Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy:
February 17, 2022
In Brief
Clayton Thomas
Even by the standards of Afghanistan’s tumultuous history, 2021 marked a major watershed for
Analyst in Middle Eastern
the country. In 2021, U.S. and international forces departed after nearly two decades of
Affairs
operations in Afghanistan; the internationally backed Afghan government and its military forces

collapsed; and the Taliban, a Sunni Islamist extremist group that formerly ruled the country from
1996 to 2001, retook power. The aftershocks of these events continue to reverberate within

Afghanistan, throughout its region, and in the United States as publics and policymakers alike
grapple with the reality of the Taliban’s renewed rule.
The chapter of Afghan history that ended in 2021 arguably began in 2001, when the United States, in response to the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, led a military campaign against Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban government that harbored
and supported it. In the subsequent 20 years, the United States suffered over 22,000 military casualties (including about 2,400
fatalities) in Afghanistan, mostly at the hands of the robust and growing Taliban insurgency, and Congress appropriated
approximately $144 billion for reconstruction and security forces there. At the same time, an elected Afghan government
replaced the Taliban and, with significant U.S. and international support, made limited improvements in most measures of
human development, though Afghanistan remained one of the world’s poorest and most corrupt countries.
After over a year of negotiations initiated by the Trump Administration in 2018, U.S. officials signed a February 2020
agreement with the Taliban in which the United States committed to the withdrawal of all international military forces and
contractors by May 2021, in return for which the Taliban committed to take unspecified action to prevent other groups
(including Al Qaeda) from using Afghan soil to threaten the United States and its allies. Throughout 2020 and 2021, U.S.
officials contended that the Taliban were not fulfilling their commitments, given increased violence between the Taliban and
Afghan government and continuing Taliban links with Al Qaeda, even as the Trump Administration drew down U.S. forces,
which reached a low of 2,500 in January 2021. Afghan officials sought to downplay the impact of the U.S. military
withdrawal on their own forces’ capabilities, but some official U.S. assessments indicated that the withdrawal could lead to
gains by the Taliban, who already controlled or contested half of the country by 2020.
In 2021, President Joseph Biden announced that the United States would withdraw its troops, though several months later
than the date to which it agreed in the U.S.-Taliban accord. On August 15, 2021, two weeks before that withdrawal was to
conclude, the Taliban entered Kabul, the culmination of a rapid nationwide military advance that shocked many in the United
States and Afghanistan. In the last two weeks of August, U.S. military forces oversaw the evacuation of over 120,000
individuals, including U.S. and international diplomatic personnel and Afghan partners, from Kabul’s international airport,
before departing on August 30, 2021. No U.S. military or diplomatic personnel are in Afghanistan as of February 2022.
The Taliban announced the formation of a new government dominated by Taliban loyalists on September 7, 2021. The
composition of that government and the Taliban’s suppression of peaceful protests against its rule indicate the group has
prioritized internal cohesion over outreach to other segments of Afghan society or similar gestures that might be welcomed
by the United States and other countries. Other than a regional Islamic State affiliate, no armed opposition to the Taliban
appears to exist as of February 2022, although some anti-Taliban Afghan leaders have sought U.S. support. The Taliban’s
renewed rule has been detrimental for the status of women and girls in Afghanistan, a longstanding U.S. policy interest. The
status of ethnic and religious minorities, as well as the tens of thousands of Afghans who worked for U.S. efforts and seek to
leave the country, also remain closely scrutinized.
Since the Taliban takeover, Afghanistan has faced intersecting and overwhelming humanitarian and economic crises, a result
of challenges both old (such as droughts, the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, and Afghanistan’s weak
economic base) and new (such as the cut-off of international development assistance, U.S. sanctions on the Taliban, and the
U.S. hold on Afghan central bank assets). The Biden Administration and many in Congress seek to ameliorate these crises,
but without taking any action that boosts the Taliban’s position or that may be perceived as doing so. Pursuing these policies
in tandem may prove complicated.
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Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief

Introduction
The aftershocks of the Taliban’s August 2021 return to power continue to reverberate in
Afghanistan and the United States alike. This report provides background information and
analysis on developments in Afghanistan and implications for U.S. policy, including
 the Taliban’s government and the impact of their rule on terrorist groups, human
rights, and the ability of U.S. Afghan partners to leave the country;
 regional dynamics; and
 the intersecting humanitarian and economic crises facing the country.
The report also provides information on legislation and other congressional action related to
Afghanistan. The challenge at the heart of many U.S. policy debates over which Congress has
influence (including humanitarian assistance, U.S. sanctions, and the status of U.S.-based central
bank assets) is how to prioritize and, if possible, reconcile two U.S. interests: supporting the
Afghan people and refraining from bolstering the Taliban’s rule.
Background: Taliban Takeover
At the outset of 2021, the Afghan government was a close U.S. counterterrorism partner, the
result of nearly 20 years of substantial U.S. and international support, including the deployment
of hundreds of thousands of troops and the provision of tens of billions of dollars in assistance.
President Donald Trump had withdrawn all but 2,500 U.S. forces, the lowest U.S. force level
since 2001, in advance of the full troop withdrawal to which the United States agreed in the
February 2020 U.S.-Taliban agreement.1 Still, U.S. officials committed to continue to provide
critical financial support to Afghan forces and expressed optimism about their capabilities vis-a-
vis the Taliban, emphasizing the Taliban’s failure to capture any of Afghanistan’s provincial
capitals.
At the same time, the Taliban were arguably at their strongest since 2001, when they were driven
from power by U.S., international, and U.S.-backed Afghan forces, having steadily gained
territory and improved their tactical capabilities over the course of their resilient two-decade
insurgency. The Afghan government against which the Taliban fought was weakened by deep
internal divisions, factional infighting, and endemic corruption, and Taliban forces enjoyed
certain advantages over their Afghan government counterparts, including greater cohesion and
financial sustainability, according to one January 2021 outside assessment.2
Several weeks after President Joseph Biden confirmed that international forces would depart
Afghanistan by the fall of 2021, Taliban forces began a sweeping advance that captured wide
swaths of the country’s rural areas, cementing the group’s hold on some districts in which it
already had a significant presence. The Taliban’s seizure of other districts was more surprising:
some northern areas had militarily resisted the Taliban when the group was in power in the 1990s,

