’s decision to construct a border wall; and U.S.
investigations of Mexican officials. Mexico has accommodated changing U.S. immigration and
border security policies, worked with the United States on pandemic recovery, and relaunched
security cooperation under a new framework. Mexico’s proposed energy reform and U.S.
concerns about the killings of journalists in Mexico have prompted congressional offices to send
several letters to the Biden Administration that voice concerns and have caused some strain in
relations.84 (See “Outlook,” below.)
Counternarcotics, Security Cooperation, and U.S. Foreign Aid85
Mexico is a long-time recipient of U.S. counterdrug assistance, but cooperation was limited
between the mid-1980s and mid-2000s due to U.S. distrust of Mexican officials and Mexican
sensitivity about U.S. involvement in the country’s internal affairs. Close cooperation resumed in
2007, when then-President George W. Bush requested, and Congress appropriated, increased
counterdrug assistance for Mexico. Although initial U.S. funding for what ultimately would be
known as the “Mérida Initiative” focused heavily on training and equipping Mexican security
forces, Congress shifted the emphasis of bilateral efforts over time to strengthening Mexican
institutions under four broad pillars. Until FY2016, Congress withheld some U.S. security
assistance provided through the Mérida Initiative until certain human rights withholding
requirements were met (see “Human Rights,” below). In compliance with Leahy Law vetting
requirements (22 U.S.C. 2378d),86 U.S. agencies continue to vet individuals and units for
potential human rights abuses prior to delivering training and/or equipment.
Congress has funded and overseen the Mérida Initiative, which has accounted for the majority of
U.S. foreign assistance to Mexico since FY2008. Congress maintained level funding for the
Mérida Initiative even as the Trump Administration requested less support (See Table 1 for recent
U.S. assistance to Mexico and Table A-1 for Mérida Initiative funding). Nevertheless, elevated
organized crime-related violence in Mexico and drug overdose deaths in the United States have
led many to question the Mérida Initiative’s efficacy.87 Mexican transnational criminal
organizations (chiefly, the Sinaloa Cartel and the Jalisco New Generation Cartel, or CJNG) have
established Mexico as the primary source and transit point for illicit fentanyl into the United
States.88 In its February 2022 final report, the Commission on Combating Synthetic Opioid
Trafficking established by Section 7221 of P.L. 116-92 assessed that “cooperation with foreign

84 AP, “U.S. Climate Envoy John Kerry Visits Mexico amid Power Clash,” February 8, 2022; Latin News Daily,
“MEXICO: US-Mexico Tensions Rise over Killings of Journalists,” February 24, 2022.
85 See also CRS In Focus IF10578, Mexico: Evolution of the Mérida Initiative, FY2008-FY2022; CRS Insight IN11859,
New U.S.-Mexico Security Strategy: Issues for Congressional Consideration.
86 See CRS In Focus IF10575, Human Rights Issues: Security Forces Vetting (“Leahy Laws”), by Liana W. Rosen.
87 Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission, Report of the Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission,
December 2020.
88 As the Chinese government has placed strict controls on fentanyl, Mexican drug trafficking organizations are
increasingly involved in supplying the U.S. market. U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, Fentanyl Flow to the
United States, March 6, 2020.
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law enforcement officials in Mexico to eradicate the fentanyl threat has been insufficient to date.”
In oversight hearings, Members of Congress have repeatedly expressed concerns about the lack of
metrics for measuring the Mérida Initiative’s success; these concerns also prompted Members to
request several Government Accountability Office reports on similar topics.89
On January 31, 2022, the U.S. and Mexican governments published an action plan for
implementing the U.S-Mexico Bicentennial Framework for Security, Public Heath, and Safe
Communities. Launched at the October 2021 HLSD, the framework is a replacement for the
Mérida Initiative. The framework’s action plan has three broad pillars (see Figure 4) that
Congress could influence, particularly through the appropriations process. The extent to which
the framework helps disrupt the illicit production and trafficking of U.S.-bound synthetic opioids,
a key U.S. priority, may determine congressional perceptions of the framework’s success.
Figure 4. U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation Frameworks

Source: U.S. Department of State.
The Biden Administration requested $116.8 million for Mexico for FY2022 (see Table 1). The
House-passed version of the FY2022 foreign aid appropriations bill (H.R. 4373, H.Rept. 117-84)
would provide $158.9 million for Mexico, the same amount as in FY2021. H.Rept. 117-84 would
prohibit funding to support Mexican military participation in public security efforts. It would
require a comprehensive review of funds provided through the Mérida Initiative and a report on
any funds appropriated to Mexican agencies involved in migration management within 90 days of
the bill’s enactment. H.Rept. 117-84 also would require reports on plans to improve data
collection on synthetic drug trafficking; the adequacy of Mexico’s efforts to combat human rights
abuses, such as torture and enforced disappearances; crimes committed along Mexico’s northern
highways; efforts to combat fentanyl flows; and the efficacy of U.S. drug policy. The Senate-
introduced version of the FY2022 foreign aid bill (S. 3075) does not stipulate a total funding level
for Mexico. It would provide $80 million in International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement funds.

89 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), U.S. Assistance to Mexico: State Department Could Improve Its
Monitoring of Mérida Initiative Projects, GAO-20-388, May 12, 2020.
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Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Mexico: FY2018-FY2022
(appropriations in millions of current dollars)
FY2021
FY2022
Foreign Assistance Account
FY2018
FY2019
FY2020
(enacted)
request
Development Assistance (DA)
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
Economic Support Fund (ESF)
45.0
45.0
50.0
50.0
50.0
International Narcotics Control and Law
100.0
110.0
100.0
100.0
64.0
Enforcement (INCLE)
Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
5.0
5.0
5.0
6.0
0.0
International Military Education and Training
1.5
1.3
1.8
1.8
1.6
(IMET)
Non-proliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining,
1.2
1.2
1.2
1.2
1.0
and Related Programs (NADR)
Total
152.7
162.5
158.0
159.0
116.8
Sources: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, FY2019-FY2022;
Explanatory statement accompanying P.L. 116-260.
Three continuing resolutions (P.L. 117-43, P.L. 117-70, and P.L. 117-86) have funded foreign aid
programs in the region at the FY2021 level since October 1, 2021. P.L. 117-86 extends
appropriations through March 11, 2022.
The Department of Defense (DOD) is not providing assistance through Mérida accounts, nor is
the agency mentioned in the Bicentennial Framework. However, DOD has overseen the
procurement and delivery of equipment provided through the Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
account. Some DOD equipment programs are funded by annual State Department appropriations
for FMF, which totaled $6.0 million in FY2021 but were not requested for FY2022. International
Military Education and Training (IMET) funds, which totaled $1.8 million in FY2021, support
training programs for the Mexican military, including courses in the United States. DOD also
provides additional training, equipping, and other logistical support to Mexico that complements
the Mérida Initiative through its own authorities including, but not limited to, Section 333
Building Partner Capacity and Section 284 Counter-drug and Activities to Counter Transnational
Organized Crime (both authorized under Title 10 of the U.S. Code).90 Through 22 U.S.C. 2416,
Congress requires an annual report on Foreign Military Training by DOD and the State
Department; the agencies submitted the most recent version of that report to relevant committees
in February 2022.
Bilateral military cooperation deepened along with Mérida-related law enforcement cooperation.
According Northern Command officials, current bilateral goals focus on “improving regional
security, strengthening military ties with regional partners, and expanding force interoperability
through the Defense Strategic Framework and the Bilateral Military Cooperation Roundtable.”91
Mexico is scheduled to host the next bilateral roundtable in May 2022.
Congress may seek to influence how the Biden Administration balances U.S. foreign assistance
priorities in Mexico; monitor the efficacy of U.S.-funded efforts; and recommend ways to
respond to challenges posed by evolving criminal activities and changes in Mexico’s policies.

