Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy
February 10, 2022
and Key Issues in the 117th Congress
Mark P. Sullivan,
The United States maintains strong linkages with neighboring Latin America and the Caribbean
Coordinator
based on geographic proximity and diverse U.S. interests, including economic, political, and
Specialist in Latin
security concerns. The United States is a major trading partner and source of foreign investment
American Affairs
for many of the 33 countries in the region, with free-trade agreements enhancing economic

linkages with 11 countries. The region is a large source of U.S. immigration, both authorized and
June S. Beittel
irregular; major factors driving migration include proximity and economic and security
Analyst in Latin American
conditions. Curbing the flow of illicit drugs has been a long-standing component of relations with
Affairs
the region, involving close cooperation with Mexico, Colombia, and countries throughout Central

America and the Caribbean. U.S. Administrations have long supported democracy and human
rights in the region, with a current focus on authoritarian governments in Cuba, Nicaragua, and
Peter J. Meyer
Venezuela, as well as democratic backsliding and corruption in other countries. In the past two
Specialist in Latin
years, support to help the region respond to the public health and economic impacts of the
American and Canadian
Affairs
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has become as a major U.S. policy component.

The Biden Administration focused extensively on addressing the root causes of Central American
Clare Ribando Seelke
migration during its initial months but has since fleshed out its broader approach toward Latin
Specialist in Latin
America and the Caribbean. The Administration’s other priorities include efforts to promote
American Affairs
public health and economic recovery from the pandemic; to work with partners to promote

inclusive democracy throughout the region; to provide support to address Haiti’s difficult
Maureen Taft-Morales
humanitarian, security, and political challenges; and to engage more broadly with the region to
Specialist in Latin
address migration challenges. To advance those and other initiatives, the Administration
American Affairs
requested nearly $2.1 billion in foreign aid for Latin America and the Caribbean in FY2022,

nearly 16% higher than estimated FY2021 appropriations. The Administration also is providing
significant supplemental pandemic-related assistance to the region, including, as of late January
M. Angeles Villarreal
Specialist in International
2022, the donation of over 60 million vaccine doses. The upcoming ninth Summit of the
Trade and Finance
Americas, scheduled to be hosted by the United States on June 6-10, 2022, in Los Angeles, CA,

provides a significant opportunity to deepen U.S. diplomatic engagement with hemispheric
leaders.
Carla Y. Davis-Castro
Research Librarian
117th Congress Action. Congress traditionally has played an active role in U.S. policy toward

Latin America and the Caribbean through legislation and oversight. In March 2021, Congress
appropriated $10.8 billion (P.L. 117-2, American Rescue Plan Act of 2021) to respond to

COVID-19 worldwide, including in Latin America and the Caribbean. In November 2021,
Congress approved the RENACER Act (P.L. 117-54), which directs the use of diplomatic tools and targeted sanctions against
antidemocratic actions and corruption in Nicaragua. In December 2021, Congress approved the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (P.L. 117-81), which includes provisions on Colombia, Central America, and China’s
presence and influence in the region. Both houses approved several resolutions on the region, including H.Res. 760, S.Res.
37, S.Res. 81, S.Res. 310, and S.Res. 489 on the human rights situation in Cuba; S.Res. 22 on Ecuador; and S.Res. 120 on the
forthcoming Summit of the Americas.
In pending legislation, Congress has not completed an FY2022 foreign aid appropriations bill. The House approved its
version, H.R. 4373 (H.Rept. 117-84), in July 2021, and the Senate Appropriations Committee introduced its version, S. 3075,
in October 2021. The House bill would provide assistance to several key countries and programs in the region at levels
matching or exceeding the Administration’s budget request, including assistance to Central America, Colombia, Mexico, and
regional assistance to the Caribbean; the Senate committee version would provide slightly more assistance than requested for
Colombia and the Caribbean and less than requested for Central America. Both houses have approved broad bills aimed at
positioning the United States to better compete with China; these bills include numerous provisions on Latin America and the
Caribbean. S. 1260, passed by the Senate in June 2021, and H.R. 4521, passed by the House on February 4, 2022, would
require the Administration to develop strategies to increase exports of U.S. goods and services to the region and to strengthen
U.S. economic competitiveness and promote good governance, human rights, and the rule of law in the region. On Haiti, the
House passed H.R. 2471 in June 2021, which would promote the sustainable rebuilding and development of the country and
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would prioritize U.S. support for anti-corruption efforts and human rights; the Senate passed an amended version in January
2022. To date, 28 congressional hearings have focused on U.S. policy challenges in the region (see Appendix).
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Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress

Regional Political and Economic Environment
The Latin American and Caribbean region consists of 33 countries, ranging from the Caribbean
nation of St. Kitts and Nevis, one of the world’s smallest states, to the South American nation of
Brazil, the world’s fifth-largest country. (See Figure 1 and Table A-1 for a map and basic facts on
the region’s independent countries.) Over the past four decades, the region has made significant
advances in political and economic development. Notable political and economic challenges
remain, however, and some countries have experienced major setbacks.
Figure 1. Map of Latin America and the Caribbean

Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) Graphics.
Notes: Caribbean countries are in purple, Central American countries are in gold, and South American
countries are in green. Geographically, Belize is located in Central America and Guyana and Suriname are located
on the northern coast of South America, but all three are members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM).
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Since its beginning in 2020, the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has had
widespread public health, economic, social, and political effects throughout Latin America and
the Caribbean. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) reports that, because of the pandemic, the
region registered an economic contraction of 6.9% in 2020, with almost every country in
recession. As a result, poverty and inequality have increased. Although regional economic growth
returned in 2021, many countries may struggle with protracted economic recoveries, given that
they rely on global investment, trade, and tourism, all of which have been affected by the
pandemic (see “Economic Situation,” below). The economic setback associated with the COVID-
19 pandemic has contributed to a resurgence of social unrest in some countries similar to that
experienced in 2019. Human rights groups also have expressed concerns about some leaders in
the region taking advantage of the pandemic to advance their own agendas and limit civil liberties
for political gain (see “Political Situation,” below).
COVID-19 in Latin America and the Caribbean1
As of February 6, 2022, Latin America and the Caribbean had almost 60.2 million confirmed
COVID-19 cases and more than 1.6 million COVID-19 deaths (almost 28% of deaths
worldwide), according to data from Johns Hopkins University, despite the region accounting for
only about 8.4% of the world’s population. Brazil, Mexico, Peru, Colombia, and Argentina had
the highest numbers of COVID-19 deaths in the region; Brazil had the second-highest COVID-19
death toll globally, after the United States. The regional rankings change when examining
mortality (death) rates per 100,000 population; using this metric, Peru had the highest recorded
COVID-19 mortality rate in the region (and globally), followed by Brazil, Argentina, Colombia,
Paraguay, and Mexico. Some Caribbean countries that have had fewer deaths compared with
other countries in the region have had high mortality rates (see Table 1).2 Experts have expressed
concerns that some countries could be significantly undercounting deaths for various reasons,
including Mexico, where COVID-19 deaths could be more than double those reported.3
On February 2, 2022, during its weekly press briefing on the pandemic, the Pan American Health
Organization (PAHO), which serves as regional office for the Americas of the World Health
Organization, reported that new COVID-19 cases were surging across Central and South
America. As the Omicron variant spread throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, PAHO
reported that deaths increased for the fourth consecutive week, with deaths more than doubling in
several Caribbean countries.4
Since the pandemic first surged in the region in 2020, PAHO Director Dr. Carissa Etienne has
repeatedly expressed concern about the poor and other vulnerable groups at greatest risk. These
groups included those living in the Amazon Basin, particularly Indigenous communities; women,
who make up 70% of the health workforce in the Americas; people of African descent; migrants

1 For further information, see CRS In Focus IF11581, Latin America and the Caribbean: Impact of COVID-19, by
Mark P. Sullivan and Peter J. Meyer.
2 Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, Coronavirus Resource Center, “Mortality Analyses,” February 6,
2022, at https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/mortality (hereinafter, Johns Hopkins, “Mortality Analyses,” February 6,
2022). Data presented by Johns Hopkins reflect COVID-19 cases and deaths as reported by countries worldwide.
3 “Tracking COVID-19 Excess Deaths Across Countries,” Economist, February 3, 2022; “Omicron Comes to Mexico, a
Place That Never Really Shut Down,” Economist, January 22, 2022.
4 Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), “Weekly Press Briefing on COVID-19, Director’s Opening Remarks,”
February 2, 2022. For the most current PAHO weekly press briefing on COVID-19, see https://www.paho.org/en/
media/weekly-press-briefing-covid-19-situation-americas.
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in temporary settlements; and prisoners in crowded jails.5 The PAHO director maintains that the
virus has deepened inequities that have long divided the region and exposed vulnerabilities in the
region’s health, economic, and social sectors.6
Vaccination Progress. The rollout of vaccines in Latin America and the Caribbean has varied
considerably. According to PAHO, 63% of the population of Latin America and the Caribbean
was fully vaccinated as of February 2, 2022. At the same time, PAHO’s director noted that despite
such progress, vaccination remains uneven in the region, with more than one in four people
across the Americas having yet to receive a single dose.7
As of February 6, 2022, according to data from Johns Hopkins University, Chile, Cuba,
Argentina, Uruguay, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Brazil, and Peru were leaders in the region, with 70%-
89% of their populations fully vaccinated. In contrast, seven countries in the region had less than
40% of their populations fully vaccinated. The countries with the lowest vaccination rates were
Haiti (less than 1%), Jamaica (21%), St. Vincent and the Grenadines (25%), and St. Lucia (28%)
(see Table 1).8
PAHO has helped countries prepare for vaccine rollout and has facilitated access to vaccines
through the COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX) Facility, a mechanism developed by
global health organizations to facilitate equitable distribution of COVID-19 vaccines; 22
countries in the region have signed agreements to access vaccines through the facility. In addition,
10 countries in the region—Bolivia, Dominica, El Salvador, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras,
Nicaragua, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines—benefit from the COVID-19 Vaccines
Advance Market Commitment (COVAX AMC) launched by Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, to
provide donor-funded vaccines for low- and middle-income economies.9
Latin American and Caribbean countries have been acquiring COVID-19 vaccines from various
sources. As of early February 2022, PAHO reported that over 100 million doses had been
delivered or were in transit to the region through COVAX, with almost 28 million provided
through country donations, including from the United States, Spain, Canada, France, Germany,
Japan, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark.10 Many countries in the region also have signed
commercial agreements with pharmaceutical companies. Both China and Russia have sold, and in
some cases donated, COVID-19 vaccines to countries throughout the region. Before infections
began to surge in India in March 2021, the Indian government donated thousands of doses to
Caribbean countries. The United States significantly ramped up its donation of vaccines to the
region beginning in June 2021 (see “Biden Administration Policy,” below).11

5 PAHO, “PAHO Director Calls to Protect Vulnerable Groups from Effects of COVID-19 Pandemic,” press release,
May 19, 2020; PAHO, “PAHO Calls on Countries to Intensify Efforts to Prevent Further Spread of COVID-19 Among
Indigenous Peoples in the Americas,” press release, July 20, 2020; and PAHO, “Countries Urged to Face Challenge of
Better Access to Health for Populations of African Descent in COVID-19 Pandemic,” press release, December 2, 2020.
6 PAHO, “Weekly Press Briefing on COVID-19, Director’s Remarks,” April 7, 2021; and PAHO, “Annual Report of
the Director of the Pan American Sanitary Bureau, 2020, Director’s Remarks,” July 21, 2021.
7 PAHO, “Weekly Press Briefing on COVID-19, Director’s Opening Remarks,” February 2, 2022.
8 Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, Coronavirus Resource Center, “Vaccination Progress Across the
World,” February 6, 2022, at https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/vaccines/international (hereinafter, Johns Hopkins,
“Vaccination Progress Across the World,” February 6, 2022).
9 The COVAX Facility, “Committee Agreements; Confirmations of Intent to Participate, and AMC-Eligible
Countries,” December 15, 2020.
10 PAHO, “Tracker COVAX Initiative—COVID-19 Deliveries in the Region,” February 6, 2022.
11 U.S. Department of State, “COVID-19 Vaccine Donations, Western Hemisphere,” accessed September 1, 2021, at
https://www.state.gov/covid-19-recovery/vaccine-deliveries/#wha.
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Table 1. COVID-19 Deaths, Mortality Rates, and Vaccinations in
Latin America and the Caribbean (as of February 6, 2022)
Country
Deaths
Deaths per 100,000
Population Fully Vaccinated (%)
Brazil
632,095
299.50
71.44
Mexico
309,417
242.54
60.73
Peru
206,891
636.38
70.61
Colombia
135,518
269.21
63.72
Argentina
122,584
272.78
78.04
Chile
39,930
210.69
89.65
Ecuador
34,533
198.77
76.73
Bolivia
21,129
183.52
46.34
Paraguay
17,558
249.24
44.26
Guatemala
16,495
99.34
32.26
Honduras
10,512
107.86
44.96
Cuba
8,431
74.39
86.85
Panama
7,813
183.99
59.09
Costa Rica
7,641
151.38
72.84
Uruguay
6,625
191.38
77.84
Venezuela
5,481
19.22
47.94
Dominican Republic
4,322
40.25
54.17
El Salvador
3,933
60.94
65.19
Trinidad and Tobago
3,454
247.60
49.79
Jamaica
2,691
91.27
21.31
Suriname
1,279
220.00
40.12
Guyana
1,180
150.75
40.24
Haiti
804
7.14
0.71
Bahamas
749
192.31
38.90
Belize
629
161.14
52.06
Saint Lucia
341
186.55
28.04
Barbados
286
99.64
51.18
Nicaragua
221
3.38
55.03
Grenada
211
188.39
32.84
Antigua and Barbuda
127
130.77
62.15
St. Vincent and the Grenadines
99
89.52
25.29
Dominica
51
71.02
40.60
Saint Kitts and Nevis
37
70.03
48.65
Total LAC*
1,603,067
—
—
Sources: Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, Coronavirus Resource Center, “Mortality Analyses,”
February 6, 2022, at https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/mortality; and “Vaccination Progress Across the World,”
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February 6, 2022, at https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/vaccines/international. For St. Kitts and Nevis, the source for
vaccinations is Our World in Data, “Coronavirus (COVID-19) Vaccinations,” as of February 2, 2022, at
https://ourworldindata.org/covid-vaccinations.
Notes: Total LAC includes all independent countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) but not overseas
territories. Peru revised its official COVID-19 death toll in May 2021 to account for excess deaths attributed to
COVID-19 not previously counted, which tripled the country’s reported death toll.
In terms of COVID-19 vaccine manufacturing in Latin America, Cuba’s biotech sector has
developed and manufactured three vaccines, two Brazilian companies and a partnership between
Argentine and Mexican companies have manufactured some vaccines, and two companies from
Brazil and Chile announced plans to manufacture vaccines in 2022.12 In August 2021, PAHO
announced a program to boost COVID-19 vaccine manufacturing in the region and subsequently
selected biomedical centers in Argentina and Brazil to produce the vaccines.13
Political Situation
Electoral Practices
In the early 1980s, authoritarian regimes (ideologically on both the left and the right) governed 16
Latin American and Caribbean countries. Today, observers consider four countries in the region—
Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and most recently Haiti—to be ruled by authoritarian
governments.14 Most governments in the region are elected democracies.
Nevertheless, although free and fair elections have become the norm in Latin America and the
Caribbean, elections for head of government at times have been controversial and contested,
including in Honduras (2017) and Venezuela (2018). In 2019, Guatemala held two presidential
election rounds that international observers judged successful, but several popular candidates
were disqualified from the race for reasons many observers considered dubious.15 In Bolivia,
severe irregularities in October 2019 presidential elections ignited protests and violence that led
to the resignation of incumbent President Evo Morales, who was seeking a fourth term. New
presidential elections in Bolivia were postponed twice in 2020 because of the COVID-19
pandemic but ultimately were held in October.16
Eight Caribbean countries held general elections in 2020. In Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St.
Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago, incumbent governments were returned to
power in free and fair elections. In Belize, the Dominican Republic, and Suriname, opposition

12 Dave Graham, “Mexico to Get First Local COVID-19 Vaccines, Share with Argentina,” Reuters News, May 25,
2021; Ludwig Burger and Manas Mishra, “Brazil’s Eurofarma to Make Pfizer COVID-19 Shots for Latin America,”
Reuters News, August 26, 2021; Reuters News, “Brazil Vaccination Pace Slows as Production Issues Halt Second
Doses,” June 1, 2021; and “China’s Sinovac to Bottle COVID-19 Vaccine in Chile,” La Prensa, August 4, 2021.
13 PAHO, “PAHO Launches New Collaborative Platform to Produce COVID-19 Vaccines in Latin America and the
Caribbean,” press release, September 1, 2021; and PAHO, “PAHO Selects Centers in Argentina, Brazil to Develop
COVID-19 MRNA Vaccines,” September 21, 2021.
14 See Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Democracy Index 2021, February 2022 (hereinafter, EIU, Democracy Index
2021), which classifies all four governments as authoritarian based on some 60 indicators; and Freedom House,
Freedom in the World 2021, March 2021, which classifies Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela as not free based on their
poor records on political rights and civil liberties. Freedom House’s report covering developments in 2021 has not yet
been released.
15 Sonia Pérez D. and Peter Orsi, “Court Ruling Puts Guatemala Vote, Anti-Graft Fight in Doubt,” AP News, May 16,
2019.
16 See CRS Insight IN11198, Bolivia’s October 2020 General Elections, by Clare Ribando Seelke; and CRS In Focus
IF11325, Bolivia: An Overview, by Clare Ribando Seelke.
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parties came to power through similarly peaceful democratic means. In contrast, Guyana’s March
2020 elections were marred by allegations of fraud; after a recount and multiple legal challenges,
final results were announced in August 2020 and an opposition government took power.17
In 2021, six Latin American and Caribbean countries held successful free and fair elections for
head of government. Ecuador held two presidential rounds in February and April, electing
center-right candidate Guillermo Lasso, inaugurated in May.18 Peru held two president rounds in
April and June; in a close election, Peru’s national electoral court ultimately declared far-left
candidate Pedro Castillo the winner in July. St. Lucia held parliamentary elections in July in
which Philip Pierre of the opposition St. Lucia Labour Party became prime minister in a landslide
election, ousting the conservative United Workers Party of Allen Chastanet from power after one
term. The Bahamas held parliamentary elections in September in which the opposition center-left
Progressive Liberal Party, led by Philip Davis, ousted the ruling center-right Free National
Movement of the outgoing prime minister in a landslide. In Honduras, Xiomara Castro of the
leftist Liberty and Re-foundation Party won a decisive victory in presidential elections in
November, alleviating concerns expressed prior to the election that a close race could be marred
by a lack of transparency or fraud allegations, as occurred in 2017. In Chile, leftist and former
student leader Gabriel Boric won a decisive victory in a second presidential round held in
December; Boric is to be inaugurated on March 11, 2022.
The November 2021 presidential race in Nicaragua was the regional exception to free and fair
elections for head of state in 2021. Ahead of the election, the government of President Daniel
Ortega escalated repression by arresting opposition figures and banning major opposition parties
from participating in the race, in which Ortega claimed victory for a fifth (and fourth consecutive)
term.
Latin America and the Caribbean:
So far in 2022, Barbados held successful
2022 Elections
elections for head of government in which
Prime Minister Mia Mottley won a second term
Barbados
January 19
in another landslide victory, with her Barbados
Costa Rica
February 6 / April 3
Labour Party winning all 30 seats in the House
of Assembly. Costa Rica held a first presidential
Colombia
May 29 / June 19
round on February 6 and is scheduled to hold a
Brazil
Oct. 2/ Oct. 30
second in April. In upcoming months, Colombia
Haiti
TBD
and Brazil are scheduled to hold elections. The
date of Haiti’s elections have yet to be
Notes: Elections for head of government. Includes
determined (see text box).
first and potential second rounds for presidential
elections.
Candidates and parties from the political left
won most elections held in the region in 2021, a trend that could be repeated in elections in
Colombia and Brazil in 2022. This leftward political shift in the region may be less about
ideology than about the unpopularity of incumbent leaders and parties seeking reelection amid
tough economic conditions as countries struggle to recover from the pandemic.
Decline in Democratic Practices
Despite significant improvements in political rights and civil liberties since the 1980s, many
countries in Latin America and the Caribbean still face considerable challenges. In a number of
countries, weaknesses remain in the state’s abilities to deliver public services, ensure

17 For background, see CRS In Focus IF11381, Guyana: An Overview, by Mark P. Sullivan.
18 For background, see CRS In Focus IF11218, Ecuador: An Overview, by June S. Beittel and Rachel L. Martin.
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accountability and transparency, advance the rule of law, and ensure citizen safety and security.
Numerous elected presidents in the region have left office early amid severe social turmoil,
economic crises, or high-profile corruption; in several cases, the presidents’ own autocratic
actions contributed to their ousters. Corruption scandals either caused or contributed to several
presidents’ resignations or removals—Guatemala in 2015, Brazil in 2016, and Peru in 2018. As
noted, severe irregularities in the conduct of Bolivia’s October 2019 elections ignited protests that
led to the president’s resignation. Although the threat of direct military rule has dissipated,
civilian governments in several countries have turned to their militaries or retired officers for
support or during crises, raising concerns among some observers.19 For example, in February
2020 in El Salvador, President Nayib Bukele used the military in what many observers saw as an
effort to intimidate the country’s legislature into approving an anti-crime bill; the action elicited
strong criticism in El Salvador and abroad.20
EIU Democracy Index. The Economist Intelligence Unit’s (EIU’s) 2021 democracy index,
issued in February 2022, showed a continuous decline in democratic practices in Latin America
since 2017.21 Prior to 2017, the EIU viewed Cuba as the only authoritarian regime in the region.
Venezuela joined Cuba’s authoritarian ranks in 2017, as President Nicolás Maduro’s government
violently repressed the political opposition. Nicaragua escalated authoritarian practices in 2018
under longtime President Ortega, as the government violently repressed protests. The EIU added
Haiti to the list of authoritarian governments in the aftermath of the 2021 assassination of
President Jovenel Moïse, which left the country virtually bereft of elected officials functioning at
any level.
The downward trend in democratic practices accelerated in 2021, according to the EIU, with a
particularly sharp decline in the region’s commitment to democratic political culture. This reflects
widespread dissatisfaction with governments’ handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, growing
skepticism about democratic governments’ ability to address the region’s challenges, and
increasing tolerance of authoritarian practices. According to the EIU, the region’s weak
commitment to democratic political culture has enabled illiberal populists to thrive, including
Presidents Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, Andrés Manuel López Obrador in Mexico, and Nayib Bukele
in El Salvador. Despite these and other notable challenges, the EIU noted that 80% of the region’s
population lived under democratic regimes, scoring below only Western Europe and North
America.22
Freedom House. Freedom House cited Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela as not free in its annual
report assessing political rights and civil liberties worldwide in 2020. The report expressed
concerns about Cuba’s wave of intimidation against independent journalists and dissident artists;
Nicaragua’s harsh cybercrime law, which mandated prison sentences for spreading “false
information” online; and Venezuela’s extrajudicial executions, enforced disappearances, and
arbitrary detentions targeting the political opposition.23
Freedom House also spotlighted El Salvador and Peru for democratic backsliding. In Peru,
Freedom House reported that many considered the grounds for the legislature’s impeachment of a

