FEMA’s Role in the COVID-19 Federal
February 10, 2022
Pandemic Response
Erica A. Lee, Coordinator
On March 13, 2020, President Donald J. Trump declared a nationwide emergency under the
Analyst in Emergency
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act, P.L. 93-288
Management and Disaster
as amended), authorizing assistance administered by the Federal Emergency Management
Recovery
Agency (FEMA). Five days later, the President notified then-FEMA Administrator Peter Gaynor

that the agency would assume leadership of the federal pandemic response effort—the first
Diane P. Horn
known instance of FEMA serving in such a role for a public health incident.
Analyst in Flood Insurance
and Emergency
The Stafford Act declarations and FEMA’s role in the pandemic response changed the scope of
Management
the statute and the agency. Both President Donald J. Trump and President Joseph R. Biden Jr.

activated the Stafford Act and FEMA resources in unprecedented ways to respond to the
COVID-19 pandemic. Former President Trump issued the first unilateral, nationwide Stafford
Bruce R. Lindsay
Specialist in American
Act emergency declaration. Soon after, President Trump issued the first Stafford Act major
National Government
disaster declaration for an infectious disease incident, and directed FEMA to lead the federal

response. Within weeks, President Trump declared concurrent major disasters in every state and
territory, marking the first time in history that the Stafford Act was activated to simultaneously
William L. Painter
deliver assistance for major disasters across the entire country. After assuming office in January
Specialist in Homeland
of 2021, President Biden expanded the scope of assistance FEMA could provide for the
Security and
pandemic, including full federal reimbursement for a wide range of ongoing emergency response
Appropriations
measures undertaken by state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) governments and healthcare

providers.
Lauren R. Stienstra
Section Research Manager
FEMA, in turn, undertook unprecedented agency-level measures to respond. FEMA activated the

National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) from which it coordinates federal response
Shawn Reese
efforts, for the longest duration in its history (ongoing as of the date of publication). FEMA also
Analyst in Emergency
established an interagency Unified Coordination Group (UCG) to lead the response—the first
Management and
time the agency reported using such a team to manage nationwide federal response planning,
Homeland Security Policy
logistics, and operations. To meet the extraordinary demands of a nationwide disaster, FEMA

adapted foundational elements of its regionalized response framework, including changes to the
deployment of federal assets, the prioritization and fulfillment of requests for emergency
Elizabeth M. Webster
supplies, and communication with SLTTs. FEMA additionally coordinated novel applications of
Analyst in Emergency
the Defense Production Act (DPA) for pandemic response, including contracting for and
Management and Disaster
allocating scarce medical supplies, identifying anti-price-gouging and hoarding actions, and
Recovery
entering agreements to coordinate information-sharing with medical supply manufacturers and

distributors. These extraordinary strains and innovations have prompted FEMA to rethink how
the agency currently responds to disasters.

President Trump, President Biden, and FEMA also made significant pandemic-specific changes to its flagship response and
recovery grant programs, Public Assistance and Individual Assistance. These programs are generally activated in response to
sudden-onset hazards that strike a defined geographic area, such as hurricanes or fires. Their pandemic adaptations enabled
the programs to finance assistance across the country over an extended period of time for pandemic-related lost wages, new
sheltering options, emergency food distribution, COVID-19 diagnostic testing, vaccination programs, and facility reopening
costs. The expansions of these grant programs well exceeded previous demands on the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) that funds
Stafford Act assistance. As of the end of the first quarter of FY2022, FEMA reports spending approximately $90 billion from
the DRF on the pandemic response.
FEMA’s role in the COVID-19 pandemic has raised basic questions about the purpose and capacity of the agency and the
Stafford Act. Policy issues facing Congress in the wake of these events include whether, and how, FEMA and the Stafford
Act should be activated for long-term public health incidents, the consequences of pandemic-specific activations of Stafford
Act authorities for the Disaster Relief Fund, and to what extent FEMA operational innovations should revert or continue.
Congress additionally faces questions about the nature of FEMA’s role in coordinating and implementing DPA activities for
ongoing supply-chain issues and future public health incidents.
Congressional Research Service

FEMA’s Role in the COVID-19 Federal Pandemic Response

Introduction
On January 20, 2020, the United States documented its first known case of the disease caused by
the novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2.1 In the weeks and months following, federal officials
activated multiple emergency powers, established interrelated response task forces and decision-
making bodies, and enacted a series of relief bills that together constituted what is referred to as
the coordinated federal response, or whole-of-government response, to the Coronavirus Disease
2019 (COVID-19) outbreak and eventual pandemic.2 These actions included historic declarations
of emergency and major disaster under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act (the Stafford Act, P.L. 93-288, as amended).3 The pandemic marked the first
instance in the history of the United States in which the President activated the Stafford Act to
provide nationwide assistance for the same incident; it also generated the first major disaster
declarations for a public health incident. Contrary to historical precedent, existing federal incident
response doctrine, and the primary scenarios outlined in federal pandemic response plans, the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) assumed leadership of this coordinated
response at the direction of President Donald J. Trump on March 19, 2020.4
President Trump, and later President Joseph R. Biden, Jr., deployed FEMA and the Stafford Act in
unprecedented ways to provide nationwide assistance during the pandemic, ranging from the
distribution of personal protective equipment (PPE), to the development of a new unemployment
assistance program, to the establishment of federal vaccination sites. As lead agency for
government-wide DPA planning and coordination, FEMA Administrators also helped to
implement selected presidential invocations of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (DPA, P.L.
81-774, as amended)5 to respond to pandemic-related supply constraints. The use of DPA during
the pandemic—including by FEMA—at times underwhelmed expectations and raised concerns
among policy experts, Members of Congress, and governors.6

1 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), PanCAP Adapted: U.S. Government COVID-19 Response
Plan, Mar. 13, 2020, p. 1, https://int.nyt.com/data/documenthelper/6819-covid-19-response-plan/
d367f758bec47cad361f/optimized/full.pdf (hereinafter HHS, PanCap-Adapted).
2 For an explanation of the sequence of federal emergency declarations, see CRS Report R46809, Federal Emergency
and Major Disaster Declarations for the COVID-19 Pandemic, coordinated by Erica A. Lee and Sarah A. Lister. A
compilation of hundreds of CRS products on various federal relief measures is available at
https://crsreports.congress.gov/resources/covid19/; U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) references are
available at https://www.gao.gov/coronavirus. For an agency description of the initial federal response, see Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Pandemic Response to Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19): Initial
Assessment Report, Jan. 2021, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/fema_covid-19-initial-assessment-
report_2021.pdf (hereinafter FEMA, Initial Assessment Report); for a perspective from nonfederal stakeholders, see
National Homeland Security Consortium (NHSC), COVID-19 Pandemic: After-Action Report, June 2021,
https://www.astho.org/COVID-19/NHSC-COVID-19-Pandemic-After-Action-Report/ (hereinafter NHSC, Pandemic
After-Action Report).
3 The Stafford Act is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§5121 et seq.
4 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, pp. 4, 7, 24.
5 The Defense Production Act of 1950 (DPA, 50 U.S.C. §§4501 et seq.) confers on the President authorities to mobilize
domestic industry in service of national defense, broadly defined, including emergency preparedness and response to
natural hazards like the pandemic. For recent information on the use of the DPA for the pandemic, see FEMA, The
Defense Production Act Committee Report to Congress, Sept. 20, 2021, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/fema_DPAC-report-Defense-production-act-committee_2020.pdf. See also CRS In Focus IF11767, The
Defense Production Act Committee (DPAC): A Primer, by Michael H. Cecire.
6 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, pp. 4 and 7. See also testimony by then-FEMA Administrator Peter Gaynor in U.S.
Congress, Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, Evaluating the Federal Government’s
Procurement and Distribution Strategies in Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic, hearings, 116th Cong., 2nd sess., June
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As noted in the following report, the pandemic compelled FEMA to rapidly adapt longstanding
components of its response operations, flagship response and recovery programs, and
coordination with state, local, tribal, and territorial governments. In the words of then-FEMA
Administrator Peter Gaynor, who led FEMA in its first year of pandemic response, these
innovations reflected “tremendous creativity, ... [and] also laid bare gaps and shortcomings in [the
agency’s] plans, procedures, and policies.”7 To identify areas to improve, FEMA assessed its
initial response to the pandemic in a January 2021 report.8 Additionally, the U.S. Government
Accountability Office (GAO) and Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Inspector
General have published multiple reports examining aspects of FEMA’s pandemic response (a list
of resources may be found in Appendix B).
The 117th Congress faces questions regarding the scope and purpose of the Stafford Act, FEMA,
and the agency’s use of the DPA as all three continue to shape the coordinated federal pandemic
response. Should the Stafford Act and FEMA play central roles in future U.S. responses to
infectious disease events? How should the Stafford Act and FEMA operate in conjunction with
other emergency authorities and public health agencies in the future? How should FEMA deploy
or coordinate the DPA to manage future supply chain constraints posed by biological incidents?
Where should Congress locate responsibility for the challenges faced in the federal COVID-19
pandemic response, and how should those challenges be redressed? What, if any, authorities
should Congress provide or revise given the course of the federal response?
This report first examines FEMA’s planned and actual role in the federal COVID-19 pandemic
response. It then presents considerations for Congress focused on the Stafford Act and its public
health adaptations, FEMA’s public health preparedness and response operations, the Disaster
Relief Fund that finances Stafford Act assistance, and FEMA’s use of the DPA during the
pandemic. A comprehensive account of FEMA’s many individual lines of effort and challenges
faced during the COVID-19 pandemic exceeds the scope of this report; however, Appendix B
includes relevant resources.
Terms
Within this report, the term “state” refers to states and territories. For purposes of the Stafford Act, “‘State’
means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American
Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands” (42 U.S.C. §5122(4)).
The term “tribe” refers to Indian tribal governments. Per the Stafford Act, “[t]he term ‘Indian tribal government’
means the governing body of any Indian or Alaska Native tribe, band, nation, pueblo, vil age, or community that
the Secretary of the Interior acknowledges to exist as an Indian tribe under the Federally Recognized Indian Tribe
List Act of 1994” (42 U.S.C. §5122(6)).

6, 2020, p. 3, https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Testimony-Gaynor%20&%20Polowczyk-2020-06-09.pdf
(hereinafter, HSGAC, Federal Procurement and Distribution). See Shayan Karbassi, “Understanding Biden’s
Invocation of the Defense Production Act,” Mar. 4, 2021, Law Fare Blog, https://www.lawfareblog.com/
understanding-bidens-invocation-defense-production-act; H.Res. 906, Calling on the President to invoke the Defense
Production Act to respond to COVID-19, 116th Cong., 2nd sess.; and Ariel Cohen, “Pharmacies, Governors Say Biden
Test Program Is Depleting Supply,” CQ News, Jan. 27, 2022, https://plus.cq.com/doc/news-6440599?0. For
background, see GAO, Defense Production Act: Opportunities Exist to Increase Transparency and Identify Future
Actions to Mitigate Medical Supply Chain Issues, GAO-21-108, Nov. 2020, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-
108.pdf, and CRS Report R43767, The Defense Production Act of 1950: History, Authorities, and Considerations for
Congress, by Heidi M. Peters.
7 Then-FEMA Administrator Peter Gaynor, Introductory Letter, Initial Assessment Report, p. i.
8 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report.
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Generally, Stafford Act assistance is requested by the “governor” (i.e., “the chief executive of any State” (42 U.S.C.
§5122(5)), or the “chief executive” (i.e., “the person who is the Chief, Chairman, Governor, President, or similar
executive official of an Indian tribal government” (42 U.S.C. §5122(12)).
The term “Recipient” in this report refers to “[a] non-Federal entity that receives a Federal award directly from a
Federal awarding agency to carry out an activity under a Federal program”; and the term “Applicant” or “PA
Applicant” refers to “the responsible entity for a [Public Assistance] project,” per FEMA, Public Assistance Program
and Policy Guide (PAPPG), FP 104-009-2, June 1, 2020, pp. 21-22, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
fema_pappg-v4-updated-links_policy_6-1-2020.pdf (hereinafter FEMA, PAPPG 2020).
The term “COVID-19 pandemic” refers to the public health disaster caused by the COVID-19 virus in the U.S.,
including the domestic outbreak that predated the World Health Organization’s designation of pandemic on
March 11, 2020. World Health Organization, “WHO Director-General's opening remarks at the media briefing on
COVID-19,” March 11, 2020, https://www.who.int/director-general/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-
opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19—11-march-2020.
Federal Response Doctrine: FEMA’s Planned Role in
Infectious Disease Incidents
This section summarizes federal plans for FEMA’s involvement in infectious disease incidents
prior to the outbreak of the COVID-19 virus in the United States to contextualize the actual role
of the agency in the COVID-19 pandemic response.
Multiple overlapping and interrelated authorities govern U.S. federal responses to domestic
hazards, including public health incidents. This report focuses on those that activate or involve
FEMA, including those tailored to biological incidents and specifically infectious disease
incidents (see Appendix A for a select list of relevant authorities).
Under these authorities, U.S. domestic incident response is organized according to a federalist
“bottom-up” framework. Federal policy envisions a “whole-of-community” approach to domestic
incident response, involving the authorities of individuals, SLTTs, private partners, and, when
warranted, federal agencies. Federal authorities provide for federal involvement only if an
incident exceeds state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) response capacity,9 and generally only
after one or more state, tribal, or territorial authorities request such involvement or assistance.10
FEMA articulates these principals in its assertion that incident preparedness, mitigation, response
and recovery are ideally “locally executed, state, tribe, and territory-managed, and federally
supported.”11
The Department of Homeland Security identifies relevant roles and responsibilities of SLTTs,
federal agencies, and private sector partners in the National Response Framework (NRF), a
strategic guide to intergovernmental incident response.12 The NRF recognizes that incidents—

9 See, for example, the President’s authority to authorize major disaster assistance under the Stafford Act following a
request from a governor or tribal chief executive “based on a finding that the disaster is of such severity and magnitude
that effective response is beyond the capabilities of the State and the affected local governments and that Federal
assistance is necessary” (the Stafford Act, Section 401(a); 42 U.S.C. §5170(a)).
10 One exception, invoked for COVID-19, is the power of the President to declare an emergency under the Stafford Act
Section 501(b) absent a request for assistance. Previously, this authority had been invoked for incidents involving
federal property. See CRS Insight IN11251, The Stafford Act Emergency Declaration for COVID-19, by Erica A. Lee,
Bruce R. Lindsay, and Elizabeth M. Webster.
11 See, for example, FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, p. 9.
12 The NRF was developed by the Secretary of Homeland Security, as required by the Post-Katrina Emergency
Management Reform Act of 2005 (PKEMRA, as amended, P.L. 109-295); PKEMRA amended the Homeland Security
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particularly nationally significant, severe incidents, such as the COVID-19 pandemic—transcend
the authorities of a single federal statute, response framework, or agency.13
Under the NRF and related domestic response plans, federal disaster response activities generally
fall under the leadership of one agency—what is referred to as the lead federal agency.14
According to the Public Health Service Act15 and federal response operations plans,16 the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is to lead federal public health response efforts
for public health incidents. Meanwhile, the Homeland Security Act and the Stafford Act identify
leadership and coordination roles for FEMA in domestic incidents that warrant federal assistance,
particularly those with Stafford Act declarations.17 FEMA interpretations of these authorities and
related presidential policy appear in Figure 1.18
Federal guidance detailing pandemic response activities, including the Pandemic Crisis Action
Plan (PanCAP; updated by FEMA in 2018) and its adaptation for the COVID-19 pandemic,
PanCAP-Adapted (released by HHS on March 13, 2020), envisioned HHS leading the federal
response.19 In its initial self-assessment, FEMA underscored

Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296) in order to enhance domestic incident response. Section 509 of Post-Katrina Emergency
Management Reform Act, P.L. 109-295 (6 U.S.C. §319); U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), National
Response Framework, Fourth Edition, Oct. 28, 2019, pp. 22, 45, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-04/
NRF_FINALApproved_2011028.pdf, (hereinafter DHS, NRF 2019); FEMA, “National Response Framework,”
https://www.fema.gov/emergency-managers/national-preparedness/frameworks/response. For more information, see
CRS Report R46696, National Preparedness: A Summary and Select Issues, by Shawn Reese and Lauren R. Stienstra.
13 GAO, Biodefense: After-Action Findings and COVID-19 Response Revealed Opportunities to Strengthen
Preparedness, GAO-21-513, Aug. 2021, p. 9, https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-21-513, (hereinafter GAO,
Biodefense: After-Action Findings).
14 DHS, NRF 2019, p. 22.
15 The Public Health Service Act (PHSA, P.L. 78-409) provides emergency authorities the HHS Secretary may activate
in response to threat of disease or disorder. Under the PHSA, the HHS Secretary “shall lead all Federal public health
and medical response to public health emergencies and incidents covered by the National Response Plan” [succeeded
by the NRF]. Public Health Service Act §2801; 42. U.S.C. §300hh. For more information, see CRS Report R46809,
Federal Emergency and Major Disaster Declarations for the COVID-19 Pandemic, coordinated by Erica A. Lee and
Sarah A. Lister.
16 DHS defines a biological incident as one which has “the potential to overwhelm state and local resources and for
which the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), to lead all federal public health and medical efforts,
deems that, in consultation with other relevant agencies, interagency support is or will be required” in interagency
guidance detailing a federal response plan for biological incidents. DHS, Biological Incident Annex to the Response
and Recovery Federal Interagency Operations Plans, Final—January 2017, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/
2020-07/fema_incident-annex_biological.pdf, p. vii. Additionally, according to FEMA, Presidential Policy Directive 44
(PPD-44) outlines agency leadership of domestic incidents in the absence of Stafford Act declarations; under this
directive, HHS served as lead federal agency and FEMA lent support through late March, 2020. FEMA, Initial
Assessment Report, p. 23. CRS has not reviewed PPD-44, as it is not publicly available.
17 Notably, FEMA has not served as the lead federal agency in incidents with Stafford Act declarations, particularly
those relevant to the expertise of other federal agencies. For example, the President declared emergencies in New York
and New Jersey under the Stafford Act for the West Nile Virus, but the CDC served as the lead federal agency. U.S.
Congress, Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources,
“Responding to the West Nile Virus: Public Health Implications and Federal Response,” hearing, 107th Cong., 2nd sess.,
Oct. 3, 2002, no. 107-233.
18 See, for example, Sections 402 and 502 of the Stafford Act (42 U.S.C. §§5170a and 5192), which authorize the
President to “direct any Federal agency, with or without reimbursement, to utilize its authorities and the resources
granted to it under Federal law (including personnel, equipment, supplies, facilities, and managerial, technical, and
advisory services)” to support state and local response and recovery efforts following a Stafford Act major disaster or
an emergency, respectively. These authorities were delegated to FEMA in Executive Order 12148 and subsequent
amendments. Executive Order 12148, “Federal Emergency Management,” 44 Federal Register 43239, July 24, 1979.
19 The PanCAP and PanCAP-Adapted are not publicly available. CRS may share the documents with Members of
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[t]he 2018 Pandemic Crisis Action Plan (PanCAP) did not envision FEMA as the agency
leading federal response for a whole-of-government response under the Stafford Act, or its
role in managing health and medical supplies and equipment for SLTT partners nationally.
FEMA regional pandemic plans either did not exist or did not account for jurisdiction-
specific capabilities or deficiencies.20
However, federal pandemic plans did allow for the possibility that a situation could evolve to
warrant a different leadership structure, including one co-led by HHS and FEMA. In particular,
the PanCAP-Adapted stipulated that HHS may “request FEMA coordination support to the
overall federal response while HHS continues to lead the public health and medical response.”21
Further, the PanCAP-Adapted noted that widespread domestic transmission of the COVID-19
virus or a Stafford Act declaration might require the activation of an interagency Unified
Coordination Group (UCG) at FEMA’s National Response Coordination Center (NRCC).22
FEMA and HHS implemented variations of these proposed leadership structures in March 2020.
Figure 1. Agency Leadership Designations in Domestic Incident Response
According to FEMA’s Interpretation of Presidential Policy

Source: FEMA’s interpretation of Presidential Policy Directive 44 (PPD-44), FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, p.
32. See also DHS, National Response Framework, Fourth Edition, October 28, 2019, p. 43.

Congress and congressional staff upon request.
20 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, p. 11.
21 HHS, PanCAP-Adapted, p. 7.
22 Ibid., p. 10.
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NRF and Supporting Interagency Operations Plans
The NRF organizes federal response capabilities responsibilities under “Emergency Support Functions” (ESFs),
each of which pertains to a particular response function and designates a lead agency and supporting agencies.23
For example, ESF-8—Public Health and Medical Services “[c]oordinates the mechanisms for assistance in response
to an actual or potential public health and medical disaster or incident.”24 The agency designated as ESF-8
Coordinator is HHS. Additional federal interagency plans and systems translate the doctrine of the NRF into
operational structures and procedures. These include:
 the National Incident Management System (NIMS), which outlines a flexible response management structure
and vocabulary that may be used at local, state, regional, or national levels.25 NIMS reflects the Incident
Command System (ICS), which standardizes chains of command, organizational hierarchies, resource
management and communication processes, and functional areas for field-level incident management
operations;26
 the Federal Interagency Operational Plans (FIOPs) align federal response tasks to specific agency roles and
responsibilities;27 FIOP “annexes,” like the Biological Incident Annex, tailor FIOPs to outline federal responses
to specific types of hazards; and
 the Pandemic Crisis Action Plan (PanCAP), authored by FEMA in 2018, which adapts existing authorities and
interagency response plans to specifically address a pandemic, including the PanCAP-Adapted, which HHS
adapted specifically to guide response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
FEMA’s Role in COVID-19 Pandemic Response
FEMA’s Role Prior to March 13, 2020
To coordinate the response, President Trump first established the White House Coronavirus Task
Force, led by then-HHS Secretary Alex Azar.28 Two days later, on January 31, 2020, then-HHS
Secretary Alex Azar declared a Public Health Emergency under the Public Health Service Act
(PHSA), under which the Secretary “shall lead all Federal public health and medical response to
public health emergencies.”29 Thereafter, leadership of the expanding federal response evolved,30
as summarized in Table 1. During this time, FEMA reported that it was lending support to HHS
in its role as lead federal agency for public health response.31 According to FEMA, this support

23 DHS, NRF 2019, pp. 21-22.
24 Ibid., p. 40.
25 FEMA, National Incident Management System, Third Edition, Oct. 2017, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/
2020-07/fema_nims_doctrine-2017.pdf.
26 Emergency Management Institute, ICS Review Document, Mar. 2018, https://training.fema.gov/emiweb/is/
icsresource/assets/ics%20review%20document.pdf.
27 See, for example, DHS, Response Federal Interagency Operational Plan, Second Edition, Aug. 2016,
https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/fema_response-fiop.pdf; and DHS, Recovery Federal Response
Federal Interagency Operational Plan, Second Edition, Aug. 2016, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-07/
Recovery_FIOP_2nd_aug2016.pdf.
28 Stefanie Grisham, “Statement from the Press Secretary Regarding the President’s Coronavirus Task Force,” Jan. 29,
2020, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/statement-press-secretary-regarding-presidents-
coronavirus-task-force/.
29 PHSA, P.L. 78-410, as amended; 42 U.S.C. §§201-300mm–61; HHS, “Public Health Emergency Declarations,”
2020: Determination that a Public Health Emergency Exists Nationwide as the Result of the 2019 Novel Coronavirus,
January 31, 2020, https://www.phe.gov/emergency/news/healthactions/phe/Pages/default.aspx. The declaration was
made retroactive to January 27, 2020, and has been renewed several times.
30 For more information, see FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, pp. 23-25.
31 FEMA, “FEMA Support to Coronavirus Response,” fact sheet, Mar. 4, 2020. Provided to CRS from FEMA Office of
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included “crisis action planning, situational awareness reporting, interagency coordination, course
of action development and logistics supply chain analysis.”32 Additionally, FEMA and HHS
collaborated to “quickly adapt” the federal government’s general pandemic response plan to
COVID-19.33 However, FEMA’s overall role appeared relatively narrow. When invited to testify
at a hearing on the federal response efforts before the Subcommittee on National Security of the
U.S. House Oversight and Reform Committee FEMA declined, responding “the Agency does not
feel as if there is much that we would be able to testify to.”34
In February, FEMA began to identify personnel to deploy for pandemic incident management,
and on March 4, 2020, FEMA reported that it was readying more than 50 teams to support
SLTTs.35 However, the agency reported that it was not preparing for a Stafford Act declaration
and reasserted that HHS was the lead federal agency for the federal government’s public health
response to the pandemic.36 Additionally, FEMA indicated to Congress that it was not a part of
the White House Coronavirus Task Force at this time.37
Table 1. Key Leadership Designations for Federal COVID-19 Pandemic Response
Relevant to FEMA’s Role
Leadership
Date
Authority
Designation
Summary
Jan. 29,
Various, including
Secretary of HHS to lead President Trump announced the formation of the
2020
explicitly the
federal response as chair
White House Coronavirus Task Force, which was
National
of White House
“charged ... with leading the United States
Biodefense
Coronavirus Task Force. Government response,” and was to be “led by
Strategy, National
Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex Azar,
Security
and ... coordinated through the National Security
Presidential
Council.”39 The announcement referenced the
Memorandum
National Biodefense Strategy, which along with NSPM-
(NSPM) 14.38
14 established a leadership structure chaired by the
HHS Secretary for implementing the Strategy.40