1 After more than a year of negotiations, U.S. and Taliban representatives signed a bilateral agreement on February 29,
2020, agreeing to two “interconnected” guarantees: the withdrawal of all U.S. and international forces by May 2021,
and unspecified Taliban action to prevent other groups (including Al Qaeda) from using Afghan soil to threaten the
United States and its allies. The text of the agreement is available at https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/
02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf. Nonpublic annexes accompanied the agreement.
2 Jonathan Schroden, “Afghanistan’s Security Forces Versus the Taliban: A Net Assessment,” CTC Sentinel, January
2021.
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making their rapid 2021 fall to the Taliban particularly significant. One source estimated that the
Taliban took control of over 100 of Afghanistan’s 400 districts in May and June 2021.3 The speed
of the Taliban’s advance reportedly surprised even some within the group, with one commander
saying that his forces were intentionally avoiding capturing provincial capitals before the
scheduled departure of U.S. forces.4
The Taliban’s advance was secured through both combat and negotiation. While the Taliban faced
stiff, if ultimately unsuccessful, resistance from government forces in some areas, others were
taken with minimal fighting.5 In many of these areas, the Taliban reportedly secured the surrender
or departure of government forces (and the handover of their weapons) with payments or through
the mediation of local elders seeking to avoid bloodshed.6
The Taliban captured their first provincial capital on August 6, after which the collapse of the
Afghan government and its security forces accelerated. Within a week, the Taliban were nearing
Kabul, which they entered on August 15, 2021. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, whose seven-
year tenure was characterized by electoral crises, factional infighting, pervasive corruption, and
the gradual deterioration of Afghan forces, fled the country that same day and remains, as of
February 2022, in the United Arab Emirates.
Taliban Government
On September 7, 2021, the Taliban announced a “caretaker government” to rule Afghanistan. The
Taliban refer to their new government, as they have for decades referred to themselves, as the
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. It is unclear by whom members of this government might be
replaced going forward and why, or in what sense these “caretaker” positions differ from
permanent positions.7 One Taliban spokesman reportedly said in September 2021 that the group
intends to temporarily “implement” the 1964 constitution of the former Afghan monarchy
“without any content that contradicts Islamic law and the principles of the Islamic Emirate,” with
another speculating that the group might draft a new constitution in 2022.8
Haibatullah Akhundzada, Taliban leader since the 2016 killing of his predecessor in a U.S. drone
strike, holds supreme power as the group’s emir. He has made few reported public appearances
and only one verified photograph reportedly exists.9 Mohammad Hassan Akhund, who served as
governor of Kandahar and foreign minister in the 1990s Taliban government, is the Acting Prime
Minister. One analyst has described Akhund as “relatively weak,” an “uncontroversial” figure

3 Kate Clark and Obaid Ali, “A Quarter of Afghanistan’s Districts Fall to the Taleban amid Calls for a ‘Second
Resistance,’” Afghanistan Analysts Network, July 2, 2021.
4 Dan De Luce, Mushtaq Yusufzai, and Saphora Smith, “Even the Taliban are surprised at how fast they’re advancing
in Afghanistan,” NBC News, June 25, 2021.
5 “Afghanistan: Taliban continue attacks on three major cities,” BBC, August 1, 2021.
6 Susannah George, “Afghanistan’s military collapse: Illicit deals and mass desertions,” Washington Post, August 15,
2021; David Zucchino, “Collapse and Conquest: The Taliban Strategy That Seized Afghanistan,” New York Times,
August 18, 2021.
7 One analyst has described the Taliban’s government during the 1990s as “nominally interim.” “Who Will Run the
Taliban Government?” International Crisis Group, September 9, 2021.
8 S. K. Khan, “Taliban to implement monarch-era Constitution in Afghanistan,” Anadolu Ajansi, September 28, 2021;
“Taliban plans to form ‘commission’ in 2022 to draft new constitution,” ANI, September 23, 2021.
9 Fazelminallah Qazizai, “The Mysterious Public Appearances of the Taliban’s Supreme Leader,” Newlines, December
20, 2021; “Haibatullah Akhundzada: Shadowy Taliban supreme leader whose son was suicide bomber,” Reuters,
September 7, 2021.
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whose selection forestalls competition among more powerful figures and factions within the
Taliban.10 Abdul Ghani Baradar, who led Taliban negotiations with the United States from 2018 to
2021, is the Acting Deputy Prime Minister.
The composition of the Taliban government is overwhelmingly homogeneous. Nearly all
members of the “caretaker cabinet” are former Taliban officials or longtime loyalists. All are
male, and the vast majority are ethnic Pashtuns (Afghanistan’s largest ethnic group, which
represents a plurality though not a majority of the population), and most are from southern
Afghanistan. Over half were, and remain, designated for terrorism-related U.S. and/or U.N.
sanctions, including the Acting Interior Minister, Sirajuddin Haqqani. The U.S. Department of
State has for years offered a reward of up to $10 million for information leading to the arrest of
Haqqani, who is the head of the Haqqani Network, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist
Organization (FTO). Some argue the role of Haqqani Network-associated figures in the Taliban
caretaker government is a reflection of their outsized military import and could make U.S.
cooperation with the Taliban more difficult.11
Some observers had speculated that the Taliban might reach out to former Afghan government
officials (such as former President Hamid Karzai, who held some meetings with senior Taliban
figures after the August 2021 takeover) or to others from outside the movement as part of their
promise to establish an “inclusive government.” The Taliban have not, however, reached beyond
their own ranks to fill senior positions.12 The Taliban are reportedly staffing government positions
with military and/or religious figures with little relevant experience, including some long resident
in neighboring Pakistan, exacerbating the group’s administrative challenges.13
In the immediate wake of the Taliban’s takeover, some reports indicated dissension in the Taliban
ranks, largely between the group’s political wing (which reportedly advocates for greater
inclusion of diverse elements from within Afghan society, with an eye toward international
recognition, e.g., Baradar) and its military wing (which opposes such compromises, e.g., the
Haqqanis).14 Other analysts emphasize the Taliban’s history of effectively managing internal
disputes.15 Even if the Taliban succeed in limiting factional infighting, their exclusive approach to
governing may carry its own risks of inspiring opposition or insurgency against its rule. Central
governance has often proved challenging throughout Afghan history, though the Taliban’s current
position appears relatively secure.
Current and Potential Opposition
While the Taliban’s August 2021 takeover was swift, its triumph, according to many analysts,
does not reflect massive popular support for the movement but rather a lack of support for the
former government.16 Many elements of Afghan society, particularly in urban areas, appear to