90 See ForeignAssistance.gov, “U.S. Foreign Assistance by Country,” at https://foreignassistance.gov/cd/mexico/,
accessed February 23, 2022.
91 CRS electronic correspondence with U.S. Northern Command officials, February 22, 2022.
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Law Enforcement Cooperation and Extraditions
In hearings and in letters, the 117th Congress has expressed concerns about friction in U.S.-
Mexican security cooperation. Congressional oversight attention may focus on the Bicentennial
Framework’s progress in restarting bilateral law enforcement cooperation. The framework’s
action plan envisions a joint objective of building on past cooperation to investigate and prosecute
corrupt actors through the disruption of criminal financial networks, as well as increasing
cooperation in extradition matters.92 However, bilateral law enforcement cooperation on all
criminal matters, especially those pertaining to corruption cases, remains a source of
friction between the countries.93 Should that cooperation not improve, Members have introduced
legislation (H.R. 2600) that would require the State Department to declare certain Mexican DTOs
as foreign terrorist organizations, a move that Mexico likely would oppose.94
During the Calderón government (2006-2012), Mexico extradited an average of 98 people per
year to the United States, a significant increase over the prior administration. When President
Peña Nieto took office, extraditions fell to 54 in 2013 but rose to an administration high of 76 in
2016 (see Figure 5). In January 2017, Mexico’s decision to extradite Joaquín “El Chapo”
Guzmán, leader of the Sinaloa Cartel and one of the DEA’s top global targets, was a high point in
bilateral cooperation that was praised by many Members of Congress. Extraditions remained
relatively level during the first two years of the López Obrador government, before hitting a 15-
year low in 2021.
Figure 5. Extraditions from Mexico to the United States: 1999-2021

Source: CRS based on data from U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. Department of State.

92 U.S. Department of State, “Fact Sheet: Summary of the Action Plan for U.S.-Mexico Bicentennial Framework for
Security, Public Health, and Safe Communities,” January 31, 2022.
93 Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Crime and Anti-crime Policies in Mexico in 2022: A Bleak Outlook,” Brookings Institution,
January 24, 2022.
94 CRS Insight IN11205, Designating Mexican Drug Cartels as Foreign Terrorists: Policy Implications, coordinated by
Liana W. Rosen.
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Human Rights95
The U.S. Congress has expressed ongoing concerns about human rights conditions in Mexico
through conditions on appropriations, support for human rights programming, oversight hearings,
and letters to, and visits with, successive U.S. and Mexican administrations. Recent attention has
focused on violence against journalists in Mexico.96 Congress has continued to monitor adherence
to the Leahy vetting requirements that must be met under the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of
1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2378d), which pertains to State Department aid, and 10 U.S.C.
2249e, which guides DOD funding. DOD suspended assistance to a brigade based in Tlatlaya,
Mexico, due to concerns about the brigade’s potential involvement in extrajudicial killings but
has also worked with Mexico to rehabilitate units once suspended from receiving U.S.
assistance.97 Congressional concerns about labor conditions in Mexico and the government’s
ability to implement USMCA commitments prompted the inclusion of $210 million in funds for
the U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of International Labor Affairs (ILAB) technical assistance
programs in the USCMA’s implementing legislation (P.L. 116-113).98
From FY2008 to FY2015, Congress made conditional 15% of U.S. assistance to the Mexican
military and police until the State Department sent a report to appropriators verifying that Mexico
was taking steps to comply with certain human rights standards. In FY2014, Mexico lost $5.5
million in funding due to human rights concerns.99 For FY2016-FY2021, human rights reporting
requirements applied to FMF rather than to Mérida Initiative accounts. In recent years, human
rights reporting requirements have been in explanatory statements rather than the legislation. The
State Department reportedly has not sent human rights reports to Congress since FY2017, as the
agency maintains it is not legally obligated to do so.100
U.S. assistance to Mexico has supported the Mexican government’s efforts to reform its judicial
system and improve human rights conditions in the country.101 Congress has provided funding to
support Mexico’s transition from an inquisitorial justice system to an oral, adversarial, and
accusatorial system that aims to strengthen due process and human rights protections for victims
and the accused.102 The State Department established a high-level human rights dialogue with
Mexico, although the dialogue has not yet convened under the López Obrador government. Top

95 See also: CRS Report R45199, Violence Against Journalists in Mexico: In Brief; CRS In Focus IF11669, Human
Rights Challenges in Mexico: Addressing Enforced Disappearances.
96 Senator Tim Kaine, “Kaine and Rubio Urge State Department to Address Ongoing Violence Against Journalists in
Mexico,” February 8, 2022.
97 Michael Evans, US: Mexico Mass Graves Raise “Alarming Questions” About Government “Complicity” in
September 2014 Cartel Killings, National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book No. 515, May 2015; Col.
Andrew M. Leonard, “Leahy Law Diplomacy: Human Rights Vetting and Foreign Policy,” FAOA Journal of
International Affairs, 2019.
98 The purpose of the funding is for ILAB to administer technical assistance grants to support worker-focused capacity
building and efforts to reduce workplace discrimination, child labor, forced labor, human trafficking, child exploitation
and other efforts related to implementation of Mexico’s labor commitments.
99 As a result of the State Department’s decision not to submit a report for Mexico, some $5 million in FY2014
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) assistance was reprogrammed by the State Department
to Peru. Mexico lost close to $500,000 in Foreign Military Financing (FMF), as well.
100 CRS interview with State Department official, March 20, 2020.
101 For an overview of recent programs, see GAO, U.S. Assistance to Mexico: State and USAID Allocated over $700
Million to Support Criminal Justice, Border Security, and Related Efforts from Fiscal Year 2014 Through 2018, GAO
19-647, September 10, 2019.
102 While DOJ has supported reform efforts at the federal level, USAID programs have been at the state level since
2016. See USAID, “Mexico: Rule of Law,” September 2020, available at https://www.usaid.gov/mexico/rule-of-law.
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U.S. officials have issued statements on specific human rights concerns, including a recent tweet
by Secretary of State Antony Blinken expressing concern violence against journalists.103
Protecting human rights and “vulnerable populations” is included under the first pillar of the new
Bicentennial Framework (see Figure 4). The State Department engages with human rights and
freedom of expression organizations in Mexico and ensures U.S. training programs for police and
criminal justice sector actors have units on protecting human rights.
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) provides technical assistance to the
Mexican federal and state governments as well as complementary support to think tanks and civil
society organizations on human rights issues.104 USAID’s human rights programming includes a
new $24 million initiative to support national and state implementation of laws against torture and
enforced disappearances and to provide forensic assistance to address unidentified remains. Other
ongoing initiatives seek to better protect journalists and human rights defenders, as well as to
address enforced disappearances, femicides, and torture in selected states. In December 2020,
USAID published its five-year strategy for Mexico, which integrates these efforts into a broader
strategy to help state and local governments committed to addressing impunity and violence.105
USAID continues to support organizations that have received criticism for their anti-corruption
and human rights advocacy from President López Obrador and his party.106
Congress is likely to continue monitoring human rights conditions in Mexico, including
compliance with conditions included in the explanatory statement to the FY2021 Consolidated
Appropriations Act (H.R. 133) and commitments to improve labor conditions made under
USMCA.107 Some Members of Congress have written letters to U.S. and Mexican officials
regarding human rights concerns, including allegations of extrajudicial killings by security forces,
violence against journalists and human rights defenders, and abuses of migrants.
Congress may monitor how the López Obrador administration moves to punish past human rights
abusers; how Mexico’s National Guard, along with other security and judicial actors, is or is not
respecting human rights; what mechanisms exist to address allegations of abuse and wrongdoing
by such actors; and the adequacy of victims’ assistance. Congress also may question how the