Congressional and Legislative Affairs.
32 Ibid.
33 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, p. 23.
34 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Reform, “FEMA Briefs Oversight Committee on
Administration’s Coronavirus Response,” Mar. 20, 2020, https://oversight.house.gov/news/press-releases/fema-briefs-
oversight-committee-on-administration-s-coronavirus-response.
35 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, p. 83; FEMA, “FEMA Support to Coronavirus Response,” fact sheet, Mar. 4,
2020.
36 FEMA, “FEMA Support to Coronavirus Response,” fact sheet, Mar. 4, 2020.
37 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Reform, “FEMA Briefs Oversight Committee on
Administration’s Coronavirus Response,” Mar. 20, 2020, https://oversight.house.gov/news/press-releases/fema-briefs-
oversight-committee-on-administration-s-coronavirus-response.
38 HHS, “Posting of the National Security Presidential Memorandum 14, ‘Support for National Biodefense,’” notice, 83
Federal Register 52841-52843, Oct. 18, 2018.
39 Stefanie Grisham, “Statement from the Press Secretary Regarding the President’s Coronavirus Task Force,” Jan. 29,
2020, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/statement-press-secretary-regarding-presidents-
coronavirus-task-force/.
40 HHS, National Biodefense Strategy, https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/biodefense-strategy/Pages/goals-and-
objectives.aspx; Multiple Agencies, National Biodefense Strategy, Sept. 2018, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/
wp-content/uploads/2018/09/National-Biodefense-Strategy.pdf; HHS, “National Security Presidential Memorandum
14, ‘Support for National Biodefense,’” notice, 83 Federal Register 52841-52843, Oct. 18, 2018.
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Leadership
Date
Authority
Designation
Summary
The establishment of the White House Coronavirus
Task Force modified the incident response
structures established in federal pandemic response
plans.41
Jan. 31,
The Public Health
Secretary of HHS to lead Then-Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS)
2020
Service Act.42
federal public health and
Alex Azar declared a Public Health Emergency under
medical response to
the Public Health Service Act (PHSA) for the
COVID-19 public health
COVID-19 pandemic, which provides that the HHS
emergency.
Secretary “shall lead all Federal public health and
medical response to public health emergencies and
incidents covered by the National Response Plan”
[succeeded by the NRF].43
Feb. 26, Various, including
Vice President to lead
President Trump announced that Vice President
2020
NRF.44
whole-of-government
Michael Pence would lead the coordinated federal
response.
response and ESF-8.45 Secretary Azar confirmed in
the same remarks that he would continue to serve as
Chairman of the White House Coronavirus Task
Force.46
March
The Stafford Act;
FEMA to lead provision
President Trump declared a Stafford Act emergency
13,
Public Health
of Stafford Act
nationwide, specifying that “Administrator Gaynor
2020
Service Act,
assistance; HHS to lead
shall coordinate and direct other Federal agencies in
PanCap-Adapted:
overall federal pandemic
providing needed assistance under the Stafford Act,
Biological Incident
response.
subject to the Department of Health and Human
Annex to NRF.
Services’ role as the lead Federal agency for the
Federal Government’s response to COVID-19.”47
March
The Stafford Act.
FEMA to serve as lead
President Trump and Vice President Pence notified
18-20,
federal agency of the
then-FEMA Administrator Peter Gaynor that the
2020
whole-of-government
agency would assume the role of LFA of the
pandemic response.
coordinated federal response. HHS would continue
to lead the public health response.48

41 GAO, Biodefense: After-Action Findings, p. 26; FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, p. 34.
42 PPD-44 is not a public document and was not available for CRS review for the writing of this report. However,
FEMA reported that “PPD-44 enhances the ability of the federal government to respond to domestic incidents by
providing for the timely identification of a lead federal agency (LFA) to oversee the federal response prior to a national
disaster declaration and by ensuring that an appropriate incident management capability is available. Under this
authority, FEMA supported HHS with incident management capability for the COVID-19 response,” prior to the
Stafford Act declarations. FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, p. 23.
43 Public Health Service Act §2801; 42. U.S.C. §300hh.
44 The National Response Framework specifies that “[r]egardless of the type of incident, the President leads the Federal
Government response effort to ensure that the necessary resources are applied quickly and efficiently to large-scale and
catastrophic incidents.” (DHS, NRF 2019, p. 34).
45 The White House, “Remarks by President Trump, Vice President Pence, and Members of the Coronavirus Task
Force in Press Conference,” Feb. 27, 2020, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-
president-trump-vice-president-pence-members-coronavirus-task-force-press-conference/.
46 Ibid.
47 Letter from Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, to then-Acting Secretary Chad Wolf, then-Secretary
Steven Mnuchin, Secretary Azar, and then-Administrator Peter Gaynor, Mar. 13, 2020,
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/letter-president-donald-j-trump-emergency-determination-
stafford-act/ (hereinafter President Trump, “Letter on Stafford Act Emergency Declaration for COVID-19”).
48 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, p. 7.
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Leadership
Date
Authority
Designation
Summary
March
National Response Unified Coordination
Fol owing FEMA’s assumption of the role of LFA,
20,
Framework;
Group (UCG) to serve
FEMA and HHS established the UCG “for decision-
2020
PanCap-Adapted;
as interagency decision-
making.” Principals included the FEMA Administrator,
Biological Incident
making body for federal
the HHS Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and
Annex to NRF.
pandemic response.
Response (ASPR), the HHS Assistant Secretary for
Health, and Director of the Influenza Division in the
National Center for Immunization and Respiratory
Diseases at the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC).49
January
Various, including
President Joseph R.
President Biden established the White House
20,
NRF.50
Biden establishes the
COVID-19 Response Team, coordinated by
2021
White House COVID-
appointee Jeffrey Zients.51
19 Response Team.
Source: CRS Analysis of Federal Pandemic Response structure leadership designations, and relevant authorities
identified in Table A-1.
FEMA’s Role Following Stafford Act Declarations for the Pandemic
On March 13, 2020, President Trump unilaterally declared an emergency pursuant to Stafford Act
Section 501(b), authorizing assistance for COVID-19 response efforts for all U.S. states,
territories, and the District of Columbia.52 This emergency declaration for the pandemic
authorized a single form of FEMA assistance: Public Assistance (PA) for emergency protective
measures.53 Subsequently, governors and tribal chief executives submitted requests for major
disaster declarations pursuant to Stafford Act Section 401 for the COVID-19 pandemic, and
President Trump declared major disasters for all 50 states, five territories, the District of
Columbia, and the Seminole Tribe of Florida. President Biden later approved the major disaster
declaration requests of the Navajo Nation and the Poarch Band of Creek Indians for the COVID-
19 pandemic.54

49 Ibid., pp. 24-25, 32.
50 The National Response Framework specifies that “[r]egardless of the type of incident, the President leads the Federal
Government response effort to ensure that the necessary resources are applied quickly and efficiently to large-scale and
catastrophic incidents.” (DHS, NRF 2019, p. 34).
51 President Joseph R. Biden Jr., “Executive Order on Organizing and Mobilizing the United States Government to
Provide a Unified and Effective Response to Combat COVID-⁠19 and to Provide United States Leadership on Global
Health and Security,” Executive Order 13987, Jan. 20, 2021, 86 Federal Register 7019-7021.
52 President Trump, “Letter on Stafford Act Emergency Declaration for COVID-19.”
53 PA provides supplemental grants or direct assistance (e.g., personnel, materials, operations) on a cost-share basis to
subfederal governments and eligible nonprofits for costs incurred for specific activities, in this case, eligible emergency
response measures. FEMA developed multiple iterations of guidance outlining eligible costs and measures. Current
guidance is available at FEMA. Eligible measures are available in pandemic-specific guidance at FEMA, “Public
Assistance Disaster-Specific Guidance,” https://www.fema.gov/media-collection/public-assistance-disaster-specific-
guidance-covid-19-declarations. PA for emergency assistance is authorized pursuant to Section 502 of the Stafford Act
(P.L. 93-288); 42 U.S.C. §5192. President Trump, “Letter on Stafford Act Emergency Declaration for COVID-19.”
54 Specific presidential declarations of major disaster for COVID-19 are listed at FEMA, “COVID-19 Disaster
Declarations,” https://www.fema.gov/coronavirus/disaster-declarations, and the FEMA “Disasters” webpage, available
at https://www.fema.gov/disasters. For more information, see CRS Insight IN11229, Stafford Act Assistance for Public
Health Incidents, by Erica A. Lee and Bruce R. Lindsay; and CRS Report R46809, Federal Emergency and Major
Disaster Declarations for the COVID-19 Pandemic, coordinated by Erica A. Lee and Sarah A. Lister.
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All major disaster declarations reauthorized PA for emergency protective measures, and most
major disaster declarations authorized Individual Assistance (IA)—Crisis Counseling Assistance
and Training Program (CCP) in the President’s initial declaration.55 Subsequently, President
Trump authorized the FEMA Administrator to approve CCP requests, and through the program,
46 states, Washington, DC, and four territories applied for and received CCP awards.56 Later, on
August 8, 2020, President Trump invoked IA statutory authorities to authorize FEMA to expend
up to $44 billion from the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) for the Lost Wages Assistance (LWA)
program to provide supplemental lost wages payments to individuals receiving unemployment
insurance.57 Congress also later authorized Funeral Assistance for the pandemic under the
Stafford Act declarations.58 Upon assumption of office in January 2021, President Biden
increased the federal cost share for PA-eligible activities from 75% to 100% and expanded the
range of work eligible for reimbursement. Figure 2 provides a chronology of the activation of
Stafford Act authorities for the pandemic.

55 The Crisis Counseling Program (CCP) provides community-based outreach and psycho-educational services to
support individuals and communities recovering from disasters. FEMA, “FEMA Administrator Authority to Approve
Crisis Counseling During Coronavirus,” press release, Apr. 28, 2020, https://www.fema.gov/fact-sheet/fema-
administrator-authority-approve-crisis-counseling-during-coronavirus; FEMA, “FEMA Administrator Approves 30
States for Crisis Counseling,” Release HQ-20-129, May 2, 2020, https://www.fema.gov/news-release/20200726/fema-
administrator-approves-30-states-crisis-counseling.
56 According to the GAO, FEMA awarded “about $467 million to 46 states, Washington, DC, and four U.S. territories
[Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands] via the Crisis
Counseling Assistance and Training Program.” The states of Alaska, Kentucky, Mississippi, and Wyoming did not
apply for CCP assistance (Alaska also withdrew its application for the CCP Regular Service Program). The Navajo
Nation’s CCP Regular Services Program application is under review (as of December 2021), and the Poarch Band
Creek Indians did not apply for CCP assistance (GAO, Behavioral Health and COVID-19: Higher-Risk Populations
and Related Federal Relief Funding, GAO-22-104437, December 2021, pp. 74-76 (Appendix V), https://www.gao.gov/
assets/gao-22-104437.pdf).
57 The Lost Wages Assistance (LWA) program includes a 25% nonfederal cost sharing requirement funded by states
and territories. It was authorized as a form of Other Needs Assistance under Stafford Act Section 408(e)(2) (42 U.S.C.
§5174(e)(2)). President Donald J. Trump, “Memorandum on Authorizing the Other Needs Assistance Program for
Major Disaster Declarations Related to Coronavirus Disease 2019,” Aug. 8, 2020,
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/memorandum-authorizing-needs-assistance-program-major-
disaster-declarations-related-coronavirus-disease-2019/. For additional information on LWA, see CRS Insight
IN11492, COVID-19: Supplementing Unemployment Insurance Benefits (Federal Pandemic Unemployment
Compensation vs. Lost Wages Assistance), by Katelin P. Isaacs and Julie M. Whittaker.
58 Congress authorized Funeral Assistance first through the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 and then in the
American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (ARPA); on the date of ARPA’s enactment, the President amended the declarations
for the COVID-19 pandemic to add Funeral Assistance for the declared states, territories, and District of Columbia. For
additional information on COVID-19 Funeral Assistance, see CRS Insight IN11582, FEMA Funeral Assistance for
COVID-19, by Elizabeth M. Webster.
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Figure 2. Authorization of Stafford Act Assistance for Pandemic-Related Costs

Sources: CRS interpretation of pandemic-specific PA and IA guidance, Stafford Act declarations, and relevant
presidential memoranda.
Notes:
a. The President granted multiple extensions of the 100% federal cost share for PA and may issue additional
extensions. FEMA announced that PA wil be available for eligible pandemic-related measures indefinitely; the
agency wil provide at least thirty days’ notice prior to the program’s conclusion. According to current policy,
FEMA will cover 100% of eligible costs through July 1, 2022, after which it wil cover 90% of eligible costs.
b. Congress authorized Funeral Assistance first through the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 and then in
the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (ARPA); on the date of ARPA’s enactment, the President amended the
declarations for the COVID-19 pandemic to add Funeral Assistance for the declared states, territories, and
District of Columbia.
The emergency and major disaster declarations for the pandemic were unprecedented in several
respects. The emergency declaration marked the first time that a President had declared a Stafford
Act emergency for all jurisdictions nationwide. Additionally, the COVID-19 nationwide
emergency declaration marked the first time the president issued such an expansive declaration
absent a governor or tribal chief executive’s request, as is generally required for Stafford Act
declarations except for very rare incidents determined to be of “primary Federal responsibility.”59
Additionally, while Presidents have occasionally declared emergencies under Stafford Act for
public health incidents, the major disaster declarations for the pandemic were the first to be issued
for any public health incident under current law.60
Initially, in the March 13, 2020 Stafford Act declaration of emergency, President Trump explained
that:
[FEMA] Administrator Gaynor shall coordinate and direct other Federal agencies in
providing needed assistance under the Stafford Act, subject to the Department of Health

59 Stafford Act Section 501(b); 42 U.S.C. §5170. For discussion, see Elizabeth Goiteen, “Emergency Powers, Real and
Imagined: How President Trump Used and Failed to Use Presidential Authority in the COVID-19 Crisis,” Journal of
National Security Law and Policy, vol. 11, no. 27 (2020), pp. 51-53; for background, see CRS Insight IN11229,
Stafford Act Assistance for Public Health Incidents, by Erica A. Lee and Bruce R. Lindsay; and CRS Report R46809,
Federal Emergency and Major Disaster Declarations for the COVID-19 Pandemic, coordinated by Erica A. Lee and
Sarah A. Lister.
60 Ibid.
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and Human Services’ role as the lead Federal agency for the Federal Government’s
response to COVID-19.61
However, on March 18, 2020, President Trump and Vice President Pence then directed FEMA to
assume leadership of the coordinated federal response. FEMA assumed this role on March 19,
2020.62 The following description of FEMA’s planned and observed role in the federal pandemic
response draws upon a number of interrelated authorities in statute, regulations, and interagency
guidance, as summarized in Appendix A.
Response Organizational Structure after FEMA’s Assumption of Leadership
On March 20, 2020, FEMA and HHS established the Unified Coordination Group, consisting of
four principals (representing FEMA and HHS) whose responsibility included “operational
command, leadership, and decision making for the coordinated federal response,” according to
the GAO.63 FEMA reported that, as lead federal agency for the coordinated federal response, the
agency also led the UCG.64 The FEMA Administrator and HHS Secretary additionally served on
the White House Coronavirus Task Force, which oversaw the coordinated federal response.
Following FEMA’s assumption of leadership, HHS transferred eight operational task forces it had
established to support the federal response from the HHS Secretary’s Operations Center to the
National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) at FEMA headquarters.65 The task forces
represented interagency efforts dedicated to:
 Community Based Testing;
 Data Management;
 Laboratory Diagnostics;
 Healthcare System Resilience;
 Medical Countermeasures;
 Supply Chain Stabilization;
 Community Mitigation Measures;
 and Continuity of Operations.66
Each task force was responsible for securing resources to support the federal pandemic response
and to coordinate specific lines of effort. For example, the Community Based Testing Task Force,
led by HHS with support from FEMA, was responsible for the creation of federally-supported
community-based testing sites to increase COVID-19 testing nationwide.67 According to FEMA,
these task forces were initially led by HHS and Department of Defense (DOD) subject matter
experts. The task forces did not correspond to the existing structure and functions of the NRCC,

61 President Trump, “Letter on Stafford Act Emergency Declaration for COVID-19.”
62 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, p. 7.
63 Note that the GAO identified three principals in its June 2020 report on the federal pandemic response; FEMA later
identified four principals in its Initial Assessment Report. GAO, COVID-19: Opportunities to Improve Federal
Response and Recovery Efforts, pp. 12-13 (hereinafter GAO, COVID-19: Opportunities); FEMA, Initial Assessment
Report, p. 25.
64 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, p. 35.
65 Ibid., p. 37.
66 For a thorough description of the responsibilities and key tasks of each task force, see GAO, COVID-19:
Opportunities, pp. 91-92.
67 GAO, COVID-19: Opportunities, p. 91; FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, pp. 38-39.
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which is modeled off of the NRF and NIMS (National Incident Management System) guidance
(see textbox on p. 6 for more information). As a result, existing NRCC response functions and the
pandemic-specific task forces operated in parallel.68 See Figure 3 for a visualization of the
federal pandemic response organization according to FEMA.69
As FEMA describes, “[f]or any given incident, FEMA disaster response begins and ends with the
affected [FEMA] Region in the lead.”70 In line with this posture, FEMA’s ten Regional Response
Coordination Centers (RRCCs) all activated to support the federal pandemic response, led by
FEMA Regional Administrators. FEMA regional staff coordinated with SLTT representatives,
relayed information from the NRCC to SLTT partners, and deployed regional FEMA personnel to
directly assist SLTT emergency management and public health offices.71 However, FEMA found
that certain functions typically coordinated out of regional offices required adaptation. For
example, FEMA designed national Mission Assignments (or “work orders” for federal personnel)
to reduce the burdens on FEMA regions and provide the NRCC better situational awareness
nationwide.72
In May and June, 2020, FEMA’s role in the federal pandemic response changed to enable FEMA
to “prepare and support the upcoming hurricane season and other potential disasters Americans
may face.”73 The remaining response task forces were converted into working groups, over which
HHS reassumed oversight.74 HHS and the Defense Logistics Agency assumed responsibility for
certain FEMA lines of effort related to medical supply chain management and procurement,
respectively.75 However, FEMA retains an active and leading role in the federal pandemic
response as of the date of publication of this report.
Stakeholder Commentary on Leadership Transition
Perceived delays in FEMA’s assumption of a leadership role in the federal response prompted
concern among some Members of Congress, news media, and academic sources.76 For example,
Representative Xochitl Torres Small noted in a July 2020 hearing that a congressional evaluation
of lessons learned should

68 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, pp. 32-40.
69 Ibid., pp. 23-24.
70 FEMA, Incident Management and Support Keystone, Jan. 2011, p. 47, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/
2020-07/fema_incident_management_and_support_keystone-Jan2011.pdf.
71 Ibid., pp. 25-26, 33-34, 80-85.
72 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, pp. 57-59.
73 Submitted testimony of then-FEMA Administrator Gaynor and Real Admiral Polowcyzk, HSGAC, Federal
Procurement and Distribution, p. 7.
74 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, p. 5.
75 GAO has noted that the scope and nature of the transition of FEMA supply chain management responsibilities to
HHS lacked clarity. See GAO, COVID-19: Federal Efforts, pp. 19-20; See also submitted testimony of then-FEMA
Administrator Gaynor and Real Admiral Polowcyzk, HSGAC, Federal Procurement and Distribution, p. 7.
76 See, for example, Daniel Kaniewski, “Coronavirus Is a Disaster. Why Hasn’t FEMA Been Brought In?” Politico,
Mar. 10, 2020, https://www.politico.com/news/agenda/2020/03/10/coronavirus-crisis-fema-125076; Eric Lipton, Zolan
Kanno-Youngs, and Helene Cooper, “Trump Slowly Enlisting More Agencies in ‘Whole of Government’ Response to
Virus,” New York Times, Mar. 17, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/17/us/politics/coronavirus-government-
army-corps.html; and William Shields, “The COVID-19 Pandemic: Early Lessons for Public Governance: The United
States Experience,” in Good Public Governance in a Global Pandemic, Paul Joyce, Fabienne Maron and Purshottama
Sivanarain Reddy, eds., IIAS public Governance Series, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 429-442.
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includ[e] revisiting the appointment of FEMA as the lead of the federal response effort in
mid-March, more than six weeks after the White House Coronavirus Task Force was
formed; a delay that unquestionably put the agency at a disadvantage of executing such a
formidable task.77
Despite these concerns, FEMA’s response also garnered praise from some subfederal
stakeholders. In July 2020, the Director of California’s Office of Emergency Services testified
that
[g]iven the complexity of the situation and how late into the response they took over federal
responsibility, FEMA was both challenged and worked to be incredibly responsive. FEMA
did the best they could to organize information and operations to assist our state. FEMA
Region IX is still embedded in the SOC and has played a critical role in the state’s Logistics
and Commodity Movement Task Force and in communicating across the entire federal
family. Particularly, the FEMA Region IX Administrator and liaison officers have been
highly communicative and supportive.”78

77 Testimony of Rep. Xochitl Torres Small, Chairman of House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on
Oversight, Management and Accountability, in U.S. Congress, House Homeland Security Subcommittees on Oversight,
Management and Accountability and Emergency Preparedness, Response and Recovery, House Committee on
Homeland Security, Federal and State Pandemic Supply Preparedness and Response, hearing, 116th Cong., 2nd sess.,
July 14, 2020 (hereinafter House Homeland Security Committee, Federal And State Pandemic Supply Preparedness
and Response).
78 Submitted testimony of Director, California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services and Governor’s Homeland
Security Advisor Mark Ghilarducci, in House Homeland Security Committee, Federal and State Pandemic Supply
Preparedness and Response, p. 4.
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Figure 3. Organization of the Federal Coordinated Pandemic Response
According to FEMA

Source: CRS adaptation of FEMA, “Revised UCG Structure in COVID-19 Response,” Initial Assessment Report, p. 36.
Notes: Not all task forces are pictured. Color codes indicate agency leadership of different functions. ASPR = Assistant Secretary of Preparedness and Response; OASH
= Office of the Assistant Secretary for Health and Response; CDC = U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; SOC = HHS Secretary’s Operations Center, the
primary emergency operations center for HHS; ESF = Emergency Support Functions as described in the National Response Framework; JIC = Joint Information Center.
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FEMA’s Pandemic Response: Key Lines of Effort
This section identifies FEMA’s key lines of effort during its expanded role in the pandemic
response following the Stafford Act declarations for the COVID-19 pandemic (see Figure 4).
This overview is not intended to offer an exhaustive catalogue of FEMA’s actions during the
pandemic (see Appendix B for resources that comprehensively detail FEMA’s pandemic
response efforts).
Lead Federal Agency (LFA) of the Federal Pandemic Response
In this role, FEMA coordinated resources across the federal government and helped to establish
and served on the Unified Coordination Group (UCG), an interagency decision-making body. On
March 19, 2020, as FEMA assumed leadership of the coordinated response, federal pandemic
response operations moved to the National Response Coordination Center (NRCC), an
interagency response operations room inside FEMA headquarters.79 The NRCC activated to Level
1, its highest activation level, for 426 days—an activation of unprecedented duration.80 FEMA’s
10 Regional Response Coordination Centers (RRCCs) also all activated and coordinated SLTT
support and communications.81
SLTT Emergency Management Operational Support
FEMA’s national and regional offices provided technical assistance and communications support
and deployed federal personnel to SLTT emergency management offices. For example, according
to FEMA, over 100 FEMA Integration Team (FIT) members—already embedded in state
emergency management offices prior to the pandemic—supported pandemic response
communication and planning across all levels of government. FEMA regional offices also
deployed Incident Management Assessment Teams-Advance (IMAT-As) and liaison officers to
support state, territorial, and tribal requests for direct and financial assistance.82
Public Assistance (PA) for SLTT and Nonprofit Response Efforts
Since March 13, 2020, FEMA has provided reimbursement through the PA program for the
eligible costs of specific emergency protective measures incurred by eligible PA Applicants (e.g.,
SLTTs and eligible nonprofits) responding to the pandemic. The wide range of costs eligible for
reimbursement includes pandemic-related purchase and distribution of food; the provision of
emergency medical care and diagnostic and screening testing; non-congregate sheltering for
eligible individuals; the purchase of medical supplies; the construction and operation of
alternative care facilities; the reopening of eligible public and nonprofit facilities; and
compensation of overtime and surge staff needed to execute the above measures.83