19 See AQ Editors, “Latin America’s 21st-Century Militaries,” Americas Quarterly, vol. 14, no. 1 (2020), pp. 12-72.
20 See Brian Winter, “Latin America’s Armed Forces, Q&A: Why El Salvador’s Crisis Is Different—and Worrying,”
Americas Quarterly, February 13, 2020; and Christine Wade, “Bukele’s Politicization of the Military Revives Old
Fears in El Salvador,” World Politics Review, February 12, 2020.
21 EIU, Democracy Index 2021.
22 Ibid.
23 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2021, March 2021.
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popular president to be dubious and saw the action as a blow to anti-corruption efforts.
Developments in Peru resulted in Freedom House downgrading Peru from classification as a free
country to a partly free one. Freedom House also classified 10 other countries in the region as
partly free: Bolivia, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti,
Honduras, Mexico, and Paraguay. In addition, Freedom House reported that Mexico suffers from
severe rule-of-law deficits that limit political rights and civil liberties; it cited organized-crime-
related violence, public corruption, human rights abuses, and rampant impunity as the most
visible of Mexico’s governance challenges.24
Decline in the Quality of and Satisfaction with Democracy. Public satisfaction with how
democracy is operating has declined along with the quality of democracy in Latin America and
the Caribbean. According to the 2018/2019 AmericasBarometer public opinion survey, the
percentage of individuals satisfied with how democracy was working in their countries averaged
39.6% among 18 countries in the region, the lowest level since the poll began in 2004.25 In the
2021 AmericasBarometer Survey, satisfaction with democracy increased marginally to 43%
among 20 countries in the region, still far lower than in 2012, when 57% of the region expressed
satisfaction with democracy.26
Several broad political and economic factors appear to be driving the decline in satisfaction with
democracy in the region. Political factors include an increase in authoritarian practices, weak
democratic institutions and politicized judicial systems, corruption, high levels of crime and
violence, and organized crime that can infiltrate or influence state institutions. Economic factors
include declining or stagnant regional economic growth rates over the past several years; high
levels of income inequality in many Latin American countries; increased poverty; and the
inadequacy of public services, social safety net programs, and advancement opportunities, along
with increased pressure on the region’s previously expanding middle class. Given these trends,
the eruption of social protests in many countries throughout the region in 2019 was unsurprising
to many observers, even though in each country a unique set of circumstances sparked the unrest.
The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated many of these economic factors, contributing to
increased protests in the region since late 2020. Pandemic-related protests erupted in several
countries in 2021, notably in Colombia and Brazil. Regional economic decline, along with
difficult security and political conditions, has helped fuel increased migration, especially from
Central America, but also from other countries, including Haitians who had migrated to South
America in the aftermath of the country’s 2010 earthquake. Human rights groups and other
observers have expressed concerns about leaders in the region taking advantage of the pandemic
to advance their own agendas and limiting civil liberties for political gain.27

24 Ibid.
25 Elizabeth J. Zechmeister and Noam Lupu, eds., LAPOP’s AmericasBarometer Takes the Pulse of Democracy,
Vanderbilt University, Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), 2019.
26 Noam Lupu, Mariana Rodríguez, and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, eds., LAPOP’s AmericasBarometer Takes the Pulse
of Democracy, Vanderbilt University, LAPOP, 2021.
27 See, for example, Catharine Christe, Edison Lanza, and Michael Camilleri, COVID-19 and Freedom of Expression in
the Americas, Inter-American Dialogue, August 2020; “COVID-19 Triggers Wave of Free Speech Abuse,” Human
Rights Watch, February 11, 2021; and “Press Freedom in Latin America Hurt by COVID-19 Response,” Committee to
Protect Journalists, June 30, 2021.
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Economic Situation
The COVID-19 pandemic has taken a significant toll on Latin American and Caribbean
economies. Even before the onset of the pandemic and its economic effects, the region had
experienced several years of slow economic growth. The IMF reported a 6.9% economic
contraction for the region in 2020.28 Caribbean nations that depend on tourism had deep economic
recessions, several with gross domestic product declines of more than 15% in 2020.29
Many of the region’s countries began some economic recovery in 2021, with the IMF estimating
a regional growth rate of 6.8% for the year, ahead of world economic output. Looking ahead,
however, the IMF forecasts more modest growth rates of 2.4% in 2022, lower than originally
forecast because of the impact of the COVID-19 Omicron variant, and 2.6% in 2023 (see Table
2), lower than projected world growth.30
Table 2. Latin America and Caribbean: Real GDP Growth, 2019-2023
(annual percentage change, constant prices)
Regional Average, Two
Largest Economies, and
2021
2022
2023
World Output
2019
2020
Estimate
Projection Projection
Region: Latin America and
0.1
-6.9
6.8
2.4
2.6
the Caribbean
Brazil
1.4
-3.9
4.7
0.3
1.6
Mexico
-0.2
-8.2
5.3
2.8
2.7
World Output
2.8
-3.1
5.9
4.4
3.8
Sources: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Update, January 2022, and World Economic
Outlook Database, October 2021.
A number of Latin American and Caribbean countries have implemented stimulus programs to
help protect their economies and vulnerable populations, and many countries have needed
external financing to respond to the pandemic and associated economic downturn. In response,
international financial institutions have increased lending to countries throughout the region. An
important factor in the region’s economic recovery is the course of the pandemic, including the
availability and distribution of vaccines. Economic recovery may be a protracted process in
countries that rely heavily on global trade and investment.
The decline in economic growth in 2020 exacerbated poverty and income inequality throughout
Latin America, with concerns that the region’s past development gains could be set back more
than a decade. According to the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean (ECLAC), even before the pandemic, the poverty-reduction gains that the region made
from 2002 through 2014 had begun to erode. Overall poverty in Latin America decreased from
45.4% of the region’s population in 2002 to 27.8% in 2014 but crept up slowly to 30.5% in 2019,
influenced by several years of slow growth.31 With the pandemic-related economic recession

28 International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook Update, January 2022.
29 IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2021.
30 IMF, World Economic Outlook Update, January 2022.
31 ECLAC, Social Panorama of Latin America 2020, March 2021; and Michael Stott, “Poverty Surge Set Latin
America Back over a Decade, says UN,” Financial Times, March 4, 2021. The ECLAC study examines poverty and
extreme poverty in 18 Latin American countries. As noted in the study, poverty rates differ considerably by country,
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experienced by most countries in the region in 2020, poverty increased to 33.0%. This accounted
for an estimated 204 million people—an increase of 17 million people in poverty from 2019 to
2020. With economic growth rates increasing in 2021, poverty also declined slightly to 32.1%,
with an estimated 201 million people in the region living in poverty.32
According to ECLAC, extreme poverty in Latin America increased from 11.3% of the population
in 2019 to 13.1% in 2020 and 13.8% in 2021.33 This increase reflected 16 million more people in
extreme poverty in 2021 than in 2019, for a total of 86 million people. According to ECLAC,
poverty and extreme poverty were estimated to be highest in rural areas as well as among
working-age women, indigenous people, Afro-descendant populations, children and adolescents,
people with less education, and single-parent and extended households. The sharp fall in labor
income was the main factor in increasing poverty and extreme poverty in Latin America during
the pandemic. ECLAC notes, however, that government programs of income transfers to
vulnerable populations helped partially offset the fall in income in the region and that poverty
figures would have reached higher levels without such transfers.34
U.S. Policy Toward Latin America and the
Caribbean
U.S. interests in Latin America and the Caribbean are diverse and include economic, political,
security, and humanitarian concerns. Geographic proximity has ensured strong economic linkages
between the United States and the region, and the United States is a major trading partner and
source of foreign investment for many Latin American and Caribbean countries. Free-trade
agreements (FTAs) have augmented U.S. economic relations with 11 countries in the region. In
addition, the Western Hemisphere is a large source of U.S. immigration, both authorized and
irregular; geographic proximity and economic and security conditions are major factors driving
migration trends.
Curbing the flow of illicit drugs from Latin America and the Caribbean has been a key component
of U.S. relations with the region and a major interest of Congress for over 50 years. The flow of
illicit drugs—including heroin, methamphetamine, and fentanyl from Mexico and cocaine from
Colombia—poses risks to U.S. public health and safety, and the trafficking of such drugs has
contributed to violent crime and gang activities in the United States. Since 2000, Colombia has
received U.S. counternarcotics support through Plan Colombia and its successor programs. In
addition, for over a decade, the United States has sought to forge close partnerships with other
countries in the region to combat drug trafficking and related violence and to advance citizen
security. These efforts include the Mérida Initiative, begun in 2007 to support Mexico; the Central
America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), begun in 2008; and the Caribbean Basin Security
Initiative (CBSI), begun in 2009.
Another long-standing component of U.S. policy, particularly since the end of the Cold War, has
been support for strengthened democratic governance and the rule of law. As described in the
previous section, although many countries in the region have made enormous strides in terms of

with Uruguay having the lowest poverty rate in the region, just over 5%, and Honduras, the highest, over 58%.
32 ECLAC, Social Panorama of Latin America 2021, January 2022.
33 ECLAC, Social Panorama of Latin America 2020, March 2021. As noted, the ECLAC study examines extreme
poverty in 18 Latin American countries. The United Nations defines extreme poverty as living on less than $1.90 day,
struggling to fulfill basic needs such as health and education. See United Nations, Sustainable Development Goals,
“Goal 1, End Poverty in all its forms everywhere,” at https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/poverty/.
34 ECLAC, Social Panorama of Latin America 2021, January 2022.
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democratic political development, several face considerable challenges. Current U.S.-democracy
promotion efforts include initiatives aimed at strengthening civil society and promoting the rule
of law and human rights.
Trump Administration Policy
Under the Trump Administration, U.S. relations with Latin America and the Caribbean generally
moved toward a more confrontational approach, especially regarding efforts to curb irregular
immigration from the region, compared with past Administrations’ emphasis on partnership. In
2018, the State Department set forth a framework for U.S. policy toward the region focused on
three pillars for engagement—economic growth and prosperity, security, and democratic
governance. The framework reflected continuity with long-standing regional U.S. policy
priorities but at times appeared to be at odds with the Administration’s occasionally antagonistic
actions and statements on immigration, trade, and foreign aid. In 2020, the White House also set
forth a strategic framework for the Western Hemisphere that included the prevention of illegal
and uncontrolled human migration, smuggling, and trafficking as its first line of effort in the
region.35 According to Gallup and Pew Research Center polls, negative views of U.S. leadership
in the region increased markedly during the Trump Administration.36
On trade issues, President Trump ordered U.S. withdrawal from the proposed Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP) FTA in 2017. As negotiated in 2015 by 12 Asia-Pacific countries, the TPP
would have increased U.S. economic linkages with Chile, Mexico, and Peru, which were parties
to the agreement. The President also strongly criticized the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) with Mexico and Canada, threatened U.S. withdrawal, and initiated
renegotiations. The three countries agreed in 2018 to the United States-Mexico-Canada
Agreement (USMCA), which entered into force July 1, 2020; the agreement retained many of
NAFTA’s provisions but included modernizing updates and changes. Before approval, the
agreement was amended to address congressional concerns regarding labor, the environment,
dispute settlement, and intellectual property rights.
From FY2018 to FY2021, the Trump Administration’s proposed foreign aid budgets for the
region would have cut assistance considerably, but Congress rejected those proposals by
providing significantly more assistance than requested. In 2019, the Trump Administration
withheld some assistance to the “Northern Triangle” countries of Central America—El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras—in an attempt to compel their governments to curb the flow of
migrants to the United States.
During the Trump Administration, vehement anti-immigrant rhetoric and immigration actions that
shifted the burdens of interdicting migrants and offering asylum to Mexico tested U.S. relations
with Mexico and Central America. In 2017, the Administration announced it would end Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), a program begun in 2012 that provides relief from
deportation for certain immigrants who arrived as children; federal court challenges led to a June
2020 Supreme Court decision vacating the Administration’s recession of DACA. The
Administration also announced in 2017 that it would terminate temporary protected status (TPS)
designations for Nicaragua, Haiti, El Salvador, and Honduras, but federal court challenges put the

35 White House, National Security Council, “Overview of Western Hemisphere Strategic Framework,” August 2020;
and Nora Gámez Torres, “Trump Adviser to Unveil U.S. Strategy for the Americas in South Florida Event,” Miami
Herald, August 16, 2020.
36 Gallup, Rating World Leaders, 2018-2020, The U.S. vs. Germany, China, and Russia; and Pew Research Center,
“Trump Ratings Remain Low Around Globe, While Views of U.S. Stay Mostly Favorable,” January 8, 2020.
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terminations on hold. In 2018, Mexico’s president agreed to allow the United States to return
certain non-Mexican migrants to Mexico while awaiting U.S. immigration court decisions.
The Trump Administration used various policy tools to deter increased unauthorized migration
from Central America. In addition to aid cuts and threats of increased U.S. tariffs and taxes on
remittances, these tools included controversial asylum cooperative agreements with Guatemala,
El Salvador, and Honduras to permit the United States to transfer asylum applicants from third
countries to the Northern Triangle countries. At the end of 2020, Congress enacted the United
States-Northern Triangle Enhanced Engagement Act (P.L. 116-260; Division FF, Title III, Subtitle
F), requiring the State Department to develop a five-year strategy to advance economic
prosperity, combat corruption, strengthen democratic governance, and improve civilian security
conditions in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.
As the situation in Venezuela deteriorated under President Maduro, the Trump Administration
imposed numerous broader financial sanctions, including sanctions against the state oil company,
the country’s main source of income. In January 2019, the Administration recognized the head of
Venezuela’s National Assembly, Juan Guaidó, as interim president. The Administration also
provided humanitarian and development assistance for Venezuelans who fled to other countries,
especially Colombia, and for Venezuelans inside Venezuela. Congress largely supported the
Administration’s policy approach toward Venezuela; in December 2019, it enacted the Venezuela
Emergency Relief, Democracy Assistance, and Development Act of 2019 (P.L. 116-94, Division
J), which, among its provisions, codified several sanctions and authorized humanitarian
assistance.
On Cuba, the Trump Administration reversed the engagement policy advanced during the Obama
Administration and imposed numerous economic sanctions on Cuba for its poor human rights
record and its support for the Maduro government in Venezuela. In January 2021, the Secretary of
State designated the Cuban government as a state sponsor of international terrorism.
On climate change issues, in June 2017, President Trump announced his intent to withdraw from
the Paris Agreement, an international accord to address climate change. Withdrawal took effect in
November 2020.37 Securing a clean energy future had been a key priority in U.S. policy toward
Latin America and the Caribbean under the Obama Administration.38
Biden Administration Policy
During the 2020 election campaign, then-candidate Biden indicated that his policy toward Latin
America and the Caribbean would be very different from the Trump Administration’s approach.
He vowed “to rebuild strong hemispheric ties based on respect for democracy, human rights, and
the rule of law” when the United States hosts the next Summit of the Americas (now scheduled
for June 2022 in Los Angeles, CA).39 He promised to “do away with the Trump Administration’s
draconian immigration policies and galvanize international action to address the poverty and
insecurity driving migrants” from Central America’s Northern Triangle, including by developing

37 See CRS In Focus IF10668, Potential Implications of U.S. Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on Climate
Change, by Jane A. Leggett.
38 For background on climate change issues in U.S. policy toward Latin America under the Obama Administration, see
the section on “Climate Change and Clean Energy” in CRS Report R43882, Latin America and the Caribbean: Key
Issues and Actions in the 114th Congress, coordinated by Mark P. Sullivan.
39 Joe Biden for President: Official Campaign website, “The Biden Plan for Leading the Democratic World to Meet the
Challenges of the 21st Century,” at https://joebiden.com/americanleadership/.
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an assistance strategy for the region.40 On Venezuela, Biden said, “the overriding goal in
Venezuela must be to press for a democratic outcome through free and fair elections, and to help
the Venezuelan people rebuild their country.”41 On Cuba, Biden maintained that he would reverse
the “failed Trump policies that have inflicted harm on the Cuban people and done nothing to
advance democracy and human rights.”42
The Biden Administration’s early broad foreign policy objectives and outlook for U.S. policy
toward Latin America and the Caribbean appeared in its Interim National Security Strategic
Guidance, issued by the White House in early March 2021, and in Secretary of State Antony
Blinken’s March 2021 address on U.S. foreign policy. President Biden’s interim guidance, which
provides broad foreign policy direction to U.S. agencies and departments, maintained that his
Administration would expand engagement throughout the Western Hemisphere, especially with
Canada and Mexico, “based on principles of mutual respect and equality and a commitment to
economic prosperity, security, human rights, and dignity.” This effort, according to the interim
guidance, includes working with Congress to provide Central America with $4 billion in foreign
assistance over four years, and taking other steps “to address the root causes of human insecurity
and irregular migration, including poverty, criminal violence, and corruption.” The guidance also
maintained that the Administration would cooperate to confront the regional effects of climate
change, and help support good governance and democratic institutions in the region.43
Many of the foreign policy priorities laid out in Secretary Blinken’s March 2021 speech are
relevant to areas of U.S. relations with the region. These priorities include stopping the COVID-
19 pandemic and strengthening global health security; turning around the economic crisis and
building a more stable, inclusive global economy; renewing democracy, to counter rising
authoritarianism and nationalism around the world; creating a humane and effective immigration
system and addressing the root causes of migration; revitalizing ties with allies and partners; and
tackling the climate crisis and driving a green energy revolution.44
Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Brian Nichols echoed these priorities
in November 2021 congressional testimony. He discussed the Administration’s efforts to promote
public health and economic recovery from the pandemic in the Americas; to bolster the
hemisphere’s commitment to inclusive democracy; to work with partners to promote democracy
in Nicaragua, Cuba, and Venezuela; and to address irregular migration and its root causes.
According to Nichols, the Administration “seeks to promote a more inclusive, green, secure,
prosperous, and democratic hemisphere aligned with U.S. values and interests.”45
The Administration’s FY2022 budget request for foreign assistance to Latin America and the
Caribbean amounts to almost $2.1 billion, nearly 16% over estimated FY2021 appropriations.
The FY2022 request includes almost $861 million for Central America, funding the first year of

40 Joe Biden for President: Official Campaign website, “The Biden Plan to Build Security and Prosperity with the
People of Central America,” at https://joebiden.com/centralamerica/.
41 Americas Quarterly, “Joe Biden Answers 10 Questions on Latin America,” March 2, 2020 (updated October 29,
2020), at https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/updated-2020-candidates-answer-10-questions-on-latin-america/.
42 Ibid.
43 White House, President Joseph R. Biden Jr, Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, March 2021, at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf.
44 U.S. Department of States, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, “A Foreign Policy for the American People,”
speech, March 3, 2021, at https://www.state.gov/a-foreign-policy-for-the-american-people/.
45 U.S. Department of State, Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs Brian A. Nichols, testimony before
the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, November 16, 2021 (hereinafter,
Nichols testimony, November 16, 2021).
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the Administration’s plans to address the root causes of irregular migration. (See “U.S. Foreign
Aid.”)
COVID-19 Pandemic. With regard to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Administration has
committed to providing over 1.2 billion vaccines doses globally, including to Latin American and
Caribbean countries, through multilateral mechanisms and bilaterally. As of late January 2022,
the United States had delivered over 60 million vaccine doses to 29 Latin American and
Caribbean countries, both bilaterally and through the COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access
(COVAX) Facility.46 In addition to vaccine donations, the State Department and the U.S. Agency
for International Development (USAID), as of mid-November 2021, have provided more than
$614 million in COVID-19 supplemental (P.L. 116-123 and P.L. 116-136) and American Rescue
Plan Act (P.L. 117-2) funding to help countries respond to the pandemic, including technical
assistance to support vaccine roll-out, case management, and oxygen access.47
Democracy. During an October 2021 visit to Ecuador, Secretary of State Blinken addressed
concerns about the state of democracy in the Americas. Secretary Blinken noted how the
pandemic has exacerbated economic inequities in the region and contributed to an increase in
dissatisfaction with the way democracy works. Blinken focused his remarks on three major
challenges and approaches to help make democracy work: (1) more effectively fight corruption
by strengthening existing, and developing new, anti-corruption tools; (2) improve civilian security
by taking a more holistic approach that deals with the root causes of crime and violence; and (3)
tackle economic and social challenges such as bolstering labor standards, expanding access to
adequate education and health, and providing more inclusive opportunities.48 President Biden
highlighted many of those same themes, as well as the need to defend against authoritarianism
and respect human rights, during the December 2021 global Summit for Democracy, in which 25
governments from Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as various civil society activists,
were invited to participate virtually.49
On the Venezuela policy challenge, the Biden Administration is continuing to pressure the
Maduro government through economic sanctions and providing humanitarian support to
Venezuelans both inside and outside the country. In a shift from the Trump Administration, in
March 2021, the Secretary of Homeland Security granted TPS to Venezuelans already in the
United States. The Administration maintains it is committed to robust multilateralism aimed at
increasing pressure on Venezuela in a coordinated fashion to make clear that the only outcome is
negotiation that leads to a democratic solution.50 Assistant Secretary of State Nichols stated in
congressional testimony in November 2021 that the Administration supported negotiations
between the Venezuelan opposition and the Maduro regime but noted that it would review U.S.
sanctions policies only if the parties make meaningful progress.51 (See “Venezuela,” below.)