103 Secretary Antony Blinken (@SecBlinken), “The high number of journalists killed in Mexico this year and the
ongoing threats they face are concerning. I join those calling for greater accountability and protections for Mexican
journalists,” Twitter, February 22, 2022, 8:47 p.m.
104 USAID, “Mexico: Human Rights,” April 2021.
105 USAID, Mexico: Country Development Cooperation Strategy, available at https://www.usaid.gov/mexico/cdcs.
106 Rafael Bernal. “Mexican President Calls on U.S. to Stop Funding Groups Critical of his Administration,” The Hill,
February 21, 2022.
107 Those conditions maintain that
of the funds available for assistance for Mexico under the FMF heading, 25 percent shall be
withheld from obligation until the Secretary of State determines and reports to the Committee that
the Government of Mexico is: (1) thoroughly and credibly investigating and prosecuting violations
of human rights in civilian courts; (2) vigorously enforcing prohibitions against torture and the use
of testimony obtained through torture; and (3) searching for victims of forced disappearances and
credibly investigating and prosecuting those responsible for such crimes.” In addition, the State
Department must withhold those funds until the Secretary of State determines that “the
Government of Mexico is implementing credible counternarcotics and law enforcement strategies
in cooperation with the United States that reflect the input of civil society, have realistic goals, and
are consistent with the right of due process and protection of human rights.
For background, see CRS In Focus IF11308, USMCA: Labor Provisions, by M. Angeles Villarreal and Cathleen D.
Cimino-Isaacs. Niv Ellis, “First USMCA Report Raises ‘Serious Concerns’ on Mexico Labor Law Implementation,”
The Hill, December 17, 2020.
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State Department and USAID can provide support to emerging human rights priorities, as well as
the effects of ILAB technical assistance programs on labor conditions in Mexico.
Migration and Border Issues
Immigration and border security are perennial issues of interest to Congress, which has enacted
piecemeal stand-alone legislation but has failed to enact comprehensive immigration reform for
several decades.108 President Biden’s proposed comprehensive immigration reform bill,
introduced in 2021 as the U.S. Citizenship Act (S. 348/H.R. 1177, has yet to receive
congressional consideration. Whereas some Members of Congress favor strong border security
measures and restrictions on asylum, others oppose restrictive immigration policies. Amid record
encounters (apprehensions and expulsions) in FY2021, Members of Congress are also closely
following the role Mexico is playing in interdicting irregular migrants and in offering asylum to
those eligible.109
President Trump’s rhetoric and shifts in U.S. immigration policies tested U.S.-Mexican relations
during the Peña Nieto government. In E.O. 13678 (2017), the Trump Administration broadened
the categories of unauthorized immigrants prioritized for removal (deportation). Since Mexicans
comprise the vast majority of individuals removed from the United States each year, this
disproportionately affected Mexicans. In September 2017, the Administration rescinded the
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrival (DACA) initiative through a process the U.S. Supreme
Court subsequently ruled in June 2020 did not follow proper procedures and had to be vacated.110
This attempt to rescind DACA also would have affected Mexicans more than other nationalities,
as Mexicans comprise a majority of those who have received relief from removal through the
initiative.
Under President López Obrador, Mexico has accommodated U.S. policy changes that have
shifted more of the burden of sheltering and offering asylum to non-Mexican migrants from the
United States to Mexico. At the same time, Mexico’s apprehensions of migrants totaled a record
307,679 in 2021, including some 232,500 from Northern Triangle countries (El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras).111 Asylum requests in Mexico reached a record 131,448 in 2021, with
Haitians comprising 39.4% of those requests (see Figure 6, below).112

108 See, for example, CRS Report R46419, Immigration Legislation and Issues in the 116th Congress, coordinated by
Andorra Bruno.
109 CRS Report R46999, Immigration: Apprehensions and Expulsions at the Southwest Border, by Audrey Singer and
William A. Kandel; CRS In Focus IF10215, Mexico’s Immigration Control Efforts, by Clare Ribando Seelke.
110 The Deferred Action for Childhood Arrival (DACA) initiative is an initiative that the Obama Administration
implemented in 2012 to provide temporary relief from removal and work authorization to certain unlawfully present
individuals who arrived in the United States as children. See CRS Report R45995, Unauthorized Childhood Arrivals,
DACA, and Related Legislation, by Andorra Bruno; and CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10497, Supreme Court: DACA
Rescission Violated the APA, by Ben Harrington.
111 Gobierno de México, Secretaría de Gobernación, Boletín Mensual de Estadisticas Migratorias 2021.
112 Maritza Pérez, “Solicitudes de Refugio Rompen Récord,” El Financiero, January 3, 2022.
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Figure 6. Mexico: Apprehensions and Asylum Applications Received

Source: CRS, based on information from Mexico’s Secretary of the Interior.
Migrant Protection Protocols
In December 2018, the López Obrador government offered basic services and jobs to non-
Mexicans enrolled in a new U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) program, the Migrant
Protection Protocols (MPP). The MPP program required more than 70,000 asylum-seekers to wait
in Mexico while U.S. immigration courts processed their cases between January 2019 and
January 2021, when the program was initially suspended. DHS first piloted MPP in the El Paso
sector but gradually expanded the program across the border as part of a June 2019 U.S.-Mexico
migration agreement. In June 2021, the Biden Administration terminated new MPP enrollments
but, after a lawsuit challenging the termination, a federal judge ordered DHS to reinstate the
program in August 2021. After losing a Supreme Court appeal, DHS announced the
reimplementation of MPP with new implementation guidance on December 2, 2021.113 The
Supreme Court has agreed to hear the Biden Administration’s appeal of the lower court decision
this term.114 In the meantime, Members of Congress have conducted oversight trips and have held
a hearing on the reinstated MPP policy.115
Title 42
In response to the pandemic, DHS largely suspended asylum processing at the U.S.-Mexico
border in March 2020 under a Centers for Disease Control and Prevention public health order
(referred to as Title 42).116 The Trump Administration then expelled most migrants without valid

113 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) pledged to help Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP) enrollees access
shelter, counsel, COVID-19 vaccines, and transport to their hearings. Mexico promised temporary legal status and
work authorizations for those in MPP. Any adult or family unit from any Western Hemisphere country other than
Mexico now may be subject to MPP.
114 Adam Liptak, “Supreme Court to Review Trump-Era ‘Remain in Mexico’ Asylum Policy,” New York Times,
February 18, 2022.
115 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border Security, Facilitation, and
Operations, Examining the Court-Ordered Reimplementation of the Remain in Mexico Policy, 117th Cong., 2nd sess.,
March 2, 2022.
116 CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10439, Entry Restrictions at the Northern and Southern Borders in Response to COVID-19,
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travel documents into Mexico or returned them to their home countries without asylum hearings.
Mexico has struggled to absorb those migrants.117 The Biden Administration ended the use of
Title 42 for unaccompanied children and curtailed the policy for family units but left the policy in
place for single adults. During FY2020 and FY2021, nearly 1.2 million migrants were expelled,
the majority to Mexico.118 On March 4, 2022, a circuit court ruled that Title 42 may still be used,
but only in cases where a migrant does not express a fear of persecution or torture.119
Mexican border cities, some of which have high rates of violent crime, have been sheltering tens
of thousands of migrants since 2019 due to MPP, Title 42, and another policy known as
metering.120 Among the concerns raised by human rights organizations is that the rapid expulsions
reportedly have led to cursory medical screenings and few qualifying for existing humanitarian
exceptions from expulsion.121 With many shelters limiting new arrivals due to COVID-19, some
migrants have experienced precarious living situations and some have been attacked by criminal
groups.122
Congress may continue to provide funding and oversight to address migration, border security,
and related humanitarian and health issues on the U.S.-Mexican border and within Mexico. U.S.
funds appropriated for the Mérida Initiative have supported Mexico’s immigration control efforts
and global funds provided through the Migration and Refugee Assistance program to improve
asylum processing, shelters, and assistance to migrants in Mexico.
Economic and Trade Relations and the U.S.-Mexico-Canada
Agreement123
The United States and Mexico have a strong economic and trade relationship that was bolstered
through NAFTA. From 1994 through the USMCA’s entry into force on July 1, 2020, NAFTA had
removed virtually all tariff and nontariff trade and investment barriers among partner countries
and provided a rules-based mechanism to govern North American trade. Most economic studies
concluded the net economic effect of NAFTA on the United States and Mexico was small but
positive, though there were adjustment costs to some sectors in both countries.
Recent U.S. Administrations have worked with Mexico to coordinate economic issues. The
Obama Administration worked with Mexico to balance border security while facilitating