79 Ibid., pp. 25, 32.
80 Initial activation to Level 1 reported in FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, p. 32. FEMA reported that the NRCC
reduced activation to Level III on May 19, 2021. FEMA, “FEMA Daily Ops Briefing,” May 19, 2021.
81 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, pp. 158-159.
82 Ibid., pp. 10, 25-26, 77, 81-85.
83 See FEMA, “Public Assistance Disaster-Specific Guidance—COVID-19 Declarations,” https://www.fema.gov/
media-collection/public-assistance-disaster-specific-guidance-covid-19-declarations, for a collection of guidance
delineating eligible work, particularly FEMA, “Eligible Emergency Protective Measures,” August 27, 2021,
https://www.fema.gov/fact-sheet/eligible-emergency-protective-measures.
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Additionally, FEMA provided direct federal assistance (e.g., federal personnel, materials, space,
operations) when PA Applicants were found unable to execute eligible response activities. FEMA
mission assignments—or “work orders”—for FEMA and other agencies reflect provision of
direct assistance ranging from the provision of temporary medical facilities to the deployment of
federal personnel to perform vaccination to the establishment of quarantine housing.84 Most
recently, in January 2022, FEMA released guidance stipulating how the agency would support the
expansion of healthcare facilities, including with direct federal assistance.85
Under the emergency and major disaster declarations issued by President Trump, Applicants
could receive reimbursement for 75% of the eligible costs of specific response measures.
Subsequently, President Biden increased the federal cost share to 100%.86 Under current
presidential directive, FEMA shall reimburse 100% of costs incurred from January 20, 2020,
through July 1, 2021.87 Thereafter, FEMA has announced that PA may be available to cover at
least 90% of eligible costs incurred.88 The agency will provide at least thirty days’ notice prior to
the conclusion of the program for the pandemic.89 As of December 2021, FEMA has obligated
more than $34 billion through the PA program for pandemic-related expenses, an unprecedented
sum for a single incident.90
Individual Assistance (IA) for Funeral Costs, Lost Wages, and Crisis
Counseling
The President and Congress authorized FEMA to provide select forms of IA to support recovery
from the COVID-19 pandemic. Specifically, President Trump authorized FEMA to provide
assistance through the Crisis Counseling Assistance and Training Program (CCP) and the Lost
Wages Assistance (LWA) program. Subsequently, Congress authorized FEMA to provide
COVID-19 Funeral Assistance.
CCP is a type of IA that can be authorized pursuant to a major disaster declaration under the
Stafford Act.91 It provides grants to state, local, territorial, or tribal government agencies that
allow them to deliver—or contract with local mental health services to deliver—community-
based outreach and psycho-educational services to support individuals and communities

84 OpenEFMA, “OpenFEMA Dataset: Mission Assignments,” reflecting obligations made through January 7, 2022,
https://www.fema.gov/openfema-data-page/mission-assignments.
85 FEMA and Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR), Healthcare Facility Expansion Assistance
Playbook, Dec. 2021, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/fema_healthcare-facility-expansion-
assistance-playbook.pdf.
86 President Joseph R. Biden, “Memorandum to Extend Federal Support to Governors’ Use of the National Guard to
Respond to COVID-⁠19 and to Increase Reimbursement and Other Assistance Provided to States,” Jan. 21, 2021,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/01/21/extend-federal-support-to-governors-use-
of-national-guard-to-respond-to-covid-19-and-to-increase-reimbursement-and-other-assistance-provided-to-states/.
87 President Joseph R. Biden., Jr. “Memorandum on Maximizing Assistance to Respond to COVID-⁠19,” Mar. 1, 2022,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2022/03/01/memorandum-on-maximizing-assistance-
to-respond-to-covid-19-2/; FEMA Advisory: “COVID-19 Cost Share Extension,” Mar. 1, 2022.
88 FEMA Advisory: “COVID-19 Cost Share Extension,” Mar. 1, 2022.
89 See, “Time Limitations for the Completion of Work,” in FEMA, “Coronavirus (COVID-19) Pandemic: Work
Eligible for Public Assistance (Interim),” FEMA Policy FP 104-009-19, Sept. 1, 2021, p. 6, https://www.fema.gov/
sites/default/files/2020-09/fema_public-assistance-eligibility-for-covid_policy_9-1-2020.pdf.
90 CRS Analysis of FEMA, “Public Assistance Funded Projects—Details,” as of Dec. 5, 2021, https://www.fema.gov/
openfema-data-page/public-assistance-funded-projects-details-v1.
91 42 U.S.C. §5183; 44 C.F.R. §206.171.
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recovering from disasters.92 The majority of the jurisdictions that received major disaster
declarations for the COVID-19 pandemic were authorized to receive assistance through the
CCP.93 President Trump authorized some CCP requests, and on April 28, 2020, the FEMA
Administrator was authorized to approve COVID-19-related requests for CCP to expedite
assistance.94
Invoking ONA’s general statutory authority, President Trump issued a presidential memorandum
that authorized the LWA program and allowed FEMA to provide grants to states, territories, and
the District of Columbia for supplemental lost wages payments to individuals receiving
unemployment insurance.95 ONA typically provides financial assistance for uninsured disaster-
related necessary expenses and serious needs (e.g., assistance to replace disaster-damaged
personal property and vehicles, and funeral assistance); LWA was a novel use of ONA.96
Funeral Assistance is another form of ONA that helps with eligible funeral expenses and is
typically available when the President authorizes the Individuals and Households Program
(IHP)—a type of Individual Assistance—pursuant to a declaration of emergency or major disaster
under the Stafford Act.97 In the case of the COVID-19 pandemic, however, Congress authorized
FEMA to provide COVID-19 Funeral Assistance.98 Specifically, Section 201 of the Coronavirus
Response and Relief Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2021 (Division M of the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2021, P.L. 116-260), and Section 4006 of the American Rescue Plan Act of

92 42 U.S.C. §5183; 44 C.F.R. §206.171.
93 The Crisis Counseling Program requests submitted by American Samoa and the Seminole Tribe of Florida had not
been approved as of Aug. 24, 2021 (email to CRS from FEMA Office of External Affairs, Aug. 24, 2021, noting
“American Samoa and Seminole Tribe of Florida have not been declared for IA with CCP”).
94 FEMA, “FEMA Administrator Authority to Approve Crisis Counseling During Coronavirus,” release, Apr. 28, 2020,
https://www.fema.gov/fact-sheet/fema-administrator-authority-approve-crisis-counseling-during-coronavirus; and
FEMA, “FEMA Administrator Approves 30 States for Crisis Counseling,” Release HQ-20-129, May 2, 2020,
https://www.fema.gov/news-release/20200726/fema-administrator-approves-30-states-crisis-counseling. According to
the GAO, FEMA awarded “about $467 million to 46 states, Washington, DC, and four U.S. territories [Guam, the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands] via the Crisis Counseling
Assistance and Training Program.” The states of Alaska, Kentucky, Mississippi, and Wyoming did not apply for CCP
assistance (Alaska also withdrew its application for the CCP Regular Service Program). The Navajo Nation’s CCP
Regular Services Program application is under review (as of December 2021), and the Poarch Band Creek Indians did
not apply for CCP assistance (GAO, Behavioral Health and COVID-19: Higher-Risk Populations and Related Federal
Relief Funding, GAO-22-104437, December 2021, pp. 74-76 (Appendix V), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-
104437.pdf).
95 President Donald J. Trump, “Memorandum on Authorizing the Other Needs Assistance Program for Major Disaster
Declarations Related to Coronavirus Disease 2019,” Aug. 8, 2020, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-
actions/memorandum-authorizing-needs-assistance-program-major-disaster-declarations-related-coronavirus-disease-
2019/. See also, FEMA, “Lost Wages Supplemental Payment Assistance Guidelines,” https://www.fema.gov/disaster/
coronavirus/governments/supplemental-payments-lost-wages-guidelines. LWA was subject to a 25% nonfederal cost
sharing requirement.
96 Section 262(b) of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260) authorized states to waive the
requirement that individuals repay Lost Wages Assistance (LWA) that they were not entitled to receive if the state
determines: “(1) the payment of such covered assistance [LWA] was without fault on the part of the individual; and (2)
such repayment would be contrary to equity and good conscience.” Additionally, pursuant to Section 262(c), a state’s
debt waiver issued under Section 262(b) also waives a debt owed to the United States.
97 42 U.S.C. §5174(e)(1); 44 C.F.R. §206.119(b)(1).
98 Only Funeral Assistance, and not all forms of Individuals and Households Program (IHP) assistance, has been
authorized for the COVID-19 pandemic Stafford Act declarations.
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2021 (P.L. 117-2) authorized FEMA to provide financial assistance for COVID-19-related funeral
expenses at 100% federal cost share.99
Supply Chain Stabilization
In coordination with DOD and HHS, FEMA led efforts to stabilize critical domestic supply
chains, particularly medical supply chains, upon assuming the role of LFA in March 2020.100
FEMA initiated several efforts in this capacity. First, FEMA began working with HHS and DOD
to assess and stabilize the PPE supply chain after forming the Supply Chain Task Force.101 The
Supply Chain Task Force supported PPE distribution efforts, analyzed supply chain
vulnerabilities, and transported privately purchased PPE from manufacturers abroad to domestic
airports through Project Air Bridge.102
Second, as designated lead of the federal government’s Joint DPA Office, FEMA coordinated and
vetted invocations of the statute in support of the federal pandemic response.103 In this role,
FEMA released guidance in coordination with Customs and Border Protection on the use of DPA
to allocate and federal prioritize orders for scarce medical supplies.104 FEMA’s DPA actions
included procuring critical medical supplies through priority-rated contracts, seizing and
distributing PPE under anti-hoarding and price-gouging authorities, restricting exports of certain
critical medical supplies, and establishing a voluntary agreement with private medical distributors
to share price, cost, supply, distribution, and capacity utilization information, among other data,
on certain critical health supplies.105

99 On the date of the enactment of the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (P.L. 117-2), the declarations for the COVID-
19 pandemic for the declared states, territories, and District of Columbia (but not the three tribes) were amended to
authorize Funeral Assistance under Other Needs Assistance (ONA) (the amendments limit IHP-ONA to Funeral
Assistance).
100 See CRS Report R46628, COVID-19 and Domestic PPE Production and Distribution: Issues and Policy Options,
coordinated by Michael H. Cecire, pp. 12-17; GAO, COVID-19: Federal Efforts Could Be Strengthened by Timely and
Concerted Actions, Sept. 2020, pp. 10-24, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-20-701.pdf (hereinafter GAO, Federal
Efforts); FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, pp. 24-25.
101 Submitted testimony of then-FEMA Administrator Peter Gaynor and Rear Admiral John Polowczyk, HSGAC,
Federal Procurement and Distribution, pp. 4-5.
102 Ibid.; GAO, Federal Efforts, pp. 10-12; FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, pp. 45-76; CRS Report R46628, COVID-
19 and Domestic PPE Production and Distribution: Issues and Policy Options, coordinated by Michael H. Cecire, pp.
7-16.
103 FEMA, “Defense Production Act Authority and Functions of the FEMA Administrator,” https://www.fema.gov/
disaster/defense-production-act/dpa-authority-and-functions. For detailed discussion of pandemic-specific organization
of DPA authorities across the government, see GAO, Defense Production Act: Opportunities Exist to Increase
Transparency and Identify Future Actions to Mitigate Medical Supply Chain Issues, GAO-21-2018, November 2020,
https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-108.pdf; for a brief overview of DPA leadership and FEMA’s role see CRS In
Focus IF11767, The Defense Production Act Committee (DPAC): A Primer, by Michael H. Cecire.
104 Executive Office of the President, Executive Order 13911, “Delegating Additional Authority Under the Defense
Production Act With Respect to Health and Medical Resources to Respond to the Spread of COVID-19,” Mar. 27,
2020, 85 Federal Register 18403. Subsequent notices report that authorities delegated to the DHS Secretary have “in
turn been delegated to the FEMA Administrator in DHS Delegation 09052, Rev. 00.1 (Apr. 1, 2020).” See, for
example, FEMA, “Prioritization and Allocation of Certain Scarce or Threatened Health and Medical Resources for
Domestic Use,” temporary final rule, Apr. 10, 2020, 85 Federal Register 20195.
105 See CRS Report R46628, COVID-19 and Domestic PPE Production and Distribution: Issues and Policy Options,
coordinated by Michael H. Cecire; FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, pp. 69-73; GAO, Defense Production Act:
Opportunities Exist to Increase Transparency and Identify Future Actions to Mitigate Medical Supply Chain Issues,
GAO-21-108, November 2020, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-108.pdf; CRS Insight IN11470, Defense Production
Act (DPA): Recent Developments in Response to COVID-19, by Heidi M. Peters and Erica A. Lee; FEMA, “Pandemic
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FEMA transferred certain medical supply chain responsibilities back to HHS and ASPR
beginning in June 2020, including management of the Supply Chain Task Force, which became
the Supply Chain Advisory Group under HHS’s management on June 15, 2020.106
Critical Medical Supply Distribution
Following its assumption of the role of lead federal agency, FEMA coordinated and often
executed federal efforts to distribute critical medical supplies, including PPE, testing supplies,
ventilators, and oxygen. As part of this effort, FEMA collaborated with ASPR and DOD to
provide and receive contracting support, including entering into an agreement with ASPR that
enabled FEMA to acquire and distribute critical medical supplies, including PPE, from the
Strategic National Stockpile (SNS).107 At the time of publication, FEMA continues to distribute
scarce medical supplies to states, tribes, and territories through its authorities to provide direct
assistance under the PA program. States, tribes, and territories may then distribute these resources
to localities and eligible nonprofits within their jurisdictions, including healthcare facilities.
National Guard Mobilization
The President has authorized FEMA to fund 100% of eligible costs of mobilizing the National
Guard under Title 32 of the U.S. Code to execute certain pandemic response measures, including
work related to vaccination, hospital and medical staffing (including “wraparound” hospital
support services like cleaning, security, and food preparation), testing, and food distribution,
among others.108 Under Title 32, FEMA issues fully-funded mission assignments to DOD for
National Guard mobilization; troops operate at the direction of governors. Funding covers troops’
salaries, allowances, travel expenses, and per diem.109 Barring any changes, FEMA’s 100%

Response Voluntary Agreement Under Section 708 of the Defense Production Act; Plans of Action To Respond to
COVID-19,” 86 Federal Register 28851-28884, May 28, 2021.
106 GAO, Federal Efforts, pp. 10-11.
107 Submitted testimony of Administrator Peter Gaynor and Rear Admiral John Polowczyk, HSGAC, Federal
Procurement and Distribution, p. 7; FEMA and HHS, “Memorandum of Understanding Between the Federal
Emergency Management Agency and the Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Assistant Secretary for
Preparedness Response,” executed Apr. 5, 2020, provided to CRS by FEMA Office of Congressional and Legislative
Affairs. Available to congressional members and staff upon request.
108 President Joseph R. Biden., Jr. “Memorandum on Maximizing Assistance to Respond to COVID-⁠19,” Mar. 1, 2022,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2022/03/01/memorandum-on-maximizing-assistance-
to-respond-to-covid-19-2/; FEMA Advisory: “COVID-19 Cost Share Extension,” Mar. 1, 2022; White House,
“Memorandum for the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency on Maximizing Assistance to Respond to COVID-⁠19,” Nov. 9, 2021 (hereinafter White House, “Maximizing
Assistance,” Nov. 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/11/09/memorandum-
for-the-secretary-of-homeland-security-and-the-administrator-of-the-federal-emergency-management-agency-on-
maximizing-assistance-to-respond-to-covid-19/; FEMA, “FEMA Administrator Gives Remarks to Ongoing COVID-19
Response,” Jan. 14, 2022, https://www.fema.gov/press-release/20220114/icymi-fema-administrator-gives-remarks-
ongoing-covid-19-response; FEMA, “Federal Support for Wraparound Medical Care and Services During COVID-19
Response,” Jan. 14, 2022.
109 FEMA will also reimburse states and territories for the costs of mobilizing the National Guard for eligible work
under Title 10 of the U.S. Code (State Active Duty), but mission assignments may help relieve economic and
administrative burdens associated with Title 10 mobilizations. FEMA, “National Guard Deployment Extended to
Support COVID-19 Response,” updated Jan. 14, 2022, https://www.fema.gov/fact-sheet/national-guard-deployment-
extended-support-covid-19-response.
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funding for the eligible costs of National Guard mobilization is scheduled to expire on July 1,
2022, after which FEMA will cover 90% of eligible costs.110
Vaccination Assistance
FEMA provides 100% reimbursement and direct assistance through the PA program for
Applicants’ eligible vaccination work, currently available through July 1, 2022.111 Since January
2021, FEMA has provided enhanced vaccination assistance, including extensive direct assistance
(e.g., federal personnel, supplies, contract assistance, facilities) and the establishment of several
dozen federally-run mass vaccination sites that provided vaccine allocations in excess of those
distributed to individual states and territories.112 FEMA PA is available for a range of costs related
to vaccine administration and distribution, including operations and surge personnel costs, PPE,
facility support costs, vaccine storage and transportation, equipment, security, and transport for
individuals under certain circumstances.113 Applicants may also receive reimbursement and direct
assistance for vaccination community outreach (e.g., communications, personnel), booster
vaccination campaigns, and vaccination of children ages 5 through 11 years.114

110 President Joseph R. Biden., Jr. “Memorandum on Maximizing Assistance to Respond to COVID-⁠19,” Mar. 1, 2022,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2022/03/01/memorandum-on-maximizing-assistance-
to-respond-to-covid-19-2/; FEMA Advisory: “COVID-19 Cost Share Extension,” Mar. 1, 2022.
111 President Joseph R. Biden., Jr. “Memorandum on Maximizing Assistance to Respond to COVID-⁠19,” Mar. 1, 2022,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2022/03/01/memorandum-on-maximizing-assistance-
to-respond-to-covid-19-2/; FEMA Advisory: “COVID-19 Cost Share Extension,” Mar. 1, 2022; FEMA, “Vaccine
Support,” https://www.fema.gov/disaster/coronavirus/vaccine-support; and CRS Report R46715, FEMA Assistance for
Vaccine Administration and Distribution: In Brief, by Erica A. Lee and Kavya Sekar.
112 FEMA, “Vaccine Support,” https://www.fema.gov/disaster/coronavirus/vaccine-support; CRS Report R46715,
FEMA Assistance for Vaccine Administration and Distribution: In Brief, by Erica A. Lee and Kavya Sekar; FEMA,
“Federally Supported Community Vaccination Centers,” https://www.fema.gov/disaster/coronavirus/vaccine-support/
vaccine-center; and FEMA, “Community Vaccination Centers Playbook,” Final version, https://www.fema.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/fema_community-vaccination-centers_playbook_04-23-2021.pdf.
113 FEMA, “Coronavirus (COVID-19) Pandemic: Medical Care Eligible for Public Assistance (Interim) (Version 2),”
FEMA Policy #104-21-0004, pp. 6-9, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/fema_public-assistance-
covid-19-medical-care-v2-with-equity-job-aid_policy_3-15-2021.pdf.
114 FEMA, “FEMA Funds Community Engagement for COVID-19 Vaccinations,” May 12, 2021,
https://www.fema.gov/fact-sheet/fema-funds-community-engagement-covid-19-vaccinations; FEMA, “FEMA Public
Assistance Supports COVID-19 Vaccine Administration to Children,” provided by FEMA Congressional and
Legislative Affairs, Nov. 3, 2021; and FEMA, “FEMA Support for COVID-19 Vaccination Efforts Continues,” Sept.
20, 2021, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/FEMA_Advisory_FEMA_Support_for_COVID-
19_Vaccination_Efforts_Continues_09202021.pdf.
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Figure 4. Duration of Select FEMA Lines of Effort in Federal Pandemic Response

Source: CRS Analysis of FEMA Pandemic-Specific Guidance and Documentation of Response Efforts.
Notes:
a. At any time, FEMA may announce an end to the “incident period” that marks the period during which the pandemic occurred. Separately, FEMA policy notes that
Public Assistance for pandemic-related costs wil be available on an ongoing basis; FEMA will provide at least 30 days’ notice prior to its conclusion. For further discussion
on the duration of Stafford Act declarations and Public Assistance, see CRS Report R46809, Federal Emergency and Major Disaster Declarations for the COVID-19 Pandemic,
coordinated by Erica A. Lee and Sarah A. Lister.
b. The Community Based Testing Sites initiative involved multiple phases; this graph reflects phases in which FEMA was directly involved. The White House announced
the establishment of new federal surge testing sites in December 2021, supported in part by FEMA. The White House, “President Biden Announces New Actions to
Protect Americans and Help Communities and Hospitals Battle Omicron,” Dec. 21, 2021; FEMA, “FEMA Funding for the Safe Opening and Operating of Schools,
Including Testing,” Jan. 18, 2022.
c. FEMA began accepting applications for Funeral Assistance on Apr.12, 2021 for deaths attributed to COVID-19 since Jan. 20, 2020.