46 U.S. Department of State, “COVID-19 Vaccine Donations, Western Hemisphere,” updated January 26, 2022, at
https://www.state.gov/covid-19-recovery/vaccine-deliveries/ (this website does not note U.S. vaccine donations to the
Bahamas, Nicaragua, and Trinidad and Tobago).
47 Nichols testimony, November 16, 2021. Also see U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), “COVID-19
– Latin American and the Caribbean Response,” Fact Sheet #2, FY2021, October 2021.
48 U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, “Making Democracy Deliver for the Americas,”
speech, October 20, 2021.
49 White House, “Summit for Democracy Summary of Proceedings,” December 23, 2021.
50 U.S. Department of State, “Background Press Call by Senior Administration Officials on Venezuela,” press briefing,
March 8, 2021.
51 Nichols testimony, November 16, 2021.
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On Nicaragua, the Administration has used targeted sanctions in response to the antidemocratic
actions of the Ortega government and has worked multilaterally to increase international pressure
against the Nicaraguan government, including at the Organization of American States (OAS) and
the United Nations. (See “Nicaragua,” below.)
On Cuba, the Biden Administration in its initial months announced it would review policy
decisions made in the prior Administration, including the decision to designate Cuba as a state
sponsor of terrorism.52 As the human rights situation in Cuba has deteriorated, the Administration
has not taken action to reverse policies from the Trump Administration, but has imposed targeted
sanctions against Cubans officials involved in the government’s repression against peaceful
protesters.53 (Also see “Cuba,” below.)
Since mid-2021, the situation in Haiti—with a presidential assassination, a surge in gang
violence, and an earthquake—has provided considerable challenges for the Biden Administration.
The United States remains the single largest donor of humanitarian assistance to Haiti. Assistant
Secretary of State Nichols testified to Congress in November that although the “Haitian people
will determine a timeline for their election,” the United States is working “to support conditions
for free and fair elections,” including by providing support to help restore security and address
gang violence.54 (Also see “Haiti,” below.)
Migration. In the Biden Administration’s initial months, much of its focus in the region was on
immigration from Central America. President Biden took executive actions revising some of the
Trump Administration’s restrictive immigration policies, but maintained certain COVID-19-
related immigration restrictions while contending with a large increase in the number of
undocumented Central American and Mexican migrants seeking to enter the United States. Vice
President Kamala Harris, whom President Biden tasked with overseeing diplomatic engagement
with Central America and Mexico, visited Guatemala, Mexico, and the Southwest border in June.
In July 2021, the Administration released two new strategies to address the underlying causes that
push Central Americans to migrate and to collaboratively manage migration in the region.
The Administration subsequently broadened its engagement on migration issues as the pandemic-
driven economic downturn contributed to large-scale migrant flows throughout the hemisphere.
Secretary Blinken traveled to Colombia in October 2021 for a Migration Ministerial with the
foreign ministers of 16 other Western Hemisphere countries to address regional cooperation
regarding irregular migration. (Also see “Migration Issues” and “Central America’s Northern
Triangle” below.)
Climate Change. The Biden Administration has reincorporated climate change concerns into the
U.S. policy approach toward Latin America and the Caribbean.55 The Administration invited
seven Latin American and Caribbean heads of government to attend the April 2021 Leaders’
Summit on Climate.56 The summit sought to build support among the world’s leading economies
to adopt more ambitious greenhouse gas emission reduction targets in advance of the U.N.

52 U.S. Department of State, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki and Deputy Director of the National
Economic Council Bharat Ramamurti,” March 9, 2021.
53 U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, “Announcement of Visa Restrictions Against Cuban
Officials,” press statement, November 30, 2021, and “Visa Restrictions Against Cuban Officials,” press statement,
January 6, 2022.
54 Nichols testimony, November 16, 2021.
55 Under the Biden Administration, the United States also rejoined the Paris Agreement in February 2021, reversing the
Trump Administration’s withdrawal of the United States from the agreement. See CRS In Focus IF11746, United
States Rejoins the Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Options for Congress, by Jane A. Leggett.
56 The seven leaders were from Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Jamaica, and Mexico.
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Climate Change Conference (COP26) in November. In September 2021, Special Presidential
Envoy for Climate John Kerry participated in a virtual High-Level Dialogue on Climate Action in
the Americas hosted by Argentina designed to build momentum for climate action in the region
ahead of COP26.
Legislative Action in the 117th Congress
Congress traditionally has played an active role in policy toward Latin America and the
Caribbean in terms of both legislation and oversight. Given the region’s geographic proximity to
the United States, U.S. foreign policy toward the region and domestic policy often overlap,
particularly in the areas of immigration and trade.
Enacted Measures and Approved Resolutions
Since 2020, Congress has appropriated some $17 billion in international affairs funding to
respond to COVID-19 globally. In the 117th Congress, this funding included $10.8 billion
appropriated in the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (P.L. 117-2), enacted in March 2021. The
funding has supported contributions to multilateral efforts and health interventions, humanitarian
assistance, and donation of COVID-19 vaccine doses worldwide, including to Latin America and
the Caribbean.
In November 2021, Congress completed action on the Reinforcing Nicaragua’s Adherence to
Conditions for Electoral Reform Act of 2021, or the RENACER Act (S. 1064, P.L. 117-54).
Among its provisions, the measure directed the U.S. government to use its diplomatic tools and
targeted sanctions to advance democratic elections and combat corruption. Prior to the bill’s
passage, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs had ordered reported a similar, although not
identical, measure (H.R. 2946) in July 2021, and the Senate had approved S. 1041, amended, in
August 2021.
In December 2021, Congress completed action on the National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2022 (P.L. 117-81), which includes several provisions on Latin America
and the Caribbean.
 Section 1007 extended authority to support a unified counterdrug and
counterterrorism campaign in Colombia.
 Section 1035 extended a prohibition on the use of funds to close or relinquish
control of the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
 Section 1205 provided temporary authority to obligate or expend not more than
$2 million in FY2022 to pay for travel and subsistence expenses of foreign
national security forces participating in the training program of the United Sates-
Colombia Action Plan for Regional Security.
 Section 1206 required the Secretary of Defense to develop and implement a
security cooperation strategy for certain combatant commands, including the U.S.
Southern Command.
 Section 1336 extended a certification requirement for the transfer of vehicles by
the Department of Defense (DOD) to Guatemala during FY2022 and required a
series of reports (by the Secretary of Defense, Comptroller General, and a
federally funded research and development center) on U.S. security cooperation
with the Northern Triangle countries.
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 Section 1337 required a report, within 180 days, from the Secretary of Defense,
in coordination with the Secretary of State on the security cooperation
relationship between the United States and Colombia and activities focused on
human rights and the rule of law.
 Section 1338 required a report by June 30, 2022, from the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Secretary of Defense and in consultation with the heads of
other appropriate federal departments and agencies, on efforts by China to
expand its presence and influence in Latin America and the Caribbean.
To date, the House and Senate have approved several resolutions on U.S. relations with the
region. On the human rights situation in Cuba, the House approved H.Res. 760 in November
2021 and the Senate approved S.Res. 310 in August 2021, both expressing solidarity with Cuban
citizens demonstrating peacefully for fundamental freedoms, condemning the Cuban regime’s
acts of repression, and calling for the immediate release of arbitrarily detained Cuban citizens.
Also on Cuba, the Senate approved S.Res. 37 in April 2021, expressing solidarity with the San
Isidro Movement, a Cuban civil society protest group, S.Res. 81 in May 2021, honoring Las
Damas de Blanco, a women-led nonviolent Cuban human rights group, and S.Res. 489 in January
2022, commending Cuban pro-democracy and human rights activists, including José Daniel
Ferrer Garcia. Among other resolutions, the Senate passed S.Res. 22 in April 2021, reaffirming
the U.S. partnership with Ecuador, and S.Res. 120 in May 2021, recognizing the forthcoming
Summit of the Americas and reaffirming the U.S. commitment to a more prosperous, secure, and
democratic Western Hemisphere.
Pending Congressional Action
FY2022 Foreign Aid Appropriations. Congress has not completed action on an FY2022 foreign
aid appropriations measure. In July 2021, the House approved its version of the Department of
State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2022, H.R. 4373 (H.Rept.
117-84). As passed, the bill would provide assistance to several key countries and programs in the
region for FY2022 at levels either matching or exceeding the Administration’s budget request,
including assistance to Central America, Colombia, Mexico, and regional assistance to the
Caribbean. The Senate Appropriations Committee introduced its version (S. 3075) in October
2021. The Senate committee bill and its draft explanatory statement would provide slightly more
assistance than requested for Colombia and the Caribbean but over $200 million less than that
requested for Central America. Both the report to the House bill and the draft explanatory
statement to the Senate committee bill include numerous directives, recommendations, and
reporting requirements for the Administration regarding U.S. assistance to, and policy toward,
Latin American and Caribbean countries.
Competition With China. Both houses have approved broad bills aimed at positioning the
United States to better compete with China, both of which include numerous provisions on Latin
America and the Caribbean. Both houses will be conferencing on the two bills. In June 2021, the
Senate passed S. 1260, the United States Innovation and Competition Act of 2021, which seeks to
improve the United States’ ability to compete with China worldwide. Among its Latin America
and Caribbean provisions, the bill would require strategies to increase exports of U.S. goods and
services and to strengthen U.S. economic competitiveness and promote good governance, human
rights, and the rule of law in the region. It also would require a report assessing China’s
engagement in international organizations and the defense sector in Latin America and the
Caribbean; authorize a capital increase for the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB); support
U.S. defense cooperation; and increase engagement with civil society regarding accountability,
human rights, and the risks of pervasive surveillance technologies.
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On February 4, 2022, the House approved H.R. 4521, the America Creating Opportunities for
Manufacturing, Pre-Eminence in Technology, and Economic Strength Act of 2022 (America
COMPETES Act of 2022).57 The bill includes most of the Latin America and Caribbean
provisions found in S. 1260, with the exceptions of the capital increase for the IDB and the
requirement for a strategy to increase to increase exports of U.S. goods and services to the region,
but includes two additional provisions to strengthen U.S. engagement with the Caribbean. One
provision would require the Administration to submit to Congress a multiyear strategy to promote
regional cooperation with the Caribbean on energy issues as an alternative to China’s Belt and
Road Initiative. Another provision would authorize assistance for the U.S.-Caribbean Resilience
Partnership from FY2022 to FY2024 and would require the Administration to submit to Congress
a multiyear strategy aimed at helping Caribbean countries increase resilience and adapt to both
natural disasters and the impacts of severe weather events and a changing environment. The bill
also includes a section that would require the Secretary of State to devise a strategy to evaluate
and expand U.S. educational and cultural diplomacy in Latin America and would require the
Secretary of State, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, to submit a report
assessing the nature and impact of China’s educational and cultural sector activity in Latin
America and the Caribbean. Finally, H.R. 4521 also includes two other reporting requirements:
one on multilateral efforts to address Latin American fentanyl trafficking and efforts between
China and Latin America to combat the production and flow of illicit fentanyl products and one
on major Chinese infrastructure investments in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Haiti. In June 2021, the House passed H.R. 2471, the Haiti Development, Accountability, and
Institutional Transparency Initiative Act, which would promote the sustainable rebuilding and
development of Haiti and would prioritize U.S. support for anti-corruption efforts and human
rights. The Senate approved the bill, amended, in January 2022.
Other Action. In other congressional action, the House approved H.R. 6 in March 2021, which
would provide a pathway to citizenship for those brought to the United States as children and
those from countries with TPS designations (currently including El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras,
Nicaragua, and Venezuela). In July 2021, the Senate approved S. 2045, which would rename the
street in front of the Cuban Embassy after a Cuban democracy activist.
Several other bills and resolutions on the region were reported out of committee. In March 2021,
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported S.Res. 44, which would denounce fraudulent
legislative elections in Venezuela. In May, the House Foreign Affairs Committee ordered reported
H.Res. 408, which would urge the government of El Salvador to respect the country’s democratic
institutions. In July, the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee reported
S. 688, which would prohibit federal agencies contracting with persons who have business
operations with Venezuela’s Maduro government, and the House Foreign Affairs Committee
ordered reported H.Res. 549, which would condemn the assassination of the Haitian president and
urge U.S. and global support of Haitian-led solutions. In September 2021, the House Foreign
Affair Committee ordered reported H.R. 4133, which would authorize funding for the Caribbean
Basin Security Initiative through FY2026 and establish monitoring and reporting requirements for
the program.

57 The text of the America COMPETES Act of 2022, as ordered reported by the House Committee on Science, Space,
and Technology, with modifications, is available on House Committee on Rules website as Rules Committee Print 117-
31 at https://rules.house.gov/sites/democrats.rules.house.gov/files/BILLS-117HR4521RH-RCP117-31.pdf. The act
includes provisions from the Ensuring American Global Leadership and Engagement Act or the EAGLE Act, H.R.
3524, ordered reported by the House Foreign Affairs Committee in July 2021.
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Regional U.S. Policy Issues
U.S. Foreign Aid
The United States provides foreign assistance to Latin American and Caribbean countries to
support development and other U.S. objectives. In recent years, top U.S. funding priorities in the
region have included addressing the underlying drivers of migration from Central America,
combatting drug production and supporting peace accord implementation in Colombia, and
strengthening security and the rule of law in Mexico. U.S. agencies also have dedicated
significant resources to combatting HIV/AIDS and fostering long-term stability in Haiti;
addressing security concerns in the Caribbean; and providing humanitarian assistance to the
nearly 5 million Venezuelans who have fled to other Latin American and Caribbean countries, as
well as to their host communities.58
Assistance needs in Latin America and the Caribbean have increased in conjunction with
deteriorating conditions in 2020. As noted, the region’s economy as a whole contracted by an
estimated 6.9% in 2020, largely due to the COVID-19 pandemic.59 The downturn pushed an
additional 17 million people into poverty and 11 million into extreme poverty, increasing the
regional poverty (33.0%) and extreme poverty (13.1%) rates to levels not seen for 10 and 20
years, respectively.60 Economic recovery may be protracted, as many countries are facing high
levels of debt and some may not achieve widespread vaccination until 2023.61
The Biden Administration has requested nearly $2.1 billion of foreign assistance for Latin
America and the Caribbean in FY2022, which (in current dollars) would be the largest annual
budget allocation for the region in more than a decade. If enacted, total State Department- and
USAID-managed funding for the region would increase by $278.2 million (15.5%) compared
with FY2021 estimated levels (see Table 3). The Administration’s FY2022 budget request also
would provide $38 million to the Inter-American Foundation—a small, independent U.S. foreign
assistance agency that promotes grassroots development in Latin America and the Caribbean.
The Administration would use the vast majority of the increased funding to begin implementation
of its four-year, $4 billion plan to foster systemic reform and address the root causes of irregular
migration from Central America (see “Central America’s Northern Triangle”). The FY2022
request includes $860.6 million for Central America—a $298.0 million (53.0%) increase
compared with the FY2021 estimate.62 With regard to other regional priorities, the
Administration’s FY2022 request would provide $453.9 million for Colombia, $187.9 million for
Haiti, $116.6 million for Mexico, $66.0 million for the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, and
$55.0 million for Venezuela.

58 R4V Platforma de Coordinación Interagencial para Refugiados y Migrantes de Venezuela, “Refugiados y Migrantes
Venezolanos en la Región,” January 11, 2022.
59 IMF, World Economic Outlook Update: Rising Caseloads, A Disrupted Recovery, and Higher Inflation, January
2022, p. 5.
60 ECLAC, Social Panorama of Latin America 2021, January 2022, p. 63.
61 Economist Intelligence Unit, How Much Will Vaccine Inequity Cost?, August 2021.
62 $27.2 million of the $860.6 million requested for Central America would be provided through global accounts that
are not included in the regional total for Latin America and the Caribbean.
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Table 3. U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2016-FY2022
(billions of U.S. dollars)
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021 (est.)
2022 (req.)
1.69
1.67
1.67a
1.69
1.72b
1.80b
2.07
Sources: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, FY2018-FY2022; and
U.S. Department of State, “FY2021 Estimate Data,” June 2021.
Notes: These figures exclude Food for Peace Act (P.L. 480) food aid and assistance appropriated as voluntary
contributions to the Organization of American States.
a. Final FY2018 allocations are unclear, because the Administration reprogrammed approximately $396 mil ion
of FY2018 aid that Congress appropriated for El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, reallocating some of
those funds to countries outside of the Latin American and Caribbean region.
b. The FY2020 and FY2021 totals do not include supplemental COVID-19 assistance.

Congressional Action. In March 2021, Congress enacted the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021
(P.L. 117-2), which provided $10.8 billion to respond to COVID-19 globally, including through
health interventions, humanitarian assistance, and contributions to multilateral response efforts.
That funding builds on nearly $6.3 billion appropriated during the 116th Congress to support
global vaccine procurement and delivery and other pandemic-related foreign assistance programs.
The United States had provided Latin American and Caribbean countries with at least
$614.0 million of pandemic response aid, as of November 2021, and 59.2 million doses of
COVID-19 vaccines, as of January 26, 2021.63
Congress has not concluded action on FY2022 appropriations. The House passed the Department
of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2022 (H.R. 4373/H.Rept.
117-84) in July 2021, and the Senate Appropriations Committee introduced its foreign aid
appropriations bill (S. 3075) in October 2021. Congress has not taken further action on either bill.
Instead, it has enacted two continuing resolutions (P.L. 117-43 and P.L. 117-70) that have funded
foreign aid programs in the region at the FY2021 level since October 1, 2021. P.L. 117-70
extends appropriations through February 18, 2022.
Congress may draw from H.R. 4373 and S. 3075 as it considers appropriations for the remainder
of the fiscal year. Neither measure specifies comprehensive appropriations levels for every Latin
American and Caribbean country, but both measures provide funding directives for some U.S.
initiatives in the region. The House-passed bill would designate funding levels for Central
America, Colombia, Mexico, and the CBSI that match or exceed the Administration’s request.
The Senate bill, which includes fewer country and programmatic directives, would provide
slightly more assistance than the Administration requested for Colombia and the CBSI and $206.7
million less than the Administration requested for Central America.
In addition to finalizing appropriations, Congress may consider various other legislative measures
to guide and oversee U.S. foreign assistance policy in the region. These include measures to
authorize certain foreign aid activities in the Caribbean (H.R. 4133) and Central America (H.R.
1177/S. 348 and H.R. 4017/S. 2003), and to evaluate the past decade of U.S. recovery and
developments efforts in Haiti (H.R. 2471, passed by the House in June 2021 and by the Senate,
with an amendment, in January 2022; S. 1104).

63 Nichols testimony, November 16, 2021; and U.S. Department of State, “COVID-19 Vaccine Donations,”
https://www.state.gov/covid-19-recovery/vaccine-deliveries/#wha.
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For additional information, see CRS Report R47028, U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America
and the Caribbean: FY2022 Appropriations, by Peter J. Meyer; CRS Report R46935, Department
of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: FY2022 Budget and Appropriations, by
Cory R. Gill, Marian L. Lawson, and Emily M. Morgenstern; and CRS In Focus IF11581, Latin
America and the Caribbean: Impact of COVID-19, by Mark P. Sullivan and Peter J. Meyer.
Migration Issues
Latin America’s status as a leading source of both legal and unauthorized migration to the United
States means that U.S. immigration policies significantly affect countries in the region and U.S.
relations with these countries’ governments. Latin Americans comprise the vast majority of
individuals who have received relief from removal (deportation) through the TPS program and the
DACA initiative; they also comprise a large percentage of recent asylum-seekers.64 As a result,
immigration policy changes implemented by President Trump, many of which President Biden
has sought to reverse, have affected countries in the Latin American and Caribbean region.
The Trump Administration’s rhetoric, tariff threats, foreign aid cuts, and restrictive immigration
policies tested relations with many countries in the region, and particularly with Mexico and the
Northern Triangle countries. The Administration terminated TPS designations for Haiti, El
Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras (those terminations are facing legal challenges),65 rescinded
DACA through a process that the Supreme Court ruled in June 2020 did not follow proper
procedures and had to be vacated,66 and restricted access to asylum. In January 2019, the Trump
Administration launched the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP), a program that required many
migrants and asylum-seekers to await their U.S. immigration proceedings in Mexico. The
Administration also signed what it termed asylum cooperative agreements (ACAs) with
Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras; these agreements would allow the United States to
transfer certain asylum-seekers who arrive at a U.S. border to Guatemala, El Salvador, or
Honduras to apply for asylum in one of those countries. The Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) began to implement the agreement with Guatemala in November 2019 but suspended
implementation in March 2020. DHS finalized ACAs with El Salvador and Honduras in late
2020, but never implemented them.
The factors that drive U.S.-bound migration from Latin America are multifaceted, and some have
changed over time. These factors include poverty and unemployment; political and economic
instability; crime and violence; natural disasters, climate change, and food insecurity; relatively
close proximity to the United States; familial ties in the United States; and relatively attractive
U.S. economic conditions. The economic and social effects of the COVID-19 pandemic,
combined with ongoing turmoil in Venezuela and Haiti, have prompted increased migration from
those and other countries in the region.