by Kelsey Y. Santamaria and Ben Harrington.
117 Michelle Hackman, “Court Upholds Federal Government’s Title 42 Border Policy,” Wall Street Journal, March 4,
2022.
118 CRS Report R46999, Immigration: Apprehensions and Expulsions at the Southwest Border, by Audrey Singer and
William A. Kandel.
119 Priscilla Alvarez, “Federal Appeals Court Limits Biden Administration’s Use of Trump-Era Border Policy,” The
Hill, March 4, 2022.
120 Even before the pandemic, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) had been limiting the number of asylum
seekers processed each day at designated ports of entry along the U.S. southern border. Migrants affected by this policy
generally had not yet reached the U.S. border and were required to remain in Mexico until CBP decided it could
process them. This policy—known as metering—sought to address an “unprecedented rise in asylum requests,” as well
as safety and health concerns resulting from overcrowding at ports of entry. The policy has led to long wait times and
overcrowded conditions on the Mexican side of the border.
121 WOLA, “U.S. and Mexico Must Urgently Address Impact of Ongoing Deportations and Expulsions During
COVID-19,” May 29, 2020.
122 Human Rights First, Delivered to Danger, February 19, 2021.
123 This section is drawn from CRS Report RL32934, U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues, and
Implications, by M. Angeles Villarreal.
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legitimate trade and travel, promoting competitiveness, and pursuing greater energy integration
through a cabinet-level High-Level Economic Dialogue (HLED) chaired by Vice President Biden.
The High-Level Regulatory Cooperation Council helped align regulatory principles. Trilateral
(with Canada) cooperation occurred under the aegis of the North American Leadership Summits
(NALS).
Under the Trump Administration, neither the HLED nor the NALS took place. However, the
Executive Steering Committee (ESC)—which guided efforts along the border during the Obama
Administration—expanded to focus on boosting competitiveness. The U.S.-Mexican CEO
Dialogue also continued to convene biannual meetings and issue recommendations for both
governments. As previously mentioned, the Biden Administration has restarted both the HLED
and the NALS.
Modernizing the U.S.-Mexican Border
Congress has long expressed concerns about delays and unpredictable wait times at the U.S.-
Mexico border. The majority of U.S.-Mexican trade passes through a port of entry along the
southwestern border, often more than once, due to the increasing integration of manufacturing
processes in the United States and Mexico. Past bilateral efforts have contributed to reductions in
wait times at some points of entry, but infrastructure and staffing issues remain on both the U.S.
and Mexican sides of the border. While Congress has enacted (P.L. 114-279) legislation to allow
public-private partnerships to address some border infrastructure issues, staffing issues remain
challenging.
In May 2010, the United States and Mexico declared their intent to collaborate on enhancing the
U.S.-Mexican border.124 A Twenty-First Century Border Bilateral ESC has met since then, most
recently in December 2021, to develop binational action plans and oversee implementation of
those plans.125 In 2021, the ESC reviewed the completion of a three-phased modernization of the
San Isidro port of entry, the one of the world’s busiest border crossings. The ESC sets goals
within broad objectives: coordinating infrastructure development, expanding trusted traveler and
shipment programs, establishing pilot projects for cargo preclearance, improving cross-border
commerce and ties, and bolstering information sharing among law enforcement agencies.
The COVID-19 pandemic posed several challenge for U.S., Mexican, and Canadian officials that
Congress has examined via several oversight hearings. Officials initially struggled to maintain the
integrity of supply chains for industries deemed essential during the pandemic while protecting
the health of workers employed in those sectors. Officials have communicated on a weekly basis
to try to minimize the effects of border travel restrictions and to determine when current trade and
travel restrictions can be safely lifted.126 Congress may monitor how the Biden Administration
balances trade and infrastructure issues with other priorities along the southwestern border.

124 White House, “Declaration by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United
Mexican States Concerning Twenty-First Century Border Management,” press release, May 19, 2010. As mentioned,
U.S.-Mexican security cooperation along the border did not begin with the Mérida Initiative.
125 The Executive Steering Committee (ESC) coordinates efforts with Mexico in three areas: infrastructure, secure
flows, and law enforcement/security. See U.S. Department of State, United States-Mexico Bilateral Executive Steering
Committee of the 21st Century Border Management Process, December 10, 2021.
126 U.S. Department of State, “North American Cooperation on COVID-19,” May 12, 2020.
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U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement127
Congress played a key role in modifying, considering, and approving implementing legislation
for the USMCA, which entered into force on July 1, 2020. Congress is actively overseeing the
USMCA’s implementation and USMCA-related trade disputes. In May 2017, the Trump
Administration sent a 90-day notification to Congress of its intent to begin talks with Canada and
Mexico to renegotiate and modernize NAFTA, as required by the 2015 Trade Promotion
Authority (TPA). Negotiations began on August 16, 2017, and were concluded on September 30,
2018. USMCA was signed on November 30, 2018. The House Democratic leadership
recommended modifications to USMCA (on labor, the environment, and dispute settlement,
among other topics) that led to changes to the agreement and a subsequent negotiation with
Mexico and Canada on a USMCA protocol of amendment on December 10, 2019. The House
approved USMCA implementing legislation in December 2019, and the Senate followed suit in
January 2020 (P.L. 116-113).
On April 24, 2020, the U.S. Trade Representative notified Congress that Canada and Mexico had
taken the legal and regulatory steps necessary to implement the USCMA and that the agreement
would enter into force on July 1, 2020. On July 8, 2020, President Trump hosted President López
Obrador at the White House to commemorate the USMCA’s entry into force.128 Canadian Prime
Minister Justin Trudeau did not to attend due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
USMCA, composed of 34 chapters and 12 side letters, retains most of NAFTA’s free-trade
provisions and other measures, but it makes notable changes to auto rules of origin, dispute
settlement provisions, government procurement, investment, and intellectual property right (IPR)
protection. It also modernizes provisions in services, labor, and the environment and addresses
new trade issues, such as digital trade, state-owned enterprises, anti-corruption, and currency
misalignment. Key issues for Congress in the debate surrounding USMCA included workers’
rights protection in Mexico, IPR provisions and access to medicine, the enforceability of labor
and environmental provisions, and the constitutional authority of Congress over international
trade and its role in revising, approving, or withdrawing from the agreement.
Congress included $180 million over four years in the USCMA’s implementing legislation (P.L.
116-113) for technical assistance projects related to the agreement and $30 million to pay for
labor attachés and other staff to monitor Mexico’s USMCA compliance.129 The goals of recent
assistance have been to ensure enforcement of Mexican labor laws and legitimate collective
bargaining rights; increase measures to mitigate COVID-19 among workers; and address child
labor and forced labor in Mexico’s supply chains, including in agriculture.130 Some Members of
Congress have praised two recent votes by Mexican workers in favor of establishing independent
unions at their automotive plants as steps toward improving workers’ rights and representation.131
Now that USMCA is in the implementation phase, Congress may wish to consider various issues
regarding the agreement. These issues include how the new importing requirements under
USMCA are being phased in; whether the new rules of origin for the motor vehicle industry are

127 This section is drawn from the summary of CRS Report R44981, The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement
(USMCA), by M. Angeles Villarreal.
128 The White House, “Remarks by President Trump and President López Obrador of the United Mexican States in
Signing of a Joint Declaration,” July 8, 2020.
129 U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, “Labor Rights and the United States-Mexico-
Canada Agreement (USMCA),” at https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/our-work/trade/labor-rights-usmca.
130 U.S. Department of Labor, “U.S. Department of Labor Announces $20 Million in New Grants to Support USMCA
Implementation, Bringing the 2020 Total to Nearly $50 Million,” News Release, December 16, 2020.
131 AP, “Mexico Sees 2nd Major Win for Independent Unions,” March 1, 2022.
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being implemented as planned; how the more stringent requirements are affecting the North
American motor vehicle industry; how well Mexico is implementing labor law reforms to provide
more workers’ rights protection; how well the funding provided by USMCA legislation is
ensuring effective implementation of Mexico’s labor reforms; how well the new labor
enforcement measures, including the rapid response mechanism, are working; and the extent to
which USMCA’s updated dispute resolution procedures are improving the enforcement of the
agreement’s provisions, among other issues.
Selected CRS Products on the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement
CRS Report R44981, The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), by M. Angeles Vil arreal
CRS In Focus IF10997, U.S.-Mexico-Canada (USMCA) Trade Agreement, by M. Angeles Vil arreal
CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10399, USMCA: Implementation and Considerations for Congress, by Nina M. Hart
CRS In Focus IF11308, USMCA: Labor Provisions, by M. Angeles Vil arreal and Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs
CRS In Focus IF11167, USMCA: Investment Provisions, by Christopher A. Casey and M. Angeles Vil arreal
CRS In Focus IF11399, Enforcing International Trade Obligations in USMCA: The State-State Dispute Settlement
Mechanism, by Nina M. Hart
Energy
Congress has expressed ongoing interest in the future of energy production in Mexico, as it is
important for Mexico’s economic growth and for the U.S. energy sector. Mexico has considerable
oil and gas resources, but its state oil company (Pemex), has struggled to counter declining
production and postponed needed investments due to fiscal challenges. Many Members of
Congress praised Mexico’s 2013 constitutional reforms on energy that opened up oil, electricity,
gas, transmission, production, and sales to private and foreign investment while keeping
ownership of Mexico’s hydrocarbons under state control. Members of Congress have expressed
serious concerns about the López Obrador administration’s treatment of U.S. energy companies,
as well as its proposed electricity reform.132
The 2013 reforms created opportunities for U.S. businesses in exploration, pipeline construction
and ownership, natural gas production, and commercial gasoline sales. Although the reforms did
not privatize Pemex, they did expose the company to competition and hastened its entrance into
joint ventures. Because of the reforms, Mexico received more than $160 billion in promised
investment. 133 However, the reforms ended subsidies that kept gasoline prices low for Mexican
consumers and failed to reverse production declines and problems within Pemex. While analysts
still predict that the reforms will bring long-term benefits to the country, the Peña Nieto
administration oversold their short-term impacts, which has emboldened those within the López
Obrador government who have sought to curtail private involvement in the sector.134
The United States sought to cement Mexico’s energy reforms through the NAFTA renegotiations.
NAFTA included some reservations for investment in Mexico’s energy sector. USMCA reinforces
Mexico’s 2013 constitutional reforms and the current legal framework for private energy projects