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Considerations for Congress
The following section identifies considerations and policy options for Congress in four areas
critical to FEMA’s role in the federal pandemic response: the Stafford Act, FEMA’s operations
and organization, the Defense Production Act (DPA), and the Disaster Relief Fund.
Stafford Act Legislative Considerations
The following section identifies policy considerations specific to FEMA’s authorities under the
Stafford Act and their relevance to the federal COVID-19 pandemic response.
Applicability of Stafford Act to Public Health Incidents
The design of the Stafford Act might complicate activations for public health incidents. Presidents
generally activate the Stafford Act to respond to rapid-onset events that cause measurable losses
in a specific geographic area (e.g., tornadoes), in contrast to ongoing infectious disease incidents
that spread across whole regions.115 As noted above, the federal government mobilized and
adapted the Stafford Act in unprecedented ways to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Under the Stafford Act, governors or tribal chief executives may request an emergency or major
disaster declaration only when an incident is “of such severity and magnitude” that state, local,
tribal, or territorial governments are unable to effectively respond without supplemental federal
assistance.116 FEMA defines the time interval during which the disaster-causing incident occurs as
the “incident period.”117 Per FEMA regulations, Stafford Act assistance shall only alleviate “the
damage or hardship ... which took place during the incident period or was in anticipation of that
incident.”118 FEMA weighs the monetary value of structural damages incurred during the incident
period when evaluating a state’s capacity to respond to an incident, and then makes a
recommendation to the President regarding the state’s request for a declaration.119
Infectious disease incidents are diffuse and develop over a significant period of time without
damaging infrastructure; they do not conform to the temporal and geographic limits built into
FEMA’s declaration process. The lack of measurable physical damage might make it difficult to
determine whether the infectious disease outbreak is beyond the state’s response capacity under
the current assessment framework. Similarly, it may be difficult for FEMA to determine the
geographic areas eligible for federal assistance and establish incident periods for pandemics.
Additionally, policymakers may be concerned that definitions within the Stafford Act limit
declarations for future infectious disease outbreaks and pandemics. Under the Stafford Act,
emergencies are defined broadly as follows:
any occasion or instance for which, in the determination of the President, federal assistance
is needed to supplement State and local efforts and capabilities to save lives and to protect

115 For more information, see CRS Report R42702, Stafford Act Declarations 1953-2016: Trends, Analyses, and
Implications for Congress, by Bruce R. Lindsay.
116 Stafford Act Sections 401 and 501; 42 U.S.C. §§5170, 5191.
117 44 C.F.R. §206.32(f).
118 Ibid.
119 For information on the damage assessment process, see CRS Report R44977, Preliminary Damage Assessments for
Major Disasters: Overview, Analysis, and Policy Observations, by Bruce R. Lindsay.
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property and public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in any
part of the United States.120
The broad definition of an emergency arguably provides the President with the discretion to
declare emergencies for a range of incidents, including infectious disease outbreaks and
pandemics. However, the scope of emergency assistance is fairly limited. By contrast, the
Stafford Act authorizes a wider range of federal assistance for major disasters, defined as:
any natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high water, wind-driven
water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm,
or drought), or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion, in any part of the United
States, which in the determination of the President causes damage of sufficient severity
and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance under this chapter to supplement the
efforts and available resources of states, local governments, and disaster relief
organizations in alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused thereby.121
While President Trump and President Biden determined that pandemics could be included within
the definition of major disaster (which does not explicitly list infectious disease outbreaks or
pandemics), future administrations could view the list to more narrowly constrain the meaning of
“any natural catastrophe.” If so, requests for disease outbreaks and pandemics could be denied in
the future on the basis that they do not meet the legal definition of a major disaster.122
If Congress wants to broaden the applicability of the Stafford Act to include future infectious
disease incidents, it could require FEMA to update its regulations accordingly. The effort may
require identification of metrics that may accurately measure a state’s response capacity with
respect to infectious disease outbreaks. Towards this end, Congress might consider directing
FEMA to clearly measure hazard losses beyond structural damages. Congress could alternatively
consider amending the Stafford Act to include infectious disease outbreaks and pandemics.
Others may disagree and argue that such incidents should not be eligible for major disaster
assistance, and propose to amend the definition of major disasters to specifically exclude them.
Clarification of Roles and Leadership for Public Health Incidents
Federal planning, including a pandemic response plan adapted for COVID-19, envisioned HHS—
not FEMA—as the lead federal agency for pandemic response (for more detail, see “Federal
Response Doctrine: FEMA’s Planned Role in Infectious Disease Incidents”).123 When warranted,
these plans also allowed for parallel leadership, whereby HHS would lead federal public health
and medical response, and FEMA would coordinate intergovernmental consequence
management. The Public Health Service Act specifies that the HHS Secretary shall lead federal
public health response efforts for declared Public Health Emergencies.124 Separately, the
Homeland Security Act and the Stafford Act (by delegated authority) direct the FEMA

120 Stafford Act Section 102(1); 42 U.S.C. §5122(1).
121 Stafford Act Section 102(2); 42 U.S.C. §5122(2).
122 For example, FEMA explained that Governor Rick Snyder’s (Michigan) request for a major disaster declaration for
the Flint water contamination incident was denied based on the grounds that it did not meet the definition of a major
disaster. Letter from W. Craig Fugate, FEMA Administrator, to Rick Snyder, Governor of Michigan, Jan. 16, 2016;
reprinted in CRS Report R46665, Stafford Act and Selected Federal Recovery Programs for Civil Unrest: Historical
Perspectives and Policy Observations, coordinated by Bruce R. Lindsay.
123 HHS, PanCAP-Adapted.
124 Public Health Service Act Section 2801; 42 U.S.C. §300hh.
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Administrator to coordinate federal disaster response efforts.125 Officials issued declarations for
the pandemic under both statutes, introducing multiple leadership roles.126
In practice, the presence of multiple leadership roles generated confusion. GAO reported
confusion among nonfederal governments and healthcare providers; one local public health
official called the early federal response “incoherent, confusing, and uncoordinated.”127
Subsequently, FEMA reported that headquarters staff did not clearly understand the
responsibilities of the Unified Coordination Group directing the whole-of-government response
or interagency operational working groups that transitioned from HHS to FEMA.128 The National
Homeland Security Consortium (NHSC), a body comprising SLTT associations, emergency
management associations, and private-sector stakeholders, among others, identified an initial
problem of the federal response as follows:
The federal government’s messaging was neither unified nor consistent. The failure to
implement a national strategy or plan led to states, localities, tribes, and territories (SLTTs)
issuing guidance that was inconsistent with federal guidance. The guidance changed
constantly, which further confused the public and led to lost credibility.... This event tested
the limits of the national response doctrine—in particular NIMS/ICS—and agencies’
understanding of how to implement it, for prolonged, nontraditional, complex incidents.129
These findings echoed those of pre-pandemic GAO and HHS assessments that unclear,
conflicting authorities persist in federal public health response plans, presidential directives, and
statutes.130 FEMA has acknowledged that HHS’s and FEMA’s “parallel and overlapping
authorities” in federal response doctrine challenged pandemic response planning and
operations.131
Additional challenges emerged following the establishment of the White House Coronavirus Task
Force led by the Vice President, which was not envisioned by pre-pandemic plans and
authorities.132 FEMA reported that the Task Force, which included the FEMA Administrator and
the HHS Secretary, effectively worked with FEMA senior officials.133 However, FEMA also

125 The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act amended the Homeland Security Act to specify that the
FEMA Administrator “shall ... lead the Nation’s efforts to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover from, and
mitigate against the risk of natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other manmade disasters, including catastrophic
incidents.” (Section 503(2)(A) of the Homeland Security Act, as amended); 6 U.S.C. §313(2)(A). Stafford Act Sections
402(1)-(2), 403(a), and 502(a)(1)-(2); 42 U.S.C. §§5170a(a)-(2), 5170b(a), and 5192(a)(1)-(2), provide the President
authority to direct and coordinate federal disaster and emergency response authorities. These authorities have been
delegated to FEMA as well as the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, who has then delegated them to
the FEMA Administrator. FEMA, Disaster Operations Legal Reference, V 4.0, Sept. 25, 2020, pp. xxv-xxxii, available
at https://oregondisasterlegalservices.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/DOLR_4_09252020.pdf.
126 While previous incidents received declarations under both statutes, the scale of the pandemic and involvement of
every federal agency exacerbated confusion regarding agency roles and hierarchies.
127 See, for example, GAO, Federal Efforts, pp. 93-94.
128 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, pp. 8; 25, 32-33; 36-37; 39; 80.
129 NHSC, Pandemic After-Action Report, p. 8.
130 GAO, Influenza Pandemic: Gaps in Pandemic Planning and Preparedness Need to Be Addressed, GAO-09-909T,
July 29, 2009, p. 8; GAO, Defense Civil Support: DOD, HHS, and DHS Should Use Existing Coordination
Mechanisms to Improve Their Pandemic Preparedness, GAO-17-150, Feb. 10, 2017, pp. 18-22; https://www.gao.gov/
products/gao-17-150; HHS, Crimson Contagion 2019 Functional Exercise After-Action Report 2020, Jan. 2020, pp. 17,
19, 24-25, 29-31, 34-35.
131 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, p. 31.
132 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, p. 34; GAO, Biodefense: After-Action Findings, p. 26.
133 Ibid.
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reported that daily engagement with the White House caused the agency to undertake additional
efforts to ensure communication was consistent across the agency and subfederal partners. The
GAO found that conflicting messaging from the White House Coronavirus Task Force and federal
agencies may have contributed to confusion among subfederal stakeholders.134
Members of Congress, oversight bodies, the news media, stakeholders from the healthcare
industry and state, local, tribal, and territorial governments have repeatedly called upon the
government to clarify agency roles and clearly identify responsibility and decision-making
authority for specific lines of effort and the federal response on the whole.135 In its initial self-
assessment on the agency’s COVID-19 response efforts, FEMA also recommended that the
federal government clarify agency authorities, roles, and financial responsibilities for public
health incidents.136 The NHSC recommended that the federal government update and promulgate
a national strategy, framework, and plan for pandemics.137
Congress may consider clarifying statutory authorities and roles in large-scale public health
incidents declared under both the Public Health Service Act and the Stafford Act. Neither the
Stafford Act nor FEMA regulations currently specify how FEMA shall coordinate with HHS in
public health incidents declared under the Stafford Act; Congress could amend the statute or
direct the agencies to issue relevant rulemaking following analysis of agency after-action reports.
Notably, in September 2020, GAO recommended that HHS, in consultation with FEMA, clarify
roles and responsibilities with respect to pandemic supply chain management and supply gaps—
recommendations that remained open as of September 2021.138
Emergency managers, experts, and SLTT stakeholders have proposed possible leadership
structures.139 The International Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM) recommended that
President Biden, upon assuming office “formally designate FEMA as THE lead agency for all
hazards Incident Coordination across the federal government enterprise to include Stafford Act
and non-Stafford Act events” and reinstate the FEMA Administrator’s membership in the

134 GAO, Federal Efforts, pp. 76, 94.
135 See, for example, GAO, COVID-19: Opportunities, pp. 65-66; GAO, Federal Efforts, p. 94; GAO, “Priority Open
Recommendations: Department of Homeland Security,” Aug. 13, 2021, p. 4, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-
377pr.pdf; NHSC, Pandemic After-Action Report, pp. ii, 6; Testimonies of Rep. Payne and Rep. Thompson, in House
Homeland Security Committee, Federal And State Pandemic Supply Preparedness and Response; Priscilla Alvarez et
al., “Confusion and Frustration Still Reign a Week After FEMA Takes over Coronavirus Response,” CNN, Mar. 27,
2020; Testimony of Heather Krause, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, “House
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, Assessing the Federal Government’s COVID-19 Relief and Response
Efforts and Its Impact,” hearing, 117th Cong., 1st sess., July 29, 2021 (hereinafter House T&I, Federal Response
Efforts); IAEM, “IAEM Recommendations for Action During the First 100 Days of the Administration of President-
Elect Biden,” Dec. 2020, https://www.iaem.org/Portals/25/documents/IAEM-Recommendations-to-the-Biden-
Transition-Team.pdf (hereinafter IAEM, “Recommendations for Action”).
136 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, pp. 22-23, 31-33.
137 NHSC, Pandemic After-Action Report, p. 8.
138 These GAO recommendations were most recently reviewed in September 2021. GAO, Federal Efforts, pp. 1-2.
These recommendations build on pre-pandemic GAO recommendations to clarify roles and responsibilities in national
biodefense strategy. See GAO, National Biodefense Strategy: Additional Efforts Would Enhance Likelihood of
Effective Implementation, GAO-20-273, Feb. 2020.
139 For scholarly analysis of these and other alternatives, see, for example, Daniel Gerstein, “Assessing the US
Government Response to the Coronavirus,” July 20, 2020, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, pp. 166-174; David Carter
and Peter May, “Making Sense of the U.S. COVID-19 Pandemic Response: A Policy Regime Perspective,”
Administrative Theory and Praxis, May 5, 2020, pp. 265-277; Roy Guharoy and Edward Krenzelok, “Lessons from the
Mismanagement of the COVID-19 Pandemic: A Blueprint to Reform CDC,” American Journal of Health-System
Pharmacy, vol. 78, iss. 18, Sept. 15, 2021, pp. 1739-1741.
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President’s cabinet.140 The National Homeland Security Consortium issued a similar
recommendation while noting that “[c]onsensus was not achieved ... on this recommendation. At
least one association maintained that as a public health disaster, public health at the state and
national level should be the lead coordinating agency.”141 Alternatively, prior to the COVID-19
pandemic, the Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense (a private organization assessing U.S.
biodefense efforts) identified deficiencies in historical iterations of agency leadership and
recommended that the Vice President lead federal biodefense efforts under the auspices of a
White House Biodefense Coordination Council.142
Adaptation of Stafford Act Public Assistance for the Pandemic
The President’s Stafford declarations for the pandemic authorized FEMA Public Assistance (PA)
for emergency protective measures for jurisdictions nationwide. Prior to the pandemic, no
President had ever mobilized the PA program, FEMA’s largest federal grant program, as a
primary instrument to respond to an infectious disease event.143
The PA program generally operates following incidents clearly delimited in time and space (e.g.,
hurricanes); the pandemic compelled FEMA to make rapid pandemic-specific adaptations for
long-term response efforts across the country.144 For example, federal regulations provide that
emergency response activities funded through PA be completed within six months of a
declaration, though extensions may be granted.145 For the pandemic, the President directed that
the PA program provide reimbursement and direct assistance for eligible measures from January
20, 2020 to beyond July 2022—more than two and a half years.146 The PA program may
additionally provide assistance beyond that time frame, subject to presidential and agency
discretion.147
The President and FEMA have also deployed PA to provide financial reimbursement and direct
assistance for novel uses. For the pandemic, FEMA will reimburse Applicants for eligible costs
incurred for work required to safely reopen and operate designated facilities (e.g., the purchase of

140 IAEM, “Recommendations for Action.” The FEMA Administrator was a member of the President’s Cabinet from
1996-2001. For more information, see DHS Office of Inspector General, FEMA: In or Out? OIG-09-25, Feb. 2009,
https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_09-25_Feb09.pdf.
141 NHSC, Pandemic After-Action Report, p. 19.
142 Bipartisan Report of the Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense (now Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense), A
National Blueprint for Biodefense, Oct. 2015, pp. 6-7, 9, 15, https://biodefensecommission.org/wp-content/uploads/
2015/10/NationalBluePrintNov2018-03.pdf.
143 See CRS Insight IN11229, Stafford Act Assistance for Public Health Incidents, by Erica A. Lee and Bruce R.
Lindsay.
144 See FEMA’s website “Public Assistance Disaster-Specific Guidance—COVID-19 Declarations,”
https://www.fema.gov/media-collection/public-assistance-disaster-specific-guidance-covid-19-declarations.
145 44 C.F.R. §206.205(c).
146 President Joseph R. Biden, Jr., “Memorandum for the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Administrator of the
Federal Emergency Management Agency on Maximizing Assistance to Respond to COVID-⁠19,” Nov. 9, 2021,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/11/09/memorandum-for-the-secretary-of-
homeland-security-and-the-administrator-of-the-federal-emergency-management-agency-on-maximizing-assistance-to-
respond-to-covid-19/; President Joseph R. Biden., Jr. “Memorandum on Maximizing Assistance to Respond to
COVID-⁠19,” Mar. 1, 2022, Memorandum on Maximizing Assistance to Respond to COVID-19 | The White House;
FEMA Advisory: “COVID-19 Cost Share Extension,” Mar. 1, 2022.
147 See, for example, “Time Limitations,” in FEMA, “Coronavirus (COVID-19) Pandemic: Work Eligible for Public
Assistance (Interim),” FEMA Policy FP 104-009-19, Sept. 1, 2020, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-09/
fema_policy_104-009-19_PA-eligibility-policy-covid.pdf.
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PPE for schools, disinfection, surveillance testing), provide ongoing non-congregate sheltering
for at-risk and exposed individuals, and execute a wide range of work related to vaccination
assistance.148 These novel applications may modify interpretations of what assistance FEMA may
provide under the Stafford Act’s nonexclusive list of emergency response measures.149
Further, President Biden increased the federal cost share that FEMA will reimburse for PA-
eligible costs from the statutory floor of 75% to 100% for all jurisdictions nationwide. Prior to
that, SLTT governments and eligible healthcare organizations, including nonprofits, noted the
challenge of meeting the fiscal burdens of the 25% cost share, as well as providing the up-front
costs of eligible work before requesting reimbursement.150 FEMA has observed that the increased
federal cost share for pandemic response and the expansion of PA-eligible work (to include
reopening costs and enhanced vaccination assistance) significantly increased projected
obligations in FY2021.151
These pandemic-era changes to PA raise questions about future uses of, and expectations for, the
PA program.152 Congress might consider challenges related to the program’s adaptation when
considering how, if at all, PA should be mobilized for hazards with nationwide impacts, like
infectious disease events and climate change. Should Congress affirm the program’s relevance for
future public health incidents, Congress may consider whether existing PA authorities for
response are sufficient or should be expanded,153 and whether to clarify the eligibility of certain
activities, including vaccination-related assistance, the costs of reopening and operating facilities
during infectious disease incidents, and the ongoing costs of non-congregate sheltering for
eligible populations. Alternatively, Congress might prefer narrower interpretations of the Stafford
Act’s list of eligible expenses and further limit the statute’s authorities.
Novel projects funded by PA during the pandemic may be relevant to these discussions. The state
of California used the PA program to create Project Roomkey, which provided hotel and motel
rooms to individuals experiencing homelessness in an effort to mitigate the risk of COVID-19
transmission associated with congregate shelters, and thereby reducing the strain on the health
care system.154 Similarly, FEMA and the President made PA available to reimburse food banks
and restaurants for 100% of the costs of purchasing and distributing meals to eligible
individuals.155 Evaluating such innovative uses of PA might help agency heads and Congress as

148 See FEMA’s website “Public Assistance Disaster-Specific Guidance - COVID-19 Declarations,”
https://www.fema.gov/media-collection/public-assistance-disaster-specific-guidance-covid-19-declarations.
149 Stafford Act Section 403(a); 42 U.S.C. §5170b(a).
150 See Testimony of J. Ryan McMahon II, County Executive, Onondaga County, New York, in U.S. Congress, House
Committee on Homeland Security, Confronting the Coronavirus: Perspectives on the COVID-19 Pandemic One Year
Later, 117th Cong., 1st sess., Feb. 24, 2021 (hereinafter House Homeland Security Committee, Confronting the
Pandemic).
151 FEMA, Disaster Relief Fund: Monthly Report as of April 30, 2021, May 11, 2021, Fiscal Year 2021 Report to
Congress, p. 24; Disaster Relief Fund: Monthly Report as of July 31, 2021, Aug. 10, 2021, p. 26; FEMA, Disaster
Relief Fund: Monthly Report as of September 30, 2021, Oct. 7, 2021, p. 27. Reports available at https://www.fema.gov/
about/reports-and-data/disaster-relief-fund-monthly-reports.
152 For background about the PA program, its scope, and expense, see CRS Report R46749, FEMA’s Public Assistance
Program: A Primer and Considerations for Congress, by Erica A. Lee.
153 See, for example, an expanded list of eligible measures in S. 4627/H.R. 8266, “FEMA Assistance Relief Act of
2020,” 116th Cong., 2nd sess.
154 California Department of Social Services, “Project Roomkey/Housing and Homelessness COVID Response,”
https://www.cdss.ca.gov/inforesources/cdss-programs/housing-programs/project-roomkey.
155 FEMA, “Coronavirus (COVID-19) Pandemic: Purchase and Distribution of Food Eligible for Public Assistance,”
FEMA Policy FP 104-010-03, Apr. 11, 2020, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-07/fema_covid_purchase-
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they determine whether and how the program may be deployed for future unconventional or long-
duration incidents.156
Congress may also note the logistical challenges posed by the program’s nationwide use during
the pandemic that may have delayed assistance and hampered SLTT response efforts. For
instance, many stakeholders expressed confusion and frustration attributed to regional
inconsistencies in program delivery and eligibility determinations.157 In response, GAO
recommended in October 2021 that FEMA clarify PA eligibility requirements nationwide and
require additional training for the agency’s PA employees to promote consistent policy
interpretations within and across FEMA regions.158 How, if at all, the regionally-administered PA
program should change in the wake of these challenges remains an open question.
Adaptation of Stafford Act Individual Assistance for the Pandemic
FEMA’s IA program was adapted to support the pandemic response, providing an unprecedented
amount of assistance through Other Needs Assistance (ONA) for COVID-19 Funeral Assistance
and the Lost Wages Assistance (LWA) program.159 In a July 19, 2021 press release, FEMA stated
that it “has provided over $710 million to more than 107,000 people to assist with COVID-19-
related funeral costs.”160 and, as of the publication of this report, there is no deadline to apply for
COVID-19 Funeral Assistance.161 Moreover, FEMA provided approximately $40 billion through
the LWA program to participating states, territories, and the District of Columbia.162 The agency’s
initial self-assessment lauded the speed with which it awarded LWA grants and the amount of
funding obligated through the program.163 FEMA also acknowledged that the CCP was authorized

and-distributions-of-food_policy.pdf; CRS Report R46432, Food Banks and Other Emergency Feeding Organizations:
Federal Aid and the Response to COVID-19, coordinated by Kara Clifford Billings.
156 See Karen Stabiner, “What If We Turned Restaurants into Government Contractors,” The Counter, Feb. 11, 2021,
https://thecounter.org/biden-fema-reimbursement-restaurants-food-aid/; FEMA, “COVID-19 Community Food
Distribution Community Innovations,” July 2020, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-07/fema_covid_food-
distribution_ci-story_june1.pdf; “New FEED Act to Address Food Insecurity with Help from Restaurants,” July 2020,
FoodTank, https://foodtank.com/news/2020/07/new-feed-act-to-address-food-insecurity-with-help-from-restaurants/.
157 GAO, COVID-19: Additional Actions Needed to Improve Accountability and Program Effectiveness of Federal
Response, GAO-22-105051, October 2021, pp. 23-24, 353-366, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-105051.pdf.
158 Ibid.
159 FEMA’s “Disaster Relief Fund Monthly Report” includes Individual Assistance program obligations for
catastrophic disasters. For the COVID-19 declarations, the estimated Individual Assistance total through FY2021 is
$41.8 billion (and financial assistance to individuals and households was only provided for ONA). By contrast, the
estimated total through FY2021 for Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria combined is $6.0 billion (and, for these
disasters, financial assistance was provided for both housing assistance and ONA) (FEMA, Disaster Relief Fund:
Monthly Report as of June 30, 2021, July 12, 2021, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/fema_july-
2021-disaster-relief-fund-report.pdf). See also Statement of Heather Krause, Director, Physical Infrastructure, and
Chris P. Currie, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, GAO, Testimony Before Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, House of Representatives, COVID-19 Pandemic: Actions Needed to Improve Federal Oversight of
Assistance to Individuals, Communities, and the Transportation Industry, GAO-21-105202, July 29, 2021, p. 3,
https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-105202.pdf.
160 FEMA, “FEMA COVID-19 Funeral Assistance Tops $700 Million,” press release HQ-21-138, July 19, 2021,
https://www.fema.gov/press-release/20210719/fema-covid-19-funeral-assistance-tops-700-million.
161 FEMA, “Funeral Assistance FAQ,” https://www.fema.gov/disaster/coronavirus/economic/funeral-assistance/faq.
162 FEMA, “By the Numbers: Coronavirus Pandemic Whole-of-America Response,” press release, Mar. 8, 2021. The
Lost Wages Assistance total of “[a]lmost $40 billion for those who were unemployed due to COVID-19 through Dec.
27, 2020” was provided as of the COVID-19 obligations as of Mar. 4, 2021. FEMA’s “By the Numbers: Lost Wages
Assistance Totals,” Feb. 9, 2021, lists the LWA total as $42.6 billion.
163 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, p. 5.
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for all of the states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands,
and that all tribal nation members were eligible for CCP services.164 Additional consideration of
the pandemic-caused needs of individuals and households is not addressed in FEMA’s self-
assessment. Congress could consider requiring FEMA to evaluate whether the IA provided to
support COVID-19 pandemic recovery—which has been limited to ONA and CCP—has been
sufficient to meet the needs of affected individuals and households. Congress could also consider
whether FEMA may require additional authorities to meet the needs of disaster-affected
individuals and households following a future pandemic or infectious-disease incident.165
Disasters commonly create economic hardships for individuals and families, and the COVID-19
pandemic was no different. During the first few months of the pandemic response, Congress
considered the federal government’s options for providing housing assistance payments to
individuals experiencing financial hardship due to the pandemic. FEMA does not have the
statutory authority to provide temporary rental or mortgage payments when people experience
disaster-caused financial hardship. Currently, FEMA’s Rental Assistance program166 is premised
on an individual being displaced from their primary residence (e.g., because it is uninhabitable or
inaccessible).167 However, this has not always been the case. Prior to May 2002, the Stafford Act
authorized assistance to disaster survivors unable to make mortgage or rental payments. Section
206 of the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 (DMA2K; P.L. 106-390) amended the Stafford Act to
remove temporary mortgage and rental payments, and added the language predicating assistance
on displacement.168 DMA2K was generally intended to control the federal cost of disaster
assistance.169 Congress may require FEMA to evaluate whether its housing assistance programs
are adequate and appropriate to meet the needs of survivors following disasters that result in
economic (rather than physical) damages—as this was a gap that was revealed by the economic
effects of the COVID-19 pandemic.170