10 Martine van Bijlert, “The Focus of the Taleban’s New Government: Internal cohesion, external dominance,”
Afghanistan Analysts Network, September 12, 2021.
11 Stephanie Findlay, “Haqqani network’s clever game culminates with Afghan government roles,” Financial Times,
September 10, 2021.
12 “Who Will Run the Taliban Government?” op. cit.
13 Zia ur-Rehman and Emily Schmall, “The Taliban have staffing issues. They are looking for help in Pakistan,” New
York Times, January 13, 2022.
14 Khudai Noor Nasar, “Afghanistan: Taliban leaders in bust-up at presidential palace, sources say,” BBC, September
15, 2021; Ali Latifi, “How deep are divisions among the Taliban?” Al Jazeera, September 23, 2021.
15 Andrew Watkins, “An Assessment of Taliban Rule at Three Months,” CTC Sentinel, November 2021.
16 “How the Taliban engineered ‘political collapse’ of Afghanistan,” Reuters, August 17, 2021; Shadi Hamid,
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view the Taliban with skepticism, fear, or hostility.17 Sporadic protests against the group’s rule,
and the Taliban’s uncompromising response to them, point to a potential for future unrest as well
as future repression.
One initial effort to form an armed resistance to the Taliban was short-lived and evidently
collapsed in September 2021. That brief armed resistance attempted to form a base in the central
province of Panjshir, which was never conquered by the Taliban during their prior rule, but
Taliban forces quickly quelled the resistance. The Taliban appear to effectively control the entire
country, unlike in the 1990s when Taliban foes (the former Northern Alliance) represented
significant armed opposition and held roughly 10% of the country’s territory. The Taliban also
have stronger ties with regional powers, including some that once supported the Northern
Alliance against the Taliban, such as Russia and Iran. Still, if they were to emerge, the existence
of resistance factions, in Panjshir or elsewhere, could serve as a rallying point or galvanize
Taliban opponents in the country, who might then make additional appeals for U.S. or other
international assistance. It is not clear how likely this prospect is. Formerly Panjshir-based
opposition leaders (including Ahmad Massoud, son of famed Northern Alliance leader Ahmad
Shah Massoud) formed the National Resistance Front (NRF) in the aftermath of the Taliban’s
takeover; the location of its leaders, who have retained Washington, D.C.-based representation, is
unclear.18 In a January 2022 visit to Tehran, Taliban leaders reportedly met with an NRF
delegation including Massoud.19
An armed threat to the Taliban does exist in the form of the local Islamic State affiliate (Islamic
State-Khorasan Province, ISKP, also known as ISIS-K), a longtime Taliban adversary. The group
has escalated its attacks against both Afghan civilians and Taliban forces, challenging the
Taliban’s legitimacy. Experts disagree about the potency of the ISKP threat and the Taliban’s self-
asserted ability to counter the group without external assistance.20 Some Afghans, including
former members of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), have reportedly
taken up arms with ISKP, purportedly attracted by ISKP cash payments and by the group’s status
as the sole active armed opposition to the Taliban.21
In the weeks after the takeover, some Afghans demonstrated nonviolently to advocate for their
rights and express opposition to the Taliban. Protests by hundreds of women in Kabul in
September gained international attention, and some Afghans demonstrated in Jalalabad,
Kandahar, and other cities as well to protest Taliban actions.22 The Taliban monitored most
protests, and violently dispersed some. The Taliban-led Interior Ministry issued a decree on
September 8, 2021, banning unapproved demonstrations though some sporadic, small-scale

“Americans never understood Afghanistan like the Taliban did,” Brookings Institution, August 23, 2021.
17 Loveday Morris and Ruby Mellen, “Portraits of fear and loss,” Washington Post, January 12, 2022.
18 Trevor Filseth, “After Renegade Province’s Fall, Panjshir Resistance Leaders Surface in Tajikistan,” National
Interest, September 23, 2021; Lachlan Markey, “Taliban resistance ramps up U.S. lobbying efforts,” Axios, October 27,
2021.
19 “Shirshah Rasooli, “Resistance Front Proposed Transitional Govt to Islamic Emirate,” TOLOnews, January 11, 2022.
20 Samya Kullab, “Islamic State attacks test Taliban’s control in Afghanistan,” Christian Science Monitor, October 13,
2021; Amira Jadoon and Andrew Mines, “The Taliban can’t take on the Islamic State alone,” War on the Rocks,
October 14, 2021.
21 Yaroslav Trofimov, “Left Behind After U.S. Withdrawal, Some Former Afghan Spies and Soldiers Turn to Islamic
State,” Wall Street Journal, October 31, 2021.
22 Susannah George and Ezzatullah Mehrdad, “Space for dissent opened in Afghanistan after the Taliban was ousted 20
years ago. Now the militants are trying to slam it shut,” Washington Post, September 12, 2021; “Thousands protest
against Taliban in Kandahar over evictions,” Reuters, September 14, 2021.
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protests have continued.23 U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet said on
September 13 that Taliban forces had used “increasing violence against protesters and
journalists.”24 The Taliban have publicized demonstrations in favor of Taliban rule, in which some
reportedly participated under duress.25
Impacts of the Taliban’s Return to Power
The Taliban’s August 2021 takeover has implications for a number of U.S. policy interests. It may
create opportunities and challenges for the various terrorist groups that have a presence in
Afghanistan, and complicates (if not rendering obsolete) original U.S. plans to partner with
Afghan authorities to counter terrorist threats “over-the-horizon.” Advancing protection of
women’s and other human rights has been another major U.S. policy goal in Afghanistan since
2001; those rights appear at risk with the Taliban back in power. Looming over these and other
developments is the critical humanitarian and economic crisis that Afghanistan now faces.
Counterterrorism
For decades, a variety of Islamist extremist terrorist groups have for decades operated in
Afghanistan, and the Taliban have related to them in varying ways. Al Qaeda (AQ) and ISKP are
two of the most significant of these terrorist groups, and the Taliban’s takeover is likely to affect
them differently.
Despite (or perhaps because of) U.S. counterterrorism pressure, AQ ties with the Taliban, which
go back to the 1990s, appear to have remained strong.26 In October 2020, Afghan forces killed a
high-ranking AQ operative in Afghanistan’s Ghazni province, where he reportedly was living and
working with Taliban forces, underscoring the close and interrelated connections between the
groups and their operatives.27 In May 2021, U.N. sanctions monitors reported that Al Qaeda
“minimized overt communications with Taliban leadership in an effort to ‘lay low’ and not
jeopardize the Taliban’s diplomatic position.”28
Estimates of how the Taliban takeover is likely to affect AQ capabilities differ. According to
media accounts, U.S. officials reportedly told some Senators in August 2021, “terror groups like
al-Qaida may be able to grow much faster than expected” in Afghanistan under the Taliban.29
Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander General Frank McKenzie, said in a December 2021
interview that the AQ presence in Afghanistan had “probably slightly increased” since August
2021. 30 On the other hand, some analysts argued in the immediate aftermath of the Taliban