132 Sheky Espejo, “Lawmakers Urge Biden to Address Concerns of U.S. Energy Companies in Mexico,” S & P Global
Commodity Insights, July 12, 2021; AP, “U.S. Congressmen Complain About Mexico Energy Changes,” October 20,
2021.
133 Duncan Wood and John Padilla, Mexico’s new Hydrocarbons Model: a Critical Assessment Four Years Later,
Wilson Center & IPD Latin America.
134 Ibid; Duncan Wood et al., Changing the Guard in Mexico: AMLO’s Opportunities and Challenges, July 2018.
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in Mexico. It includes investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms similar to those that existed
in NAFTA for the oil and gas, infrastructure, and other energy sectors, even as those mechanisms
were limited for other sectors.135 In addition, the free trade agreement maintains tariff-free exports
of U.S. natural gas to Mexico, which have increased significantly since the 2013 reforms.136
Private sector trade, innovation, and investment have created a North American energy market
that is interdependent and multidirectional, with cross-border gas pipelines and liquefied natural
gas (LNG) shipments from the United States to Mexico surging. In 2019, the value of U.S.
petroleum products exports to Mexico totaled nearly $30 billion, more than double the value of
U.S. energy imports from Mexico ($13 billion).137 Many experts have argued that deepened
energy cooperation with Mexico could give North America an industrial advantage.138
López Obrador’s energy policies have concerned energy investors and U.S. companies with large
parts of their supply chains in Mexico. The government’s decisions to halt new auctions in the oil
and gas sector, as well as in wind and solar energy projects, stunned investors and put hundreds of
existing projects in limbo.139 Private sector actors are lobbying for adjustments in the proposed
electricity reform that would enable Mexico to keep its Paris climate agreement pledges and
respect private investment while still strengthening the CFE.140
Opportunities exist for continued U.S.-Mexican energy cooperation in the energy sector, but the
future of those efforts may depend on the outcome of López Obrador’s proposed reforms. The
Biden Administration has engaged Mexico in several high-level meetings to express concern over
the proposal, citing concerns that it could hinder U.S.-Mexico cooperation on clean energy
initiatives and violate the USMCA.141 Bilateral efforts to accelerate Mexican action on renewable
energy development and other policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions could continue
through a newly created U.S.-Mexico Climate and Clean Energy Working Group.142
In addition to monitoring López Obrador’s proposed energy reform as it pertains to USMCA,
congressional oversight may involve broader issues related to the fairness of policies adopted by
the López Obrador government toward foreign energy companies and investors.
Selected Border Environmental Issues143
The transboundary flow of raw sewage and industrial wastewater has been a focus of bilateral
environmental dialogue since at least the U.S.-Mexico Water Treaty of 1944. Effluent, trash, and

135 CRS In Focus IF11167, USMCA: Investment Provisions, by Christopher A. Casey and M. Angeles Villarreal.
136 “USMCA Deal to Keep Tariffs Off North American Oil, Gas Trade,” S & P Global Market Intelligence, December
10, 2019.
137 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “In 2019, the U.S. Imported $13 Billion of Energy Goods from Mexico,
Exported $34 Billion,” November 4, 2020.
138 Earl Anthony Wayne and David Shedd, Assuring Energy Security with a Modern NAFTA, Wilson Center Mexico
Institute, May 9, 2018.
139 Kate Linthicum, “For Mexico’s President, the Future Isn’t Renewable Energy—It’s Coal,” Los Angeles Times, April
12, 2021.
140 Dave Graham, “Analysis: Hints of Compromise Emerge over Mexico’s Contentious Power Bill,” Reuters, February
15, 2022.
141 U.S. Department of Energy, “Statement by U.S. Secretary of Energy Jennifer M. Granholm on Travel to Mexico
City, Mexico,” press release, January 21, 2021,
142 U.S. Embassy and Consulates in Mexico, “Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry Visits Mexico City,”
press release, February 9, 2022.
143 This section was authored by Elena Humphreys, Analyst in Environmental Policy.
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sediment flowing into the United States from Mexico has caused health and environmental
problems in the border region that Members of Congress have consistently raised on behalf of
their constituents. Wastewater collection and treatment system capacity has not kept pace with
rapid population growth in the border region. Also, the aging of existing wastewater infrastructure
has led to increased maintenance issues, such as pipeline ruptures. To address border sanitation
issues, Congress has appropriated funds for the International Boundary and Water Commission
(IBWC), the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the North American
Development Bank (NADB) to construct or finance wastewater infrastructure on both sides of the
border. Several sanitation facilities have been constructed, though continued transboundary flows
require bilateral cooperation.
International Boundary and Water Commission
The IBWC, consisting of U.S. and Mexico Sections, implements boundary and water treaties
between the United States and Mexico.144 IBWC’s activities are conducted through Minutes,
which have the force of law when both the U.S. and Mexican governments provide written
approval through their respective sections of the IBWC. To address the issue of transboundary
effluent flows, the IBWC has taken actions under numerous Minutes.145 Under this authority,
IBWC has constructed and operates three wastewater treatment plants, two of which treat
Mexican wastewater on the U.S. side of the border. These two wastewater treatment plant are the
South Bay International Wastewater Treatment Plant in San Ysidro, CA, and the Nogales
Wastewater Treatment Plant in Nogales, AZ. IBWC also operates the Nuevo Laredo Wastewater
Treatment Plant in Nuevo Laredo, Mexico.
Congress appropriates funds to the IBWC for construction activities through State Department
appropriations. The FY2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 116-260) included an
appropriation of $49.0 million for IBWC construction, $12.1 million above enacted FY2020
IBWC construction appropriations. Congressional appropriators have shown interest in increasing
oversight regarding transboundary sewage flows. P.L. 116-260 included a requirement for the
Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of other relevant federal agencies, to submit a
report to the appropriations committee on the implementation of the interagency plan developed
pursuant to the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-94), within 90 days of
enactment. P.L. 116-94 directed the Secretary of State, as well as other relevant federal agencies,
to develop a plan to
address the impacts of toxic transboundary flows on U.S. communities, including: (1) an
explanation of the sources and impacts of such flows; (2) the delineation of responsibility
between each agency and a description of necessary actions and resources for each agency
to address such impacts; (3) steps that will be taken to raise the issue of transboundary
flows with the Government of Mexico, including by utilizing U.S. assistance for Mexico
to obtain improvements to prevent, divert, and/or treat toxic flows on the Mexican side of