64 Temporary protected status (TPS) is a discretionary, humanitarian benefit granted to eligible nationals after the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) determines that a country has been affected by armed conflict, natural
disaster, or other extraordinary conditions that limit the country’s ability to accept the return of its nationals from the
United States. TPS designations began for Nicaragua and Honduras in 1999, for El Salvador in 2001, and for Haiti in
2010. The Deferred Action for Childhood Arrival (DACA) initiative is an initiative the Obama Administration
implemented in 2012 to provide temporary relief from removal and work authorization to certain unlawfully present
individuals who arrived in the United States as children.
65 As legal challenges to the termination of TPS for these countries continue, DHS has extended the validity of TPS
documents for current beneficiaries through December 31, 2022.
66 U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,—S. Ct.—, 2020 WL 3271746, at *3 (2020).
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Migrant apprehensions at the Southwest border reached a 45-year low in 2017 but began to rise in
FY2018, with unaccompanied children and families from the Northern Triangle, many of whom
were seeking asylum, comprising a majority of apprehensions. In FY2020, apprehensions
declined by more than half, particularly after the COVID-19 pandemic began in March 2020.67 In
response to the pandemic, DHS largely suspended asylum processing at the U.S.-Mexico border
in March 2020 under a Centers for Disease Control and Prevention public health order (Title 42);
most migrants without valid travel documents were expelled into Mexico or returned to their
home countries as quickly as possible.68 In FY2021, border enforcement encounters
(apprehensions and expulsions) reached a record 1.7 million, although that total includes
individuals expelled into Mexico more than once.69 In FY2021, migrant origins expanded beyond
Mexico and Central America to include South American countries and the Caribbean. Sizeable
migrant flows also originated from countries as distant as Romania, India, and Turkey.
In the Biden Administration’s initial months, much of its focus in the region was on immigration
from Central America, although DHS also designated Venezuela for TPS in March 2021.
President Biden took executive actions revising some of the Trump Administration’s restrictive
immigration policies but maintained certain COVID-19-related immigration restrictions while
contending with a large increase in the number of undocumented Central American and Mexican
migrants seeking to enter the United States. Vice President Kamala Harris, whom President Biden
tasked with overseeing diplomatic engagement with Central America and Mexico, visited
Guatemala, Mexico, and the Southwest border in June. In July 2021, the Administration released
two new strategies to address the underlying causes that push Central Americans to migrate and
to collaboratively manage migration in the region. In accordance with the strategies, the
Administration allocated $272.2 million of humanitarian assistance to alleviate conditions in
Central America in FY2021 and requested $860.6 million to address the root causes of migration
from the region in FY2022.70 The Biden Administration sought to terminate the MPP program,
but, after a lawsuit challenging the termination, a federal judge ordered DHS to reinstate the
program. After losing a Supreme Court appeal, DHS announced the reimplementation of MPP on
December 2, 2021.
The Administration has broadened its engagement on migration issues as the pandemic-driven
economic downturn has contributed to large-scale migrant flows throughout the hemisphere.
Secretary Blinken traveled to Colombia in October 2021 for a Migration Ministerial with the
foreign ministers of 16 other Western Hemisphere countries to address regional cooperation on
irregular migration. In his remarks, Secretary Blinken focused on the top U.S. priorities: (1) more
effective management of the immediate situation through strengthened border enforcement,
improved asylum processes, and expanded legal pathways and options for protection and
resettlement; (2) protection for the most vulnerable migrants, including victims of human
trafficking and smuggling; (3) regional cooperation to address the urgent situation with

67 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), “Southwest Border Migration FY2020.” See explanation of the
difference between a Title 8 apprehension under DHS authority and a Title 42 expulsion under Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention authority in the notes.
68 The Biden Administration has exempted unaccompanied children and some families from this policy. See CRS Legal
Sidebar LSB10582, Asylum Processing at the Border: Legal Basics, by Ben Harrington.
69 CRS Report R46999, Immigration: Apprehensions and Expulsions at the Southwest Border, by Audrey Singer and
William A. Kandel.
70 USAID, “El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras – Regional Response,” Fact Sheet #1, FY2022, December 1, 2021.
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Venezuelan and Haitian migrants, including directing resources to communities across the region
hosting migrants from these countries; and (4) efforts to address the root causes of migration.71
Congressional Action. Congress may consider comprehensive immigration measures (S.
348/H.R. 1177) or piecemeal legislation to address specific issues, such as border security,
immigration enforcement, legalization of unauthorized immigrants, temporary and permanent
immigration, and humanitarian admissions. In March 2021, the House passed H.R. 6, which
would modify the legal pathways available to those in the region and adjust the status of some
Central American immigrants in the United States. Amid an increase in child and family arrivals
at the Southwest border, Congress may consider legislation to address the sheltering of child
migrants, as well as additional appropriations as needed to respond to families. Congress is likely
to continue funding and overseeing U.S. assistance to respond to the Venezuela regional
migration crisis, address the root causes of migration from Central America, and bolster Mexico’s
interdiction and humanitarian protection systems.
For additional information, see CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10574, Recent White House Actions on
Immigration, by Hillel R. Smith and Kelsey Y. Santamaria; CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10617,
Asylum Eligibility for Applicants Fleeing Gang and Domestic Violence: Recent Developments, by
Hillel R. Smith; CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10582, Asylum Processing at the Border: Legal Basics,
by Ben Harrington; CRS Insight IN11741, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) COVID-
19 Policies and Protocols at the Southwest Border, by Audrey Singer; CRS Report R46999,
Immigration: Apprehensions and Expulsions at the Southwest Border, by Audrey Singer and
William A. Kandel; CRS In Focus IF11151, Central American Migration: Root Causes and U.S.
Policy, by Peter J. Meyer; CRS In Focus IF10215, Mexico’s Immigration Control Efforts, by
Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS Report R44849, H-2A and H-2B Temporary Worker Visas: Policy
and Related Issues, by Andorra Bruno; CRS Report RS20844, Temporary Protected Status and
Deferred Enforced Departure, by Jill H. Wilson; and CRS Report R46764, Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals (DACA): By the Numbers, by Andorra Bruno.
Drug Trafficking and Criminal Gangs
Latin America and the Caribbean feature prominently in U.S. counternarcotics policy due to the
region’s role as a source and/or transit zone for several illicit drugs destined for U.S. markets—
cocaine, marijuana, methamphetamine, and opioids (plant-based and synthetic)—as well as for
precursor chemicals used in the production of illicit drugs. Heroin abuse and synthetic opioid-
related deaths in the United States have reached epidemic levels, raising questions about how to
address foreign sources of opioids. Policymakers also are concerned that methamphetamine and
cocaine overdoses in the United States are rising, with cocaine overdoses frequently linked to the
presence of synthetic opioids, such as fentanyl.
Drug demand in the United States and changes in the international drug market continue to drive
drug production in Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. Opium poppy cultivation and heroin
production rose in Mexico from 2012 through 2017 but have since declined. However, the
production of fentanyl (a synthetic opioid) and methamphetamine has surged. Over 90% of heroin
seized and sampled in the United States comes from Mexico. Since the Chinese government
implemented strict controls on all forms of fentanyl, including fentanyl analogues, in mid-2019,
Mexico has become a more important source of fentanyl.72 Despite restrictions on imports of

71 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken Remarks at the Regional Migration Ministerial,” October 20,
2021.
72 U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), National Drug Threat Assessment, 2020, February 2021. Hereinafter,
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some precursor chemicals, Mexican transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) continue to be
the primary producers and traffickers of low-cost, high-purity U.S.-bound methamphetamine.
Coca cultivation and cocaine production in Colombia, which supplies roughly 89% of cocaine in
the United States, reached record levels in 2020.73 Coca cultivation and production in Peru also
surged, while coca cultivation fell and potential production increased in Bolivia.74
Whereas Mexico, Colombia, Peru, and most other source and transit countries in the region work
closely with the United States to combat drug production and interdict illicit flows, the
Venezuelan and Bolivian governments do not. In March 2020, the Department of Justice (DOJ)
indicted Venezuela’s leader, Nicolás Maduro (whom the United States does not recognize as
Venezuela’s legitimate president), and other current and former high-ranking Venezuelan
officials. As charged, Maduro allegedly participated in a drug trafficking organization that
conspired with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) to traffic illicit drugs to the
United States. Over the past several years, Maduro government officials have been identified as
conspiring with FARC dissidents and National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrillas operating in
Venezuela to smuggle cocaine and illicit gold.75 U.S. antidrug cooperation with Bolivia decreased
under former President Evo Morales (2006-2019) and remains limited under his successor,
President Luis Arce.
Contemporary drug trafficking and transnational crime syndicates have contributed to
degradations in citizen security and economic development in some countries, often resulting in
high levels of violence. Despite efforts to combat the drug trade, many Latin American
governments, particularly in Mexico and Central America—a region through which roughly 90%
of cocaine bound for the United States from South America transited in 2019—continue to suffer
from weak criminal justice systems and law enforcement agencies.76 Public corruption, including
high-level cooperation with criminal organizations, further frustrates efforts to interdict drugs,
investigate and prosecute traffickers, and recover illicit proceeds. At the same time, there is a
widespread perception—particularly in Latin America—that U.S. demand for illicit drugs is
largely to blame for the region’s crime problems. The COVID-19 pandemic has lowered violence
in most countries, but drug trafficking-related violence remains elevated in Mexico.
Criminal gangs with origins in Southern California, principally the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13)
and the 18th Street gang, continue to undermine citizen security and subvert government authority
in Central America. Gang-related violence has been particularly acute in El Salvador, Honduras,
and urban areas in Guatemala. Gangs have been involved in a range of criminal activities,
including local drug distribution, extortion, money laundering, and weapons smuggling, and they
have used violence to enforce COVID-19-related quarantines. Gang-related violence has fueled
irregular migration to the United States.
U.S. Policy. For more than 50 years, U.S. policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean has
focused on countering drug trafficking and reducing drug production in the region. The largest
antidrug support program, Plan Colombia, provided more than $10 billion (current dollars) to
help Colombia combat both drug trafficking and rebel groups financed by the drug trade from

DEA, NDTA 2020.
73 Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), “ONDCP Releases Data on Coca Cultivation and Production in
the Andean Region,” June 25, 2021.
74 Ibid.
75 Douglas Farah, The Maduro Regime’s Illicit Activities: A Threat to Democracy in Venezuela and Security in Latin
America, Atlantic Council, August 12, 2020.
76 Drug transit data are from U.S. Government, Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement, based on 2019 data
from the Consolidated Counterdrug Database as cited in DEA, NDTA 2020.
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FY2000 to FY2016. After Colombia signed a historic peace accord with the country’s largest
leftist guerrilla group, the FARC, the United States provided assistance to help implement the
agreement. In addition to concerns about cocaine production, some U.S. policymakers have
expressed concern that parts of the peace accord remain unimplemented.
U.S. support to combat drug trafficking and reduce crime also has included partnerships with
other countries in the region: the Mérida Initiative with Mexico, CARSI, and the CBSI. During
the Obama Administration, those initiatives combined U.S. antidrug and rule-of-law assistance
with economic development and violence prevention programs. The Trump Administration
sought to focus on security and antidrug efforts while also attempting to reduce overall funding
for each of the programs.
Through visa denials and revocations, targeted economic sanctions, and federal criminal
investigations and prosecutions, U.S. Administrations also have sought to punish foreign officials
and entities complicit with drugs traffickers, gangs, and other criminal groups. The State
Department manages several deterrence tools, including multiple visa denial programs targeting
foreign drug traffickers, as well programs to offer rewards for information related to significant
foreign narcotics traffickers and transnational organized crime. In December 2021, the
Department of the Treasury announced Global Magnitsky sanctions against two high-level
Salvadoran officials for providing illicit favors to the MS-13 gang (a Treasury-designated TCO
subject to sanctions) during covert negotiations.77 In addition to DOJ’s indictment of Maduro in
Venezuela, cases in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York have implicated
high-level Honduran officials, including former President Juan Orlando Hernández (2014-January
2022).78
The Biden Administration’s first-year drug policy priorities focused on domestic treatment and
harm reduction but also focused on working with “key global partners such as China, Colombia,
and Mexico to curb illicit drug production and trafficking.”79 Drug policy efforts complement
broader efforts to combat corruption, a core component of the Administration’s national security
policy.80 In October 2021, the Biden Administration launched a new bicentennial framework for
U.S.-Mexican security cooperation that focuses on addressing drugs and violence from a public
health perspective, combating transborder crime, and dismantling illicit financial networks.81 The
Administration’s regional drug policy may be further informed by the findings of the
congressionally mandated Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission, which recommended
the State Department take the lead in regional drug policy and replace the annual drug
certification process with compacts negotiated with countries to identify bilateral priorities.82
Congressional Action. Congress continues to consider the Biden Administration’s FY2022
budget request. The House-passed version of the FY2022 foreign aid appropriations bill, H.R.
4373, would, among other provisions, require additional human rights conditions on International
Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) assistance to Colombia and cut INCLE

77 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Targets Corruption Networks Linked to Transnational Organized
Crime,” December 8, 2021.
78 U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, United States v. Juan Antonio Hernández Alvarado, S2 15 Cr.
379 (PKC), Government’s Sentencing Submission, March 16, 2021.
79 The White House, “Biden-⁠Harris Administration Announces First-Year Drug Policy Priorities,” April 1, 2021.
80 The White House, “Memorandum on Establishing the Fight Against Corruption as a Core United States National
Security Interest,” June 3, 2021.
81 The White House, “FACT SHEET: U.S.-Mexico High-Level Security Dialogue,” October 8, 2021.
82 Report of the Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission, Charting a New Path Forward, December 2020.
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assistance to Mexico, while focusing that assistance on combating opioid production and
trafficking. H.Rept. 117-84 accompanying H.R. 4373 would require a report on bilateral (with
Mexico) and multilateral efforts to combat fentanyl trafficking into the United States, as well as
several reports and evaluations on broader aspects of U.S. drug policy recommended by the
WHDPC.83 The draft explanatory statement accompanying the Senate Appropriation Committee’s
version of the FY2022 foreign aid bill (S. 3075) would require an evaluation of U.S. drug policies
over the past several decades and how current efforts differ with those policies within 120 days of
the bill’s enactment.
The 117th Congress has convened oversight hearings that address drug trafficking and crime in the
region, including a November 2021 Senate hearing on drugs and corruption (see Appendix).
During its second session, Congress may convene additional hearings, request Government
Accountability Office reports, and draft legislation to influence U.S. anti-crime and counterdrug
programs in the Western Hemisphere. Issues of concern may include whether or not to support a
resumption of aerial eradication in Colombia, how to address drug flows emanating from
Venezuela, how to improve antidrug cooperation with Mexico after strains in bilateral relations,
and how to improve anti-crime efforts as part of a broader strategy to address the root causes of
unauthorized migration from Central America. Newer issues may focus on how to interdict
precursor chemicals from China and India that are being used to produce fentanyl in Mexico, as
well as how to combat the role of money launderers from China in supporting TCOs in the
region.
For additional information, see CRS Insight IN11535, Mexican Drug Trafficking and Cartel
Operations amid COVID-19, by June S. Beittel and Liana W. Rosen; CRS In Focus IF10578,
Mexico: Evolution of the Mérida Initiative, FY2008-FY2022, by Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS In
Focus IF10400, Trends in Mexican Opioid Trafficking and Implications for U.S.-Mexico Security
Cooperation, by Liana W. Rosen and Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS Report R41576, Mexico:
Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations, by June S. Beittel; CRS In Focus IF10371,
U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America: An Overview, by Peter J. Meyer; CRS Report
R43813, Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations, by June S. Beittel; CRS In Focus IF10789,
Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, by Mark P. Sullivan; and CRS Report R46695, The U.S.
“Majors List” of Illicit Drug-Producing and Drug-Transit Countries, by Liana W. Rosen.
Trade Policy
The Latin American and Caribbean region is among the United States’ most important regional
trading partners. Economic relations between the United States and most of its trading partners in
the region remain strong, despite challenges, such as the downturn in economic growth and trade
due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the high levels of violence in some countries. The United
States accounted for roughly 31% of the region’s merchandise imports and 45% of its
merchandise exports in 2020. Most of this trade is with Mexico, which accounted for 78% of U.S.
imports from the region and 62% of U.S. exports to the region in 2020. In 2020, total U.S. trade
with the region declined 14%, with U.S. merchandise exports declining from $413.0 billion in
2019 to $336.7 billion in 2020 and U.S. merchandise imports declining from $464.7 billion to
$416.0 billion (see Table 4).

83 H.Rept. 117-84 also would require a report on whether relevant U.S. sanctions, such as the Foreign Narcotics
Kingpin Designation Act of 1999, effectively target the most dangerous criminal organizations; an evaluation of the
efficacy of the designation procedures on major illicit narcotics producing and transit countries; a strategy for working
with international partners to develop new guidelines to reduce the manufacturing, trafficking, and use of illicit
narcotics; and an assessment of alternative tools for drug trafficking control.
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The United States has strengthened economic ties with Latin America and the Caribbean over the
past 27 years through the negotiation and implementation of FTAs. Starting with NAFTA in 1994,
which was replaced by the USMCA on July 1, 2020, the United States currently has six FTAs in
force involving 11 Latin American countries: Mexico, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, and Peru. NAFTA
was the first U.S. FTA with a country in the Latin American and Caribbean region, establishing
new rules and disciplines that influenced subsequent trade agreements on issues important to the
United States, such as intellectual property rights protection, services trade, agriculture, dispute
settlement, investment, labor, and the environment.
Table 4. U.S. Trade with Key Trading Partners in Latin America and the Caribbean,
2013-2020
(in billions of current U.S. dollars)
Partner
Country
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
U.S. Exports

Mexico
226.0
241.0
236.5
230.2
243.6
266.0
256.3
211.5
Brazil
44.1
42.4
31.6
30.2
37.3
39.4
42.9
34.6
Chile
17.5
16.5
15.4
12.9
13.6
15.3
15.7
12.5
Colombia
18.4
20.1
16.3
13.0
13.4
15.1
14.8
11.9
Total LAC
404.3
418.9
383.4
360.7
388.8
424.0
413.0
336.7
World
1,578.5
1,621.9
1,503.3
1,451.5
1,547.2
1,665.8
1,642.8
1,424.9
U.S. Imports

Mexico
280.6
295.7
296.4
293.5
312.7
343.7
356.2
325.2
Brazil
27.5
30.0
27.5
26.0
29.5
31.2
30.9
23.4
Colombia
21.6
18.3
14.1
13.8
13.6
13.8
14.2
10.8
Chile
10.4
9.5
8.8
8.8
10.6
11.4
10.4
10.1
Total LAC
438.3
445.3
411.6
400.6
428.2
465.5
464.7
416.0
World
2,268.0
2,356.4
2,248.8
2,186.8
2,339.6
2,536.1
2,493.7
2,336.0
Source: CRS with data from the U.S. Department of Commerce provided by Trade Data Monitor.
Note: This table provides statistics on the top four countries fol owed by the total of U.S. trade with 33
countries of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC).
The United States, Canada, and Mexico entered into NAFTA renegotiations in 2017 and
concluded talks with the announcement of the USMCA on September 30, 2018. The agreement,
which entered into force on July 1, 2020, continues most of NAFTA’s market opening provisions
but modernizes and revises NAFTA with new provisions on digital trade, state-owned enterprises,
currency manipulation, anti-corruption, enforcement of workers’ rights, and the environment.
Certain revisions to USMCA, including tighter rules-of-origin requirements for the motor vehicle
industry, removal of government-procurement provisions for Canada, and changes to investor-
state dispute settlement provisions, are significant because they scale back previous
Administrations’ U.S. trade policy goals.
In addition to FTAs, the United States has extended unilateral trade preferences to some countries
in the region through several trade-preference programs. The Caribbean Basin Economic
Recovery Act (P.L. 98-67, subsequently amended, with no expiration), for example, provides
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limited duty-free entry of selected Caribbean products as a core element of the U.S. foreign
economic policy response to uncertain economic and political conditions in the region. Several
preference programs for Haiti, which expire in 2025, provide generous and flexible unilateral
preferences to the country’s apparel sector. Two other preference programs include the Caribbean
Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA, P.L. 106-200, Title II), which has been extended through
September 2030 (P.L. 116-164), and the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), which expired
on December 31, 2020. The CBTPA extends to eligible Caribbean countries preferences on
apparel products, similar to those given to Mexico under NAFTA and USMCA. The GSP
program, first authorized in the 1970s, provides duty-free tariff treatment to certain products
imported from 120 designated developing countries throughout the world, including Argentina,
Brazil, Ecuador, and other Latin American and Caribbean countries.
Numerous other bilateral and plurilateral trade agreements throughout the Western Hemisphere
do not include the United States. For example, the Pacific Alliance, a trade arrangement
composed of Mexico, Peru, Colombia, and Chile, has made efforts to negotiate a possible trade
arrangement with Mercosur, composed of Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay. In June
2019, after 20 years of negotiations, the European Union and Mercosur reached a political
agreement in principle for an ambitious and comprehensive trade agreement. In April 2020,
Mexico and the European Union finalized negotiations to update their original FTA from 2000
and remove most of the remaining trade barriers between the two partners. Neither of the
agreements with the European Union have yet entered into force.
Numerous observers have proposed that the United States strengthen trade relations with
countries in Latin America and the Caribbean through regional trade agreements or other efforts.84
Some policymakers also have expressed an interest in enhancing trade ties in the Western
Hemisphere to enhance economic competitiveness. Although the United States remains the top
trading partner with the region, numerous lawmakers point to the rising influence of China and
the need to strengthen U.S. economic integration, reinforce regional supply chains, and promote
economic growth.85 Although some of the largest economies in South America, such as Argentina,
Brazil, and Venezuela, resisted the idea of forming comprehensive FTAs with the United States in
the first 15-20 years after NAFTA, such opposition has shifted in some countries. For example,
Brazil and Ecuador, have taken steps to enhance their trade relationships with the United States
through “mini” bilateral trade agreements on trade facilitation, regulatory cooperation, and anti-
corruption. However, some Members of Congress have stated that FTAs with Brazil or Ecuador
are not feasible in the short term, due to concerns regarding the environment, labor standards, and
human rights.
The United States’ January 2017 withdrawal from the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP),
an FTA that included Mexico, Peru, and Chile as signatories, signified a change to U.S. trade
policy in the region. In March 2018, all remaining TPP parties signed the Comprehensive and
Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP, or TPP-11), which essentially
brought into effect a modified TPP. The TPP-11 has entered into force among eight countries—
Australia, Canada, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam. The remaining
signatories have not ratified the agreement. Chile expects to ratify the agreement eventually.
Ecuador applied to enter into the agreement in 2021, and Colombia has expressed plans to request
entry into the agreement after it enters into force among all partners. Some observers have noted

84 Margaret Spiegelman, “Former Envoys: U.S. Must Seize Trade Opportunities in Latin America,” Inside U.S. Trade’s
World Trade Online, January 11, 2022.
85 See for example, Madeline Halpert, “GOP Lawmakers Urge Engagement in Latin America to Counter China,” Inside
U.S. Trade’s World Trade Online, October 13, 2021.
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that the Biden Administration could focus on a comprehensive, high-standard regional trade
agreement in the Asia-Pacific region by applying to join the CPTPP. The Biden Administration,
however, has stated it would not join the CPTPP in its current form. China’s announcement that it
had formally submitted a request to join the CPTPP may be an issue for Congress as it considers
future of trade policy in the Asia-Pacific region.86 The Administration announced a multifaceted
Indo-Pacific Economic Framework in October 2021 but has not issued any details about the
framework or whether it will have any future relationship with the Latin America and Caribbean
region.
Key Policy Issues: Congress may examine how the United States could enhance trade relations
with countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, whether through bilateral FTAs or a broader
initiative such as the Free Trade Area of the Americas agreement, which was pursued in the mid-
1990s but never concluded.87 Congress also may examine whether the United States should
consider partial trade agreements, such as the limited agreements reached with Brazil and
Ecuador in the last quarter of 2020 on trade facilitation, anti-corruption, and good regulatory
practices. Some Members of Congress favor these “mini” agreements, perceiving them as a
mechanism to eventually develop and enter into a comprehensive FTA with those countries. Other
lawmakers identify that such mini agreements provide less leverage for addressing concerns
regarding the environment and workers’ rights in these countries. President Biden has said he
does not plan any new trade agreements at this time and has prioritized domestic economic
recovery.88
The 117th Congress may take an interest in renewing Trade Promotion Authority (Bipartisan
Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015, or TPA; P.L. 114-26), which
expired on July 1, 2021. Although the Biden Administration is not prioritizing trade agreements,
lawmakers may consider whether to include new trade agreement negotiating objectives and
priorities or other requirements in TPA renewal.
Policymakers also may consider how to use trade policy to boost regional economies, especially
in Central America, to help address some of the root causes of migration. Some Members have
expressed an interest in the possibility of modifying CAFTA-DR’s rules of origin in the textiles
and apparel industries to promote investment and create manufacturing jobs in the region. For
example, the flexibilities in CAFTA-DR may allow cumulation of originating content with other
U.S. trade agreement partners such as USMCA or the U.S.-Colombia free trade agreement, which
could broaden and strengthen supply chains in the region.
In addition, policymakers may continue to monitor the effects of COVID-19 on U.S. supply
chains with countries in the Latin American and Caribbean region, the entry into force of the
U.S.-Brazil trade protocol, alleged forced labor conditions in the Dominican Republic, and a
possible extension of apparel trade preferences for Haiti, which are set to expire in 2025.