164 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, pp. 26, 87.
165 For example, Congress may wish to consider whether there is a need to clarify the LWA program’s authority.
FEMA stated that they were using the LWA authority, rather than the existing Stafford Act Section 410 authority to
provide Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA), because “DUA is very limited and only available to individuals
who aren’t eligible for regular Unemployment Insurance (UI). The President’s authorization for a $300 lost wages
payment from FEMA is for a supplemental payment on top of UI paid by the state, territory and the District of
Columbia. Also, DUA is limited to what regular UI in the state, territory and the District of Columbia would pay out so
it can’t be used to supplement regular UI.” FEMA, “Frequently Asked Questions About Receiving Supplemental
Payments for Lost Wages,” Aug. 16, 2021, https://www.fema.gov/disaster/coronavirus/governments/supplemental-
payments-lost-wages/frequently-asked-questions.
166 42 U.S.C. §5174(c)(1)(A).
167 42 U.S.C. §5174(b)(1); see also FEMA, IAPPG, pp. 80-81.
168 See the prior version of the Stafford Act’s provision of temporary rental or mortgage payments at 42 U.S.C.
§5174(b), (2001), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2001-title42/pdf/USCODE-2001-title42-chap68-
subchapIV-sec5174.pdf.
169 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Disaster Mitigation and Cost Reduction Act
of 1999, 106th Cong., 1st sess., Mar. 3, 1999, H.Rept. 106-40, pp. 1, 12, 17, https://www.congress.gov/106/crpt/hrpt40/
CRPT-106hrpt40.pdf; see also U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, Subcommittee on
Clean Air, Climate Change, and Nuclear Safety, Review of the General Accounting Office Report on FEMA’s Activities
After the Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 108th Cong., 1st sess., Sept. 24, 2003, S.Hrg. 108-364, p. 253.
170 FEMA has evaluated its housing solutions following disasters, including following Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and
Maria in its 2017 Hurricane Season FEMA After-Action Report, July 12, 2018, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/
files/2020-08/fema_hurricane-season-after-action-report_2017.pdf. Additionally, in several of its reports on FEMA’s
housing assistance programs, the GAO has recommended FEMA evaluate its housing solutions (see, for examples,
GAO, Disaster Housing: Improved Cost Data and Guidance Would Aid FEMA Activation Decisions, GAO-21-116,
Dec. 2020, p. 21, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-116.pdf; and GAO, U.S. Virgin Islands Recovery: Additional
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Hazard Mitigation Funding for Pandemic Stafford Act Declarations
FEMA’s role in responding to the pandemic may prompt stakeholders, including Congress and
the agency itself, to consider the timeline and scale of Hazard Mitigation Assistance funding
available nationwide through the Stafford Act declarations for the pandemic.
The Hazard Mitigation Grant Program is authorized by Stafford Act Section 404—Hazard
Mitigation171 and is funded through the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF). HMGP funding is available
to all areas of a state, territory, or tribal lands where it is requested by a governor or tribal chief
executive following a major disaster declaration (or the approval of a Fire Management
Assistance Grant). At the state, tribe, or territory’s request, HMGP may also be available
statewide.
HMGP funding is awarded as a formula grant to a state. The amount of the grant is based on the
estimated total federal assistance per major disaster declaration or Fire Management Assistance
Grant, subject to a sliding scale formula. For each declaration, a state receives a percentage of the
total amount of FEMA assistance awarded to the state for that disaster; in other words, the state
receives
 up to 15% of the first $2 billion of aggregate amount of disaster assistance,
 up to 10% for aggregate amounts of assistance between $2 billion and $10
billion, and
 up to 7.5% for aggregate amounts of assistance between $10 billion and $35.333
billion.172
States that have an Enhanced State Hazard Mitigation Plan173 under section 322(e) of the Stafford
Act can receive 20% of the total amount.174
HMGP-funded projects must provide a long-term solution to a problem, rather than immediate
disaster response or recovery activities. The state, territory, or tribal government can use HMGP
funding for mitigation projects for any type of natural hazard and for any eligible activity that
reduces risk and builds resilience. HMGP funding does not have to be used for the particular
disaster for which it was allocated, nor for the particular type of disaster. For example, funding
allocated for wildfires in one county could be used for flood mitigation activities in a different
county, if the state chooses to do so and the activity is eligible.
All 50 states, five territories, the District of Columbia, and three tribes175 requested HMGP
funding for the pandemic disaster declarations. FEMA announced on August 5, 2021, that every
state, tribe, and territory that received a major disaster declaration for COVID-19 will be eligible
to receive 4% of their total pandemic-related Stafford Act assistance in HMGP funding.176 Four

Actions Could Strengthen FEMA’s Key Disaster Recovery Efforts, GAO-20-54, Nov. 2019, p. 44,
https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-20-54.pdf).
171 42 U.S.C. §5170c.
172 42 U.S.C. §5170c(a) and 44 C.F.R. §206.432(b).
173 44 C.F.R. §201.5.
174 As of June 31, 2021, 14 states have approved Enhanced State Hazard Mitigation Plans. See FEMA, Hazard
Mitigation Plan Status, https://www.fema.gov/emergency-managers/risk-management/hazard-mitigation-planning/
status.
175 The three tribes are the Navaho Nation, the Poarch Band of Creek Indians, and the Seminole Tribe of Florida.
176 FEMA, “COVID-19 Disaster Declarations, Hazard Mitigation Grant Program Allocations for COVID-19
Declarations,” Aug. 5, 2021, https://www.fema.gov/disaster/coronavirus/disaster-declarations.
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percent is a lower percentage than is usually awarded for HMPG, but the total funding of $3.46
billion represents the largest amount of HMGP funding in a single fiscal year.177 (The largest
amount previously was $2.29 billion in FY2005, following the extreme 2005 hurricane season.)178
As with all HMGP funding, the State determines where the funding can best be used and how to
allocate HMGP funds to sub-applicants, which means this funding does not have to be used for
pandemic-related mitigation activities. The largest amount of HMGP COVID-19 funding will go
to Texas, followed by California, New York, Florida, and New Jersey (see Figure 5).
The Stafford Act declarations for the pandemic also made more funding available for the FEMA-
administered pre-disaster mitigation grants through the Building Resilience Infrastructure and
Communities (BRIC) program. BRIC is funded by a set-aside in the DRF equal to 6% of the
estimated aggregate amount of funding awarded under seven sections of the Stafford Act.179 As of
December 31, 2021, there was $1.81 billion set aside in the DRF for mitigation.180 This sum far
exceeds FEMA’s expectation that this fund would receive $300-500 million per year on average,
based on historical disaster expenditures.181 However, in its first year of operation, FY2020, BRIC
was over-subscribed, with over $3.6 billion requested from the $500 million available,182
suggesting that even the increased amount of pre-disaster mitigation funding due to the COVID-
19 disaster declarations is not sufficient to meet demands.
Congress might note the unusual availability of hazard mitigation funding across the country due
to the nationwide Stafford Act declarations. To be eligible for BRIC, applicants must have
received a major disaster declaration within the previous seven years. All jurisdictions are thus
currently eligible for BRIC due to the pandemic major disaster declarations, though that is
unlikely to be the case in the future. Normally, it would be unlikely for every jurisdiction to have
a major disaster declaration in the same year. Restricting pre-disaster mitigation funding to states
which have experienced a disaster recently could preclude communities with a clear risk under a
changing climate from receiving funding when that risk has not yet eventuated, and may make it
more difficult for locations facing major impacts of climate change to plan ahead. For this reason,
Congress may wish to consider whether these requirements should be relaxed. Congress may also
wish to consider the unusual situation where disaster declarations for a public health incident with
no physical damage has made funding available for physical mitigation activities.

177 CRS analysis of FEMA OpenFEMA data set on Hazard Mitigation Assistance Projects—v2, https://www.fema.gov/
openfema-data-page/hazard-mitigation-assistance-projects-v2. Accessed Nov. 21, 2021.
178 Ibid.
179 Stafford Act Sections 403 (essential assistance), 406 (repair, restoration and replacement of damaged facilities), 407
(debris removal), 408 (federal assistance to individuals and households), 410 (unemployment assistance), 416 (crisis
counseling assistance and training), and 428 (public assistance program alternative program procedures). See CRS
Report R45819, The Disaster Recovery Reform Act of 2018 (DRRA): A Summary of Selected Statutory Provisions, for
further details.
180 FEMA, Disaster Relief Fund: Monthly Report as of December 31, 2021. Fiscal Year 2022 Report to Congress, Jan.
7, 2022, p. 25, https://www.fema.gov/about/reports-and-data/disaster-relief-fund-monthly-reports.
181 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Economic Development,
Public Buildings, and Emergency Management, Disaster Preparedness: DRRA Implementation and FEMA Readiness,
Serial No. 116-17, hearing, 116th Cong., 1st sess., May 22, 2019, p. 90, https://www.congress.gov/116/chrg/CHRG-
116hhrg40590/CHRG-116hhrg40590.pdf.
182 FEMA, Hazard Mitigation Assistance (HMA) Annual Grant Cycle Submissions Summary, Mar. 17, 2021,
https://www.fema.gov/fact-sheet/hazard-mitigation-assistance-hma-annual-grant-cycle-submissions-summary.
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Figure 5. HMGP Funding for COVID-19 Disaster Declarations

Source: FEMA, COVID-19 Disaster Declarations, Hazard Mitigation Grant Program Allocations for COVID-19
Declarations, Aug. 5, 2021, https://www.fema.gov/disaster/coronavirus/disaster-declarations.
FEMA Preparedness and Response Operations
FEMA’s Public Health Preparedness Coordination
Persistent challenges related to acquisition and delivery of diagnostic tests, production and
management of PPE, and development and distribution of vaccines have introduced new
questions about the state of national readiness for pandemics, as well as for other emergencies
more broadly. This is not the first time the nation has evaluated its state of preparedness. In the
wake of the much-criticized response to Hurricane Katrina, Congress directed the President to
develop a stronger system for building national preparedness for all types of emergencies and
disasters. In February of 2011, President Barack Obama issued Presidential Policy Directive 8
(PPD-8),183 which established a National Preparedness Goal,184 System, and Report to provide the
nation with a framework for organizing preparedness activities. The strategies set forth in this
doctrine govern how individuals, families, communities, localities, tribal nations, territories,
states, and federal agencies can strengthen the security and resilience of the nation, even against
pandemics. PPD-8 defines preparedness as “actions taken to plan, organize, equip, train, and
exercise to build and sustain the capabilities necessary to prevent, protect against, mitigate the
effects of, respond to, and recover from those threats that pose the greatest risk to the security of
the Nation.”185

183 White House, “PPD-8: Announcing the National Preparedness Goal,” Oct. 7, 2011,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2011/10/07/ppd-8-announcing-national-preparedness-goal.
184 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Preparedness Goal,
https://www.fema.gov/national-preparedness-goal.
185 White House, “PPD-8: Announcing the National Preparedness Goal,” Oct. 7, 2011,
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The United States’ national preparedness is based on capability planning186 and the 32 core
capabilities outlined by the National Preparedness Goal represent the critical competencies
needed to address all types of emergencies, from local incidents addressed with local resources to
national disasters involving presidential declarations under the Stafford Act.187 While FEMA
coordinates the federal government’s preparedness broadly, HHS is largely responsible for the
development of the national capability to perform public health, healthcare, and emergency
medical services activities. FEMA supports HHS with preparedness guidance, training, exercise
support for specific activities related to community resilience, information sharing, incident
management, and medical countermeasures.188
Although HHS generally takes the primary role for public health incident preparedness,
responding to a pandemic requires several other adjacent capabilities, including public
information and warning, logistics and supply chain management, situational assessment,
operational coordination, and economic recovery. FEMA is the coordinator for logistics and
information sharing activities at the federal level.189
In May 2020, GAO released a report that identified actions necessary to address shortcomings in
the nation’s emergency management capabilities.190 GAO stated that FEMA had yet to determine
what steps were needed to address capability gaps at the federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial
levels. GAO also concluded that FEMA had taken steps to strengthen national preparedness but
has not fully identified capability gaps and determined what actions were needed to enhance
national preparedness capabilities.191 To address these issues, GAO recommended the following:
Following the completion of the 2021 National Preparedness Report,192 determine what
steps are needed to address the nation’s emergency management capability gaps across all
levels of government and inform key stakeholders, such as the Office of Management and
Budget and Congress, about what level of resources will be necessary to address the known
gaps.193

https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2011/10/07/ppd-8-announcing-national-preparedness-goal.
186 This planning includes developing and maintaining knowledge, skills, and abilities to address threats and hazards, in
lieu of preparing for every potential scenario. For more information on these capabilities and FEMA’s capability-based
planning process, see FEMA, Core Capabilities, https://www.fema.gov/core-capabilities.
187 For more information on responding to and recovering from major disasters, see CRS Report R41981,
Congressional Primer on Responding to and Recovering from Major Disasters and Emergencies, by Bruce R. Lindsay
and Elizabeth M. Webster. The core capabilities are not the exclusive responsibility of any one government agency or
organization. Instead, they require the combined efforts of the “whole community,” including individuals and families,
non-profit and religious organizations, private sector companies, schools, media outlets, as well as SLTT governments
and federal partners.
188 GAO, Biodefense: After-Action, p. 65.
189 DHS, NRF 2019, pp. 39-41.
190 U.S. Government Accountability Office, National Preparedness: Additional Actions Needed to Address Gaps in the
Nation’s Emergency Management Capabilities, GAO-20-297, May 4, 2020, (hereinafter GAO, National
Preparedness), https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-20-297.
191 Ibid., p. 39.
192 In the DHS response to GAO’s report, FEMA stated that it does not believe that the cost of national resource gaps
can be estimated without first accounting for existing federal capabilities, which will be incorporated into the 2021
National Preparedness Report. The collection of necessary information was scheduled to begin in 2020, but was
delayed due to the response operations for the COVID-19 pandemic. As such, GAO’s recommendation has been
updated to reflect the updated timeframe following the publication of the 2021 National Preparedness Report.
193 GAO, National Preparedness, p. 39.
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GAO went further in an August 2021 report and stated that the U.S. emergency response
enterprise “lacked elements necessary for preparing for nationally significant biological
incidents,” including:
 a set of defined capabilities that account for the unique elements specific to
responding to nationally significant biological incidents; and
 a process at the interagency level for agencies to assess and communicate
priorities for exercising capabilities and consistently reporting on those
capabilities in after-action reviews.194
Congress may wish to monitor implementation of GAO’s recommendations, and may also
consider further clarifying the roles and responsibilities for pandemic preparedness between
FEMA and HHS.
FEMA’s Preparedness Grants for Public Health Incidents
FEMA also supports the development of preparedness capabilities nationally through a number of
grant programs. Some of these grants provide funding and resources for general emergency
management and preparedness activities (e.g., Emergency Management Performance Grants).
FEMA also administers grant programs that provide funding for preparedness equipment,
training, and activities through the Homeland Security Grant Program, which is primarily195
composed of the State Homeland Security Grant Program and the Urban Area Security Initiative.
In the past, SLTTs have used these grants to develop their preparedness for public health
emergencies by purchasing equipment such as PPE and by conducting training for biological
weapons attacks. According to a GAO report published in May 2020, DHS awarded over $52
billion in preparedness grants to SLTT partners to strengthen preparedness between FY2002 and
FY2019.196 Additionally, HHS also provides funding for public health preparedness through grant
programs such as the Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) program and Hospital
Preparedness Program (HPP). Prior to the pandemic, funding for preparedness grants from both
agencies declined several times.197
Given that Congress has appropriated funding for DHS preparedness grants for over 20 years,
Congress may wish to evaluate its continued investment. Congress may evaluate the need for
continued federal support and consider whether to reduce or eliminate funding. Some may argue
that states and localities should assume more responsibility for funding their preparedness, and
that the federal government should reduce its investment. Whether states and localities can
support this change may depend on their financial condition. Alternatively, Congress may choose
to maintain or increase present funding levels. Given the changing risk landscape, including the
presentation of novel threats such as COVID-19 and its variants, preparedness stakeholders may
need to develop new capacity and expand their capabilities. To support such changes, Congress
might consider expanding the eligible uses for FEMA’s preparedness grants beyond its traditional
aims to mitigate terrorism threats and redirect them towards public health applications.198

194 GAO, Biodefense: After-Action Findings, p. 30.
195 FEMA’s Homeland Security Grant Program also includes funding for nonprofit security and jurisdictions on the
U.S. southwest border. These two programs do not appear to provide funding that would support pandemic
preparedness.
196 GAO, National Preparedness, p. 3.
197 See CRS Report R44669, Department of Homeland Security Preparedness Grants: A Summary and Issues, by
Shawn Reese.
198 For more information and recommendations on shifting DHS’s mission towards nonmilitary threats, see Thomas
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Congress may consider assessing whether it is efficient and effective to have two separate
agencies administering preparedness grants, and the impact of this approach on capability
development and coordination.
Validating National Readiness: Exercises
FEMA recommends using simulated disaster scenarios, known as exercises, to validate
preparedness and test emergency plans, equipment, and training. Every two years, FEMA
conducts a National Level Exercise (NLE) to gauge readiness for catastrophic events and evaluate
the nation’s progress towards the National Preparedness Goal. These exercises have multiple
components, and generally culminate in a large, full-scale exercise with thousands of participants
from multiple federal agencies, state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) governments, industry
partners, and nongovernmental organizations.
FEMA has never led an NLE that has focused on a pandemic scenario, although in the early
2000s, some of its “Top Officials” (TOPOFF) exercises explored national coordination for
response to certain types of public health emergencies, such as chemical or biological weapons
attacks.199 FEMA is also not the only agency conducting nationally scoped preparedness exercises
with broad stakeholder participation. For instance, the Department of Health and Human
Services’ Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) also conducts
major exercises involving multiple federal agencies, SLTT partners, private industry, and
nongovernmental participants. Some of these intergovernmental exercises have addressed
pandemic scenarios.200 Other departments and agencies that coordinate exercises are not required
to coordinate with the NLE, and their results and recommendations may not be integrated with
those from NLEs. Congress might consider mandates for better interagency coordination of
nationally scoped exercises as well as a more unified strategy for tracking outcomes. Congress
may also conduct oversight activities or mandate reporting on the results of these preparedness-
building activities.
According to guidance published by FEMA, every exercise should yield lessons learned,
corrective actions, and an improvement plan for the participating stakeholders. These documents
provide a roadmap for closing gaps in core prevention, protection, response, recovery, and
mitigation capabilities. GAO has stated that FEMA lacks a formal mechanism to document and
track best practices, lessons learned, and corrective actions identified through after-action reports
(AARs), and lacks guidance on sharing AAR findings with stakeholders.201 The outputs and
benefits of NLEs, and other exercises may be lost without greater accountability for recording
and implementing the results. GAO recommended that DHS develop a better means of tracking
exercise outputs, and DHS officials concurred and planned to address them before March 31,
2022.202 Congress may consider oversight activities to ensure that the findings of NLEs are
properly leveraged to improve national capabilities.

Warrick and Caitlin Durkovich, “Future of DHS Project: Key Findings and Recommendations,” Atlantic Council,
August 2020, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/future-of-dhs/future-of-dhs-project-key-findings-and-
recommendations/.
199 For more information on National Level Exercises, see CRS In Focus IF11879, National Level Exercises: History,
Authorities, and Congressional Considerations, by Lauren R. Stienstra.
200 See, for example, the pandemic exercise conducted in 2019 and detailed in Office of the Assistant Secretary for
Preparedness and Response, Crimson Contagion 2019 Functional Exercise After-Action Report, January 2020.
201 GAO, National Preparedness, pp. 36-37.
202 GAO, National Preparedness.
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Additionally, while FEMA administers NLEs on behalf of the federal government as a whole, it
does not select the focus of these exercises directly. The design and development of NLEs is
guided by the strategic priorities set by the Principals Committee of the National Security Council
and builds on real-world incidents.203 Should Congress desire to shift the focus, frequency, or
scope of NLEs, it may consider more prescriptive legislative language or rulemaking.
Pandemic Response and the Limits of FEMA’s Capacity and Expertise
The FEMA Administrators who have led the agency during the nation’s response to the COVID-
19 pandemic (Peter Gaynor, under President Trump; Bob Fenton (Acting) and Deanne Criswell,
under President Biden) have acknowledged the challenges posed by the agency’s simultaneous
response to the pandemic and other concurrent disasters. They have noted that the magnitude and
nature of the incident necessitated a re-examination of its practices, and emphasized the need to
reduce the risk to staff while still enabling FEMA to perform its mission.204 To support pandemic
response, they have focused on expanding FEMA’s workforce,205 and supporting state, local,
tribal, and territorial response partners (“response works the best when it’s locally executed, state-
managed, and federally supported”).206 Additionally, they have acknowledged that Congress
provided FEMA and the DRF with sufficient financial resources to perform its mission.207
Although the Administrators lauded the work of FEMA in managing the whole-of-government
response to the COVID-19 pandemic, GAO determined that the pandemic overwhelmed existing
preparedness and response structures and resources at the agency.208 Further, in 2020, GAO
reported on FEMA’s staffing shortages and workforce challenges, noting “[t]he large number of
declared COVID-19 disasters coupled with hurricane and wildfire seasons adds other potential
challenges.”209 Challenges identified by GAO related to FEMA’s support of the pandemic

203 The priorities for 2021-2022 include continuity of essential functions; cybersecurity; economic recovery and
resilience; national security emergencies and catastrophic incidents; operational coordination; public health and
healthcare emergencies; shelter and housing solutions; and stabilization and restoration of community lifelines.
204 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Reform, Subcommittee on Environment, FEMA’s Natural
Disaster Preparedness and Response Efforts During the Coronavirus Pandemic, Statement of Peter Gaynor, then-
Administrator, FEMA, DHS, 116th Cong., 2nd sess., July 24, 2020, no. 116-107, p. 5 (hereinafter Statement by
Administrator Gaynor, FEMA’s Natural Disaster Response During COVID-19). See also FEMA, Initial Assessment,
pp. 110, 112; U.S. Congress, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Economic
Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management, FEMA’s Priorities for FY 2022 and Beyond:
Coordinating Mission, Vision, and Budget, Statement of Deanne Criswell, FEMA Administrator, 117th Cong., 1st sess.,
June 23, 2021, p. 2, https://transportation.house.gov/imo/media/doc/Criswell%20Testimony1.pdf (hereinafter
Statement by Administrator Criswell, FEMA’s Priorities for FY2022 and Beyond).
205 Statement by Administrator Gaynor, FEMA’s Natural Disaster Response During COVID-19, p. 6; Statement by
Administrator Criswell, FEMA’s Priorities for FY2022 and Beyond, p. 3.
206 Statement by Administrator Gaynor, FEMA’s Natural Disaster Response During COVID-19, pp. 16-17; see also
Statement of Robert Fenton, then-Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Administrator, FEMA, DHS, in U.S.
Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security, The Role of FEMA and
Emergency Management in COVID-19 Response, 117th Cong., 1st sess., Mar. 16, 2021, https://www.fema.gov/fact-
sheet/role-fema-and-emergency-management-covid-19-response (hereinafter Statement of Robert Fenton, The Role of
FEMA in COVID-19 Response).
207 Statement by Administrator Gaynor, FEMA’s Natural Disaster Response During COVID-19, p. 17.
208 Statement of Chris Currie, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, GAO, in House Homeland Security Committee,
Federal and State Pandemic Supply Preparedness and Response; see also GAO, FEMA Disaster Workforce: Actions
Needed to Address Deployment and Staff Development Challenges, GAO-20-360, May 4, 2020, https://www.gao.gov/
products/gao-20-360.
209 Statement by Chris Currie, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, GAO, in House Homeland Security
Committee, Federal and State Pandemic Supply Preparedness and Response, pp. 26, 32-33.
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response include workforce-related challenges, such as staffing shortages; unreliable/incomplete
staffing information from the qualification and deployment process, contributing to an ineffective
use of the deployed workforce; the need for contract management improvements;210 and a dearth
of pandemic disaster management experience.211
Operational Capacity
Sufficient staffing is critical to FEMA’s ability to support its partners during disasters. The
President’s pandemic declarations required FEMA to support response efforts in every state and
territory, as well as the District of Columbia and several tribes, while also supporting the ongoing
response to natural disasters, such as hurricanes and wildfires.
FEMA has dedicated significant numbers of staff to the COVID-19 pandemic response. Prior to
standing up the NRCC to manage federal interagency COVID-19 coordination efforts, FEMA
was already “supporting 43 concurrent, open disaster declarations with over 5,000 personnel
deployed.”212 As of July 22, 2020, “FEMA ha[d] 2,245 employees supporting COVID-19
pandemic response out of a total of 20,831 agency employees ready to respond to any other
potential emergencies ... [and] FEMA [was] responding to 114 active disasters and 97 emergency
declarations concurrently.”213 As of March 12, 2021, a year after President Trump declared a
nationwide emergency for the COVID-19 pandemic, “FEMA ... deployed 1,842 staff across the
nation to support vaccination missions.”214 In addition to deploying to support disaster response
activities, FEMA’s staff also have steady-state responsibilities associated with their “day jobs,”
and the increasing number of Stafford Act declarations and nationwide events like the COVID-19
pandemic “will continue to put unsustainable pressure on FEMA personnel.”215
Some members of FEMA’s workforce that contribute to day-to-day operations and long-term
projects may be deployed at length for incidents like the COVID-19 pandemic. GAO explains
that a FEMA “staff member who works day-to-day in FEMA’s Office of Policy and Program
Analysis could hold a primary incident management title as a Facilities Manager in FEMA’s
Logistics cadre and a subordinate title of Logistics Specialist in the same cadre, and may be
certified to operate certain types of forklifts” for response purposes.216 Some may worry that the
deployment of staff in this way could diminish the agency’s capacity to advance its day-to-day
mission.217