23 “Afghan women call for rights, protest alleged Taliban killings,” Al Jazeera, December 28, 2021.
24 “Oral update on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan” 48th Session of the Human Rights Council, September
13, 2021.
25 “Were Afghan women forced to attend the pro-Taliban rally?” TRT World, September 15, 2021.
26 Twelfth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2557
(2020) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace, stability
and security of Afghanistan, U.N. Document S/2021/486, released May 27, 2020.
27 Jeff Seldin, “US Calls Death of al-Qaida Official a Major Setback for Terror Group,” Voice of America, October 26,
2020.
28 U.N. Document S/2021/486, op. cit.
29 Michael Balsamo, et al., “Concerns over US Terror Threat Rising as Taliban hold Grows,” Associated Press, August
15, 2021.
30 Robert Burns and Lolita Baldor, “US commander: Al-Qaida numbers in Afghanistan up ‘slightly,’” Associated
Press, December 10, 2021.
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takeover that Al Qaeda is unlikely to resurge in Afghanistan given two decades of U.S.
counterterrorism pressure, the existence of other safe havens around the world, and potential
Taliban constraints.31 U.N. sanctions monitors reported in February 2021 that the Taliban’s
takeover had given Al Qaeda “a significant boost” and that Al Qaeda has since “maintained a
strategic silence, likely an effort not to compromise Taliban efforts to gain international
recognition and legitimacy.”32
The Islamic State affiliate in Afghanistan, on the other hand, has opposed the Taliban since its
2015 establishment, and the two groups have often clashed. ISKP (with 1,500-2,200 fighters, per
U.N. sanctions monitors) views the Taliban’s Afghanistan-focused nationalist political project as
counter to its own universalist vision of a global caliphate. The Taliban have deployed hundreds
of fighters to eastern Afghanistan, where ISKP attacks appear most frequent, and have been
accused of extra-judicial killings of suspected ISKP members.33 Under the former U.S.-backed
government, the United States launched airstrikes in support of Taliban offensives against ISKP, a
rare area of prior U.S.-Taliban cooperation.34 At a September 1, 2021, press conference, when
asked about the possibility of future U.S. coordination with the Taliban against ISKP, General
Milley said, “It’s possible.”35 A Taliban spokesperson reportedly rejected such cooperation in
October 2021, saying, “We are able to tackle [ISKP] independently.”36
From the outset of the 2021 U.S. withdrawal, U.S. officials said that the United States would
maintain the ability to combat terrorist threats in Afghanistan such as AQ and ISKP without a
military presence on the ground there by utilizing assets based outside of Afghanistan, in what
U.S. officials describe as an “over-the-horizon” approach.37 With the Taliban in control of
Afghanistan, the United States will have had to alter any plans that had been predicated on the
continued existence of the former Afghan government and its security forces. Cooperation with
Taliban authorities may prove impossible or too diplomatically or politically fraught.
Collaboration with non-Taliban-affiliated Afghans via clandestine or covert action authorities
could yield counterterrorism gains, but would also carry risks. Incoming CENTCOM Commander
General Michael Kurilla described over-the-horizon capabilities as “extremely difficult but not
impossible” in February 2022 testimony.38
Human Rights: Women and Ethnic and Religious Minorities
Present-day Afghanistan is in many ways a different country than the one the Taliban last ruled in
2001. Women have been active participants in many parts of Afghan society; protections for
them, and ethnic and religious minorities, were enshrined in the country’s 2004 constitution.
Since taking power in August 2021, Taliban officials have reiterated their commitment to

31 Ahmad Siddiqi, “The West is getting Afghanistan wrong – again,” Al Jazeera, September 12, 2021; Daniel Byman,
“Will Afghanistan Become a Terrorist Safe Haven Again?” Foreign Affairs, August 18, 2021.
32 Twenty-ninth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2368
(2017) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, U.N. Document S/2022/83,
released February 3, 2022.
33 Susannah George, “Taliban sends hundreds of fighters to eastern Afghanistan to wage war against Islamic State,”
Washington Post, November 22, 2021.
34 Wesley Morgan, “Our secret Taliban Air Force,” Washington Post, October 22, 2020.
35 Secretary of Defense Austin and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Milley Press Briefing on the End of the
U.S. War in Afghanistan, Department of Defense, September 1, 2021.
36 Kathy Gannon, “Taliban say they won’t work with US to contain Islamic State,” Associated Press, October 9, 2021.
37 See, for example, Remarks by President Biden on the Way Forward in Afghanistan, White House, April 14, 2021.
38 See transcript at http://www.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-6450846?3&search=8TnqSQnx.
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protecting women’s rights “within the framework of sharia,”39 and their early actions suggest at
least some moderation from their highly oppressive 1996-2001 rule. Nonetheless, their return to
power has ushered in “immediate and dramatic reversals on women’s rights and fundamental
freedoms,” according to the United Nations.40
The Taliban are often portrayed as the prime drivers of Afghan women’s oppression. Some
observers have noted, however, that many people within Afghan society hold restrictive views of
women’s rights, particularly in rural areas, where 76% of the population resides.41 For some
Afghans, including some women, the Taliban takeover may represent an improvement over high
levels of violence that characterized the Taliban’s insurgency.42 This may be particularly so for
those in rural areas more affected by conflict.
For other Afghans, particularly in urban areas, the Taliban’s takeover has increased fears of
repression, and has created longer-term concerns over the future of women’s rights under a
Taliban government.43 The Taliban have closed the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, which had been
a part of the former Afghan government, and have reinstated the Ministry of Propagation of
Virtue and Prevention of Vice, which enforced the Taliban’s interpretation of Islam in the 1990s.44
Guidance issued by that ministry in late December 2021 seeks to impose new restrictions on
Afghan women, including by directing that women should not be allowed to travel long distances
without a male guardian.45 The disappearance of several women activists (some of whom were
involved in protests mentioned above) in January 2022 attracted considerable international
attention and raised fears of a broader Taliban crackdown on women’s rights.46
Of particular concern to many U.S. policymakers are Taliban policies toward education for
Afghan girls. Some signs suggest that the Taliban may permit education for women and girls in at
least some cases, with secondary public schools for girls having reopened in some provinces.47 In
many other provinces, however, a de facto ban on girls’ education, at least above the primary
level, remains in place. For months, Taliban officials have said that they intend to create “a safe
learning environment” in which girls’ schools can reopen,48 but many women’s rights advocates
are skeptical of these claims and fearful that the group never intends to officially allow such
education. In the 1990s, the Taliban did not formally ban secondary or higher education for girls,
but similarly prohibited it on an ostensibly temporary basis due to unspecified security concerns,