86 CRS Insight IN11760, China and Taiwan Both Seek to Join the CPTPP, by Brock R. Williams and Michael D.
Sutherland.
87 In 1994, 34 Western Hemisphere nations met at the first Summit of the Americas, envisioning a plan to complete a
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) by January 1, 2005. Faced with deadlocked negotiations, the United States
and Brazil, the FTAA co-chairs, brokered a compromise at the November 2003 Miami trade ministerial. The
compromise moved the FTAA away from the comprehensive single-undertaking principle toward a two-tier framework
comprising a set of “common rights and obligations” for all countries, combined with voluntary plurilateral
arrangements with country benefits related to commitments. The FTAA talks stalled in 2004. At the fourth Summit of
the Americas, held in November 2005, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Venezuela blocked an effort to
restart negotiations. Further action has not occurred.
88 See Guy Erb and Scott Sommers, Biden’s Trade Policy and Free Trade Areas, Washington International Trade
Association, April 8, 2021.
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Members also may consider how the USMCA is affecting U.S. industries, especially the motor
vehicle industry. Mexico and Canada recently requested a USMCA panel to resolve a dispute
over the U.S. interpretation the rules of origin.
For additional information, see CRS Report R44981, The United States-Mexico-Canada
Agreement (USMCA), by M. Angeles Villarreal; CRS In Focus IF10997, U.S.-Mexico-Canada
(USMCA) Trade Agreement, by M. Angeles Villarreal; and CRS In Focus IF10038, Trade
Promotion Authority (TPA), by Ian F. Fergusson.
Selected Country and Subregional Issues
The Caribbean
Caribbean Regional Issues
The Caribbean is a diverse region of 16 independent countries and 18 overseas territories,
including some of the hemisphere’s richest and poorest nations. Among the region’s independent
countries are 13 island nations stretching from the Bahamas in the north to Trinidad and Tobago
in the south. In addition, geographically, Belize is located in Central America and Guyana and
Suriname are located on the northern coast of South America, but all three are members of
CARICOM (see Figure 2).
In recent years, U.S. policy toward the Caribbean often has been eclipsed by attention to foreign
policy crises elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere. Nevertheless, U.S. interests in the Caribbean
are diverse and include economic, political, and security concerns. The U.S.-Caribbean
relationship is characterized by extensive economic linkages (involving trade, investment,
tourism, and large Caribbean diaspora communities in the United States) and by significant
cooperation on counternarcotics and other security efforts. Because most Caribbean countries,
with the exception of Haiti, have relatively high per capita incomes (classified by the World Bank
as upper-middle-income or high-income economies), the region has not received large amounts of
U.S. development assistance.89 However, the United States has responded with humanitarian
assistance in the aftermath of hurricanes that have devastated several countries in recent years.
Beginning in the early 2000s, the United States significantly expanded assistance to the region to
combat HIV/AIDS, with both Guyana and Haiti designated as focus countries in the President’s
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief initiative.
In December 2016, Congress enacted the United States-Caribbean Strategic Enhancement Act of
2016 (P.L. 114-291), requiring the State Department to develop a multiyear strategy to support
U.S. engagement in the Caribbean. Completed in 2017, the strategy established a framework to
strengthen U.S.-Caribbean relations in six priority areas: (1) security, with the objectives of
countering transnational crime and terrorist organizations and advancing citizen security; (2)
diplomacy, with the goal of increasing institutionalized engagement to forge greater cooperation
at the OAS and the U.N.; (3) prosperity, including the promotion of sustainable economic growth
and private sector-led investment and development; (4) energy, with the goals of increasing U.S.
exports of natural gas and the use of U.S. renewable energy technologies; (5) education, focusing
on increased exchanges for students, teachers, and other professionals; and (6) health, including a
focus on long-standing efforts to fight infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS.

89 World Bank, “World Bank Country and Lending Groups,” at https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/
articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups.
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Figure 2. Map of the Caribbean Region: Independent Countries

Source: Prepared by Amber Hope Wilhelm, Visual Information Specialist, CRS Graphics.
Notes: With the exception of Cuba and the Dominican Republic, the remaining 14 independent countries of the
Caribbean region are members of the Caribbean Community, or CARICOM, an organization established by
English-speaking Caribbean nations in 1973 to spur regional integration. Six Eastern Caribbean nations—Antigua
and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines—are
members of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States, established in 1981 to promote economic integration,
harmonization of foreign policy, and other forms of cooperation among member states.
In 2019, the State Department issued a report to Congress on the implementation of its multiyear
strategy. The report maintained that limited budgets and human resources have constrained
opportunities for deepening relations, but funding for the strategy’s security pillar has supported
meaningful engagement and produced tangible results for regional and U.S. security interests.90
Caribbean Basin Security Initiative. Because of their geographic location, many Caribbean
nations are vulnerable to use as transit countries for illicit drugs from South America destined for
the U.S. and European markets. Many Caribbean countries also have suffered high rates of
violent crime, including murder, often associated with drug trafficking activities. In response, the
United States launched the CBSI in 2009, a regional U.S. foreign assistance program seeking to
reduce drug trafficking in the region and advance public safety and security. The program
dovetails with the first pillar of the State Department’s Caribbean multiyear strategy for U.S.
engagement, security. From FY2010 through FY2021, Congress appropriated a total of $751
million (current dollars) for the CBSI. These funds benefitted 13 Caribbean countries.91 The

90 U.S. Department of State, 2019 Report to Congress on Progress of Public Law (P.L.) 114-291: Efforts to Implement
the Strategy for U.S. Engagement with the Caribbean Region, July 2019.
91 The 13 countries benefiting from the CBSI are Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, the
Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines,
Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago.
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program has targeted assistance in five areas: (1) maritime and aerial security cooperation, (2) law
enforcement capacity building, (3) border/port security and firearms interdiction, (4) justice
sector reform, and (5) crime prevention and at-risk youth. For FY2022, the Biden Administration
is requesting $66 million for the CBSI.
Caribbean Energy Security Initiative. Many Caribbean nations depend on energy imports and
once participated in Venezuela’s PetroCaribe program, which supplied Venezuelan oil under
preferential financing terms. The United States launched the Caribbean Energy Security Initiative
(CESI) in 2014, with the goal of promoting a cleaner and more sustainable energy future in the
Caribbean.92 The CESI includes various initiatives to boost energy security and sustainable
economic growth by attracting investment in a range of energy technologies through a focus on
improved governance; increased access to finance; and enhanced coordination among energy
donors, governments, and stakeholders.93
Disaster Resilience and Climate Change. Many Caribbean countries are susceptible to extreme
weather events such as tropical storms and hurricanes, which can significantly affect their
economies and infrastructure. Recent scientific studies suggest climate change may be increasing
the intensity of such events.94 In September 2019, Hurricane Dorian caused widespread damage
to the northwestern Bahamian islands of Grand Bahama and Abaco, with 70 confirmed deaths
and many missing.95 The United States responded with nearly $34 million in humanitarian
assistance, including almost $25 million provided through USAID. Prior to the hurricane, the
State Department had launched a U.S.-Caribbean Resilience Partnership in April 2019, with the
goal of increasing regional disaster response capacity and promoting resilience to natural
disasters. In December 2019, USAID announced it was providing $10 million to improve local
resilience to disasters in the Caribbean. In 2020, USAID joined with CARICOM’s Caribbean
Disaster Emergency Management Agency to launch the Caribbean Climate Resilience Initiative.
As noted, the leaders of both Antigua and Barbuda and Jamaica were invited to participate in
President Biden’s Leaders’ Summit on Climate in April 2021.
Small Islands Initiative. In March 2021, the Biden Administration launched the Small and Less
Populous Island Economies (SALPIE) Initiative, an economic cooperation framework to
strengthen U.S. collaboration with island countries, including in the Caribbean. The initiative’s
goals are to counter COVID-19 economic challenges, promote economic recovery, respond to the
climate crisis, and advance longer-term shared interests.96
Congressional Action. Over the past several years, Congress rejected budget requests that would
have cut CBSI funding and appropriated foreign assistance to address other challenges in the
Caribbean, including disaster resilience, energy security, and climate change. Such support for
Caribbean regional programs is continuing in the 117th Congress during consideration of the
Biden Administration’s FY2022 foreign aid request.
The House-passed version of the FY2022 foreign aid appropriations measure, H.R. 4373 (H.Rept.
117-84), would provide not less than $80 million for the CBSI (about 21% more than requested),

92 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, “U.S.-Caribbean Resilience Partnership,” at
https://www.state.gov/u-s-caribbean-resilience-partnership/.
93 For background, see U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, “Caribbean Energy Security
Initiative (CESI),” at https://www.state.gov/caribbean-energy-security-initiative-cesi/.
94 See, for example, Kieran T Bhatia et al., “Recent Increases in Tropical Cyclone Intensification Rates,” Nature
Communications, vol. 10, no. 635 (2019).
95 The Government of the Bahamas, Cabinet & Disaster Management (NEMA), “Hurricane Dorian, NEMA Update,”
November 29, 2019.
96 White House, “Fact Sheet: Small and Less Populous Island Economies (SALPIE) Initiative,” March 22, 2021.
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$3 million for the CESI, and $5 million for Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean. The report to the
bill also recommended $15 million for strengthening resilience to natural disasters in the
Caribbean and $10 million for inclusive economic growth in the region, with a primary focus on
small grants that advance entrepreneurship efforts of women, youth, and other disadvantaged
populations. The report also recommended that $2 million of increased funding for the Inter-
American Foundation be targeted at building disaster resiliency in the Caribbean and that the U.S.
International Development Finance Corporation prioritize investments in the Caribbean,
especially investments that support minority- and women-owned businesses and promote
women’s economic empowerment.
The draft explanatory statement to the Senate Appropriations Committee version of the FY2022
foreign aid appropriations bill, S. 3075, introduced in October 2021, would recommend $74.5
million for the CBSI (almost 13% more than requested) and $6.5 million for the Caribbean
Energy Initiative (as opposed to the CESI). According to the explanatory statement, the
committee continues to support enhanced efforts to help Latin American and Caribbean countries
achieve greater energy independence, including by improving governance, renewable energy
development, energy efficiency, and electrical interconnectivity.
The 117th Congress has taken action on two other bills with provisions on the Caribbean. The
House-passed America COMPETES Act of 2022, H.R. 4521, approved February 4, 2022, would,
among its provisions, require a multiyear strategy to promote regional cooperation with the
Caribbean on energy issues and would authorize assistance for the U.S.-Caribbean Resilience
Partnership from FY2022 to FY2024 (such measures also were included in H.R. 3524, the
EAGLE Act, ordered reported by the House Foreign Affairs Committee in July 2021). Another
bill, H.R. 4133, ordered reported by the House Foreign Affairs Committee in September 2021,
would authorize $74.8 million for the CBSI for each fiscal year from FY2022 to FY2026 and
would establish monitoring and reporting requirements for the program.
For additional information, see CRS In Focus IF10789, Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, by
Mark P. Sullivan; CRS In Focus IF10407, Dominican Republic, by Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS In
Focus IF10912, Jamaica, by Mark P. Sullivan; and CRS In Focus IF10666, The Bahamas: An
Overview, by Mark P. Sullivan.
Cuba
Political and economic developments in Cuba, a one-party authoritarian state with a poor human
rights record, frequently have been the subject of intense congressional concern since the 1959
Cuban revolution. Miguel Díaz-Canel succeeded Raúl Castro as president in 2018 and as head of
the Cuban Communist Party in April 2021. Cuba adopted a new constitution in 2019 that
introduced some political and market-oriented reforms but continued the state’s dominance over
the economy and the Communist Party’s predominant political role. A November 2020
government crackdown on the San Isidro Movement (MSI), a civil society group opposing
restrictions on artistic expression, spurred a protest by several hundred Cubans. Motivated by the
repression of the MSI, in February 2021, a group of Cuban recording artists released a song and
music video, Patria y Vida, critical of the government; it became an instant hit.
On July 11, 2021, widespread anti-government demonstrations broke out in Havana and in cities
and towns throughout the country, with thousands of Cubans protesting shortages of food and
medicine, daily blackouts, slow progress on COVID-19 vaccinations, and long-standing concerns
about the lack of freedom of expression and assembly. The government responded with harsh
measures, including widespread detentions of hundreds of protesters, activists, and journalists,
and Cuba human rights groups reported summary trials for some of those detained. The Cuban
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government also denied permission and disrupted plans for a new dissident group, Archipiélago,
to conduct a countrywide “civic march for change” on November 15, 2021. As of early February
2022, the human rights groups Cuban Prisoners Defenders reported 932 political prisoners (up
from 152 on July 1, 2021), of which 626 were imprisoned and considered prisoners of conscience
by CPD, 209 were under some form of conditional release, and 97 were imprisoned for other
politically motivated acts.97
The Cuban economy is being hard-hit by the COVID-19 pandemic, reduced support from
Venezuela, and U.S. economic sanctions. The Cuban government reports the country’s economy
contracted 11% in 2020, and the Economist Intelligence Unit estimated 0.1% growth in 2021.98
Over the past decade, Cuba has implemented gradual market-oriented economic policy changes,
but the slow pace of these reforms has not fostered sustainable growth and development. In
January 2021, Cuba eliminated its dual currency system; the long-debated reform ignited
inflation, with estimates ranging from 300% to over 700% by the end of 2021.99
Cuba’s public health response to the pandemic initially kept cases and deaths low, but both began
to increase in late 2020 and surged until August 2021; the country experienced another surge of
cases in January 2022 due to the Omicron variant, but deaths remained low because of the
country’s high vaccination rate. As of early February 2022, the country had reported over 8,400
deaths, with a mortality rate of 74 per 100,000 people.100 Cuba has developed and manufactured
three COVID-19 vaccines and, as of early February 2022, had fully vaccinated 86% of its
population, one of the highest rates in the region.101
Since the early 1960s, the centerpiece of U.S. policy toward Cuba has been economic sanctions
aimed at isolating the Cuban government. Congress has played an active role in shaping policy
toward Cuba, including by enacting legislation that strengthens—and at times eases—U.S.
economic sanctions. In 2014, the Obama Administration initiated a policy shift away from
sanctions and toward a policy of engagement. This shift included the restoration of diplomatic
relations; the rescission of Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of international terrorism; and an
increase in travel, commerce, and the flow of information to Cuba implemented through
regulatory changes. President Trump unveiled his Administration’s Cuba policy in 2017, issuing a
national security presidential memorandum that introduced new sanctions, including restrictions
on transactions with companies controlled by the Cuban military. By 2019, the Trump
Administration had largely abandoned engagement and had significantly increased sanctions,
particularly on travel and remittances, to pressure Cuba on human rights and for its support of the
Maduro government in Venezuela government.
In its initial months, the Biden Administration announced it was conducting a review of policy
toward Cuba. The White House press secretary said on March 9, 2021, that although a Cuba
policy shift was not among the President’s top priorities, the Administration was “committed to
making human rights a core pillar” of policy and would review policy decisions made in the prior
Administration, including the decision to designate Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism.102

97 Cuban Prisoners Defenders, “Monthly Update of the Prisoners Defenders’ List of Political Prisoners in Cuba,”
February 7, 2022.
98 EIU, Cuba Country Report, 4th quarter 2021.
99 Ibid, and Marc Frank, “Cuban Peso in Free Fall Against the Dollar,” Reuters, January 26, 2022.
100 Johns Hopkins, “Mortality Analyses,” February 6, 2022.
101 Johns Hopkins, “Vaccination Progress Across the World,” February 6, 2022.
102 U.S. Department of State, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki and Deputy Director of the National
Economic Council Bharat Ramamurti,” March 9, 2021.
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In the aftermath of the July 11 protests, the Biden Administration took several actions. President
Biden and other Administration officials expressed solidarity with the protesters and strongly
criticized the Cuban government for its repressive response. In July and August 2021, the
Department of the Treasury imposed four rounds of targeted financial sanctions on several Cuban
security entities and officials involved in actions to suppress peaceful, democratic protests in
Cuba. In November 2021, the State Department imposed visa restrictions on Cuban officials
implicated in suppressing a planned civic march; in January 2022, it imposed visa restrictions on
Cuban officials connected to the detention, sentencing, and imprisonment of the July 11
protesters. Among other actions, the Administration established a working group to identify the
most effective ways to get remittances directly to the Cuban people, held engagement sessions
with members of the Cuban American community, began reviewing plans to increase staffing at
the U.S. Embassy in Havana to facilitate consular services and engagement with civil society, and
stated it was actively collaborating with the private sector to identify creative ways to ensure
Cuban citizens have internet access.
In congressional testimony in early February 2022, Assistant Secretary of State for Western
Hemisphere Affair Brian Nichols maintained that the State Department would soon be deploying
temporary duty personnel offices to Havana to increase visa processing and is awaiting a White
House decision on remittances. He noted that the remittances working group had provided
recommendations to the White House on ways to permit the flow of remittances to Cuba without
increasing funds that would go to the Cuban military.103
Congressional Action. Past Congresses supported U.S. funding for human rights and democracy
programs in Cuba and for U.S.-government sponsored broadcasting to Cuba, as well as
resolutions expressing concern about human rights, but views among Members often diverged
regarding the best approach to influence the Cuban government’s behavior.
The 117th Congress is considering the Administration’s FY2022 foreign operations request of $20
million for Cuba democracy programs (same as appropriated annually since FY2014) and nearly
$13 million for Cuba broadcasting (same as appropriated in FY2021). Both the House-approved
and the Senate-introduced versions of the FY2022 foreign aid appropriations bill (H.R. 4373,
H.Rept. 117-84; S. 3075) would fully fund both programs. Of the $20 million for Cuba
democracy programs, the House bill would provide not less than $5 million to support free
enterprise, private business organizations, and people-to-people and cultural activities. In
contrast, the version in the Senate would provide $5 million for such activities in addition to the
$20 million in democracy funding.
On human rights in Cuba, the House approved H.Res. 760 in early November 2021 and the
Senate approved S.Res. 310 in August; both resolutions expressed solidarity with Cubans
demonstrating peacefully, condemned Cuba’s acts of repression, and called for the immediate
release of arbitrarily detained Cuban citizens. In other action, the Senate passed: S.Res. 37 in
April 2021, expressing solidarity with the MSI; S.Res. 81 in May, honoring Las Damas de
Blanco, a woman-led human rights group; S. 2045 in July, which would rename the street in front
of the Cuban Embassy after a democracy activist; and S.Res. 489 in January 2022, commending
Cuban pro-democracy and human rights activists, including José Daniel Ferrer Garcia.
For additional information, see CRS In Focus IF10045, Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview, by Mark P.
Sullivan; CRS Report R45657, Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 116th Congress and Through the Trump
Administration, by Mark P. Sullivan; CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel

103 “House Foreign Affairs Committee Holds Hearing on Overview of U.S. Priorities in the Western Hemisphere,” CQ
Congressional Transcripts, February 3, 2022.
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and Remittances, by Mark P. Sullivan; and CRS Report R43835, State Sponsors of Acts of
International Terrorism—Legislative Parameters: In Brief, by Dianne E. Rennack.
Haiti
In July and August 2021, a presidential assassination, an earthquake, and a tropical storm
exacerbated Haiti’s political, social, and economic woes. The aftermath of these events, on top of
several preexisting crises in Haiti, likely points to a period of major instability, presenting
challenges for U.S. policymakers and for congressional oversight of the U.S. response and
assistance, including to Haitian emigration and foreign assistance.
The assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in the capital, Port-au-Prince, on July 7, 2021, left a
power vacuum without a clear path forward. Political gridlock between the executive and
legislative branches during his tenure led to the government not organizing elections scheduled
for 2019. The terms of the entire lower Chamber of Deputies and two-thirds of the Senate expired
in January 2020, as did the terms of all local government posts, without newly elected officials to
take their places. Moïse had been ruling by decree since then.
After his death, Haiti had no president or legislature and virtually no elected officials functioning
at any level. The lack of elected officials makes the question of presidential succession and the
organization of elections difficult, as officials are not in place to carry out the procedures outlined
in various articles of the Haitian constitution. It also raises questions about the legitimacy of any
interim governments. Gangs have been taking advantage of this power vacuum to expand their
criminal activities; some observers estimate that gangs now control as much as 50%-60% of
Haitian territory.104
On July 17, 2021, after a Haitian power struggle, U.S. and U.N. officials shifted support from the
acting prime minister to prime minister-designate Ariel Henry, calling for the formation of a
consensus government to hold credible elections as soon as possible and to ensure every citizen
receives adequate public services. Some observers have questioned that support, both because
Henry was not elected and because of alleged ties to the president’s assassination.105 Henry’s term
was due to expire on February 7, 2022, when Moïse’s term would have ended, adding to the
urgency of Haitians agreeing on some sort of interim government to follow his. Nonetheless,
Henry will most likely stay in place for the time being.
Ten senators remain in office but do not constitute a quorum and so cannot act officially.
Nonetheless, after the assassination, they voted for Senate leader Joseph Lambert to succeed
Moïse. In October 2021, Lambert called for Henry to resign and be replaced by a new interim
government, with himself as president.106 The senators argue that their terms expire in January
2023; Henry argues they end in 2022.107
Various coalitions of civil society groups and political parties have proposed plans for an interim
government to manage Haiti until conditions are suitable for holding elections, the major ones

104 New York Times, “‘It’s Terror’: In Haiti, Gangs Gain Power as Security Vacuum Grows,” October 27, 2021; and
CANANews, “Haiti-Crime-Former Government Official Says Kidnappers Are Better Equipped Than Police,”
December 6, 2021.
105 See, for example, Washington Post, “Read: Resignation Letter from U.S. Special Envoy for Haiti, Daniel Foote,”
September 23, 2021; and U.S. Department of State, “Western Hemisphere Affairs Assistant Secretary Brian A. Nichols
on the Recent International Partners Meeting on Haiti,” special briefing, December 17, 2021.
106 Matt Rivers, “Exclusive: Haiti’s Senate Leader Calls on Prime Minister to Resign,” CNN, October 27, 2021.
107 Telesur, “Haiti: Duration of the Mandate of 10 Senators Prompts Conflicts,” January 11, 2022.
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being the so-called Montana Group, signers of the Louisiana Unitary Accord, and backers of de
facto Prime Minister Ariel Henry’s plan, which he presented in September 2021. Henry’s plan
includes holding a referendum on constitutional changes prior to elections, despite constitutional
amendment by referendum being “strictly forbidden” by the current constitution (Article 284.3).
Henry also dissolved the Provisional Electoral Council, which would have organized elections. At
a meeting with donors on January 21, 2022, Henry reportedly said he expected to install a new
provisional electoral council within days and pledged to hold elections in 2022.108
According to U.N. reports, gangs challenge the Haitian state’s authority and are often better
armed and better equipped than law-enforcement authorities.109 According to the U.S. Department
of the Treasury, gangs have operated with the support of some Haitian politicians, receiving
money, political protection, and firearms in exchange for carrying out attacks designed to create
instability and suppress protests over living conditions.110 Some gangs have called for Henry to
resign, violently preventing him from carrying out official functions and creating a nationwide
fuel shortage in protest. Armed groups attacked Henry on January 1, 2022, in what his office said
was an assassination attempt.
The Haitian National Police (HNP) force, which became increasingly professional with the
support of U.N. peacekeeping forces (2004-2017) and U.S. and other international assistance, has
been unable to maintain control in the face of increased violence, murders, and kidnapping
(including that of 16 U.S. missionaries in October, who have since been released or escaped). The
HNP is underfunded and is smaller than international standards for the country’s population.
According to the U.N., the HNP has committed human rights abuses, including 19 extrajudicial
killings in fall 2019.111
Political instability and extreme vulnerability to natural disasters contribute to Haiti being the
poorest and one of the most unequal countries in the Western Hemisphere. According to the
World Bank, a weak economy, political turmoil, and the COVID-19 pandemic reversed modest
reductions in poverty, leaving almost 60% of Haitians in poverty in 2020. Over 96% of the
population is vulnerable to natural disasters.112 In August 2021, a 7.2 magnitude earthquake
struck Haiti, resulting in over 2,000 deaths and affecting about 1.2 million people, mostly in the
southwestern peninsula.113 The quake destroyed 84,000 homes and many hospitals, schools, and
crops. Three days later, Tropical Storm Grace hit Haiti, causing mudslides and flooding. Haiti
already had one of the highest levels of food insecurity in the world, with 42% of the population
facing acute food insecurity in September 2020. In the areas hardest hit by the August earthquake,
according to the World Food Programme, the number of people urgently needing food assistance
increased by one-third.114 Two more earthquakes hit the area on January 24, 2022.