210 See, for example, GAO, 2017 Disaster Contracting: Actions Needed to Improve the Use of Post-Disaster Contracts
to Support Response and Recovery, GAO-19-281, April 2019, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-19-281.pdf.
211 Statement by Chris Currie, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, GAO, in House Homeland Security
Committee, Federal and State Pandemic Supply Preparedness and Response, pp. 32-33.
212 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, p. 11.
213 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Reform, Subcommittee on Environment, FEMA’s Natural
Disaster Preparedness and Response Efforts During the Coronavirus Pandemic, 116th Cong., 2nd sess., July 24, 2020,
no. 116-107, p. 4.
214 Statement of Robert Fenton, The Role of FEMA in COVID-19 Response.
215 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Preparedness for COVID-19:
The Initial Pandemic Response and Lessons Learned, Statement of RADM Joseph L. Nimmich (USCG, ret.), 117th
Cong., 1st sess., Apr. 14, 2021, p. 3 (hereinafter Statement of RADM Joseph L. Nimmich, Preparedness for COVID-
19).
216 GAO, FEMA Disaster Workforce: Actions Needed to Address Deployment and Staff Development Challenges,
GAO-20-360, May 2020, p. 13.
217 See, for example, the testimony of GAO representative Chris Currie and former FEMA Administrator Craig Fugate
in U.S. Congress, House Homeland Security Subcommittees on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Recovery and
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To enhance the agency’s capacity, then-FEMA Administrator Peter Gaynor noted that, since the
beginning of FY2020, FEMA on-boarded more than 2,300 disaster personnel (more than a 22%
increase over FY2019).218 Additionally, in her statement before the House Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings,
and Emergency Management, Administrator Deanne Criswell stated that FEMA is prioritizing its
workforce’s health and safety, and noted FEMA is evaluating how to enhance operational
capacity as they prepare for a post-COVID-19 environment.219 Administrator Criswell also
emphasized the need to have the right staffing levels to ensure workforce readiness, as well as
appropriate training, tools, and resources.220
Still, FEMA reported that capacity constrained the agency’s posture towards the pandemic.
Despite the efforts discussed above, in June 2020, FEMA cited the need to adequately prepare for
hurricane and fire seasons as one reason it was reducing engagement in certain pandemic
response efforts (some of which transitioned to DOD and HHS in late spring through fall
2020).221 Further, FEMA’s January 2021 self-assessment noted that the agency was unprepared to
staff the NRCC for an incident of such scale and duration as the pandemic.222 Federal personnel
across the government that FEMA deploys to supplement SLTT capacity also appeared near
exhaustion during the healthcare worker shortage in fall 2021. FEMA instructed SLTTs seeking
supplemental federal personnel to first exhaust other means to build capacity, including
decompressing hospitals and recalling retirees, before requesting federal assistance given “the
possible scarcity of medical personnel resources.”223 A recent survey of federal civil servants
suggests that capacity constraints across agencies may have hindered the pandemic response.224
The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and the disaster seasons (notably, floods, fires, and
hurricanes), and the potential for novel and emerging threats and hazards may continue to affect
FEMA’s workforce and future staffing needs.225 FEMA and Congress continually evaluate the

Oversight, Management, and Accountability, FEMA: Building A Workforce Prepared And Ready To Respond, hearing,
117th Cong., 1st sess., Jan. 20, 2022.
218 Statement by Administrator Gaynor, FEMA’s Natural Disaster Response During COVID-19, p. 6.
219 Statement by Administrator Criswell, FEMA’s Priorities for FY2022 and Beyond, p. 2.
220 Ibid., p. 3.
221 Statement of then-FEMA Administrator Peter Gaynor and Rear Admiral John Polowczyk, in HSGAC, Federal
Procurement and Distribution.
222 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, pp. 12, 122.
223 FEMA, “Medical Staffing Requests Advisory,” Aug. 18, 2021, https://www.fema.gov/fact-sheet/medical-staffing-
requests-advisory.
224 David Lewis, “Is the Failed Pandemic Response a Symptom of a Diseased Administrative State?” Daedalus, vol.
150, no. 3, Summer 2021, pp. 68-88; “Partnership for Public Service Releases Preliminary Federal Executive Survey
Data, Announces New Initiative to Renew the Federal Government,” Partnership for Public Service, Oct. 14, 2020,
https://ourpublicservice.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Partnership-Survey-Reform-Release-2.pdf.
225 Statement of Elizabeth Zimmerman, Former Associate Administrator, FEMA Office of Response and Recovery, in
U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Preparedness for COVID-19: The
Initial Pandemic Response and Lessons Learned, 117th Cong., 1st sess., Apr. 14, 2021, p. 8 (hereinafter Statement of
Elizabeth Zimmerman, Preparedness for COVID-19).
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agency’s funding and staffing needs,226 and Congress could also consider evaluating the need for
building staffing surge capacity to further support disaster response.227
Infectious Diseases Incident Experience/Expertise
As noted by GAO, “the response to the COVID-19 pandemic has relied on both public health and
emergency management capabilities, which are often governed by different authorities and
directed by different agencies at the Federal and non-Federal level.”228 HHS is the lead federal
agency for Emergency Support Function #8—Public Health and Medical Services, and has
statutory authority for health and medical events.229 Despite this, as described above, FEMA was
placed in charge of the federal response to the COVID-19 pandemic. In an earlier hearing, former
FEMA Administrator Craig Fugate noted that FEMA is
the ultimate support agency.... By putting FEMA in the lead role, I think we lost a lot of
the expertise that CDC should have had that FEMA could have supported. So I think
FEMA’s role as the Nation’s crisis manager should be enforced, but I think it should also
be seen that we want to make sure that the lead agencies with the jurisdiction, the legal
authority, and the expertise are taking that lead and FEMA is supporting it and hopefully
making them more successful.230
Emergency mangers commonly support overall incident coordination, and work with the lead
agencies that possess the subject matter expertise needed to manage the incident response efforts.
According to GAO, during previous health-related incidents in the United States, such as H1N1,
Ebola, and Zika, HHS and the CDC possessed the capacity to handle the public health response.
The COVID-19 pandemic, however, has been different, in part, because of the resource
coordination and logistical challenges it has presented.231
Congress might examine FEMA’s ongoing role in the pandemic to determine whether possible
future roles in public health incidents require the agency to develop new areas of expertise in its
leadership and workforce. For example, policy scholars have suggested incorporating healthcare
experts into FEMA’s leadership.232 Additional funds may be needed for general or targeted hiring

226 FEMA includes funding for staffing in its annual budget requests to Congress. See U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, FY 2022 Budget in Brief, p. 64-67, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/dhs_bib_-
_web_version_-_final_508.pdf; see also DHS, Federal Emergency Management Agency Budget Overview: Fiscal Year
2022 Congressional Justification, May 25, 2021, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
federal_emergency_management_agency_0.pdf.
227 Statement of RADM Joseph L. Nimmich, Preparedness for COVID-19, p. 4. RADM Nimmich cited the Business
Executives for National Security’s (BENS’s) recommendation to maximize surge and supply capabilities, included in
their report, Findings and Recommendations of the BENS Commission on the National Response Enterprise: A Call to
Action, pp. 14-16, https://www.bens.org/file/national-response-enterprise/CNRE-Report-February-2021.pdf.
228 Statement by Chris Currie, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, GAO, in HSGAC, Reviewing Federal and
State Pandemic Supply Preparedness and Response, pp. 34-35.
229 FEMA, “Emergency Support Function #8—Public Health and Medical Services Annex,” June 2016,
https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-07/fema_ESF_8_Public-Health-Medical.pdf; FEMA, Initial Assessment
Report, pp. 22-23; see also Statement of Elizabeth Zimmerman, Preparedness for COVID-19, p. 3.
230 House Homeland Security Committee, Federal and State Pandemic Supply Preparedness and Response, p. 39. See
comments by Craig Fugate, Senior Advisor, Blue Dot Strategies and Former FEMA Administrator, and Mark
Ghilarducci, Director of the California Office of Emergency Services, who concurred with Mr. Fugate’s comments.
231 Chris Currie, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, GAO, in House Homeland Security Committee, Federal
and State Pandemic Supply Preparedness and Response, pp. 39-40.
232 Attila Hertelendy and William Waugh, “Emergency Management Missing from the Pandemic?” Journal of
Emergency Management, vol. 18, no. 7 (2020), pp. 149-150; Dale A. Roseet al., “The Evolution of Public Health
Emergency Management as a Field of Practice,” America Journal of Public Health, vol. 107 (September 2017), pp.
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to ensure FEMA has sufficient and appropriately trained staff to accomplish pandemic-related
tasks and activities. Additional staff may help to meet the agency’s evolving needs; for example,
providing vaccination support.
Adapting FEMA’s Regionalized Response Structure to a Nationwide Disaster
To respond to the pandemic, FEMA undertook operations missions that were unprecedented in
kind and scale for the agency. While much of FEMA’s response efforts adhered to the principles
described in the National Incident Management Strategy (NIMS), Incident Command System
(ICS) and Federal Interagency Response and Recovery Plans (FIOPs), the agency also adapted
certain response procedures to meet the novel demands of an infectious disease incident.
The historic, nationwide, and unique demands of the pandemic conflicted with some aspects of
FEMA’s operational plans, tools, and locally-focused strategies. For example, conflicts with DHS
NIMS/ICS mechanisms and HHS-established task forces delayed the creation of a unified
information collection and situational awareness plan for the pandemic by several months.233
Additionally, FEMA executed an unprecedented number of mission assignments (work orders
through which FEMA tasks federal personnel and agencies to execute response work, e.g.,
construction of temporary care facilities) that required federal personnel to support response in
HQ and different regions and states. This surge required FEMA to modify mission assignment
procedures previously designed for localized response—by creating “national activation mission
assignments”—to reduce complexity and save time.234
At times, the NRCC also shared or assumed responsibility for certain efforts typically coordinated
at the regional level—including donations management, ongoing resource request assessment and
fulfillment, and logistics. FEMA’s system of collecting and tracking resource requests from state
and local governments required modification during response efforts due to Applicants’ lack of
familiarity with the system and the number and complexity of requests.235 FEMA’s logistics
supply chain management tool tracks resources and requests, but the agency was unable to
integrate information from other federal agencies and private sector and NGO partners.236 FEMA
reported that nonfederal partners were frustrated with national response strategies that differed
from previous, conventional FEMA responses that are more localized and led by FEMA Regional
leadership.237
Congress may be interested in monitoring what, if any, modifications to FEMA’s response
processes and frameworks are retained. The benefits and drawbacks of these changes may shed
light on how FEMA—or the federal government more broadly—prepares for future infectious
disease or other geographically dispersed incidents, given shared response responsibilities across
all levels of government. Among the factors Congress may choose to review is the fact that the
NHSC called for the government to revisit NIMS/ICS concepts and endorsed the creation of a
national strategy, “top-down guidance from the federal government,” and the “use of a single
official federal voice” for such guidance to ensure coherence across regions, agencies, and levels

126-133.
233 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, pp. 103-104.
234 Ibid., pp. 48, 57-59.
235 Ibid., pp. 48-50.
236 Ibid., p. 55.
237 Ibid., p. 80.
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of government.238 Other policy experts noted that increased subnational coordination beyond
federal intervention might mitigate the “fragmented and decentralized” nature of phases of the
U.S. pandemic response.239
FEMA-Led Critical Supply Distribution
Following FEMA’s assumption of leadership of the federal pandemic response, responsibility for
supporting and informing decisions about the allocation, distribution, and procurement of
pandemic-related supplies shifted to the Supply Chain Task Force. Representatives from FEMA
and DOD jointly led the Supply Chain Task Force.
At the height of the agency’s distribution efforts from March 2020 through July 2020, FEMA
exercised its authority to provide direct federal assistance to distribute PPE, ventilators, testing
supplies, and oxygen to PA Recipients (e.g., states, tribes, and territories with Stafford
declarations), who could then distribute them to Applicants, including nonprofit healthcare
providers. However, FEMA and the Unified Coordination Group (UCG) confronted several
challenges, including PPE supplies insufficient to meet the demands of governments and
providers nationwide. As a result, decision-making bodies, including the UCG, undertook PPE
allocation decisions using, in part, a new Resource Allocation Tool. FEMA’s testing supply
distribution followed different procedures guided by the Trump Administration’s Testing
Blueprint.240
To inform PPE allocation decisions, the UCG relied upon real-time contract data provided by the
country’s largest medical supply distributors, pursuant to agreements established for Project Air
Bridge participants.241 This data afforded FEMA and the UCG visibility into the domestic PPE
supply chain.242 The Supply Chain Task Force consolidated these data with other medical, supply,
and demographic data obtained through private sector and government partners to support
allocation decisions.243
In the early months of FEMA’s distribution efforts, many stakeholders expressed confusion over
shifting responsibility for supply procurement and the federal government’s PPE allocation
determinations. FEMA acknowledged that the “UCG scrutinized requests for supplies,” because
subfederal officials “overestimated their needs.”244

238 NHSC, Pandemic After-Action Report, pp. 8-9.
239 David Carter and Peter May, “Making Sense of the U.S. COVID-19 Pandemic Response: A Policy Regime
Perspective,” Administrative Theory and Praxis, May 5, 2020, pp. 265-277.
240 GAO, Federal Efforts, p. 12; CRS Report R46481, COVID-19 Testing: Frequently Asked Questions, coordinated by
Amanda K. Sarata and Elayne J. Heisler, pp. 15-17; FEMA, “Federal Support to Expand National Testing
Capabilities,” May 5, 2020, pp. 15-17, https://www.fema.gov/fact-sheet/federal-support-expand-national-testing-
capabilities; HHS, “Report to Congress: COVID-19 Strategic Testing Plan,” May 24, 2020, pp. 20-21,
https://www.democrats.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
COVID%20National%20Diagnostics%20Strategy%2005%2024%202020%20v%20FINAL.pdf.
241 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, pp. 64-68.
242 Ibid., p. 68.
243 The Supply Chain Task Force’s data and analysis body, the National Resource Prioritization Cell, supported
allocation decisions and procedures. See FEMA, “Coronavirus (COVID-19) Pandemic: National Resource
Prioritization Cell,” Apr. 18, 2020. For more information, see CRS Report R46628, COVID-19 and Domestic PPE
Production and Distribution: Issues and Policy Options, coordinated by Michael H. Cecire, pp. 12-17; FEMA, Initial
Assessment Report, pp. 8-9, 35-36, 68.
244 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, p. 36; GAO, COVID-19: Opportunities, p. 22.
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In September 2020, GAO found that seven of eight states interviewed about PPE supplies found
that the situation had improved since the onset of the pandemic.245 However, GAO issued
multiple recommendations related to federal medical supply distribution. In particular, it
recommended that FEMA and HHS communicate to subfederal governments how the federal
government planned to help mitigate medical supply needs and enhance those governments
ability to track supply requests.246 When reviewing the status of these recommendations in
September 2021, GAO cautioned that “[w]ithout systematic and deliberate action to help
jurisdictions ensure they have the support they need to track, manage, and plan for supplies,
states, tribes, and territories on the front lines of the whole-of-nation COVID-19 response may
continue to face challenges that hamper their effectiveness.”247
Members of Congress have repeatedly raised concerns over distribution procedures given the lack
of publicly available information on the factors and methodology used to determine supply
distribution.248 Given these issues, Congress may wish to consider legislation or directed
rulemaking that promotes greater transparency in FEMA’s supply allocation procedures,
particularly when the agency is confronting supply scarcity.249 FEMA has acknowledged that the
pandemic supply issues presented new challenges to the agency.250 Historically, the agency’s
logistics and distribution challenges focused on transporting resources into disaster-stricken
areas.251 Congress may determine that FEMA should share with Congress, experts, or the public
the data, algorithms, and decision-making methodologies it uses for supply allocation if FEMA is
to coordinate national or multi-region supply distribution needs in future hazards. Of note, HHS’s
recent National Strategy for a Resilient Public Health Supply Chain includes several objectives
focused on increasing transparency and coordination with subfederal partners.252

245 GAO, Federal Efforts, p. 13. The GAO conducted interviews in July and August 2020 with officials from
California, Colorado, Idaho, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, and South Carolina. GAO, Federal
Efforts, p. 141.
246 GAO, COVID-19: Opportunities, p. 1.
247 GAO, “Recommendations from COVID-Related Reports as of Sept. 30, 2021,” Recommendation Status Comment
as of Sept. 30, 2021, Recommendation 03, GAO-20-701, https://www.gao.gov/coronavirus.
248 See, for example, Sens. Warren, Blumenthal, and Schumer, Letter to Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
Chair Michael Horowitz, June 8, 2020, https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
Letter%20to%20PRAC%20re%20project%20airbridge%202020.06.pdf; and Sen. Lankford and Sen. Johnson, public
statements in HSGAC, Federal Procurement and Distribution; Testimony of Rep. Katko, House Homeland Security
Committee, Confronting the Pandemic.
249 For more detail, see CRS Report R46628, COVID-19 and Domestic PPE Production and Distribution: Issues and
Policy Options, coordinated by Michael H. Cecire, pp. 15-17, 43-44. For more on stockpile and distribution
transparency, see Preeti Mehrotra, Preeti Malani, and Prashant Yadav, “Personal Protective Equipment Shortages
During COVID-19—Supply Chain-Related Causes and Mitigation Strategies,” JAMA Health Forum, May 12, 2020,
https://jamanetwork.com/channels/health-forum/fullarticle/ 2766118; Anita Patel et al., “Personal Protective Equipment
Supply Chain: Lessons Learned from Recent Public Health Emergency Responses,” Health Security, vol. 15, no. 2
(June 2017), pp. 244-252.
250 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, p. 71.
251 Ibid., p. 54; Statement by Administrator Gaynor, FEMA’s Natural Disaster Response During COVID-19.
252 HHS, National Strategy for a Resilient Public Health Supply Chain, July 2021, pp. 38-39, https://www.phe.gov/
Preparedness/legal/Documents/National-Strategy-for-Resilient-Public-Health-Supply-Chain.pdf.
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Equity and FEMA’s Pandemic Response
Many Members of Congress, policy experts, and scholars have underscored the importance of
equitable253 access to federal disaster assistance during the pandemic, particularly for underserved
populations.254
Concerns over access to FEMA assistance for underserved populations, including low-income
individuals, individuals with disabilities, tribal communities, communities of color, and rural
communities grew as the government observed some vulnerable populations suffering
disproportionate hospitalizations and deaths attributed to COVID-19.255 For example, in June
2020, nine Senators wrote to then-FEMA Administrator Gaynor expressing concern over
“administrative hurdles” including prerequisites to receiving PA and the reimbursement-based
delivery model that inhibited or slowed the delivery of assistance to tribal communities that
suffered disproportionally from the pandemic.256 Subsequently, following reports that racial and
ethnic minority groups may have been underrepresented in the population that received vaccines
during the first month of the COVID-19 vaccination program, some Members suggested FEMA
ensure vaccination assistance reached these communities.257 More recently, both FEMA and GAO
found that tribal governments faced particular challenges accessing Stafford Act assistance during
the pandemic. GAO additionally found that FEMA did not have the capacity to extend needed
technical assistance to these communities.258

253 FEMA defines equity as “[t]he consistent and systematic fair, just and impartial treatment of all individuals.”
FEMA, “FEMA Defines Equity in Its Mission of Making Programs More Accessible,” Sept. 9, 2021,
https://www.fema.gov/press-release/20210909/fema-defines-equity-its-mission-making-programs-more-accessible.
254 See, for example, Testimony of Ranking Member Peters, in HSGAC, Federal Procurement and Distribution;
Testimony of Chairman Bennie Thompson, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Ensuring Equity
In Disaster Preparedness, Response, And Recovery, hearing, 117th Cong., 1st sess., Oct. 27, 2021; Testimony of Rep.
Johnson, House T&I, Federal Response Efforts. This report uses the term “underserved populations” to reflect FEMA’s
definition: “Groups that have limited or no access to resources or that are otherwise disenfranchised. These groups may
include people who are socioeconomically disadvantaged; people with limited English proficiency; geographically
isolated or educationally disenfranchised people; people of color as well as those of ethnic and national origin
minorities; women and children; individuals with disabilities and others with access and functional needs; and seniors.”
FEMA, “Underserved Populations,” FEMA Glossary, https://www.fema.gov/about/glossary/u.
255 See, for example, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “COVID-19 Among American Indian and Alaska
Native Persons—23 States, January 31–July 3, 2020,” Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, Aug. 19, 2020,
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm6934e1.htm?s_cid=mm6934e1_w; GAO, COVID-19: Sustained
Federal Action Is Crucial as Pandemic Enters Its Second Year, GAO-21-387, Mar. 31, 2021, pp. 356-366 (hereinafter
GAO, COVID-19: Sustained Federal Action).
256 Senator Krysten Sinema et al., Letter to then-Administrator Peter Gaynor, June 8, 2020,
https://www.rosen.senate.gov/sites/default/files/2020-06/2020-06-
08%20Udall,%20Sinema%20et.al_.%20FEMA%20Tribal%20Response.pdf; see also Testimony of Rep. Xochitl
Torres Small, in House Homeland Security Committee, Federal And State Pandemic Preparedness and Response;
GAO, COVID-19: Sustained Federal Action, pp. 25-27.
257 See, for example, testimony from Rep. James E. Clyburn and Rep. Maxine Waters, U.S. Congress, Select
Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, 117th Cong., 1st sess., Feb. 19, 2021, https://coronavirus.house.gov/
subcommittee-activity/briefings/webex-briefing-ensuring-equity-coronavirus-vaccinations. See also Elizabeth M.
Painter, Emily N. Ussery, and Anita Patel, “Demographic Characteristics of Persons Vaccinated During the First
Month of the COVID-19 Vaccination Program—United States, December 14, 2020–January 14, 2021,” Morbidity and
Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR), vol. 70, no. 5 (Feb. 5, 2021), pp. 174-177; Murial Jean-Jacques and Howard
Bauchner, “Vaccine Distribution—Equity Left Behind?” JAMA Network, Jan. 29, 2021, https://jamanetwork.com/
journals/jama/fullarticle/2776053.
258 GAO, COVID-19: Sustained Federal Action, pp. 356-366; FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, pp. 10, 86-89.
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Amid these concerns, FEMA has taken a series of actions to ensure that some underserved
populations may access Stafford Act assistance. During the summer of 2020, then-FEMA
Administrator Gaynor testified that he had deployed 25 civil rights advisors to the 10 FEMA
regions, where they had adjudicated several hundred civil rights concerns.259 In January 2021,
FEMA established the Civil Rights Advisory Group (CRAG) specifically to ensure that FEMA
assistance for SLTT and nonprofit vaccination programs is delivered without discrimination, as
required by the Stafford Act and federal civil rights law.260 According to FEMA, CRAG deployed
personnel from several federal agencies to promote equity in different aspects of vaccination
programs, including site selection and distribution.261 FEMA also released an itemized list of civil
rights considerations to inform state, tribal, and territorial planning for vaccination sites and
notified all PA recipients of their obligations to comply with federal civil rights law and data
collection under the Stafford Act.262 To promote vaccine access, FEMA made PA available to
transport remote and other underserved populations to vaccination sites, and to fund
transportation to underserved communities for vaccine outreach campaigns.263 FEMA made
available direct and financial assistance for mobile vaccination clinics in order to “meet people
where they work, live and socialize,” and make vaccines available to “hard-to-reach areas and
targeting specific populations such as high-risk groups, essential workers and rural
communities.”264
FEMA has also undertaken efforts to ensure assistance may reach specific groups with known
barriers to accessing Stafford Act assistance, such as individuals and families experiencing
homelessness, tribal communities, individuals with disabilities, and other underserved
populations. For example, beginning in March 2020, FEMA guidance made PA available for non-
congregate sheltering (i.e., sheltering that affords privacy, such as hotels and motels) for several
groups of eligible individuals, including individuals residing in congregate sheltering (e.g., people
experiencing homelessness) that face increased risk of exposure.265 FEMA also continued existing
efforts to enhance coordination with members and leaders of some underserved communities