39 “Transcript of Taliban’s first news conference in Kabul,” Al Jazeera, August 17, 2021. Sharia refers broadly to
concepts and principles of Islamic religious jurisprudence that vary in their interpretation under different schools of
practice. For more, see Matthew Nelson, “The Taliban’s (Islamic) Isolation,” Chatham House, October 21, 2020.
40 “Women’s Rights in Afghanistan: Where Are We Now?” United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the
Empowerment of Women, December 2021.
41 John R. Allen and Vanda Felbab-Brown, “The fate of women’s rights in Afghanistan,” Brookings Institution,
September 2020.
42 Anand Gopal, “The Other Afghan Women,” The New Yorker, September 6, 2021.
43 Margherita Stancati, “After Taliban Return, Afghan Women Face Old Pressures From Fathers, Brothers,” New York
Times, December 15, 2021.
44 Rachel Pannett, “Who leads Afghanistan’s new government? Here’s what we know about the Taliban’s top
officials,” Washington Post, September 8, 2021.
45 “No long-distance travel for women without male relative: Taliban,” Al Jazeera, December 26, 2021.
46 Patricia Grossman, “Afghan women’s rights activists forcibly disappeared,” Human Rights Watch, January 24, 2022;
Sudarsan Raghavan, “Faced with disappearances, beatings and intimidation, Afghanistan’s women’s rights activists go
quiet on the streets,” Washington Post, February 8, 2022.
47 Kate Clark, “Who gets to go to school? (1): What people told us about education since the Taleban took over,”
Afghanistan Analysts Network, January 26, 2022.
48 “Girls to return to secondary school ‘soon as possible’: Taliban,” Al Jazeera, September 21, 2021.
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a de facto ban that lasted the entirety of the group’s five-year rule.49 A Taliban spokesman said in
a January 2022 interview that the group intended to reopen girls’ schools across the country by
March 2022, describing the delay as a “question of capacity.”50 Public universities reopened in
February 2022 with women permitted to attend but only when separated from men.51
Taliban rhetoric and action with regard to ethnic and religious minorities have also received
scrutiny. Many Hazaras (Shia Muslims who comprise 10-15% of Afghanistan’s population and
represent one of the country’s largest ethnoreligious minorities) previously expressed fear about
the Taliban’s possible return.52 Since their August 2021 takeover, the Taliban have demonstrated a
more accepting official stance toward the Hazaras, particularly in urban areas, even as reports
emerge of killings and forced displacement in the Hazaras’ historic homelands in central
Afghanistan.53 Surveying these mixed messages, one observer speculated in early September
2021 that “the Taliban political leadership’s more pragmatic approach toward the Hazara is
necessary to maintain its fragile control over all of Afghanistan,” but that persecution could
increase in the absence of international attention.54
Ongoing Relocations of American Citizens and Certain Afghans
The Taliban’s entry into Kabul on August 15 triggered the mass evacuation of tens of thousands
of U.S. citizens (including all diplomatic personnel), partner country citizens, and Afghans who
worked for international efforts and/or the former Afghan government. That effort largely came to
a close with the final departure of U.S. military forces on August 30. U.S. officials say that they
intend to secure the relocation of all remaining U.S. citizens and eligible Afghan partners who
seek to leave the country, but some Members of Congress and other observers express concern
about the pace of relocations.
U.S. officials say that U.S. military forces facilitated the evacuation of 124,000 individuals,
including 5,300 U.S. citizens, as part of Operation Allies Refuge, which General Milley described
as “the largest air evacuation in US history.”55 Since that operation ended on August 30, 2021, the
State Department said that as of December 13, 2021, it has assisted in the departure of 479 U.S.
citizens, 450 lawful permanent residents, and over 2,200 Afghans.56 It is not clear how many of
those departed via overland routes or via the U.S.-backed Qatar Airways charter flights that
periodically left Kabul, despite issues with the international airport there (see textbox).
The number of U.S. citizens remaining in Afghanistan appears to be in flux. The Department said
on December 13 that it was in contact with “fewer than a dozen U.S. citizens” who wanted and

49 Margot Buff, “‘Our Futures Will Be Ruined’: Afghan Girls Fear Denial of Education Under Taliban,” Gandhara,
September 21, 2021; Rasmussen and Nazari, op. cit.
50 Kathy Gannon, “The AP Interview: Taliban pledge all girls in school soon,” Associated Press, January 15, 2022.
51 Ehsan Popalzai and Hande Atay Alam, “Afghan universities reopen to female students but with strict rules on
mixing,” CNN, February 3, 2022.
52 David Zucchino and Fatima Faizi, “They Are Thriving After Years of Persecution but Fear a Taliban Deal,” New
York Times, March 27, 2019.
53 Shirin Jaafari, “‘Why don’t you have mercy?’: Afghanistan’s Hazara people increasingly face eviction, violence
under Taliban rule,” PRI, October 5, 2021.
54 Tom Mutch, “Afghanistan’s Hazaras Get Mixed Messages From the Taliban,” Foreign Policy, September 4, 2021.
55 Statement available at https://www.armed-
services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Printed%2028%20Sep%20SASC%20CJCS%20Written%20Statement.pdf.
56 U.S. Department of State, “Afghanistan Relocation and Resettlement Update,” December 13, 2021. On January 11,
2022, a State Department spokesperson similarly noted that the State Department had directly assisted with the
departure of 479 U.S. citizens, 450 lawful permanent residents, and approximately 2,000 Afghans.
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were prepared to leave Afghanistan; a spokesperson said on January 11, 2022, “We are working
currently with a few dozen U.S. citizens and their families who have identified themselves as
prepared to depart and who have the necessary travel documents to do so.”57 That spokesperson
added that there were “probably fewer than 200” U.S. citizens in Afghanistan, leaving “about 150
other U.S. citizens who don’t want to leave Afghanistan at this point or [are] otherwise not ready
to depart.”58
One December 2021 press report, citing a State Department official, stated that around 62,000
Afghan Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) applicants remain in Afghanistan.59 This figure excludes
the tens of thousands of Afghans at risk who are not eligible for an SIV.
Status of Kabul Airport
Relocation efforts are complicated by the status of Kabul’s international airport. Since the final departure of U.S.
forces, Qatar and Turkey have been working to make the airport—which sustained damage to its runways, radar
system, and other components during the U.S. evacuation effort and withdrawal—operational. Domestic flights
restarted in early September 2021, but international flights have been mostly limited to charter Qatar Airways
flights as carriers cite high insurance charges as well as security and logistical concerns as impediments to regular
commercial air travel.60 In late December 2021, Qatar and Turkey reportedly signed an agreement to operate the
Kabul airport jointly, along with four other airports in Afghanistan.61 The United Arab Emirates reportedly has also
held talks with the Taliban about operating the Kabul airport, possibly in a bid to diminish the influence of Qatar,
its regional rival.62 The foreign minister of Turkey, which in 2022 improved relations with the UAE, raised the
prospect of a trilateral arrangement as talks with the Taliban continue.63
Beyond logistical problems at Kabul airport, another impediment to continued relocations has
been the issue of travel documentation, particularly passports, without which Afghans cannot
leave the country. The Taliban began re-issuing passports several weeks after taking control of the
country, but the operations of passport offices have been sporadic and hamstrung by delays, long
lines, and administrative challenges.64
Additionally, some Afghans who seek to relocate remain in hiding, fearing Taliban retribution
against individuals who worked for the former Afghan government and/or with the United States.
The Taliban issued a general amnesty after coming to power, but U.N. Secretary-General Antonio
Guterres reportedly stated in January 2022 that the United Nations has received “credible
allegations” of Taliban reprisals against those individuals, including dozens of killings.65
In mid-December 2021, reports emerged that the Taliban had halted evacuation flights from
Afghanistan after Qatar ceased providing seats on chartered Qatar Airways flights for Taliban-
designated individuals to work abroad and earn money to be remitted back to Afghanistan amid