108 Rob Gillies and Dánica Coto, “Canada, U.S. and Allies Talk Aid for Haiti at Meeting,” Associated Press, January
21, 2022.
109 U.N. Integrated Office in Haiti, “SRSG La Lime Statement to the Security Council,” October 5, 2020; and U.N.
Security Council, “The Question Concerning Haiti,” S/PV.8729, February 20, 2020, p. 3.
110 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Serious Human Rights Abusers on International Human
Rights Day: Designations Target Human Rights Abusers in Haiti, Yemen, and Russia,” press release, December 10,
2020.
111 Marta Hurtado, “Press Briefing Note on Haiti Unrest,” Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights,
November 1, 2019.
112 “The World Bank in Haiti: Overview,” November 8, 2021, at https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/haiti/overview.
113 Amanda Coletta and Ellen Francis, “Stranded by Tropical Storm Grace, Haiti Earthquake Survivors Seek Shelter,”
Washington Post, August 19, 2021.
114 Laura Gottesdiener, “Haiti’s Hunger Crisis Bites Deeper After Devastating Quake,” Reuters, August 30, 2021.
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The Biden Administration requested $188 million in U.S. assistance for Haiti in FY2022, $51
million of which would be for development assistance. The United States donated 500,000 doses
of COVID-19 vaccine doses in July 2021 through COVAX; Haiti returned more than half of the
doses in October, since they were set to expire before Haiti could administer them. Haiti
reportedly will receive future doses in exchange. From November through January 2022, the
United States donated almost 248,000 additional vaccine doses through COVAX.115 As of early
February 2022, less than 1% of Haiti’s 11 million people were fully vaccinated.116
In December 2021, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Brian Nichols
met with 14 partner countries, several international organizations, and the Haitian foreign
minister to discuss challenges in Haiti. The group agreed that the HNP needs additional
international support and that “political dialogue must continue among all sectors of Haitian
society to build consensus on a political accord.” The group also sought concrete pledges from
participants for security, political, and economic assistance.117 On January 21, 2022, two dozen
senior international officials pledged to increase aid, including to the HNP, focusing on rule of
law, justice, and human rights.118
Congressional Action. In March 2021, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs held a hearing
on policy recommendations for the Biden Administration on Haiti (see Appendix). The House
passed the Haiti Development, Accountability, and Institutional Transparency Initiative Act (H.R.
2471) in June 2021, and the Senate approved the bill, with an amendment, on January 13, 2022.
The bill would measure the progress of post-disaster recovery and efforts to address corruption,
governance, rule of law, and media freedoms in Haiti. In July 2021, the House Foreign Affairs
Committee ordered reported H.Res. 549, which would condemn the assassination of the Haitian
president and urge U.S. and global support of Haitian-led solutions. Measures to extend from
2025 to 2035 duty-free treatment with respect to imports from Haiti under the Caribbean Basin
Economic Recovery Act have been introduced in both chambers as the Haiti Economic Lift
Program Extension Act of 2021 (S. 3279 in November 2021; H.R. 6136 in December 2021).
See also CRS Insight IN11699, Haiti: Concerns After the Presidential Assassination, by Maureen
Taft-Morales; and, for earlier background, CRS Report R45034, Haiti’s Political and Economic
Conditions, by Maureen Taft-Morales.
Mexico and Central America
Mexico
Congress has demonstrated sustained interest in Mexico, a neighboring country and top trading
partner with which the United States has a close but complicated relationship. In recent decades,
U.S.-Mexican relations have improved, as the countries have become close trade partners and
have worked to address migration, crime, and other issues. Nevertheless, the history of U.S.

115 PAHO, Tracker COVAX Initiative – COVID-19 Vaccine Deliveries in the Americas, February 3, 2022; Haiti Libre,
“Haiti - Covid: Vaccination Failure, Haiti Will His [sic] Exchange Expired Vaccines,” October 14, 2021; and CE
Noticias Financieras, “Haiti to Return Thousands of COVID Vaccines to U.S.; They’re Close to Expiring,” October
13, 2021.
116 Johns Hopkins, “Vaccination Progress Across the World,” February 6, 2022.
117 U.S. Department of State, “Western Hemisphere Affairs Assistant Secretary Brian A. Nichols on the Recent
International Partners Meeting on Haiti,” special briefing, December 17, 2021.
118 Rob Gillies and Dánica Coto, “Canada, U.S., and Allies Talk Aid for Haiti at Meeting,” Associated Press, January
21, 2022.
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military and diplomatic intervention in Mexico and the asymmetrical power dynamics of the
relationship provoke periodic tensions.
Mexico has undergone significant changes under the populist rule of Andrés Manuel López
Obrador, leader of the National Regeneration Movement (MORENA) party, who took office for a
six-year term in December 2018. López Obrador, who created MORENA in 2014, is the first
Mexican president in over two decades to enjoy majority support in both legislative chambers,
although the size of those majorities decreased following June 2021 midterm elections. In
addition to combating corruption, he pledged to build infrastructure in southern Mexico, revive
the poorly performing state oil company, address citizen security through social programs, and
adopt a noninterventionist foreign policy.
López Obrador’s approval ratings have remained high (65% in November 2021), even as his
government has struggled to address organized crime-related violence and the health and
economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, which had resulted in more than 309,000 deaths as
of early February 2022.119 Supporters have generally praised the government’s social programs
and minimum-wage increases, as well as López Obrador’s ability to connect with average
Mexicans through daily press conferences and frequent, countrywide travel. Many observers have
criticized López Obrador’s attacks on freedom of the press, independent government institutions,
and judicial independence. His government has also received criticism for its austere fiscal policy,
which has reduced government spending, especially for autonomous institutions, while sparing
his priority infrastructure projects from cuts.120 Since López Obrador took office, prosecutors
have not pursued corruption allegations involving the president’s allies.121
U.S.-Mexico relations have remained generally cordial under López Obrador. Nevertheless,
tensions have emerged over issues including border security, U.S. investigations of Mexican
officials, and policies Mexico has adopted that have negatively affected U.S. energy investors.
The López Obrador government enacted labor reform measures (May 2019), which contributed to
U.S. congressional approval of implementing legislation (P.L. 116-113) for the United States-
Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). The government accommodated the Trump
Administration’s restrictive border and asylum policy changes, which shifted more of the burden
of interdicting migrants and offering asylum from the United States to Mexico. The October 2020
arrest of former Mexican Defense Minister Salvador Cienfuegos in the United States on drug
trafficking charges deeply angered the Mexican government. Despite Cienfuegos’s subsequent
release, Mexico enacted legislation to limit U.S. law enforcement operations and U.S.-Mexican
intelligence sharing in the country.122 Security cooperation under the Mérida Initiative, a security
and rule-of-law partnership for which Congress has appropriated more than $3.3 billion since
FY2008, stalled at the federal level in Mexico, but state and local cooperation continued.
Despite some lingering tension in relations, Mexico is directly involved in addressing several
challenges facing U.S. policymakers. A High-Level Economic Dialogue took place in September
2021, and a Cabinet-level security dialogue convened in October to launch a new bicentennial
framework for security cooperation to replace the Mérida Initiative. The August 2021 Supreme

119 Carrin Zissis, “Approval Tracker: Mexico’s President AMLO,” Americas Society/Council of the Americas, January
6, 2022; and Johns Hopkins, “Mortality Analyses,” February 6, 2022.
120 Zedryk Raziel, “Recorte de 75% Compromete Pagos de Servicios Básicos del Gobierno y Arriesga Inversiones en
Salud y Ciencia,” Animal Político, June 1, 2020.
121 Americas Society/Council of the Americas and Control Risks, The Capacity to Commit Corruption Index: 2021.
122 Vanda Felbab-Brown, “A Dangerous Backtrack on the US-Mexico Security Relationship,” Brookings Institution,
December 21, 2021.
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Court ruling ordering the Biden Administration to reinstate the MPP policy prompted new
discussions on how and under what conditions Mexico would agree to restart the program. MPP
restarted in December 2021 under new guidance, providing more assistance with shelter and other
services to migrants enrolled in the program and expanding the number of migrants who fall
within its criteria. The Biden Administration had provided Mexico with some 11 million doses of
COVID-19 vaccines as of December 2021, some of which Mexico had distributed in northern
border states to help facilitate the border’s reopening in November 2021.123 The Administration
has expressed increasing concerns about a López Obrador-backed electricity reform, now under
consideration in the Mexican Congress, that would guarantee a majority of the electricity market
to Mexico’s state-owned electricity commission at the expense of private U.S. energy producers.
Presidents Biden and López Obrador held bilateral and trilateral (with Canadian Prime Minister
Justin Trudeau) meetings during the North American Leaders summit in November 2021, the first
since 2016.
Congressional Action. Congress is considering the Biden Administration’s FY2022 foreign
assistance request for Mexico of $116.5 million, which is nearly 27% lower than the estimated
FY2021 appropriation of $158.9 million. The Administration’s FY2022 request for INCLE aid
for Mexico is $44 million less than the FY2021 estimated appropriation. The House-passed
version of the FY2022 foreign aid appropriations bill (H.R. 4373, H.Rept. 117-84) would provide
$158.9 million for assistance to Mexico. It would require a comprehensive review of funds
provided through the Mérida Initiative and a report on any funds appropriated to Mexican
agencies involved in migration management within 90 days of the bill’s enactment. The measure
also would require reports on plans to improve data collection on synthetic drug trafficking,
crimes committed along Mexico’s northern highways, combating fentanyl flows, and the efficacy
of U.S. drug control tools such as sanctions. The Senate Appropriation Committee’s version of
the FY2022 foreign aid bill (S. 3075) does not stipulate a total funding level for Mexico but
would specify $80 million in INCLE funds. The explanatory statement accompanying the bill
would require a review of the Mérida Initiative and a report on Mexico’s human rights efforts.
Other legislation would address U.S. relations with Mexico, including H.R. 3524, the EAGLE
Act, reported by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in July 2021, which would require a
report on how the United States, Mexico, and Canada could work together to reduce methane and
other emissions and implement Article 23.6 of the USMCA, which prohibits importation of goods
produced by forced labor. S. 1201, the U.S. Climate Act, introduced in the Senate in April 2021,
contains similar provisions. The bill would require the Secretary of State to produce a report
including a strategy for reengaging with Mexico and Canada on methane reduction targets and
would require the President to develop a strategy for enhancing trilateral cooperation on climate
issues.
For additional information, see CRS Report R42917, Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations, by
Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS Report RL32934, U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues,
and Implications, by M. Angeles Villarreal; CRS Report R44981, The United States-Mexico-
Canada Agreement (USMCA), by M. Angeles Villarreal; CRS In Focus IF10578, Mexico:
Evolution of the Mérida Initiative, FY2008-FY2022, by Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS Report
R41576, Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations, by June S. Beittel; CRS
In Focus IF10215, Mexico’s Immigration Control Efforts, by Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS In
Focus IF10400, Trends in Mexican Opioid Trafficking and Implications for U.S.-Mexico Security
Cooperation, by Liana W. Rosen and Clare Ribando Seelke; and CRS In Focus IF11669, Human

123 Chase Harrison, “Tracker: U.S. Vaccine Donations to Latin America,” Americas Society/Council of the Americas,
December 15, 2021.
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Rights Challenges in Mexico: Addressing Enforced Disappearances, by Clare Ribando Seelke
and Rachel L. Martin.
Central America’s Northern Triangle
The Northern Triangle region of Central America (see Figure 3) has received considerable
attention from U.S. policymakers over the past decade, as it has become a major transit corridor
for illicit drugs and, in some years, has surpassed Mexico as the largest source of irregular
migration to the United States. In FY2021, for example, U.S. authorities encountered
approximately 319,000 Hondurans, 283,000 Guatemalans, and 99,000 Salvadorans at the
Southwest border.124
These narcotics and migrant flows are the latest symptoms of deep-rooted challenges in the
region, including widespread insecurity, fragile political and judicial systems, and high levels of
poverty and unemployment. The COVID-19 pandemic and a series of tropical storms have
exacerbated socio-economic difficulties in the region, contributing to a sharp increase in poverty
and food insecurity since 2020. Political conditions also have deteriorated over the past two years,
as government officials in all three Northern Triangle countries have taken steps to hinder anti-
corruption efforts and Salvadoran officials have significantly eroded checks and balances and
have restricted civil liberties.
U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America. In 2014, the Obama Administration
determined it was in the national security interests of the United States to work with Central
American governments to improve living conditions in the region. It drafted a new U.S. Strategy
for Engagement in Central America and, with congressional support, significantly increased
annual foreign assistance for the region. From FY2016 to FY2021, Congress appropriated a total
of more than $3.7 billion to implement the strategy, allocating most of the funds to El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras.
Figure 3. Map of Central America

Source: CRS Graphics.
Note: Geographically located in Central America, Belize is a member of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM)
as well as the Central American Integration System.

124 It is unclear how many of these were unique individuals versus repeat encounters. CBP, “Southwest Land Border
Encounters,” January 24, 2022.
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The Trump Administration initially maintained the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central
America but effectively halted the initiative in March 2019, when it suspended aid to the
Northern Triangle due to the continued northward flow of migrants and asylum-seekers from the
region. The Administration reprogrammed $396.2 million to other foreign policy priorities and
withheld the remaining assistance for the region for up to 14 months while it negotiated a series
of border security and asylum agreements with the Northern Triangle governments. The aid
suspension adversely affected nearly 39% of the State Department’s assistance projects and 81%
of USAID’s assistance projects in the region.125
Biden Administration Policy. The Biden Administration has placed renewed emphasis on
engagement with Central America. In July 2021, pursuant to the United States-Northern Triangle
Enhanced Engagement Act (P.L. 116-260, Division FF, Subtitle F) and E.O. 14010, the
Administration released a new U.S. Strategy for Addressing the Root Causes of Migration in
Central America. The strategy seeks to foster systemic change in the region by (1) addressing
economic insecurity and inequality; (2) combatting corruption, strengthening democratic
governance, and advancing the rule of law; (3) promoting respect for human rights, labor rights,
and a free press; (4) countering and preventing violence, extortion, and other crimes perpetrated
by gangs, trafficking networks, and other criminal organizations; and (5) combatting sexual,
gender-based, and domestic violence.126
Although the root causes strategy is similar to the prior U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central
America, Biden Administration officials assert they will improve the effectiveness of U.S. efforts
by incorporating lessons learned over the past six years. They intend to use migration data to
target programs, place greater emphasis on host country governance, enhance partnerships with
local organizations, and increase the scale of U.S. efforts.127 As part of its increased emphasis on
governance concerns, the Administration has named and imposed visa sanctions on more than 60
current and former Salvadoran, Guatemalan, and Honduran officials allegedly involved in
corruption or undemocratic actions, pursuant to the United States-Northern Triangle Enhanced
Engagement Act (P.L. 116-260, Division FF, Subtitle F).128 To increase the scale of U.S. efforts,
the Administration has proposed allocating $4 billion to the region over four years, including
$860.6 million in FY2022.
The Biden Administration also developed, pursuant to E.O. 14010, a new Collaborative Migration
Management Strategy intended to build a regional framework for safe, orderly, and humane
migration in North and Central America. Released in July 2021, the migration management
strategy calls for a surge of humanitarian assistance to alleviate conditions in the region;
messaging campaigns to deter irregular migration; support for partner governments’ efforts to
manage their borders, provide protection to vulnerable populations, and reintegrate returned
migrants; and expanded access to legal migration and protection pathways in the United States

125 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Northern Triangle of Central America: The 2019 Suspension and
Reprogramming of U.S. Funding Adversely Affected Assistance Projects, GAO-21-104366, September 2021, at
https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-104366.pdf.
126 White House, U.S. Strategy for Addressing the Root Causes of Migration in Central America, July 2021, at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Root-Causes-Strategy.pdf.
127 U.S. Department of State, “On the Collaborative Migration Management Strategy and Root Causes Strategy Toward
Migration,” special briefing, July 29, 2021.
128 U.S. Department of State, “Section 353 Corrupt and Undemocratic Actors Report,” July 1, 2021; and Secretary of
State Antony J. Blinken, “United States Announces Actions Against Seven Central American Officials for
Undermining Democracy and Obstructing Investigations into Acts of Corruption,” press statement, September 20,
2021.
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and third countries.129 In accordance with the strategy, the Administration allocated $272.2
million of humanitarian assistance to address the needs of vulnerable populations in Central
America and Mexico in FY2021.130 The Administration also has reestablished and expanded the
Central American Minors program, which reunites eligible minors in the Northern Triangle with
parents in the United States, and has made available 6,500 supplemental H-2B temporary
nonagricultural worker visas for nationals of the Northern Triangle countries and Haiti in
FY2022.131
Congressional Action. The Biden Administration’s approach to Central America has been the
subject of significant congressional debate and oversight, including several hearings (see
Appendix). Some Members have demonstrated support for the Administration’s funding
priorities. For example, the House-passed foreign aid appropriations measure (H.R. 4373, H.Rept.
117-84) would fully fund the Administration’s $860.6 million request for Central America.
Likewise, the U.S. Citizenship Act of 2021 (S. 348/H.R. 1177) would authorize $4 billion over
four years to combat corruption, strengthen the rule of law, and consolidate democratic
governance; reduce criminal violence and improve citizen security; counter sexual, gender-based,
and domestic violence; and address extreme poverty and economic development in the region.
Other legislative measures would provide more limited support for assistance efforts in Central
America. The foreign aid appropriations bill introduced in the Senate (S. 3075) would provide
$653.9 million for the region, which is 24% less than requested. The Central American Women
and Children Protection Act of 2021 (S. 2003 /H.R. 4017) would authorize the Administration to
enter into agreements with the Northern Triangle governments to prevent and deter violence
against women and children, provide support to victims, and hold perpetrators accountable.
Similar provisions were incorporated into the House-passed version of the FY2022 NDAA (H.R.
4350) but were not included in the final legislation (P.L. 117-81).
Many Members of Congress remain concerned about widespread corruption and impunity in
Central America. H.R. 4373 and S. 3075, like previous foreign aid appropriations measures,
would require the State Department to withhold a portion of the assistance appropriated for the
Northern Triangle governments until it certifies those governments are combatting corruption,
protecting human rights, and addressing other congressional concerns. H.R. 4373 would also
provide $60 million for “entities and activities to combat corruption and impunity” in Central
America and $500,000 to increase staff focused on Central America within the State
Department’s Office of Economic Sanctions Policy and Implementation. A provision of H.R.
4350 would have extended visa sanctions to cover the immediate families of individuals engaged
in corruption, prohibited assistance for Northern Triangle security force units credibly alleged to
have engaged in corruption, established a State Department fellowship program to support rule-
of-law activities in Central America, and required an intelligence assessment of corrupt networks
within Central American governments, among other measures.
The erosion of democracy and human rights in the region also remains a top concern for many in
Congress. A provision of P.L. 117-81 requires a series of reports on U.S. security cooperation
with the Northern Triangle countries. These include a DOD report on ongoing and planned
activities in the region focused on human rights and the rule of law, a GAO evaluation of DOD’s

129 White House, Collaborative Migration Management Strategy, July 2021, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2021/07/Collaborative-Migration-Management-Strategy.pdf.
130 USAID, “El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras—Regional Response,” Fact Sheet #12, FY2021, September 30,
2021.
131 DHS, “For First Time, DHS to Supplement H-2B Cap with Additional Visas in First Half of Fiscal Year,” press
release, December 20, 2021.
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end-use monitoring procedures in the Northern Triangle, and an evaluation to be conducted by a
federally funded research and development center regarding how DOD’s security cooperation
programs promote the rule of law and human rights and advance other U.S. objectives in the
region. Other bills would restrict U.S. security cooperation with Honduras (S. 388/H.R. 2716 and
H.R. 1574) and urge the Salvadoran government to respect the country’s democratic institutions
(H.Res. 408).
For additional information, see CRS Insight IN11603, Central America’s Northern Triangle:
Challenges for U.S. Policymakers in 2021, by Peter J. Meyer; CRS In Focus IF11151, Central
American Migration: Root Causes and U.S. Policy, by Peter J. Meyer; CRS In Focus IF10371,
U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America: An Overview, by Peter J. Meyer; CRS Report
R44812, U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America: Policy Issues for Congress, by Peter
J. Meyer; CRS Report R43616, El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations, by Clare Ribando
Seelke; CRS Insight IN11658, El Salvador: Authoritarian Actions and U.S. Response, by Clare
Ribando Seelke; and CRS Report RL34027, Honduras: Background and U.S. Relations, by Peter
J. Meyer.
Nicaragua
President Daniel Ortega further solidified his control over Nicaraguan institutions and society in
November 7, 2021, elections that eliminated all viable candidates and parties from participation.
Presidential terms are normally for five years, and Ortega orchestrated the elimination of term
limits in 2014. Ortega has been suppressing unrest in Nicaragua in a manner reminiscent of
Anastasio Somoza, the dictator Ortega helped overthrow in 1979 as a leader of the leftist
Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). Ortega served as president from 1985 to 1990,
during which time the United States backed right-wing insurgents (contras) in an attempt to
overthrow the Sandinista government. In the early 1990s, Nicaragua began to establish
democratic governance.
Nonetheless, the FSLN and Ortega gradually consolidated control over the country’s institutions.
Ortega reclaimed the presidency in 2007 and has served as president for the past 14 years,
creating what the State Department calls “a highly centralized, authoritarian system.”132
According to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), this consolidation of
power in the executive “has facilitated Nicaragua’s transformation into a police state in which the
executive branch has instituted a regime of terror and of suppression of all freedoms ... supported
by the other branches of government.”133
Until 2018, for many Nicaraguans, Ortega’s populist social welfare programs, which had
improved their standards of living, outweighed his authoritarian tendencies and self-enrichment;
similarly, for many in the international community, the relative stability in Nicaragua outweighed
Ortega’s antidemocratic actions. Ortega’s long-term strategy to retain government control began
to unravel in 2018, when his proposal to reduce social security benefits triggered protests led by a
wide range of Nicaraguans. The government’s repressive response included extrajudicial killings,
torture, political imprisonment, and suppression of the press and led to thousands of citizens
going into exile.134 The government says it was defending itself from coup attempts.