144 In 1882, the United States and Mexico created the International Boundary Commission (IBC) as a temporary
boundary-setting body. See 1882 Boundary Convention, Article 3. The United States and Mexico reestablished the IBC
in 1889 and made it permanent in 1900. See Convention Between the United States of America and the United States
of Mexico, Extending for an Indefinite Period the Treaty of March 1, 1889, Between the Two Governments, Known as
the Water Boundary Convention, U.S.-Mex., Nov. 21, 1900, 31 Stat. 1936. Treaty Between the United States of
America and Mexico Respecting Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, U.S.-
Mex., February 3, 1944, 59 Stat. 1219, at https://www.ibwc.gov/Files/1944Treaty.pdf. The 1944 Treaty, Article 3,
states that the countries agree to give preferential attention to the solution of all border sanitation problems.
145 These Minutes can be found at https://www.ibwc.gov/Treaties_Minutes/Minutes_ByProject.html.
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the border; and (4) steps that will be taken to improve the timeliness of warnings to U.S.
communities regarding toxic conditions.
Pursuant to the FY2022 Further Extending Government Funding Act (P.L. 117-70), the IBWC,
along with other federal agencies, is operating under a continuing resolution at FY2021 funding
levels. For FY2022, the State Department’s budget request specified that the $46.8 million,
requested in construction funds, be used for strengthening the Amistad Dam; rehabilitating IBWC
wastewater infrastructure in Nogales, AZ; and improving security for USIBWC facilities and
critical infrastructure.146
As the 117th Congress deliberates on appropriations bills for FY2022, it has continued to pay
attention to transboundary pollution issues. The report accompanying the House-passed
Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2022 (H.R.
4373) expresses concern over the transboundary flow of effluent from Mexico into the United
States and includes a requirement for the Department of State and the IBWC to submit a status
report that reviews planned and completed actions to address such flows. The explanatory
statement accompanying the Senate-introduced version of the Department of State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2022 (S. 3075) directs the U.S. Section of
the IBWC to assess the costs, benefits, and feasibility of constructing a screen for debris and
drugs in a portion of a pipeline that delivers wastewater across the border to the Nogales
Wastewater Treatment Plant. The explanatory statement for S. 3075 further states that should such
a screen be effective, then the IBWC should include in its FY2023 request funding to construct a
screen. The measure does not specify criteria to assess efficacy.
North American Development Bank
In October 1993, the United States and Mexico adopted an agreement to establish the Border
Environment Cooperation Commission (BECC) and the NADB to provide financial assistance for
environmental infrastructure projects in the border region. The agreement noted the need for
environmental infrastructure, especially in the areas of water pollution, wastewater treatment, and
municipal solid waste. The BECC is authorized to help border states and communities coordinate,
design, and mobilize financing for environmental infrastructure projects, and to certify projects
for financing. The NADB evaluates the financial feasibility of BECC-certified projects and
provides financing as appropriate. Congress authorized U.S. participation in the BECC and
NADB in legislation implementing the North America Free Trade Agreement (P.L. 103-182).
Enacted in 2004, P.L. 108-215 authorized several operational reforms to the NADB. In 2017,
BECC and NADB were integrated into a single institution.147
The USMCA Implementation Act (P.L. 116-113), Title VIII, Subtitle C, called for U.S. NADB
board members to urge NADB to prioritize financing environmental infrastructure projects (over
road or commercial projects), streamline project certification and financing procedures, and
develop project performance measures. The FY2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 116-
260), Division O, Title VI, authorized the U.S. Treasury to contribute up to $1.02 billion for U.S.
shares of NADB capital stock. The 2020 NADB annual report states that, in 2020, the United
States provided $225 million in paid-in capital to the NADB and that Mexico intends to provide

146 Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related
Programs, Washington, DC, May 28, 2021, p. 54, at https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/FY-2022-
State_USAID-Congressional-Budget-Justification.pdf.
147 North American Development Bank (NADB), “NADB and BECC Merge,” press release, November 7, 2017,
https://www.nadb.org/news/nadb-and-becc-merge.
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matching payments.148 The report also indicated that $165 million of this amount depends on
payments from Mexico.149
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Congress annually provides funding to EPA for high priority water and wastewater infrastructure
projects in the U.S.-Mexican border region. In 1997, EPA and NADB entered into an agreement,
under which EPA contributes much of its annual border infrastructure appropriation to NADB for
grants to construct water infrastructure on both sides of the border. For FY2021, Congress
provided $30 million for the Border Water Infrastructure Program (BWIP) through an EPA
account in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021.150 EPA in turn provides these funds151 to
two programs: (1) the Project Development Assistance Program (PDAP) and (2) the Border
Environment Infrastructure Fund (BEIF). The PDAP and BEIF programs are intended to identify
and fund drinking water quality, wastewater management infrastructure projects, or both. Project
sponsors can apply jointly to the PDAP/BEIF program through NADB, which screens for initial
eligibility and prioritizes projects using EPA’s ranking methodologies.152 To be eligible for BEIF
grants, projects located in Mexico must have a U.S. benefit and are required to provide a cost-
share, as determined by the Mexican national water agency. EPA reports that BWIP has provided
funding for 136 projects, 101 of which have been completed.153
The USMCA Implementation Act (P.L. 116-113) includes a supplemental appropriation of $300
million for EPA to support high-priority wastewater facilities, after consultation with the
appropriate border commission.154 The act directs EPA to carry out design, construction,
operation, and maintenance activities of high-priority treatment works in the Tijuana River Valley
to treat wastewater flows originating in Mexico.155 EPA is directed to carry out such activities in
coordination with the U.S. Section of the IBWC; federal agencies, including the Department of
State and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; and state and local partners. In July 2020, EPA
convened the USMCA Interagency Consultation Group, composed of the partners identified in
the act, and later announced the selection of two projects to be funded with the USMCA
supplemental appropriation.156 Under a new memorandum of understanding with IBWC, EPA will
design and construct a structure to divert 10 million gallons per day of flows to the South Bay
International Wastewater Treatment Plant. EPA, working with the City of San Diego, also will

148 Paid-in capital consists of funds contributed by the two governments to NADB. NADB, North American
Development Bank 2020 Annual Report, November 9, 2020, p. 4, at https://www.nadb.org/uploads/files/
2020_annual_report_eng_final.pdf.
149 Ibid, p. 33.
150 The Joint Explanatory Statement for the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, Division G, states that combined
stormwater runoff and raw sewage abatement projects are eligible for Border Water Infrastructure Program (BWIP).
151 Funds are divided between the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Region 6 (for projects in New Mexico,
Texas, Chihuahua, Nueva Leon, Coahuila, and Tamaulipas) and EPA Region 9 (for projects in Arizona, California,
Baja California, and Sonora).
152 Project application documents can be found at https://www.nadb.org/infrastructure-financing/grants/border-
environment-infrastructure-fund-beif-pdap.
153 EPA, Fiscal Year 2022 Justification of Appropriation Estimates for the Committees on Appropriation, 190-R-21-
002, May 2021, pp. 686-688, at https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2021-07/fy22-cj-10-stag.pdf.
154 The supplemental appropriation of $300 million for high priority wastewater facilities in P.L. 116-113 parallels the
FY2020 BWIP appropriation, which is for “the construction of high priority water and wastewater facilities.”
155 P.L. 116-113 §821.
156 EPA, “EPA Announces Two Near-Term, Clean Water Projects in the Tijuana River,” press release, October 2,
2020, at https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-announces-two-near-term-clean-water-projects-tijuana-river.
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develop a sediment and trash reduction strategy at the U.S.-Mexican border to mitigate such
waste from going into the Pacific Ocean.157
In May 2021, EPA completed a technical evaluation of potential projects to address
transboundary pollution in the Tijuana River Valley and identified three alternatives with “the
highest potential” to reduce transboundary pollution in the Tijuana River and the coastal areas.158
In November 2021, EPA stated that projects identified in one of the three alternatives are
undergoing environmental review.159 These projects range from constructing a new wastewater
treatment plant in Tijuana to installing a boom to control trash in the Tijuana River. EPA notes
that the cost to construct all projects included in this alternative would total $627 million,
exceeding the supplemental appropriation provided by P.L. 116-113.160 Accordingly, EPA intends
to use a phased approach in the design and construction of the projects.161
As discussed above, EPA, along with other federal agencies, is operating under a continuing
resolution at FY2021 funding levels. The EPA FY2022 request for BWIP maintains the funding
level provided by the FY2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 116-260) of $30 million.162
The House-passed Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, Agriculture, Rural
Development, Energy and Water Development, Financial Services and General Government,
Interior, Environment, Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, Transportation, and Housing and
Urban Development Appropriations Act, 2022 (H.R. 4502) would increase the level of
appropriations for BWIP to $35 million for FY2022. The Senate-introduced Department of the
Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2022 (S. 3034), also would
provide $35 million for BWIP.
Water Resource Issues163
The United States and Mexico share the waters of the Colorado River and the Rio Grande. These
shared rivers have long presented complex issues leading to cooperation and conflict in the U.S.-
Mexican border region and between the United States and Mexico.