259 Testimony of then-FEMA Administrator Gaynor, HSGAC, Federal Procurement and Distribution.
260 Stafford Act Section 308; 42 U.S.C. §5151. See also implementing federal regulations at 44 C.F.R. Part 7—
Nondiscrimination in Federally-Assisted Programs; 44 C.F.R. §206.11—Nondiscrimination in disaster assistance; and
relevant civil rights law at DHS, “Guidance to State and Local Governments and Other Federally Assisted Recipients
Engaged in Emergency Preparedness, Response, Mitigation, and Recovery Activities on Compliance with Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,” 2016. For more information, see CRS Report R46715, FEMA Assistance for Vaccine
Administration and Distribution: In Brief, by Erica A. Lee and Kavya Sekar.
261 Statement of Robert Fenton, The Role of FEMA in COVID-19 Response.
262 FEMA, Community Vaccination Centers Playbook, Final Version, Apr. 23, 2021, p. 4, https://www.fema.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/fema_community-vaccination-centers_playbook_04-23-2021.pdf; FEMA, “Civil Rights
Considerations During COVID-19 Vaccine Distribution Efforts,” Advisory, Feb. 11, 2021, https://www.fema.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/fema_civil-rights-covid-19_vaccine_checklist_02-11-2021.pdf; FEMA, “Civil Rights Data
Collection,” Advisory, Feb. 6, 2020, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/fema_civil-rights-data-
collection_advisory_02-06-2021.pdf.
263 FEMA, “FEMA Funds Community Engagement for COVID-19 Vaccinations,” May 12, 2021,
https://www.fema.gov/fact-sheet/fema-funds-community-engagement-covid-19-vaccinations.
264 FEMA, “Mobile Vaccination Centers Improve Vaccine Accessibility,” Mar. 16, 2021, https://www.fema.gov/blog/
mobile-vaccination-centers-improve-vaccine-accessibility.
265 For more information, see FEMA, “Coronavirus (COVID-19) Pandemic: Non-Congregate Sheltering,” Mar. 21,
2020, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-07/fema_covid_noncongregate-sheltering-faq_factsheet.pdf;
National Low Income Housing Coalition (NLIHC), FEMA Non-Congregate Sheltering During the COVID-19
Pandemic: Policy Changes and New Opportunities to Address the Needs of People Experiencing Homelessness,
https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/FEMA-Non-Congregate-Sheltering-During-the-COVID-19-Pandemic.pdf.
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through its Tribal Consultation Policy and Office of Disability Integration and Coordination.266
Still, concerns persist that Stafford Act assistance may not be sufficiently accessible to
underserved populations.
Members of Congress concerned about disparities in access to Stafford Act pandemic assistance
might take note of relevant open GAO recommendations. For instance, GAO recommended that
FEMA provide technical assistance to support tribal governments’ efforts to request and receive
PA for pandemic response.267 Another potential opportunity for Congress is to review FEMA’s
authority and capacity to enforce federal civil rights statutes and regulations when providing
assistance. If found insufficient, Congress might consider the recommendations of experts that
FEMA enhance direct and/or technical assistance for communities with fewer resources and less
experience navigating complex FEMA grant programs.268
FEMA and the Defense Production Act
The Defense Production Act (DPA) confers upon the President a broad set of authorities to
influence domestic industry in the interest of national defense. The authorities can be used across
the federal government to shape the domestic industrial base so that, when called upon, it is
capable of providing essential materials and goods needed for the national defense, including
emergency preparedness. The DPA includes provisions under Title I to prioritize federal contracts
and allocate scarce goods, materials, and services; and under Title III, to provide for the
expansion of productive capacity. Title VII provides definitions and other supporting provisions.
The Trump and Biden Administrations have employed the DPA to different extents, and in
sometimes novel ways, as part of federal pandemic response. The Trump Administration
employed the DPA selectively, focusing on individual companies (e.g., General Motors, 3M) or
industry sub-sectors (e.g., meat processing).269 Subsequently, the Biden Administration
announced that it would invoke DPA authorities broadly, including to expedite vaccine
production.270 Additionally, Congress appropriated approximately $10 billion in the American
Rescue Plan Act to support DPA actions that provide additional domestic access to critical
medical supplies.271FEMA is the designated lead agency for government-wide DPA planning and
coordination.272 FEMA’s employment of DPA authorities during the COVID-19 pandemic
revealed certain gaps between executive branch policy intent and execution. In particular, the
minimal resources allocated to FEMA’s DPA operations prior to 2020 may have undermined

266 FEMA, “Tribal Consultations Policy,” https://www.fema.gov/about/tribes/consultations, and “FEMA Tribal
Consultation Policy,” FEMA Policy #101-002-02, July 2019, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-04/
CLEAN_FP_101-002-2_Tribal_Policy_June_2019_Signed.pdf; FEMA, “Office of Disability Integration and
Coordination,” https://www.fema.gov/about/offices/disability. Note that GAO and FEMA recommended FEMA more
fully implement its Tribal Consultation Policy and improve tribal engagement given problems noted in delivery of
Stafford Act assistance to tribal communities. See FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, pp. 88-89; GAO, COVID-19:
Sustained Federal Action, pp. 356-366.
267 GAO, COVID-19: Sustained Federal Action, p. 356.
268 GAO, COVID-19: Sustained Federal Action, pp. 363-365.
269 See CRS Report R46628, COVID-19 and Domestic PPE Production and Distribution: Issues and Policy Options,
coordinated by Michael H. Cecire.
270 HHS, “Biden Administration Announces Historic Manufacturing Collaboration Between Merck and Johnson &
Johnson to Expand Production of COVID-19 Vaccines,” March 2, 2021, https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2021/03/02/
biden-administration-announces-historic-manufacturing-collaboration-between-merck-johnson-johnson-expand-
production-covid-19-vaccines.html.
271 CRS Report R46834, American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (P.L. 117-2): Public Health, Medical Supply Chain, Health
Services, and Related Provisions, coordinated by Johnathan H. Duff and Kavya Sekar, pp. 19-21.
272 See CRS In Focus IF11767, The Defense Production Act Committee (DPAC): A Primer, by Michael H. Cecire.
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FEMA’s ability to coordinate DPA efforts prior, and in response, to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Relatedly, FEMA’s leadership of the Defense Production Act Committee (DPAC), an interagency
platform created in 2009 to facilitate DPA planning and coordination across the executive branch,
may have contributed to certain challenges experienced during the federal pandemic response.
Defense Production Act Coordination Issues
As discussed earlier, some stakeholders expressed confusion over agency roles and
responsibilities during the federal pandemic response. Confusion regarding DPA coordination and
implementation was particularly evident as leadership authority shifted between FEMA and HHS;
with respect to usage of DPA authorities, both agencies displayed deference to DOD’s experience
utilizing DPA authorities (which is predominantly based on defense industrial base activities).
However, shifting the locus of DPA coordination authority conflicted with preexisting guidance
on whole-of-government DPA coordination, which designates FEMA as the federal government’s
DPA coordinator.
According to Executive Order (E.O.) 13603, the Secretary of Homeland Security is to:
(1) advise the President on issues of national defense resource preparedness and on the use
of the authorities and functions delegated by this order; (2) provide for the central
coordination of the plans and programs incident to authorities and functions delegated
under this order, and provide guidance to agencies assigned functions under this order,
developed in consultation with such agencies; and (3) report to the President periodically
concerning all program activities conducted pursuant to this order.273
However, in keeping with FEMA’s longstanding role, which precedes the creation of DHS,274 the
Secretary of Homeland Security delegated DPA authority to the FEMA Administrator.275 In this
capacity, the FEMA Administrator is also the chairperson of the multi-agency Defense Production
Act Committee (DPAC), which the 2009 DPA reauthorization established to advise the President
and coordinate DPA activities across government.276
Staffing
Although FEMA is the nominal DPA coordinator under the structure established by E.O. 13603,
its activities and influence in this regard have been more limited, including prior to the COVID-
19 pandemic. According to FEMA, its DPA activities are organized under FEMA’s DPA Program
Division at the Office of Program and Policy Analysis (OPPA), which prior to the pandemic
included four full-time staff (a director and three analysts) and contracted support personnel.277
The DPA Program Division director reports to the OPPA Associate Administrator, who reports to
the FEMA Administrator.

273 Executive Order 13603, “National Defense Resources Preparedness,” 77 Federal Register 16651-16660, Mar. 22,
2012, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2012/03/22/2012-7019/national-defense-resources-preparedness.
274 See, for example, Executive Order 12919, “National Defense Industrial Resources Preparedness,” 59 Federal
Register 29523-29534, June 7, 1994, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1994-06-07/pdf/FR-1994-06-07.pdf.
275 The Secretary of Homeland Security delegated this authority to the FEMA Administrator in DHS Delegation 09052
Rev. 00.1, “Delegation of Defense Production Act Authority to the Administrator of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency” (Apr. 1, 2020).
276 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF11767, The Defense Production Act Committee (DPAC): A Primer, by
Michael H. Cecire.
277 Email to CRS from FEMA Legislative Affairs, May 8, 2020.
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FEMA reported that its DPA Program Division’s modest staffing was insufficient to the enormity
of the task presented by the COVID-19 pandemic. “Because of the technical nature of DPA and
its importance during a catastrophic event,” noted FEMA’s initial assessment report of the
COVID-19 pandemic response, “a lack of trained, permanent personnel dedicated to supporting
that mission represents a major gap.”278 In response to the pandemic, FEMA reported that it
increased DPA staff to 30 using interagency personnel, many of whom required training.279
Notably, the same report highlighted that interagency augmentation during the COVID-19
pandemic was not a viable substitute for permanent staff trained and experienced in planning for
and employing DPA authorities. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the after-action report for an
HHS-led interagency pandemic exercise, Crimson Contagion, identified deficiencies associated
with participants’ understanding of DPA authorities, the statute’s applicability to pandemic
countermeasures, and a structure for employing those authorities.280
According to its own assessment, FEMA was not well equipped to use DPA authorities
independently, or to serve as an interagency coordinator for the use of DPA authorities, in reacting
to the COVID-19 pandemic. Such broader concerns were echoed in Congress during the
pandemic.281
The Defense Production Act Committee Composition
Congress proposed the creation of DPAC following DHS and GAO reports citing insufficient
agency planning and employment of DPA authorities and a lack of related interagency
coordination.282 DPAC was to “advise the President on the effective use of [the DPA]” and
“elevate DPA policy discussions to Cabinet-level posts, so that administrations going forward
[would] be able to reassess the [DPA’s] provisions and applications, and never lose sight of the
importance of coordinating.”283
Despite this critical mission, DPAC leadership roles remain to be filled. The 2009 reauthorization
directed the President to appoint an executive director, without Senate confirmation and at the
rank “of a Deputy Assistant Secretary (or a comparable position),” who is employed and paid by
the same federal agency as the DPAC chairperson.284 Initially, the position of chairperson
alternated between FEMA (via DHS delegation) and DOD, per a 2010 presidential directive.285

278 Ibid.
279 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, p. 74.
280 Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, Crimson Contagion 2019 Functional Exercise
After-Action Report, Jan. 2020.
281 Website of Senator Mark Warner, “Warner, Colleagues Urge Trump to Immediately Use DPA to Manufacture PPE,
COVID-19 Testing Supplies,” May 7, 2020, https://www.warner.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2020/5/warner-
colleagues-urge-trump-to-immediately-use-dpa-to-manufacture-ppe-covid-19-testing-supplies.
282 Although the DHS report is cited in the Congressional Record, CRS was unable to find the document. The GAO
report in question is Government Accountability Office, Defense Production Act: Agencies Lack Policies and
Guidance for Use of Key Authorities, GAO-08-854, June 2008, https://www.gao.gov/assets/280/277418.pdf.
283 “Defense Production Act Reauthorization of 2009,” Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 155, part 131 (Sept.
16, 2009), p. 21790, https://www.congress.gov/111/crec/2009/09/16/CREC-2009-09-16-pt1-PgS9480.pdf.
284 Ibid.
285 Executive Office of the President, “Designating the Chairperson of the Defense Production Act Committee,” 75
Federal Register 32087, May 19, 2010, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2010/06/07/2010-13659/
designating-the-chairperson-of-the-defense-production-act-committee.
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Subsequently, E.O. 13603 designated the FEMA Administrator as chairpersonship. Yet, to date,
no executive director has been appointed.
Since the reauthorization of the DPA in 2014, the structural composition of the DPAC, as defined
by E.O. 13603, remains unchanged. The DPAC submits an annual report to Congress, which
includes a high-level survey of Title I activities and typically includes varying detail and analysis
of these activities by agency.286 The DPAC’s other statutory functions, such as planning and
coordinating DPA Title I activities across government, do not appear in the annual report or in
other publicly available documents.
The DPAC’s limited activity, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic, suggests that it has not
fulfilled its intended purpose to advise upon and coordinate interagency DPA activities. Relatedly,
FEMA’s role overseeing the activities of the DPAC suggests that the DPAC, like its DPA
Program Division more broadly, requires more robust and permanent resources and staffing to be
able to fulfill its mission.
Congress may consider several policy options to improve coordination of DPA authorities. First,
Congress could amend existing statutory authorities to more clearly define the responsibilities and
resources for the DPAC to fulfill its mandate with independent political leadership. Alternatively,
the DPAC’s functions could be merged with a new central DPA office with sufficient resources
and staffing to coordinate interagency DPA coordination and staffing. FEMA could play a lead or
support role in any of these policy alternatives. While FEMA currently is the designated lead
agency for DPA and the DPAC, FEMA’s apparent institutional reticence to play a more proactive
role when it comes to fulfilling its DPA and DPAC obligations may suggest that the federal
government might better house lead DPA responsibilities elsewhere. On the other hand, FEMA
remains the government’s designated lead for DPA authorities, and as recently as the end of the
Cold War maintained sizeable staff and resources dedicated to the DPA mission.287
FEMA, the Defense Production Act, and Supply Distribution
In the early stages of the pandemic, media reporting,288 as well as congressional statements,289
contributed to a perception that the federal government was utilizing DPA authorities to preempt,
redirect, or, in some cases seize PPE and other medical or critical goods en route to SLTT entities.
FEMA denied this claim, explaining that “FEMA is not seizing or taking personal protective
equipment (PPE) from state or local governments, hospitals or anyone lawfully engaged in
acquiring or distributing PPE.”290 FEMA also acknowledged that certain DPA actions may be

286 The most recent DPAC reports are DHS and FEMA, “The Defense Production Act Committee Report to Congress:
Calendar Year 2020,” Sept. 20, 2021, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/fema_DPAC-report-
Defense-production-act-committee_2020.pdf; and DHS and FEMA, “The Defense Production Act Committee Report
to Congress: Calendar Year 2020,” Sept. 17, 2020, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/fema-dpac-
report-to-congress_2019.pdf.
287 According to FEMA, at the end of the Cold War, the DPA Program Division “had more than 60 people.” FEMA,
Initial Assessment Report, p. 74.
288 Noam N. Levey, “Hospitals say feds are seizing masks and other coronavirus supplies without a word,” Los Angeles
Times, Apr. 7, 2020, ttps://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2020-04-07/hospitals-washington-seize-
coronavirussupplies.
289 Letter from Senator Elizabeth Warren to Peter T. Gaynor, then-FEMA Administrator, Mar. 30, 2020,
https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
2020.03.30%20Letter%20to%20FEMA%20re%20MA%20PPE%20Needs.pdf.
290 FEMA, “Coronavirus Rumor Control,” https://www.fema.gov/disaster/coronavirus/rumor-control#supplies-masks-
ppe.
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misunderstood as seizures of lawful orders of critical medical supplies.291 On April 10, 2020,
FEMA, in coordination with Customs and Border Protection (CBP), issued a final rule on the use
of DPA to allocate specific scarce medical supplies, per E.O. 13090 and the President’s April 3,
2020 memorandum.292 This allocations action was justified in the final rule as a measure to
preserve domestic stocks of scarce medical supplies, because at that time the “domestic need for
them exceed[e] the supply.” The rule allocated these supplies exclusively for domestic use,
effectively prohibiting export without FEMA’s authorization.293 Although the Trump
Administration described these measures as necessary to “restrict the export of such threatened
PPE,” it did not release data on the policy’s potential effect on domestic supply. Some experts
questioned this strategy, noting that domestic bans constrained trade flows and, in aggregate,
could exacerbate supply shortages.294
Similarly, under E.O. 13090, the Administration utilized another DPA Title I authority to police
price gouging and hoarding of designated scarce materials and resources, including PPE, in part
to prevent profiteering and ensure equitable access to scarce supplies. The Department of Justice
(DOJ), in coordination with FEMA and other Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
component agencies, established and currently leads a COVID-19 Hoarding and Price Gouging
Task Force,295 which has engaged in various enforcement and redistribution actions since its
formation in March 2020.
Although the Trump Administration and the Biden Administration have publicized certain
individual enforcement actions, both Administrations have not released more comprehensive data
on the scale of anti-hoarding/price gouging enforcement or its overall effect on the availability of
designated scarce goods. As such, the aggregate impact of these actions is unclear.
More broadly, although the FEMA Administrator issued a formal denial,296 some sources allege
that the federal government interrupted or delayed legitimate medical shipments early in the
pandemic in an effort to combat potential price gouging or hoarding events. These alleged cases
of federal PPE interceptions or seizures may have been preemptive actions, where a producer was
compelled to prioritize the performance of a federal contract under DPA Title I authorities.297
Similarly, a producer could have mistakenly attributed an action unrelated to the DPA to the

291 Ibid.
292 FEMA, “Prioritization and Allocation of Certain Scarce or Threatened Health and Medical Resources for Domestic
Use,” 85 Federal Register 20195, Apr. 10, 2020, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/04/10/2020-07659/
prioritization-and-allocation-of-certain-scarce-or-threatened-health-and-medical-resources-for. Title I of the DPA
allows the President to allocate or control the general distribution of materials, services, and facilities. See CRS Report
R43767, The Defense Production Act of 1950: History, Authorities, and Considerations for Congress, by Heidi M.
Peters.
293 See Ana Swanson, Zolan Kanno-Youngs, and Maggie Haberman, “Trump Seeks to Block 3M Mask Exports and
Grab Masks from Its Overseas Customers,” New York Times, Apr. 3, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/03/us/
politics/coronavirus-trump-3m-masks.html.
294 Stormy-Annika Mildner et al., “Export Controls and Export Bans over the Course of the Covid-19 Pandemic, World
Trade Organization,” Apr. 29, 2020, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/covid19_e/bdi_covid19_e.pdf.
295 Department of Justice (DOJ), Combatting Price Gouging and Hoarding, accessed Aug. 11, 2021,
https://www.justice.gov/coronavirus/combattingpricegouginghoarding/.
296 David Rasbach, “Feds Seize Coronavirus Test Kit Materials Bound for Bellingham Hospital and Northwest,”
Bellingham Herald, April 2020, https://www.bellinghamherald.com/news/coronavirus/article241884351.html;
testimony of then-FEMA Administrator Peter Gaynor, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security,
Examining the National Response to the Worsening Coronavirus Pandemic, Part II, hearings, 116th Cong., 2nd sess.,
July 22, 2020.
297 For more information on authorities under Title I of the DPA, see CRS Report R43767, The Defense Production Act
of 1950: History, Authorities, and Considerations for Congress, by Heidi M. Peters.
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statute or FEMA. However, because the DPA statute does not require the government to publicize
DPA actions, it is possible that shipments were redirected or seized under allocations authorities.
Congress may consider requiring more systematic, transparent tracking of DPA actions. In a
recent report, GAO recommended that the executive branch “provide greater transparency on the
use of DPA Title I authorities for COVID purposes” to allow “taxpayers and other interested
stakeholders to see where a priority rating was placed on the contract or contract modification for
contract purposes.”298 A more transparent reporting of DPA actions could help the federal
government to identify and mitigate gaps in the use of DPA authorities while also reducing
confusion and controlling rumors. On the other hand, requiring enhanced transparency could
sometimes conflict with the use of the DPA for sensitive purposes, including for national security
purposes.
COVID-19 Spending Patterns from the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF)
The COVID-19 Pandemic Disaster Declarations and Tapping into the DRF
The federal share of costs of responding to and recovering from Stafford Act-declared
emergencies and disasters is generally the Disaster Relief Fund—an appropriations account
managed by FEMA for resources provided by Congress for that specific purpose. Unlike most
appropriations, these appropriations do not expire after a period of time, meaning they remain
available to be used any time after they are provided, and unobligated balances in the DRF are
carried over from year to year. At the present time, the DRF appropriation is divided into two
categories: resources available for the costs incurred pursuant to major disaster declarations under
the Stafford Act, and “the base”—resources available for most other Stafford Act activities,
including the costs of responding to emergency declarations.
Figure 6 shows the unobligated balances available in the DRF from December 2019 through June
2021, based on FEMA’s end-of-the-month reports. The bars show the unobligated balances of the
major disaster and base categories, and the circles reflect FEMA’s best projections of how much
would remain unobligated in the DRF at the end of the fiscal year, as of that month.299

298 GAO, Defense Production Act: Opportunities Exist to Increase Transparency and Identify Future Actions to
Mitigate Medical Supply Chain Issues, GAO-21-108, November 2020, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-108.pdf.
299 Given the unprecedented nature of FEMA’s involvement in the pandemic response, the estimates did not include
COVID-19 pandemic spending until the May 2020 report.
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Figure 6. DRF Unobligated Balances and Projections, December 2019-June 2021

Source: CRS analysis of data compiled from FEMA DRF monthly reports, Appendix A.
Note: At the end of January and February, 2021, the projected end-of-year balance for the DRF was negative.
Figure 6 shows how, at the time of the unprecedented nationwide emergency declarations for the
COVID-19 pandemic, the DRF had a significant unobligated balance available. This was due to
prior appropriations made, in part, in anticipation of the long-term costs of a series of catastrophic
disasters from 2017-2019.300 More than $41 billion was on hand for the costs of major disaster
declarations and roughly $600 million for other Stafford Act declarations, including the costs of
emergency declarations. The emergency declarations issued March 13, 2020, allowed for limited
assistance to flow from the DRF, but most of the broader authorities (and resources) available
under the Stafford Act were not available until major disaster declarations were requested and
approved, starting on March 20, 2020.
In the early weeks of the pandemic, there was uncertainty about how Stafford Act authorities
might be interpreted in responding to it. Matters of national public health had not been addressed

300 For information on historical balances and usage of the DRF, please see CRS Report R45484, The Disaster Relief
Fund: Overview and Issues.
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in this fashion, and the modern federalized emergency management system had never before
mobilized in response to an incident of this scope and scale.
The novelty of the pandemic response was reflected in the funding provided by Congress in the
early weeks of the pandemic. On March 25, 2020, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell
unveiled the “Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act,” which included a
supplemental appropriations measure with $45 billion for the DRF in an unprecedented structure:
$25 billion was provided for the costs of major disasters, $5 billion for the base (which pays the
costs of Stafford Act emergencies), and $15 billion that could be used for either set of purposes.
Major disasters and emergencies use different authorities to provide their assistance, so this
structure ensured that Stafford Act resources were available to support FEMA’s response, no
matter how it was structured. Figure 6 shows how FEMA originally counted this flexible funding
as part of the base. However, after major disaster declarations were issued, the $15 billion was
accounted for as major disaster funding.
Funding began to flow from the DRF in the days following the declarations. Figure 7 shows the
monthly obligations from the DRF from March 2020 through June 2021 for COVID-19
assistance. By the end of the March 2020, over $3.1 billion had been obligated from the DRF for
assistance to 16 states, and by the end of April, that total had risen to $5.5 billion for assistance to
51 states and territories.301 The obligation rate slowed over time, in part due to the evolving
understanding of the pandemic and the Administration’s interpretations of the role FEMA should
play. The Administration’s approach to the Stafford Act’s authorities may change in a novel
situation during the course of an emergency or disaster, which can have a significant impact on
outlays from the DRF. Two examples of this, from late summer 2020 and January, 2021, are
discussed in the next section.