57 Ibid; Department Press Briefing – January 11, 2022, U.S. Department of State, January 11, 2022.
58 Department Press Briefing – January 11, 2022, op. cit.
59 Jessica Donati, “More Than 60,000 Interpreters, Visa Applicants Remain in Afghanistan,” Wall Street Journal,
December 16, 2021.
60 Aftab Khan, “PIA prepared to run regular flights to Kabul: CEO,” Express Tribune, November 13, 2021.
61 “Turkey, Qatar Await Taliban Green Light to Run Afghan Airports,” Voice of America, December 28, 2021.
62 Alexander Cornwell, “EXCLUSIVE: UAE holds talks with Taliban to run Kabul airport – foreign diplomats,”
Reuters, November 24, 2021.
63 “Kabul Airport May be Run Jointly by Turkey, Qatar, UAE,” TOLOnews, December 28, 2021.
64 Amy Cheng and Haq Nawaz Khan, “Hundreds of Afghans gather outside passport office as Taliban resumes issuing
travel documents,” Washington Post, October 6, 2021; “Painful Passport Problems in Afghanistan,” RFE/RL, January
16, 2022.
65 “UN chief accuses Taliban of scores of revenge killings since seizing control in Afghanistan,” RFE/RL, January 30,
2022.
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the country’s severe economic difficulties. While some suggest Qatar forced the Taliban to cease
this practice at the behest of the United States, others have stated that this dispute is entirely
between the Taliban and Qatar.66 Qatar, Turkey, and the Taliban have had negotiations on
resuming airport operations, and reportedly reached a preliminary agreement on airport security
in January 2022.67 The first relocation flight in several months, a Qatar Airways charter paid for
by the U.S. State Department, reportedly left Kabul in late January 2022.68
Humanitarian and Economic Crisis69
The Taliban’s return to power has triggered what U.N. officials describe as potentially the worst
humanitarian crisis in the world in Afghanistan, long one of the world’s poorest and most aid-
dependent countries.70 A number of interrelated factors, including the cut-off of international
development assistance, U.S. and international sanctions on the Taliban, and the U.S. hold on
Afghanistan’s central bank assets, have all contributed to the economic breakdown that underlies
the humanitarian crisis.
Prior to the Taliban’s August 2021 takeover, a severe humanitarian crisis already existed in
Afghanistan, due primarily to conflict, drought, and the COVID-19 pandemic. Indicators suggest
that conditions have worsened significantly since August 2021: the World Food Program reported
in December 2021 that the proportion of Afghans with insufficient food had increased from 80%
to 98% since the Taliban’s takeover.71 In October 2021, the U.N. Children’s Fund (UNICEF)
estimated that “at least 1 million” Afghan children are “at risk of dying due to severe acute
malnutrition without immediate treatment.”72
The United States and other international donors provided billions of dollars each year to support
the former Afghan government, financing over half of the government’s $6 billion annual budget
and as much as 80% of total public expenditures.73 That development assistance halted with the
Taliban’s August 2021 takeover, plunging the country into what U.N. officials describe as
economic “free fall” as the country’s economy has contracted as much as 40% since August 2021
as of December 2021.74 The U.N. Development Program (UNDP) warned in November 2021
that, under various scenarios, poverty rates could reach as high as 97% by July 2022.75

66 Courtney Kube, Dan De Luce and Josh Lederman, “The Taliban have halted all evacuee flights out of Afghanistan
for the past two weeks,” NBC News, December 23, 2021.
67 Callie Patteson, “Turkey, Qatar in talks to restart Afghan evacuation flights,” New York Post, December 28, 2021;
Tuvan Gumrukcu, “Turkey, Qatar reached preliminary deal on Kabul airport security- Turkish sources,” Reuters,
January 20, 2022.
68 Courntey Kube et al., “First flight of American evacuees in months leaves Kabul airport for Qatar,” NBC News,
January 27, 2022.
69 See CRS In Focus IF12039, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Crisis, Economic Collapse, and U.S. Sanctions.
70 “Get the facts: What’s happening now in Afghanistan,” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),
January 18, 2022.
71 “Afghanistan Food Security Update,” World Food Program, December 8, 2021.
72 “Half of Afghanistan’s children under five expected to suffer from acute malnutrition as hunger takes root for
millions,” UNICEF Afghanistan, October 5, 2021.
73 Roxanna Shapour, “Realpolitik and the 2021 National Budget: The toxic struggle for money and power that
undermined Afghanistan’s republic,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, December 21, 2021.
74 Yaroslav Trofimov, “For a Taliban-Ruled Afghanistan, and the Rest of the World, a Crisis Looms,” Wall Street
Journal December 13, 2021.
75 “Afghanistan: Socio-Economic Outlook 2021-2022,” UNDP Afghanistan, November 30, 2021.
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U.S. sanctions on the Taliban (in place in various forms since 1999) remain, but it is unclear to
what extent they are affecting humanitarian conditions in Afghanistan; the head of the Norwegian
Refugee Council said in January 2021 that sanctions have “held back” their operations.76 Since
the Taliban’s takeover, the U.S. Department of the Treasury has issued several general licenses
outlining the U.S. position and stating that U.S. sanctions do not prohibit the provision of
humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan.77
In at least some parts of the country, food is available but many Afghans do not have money with
which to pay for it, illustrating the impact of the country’s economic crisis on humanitarian
conditions. Afghanistan is a highly cash-dependent society, but shipments of dollars halted with
the U.S. freeze on Afghan central bank assets in August 2021 and Afghanistan does not have the
ability to print its own currency. The result is a severe liquidity crisis that threatens to destroy the
country’s banking system. In October 2021, Secretary-General Guterres urged “the world to take
action and inject liquidity into the Afghan economy to avoid collapse,” and Secretary of State
Antony Blinken said in December 2021 that the United States was “looking intensely at ways to
put more liquidity into the Afghan economy, to get more money into people’s pockets...in a way
that doesn’t directly benefit the Taliban.” 78
The World Bank in December 2021 decided to release $280 million in Afghanistan
Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) monies to U.N. agencies to support Afghan health and
education workers’ salaries, injecting much-needed money into the Afghan economy; the United
States has reportedly “encouraged” the World Bank to release additional ARTF funds.79
Additionally, the Asian Development Bank approved $405 million in grants to four U.N. agencies
to provide food, health care, and education to millions of Afghans.80
Both the Taliban and some foreign leaders (including Secretary-General Guterres) have urged the
United States to release the hold on Afghan central bank assets, which total around $7 billion. On
February 11, 2022, the Biden Administration announced that it will “seek to facilitate access of
$3.5 billion [of the assets]...for the benefit of the Afghan people,” pending ongoing litigation
related to the September 11, 2001, attacks.81
Regional Dynamics: Pakistan and Other Neighbors
Regional dynamics directly affect developments in Afghanistan, which is landlocked and has
throughout its history been the object of intervention by its neighbors and other foreign powers.
Events in Afghanistan also have consequences for those neighbors.