157 EPA, “EPA Announces Two Near-Term, Clean Water Projects in the Tijuana River,” press release, October 2,
2020, at https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-announces-two-near-term-clean-water-projects-tijuana-river.
158 For a discussion of these alternatives, see PG Environmental, LLC, for EPA, Water Infrastructure Alternatives
Analysis, November 9, 2021, at https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2021-11/usmca-water-infrastructure-
alternatives-analysis-final-report.pdf.
159 EPA, “EPA Announces Holistic Approach to Address Water Pollution from the Tijuana River Watershed,” press
release, November 8, 2021, at https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-announces-holistic-approach-address-water-
pollution-tijuana-river-watershed.
160 EPA, United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) Investments, fact sheet, November 20, 2021, at
https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2021-11/cis-factsheet-110221.pdf.
161 EPA, “EPA Announces Holistic Approach to Address Water Pollution from the Tijuana River Watershed,” press
release, November 8, 2021, at https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-announces-holistic-approach-address-water-
pollution-tijuana-river-watershed.
162 EPA, Fiscal Year 2022 Justification of Appropriation Estimates for the Committees on Appropriation, 190-R-21-
002, Washington, DC, May 2021, pp. 686-688, at https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2021-07/fy22-cj-10-
stag.pdf.
163 This section is drawn from CRS Report R45430, Sharing the Colorado River and the Rio Grande: Cooperation and
Conflict with Mexico, by Nicole T. Carter, Stephen P. Mulligan, and Charles V. Stern. See also Alexandra Helfgott,
Bilateral Water Management: Water Sharing between the US and Mexico along the Border, Woodrow Wilson Center’s
Mexico Institute, January 4, 2021.
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The U.S.-Mexico Water Treaty of 1944 and other binational agreements guide how the two
governments share the flows of these rivers.164 The binational IBWC administers these
agreements and includes a U.S. Section that operates under foreign policy guidance from the U.S.
Department of State. Since 1944, the IBWC has been the principal venue for addressing river-
related disputes between the United States and Mexico.
Under the U.S.-Mexico Water Treaty of 1944, the United States is required to provide Mexico
annually with 1.5 million acre-feet of Colorado River water.165 U.S. deliveries to Mexico in the
Rio Grande basin near El Paso/Ciudad Juárez occur annually under a 1906 binational convention,
whereas Mexico’s deliveries downstream of Fort Quitman, TX, are established in the U.S.-
Mexico Water Treaty of 1944. The 1944 treaty typically requires Mexico to deliver to the United
States a minimum amount during a five-year cycle.
Recent Developments in the Colorado River Basin. The United States continues to meet its
Colorado River annual delivery requirements to Mexico pursuant to the U.S.-Mexico Water
Treaty of 1944. Recent IBWC actions on the Colorado River have focused on how to manage the
Colorado River’s water and infrastructure to improve water availability during drought and to
restore and protect riverine ecosystems. The most recent minute governing basin operations,
Minute 323 (signed in September 2017), is a set of binational measures that provides for
cooperative basin water management, including environmental flows to restore riverine habitat.
Minute 323 also provides for Mexico to share in cutbacks during shortage conditions in the U.S.
portion of the basin, including delivery reductions under drought contingency plans authorized by
Congress in April 2019.166 In addition, Minute 323 designates a “Mexican Water Reserve”
through which Mexico can delay its water deliveries from the United States and store its delayed
deliveries upstream at Lake Mead, thereby increasing the lake’s elevation.167 For the Colorado
River basin, issues before Congress may be largely related to oversight of Minute 323
implementation and water management associated with potential shortage conditions. Congress
also may be interested in the upcoming 2026 expiration of Minute 323 and the negotiation of any
extensions or replacement agreements in the interim.
Recent Development in the Rio Grande Basin. On multiple occasions since 1994, Mexico has
not met its Rio Grande delivery obligations of 1,750,000 acre-feet within the five-year cycle
established by the U.S.-Mexico Water Treaty of 1944, most recently during the five-year cycle
from 2010 to 2015.168 Mexico avoided ending the October 2015 to October 2020 cycle with a
water delivery deficit as the result of a transfer to the United States of Mexican water stored at
binational IBWC dams. The October 2020 Minute 325 provided that a shortfall would be avoided
through the transfer of water stored at two IBWC dams from Mexican to U.S. ownership. Minute
325 resulted in the transfer of ownership of 144,728 acre-feet of water.169 Minute 325 also

164 Another example of a water resource related treaty provision is Article IV of the 1970 Treaty to Resolve Pending
Boundary Differences and Maintain the Rio Grande and Colorado River as the International Boundary, U.S.-Mex.
165 Under the treaty, the United States must supply an additional 200,000 acre-feet when surplus is declared. During
drought, the United States may reduce deliveries to Mexico in similar proportion to reductions of U.S. uses.
166 Drought Contingency Plans for the Upper and Lower Colorado River Basin were enacted in April 2019 in P.L. 116-
14. For more information, see CRS Report R45546, Management of the Colorado River: Water Allocations, Drought,
and the Federal Role, by Charles V. Stern and Pervaze A. Sheikh.
167 Lake Mead elevation is the baseline used by the United States for determining shortage conditions and associated
water delivery cutbacks for the Lower Colorado River Basin states of Arizona, California, and Nevada.
168 Mexico made up for those shortfalls in subsequent five-year cycles, as authorized under the U.S.-Mexico Water
Treaty of 1944.
169 Amount of the transfer is described in Letter from Jayne Harkins, Commissioner, U.S. IBWC, to Greg Abbott,
Governor of Texas, November 3, 2020.
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allowed for negotiation of an agreement for the potential temporary use of U.S. water for
minimum municipal needs in Mexico below the Amistad Dam. In addition, Minute 325 indicated
that two Rio Grande working groups would be established as part of the efforts to reach a goal of
developing a minute on increased reliability and predictability of Rio Grande deliveries to water
users in the United States and Mexico by December 2023. To date, Congress has been primarily
involved in conducting oversight through reporting requirements for the U.S. Department of
State, such as those included in P.L. 116-6 (S.Rept. 115-282). Pursuant to the various reporting
requirements, reports have been delivered to various committees of Congress. As of early January
2022, Mexico’s deliveries for the first 14 months of the current five-year cycle (2020-2025) are
lower than the first 14 months of delivery cycles since 1992.
U.S.-Mexican Health Cooperation
As with neighboring Canada, robust trade and migration and an extensive shared border have
made health cooperation an important part of the United States’ bilateral relationship with
Mexico.170 New challenges to border heath have arisen during the COVID-19 pandemic,
including how to coordinate cross-border pandemic restrictions, vaccine distribution, and
protections for workers deemed essential. These and other challenges have prompted some
Members of Congress to introduce legislation that would revitalize the U.S.-Mexico Border
Health Commission, first authorized in 1994 but not established until 2000.
U.S.-Mexican cooperation on public health efforts developed in response to the outbreaks of
SARS (2002-2004) and H1N1 (2009). Trilateral efforts intensified in 2005 and proved important
for preventing the spread of H1N1 from Mexico in 2009. The United States and Mexico increased
health surveillance measures through robust information-sharing, and in 2012, the countries
expanded focus from avian influenza to all influenzas. The current trilateral health architecture is
led by the North American Health Security Working Group (NAHSWG) under the health systems
strengthening and preparedness activities laid out in the 2012 North American Plan for Animal
and Pandemic Influenza.171 These activities include
 detecting, monitoring and controlling an outbreak;
 facilitating communication among entities in each country that need to respond to
the outbreak;
 sustaining infrastructure and mitigating human, economic, and social impacts of
an outbreak; and
 preventing the entry and spread of such outbreaks.
The U.S. government is represented on the NAHSWG by permanent attachés from the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the CDC, among others. Mexico is one of
five countries that has a permanent HHS representative tasked with leading health diplomacy,
encouraging collaborative research, and serving as a key point of contact for the U.S. government
in the event of an infectious disease outbreak.172 There is also a U.S.-Mexican technical working