132 U.S. Department of State, Nicaragua 2020 Human Rights Report, March 20, 2021.
133 Inter-American Commission On Human Rights, Nicaragua: Concentration of Power and the Undermining of the
Rule of Law, OEA/Ser.L/V/II, Doc. 288, October 25, 2021, p. 65.
134 Organization of American States (OAS), Report of the High-Level Commission on Nicaragua of the Organization of
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The 2018 crisis undermined economic growth in Nicaragua, the hemisphere’s second-poorest
country. Government repression has continued, and the COVID-19 pandemic and hurricane
damage have worsened conditions in the country. Nicaragua’s economy contracted by 3.7% in
2019 and 2.0% in 2020 but grew an estimated 5% in 2021, according to the IMF. Unemployment
nearly doubled, from 6% in 2019 to an estimated 11% in 2021.135
Dialogue between the government and the opposition collapsed in 2019. Opposition elements
tried unsuccessfully to unite behind a single candidate. In addition, the Sandinista-controlled
legislature passed a series of repressive laws used to eliminate electoral competition, and the
government launched a period of increased oppression. According to Amnesty International, “The
enforced disappearance of people is the latest tactic that authorities in Nicaragua have adopted to
silence any criticism or dissenting voices.”136 By July 2021, the government had arrested seven of
the most likely presidential candidates.137
Ortega registered his candidacy for a fourth consecutive term, with his wife, Rosario Murillo,
again running as his vice president. A CID Gallup survey published a week prior to the elections
found that in a fair election, 65% of voters would vote for any opposition candidate and 17%
would support Ortega and Murillo.138 Nonetheless, Nicaragua’s Supreme Electoral Council
reportedly said that, with almost all ballots counted, Ortega and Murillo had won over 75% of the
vote and voter turnout was 65%.139 A Nicaraguan opposition group, Open Ballot Boxes, which
had 1,450 monitors trying to observe the elections, estimated turnout was approximately 18%.140
The international community has sought to hold the Ortega government accountable for human
rights abuses and to facilitate the reestablishment of democracy in Nicaragua. An IACHR team
concluded in 2018 that the Nicaraguan security forces’ actions could be considered crimes against
humanity. The OAS has stated multiple times that the Ortega government has violated the rule of
law, altered constitutional order, and violated human rights. It also has passed resolutions
expressing alarm at Nicaragua’s deteriorating human rights situation, “unequivocally
condemn[ing]” the arrest and arbitrary restrictions on candidates and the press, and calling for the
immediate release of all political prisoners and the implementation of measures for transparent
and fair elections.141 At a U.N. Human Rights Council meeting on June 22, 2021, 59 countries,
including the United States, made a similar statement, also calling on Nicaragua “to re-establish
dialogue and renew trust in democracy.”142 Following the November elections, the OAS passed
resolutions declaring Nicaragua’s elections “were not free, fair or transparent and have no

American States, November 19, 2019.
135 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2021.
136 Amnesty International, “Nicaragua: Enforced Disappearance Is the New Tactic for Repression,” August 25, 2021.
137 Reuters, “Nicaragua’s Ortega Arrests Another Rival, Says U.S. Aims to Undermine Vote,” July 26, 2021.
138 Federico Rivas Molina and Carlos Salinas Maldonado, “Latin America Prepares for Frantic Month of Elections in
November,” El País, Buenos Aires and Mexico, November 4, 2021.
139 Associated Press, “Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega Decries Those Who Question his Reelection,” November 8, 2021.
140 Ibid.
141 See, for example, OAS, “Statement from the General Secretariat on the Situation in Nicaragua,” press release E-
102/20, October 15, 2020; and OAS, “Resolution Restoring Democratic Institutions and Respect for Human Rights in
Nicaragua Through Free and Fair Elections,” press release S-019/20, October 22, 2020. OAS, “The Situation in
Nicaragua,” CP/RES. 1175/21, June 15, 2021.
142 U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Geneva, “Joint Statement on the Human Rights Situation in
Nicaragua: Joint Statement on Nicaragua at the Human Rights Council, Presented by the Nicaragua Core Group on
Behalf of 59 Countries Including the United States,” June 22, 2021.
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democratic legitimacy”143 and saying Nicaragua is not in compliance with its commitments under
the Inter-American Democratic Charter.144 Nicaragua then announced it was leaving the OAS.
During the two-year withdrawal process, according to the OAS, Nicaragua’s obligations to the
OAS and its charters remain in force, as do its international human rights obligations.145
U.S. policy toward Nicaragua focuses on strengthening civil society and promoting respect for
human rights and free and fair elections. The Biden Administration requested a total of $15
million for FY2022 assistance for Nicaragua, all for democracy, rights, and governance programs.
It imposed financial sanctions on four more government officials, including one of the president’s
daughters, who support the Ortega regime.146 In response to the Nicaraguan government’s arrest
of 32 political opponents in summer 2021, the State Department imposed visa restrictions on 100
members of the Nicaraguan legislature and judiciary who “helped to enable the Ortega-Murillo
regime’s attacks on democracy and human rights”147 and on 50 immediate family members of
“regime-affiliated officials” who contributed directly to government measures that “do not meet
the conditions for transparent, free, and fair elections.”148 Following what the Administration
called “sham elections,” it imposed sanctions against the Nicaraguan Public Ministry and nine
Nicaraguan government officials. It then imposed sanctions against members of the government
of Nicaragua, their staff, and families.149 On November 7, President Biden declared, “What
Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega and his wife, Vice President Rosario Murillo, orchestrated
today was a pantomime election that was neither free nor fair, and most certainly not
democratic.”150
When Nicaragua broke diplomatic ties with Taiwan and established them with China in
December 2021, the State Department responded that the action “deprives Nicaragua’s people of
a steadfast partner in its democratic and economic growth.”151
Congressional Action. In November 2021, Congress completed action on the Reinforcing
Nicaragua’s Adherence to Conditions for Electoral Reform Act of 2021 (RENACER Act), signed
into law as P.L. 117-54, which includes measures to advance the strategic alignment of U.S.
diplomatic tools and targeted sanctions to support the realization of free, fair, and transparent
elections in Nicaragua. The House Appropriations Committee’s report to the FY2022 foreign aid
appropriations bill, H.R. 4373 (H.Rept. 117-84), recommends $15 million for programs in

143 U.S. Mission to the OAS, “OAS General Assembly Condemns the Ortega-Murillo Regime in Nicaragua,”
November 12, 2021 (includes resolution text).
144 OAS, “Resolution: Outcome of the Permanent Council’s Deliberations of November 29, 2021, on the Situation in
Nicaragua Pursuant to the Resolution Adopted at the Fifty-First Regular Session of the General Assembly,” CP/RES.
1188 (2355/21), December 8, 2021.
145 Ibid.
146 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Nicaraguan Officials for Supporting Ortega’s Efforts to
Undermine Democracy, Human Rights, and the Economy,” press release, June 9, 2021.
147 U.S. Department of State, Antony J. Blinken, “The United States Restricts Visas of 100 Nicaraguans Affiliated with
Ortega-Murillo Regime,” press statement, July 12, 2021.
148 U.S. Department of State, Ned Price, Department Spokesperson, “The United States Restricts Visas of 50
Additional Nicaraguan Individuals Affiliated With Ortega-Murillo Regime,” August 6, 2021.
149 U.S. Department of State, “New Sanctions Following Sham Elections in Nicaragua,” press statement, Antony J.
Blinken, Secretary Of State, November 15, 2021; and White House, “A Proclamation on Suspension of Entry as
Immigrants and Nonimmigrants of Persons Responsible for Policies or Actions That Threaten Democracy in
Nicaragua,” November 16, 2021.
150 The White House, “Statement by President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. on Nicaragua’s Sham Elections,” November 7,
2021.
151 U.S. Department of State, Ned Price, Department Spokesperson, “Nicaragua’s Breaking of Diplomatic Relations
with Taiwan,” press statement, December 9, 2021.
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Nicaragua that promote democracy and the rule of law and would prohibit funding for the central
government of Nicaragua or for security assistance. The Senate Appropriations Committee’s
FY2022 foreign aid appropriations bill (S. 3075) would appropriate “not less than” $10 million in
Economic Support Funds for civil society programs for Nicaragua. The 117th Congress has held
two hearings on Nicaragua, the first in July 2021 on the plight of political prisoners, and the
second in September 2021on the international response to the destruction of democracy under
President Ortega (see Appendix).
For additional information, see CRS Report R46860, Nicaragua in Brief: Political Developments
in 2021, U.S. Policy, and Issues for Congress, by Maureen Taft-Morales.
South America
Brazil
Occupying almost half of South America, Brazil is the fifth-largest and sixth-most-populous
country in the world. Given its size and tremendous natural resources, Brazil has long had the
potential to become a world power and periodically has been the focal point of U.S. policy in
Latin America. However, uneven economic performance and political instability have hindered
Brazil’s rise to international prominence. The country experienced a period of strong economic
growth and increased international influence during the first decade of the 21st century, but it has
struggled with a series of economic, political, security, and health crises since 2014. This
domestic turbulence discredited much of Brazil’s political class, paving the way for right-wing
populist Jair Bolsonaro to win the presidency in 2018.
Since taking office in January 2019, President Bolsonaro has implemented some economic
reforms favored by international investors and Brazilian businesses and has proposed measures to
ease firearms regulations and promote development in the Brazilian Amazon. Rather than
building a broad-based coalition to advance his agenda, Bolsonaro has sought to keep his political
base mobilized by taking socially conservative stands on cultural issues and verbally attacking
perceived enemies, such as the press, nongovernmental organizations, and other branches of
government. This confrontational approach to governance has alienated potential allies within the
conservative-leaning Brazilian congress and placed additional stress on the country’s already-
strained democratic institutions. It also has hindered Brazil’s ability to respond to the COVID-19
pandemic. Although the Brazilian government has enacted significant economic support measures
to help households, businesses, and state governments during the pandemic, Bolsonaro’s
resistance to public health restrictions and recommendations has undermined Brazil’s efforts to
slow the spread of the virus. As of early February 2022, Brazil had recorded more than 632,000
deaths, giving it the second-highest COVID-19 mortality rate in the Western Hemisphere.152
In international affairs, the Bolsonaro administration has moved away from Brazil’s traditional
commitment to autonomy and toward closer alignment with the United States. Bolsonaro
coordinated closely with the Trump Administration on regional challenges, such as the crisis in
Venezuela, and frequently supported the Trump Administration within multilateral organizations.
The Trump Administration welcomed Bolsonaro’s rapprochement and sought to strengthen U.S.-
Brazilian relations. In 2019, for example, the Trump Administration designated Brazil as a major
non-NATO ally for the purposes of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C.
2321k), and the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.). The United States and Brazil
also forged agreements on several trade and investment matters, including the Protocol on Trade

152 Johns Hopkins, “Mortality Analyses,” February 6, 2022.
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Rules and Transparency, concluded in October 2020, which aims to foster cooperation on trade
facilitation and customs administration, good regulatory practices, and anti-corruption measures.
The Biden Administration has sought to maintain a cooperative relationship with the Bolsonaro
administration, recognizing Brazil’s importance for addressing global challenges. President Biden
invited Bolsonaro to attend the April 2021 Leaders Summit on Climate, during which Bolsonaro
pledged to double funding for environmental enforcement efforts, reiterated Brazil’s commitment
to end illegal deforestation by 2030, and stated that Brazil would reduce its net greenhouse gas
emissions to zero by 2050—10 years earlier than the country’s previous goal.153 The Biden
Administration has requested $17 million to support conservation in the Brazilian Amazon in
FY2022 but has stated more extensive financial support for Brazil would be contingent on the
country making demonstrable progress toward its environmental commitments. There are few
signs of such progress to date, with deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon reaching a 15-year high
in the annual observation period that ended in July 2021.154
The Biden Administration also has continued to engage with Brazil on security matters.
Administration officials have expressed support for expanded bilateral security cooperation and
Brazil’s participation as a NATO global partner while reiterating concerns about the potential use
of Chinese equipment in Brazil’s telecommunications infrastructure. They also have sought to
coordinate with Brazil, which is serving on the U.N. Security Council for the 2022-2023 term,
regarding the Russian military mobilization on Ukraine’s borders.155
Congressional Action. U.S.-Brazilian cooperation on environmental issues has remained a
subject of interest in the 117th Congress. Some Members have called on the Biden Administration
to condition U.S. relations with Brazil, including U.S. assistance and bilateral economic and
security cooperation, on the Brazilian government’s efforts to reduce deforestation and combat
environmental crimes.156 The U.S. CLIMATE Act of 2021 (S. 1201), introduced in April 2021,
would express the sense of Congress on the importance of conservation of the Amazon River
Basin, including support for U.S. engagement with Brazil on efforts to reduce deforestation and
greenhouse gas emissions. The draft explanatory statement accompanying the Senate
Appropriations Committee’s FY2022 foreign aid appropriations bill (S. 3075) would recommend
$20 million for conservation programs in the Brazilian Amazon.157
Congress also has continued to express concerns about human rights in Brazil. The report
accompanying the House-passed FY2022 foreign aid appropriations measure (H.Rept. 117-84 to
H.R. 4373) states that any funding provided for programs in the Brazilian Amazon “should
protect the rights of indigenous and Afro-Brazilian communities and support the prosecution of
violations of such rights.” The report would further direct the Secretary of State to work with the
Brazilian government to ensure it consults with Indigenous and Afro-Brazilian communities

153 “Confira Discurso do Presidente Bolsonaro na Cúpula do Clima,” Agência Brasil, April 22, 2021.
154 Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais, “Monitoramento do Desmatamento da Floresta Amazônica Brasileira por
Satélite,” November 19, 2021.
155 U.S. Embassy & Consulates in Brazil, “Statement by U.S. Embassy Spokesperson, Tobias Bradford, on Advisor
Sullivan’s Visit to Brazil,” August 6, 2021; and U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Blinken’s Call with Brazilian
Foreign Minister França,” January 10, 2022.
156 Letter from U.S. Senators Patrick Leahy, Robert Menendez, and Chris Van Hollen, et al. to President Joseph Biden,
April 16, 2021, https://www.leahy.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Letter%20to%20Biden%20re%20Amazon%204-15-
21.pdf.
157 The draft explanatory statement is available at https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
SFOPSREPT_FINAL.PDF.
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regarding projects and policies that affect them and to prioritize preventative actions to protect
threatened community leaders and environmental human rights defenders.
The draft explanatory statement accompanying S. 3075 expresses concerns about the potential
relocation of Quilombola families to expand the Alcântara space launch center and would prohibit
the provision of any State Department-managed security assistance to Brazilian security forces
engaged in the forced resettlement of Indigenous or Quilombola communities.158 The House-
passed version of the FY2022 NDAA (H.R. 4350) also would have prohibited the use of any
DOD-managed security assistance to support Brazilian security forces in the involuntary
relocation of such communities. Although that provision was not included in the final FY2022
NDAA legislation (P.L. 117-81), the accompanying explanatory statement called on the Secretary
of Defense to ensure any security assistance provided to Brazil is in compliance with U.S. laws
and DOD policies regarding adherence to human rights and international law.159
For additional information, see CRS Report R46236, Brazil: Background and U.S. Relations, by
Peter J. Meyer; CRS Report R46619, U.S.-Brazil Economic Relations, coordinated by M. Angeles
Villarreal; CRS In Focus IF11306, Fire and Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon, by Pervaze A.
Sheikh et al.
Colombia
Colombia—a close U.S. ally in Latin America—endured more than half a century of internal
armed conflict. To address the country’s role in illegal drug production, which fueled the conflict,
the United States and Colombia forged a close relationship. Plan Colombia, a program focused
initially on counternarcotics and later on counterterrorism, laid the foundation for an enduring
security partnership that has lasted more than two decades. The United States also has supported
the implementation of a peace accord that President Juan Manuel Santos (2010-2018) concluded
with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)—the country’s largest leftist guerrilla
organization at the time. U.S. assistance over the past two decades has exceeded $12 billion to
support Plan Colombia, its successor strategies, and peace accord implementation.
During a U.N.-monitored demobilization effort in 2017, some 13,300 FARC disarmed. The
FARC later transformed from a leftist guerrilla army into a political party known as Comunes.
Neither the government nor the rebels have upheld all their commitments under the agreement.
Some guerrillas, known collectively as FARC dissidents, include rearmed FARC and others who
never demobilized. In early December 2021, on the fifth anniversary of the peace accord’s
signing, the U.S. government removed the FARC from its list of foreign terrorist organizations
(FTOs) and designated two FARC dissident groups, Segunda Marquetalia and FARC-People’s
Army (FARC-EP), as FTOs.
President Iván Duque from the conservative Democratic Center (CD) party came to office in
2018 as a peace accord critic. Some Colombians have protested what they view as the Duque
government’s lax peace accord compliance and inadequate efforts to protect human rights
defenders and other social activists. Colombia’s Human Rights Ombudsman reported more than
145 targeted assassinations in 2021.160 Others blame ongoing violence on the FARC dissidents
and on Colombia’s current largest insurgent group, the National Liberation Army (ELN). Duque

158 Quilombolas are inhabitants of communities founded by individuals who escaped or were freed from slavery.
159 Explanatory Material Statement Submitted by Mr. Smith of Washington, Chair of the House Committee on Armed
Services, On House Amendment to S. 1605, Congressional Record, vol. 167, No. 211 - Book II (December 7, 2021), p.
H7335.
160 BBC, “Colombia Saw 145 Activists Killed in 2021, Ombudsman Says,” January 18, 2022.
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has faced an enormous influx of Venezuelan refugees and migrants, with Colombia taking in a
reported 40% of the Venezuelan exodus. The COVID-19 pandemic slowed economic recovery,
further limited peace accord implementation, and was complicated by hosting impoverished
Venezuelans.
Duque’s popularity has declined over the past year as his government has struggled to address
several challenges. In mid-2021, nationwide protests broke out over an unpopular government-
proposed tax increase. A national strike lasted for nearly eight weeks as diverse sectors protested
a host of grievances, including police brutality against demonstrators, economic inequality, crime,
and unaddressed corruption. Although many protested peacefully, crippling blockades and
vandalism resulted in an estimated $3 billion in damages. The shift in political sentiment could
benefit leftist Senator Gustavo Petro, who lost to Duque in 2018 but is a presidential candidate in
elections scheduled for May 2022. Petro is the highest polling of the likely candidates, and some
maintain that he is well placed to compete in a presidential runoff in June. Duque is term limited
from seeking reelection.
To date, more than 9 million Colombians, or roughly 17% of the population, have registered as
conflict victims. Many await promised compensation, including land from which they were
forcibly displaced or other reparations. More than 300 former FARC combatants who
demobilized have been killed since 2016.161 Delays in funding major peace accord commitments
mean they are not on pace to reach their 15-year target.162 A significant portion of the Colombian
public is skeptical of the peace process and the FARC’s role in Colombia’s democracy—and most
Colombians increasingly rank implementation of the peace agreement much lower as a concern
than urban crime, corruption, and the disrupted economy. Other Colombians maintain that full
implementation of the peace accord is vital. Some argue that more complete implementation of
the agreement would bring unrealized benefits, such as less violence in the rural and remote zones
facing armed groups that compete to inherit the former FARC’s illicit businesses. This violence
includes multiple “armed conflicts” that are ongoing inside Colombia; though regional, rather
than national, in scope, these conflicts have sparked heightened violence, such as along with the
border with Venezuela in the Colombian department (equivalent of a state) of Arauca.163
Colombia has set records in cocaine production in recent years, including an estimated 1,010
metric tons produced in 2020, according to the U.S. government.164 In meetings between
President Duque and then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in 2019, the governments reaffirmed a
commitment to work together to lower coca crop levels and cocaine production by 50% by
2023.165 The U.S. government depends on the Colombian government to interdict much of the
cocaine leaving the country, as it is mainly destined for the United States.
President Duque campaigned on resuming forced aerial eradication (i.e., spraying) of coca crops
with the herbicide glyphosate; in 2020, his government accelerated forced manual eradication.
However, in January 2022, Colombia’s Constitutional Court ruled that a halt of coca aerial