301 FEMA, Disaster Relief Fund: Monthly Report as of April 30, 2020, May 7, 2020, pp. 11-12, https://www.fema.gov/
sites/default/files/2020-07/disaster-relief-fund-report_5-2020.pdf.
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Figure 7. Monthly Obligations for COVID-19 Disaster Declarations

Source: CRS analysis of data compiled from FEMA DRF monthly reports, Appendix B.
Lost Wages Assistance and Boosting FEMA’s Pandemic Involvement
Policy decisions by two different Presidents had a significant impact on the amount of funding
provided from the DRF under the Stafford Act major disaster declarations for the COVID-19
pandemic: the Trump Administration’s creation of the “Lost Wages” program, and the Biden
Administration’s expansion of FEMA’s response and reduction of state cost share for PA.
Lost Wages Assistance
On August 8, 2020, the Administration announced a “lost wages assistance” program (LWA),
which would expand and extend unemployment benefits for several weeks. This initiative would
use the Other Needs Assistance (ONA) program under the Individual Assistance (IA) programs
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under the Stafford Act.302 More than $41 billion was obligated for this program—visible in the
spike in obligations shown in Figure 7 in August and September 2020.303
According to FEMA, the LWA program provided $42.85 billion in grants—this was more than all
non-COVID obligations from the entire IA program under the Stafford Act since FY2000 through
FY2020 ($39.19 billion). The LWA provided more than six times the amount previously obligated
under ONA since its inception on April 30, 2002 ($6.77 billion).
The decision to proceed with the LWA resulted in a significant shift in the way the resources from
the DRF were applied across Stafford Act programs. Table 2 shows the distribution of funds
across the program types, looking at non-COVID disasters from FY2011-FY2020, and the
COVID-19 declarations.
Table 2. Major Disaster Program Obligation Ratios
Other Disasters vs. COVID-19 Pandemic
All Major Disaster Declarations,

FY2011-FY2020, Non-COVID
COVID-19 Declaration

Obligations
%
Obligations
%
Individual Assistance
$15.1 bil ion
12.71
$43.4 bil ion
52.96
Public Assistance
71.2 bil ion
59.92
29.5 bil ion
35.92
Mitigation
6.9 bil ion
5.81
0.0 bil ion
0.00
Operations
7.6 bil ion
6.40
8.3 bil ion
10.07
Administration
18.0 bil ion
15.16
0.9 bil ion
1.06
Source: CRS analysis of FEMA data
Increasing FEMA Engagement and Reducing Cost Shares
On January 21, 2021, the Biden Administration announced plans to increase FEMA’s support for
state and local governments for pandemic response and recovery by providing full reimbursement
for vaccination efforts, eligible facility reopening, as well as the cost of National Guard personnel
involved in the response.304 The decision to take these steps to increase FEMA’s engagement in
the response and to reduce nonfederal cost shares resulted in increased obligations from the DRF
for Public Assistance, which can be seen in Figure 7. In fact, the impact of the LWA coupled with
this expanded role resulted in projections that FEMA would exhaust the resources in the DRF
prior to the end of the fiscal year, which can be seen in the January and February columns of
Figure 6. In response, the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (P.L. 117-2; ARPA) included $50
billion in budget authority for the DRF.

302 For more information on the Lost Wages Assistance program, see CRS Insight IN11492, COVID-19: Supplementing
Unemployment Insurance Benefits (Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation vs. Lost Wages Assistance), by
Katelin P. Isaacs and Julie M. Whittaker.
303 FEMA, Disaster Relief Fund: Monthly Report as of September 30, 2020, Oct. 7, 2020, pp. 13, 25,
https://www.fema.gov/about/reports-and-data/disaster-relief-fund-monthly-reports.
304 Executive Office of the President, National Strategy for the COVID-19 Response and Pandemic Preparedness,
Washington, DC, Jan. 21, 2021, pp. 10, 15, and 17, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/
National-Strategy-for-the-COVID-19-Response-and-Pandemic-Preparedness.pdf.
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“Slush Fund” or “Required Flexibility?”
To be clear, the exercise of Stafford Act authorities for nationwide pandemic response is a new
approach, and not one proscribed by law, but Congress has chosen not to push the executive
branch to take a different approach. The exercise of the flexibility provided in the Stafford Act
that made a novel approach to a new crisis possible may ultimately jeopardize the political
viability of the general disaster relief program, if the DRF funding mechanism starts to be
perceived as a “slush fund” for an administration to accomplish ends beyond the agreed-upon
disaster relief construct.
In the case of the LWA, the Trump Administration created a new program within the Stafford Act
structure using a new interpretation of existing authorities, thus creating a second unemployment
program aside from the statutorily-authorized Disaster Unemployment Assistance. It did so at
least in part in response to a congressional impasse on how to proceed on unemployment
assistance,305 using resources already appropriated by Congress. In doing so, it provided those
appropriated funds in a way not previously envisioned and out of proportion with previous
precedent, resulting in a significant increase in the spend-down rate of DRF balances, which were
provided for a range of disasters, not just the COVID-19 pandemic.
In the second case, the Biden Administration took a new policy approach within the authorities of
the Stafford Act, increasing the degree of FEMA’s involvement with the response beyond the
precedent set by the prior Administration, and also increased the share of costs assumed by the
federal government. In using flexibilities found within the Stafford Act, this increased level of
engagement has resulted in increased obligations over time that have, in turn, required additional
appropriations—though this surge in obligations did not compare to those for LWA.
Congress has at times expressed concerns when an Administration has used appropriated
resources differently than Congress envisioned. With disasters (including pandemics), a quick
response and a flexible approach are essential to meet the unique needs and challenges presented
by novel circumstances. However, given that Congress ultimately controls the power of the purse,
and periodically reins in federal spending, it remains to be seen if Congress will accept as a
precedent the way these two Administrations have approached pandemic response and recovery
through the Stafford Act, or change the Stafford Act or its funding mechanism as a result.
A Catastrophic Disaster Like No Other
As Congress considers whether future pandemics should be addressed with Stafford Act
authorities and resources, it may consider how a pandemic affects the disaster relief budget in
contrast to a more traditional disaster. Pandemics have a long incident period, and do not cause
the physical infrastructure damage seen in more traditional “kinetic” disasters. The pattern of
assistance required may not conform to existing programmatic structures and mechanisms.
As a disaster that has cost more than $500 million from the DRF to date, the COVID-19
pandemic is categorized as a catastrophic incident. Accordingly, the allocation, obligation, and
expenditure of DRF resources for the pandemic is tracked in the DRF monthly reports. This
pattern of planning, legal obligation to fund, and provision of resources for COVID-19 pandemic
declarations is shown in Figure 8. Month 6 and 7 represent the increased obligations due to LWA,
and month 11 shows the jump in obligations based on the Biden Administration’s changes in
COVID-19 pandemic policy.

305 Lindsey McPherson and Niels Lesniewski, “Coronavirus Relief Talks Stuck on Scope of Aid,” CQ News, July 31,
2020.
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Figure 8. Cumulative Allocations, Obligations, and Expenditures from the DRF for
COVID-19

Source: CRS analysis of data compiled from FEMA DRF monthly reports, Appendix D.
Congress has required FEMA to report monthly on a handful of catastrophic incidents with a
degree of programmatic detail. In addition to obligations for COVID-19, programmatic
obligations for Hurricanes Sandy, Harvey, Irma, and Maria are tracked on a quarterly basis. As in
Figure 8, the impact of LWA and the expanded FEMA role are both visible in Figure 9.
Figure 9. COVID-19 DRF Obligations by Program and Quarter

Source: CRS analysis of data compiled from FEMA DRF monthly reports, Appendix C.
Notes: First quarter is FY2020, Q2.
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The following four figures show nine quarters of spending data by program for each of the four
hurricanes. Presenting data by generic quarter starting with the quarter in which the disaster
struck allows for visual comparison to identify patterns.
Figure 10 shows the quarterly spending on each program type from the DRF for Hurricane
Sandy. Note that the scale is roughly a fifth of that for the COVID-19 pandemic (Figure 9).
Hurricane Sandy struck in October 2012, triggering 13 major disaster declarations. Of the four
compared catastrophic hurricanes, Hurricane Sandy occurred earliest in the quarter. Unlike the
other three graphics, the first bar represents two combined quarters due to limitations of the
available data.
Figures 10-13 illustrate patterns that are associated with traditional disasters:
 Early in the incident, Individual Assistance, Operations, and Administrative
functions are all present, but decline thereafter, with some costs being recovered
in quarters post-obligation;
 Public Assistance is present throughout response and recovery phases; and
 Mitigation funding associated with the disaster is obligated later in the process.
Figure 11 shows the initial quarters of spending for Hurricane Harvey, which struck Texas and
Louisiana in August and September 2017. Figure 12 shows the initial spending for Hurricane
Irma, which struck Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina in
September 2017. Figure 13 shows the initial spending for Hurricane Maria, which struck Puerto
Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands in September 2017. The decreased level of 1st quarter spending
over Figures 11-13 in part reflects the increasing closeness of the events to the end of the fiscal
quarter.
Reasons why the pattern of obligations differs between the COVID-19 pandemic and these
hurricanes include the fact that the incident types are radically different, the lack of defined policy
for FEMA engagement, response and recovery policy shifts, the sheer breadth of the country
covered by the COVID-19 declarations, and the fact that the COVID-19 incident period (the
active operation of the forcing incident) continues. None of the other incident periods extended
for more than a month. Given that FEMA and its response and recovery authorities are structured
to respond to incidents of a shorter period and a more limited geographic range than a pandemic,
responding to a global event with a months-long incident period presented FEMA with a range of
emergency management challenges.
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Figure 10. Hurricane Sandy DRF Obligations by Program and Quarter

Source: CRS analysis of data compiled from FEMA DRF monthly reports, Appendix C.
Notes: First half is FY2013, Q1 and Q2, due to the structure of FEMA’s data in the initial DRF quarterly reports.
Figure 11. Hurricane Harvey DRF Obligations by Program and Quarter

Source: CRS analysis of data compiled from FEMA DRF monthly reports, Appendix C.
Notes: First quarter is FY2017, Q4.
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Figure 12. Hurricane Irma DRF Obligations by Program and Quarter

Source: CRS analysis of data compiled from FEMA DRF monthly reports, Appendix C.
Notes: First quarter is FY2017, Q4.
Figure 13. Hurricane Maria DRF Obligations by Program and Quarter

Source: CRS analysis of data compiled from FEMA DRF monthly reports, Appendix C.
Notes: First quarter is FY2017, Q4.
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Conclusion
Congress faces an ongoing nationwide disaster that has tested FEMA and its statutory authorities.
In its current form, the Stafford Act predominately authorizes assistance for sudden-onset
disasters with measurable structural damages. FEMA policies and practices plan localized
responses to local hazards. FEMA and its partners rapidly modified and continue to modify these
plans and practices to respond to the unprecedented COVID-19 pandemic. As the pandemic
evolves, so has FEMA’s role and response.
FEMA’s role in the COVID-19 pandemic has thus raised basic questions about the purpose and
capacity of the agency and the Stafford Act. Is the Stafford Act an effective and appropriate
statutory framework for responding to widespread public health incidents? Should the agency
plan to lead future federal responses to infectious disease incidents? If so, how, if at all, must
FEMA’s workforce and authorities change to ensure coherent, timely, and effective federal
responses to future public health incidents? If the President is to activate the Stafford Act to
promote response and recovery to novel, slow-onset and diffuse hazards like the COVID-19
pandemic, what assistance should it authorize, and how might assistance be requested and
distributed across many or all jurisdictions? If the DRF is to serve as a key resource for future
public health and infectious disease incidents, how, if at all, should Congress modify, restructure,
and scale DRF appropriations?
Congress also faces key questions regarding the Defense Production Act and how, if at all, FEMA
should continue to coordinate its activation on the part of the federal government. Should the
DPA be used more broadly in future public health disasters, and if so, should FEMA continue to
coordinate DPA activation?
In the wake of the pandemic, the 117th Congress may wish to determine if—and how—the
Stafford Act and FEMA should adapt.
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Appendix A. Key FEMA Authorities for Pandemic
Response
Table A-1. Select FEMA Authorities Relevant to Federal Pandemic Response
Name of
Type of
Authority
Authority
Relevance to Pandemic
The Robert T.
Statute
The Stafford Act, through delegated authorities, enables FEMA to provide
Stafford Disaster
and coordinate a broad range of assistance fol owing a Stafford Act
Relief and
declaration. Stafford Act declarations of emergency and major disaster for
Emergency
the pandemic authorized Public Assistance for subfederal governments and
Assistance Act
nonprofits, Individual Assistance for individuals and households, and Hazard
Mitigation Assistance for communities. President Trump issued a national
emergency declaration on March 13, 2020, and began issuing major disaster
declarations on March 20, 2020.
The Homeland
Statute
The Homeland Security Act (HSA) made the DHS Secretary responsible for
Security Act of
helping to ensure the effectiveness of emergency response providers to
2002, as amended
terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies; aiding recovery
by Post-Katrina
from terrorist attacks and major disasters; and consolidating existing federal
Emergency
government emergency response plans into a single, coordinated national
Management
response plan. PKEMRA revised the HSA to enhance FEMA’s authority
Reform Act
before and after domestic disasters and increase the agency’s autonomy
(PKEMRA)
within DHS. Under PKEMRA, the Administrator of FEMA “shall lead the
Nation's efforts to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover from,
and mitigate against the risk of natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other
man-made disasters, including catastrophic incidents.”306 FEMA cited the
HSA, as amended by PKEMRA, as among the authorities that “played a
major role in shaping the response to COVID-19.”307
Defense
Statute
The DPA confers upon the President a broad set of authorities to influence
Production Act of
domestic industry in the interest of national defense, including against
1950 (DPA)
natural hazards like the COVID-19 pandemic. FEMA is the designated
coordinator of DPA actions across the government and invoked the statute
numerous times during the pandemic response.
Title 44 of the
Federal
CFR Title 44 interprets FEMA’s response and recovery authorities under
Code of Federal
Regulations
the Stafford Act, including authority to deliver assistance through Mission
Regulations
Assignments and the Public Assistance and Individual Assistance grant
programs that were mobilized for the pandemic response.
Presidential Policy
Presidential
PPD-44 is not a public document and is unavailable for CRS review.
Directive-44
Directive
President Barrack H. Obama issued the directive in November 2016. FEMA
(PPD-44)
explains that PPD-44 “provides for the identification of a lead federal agency
and senior response official to lead coordination of the Federal
Government’s incident response.”308 FEMA cites this authority as that under
which it supported HHS in its initial role as the lead federal agency for the
federal pandemic response.309

306 Section 505 of Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (PKEMRA), P.L. 109-295; 6 U.S.C.
§313.
307 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, p. 168.
308 Ibid., p. 174.
309 Ibid., p. 23.
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Name of
Type of
Authority
Authority
Relevance to Pandemic
Homeland
Presidential
HSPD-5 directs the development and adoption of a domestic incident
Security
Directive
management system. It assigns some incident response roles to particular
Presidential
agency heads and compels the adoption of the National Incident
Directive-5
Management System (NIMS) by all federal agencies. It mandated the
(HSPD-5)
development and adoption of a National Response Plan (NRP), which was
superseded by the National Response Framework. Both NIMS and the NRP
address integration with SLTT governments. Beginning in FY2005, HSPD-5
compelled the adoption of NIMS as a requirement for federal preparedness
grants. FEMA states that local, state, tribal and territorial jurisdictions are
required to adopt NIMS in order to receive federal preparedness grants,
and some preparedness grant funding was used for SLTT pandemic
response.
National Response
DHS
The National Response Framework (NRF) describes and presents itself as a
Framework
Interagency
guide to how the nation may respond to all types of domestic disasters and
Guidance
emergencies. The NRF is the highest-level federal document for incident
response strategy. At a high level, it identifies, aligns, and coordinates key
roles and responsibilities across the nation including all levels of government,
nonprofits, and nongovernmental organizations. The NRF-assigned
responsibility for efforts including public health incident management and
logistics informed response operations during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Federal
DHS
Federal Interagency Operational Plans (FIOPs) operationalize DHS strategic
Interagency
Interagency
domestic incident management frameworks, including the NRF. FIOPs
Operational Plans
Guidance
describe how federal government agencies align resources to implement
(FIOPs)
domestic incident management plans. There is a FIOP for each emergency
management issue area—prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and
recovery. FEMA notes that, given the pandemic response, the FIOPs may
warrant revision “to incorporate PPD-44 and the use of multiple agency
authorities during a response and revising or creating more operational and
tactical documents,” and “to reflect more accurately the role of a UCG in an
interagency, nationwide catastrophic response.”310
National Incident
DHS
The National Incident Management System (NIMS) outlines a flexible
Management
Interagency
incident response management structure (reflecting the Incident Command
System (NIMS)
Guidance
Structure) and vocabulary that may be used at local, state, regional, or
national levels.311 NIMS/ICS principles and organizational structures
informed federal and subfederal pandemic response efforts.
Incident
DHS
The Incident Command System (ICS) standardizes chains of command,
Command System
Interagency
organizational hierarchies, resource management and communication
(ICS)
Guidance
processes, and functional areas for field-level incident management
operations.312 It is aligned with the NRF and NIMS. NIMS/ICS principles and
organizational structures informed federal and subfederal pandemic
response efforts.

310 Ibid., pp. 33, 37.
311 FEMA, National Incident Management System, Third Edition, Oct. 2017, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/
2020-07/fema_nims_doctrine-2017.pdf.
312 Emergency Management Institute (a FEMA-run training institute), ICS Review Document, Mar. 2018,
https://training.fema.gov/emiweb/is/icsresource/assets/ics%20review%20document.pdf.
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Name of
Type of
Authority
Authority
Relevance to Pandemic
National Biodefense
Presidential
The National Biodefense Strategy identifies five high-level goals, and supporting
Strategy (2018)
Strategy
objectives, to help the U.S. prepare for and respond to biological
incidents.313 HHS reports that “[t]hroughout the pandemic, the Biodefense
Coordination Team has continued its work to implement the strategy and
protect the nation from current and future biological threats.”314
Biological Incident
FEMA
The Biological Incident Annex to the Response Federal Interagency
Annex to the
Interagency
Operational Plan, finalized in 2017 by the Department of Homeland Security,
National Response Guidance
adapts federal agency planning efforts to all types of biological incident. 315
Framework
The federal government’s pandemic response plan tailored to the COVID-
19 pandemic cites the Biological Incident Annex as “guiding doctrine.”316
Federal Pandemic
FEMA
The Pandemic Crisis Action Plan (PanCAP), authored by FEMA in 2013 and
Crisis Action Plan
Interagency
updated in 2018, adapts existing federal authorities and interagency
(PanCAP)
Guidance
response plans to address a pandemic.317 These plans were subsequently
adapted specifically to the COVID-19 pandemic in PanCAP-Adapted (see
below).
Federal Pandemic
HHS
HHS adapted the PanCAP into the PanCAP-Adapted specifically to guide
Crisis Action Plan
Interagency
response to the COVID-19 pandemic. It was released on March 13, 2020.
Adapted for
Guidance
According to the GAO, it remained an operative planning guide despite
COVID-19
early modifications to agency roles and responsibilities, including FEMA’s
Pandemic (PanCAP-
assumption of leadership of the coordinated federal response.
Adapted)
Source: CRS Analysis of authorities relevant to FEMA’s pandemic response, including those identified in FEMA,
Initial Assessment Report, pp. 168-175 and HHS, PanCAP-Adapted.

313 HHS, “National Biodefense Strategy: Goals and Objectives,” https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/biodefense-
strategy/Pages/goals-and-objectives.aspx; President Donald J. Trump, “Presidential Memorandum on the Support for
National Biodefense,” Sept. 18, 2018, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-
memorandum-support-national-biodefense/. See also GAO, Biodefense: After-Action Findings.
314 HHS, “National Biodefense Strategy,” https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/biodefense-strategy/Pages/default.aspx.
315 Department of Homeland Security, “Biological Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency
Operational Plans,” final version, Jan. 2017, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-07/fema_incident-
annex_biological.pdf.
316 HHS, PanCAP-Adapted, p. 6.
317 FEMA, Pandemic Crisis Action Plan, Version 2.0, Jan. 2018. Provided to CRS by the FEMA Office of
Congressional and Legislative Affairs. Available upon request to congressional members and staff.
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Appendix B. Bibliography—Selected Resources
GAO Reports
Government Accountability Office (GAO), COVID-19: Additional Actions Needed to Improve
Accountability and Program Effectiveness of Federal Response, GAO-22-105051, October 2021,
https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-22-105051.
GAO, Biodefense: After-Action Findings and COVID-19 Response Revealed Opportunities to
Strengthen Preparedness, GAO-21-513, August 2021, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-
513.pdf.
GAO, COVID-19: Continued Attention Needed to Enhance Federal Preparedness, Response,
Service Delivery, and Program Integrity, GAO-21-551, July 19, 2021, https://www.gao.gov/
products/gao-21-551.
GAO, COVID-19: Sustained Federal Action Is Crucial as Pandemic Enters Its Second Year,
GAO-21-387, March 31, 2021, https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-21-387.
GAO, COVID-19: Critical Vaccine Distribution, Supply Chain, Program Integrity, and Other
Challenges Require Focused Federal Attention, GAO-21-265, January 28, 2021,
https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-21-265.
GAO-20-273, COVID-19: Urgent Actions Needed to Better Ensure an Effective Federal
Response, GAO-21-191, November 30, 2020, https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-21-191.
GAO, COVID-19: Federal Efforts Could Be Strengthened by Timely and Concerted Actions,
GAO-20-701, September 21, 2020, https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-20-701.
GAO, COVID-19: FEMA’s Role in the Response and Related Challenges, GAO-20-685T, July
14, 2020, https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-20-685t.
GAO, COVID-19: Opportunities to Improve Federal Response and Recovery Efforts, GAO-20-
625, June 25, 2020, https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-20-625.
GAO, Biodefense: Federal Efforts to Develop Biological Threat Awareness, GAO-18-155,
October 2017, https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-18-155.
CRS Insights and Reports
CRS Insight IN11582, FEMA Funeral Assistance for COVID-19, by Elizabeth M. Webster.
CRS Report R46809, Federal Emergency and Major Disaster Declarations for the COVID-19
Pandemic, coordinated by Erica A. Lee and Sarah A. Lister.
CRS Insight IN11229, Stafford Act Assistance for Public Health Incidents, by Erica A. Lee and
Bruce R. Lindsay.
CRS Insight IN11593, New Presidential Directives on the Defense Production Act (DPA) and the
COVID-19 Pandemic, by Heidi M. Peters and Erica A. Lee.
CRS Report R45484, The Disaster Relief Fund: Overview and Issues, by William L. Painter.
CRS Report R46628, COVID-19 and Domestic PPE Production and Distribution: Issues and
Policy Options, coordinated by Michael H. Cecire.
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CRS Insight IN11492, COVID-19: Supplementing Unemployment Insurance Benefits (Federal
Pandemic Unemployment Compensation vs. Lost Wages Assistance), by Katelin P. Isaacs and
Julie M. Whittaker.
CRS Report R46379, Emergency Authorities Under the National Emergencies Act, Stafford Act,
and Public Health Service Act, coordinated by Jennifer K. Elsea.
Office of Inspector General Reports
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG), Lessons Learned
from FEMA’s Initial Response to COVID-19, OIG-21-64, September 19, 2021,
https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2021-09/OIG-21-64-Sep21.pdf.
After-Action Reports
Federal
FEMA, Pandemic Response to Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19): Initial Assessment
Report, FEMA Operations January through September 2020, January 2021,
https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/fema_covid-19-initial-assessment-
report_2021.pdf.
State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Government Stakeholders
National Homeland Security Consortium (SLTT and private sector representatives), COVID-19
Pandemic After-Action Report, June 2021, https://www.astho.org/COVID-19/NHSC-COVID-19-
Pandemic-After-Action-Report/.
City of Burlington, Vermont, COVID-19 Pandemic Response After Action Report, June 4, 2021,
https://www.burlingtonvt.gov/sites/default/files/
COVID19%20After%20Action%20Report%2006042021.pdf.
City Of Kirkland, Washington, COVID-19 Initial Response After Action Report, November 13,
2020, https://www.kirklandwa.gov/files/sharedassets/public/fire/emergency-mgmt/plans/kirkland-
covid-19-initial-aar-11-2020.pdf.

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Author Information

Erica A. Lee, Coordinator
Lauren R. Stienstra
Analyst in Emergency Management and Disaster
Section Research Manager
Recovery

Diane P. Horn
Shawn Reese
Analyst in Flood Insurance and Emergency
Analyst in Emergency Management and Homeland
Management
Security Policy

Bruce R. Lindsay
Elizabeth M. Webster
Specialist in American National Government
Analyst in Emergency Management and Disaster

Recovery

William L. Painter

Specialist in Homeland Security and Appropriations

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
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copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

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