170 This paragraph draws from Andrew I. Rudman and Duncan Wood, Pandemics and Beyond: The Potential for U.S.-
Mexican Cooperation in Public Health, Woodrow Wilson Center’s Mexico Institute, March 2020.
171 Embassy of Mexico in the United States, “U.S.-Mexico Cooperation Framework on Health Issues,” May 4, 2020.
172 The other countries with HHS health attachés are Brazil, China, India, and South Africa. HHS, Office of Global
Affairs, accessed April 27, 2020.
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group led by the CDC that shares information on laboratory capacity, investigative findings, and
training, among other issues.173
The COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated the need for closer communication and cooperation
during a future pandemic or other similar emergency. On March 20, 2020, the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security issued a joint statement with Mexico announcing the suspension of
nonessential travel between the two countries; the suspension lasted through November 8,
2021.174 Early in the pandemic, the United States and Mexico had difficulty maintaining U.S.
supply chain continuity (including for DOD) with differences in essential business determinations
between countries and the need to keep Mexican workers safe despite a shortage of personal
protective equipment.175 Later, U.S. hospitals struggled to serve legal permanent residents
residing in Mexico and Mexicans who sought treatment for COVID-19, while Mexican cities
received deportees and immigrants expelled under Title 42, some infected with the virus.176 The
U.S. provision of 11 million vaccines to Mexico, which the Mexican government first distributed
along the northern border, enabled the eventual border reopening to nonessential travel.177
The difficult experiences in both Mexico and the United States with managing the COVID-19
pandemic have led some health experts to call for the reinstatement of the U.S.-Mexico Border
Health Commission.178 Some health experts also have called for a renewal of the U.S.-Mexico
Border Health Commission.179 Established in 2000, this binational commission received funding
from HHS to finance state and local projects that address binational objectives, including
infectious diseases.180 Funds reportedly lapsed for the commission in 2017; the Biden
Administration’s plan for the U.S. Section are unclear.181
Legislation has been introduced, H.R. 1538, the Binational Health Strategies Act of 2021, that
would amend the U.S.-Mexico Border Health Commission Act to authorize the commission to
undertake an assessment of COVID-19 impact and response along the border and to mandate a
binational plan on how that response could be bolstered. Related legislation, S. 2570, would
require the U.S.-Mexico Border Health Commission and a similar entity with Canada to develop
strategic plans to address border health issues and would authorize a total of $20 million annually
for those entities to award grants to eligible entities in border areas to carry out those plans.
Other Legislative Action
Congress has appropriated foreign assistance for Mexico and has overseen bilateral efforts to
address U.S.-bound unauthorized migration, illegal drug flows, the COVID-19 pandemic,

173 DHS, “Joint Statement on U.S.-Mexico Joint Initiative to Combat the COVID-19 Pandemic,” March 20, 2020.
174 DHS, “Starting Today Fully Vaccinated Travelers Permitted to Enter U.S. via Land and Ferry Border Crossings,”
November 8, 2021.
175 Adam Behsudi, “Mexico’s Covid-19 Response Threatening North American Supply Chains,” Politico, April 24,
2020.
176 Miriam Jordan, “Coronavirus Jumps the Border, Overwhelming Hospitals in California,” New York Times, June 7,
2020; Julian Resendiz, “Juarez Shelter Grappling with Migrants Expelled from U.S. Infected with COVID-19,” Border
Report, September 3, 2021.
177 Chase Harrison, “Tracker: U.S. Vaccine Donations to Latin America,” updated February 1, 2022.
178 Francisco Lara-Valencia and Hilda García-Pérez, “The Borders of the Pandemic: Lessons on Governance and
Cooperation in United States-Mexico Border Cities,” Estudios Fronterizos, vol. 22, October 4, 2021.
179 Eva Moya, Irasema Coronado, and Stephen Mumme, “A Call to Action: Reestablishment of the US-Mexico Border
Health Commission,” Health Affairs, July 30, 2021.
180 HHS, Office of Global Health Affairs, “U.S.-Mexico Border Health Commission Activities.”
181 Moya et. al., op. cit.
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USMCA implementation, and border environmental issues, among others. Although several
pieces of legislation have been introduced that would influence the issues in bilateral relations
discussed in this report, appropriations legislation has been the primary vehicle through which
laws and policies affecting Mexico have been enacted thus far.
Congress is considering the Biden Administration’s FY2022 foreign assistance request for
Mexico of $116.5 million, which is nearly 27% lower than the estimated FY2021 appropriation of
$158.9 million. The House-passed version of the FY2022 foreign aid appropriations bill (H.R.
4373, H.Rept. 117-84) would provide $158.9 million for assistance to Mexico, with several
reporting requirements. The FY2022 foreign aid bill introduced in the Senate (S. 3075) would not
stipulate a total funding level for Mexico. Other legislation that would affect U.S. relations with
Mexico includes H.R. 3524, reported by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in July 2021,
which would require a report on how the United States, Mexico, and Canada could work together
to reduce methane and other emissions and implement Article 23.6 of the USMCA, which
prohibits importation of goods produced by forced labor. S. 1201, introduced in the Senate in
April 2021, contains similar provisions.
Outlook
U.S.-Mexican relations are likely to be tested in 2022 by ongoing tension in security and energy
relations, lingering economic and health challenges caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, and
elevated levels of irregular migration. Most experts maintain the best way for both countries to
address these challenges is to continue working together and with Canada to ensure the best
possible outcomes for North America. A series of high-level meetings in autumn 2021 seemed to
smooth over initial tensions between the Biden and López Obrador administrations. Nevertheless,
recent U.S. criticism of Mexico’s inability to protect journalists and Mexican criticism of U.S.
support for nongovernmental organizations investigating corruption and abuses against journalists
in Mexico have caused some renewed tension. Congress is likely to maintain significant interest
in Mexico, with trade, security, drug policy, migration, health, and environmental issues as
probable areas of funding and oversight efforts.
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Appendix. Mérida Initiative Funding
Table A-1. Estimated Mérida Initiative Funding: FY2008-FY2022
$ in millions
Account
ESF
INCLE
FMF
Total
FY2008
20.0
263.5
116.5
400.0
FY2009
15.0
406.0
39.0
460.0
FY2010
9.0
365.0
265.2
639.2
FY2011
18.0
117.0
8.0
143.0
FY2012
33.3
248.5
Not app.
281.8
FY2013
32.1
190.1
Not app.
222.2
FY2014
35.0
143.1
Not app.
178.1
FY2015
33.6
110.0
Not app.
143.6
FY2016
39.0
100.0
Not app.
139.0
FY2017
40.9a
90.0
Not app.
130.9
FY2018
39.0b
100.0
Not app.
139.0
FY2019
39.0c
110.0
Not app.
149.0
FY2020
33.0d
100.0
Not app.
133.0
FY2021
50.0e
100.0
Not app.
150.0
Total
436.9
2,443.2
428.7
3,308.8
FY2022
50,0 64.0
Not app.

Sources: U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) budget office, November 3, 2016; U.S.
Department of State, November 18, 2016; P.L. 115-141; P.L. 116-6; U.S. Department of State, Congressional
Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY2022; Explanatory statement accompanying P.L. 116-94; Explanatory
statement accompanying P.L. 116-260.
Notes: ESF = Economic Support Fund; INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; FMF =
Foreign Military Financing. FY2008-FY2010 included supplemental funding.
a. For FY2017, Mérida programs administered by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
were funded through the Development Assistance account rather than ESF.
b. Of the $45 mil ion in funds appropriated for ESF, some $6 mil ion supported non-Mérida Initiative programs.
c. Of the $45 mil ion in funds appropriated for ESF, some $6 mil ion supported non-Mérida Initiative programs.
d. Of the $50 mil ion in funds appropriated for ESF, an estimated $13 mil ion wil be used to support non-
Mérida Initiative programs focused on clean energy and sustainable landscapes. USAID, CN #71, December
16, 2020.
e. Congress appropriated $50 mil ion in ESF for Mexico in FIND, but USAID has yet to notify Congress on
how much of those funds wil support Mérida Initiative programs.

Congressional Research Service

36

Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations

Author Information

Clare Ribando Seelke
Joshua Klein
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Presidential Management Fellow

Acknowledgments
This report contains significant contributions from Nicole T. Carter, Specialist in Natural Resources Policy;
Stephen P. Mulligan, Legislative Attorney; Charles V. Stern, Specialist in Natural Resources Policy; and
Elena H. Humphreys, Analyst in Environmental Policy.

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Congressional Research Service
R42917 · VERSION 53 · UPDATED
37