76 See interview at https://twitter.com/nrc_norway/status/1486778209387565058.
77 See Treasury Department Fact Sheet, December 22, 2021, at
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/afg_factsheet_20211222_nu.pdf.
78 Jonathan Landay, “U.N. chief: Liquidity needed to stem Afghanistan economic, humanitarian crises,” Reuters,
October 11, 2021; U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken at a Press Availability,” December 21, 2021.
79 David Ignatius, “How the U.S. is helping vulnerable Afghans without recognizing the Taliban,” Washington Post,
January 18, 2022.
80 “$405 million in ADB grants to support food security, health, and education in Afghanistan through United Nations,”
Asian Development Bank, January 25, 2022.
81 See Executive Order at https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/afghanistan_bank_eo.pdf and briefing at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/02/11/background-press-call-on-u-s-support-for-
the-people-of-afghanistan/.
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Pakistan. The neighboring state widely considered most important in this regard is Pakistan,
which has played an active, and by many accounts destabilizing, role in Afghan affairs for
decades, including by actively supporting the Taliban during its 1990s rule. Pakistan’s security
services maintain ties to Afghan armed groups, most notably the Haqqani Network.82 Former
Afghan leaders, along with U.S. military commanders, attributed much of the Taliban’s strength
either directly or indirectly to Pakistani support.83 The Trump Administration sought Islamabad’s
assistance in U.S. talks with the Taliban in 2018, and U.S. assessments of Pakistan’s role were
generally more positive thereafter.84 Many analysts regarded the Taliban takeover at least initially
as a triumph for Pakistan’s regional policy, pointing to Pakistan’s long history of support for the
Taliban and statement of evident support for the takeover from Pakistani Prime Minister Imran
Khan and others.85 Senior Pakistani officials have held numerous meetings with the new Taliban
government, both in Kabul and Islamabad, since August 2021.
However, there are some indications that the Taliban’s return to power may pose serious
challenges for Pakistan. The Taliban’s victory may provide a morale and perhaps material boost
to Pakistan-based Islamist terrorist groups, including the so-called Pakistani Taliban (Tehreek-i
Taliban-i Pakistan, or TTP, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization). TTP attacks against
Pakistani security forces increased after August 2021, reportedly prompting the Pakistani
government to seek an Afghan Taliban-mediated ceasefire with the TTP that ended in December
2021.86 Moreover, state-run Pakistan International Airlines ended its flights to Kabul in October
2021 due to the Taliban’s “unprofessional attitude.”87 Afghanistan-Pakistan relations are further
complicated by the presence of over one million Afghan refugees in Pakistan, as well as a long-
running and ethnically tinged dispute over their shared 1,600-mile border.88 Taliban and Pakistani
government forces reportedly clashed at the border in December 2021 and January 2022.89
Iran. Iran, with which Afghanistan shares its western border, opposed the Taliban’s 1990s rule
but has maintained relations with the group in recent years while emphasizing the need for
representation for Afghanistan’s ethnic and religious groups with which Iran has close ties
(namely Tajiks, who speak a variant of Persian, and Hazaras, who are mostly Shia Muslims).
Official Taliban visits to Tehran preceded the group’s August 2021 takeover, and have continued
since then, including with the visit of the Taliban’s acting foreign minister in January 2022.
Central Asia. Afghanistan’s Central Asian neighbors (Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan)
have responded in varying ways to the Taliban’s takeover, including the only regional rejection of

82 For more, see CRS In Focus IF10604, Terrorist Groups in Afghanistan, by Clayton Thomas.
83 White House, Remarks by President Trump on the Strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia, August 21, 2017. Some
Pakistani officials disputed that charge and noted the Taliban’s increased territorial control within Afghanistan itself.
Author interviews with Pakistani military officials, Rawalpindi, Pakistan, February 21, 2018.
84 “Mullah Baradar released by Pakistan at the behest of US: Khalilzad,” The Hindu, February 9, 2019. Baradar had
been imprisoned in Pakistan since his capture in Karachi in a joint U.S.-Pakistani operation in 2010. Baqir Sajjad Syed,
“Pentagon chief praises Pakistan’s role in Afghan peace process,” Dawn, March 23, 2021.
85 Ishaan Tharoor, “Pakistan’s hand in the Taliban’s victory,” Washington Post, August 18, 2021; Husain Haqqani,
“Pakista’'s Pyrrhic Victory in Afghanistan,” Foreign Affairs, July 22, 2021.
86 “Pakistani Taliban ends ceasefire, future of peace talks uncertain,” Al Jazeera, December 10, 2021; Abdul Sayed,
“The Evolution and Future of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December
21, 2021.
87 Aftab Khan, “PIA prepared to run regular flights to Kabul: CEO,” Express Tribune, November 13, 2021.
88 Pakistan, the United Nations, and others recognize the 1893 Durand Line as an international boundary, but
successive Afghan governments, including the Taliban, have not. See Vinay Kaura, “The Durand Line: A British
Legacy Plaguing Afghan-Pakistani Relations,” Middle East Institute, June 27, 2017.
89 Asfandyar Mir et al., “Afghanistan-Pakistan Border Dispute Heats Up,” U.S. Institute of Peace, January 12, 2022.
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the group’s government. The Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan governments appear to be prioritizing
economic ties, including the planned Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) natural
gas pipeline, and have had official engagements with the Taliban (such as a visit to Kabul by the
Uzbek foreign minister in October 2021 and a visit to Turkmenistan by the Taliban’s acting
foreign minister in January 2022).90 Tajikistan, on the other hand, has rejected the Taliban’s
government and emerged as the group’s chief regional antagonist, a result both of Tajikistan’s
own historical struggles with Islamist militancy as well as ethnolinguistic ties with Afghan Tajiks
(the country’s second largest ethnic group), some of whom oppose the Taliban’s rule. Tajikistan
has reportedly offered refuge to prominent anti-Taliban Afghan leaders, and its officials have
criticized the Taliban government, prompting the Taliban to warn Tajikistan against interfering in
Afghan affairs.91
China. The prospect of greater Chinese influence and activity in Afghanistan has attracted some
congressional attention since the Taliban takeover.92 China, which played a relatively limited role
in Afghanistan under the former government, has made some economic investments in
Afghanistan (particularly in the development of Afghan minerals and other resources) but major
projects have not come to fruition due to instability, lack of infrastructure, and other
limitations.93 China initially signaled support for the Taliban but has not formally recognized the
group to date, and may be reluctant to pursue closer relations due to concerns about Afghanistan-
based Islamist terrorist groups.94
Congressional Action and Outlook
President Biden’s April 2021 announcement of his intention to fully withdraw U.S. forces by
September 11, 2021, drew both praise and criticism across partisan lines from some Members of
Congress who for years had debated the relative costs and benefits of the U.S. military presence
in Afghanistan. Some welcomed the announcement, citing what they characterize as U.S.
counterterrorism successes or a need to reprioritize U.S. global interests.95 Other Members urged
President Biden to reconsider in favor of a conditions-based approach.96
The Taliban’s takeover attracted intense congressional and public attention. Many Members
characterized the August 2021 withdrawal as chaotic and damaging to U.S. interest and global
standing; some said they supported the removal of U.S. troops but not the way in which it was
carried out.97 In the months since the Taliban entered Kabul, U.S. public attention appears to have
decreased, but Afghanistan remains the subject of significant congressional interest as some

