INSIGHTi

Russian Military Buildup Along the
Ukrainian Border
Updated February 7, 2022
Since mid-October 2021, social media and news outlets have reported significant movement by Russian
military forces, with limited Russian transparency, on or near the Ukrainian border and within Ukraine’s
occupied Crimea region. These movements, which follow a similar but less expansive military buildup in
March-April 2021 and Russia’s Zapad military exercises in September 2021, have come amid
increasingly aggressive rhetoric reported from Russian policymakers about the so-called encroachment of
NATO near Russia’s borders and the geopolitical status of Ukraine. This rhetoric has continued despite
new bilateral negotiations between the United States and Russia, as well as joint meetings with NATO
and within the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), in January 2022. On
February 6, U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan warned, “Any day now, Russia could take
military action against Ukraine,” and said, “We believe that the Russians have put in place the capabilities
to mount a significant military operation into Ukraine.” Many observers and policymakers, including
some in Congress, have expressed concerns about a possible new Russian invasion of Ukraine or other
aggressive actions.
Recent Developments
U.S. and allied leaders have publicly voiced their concerns about Russia’s military buildup in recent
weeks. On January 14, 2022, Ukraine was hit by a cyberattack that many observers attributed to Russia.
The same day, the Biden Administration accused Russia of sending saboteurs to Ukraine “to have the
option of fabricating a pretext for invasion.” U.S. officials told Reuters in late January 2022 that Russia
had moved blood supplies and other medical support to the Ukrainian border, a concerning sign that
Moscow was potentially preparing for casualties. During a January 28 press conference, Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley stated, “The Russian Federation has amassed upwards, at this
time, of over 100,000 ground forces, air forces, naval forces, special forces, cyber, electronic warfare,
command and control, logistics, engineers and other capabilities along the Ukraine border.” On February
5, U.S. officials told media outlets that Russia had 70% of the forces it would need to conduct a full-scale
invasion, with 83 Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) deployed and 14 more in transit to the region.
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
IN11806
CRS INSIGHT
Prepared for Members and
Committees of Congress

---

link to page 2
Congressional Research Service
2
Russian Troop and Equipment Deployments
Many analysts and officials characterize Russia’s recent military buildup as the largest in recent memory.
The buildup comes after a sustained increase in Russia’s permanent force posture on the Ukrainian
border. Since 2014, Russia has created two new Combined Arms Armies (CAAs) in the Western Military
District (20th CAA, headquartered in Voronezh) and the Southern Military District (8th CAA,
headquartered in Rostov-on-Don and Novocherkassk) bordering Ukraine to oversee, coordinate, and
manage command and control of units transported to the border. The 8th CAA also reportedly commands
the separatist units in the Russia-controlled regions of eastern Ukraine (Donetsk and Luhansk). Russia’s
military capabilities in occupied Crimea center on (1) the Black Sea Fleet and (2) ground, air, and coastal
defense units focused on defending the peninsula and denying freedom of movement to Ukrainian and
foreign actors.
Media reporting has documented Russia’s shift of
Figure 1. Russian Borders with Ukraine
equipment and units (including Iskander-M short-
and Belarus
range ballistic missile and heavy artillery
systems) from the 41st CAA from the Central
Military District, headquartered in Novosibirsk,
Siberia, to Yelnya, on Belarus’s eastern border
(see Figure 1).
Since late December 2021, Russia has continued
to build up its forces in the region. Reports
indicate Russia has moved almost the entire 41st
CAA to Yelnya and positions closer to the
Ukrainian border. Analysts and media outlets
have reported the movement of elements of the 1st
Guards Tank Army (based outside Moscow) and

the 6th CAA (based outside St. Petersburg) to
Source: Congressional Research Service.
areas on Ukraine’s northeastern border near
Voronezh. Reports also have noted the increased
movement of units from the 49th and 58th CAAs toward Ukraine’s southeast border and the Russia-
controlled regions of eastern Ukraine. Troops from Russia’s Southern Military District have conducted
military exercises and have moved artillery and BTGs into the peninsula. In January 2022, Russia
announced large-scale naval exercises would take place in “all zones of responsibility.” Some analysts are
concerned Russia may be transporting landing ships to the Black Sea Fleet to support potential
amphibious operations.
Additionally, in early January 2022, Russia began to transport a significant portion of units from the
Eastern Military District (35th, 29th, 36th, and 5th CAAs), 155th Naval Infantry Brigade, air defense,
Iskander-M, and artillery units into Belarus. On January 18, 2022, Belarusian and Russian officials
announced these units would participate in joint Belarus-Russian military exercises (Allied Resolve 2022)
from February 9 to February 20 and would include Aerospace Forces (VKS) air defense and fighter
assets. Concerning for observers is the fact these units include support, logistics, command and control,
electronic warfare, heavy artillery, and strategic air defense systems (S-300V and S-400).

---

Congressional Research Service
3
Analysts also have noted the movement of Russia’s Airborne (VDV) units to Belarus and to Ukraine’s
occupied Crimea region. These units would play a key role in spearheading any potential Russian
operation, along with special forces (spetsnaz) and Naval Infantry units. Media reporting indicates Russia
has been gradually building up the necessary VKS air and helicopter assets. In recent days, open source
reporting noted the possible movement of Rosgvardiya (National Guard) troops closer to the Ukrainian
border. These troops would be crucial for rear area security, as well as for occupation and counter-
insurgency missions.
Most observers believe Russia either has, or shortly will have, all the necessary components to conduct a
large-scale invasion of Ukraine. Indicators concerning to observers include the movement of personnel to
staff the equipment transported from across Russia; the presence of strategic-level artillery, rocket
artillery, Iskander-M, and electronic warfare systems; support and logistics (including Material-Technical
Support Brigades); the movement of VKS fighter, fighter-bomber, and helicopter squadrons; and the
presence of command and control capabilities.

Author Information

Andrew S. Bowen

Analyst in Russian and European Affairs




Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff
to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of
Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of
information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role.
CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United
States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However,
as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the
permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

IN11806 · VERSION 5 · UPDATED

---