161 United Nations Security Council, “Colombia: Quarterly Meeting,” What’s in Blue, Security Council Report, January
19, 2022.
162 Adam Isacson, “A Long Way to Go: Implementing Colombia’s Peace Accord after Five Years,” Washington Office
on Latin America, November 23, 2021.
163 For more background, see Kyle Johnson, Ángela Olaya, Juanita Vélez,Caras de las disidencias:cinco años de
incertitude y evolución,CORE, Foundation Conflict Responses; Juan Diego Posada, “Ex-FARC Mafia vs. ELN: A
Fight Too Far at the Colombia-Venezuelan Border?,” InSight Crime, January 11, 2022.
164 Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), “Updated: ONDCP Releases Data on Coca Cultivation and
Potential Cocaine Production in the Andean Region,” July 16, 2021.
165 U.S. State Department, International Drug Control Strategy Report, March 2021, Volume 1.
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spraying would remain until the consent of rural communities who are subject to spraying is
obtained within one year, effectively ending the practice until a new government is in place.166
With close to 2 million Venezuelans residing in Colombia in February 2021, the Duque
administration unveiled a program offering Venezuelans who entered before January 2021 a
decade of temporary protected status (TPS). By January 2022, nearly 1.7 million Venezuelan
refugees and migrants had begun the registration process for the TPS program, with nearly half a
million fully enrolled, giving them access to health care, work permits, and other social
services.167 Many Members of the U.S. Congress have expressed support for Colombia’s
continued leadership role to assist in a democratic transition in Venezuela and to respond to the
worsening humanitarian situation.
The United States remains Colombia’s top trading partner. In April 2020, Colombia became the
third Latin American country-member of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), after a seven-year accession process. Furthermore, as near-shoring
manufacturing becomes a relevant alternative to Asia in the wake of the pandemic, some
Members see U.S.-Colombian trade as a potential opportunity.168
Congressional Action. The Biden Administration’s FY2022 foreign aid budget request for
Colombia is $453.9 million. The House-passed foreign aid appropriations measure, H.R. 4373,
would provide $461.4 million and would stipulate 30% of funding under the International
Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) and Foreign Military Financing programs
would be obligated only after the Secretary of State certifies that certain human rights conditions
are met; this includes a provision that Colombian security forces involved in gross violations of
human rights during the protests are held accountable for abuses. The proposed Senate bill for
FY2022, S. 3075, would prohibit assistance to Colombian riot police and would withhold 5% of
INCLE funding until the Secretary of State certifies the riot police are held to account.
The FY2022 NDDA, P.L. 117-81, enacted in December 2021 includes several provisions on
Colombia. These include an extension of authority to support a unified counterdrug and
counterterrorism campaign in Colombia; temporary authority to obligate or expand not more than
$2 million in FY2022 for travel and subsistence expenses of foreign national security forces
participating in the training program of the United Sates-Colombia Action Plan for Regional
Security; and a reporting requirement on the security cooperation relationship between the United
States and Colombia and activities focused on human rights and the rule of law.
For additional information, see CRS Insight IN11631, Colombia: Challenges for U.S.
Policymakers in 2021, by June S. Beittel, and CRS Report R43813, Colombia: Background and
U.S. Relations, by June S. Beittel.
Venezuela
Venezuela, under the authoritarian rule of Nicolás Maduro, is mired in a deep economic and
humanitarian crisis worsened by the COVID-19 pandemic. Maduro has consolidated power over
all of Venezuela’s democratic institutions since his narrow 2013 election following the death of
President Hugo Chávez (1999-2013). His United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) took

166 Steven Grattan, “Colombia Can’t Resume Coca Aerial Spraying for Now, Court Rules,” Al Jazeera, January 20,
2022.
167 Information provided by the Colombian Embassy to the United States, January 25, 2022. The TPS program also
includes a path to Colombian citizenship.
168 Senator Roy Blunt, “A Plan for Colombia’s COVID-19 Recovery and Why It Matters for the United States,”
Atlantic Council, remote event, December 8, 2021.
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control of the National Assembly, the last independent branch of government, in January 2021.
The PSUV and its allies won 19 of 23 gubernatorial elections in flawed elections held in
November 2021; however, the opposition won a gubernatorial election in Chávez’s home state of
Barinas that was rerun in January 2022.
Maduro has used repression to quash dissent; rewarded allies, particularly in the security forces,
with income earned from illegal gold mining, drug trafficking, and other illicit activities; and
relied on support from Russia, China, Iran, and others to subvert U.S. sanctions and resist
international pressure to step down. Meanwhile, international support for opposition leader Juan
Guaidó, the former National Assembly president once regarded as interim president by the United
States and nearly 60 countries, has dissipated.
The COVID-19 pandemic, low oil prices, and years of economic mismanagement and corruption
have taken a toll. Venezuela’s economy has collapsed. The country is plagued by hyperinflation,
severe shortages of food and medicine, and a dire humanitarian crisis that has worsened since
2020 due to gasoline shortages. Maduro has blamed U.S. sanctions for the economic crisis, but
U.S. officials note that current sanctions include broad exemptions for the delivery of
humanitarian goods. U.N. agencies estimate that 6 million Venezuelans had fled the country as of
December 2021, primarily to neighboring countries in Latin America and the Caribbean.
In September 2021, seeking sanctions relief and international recognition of his government,
Maduro resumed Norway-led negotiations—previously suspended in September 2019—with the
opposition Unity Platform (a group that includes Guaidó supporters and other factions). Maduro
once again suspended the negotiations, however, after the United States extradited a top ally, Alex
Saab, from Cape Verde to stand trial for money laundering. Should the talks resume, the
opposition may be in a weaker position than before, since rifts within the opposition hurt its
performance in the November elections.
The U.S. government ceased recognizing Maduro as Venezuela’s legitimate president in January
2019. Although the Trump Administration initially discussed the possibility of using military
force in Venezuela, it ultimately sought to compel Maduro to leave office through diplomatic,
economic, and legal pressure. Biden officials have sought to support the Venezuelan people while
engaging in multilateral diplomacy to press for a return to democracy and hold corrupt and
abusive Maduro officials accountable. As part of its efforts to support the Venezuelan people, on
March 8, 2021, the Biden Administration designated Venezuela as a beneficiary country for TPS.
The Administration also has reviewed and maintained U.S. targeted and sectoral sanctions on
Venezuela. In June 2021, the State Department issued a joint statement with Canada and the
European Union expressing support for “time-bound and comprehensive negotiation process.”169
Nevertheless, the Administration remains wary of Maduro’s intentions and appears unlikely to lift
U.S. sanctions in the short term. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs
Brian Nichols repeated similar statements during a November 2021 Senate hearing in which he
also reiterated U.S. support for Interim President Juan Guaidó.170
Congressional Action. The 117th Congress has continued close oversight of U.S. policy toward
Venezuela, through hearings, legislation, and letters to the Administration. The Senate Foreign
Relations Committee reported S.Res. 44 in March 2021, which would denounce fraudulent
legislative elections in Venezuela. The Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
Committee reported S. 688 in March, which would prohibit contracting with persons who engage
in commerce with the Maduro government. In July 2021, the House passed its version of the

169 U.S. Department of State, “U.S.-EU-Canada: Joint Statement on Venezuela,” June 25, 2021.
170 U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Holds Hearing on Democracy in Latin America, CQ Congressional
Transcripts, November 31, 2021.
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FY2022 foreign aid appropriations bill, H.R. 4373; the bill would provide $50 million in
Economic Support Funds (ESF) for democracy programs in Venezuela. H.Rept. 117-84
accompanying the bill recommends continued humanitarian and development aid to countries
sheltering Venezuelan migrants and the provision of aid to support a democratic transition in
Venezuela if conditions permit. The Senate Appropriations Committee’s version of the bill, S.
3705, would provide the same level of ESF funding for Venezuela.
Congressional oversight has focused on the Biden Administration’s actions to sanction human
rights abuses, corruption, and antidemocratic actions by the Maduro government and its
supporters. Congress is also overseeing the provision of democracy and development assistance
to Venezuela, as well as the $1.65 billion in humanitarian aid provided since FY2017 for
Venezuelans and countries sheltering them. Many Members of Congress praised the March 2021
designation of TPS for Venezuela. Although some in Congress support continued pressure on the
Maduro government, others favor a more targeted approach, arguing that broad sanctions have
not prompted political change but have hurt the Venezuelan people. Some Members have
advocated for an end to any sanctions that have worsened the humanitarian crisis, whereas others
have called for more targeted sanctions relief, such as ending an October 2020 ban on oil-for-
diesel fuel swaps that likely have contributed to fuel shortages in the country.171
For additional information, see CRS Report R44841, Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations,
coordinated by Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS In Focus IF10230, Venezuela: Political Crisis and
U.S. Policy, by Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS In Focus IF10715, Venezuela: Overview of U.S.
Sanctions, by Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS In Focus IF11216, Venezuela: International Efforts to
Resolve the Political Crisis; CRS Report R46213, Oil Market Effects from U.S. Economic
Sanctions: Iran, Russia, Venezuela, by Phillip Brown; and CRS In Focus IF11029, The Venezuela
Regional Humanitarian Crisis and COVID-19, by Rhoda Margesson and Clare Ribando Seelke.
Outlook
Even before the COVID-19 pandemic, the Latin American and Caribbean region was facing
significant political and economic challenges—most prominently, Venezuela’s ongoing political
impasse and economic and humanitarian crisis, but also increasing public dissatisfaction with the
state of democracy throughout the region. The pandemic has multiplied the region’s challenges
and negatively affected its future economic prospects. Instead of registering low economic
growth rates, as originally forecast before the pandemic, the region experienced a deep recession
in 2020, with millions of people impoverished. Although regional economic growth resumed in
2021, recovery in some countries may be slow, and could jeopardize the economic and social
progress that the region has made over the past two decades. The course of the pandemic,
including vaccination rates, likely will be key to the region’s economic recovery.
In addition to the pandemic and its economic fallout, the Biden Administration and the 117th
Congress are facing a variety of other policy challenges in the Latin American and Caribbean
region. For example, as the Biden Administration has taken actions to revise the Trump
Administration’s more restrictive immigration policies, irregular migration from Central America,
Mexico, and other countries has increased. The political, economic, and humanitarian crises in
Venezuela remain a challenge not only for the United States but also for the entire Western
Hemisphere and could be an important test for multilateral diplomacy. Similarly, in Nicaragua,

171 U.S. Congressmen Jesús G. “Chuy” Garcia, “Grijalva, García, 17 Members of Congress call for Biden
Administration to Change Failed Trump-Era Venezuela Policy,” press release, August 13, 2021; Timothy Gardner,
“Democratic Senator Urges Biden Admin to Allow Diesel Swap in Venezuela,” Reuters, March 23, 2021.
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the Administration has used targeted sanctions and is working multilaterally to increase
international pressure against the antidemocratic actions of the Ortega government. With regard
to Cuba, although the Administration continues to review U.S. policy, the Cuban government’s
violent suppression of anti-government protests makes it difficult for the Administration to take
policy actions perceived as easing pressure on the Cuban government. In Haiti, the
Administration continues to provide humanitarian aid and assistance to restore security while
supporting Haitian efforts to achieve political consensus that will support the restoration of
democratic institutions, including free and fair elections.
These and many other policy challenges discussed in this report may continue to be subjects of
legislative initiatives, debate, and oversight in the 117th Congress. The ninth Summit of the
Americas, originally to be hosted by the United States in 2021, is scheduled to take place in Los
Angeles, CA, in June 2022, with the theme of “Building a Sustainable, Resilient, and Equitable
Future.” The summit could serve as an opportunity for the Biden Administration to further
articulate its policy agenda for the region and deepen U.S. diplomatic engagement with
hemispheric leaders on regional and global issues.
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Appendix. Latin American and Caribbean
Countries: Basic Data and Hearings
Table A-1. Latin American and Caribbean Countries: Basic Facts
GDP
GDP per
(2020
capita
Population
est.,
(2020
Area
(2020
U.S. $
est.,
(square
estimated,
billions,
U.S. $,
Leader (elected/next
Country
miles)
thousands)
current)
current)
election)
Caribbean
Antigua &
171
98
1.4
13,967
Gaston Browne
Barbuda
(Mar. 2018/by Mar. 2023)
Bahamas
5,359
385
9.9
25,734
Philip Davis
(Sept. 16, 2021/by Sept, 2026)
Barbados
166
288
4.4
15,346
Mia Mottley
(Jan. 19, 2022/ by Jan. 2027)
Belizea
8,867
419
1.7
4,077
Juan Antonio “Johnny” Briceño
(Nov. 2020/by 2025)
Cuba
42,803
11,327
107.4
9,477.9
Miguel Díaz-Canel
(2020)
(2020)
(2020)
(Apr. 2018/ Apr. 2023)b
Dominica
290
73
0.5
7,416
Roosevelt Skerrit
(Dec. 2019/by Mar. 2025)
Dominican
18,792
10,448
78.9
7,554
Luis Abinader
Republic
(July 2020/May 2024)
Grenada
133
113
1.0
9,130
Keith Mitchell
(Mar. 2018/by Mar. 2023)
Guyanaa
83,000
787
5.5
6,953
Irfaan Ali
(Mar. 2020/by 2025)
Haiti
10,714
11,743
14.5
1,235
Ariel Henry (Nov.
2016/postponed until 2022)c
Jamaica
4,244
2,737
14.0
5,103
Andrew Holness
(Sept. 2020/by 2025)
St. Kitts & Nevis
101
57
1.0
17,173
Timothy Harris
(June 2020/by 2025)
St. Lucia
238
181
1.6
8,934
Philip Pierre
(July 2021/by 2026)
St. Vincent & the
150
111
0.8
7,304
Ralph Gonsalves
Grenadines
(Nov. 2020/by 2025)
Surinamea
63,251
603
2.9
4,787
Chandrikapersad “Chan”
Santokhi (May 2020/2025)
Trinidad &
1,980
1,399
21.6
15,425
Keith Rowley
Tobago
(August 2020/by 2025)
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GDP
GDP per
(2020
capita
Population
est.,
(2020
Area
(2020
U.S. $
est.,
(square
estimated,
billions,
U.S. $,
Leader (elected/next
Country
miles)
thousands)
current)
current)
election)
Mexico and Central America
Mexico
758,449
127,792
1,073.9
8,404
Andrés Manuel López Obrador
(July 2018/July 2024)
Costa Rica
19,730
5,128
61.8
12,057
Carlos Alvarado
(Feb. & Apr. 2018/Feb. 6, 2022
& April 3, 2022)
El Salvador
8,124
6,486
24.6
3,799
Nayib Bukele
(Feb. 2019/Feb. 2024)
Guatemala
42,042
17,974
77.6
4,318
Alejandro Giammattei
(June & Aug. 2019/ June 2023)
Honduras
43,278
9,942
23.8
2,397
Xiomara Castro
(Nov. 28, 2021/Nov. 2025)
Nicaragua
50,336
6,496
12.6
1,943
Daniel Ortega
(Nov. 7, 2021/Nov. 2025)
Panama
29,120
4,279
52.9
12,373
Laurentino Cortizo
(May 2019/May 2024)
South America
Argentina
1,073,518
45,388
389.1
8,572
Alberto Fernández
(Oct. 2019/Oct. 2023)
Bolivia
424,164
11,630
36.8
3,168
Luis Arce
(Oct. 2020/2025)
Brazil
3,287,957
211,756
1,444.7
6,823
Jair Bolsonaro
(Oct. 7 & 28, 2018/Oct. 2 & 30,
2022)
Chile
291,932
19,458
252.8
12,993
Sebastián Piñera

(Nov. 21 & Dec. 19, 2021/Nov.
2025) (Gabriel Boric to be

inaugurated March 11, 2022)
Colombia
439,736
50,372
271.6
5,391
Iván Duque
(May & June 2018/May 29, 2022
& June 19, 2022)
Ecuador
109,484
17,511
98.8
5,643
Guil ermo Lasso (Feb. 7 & Apr.
11, 2021/Feb. 2025)
Paraguay
157,048
7,253
35.7
4,918
Mario Abdo Benítez

(Apr. 2018/Apr. 2023)
Peru
496,225
33,494
205.5
6,134
Pedro Castil o (Apr. 11 & June
6, 2021/Apr. 2026)
Uruguay
68,037
3,531
56.6
16,023
Luis Lacalle Pou (Oct. & Nov.
2019/Oct. 2024)
Venezuela
352,144
27,951
47.3
1,691
Nicolás Maduro
(May 2018/May 2024)d
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Sources: Area statistics are from the Central Intelligence Agency’s World Factbook, with square kilometers
converted into square miles. Population and economic statistics are from the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
World Economic Outlook Database, October 2021. Population and economic statistics for Cuba are from the
World Bank’s World Development Indicators databank.
Notes:
a. Geographically, Belize is located in Central America and Guyana and Suriname are located on the northern
coast of South America, but all three are members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and
therefore are listed under the Caribbean region.
b. Cuba does not have direct elections for its head of government. Instead, Cuba’s legislature selects the
president of the republic for a five-year term.
c. President Jovenel Moïse was assassinated on July 7, 2021. Ariel Henry was sworn in as prime minister on
July 20, 2021. Under the Haitian Constitution, either the Council of Ministers under the Prime Minister
should govern or, in the last year of a presidential term, the legislature should elect a provisional president.
Currently, there is no functioning legislature, as most of the legislators’ terms have expired. See CRS Insight
IN11699, Haiti: Concerns After the Presidential Assassination, by Maureen Taft-Morales.
d. Venezuela’s May 2018 elections were characterized by widespread fraud. The United States recognizes Juan
Guaidó, president of Venezuela’s National Assembly, as interim president of Venezuela. See CRS In Focus
IF10230, Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy, by Clare Ribando Seelke.
Table A-2. Congressional Hearings in the 117th Congress on Latin America
and the Caribbean
Committee and Subcommittee
Date
Title
House Foreign Affairs Committee,
March 3, 2021
A Way Forward for Venezuela: The
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere,
Humanitarian, Diplomatic, and National
Civilian Security, Migration, and
Security Challenges Facing the Biden
International Economic Policy
Administration
House Foreign Affairs Committee
March 12, 2021
Policy Recommendations on Haiti for the
Biden Administration
Senate Armed Services Committee
March 16, 2021
United States Southern Command and United
States Northern Command
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
March 24, 2021
The State of Democracy in Latin America and
the Caribbean
House Foreign Affairs Committee,
April 14, 2021
Renewing the United States’ Commitment to
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere,
Addressing the Root Causes of Migration
Civilian Security, Migration, and
from Central America
International Economic Policy
House Armed Services Committee
April 14, 2021
National Security Challenges and U.S. Military
Activity in North and South America
House Committee on Appropriations,
April 15, 2021
United States Southern Command
Subcommittee on Defense
House Committee on Homeland
April 27, 2021
Unaccompanied Children at the Border:
Security, Subcommittee on Border
Stakeholder Perspectives on the Way
Security, Facilitation, and Operations
Forward
House Committee on Homeland
April 28, 2021
The Non–Governmental Organization
Security, Subcommittee on Government
Perspective on the Southwest Border
Operations and Border Management
House Committee on Homeland
May 6, 2021
Stakeholder Perspectives on Addressing
Security, Subcommittee on Oversight,
Migration Push Factors
Management and Accountability
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Committee and Subcommittee
Date
Title
House Foreign Affairs Committee,
May 13, 2021
A Race Against Time: Deploying Vaccines and
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere,
Addressing the Disproportionate Impacts of
Civilian Security, Migration, and
COVID-19 in Latin America and the
International Economic Policy
Caribbean
Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission
June 9, 2021
Judicial Independence in Central America
House Committee on Homeland
June 10, 2021
Unaccompanied Children at the Border:
Security, Subcommittee on Border
Federal Response and the Way Forward
Security, Facilitation, and Operations
House Committee on Homeland
June 11, 2021
Enhancing Border Security: Addressing
Security, Subcommittee on Oversight,
Corruption in Central America
Management and Accountability
House Foreign Affairs Committee,
June 23, 2021
The Biden Administration’s Efforts to Deepen
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere,
U.S. Engagement in the Caribbean
Civilian Security, Migration, and
International Economic Policy
Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission
July 1, 2021
Protests in Colombia
House Foreign Affairs Committee,
July 20, 2021
Historic Protests in Cuba and the Crackdown
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere,
on Free Expression
Civilian Security, Migration, and
International Economic Policy
Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission
July 21, 2021
The Ortega Government and the Human
Cost of Repression in Nicaragua: Political
Prisoner
Senate Committee on Finance
July 27, 2021
Implementation and Enforcement of the
United States – Mexico – Canada Agreement:
One Year After Entry into Force
House Committee on Homeland
July 28, 2021
DHS’s Efforts to Disrupt Transnational
Security
Criminal Organizations in Central America
House Foreign Affairs Committee,
September 21, 2021
An International Response to Ortega’s
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere,
Destruction of Democracy in Nicaragua
Civilian Security, Migration, and
International Economic Policy
Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission
September 23, 2021
Root Causes of Migration: Food Insecurity
and the Right to Food in Central America
House Foreign Affairs Committee,
November 16, 2021
The Biden Administration’s Policy Priorities
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere,
for Latin America and the Caribbean
Civilian Security, Migration, and
International Economic Policy
Senate Caucus on International
November 17, 2021
The Nexus between the Il icit Drug Trade
Narcotics Control
and Corruption
Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
November 18, 2021
Vaccine Diplomacy in Latin America and the
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere,
Caribbean: The Importance of U.S.
Transnational Crime, Civilian Security,
Engagement
Democracy, Human Rights, and Global
Women’s Issues
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
November 30, 2021
U.S. Policy on Democracy in Latin America
and the Caribbean
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House Foreign Affairs Committee,
January 20, 2022
Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, and
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere,
Panama: A New Alliance for Promoting
Civilian Security, Migration, and
Democracy and Prosperity in the Americas
International Economic Policy
House Foreign Affairs Committee
February 3, 2022
Overview of U.S. Priorities in the Western
Hemisphere: Opportunities, Challenges, and
the Path Ahead
Source: CRS, prepared by Carla Davis-Castro, Research Librarian.
Notes: See also hearing information at House Foreign Affairs Committee at https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/
hearings; Senate Foreign Relations Committee at http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings; Senate Armed Services
Committee at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings; and House Armed Services Committee at
https://armedservices.house.gov/hearings.

Author Information

Mark P. Sullivan, Coordinator
Maureen Taft-Morales
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Specialist in Latin American Affairs

June S. Beittel
M. Angeles Villarreal
Analyst in Latin American Affairs
Specialist in International Trade and Finance

Peter J. Meyer
Carla Y. Davis-Castro
Specialist in Latin American and Canadian Affairs
Research Librarian

Clare Ribando Seelke

Specialist in Latin American Affairs

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
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under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
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