90 Bruce Pannier, “For the Turkmen and Uzbek leaders, a meeting of minds on Afghanistan,” RFE/RL, October 9,
2021; Orkhan Jalilov, “Turkmen, Afghan Officials Discuss Energy and Transport Projects,” Caspian News, January 18,
2022.
91 Vinay Kaura, “Tajikistan’s evolving relations with the Taliban 2.0,” Middle East Institute, December 1, 2021.
92 See, for example, H.R. 5404 and S. 2826.
93 Matthew Funaiole and Brian Hart, “Afghanistan Is No Treasure Trove for China,” Foreign Policy, September 28,
2021.
94 Atal Ahmadzai, “Why China Is Slow-Rolling Taliban Cooperation,” Foreign Policy, January 27, 2022.
95 Representative Andy Kim, “Congressman Kim Statement on Announcement of U.S. Troop Withdrawal from
Afghanistan,” April 13, 2021; Senator Ed Markey (@SenMarkey), Twitter, April 13, 2021, 1:29PM.
96 Senator Jim Inhofe (@JimInhofe), Twitter, April 13, 2021, 1:26PM.
97 Barbara Sprunt, “There’s a bipartisan backlash to how Biden handled the withdrawal from Afghanistan,” NPR,
August 17, 2021.
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Members seek to account for the evident failure of U.S. efforts and grapple with the reality of the
Taliban’s renewed rule.
At least six congressional committees held hearings on Afghanistan in the weeks after the
Taliban’s takeover.98 Some of these hearings focused on contemporaneous U.S. policy actions,
whereas others sought to examine the two decades of U.S. policy decisions that preceded the
Taliban’s takeover. Perhaps the most comprehensive effort to investigate U.S. efforts in
Afghanistan is Congress’s establishment of the Afghanistan War Commission (Section 1094 of
the FY2022 National Defense Authorization Act, NDAA, P.L. 117-81). The Commission’s 16
members are to be appointed by the chairs and ranking members of the Senate and House armed
services, foreign affairs, and intelligence committees, as well as by House and Senate majority
and minority leaders, within 60 days of enactment. They are charged with examining “the key
strategic, diplomatic, and operation decisions that pertain to the war in Afghanistan” and
developing “a series of lessons learned and recommendations for the way forward” in a final
report to be issued within three years.
In the meantime, some Members express an intent to remain focused on developments in
Afghanistan. Some of these Members argue that a U.S. failure to remain engaged in Afghanistan
may lead to a broader societal collapse and civil war akin to the environment in which Al Qaeda
thrived and planned the September 11, 2001, attacks after the 1989 Soviet withdrawal.99
How Afghanistan fits into broader U.S. strategy is one issue on which Members might engage,
especially given competing fiscal priorities in light of the COVID-19 pandemic as well as
competing U.S. policy priorities.100 The Biden Administration initially framed and has since
defended the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan as helping to make the United States more
prepared to confront other, and ostensibly more strategically important, challenges, such as those
posed by Russia and China.101
Going forward, U.S. policy, including congressional action, will be influenced and likely
constrained by a number of factors, including:
 a dearth of information about dynamics in Afghanistan, given the lack of U.S.
diplomats and other on the ground observers and Taliban-imposed limitations on
journalists; and

98 Hearings on Afghanistan include those held by: House Foreign Affairs Committee (September 13, 2021, with
Secretary Blinken); Senate Foreign Relations Committee (September 14, 2021, with Secretary Blinken); Senate Armed
Services Committee (September 28, 2021, with Secretary Austin, General Milley, and General McKenzie); House
Armed Services Committee (September 29, 2021, with Secretary Austin, General Milley, and General McKenzie);
Senate Armed Services Committee (September 30, 2021, with outside witnesses); House Foreign Affairs Committee
(October 5, 2021, with former U.S. officials); Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee (October 5,
2021, with outside witnesses); House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Development, International
Organizations, and Global Corporate Impact (October 6, 2021, with SIGAR); Senate Armed Service Committee
(October 26, 2021, with DOD witnesses); and Senate Foreign Relations Committee (November 17, 2021, with former
U.S. officials).
99 Letter available at https://crow.house.gov/media/press-releases/representatives-crow-malinowski-meijer-press-
president-biden-release.
100 See, for example, CRS Report R43838, Renewed Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for
Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
101 See for example “Remarks by President Biden on the Way Forward in Afghanistan,” White House, April 14, 2021;
“Remarks by President Biden on the End of the War in Afghanistan,” White House, August 31, 2021; Department
Press Briefing – January 24, 2022, U.S. Department of State.
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 the historical legacy of U.S. conflict with the Taliban, which may make
cooperation with the group, even to advance U.S. policy priorities, politically
difficult.
Changes in dynamics in Afghanistan, such as further deterioration of the humanitarian situation or
actions by the Taliban (including the planned March 2022 reopening of public education for
Afghan girls), could prompt some Members to initiate or call for new U.S. policy measures. In
addition to direct congressional action (including appropriating, authorizing, or limiting funding
for various purposes), congressional options for overseeing the Administration’s approach to
Afghanistan include continued hearings, letters to executive branch officials, public statements,
reporting requirements, requesting assessments from the Government Accountability Office
(GAO), and legislation pertaining to sanctions policy or other issues. The Administration’s
February 2022 announcement on the disposition of U.S.-based Afghan central bank assets may be
one policy area for congressional engagement and oversight.
Beyond the challenges of how to formulate U.S. policy toward the new situation in Afghanistan,
Members may seek to articulate and shape what U.S. goals in Afghanistan should be. Many
Members express an interest in minimizing humanitarian suffering, containing regionally based
terrorist groups, and continuing support for Afghan women and girls. At the same time, many
Members (with the evident support of the Biden Administration) evidently seek to avoid any
actions, including the provision of development assistance, that might have the effect of
benefiting the Taliban or improving the group’s position in power.102
Some of these priorities may come into tension: providing purely humanitarian aid may be
sufficient to stave off mass casualties, but is unlikely to boost the Afghan economy. Financial
assistance could improve the Afghan economy, ameliorating the humanitarian situation, but
comes with the risk of diversion of some funds to the Taliban. Going forward, Members may
weigh the financial and social costs of providing humanitarian assistance indefinitely with the
political and moral costs of boosting (or at least refraining from undermining) the Taliban’s rule.

Author Information

Clayton Thomas

Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs

102 See S. 2863.
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Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
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under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
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