
Updated February 3, 2022
Defense Primer: National Security Space Launch
Introduction
launch providers and more competition, it will likely
The National Security Space Launch (NSSL) is a U.S.
continue to be a legislative priority.
government program that acquires launch services, aimed at
ensuring continued access to space for critical national
Background
security missions. The U.S. Air Force oversaw NSSL’s
The origins of the NSSL program date back to 1995, after
predecessor program, the Evolved Expendable Launch
years of concerns within the Air Force and space launch
Vehicle (EELV), and awarded four companies contracts to
community over increasing cost and decreasing confidence
design a cost-effective launch vehicle system. The
in the continued reliability of national access to space. The
Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition strategy was to
purpose of EELV was to provide the United States
select one company to ensure national security space (NSS)
affordable, reliable, and assured access to space with two
launches were affordable and reliable. The EELV effort
families of space launch vehicles. Initially only two
was prompted by significant increases in launch costs,
companies competed: Boeing produced the Delta IV launch
procurement concerns, and the lack of competition among
vehicle, and Lockheed Martin developed the Atlas V.
U.S. companies. Today, the NSSL program’s main priority
Overall, the program provided critical space lift capability
is mission success. A RAND study released April 2020
to support DOD and intelligence community satellites,
identified a magnitude of risk associated with assured
together known as NSS missions.
access to space. As Congress continues its oversight of
NSSL, it may consider examining DOD’s plan on the
The EELV program evolved modestly in response to
prioritization of the launch-related risks to ensure continued
changing circumstances, and the Air Force approved an
access to space and 100% mission success.
EELV acquisition strategy in November 2011, revising it in
2013. That strategy was designed to (1) sustain two major
A major concern in Congress and elsewhere over U.S.
independent rocket-powered launch vehicle families to
reliance on a Russian rocket engine (RD-180), used on one
reduce the chance of launch interruptions and to ensure
of the primary national security rockets for critical national
reliable access to space; (2) license and stockpile the
security space launches, was exacerbated by the Russian
Russian-made RD-180 heavy-lift rocket engine, a critical
backlash over the 2014 U.S. sanctions against its actions in
component of the Atlas V; (3) pursue a block-buy
Ukraine. Congress enacted laws limiting the number of
commitment to a number of launches through the end of the
Russian RD-180 rocket engines authorized to be used to a
decade to reduce launch costs; and (4) increase competition
total of 18 rocket engines, beginning with the National
to reduce overall launch costs. The Air Force and others
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 and ending
viewed the overall EELV acquisition strategy as having
on December 31, 2022. Moreover, significant overall NSSL
successfully reduced launch costs while demonstrating
program cost increases and unresolved questions over
highly reliable access to space for DOD and the intelligence
individual launch costs, along with legal challenges to the
community.
Air Force contract awards by space launch companies,
prompted legislative action. In the John S. McCain NDAA
NSSL Program Today
for Fiscal Year 2019, Congress renamed the EELV to the
The U.S. Space Force, the sixth branch of the Armed
NSSL program to reflect a wider mission that would
Forces, is responsible for the military space launch mission.
consider both reusable and expendable launch vehicles.
The NSSL program is managed by the Space Systems
Command, located at Los Angeles Air Force Base. The
The Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC), together
NSSL program currently consists of four launch vehicles:
with the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), released a
Atlas V and Delta IV Heavy (both provided by ULA of
request for proposals in May 2019 to award two domestic
Denver, CO) and Falcon 9 and Falcon Heavy (both
launch service contracts. On August 7, 2020, the U.S. Space
provided by SpaceX of Hawthorne, CA).
Force competitively awarded two Firm-Fixed-Price,
Indefinite Deliver Requirement contracts to United Launch
NSS launches support the Space Force, Navy, and NRO.
Alliance (ULA) and Space Exploration Technologies
More specifically, the Atlas V has launched commercial,
Corporations (SpaceX) for Phase 2 of the NSSL program.
civil, and NSS satellites into orbit, including commercial
These two companies share the responsibility for launching
and military communications satellites, lunar and other
U.S. military and intelligence satellites through 2027. ULA
planetary orbiters and probes, earth observation and
was awarded approximately 60% of the launch services
military research satellites, weather satellites, missile
orders, similarly SpaceX 40%. NSS launch has been a
warning and NRO reconnaissance satellites, a tracking and
leading legislative priority in the defense bills over the past
data relay satellite, and the X-37B space plane (a military
few years, and with the increasing number of commercial
orbital test vehicle). The Delta IV has launched commercial
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Defense Primer: National Security Space Launch
and military communications and weather satellites and
Implications for Congress
missile warning and NRO satellites.
Although widespread support for the NSS requirement to
promote robust competition and assured access to space
DOD expects to achieve cost saving through acquisitions
exists across Congress and national space community
and operability improvements through use of common
stakeholders, challenges to achieving these goals remain. A
components and infrastructure, standard payload interfaces,
recurring challenge since the start of the NSSL program has
standardized launch pads, and reductions in on-pad
been how best to pursue this requirement while driving
processing. To improve acquisitions, the program offers
down costs through competition and ensuring launch
block buys of launch vehicles and competition between
reliability and performance. The Space Force decision to
certified providers. The competitions are conducted through
select only two launch providers and award two separate
two contract vehicles: Launch Service Agreements (LSA)
LSP contracts in August 2020 is not without potential
and Launch Service Procurement (LSP) awards:
implications and could have second- and third-order effects
on operational capabilities.
Launch Service Agreement (LSA) awards are a set of
three Air Force Research, Development, Test, and
Congress may consider whether the strategy’s cost-benefit
Evaluation awards intended to facilitate the
analysis warrants further research. Since only two launch
development of three domestic launch system
providers were chosen for LSP contracts in Phase 2, and the
prototypes.
companies not selected (Northrop Grumman and Blue
Launch Service Procurement (LSP) is an ongoing
Origin) lost their LSA funds received from the Air Force,
procurement competition that awarded its Phase 2
these companies could potentially be faced with (1) the
contracts on August 7, 2020—a five-year procurement
choice of abandoning NSSL development to focus on
of approximately 34 launches starting in 2022.
competing in the commercial launch sector, or (2) investing
vast company reserves to continue development on its own.
United Launch Alliance, Northrop Grumman, SpaceX, and
Furthermore, DOD selection of only two launch providers
Blue Origin submitted bids for Phase 2, with each company
could mean fewer options for an increasingly diverse range
proposing its rocket design: Vulcan, OmegA, Falcon, and
of NSS mission demands and possibly limit competition in
New Glenn, respectively. Northrop Grumman and Blue
the launch market once again. Congress may consider
Origin were not selected to receive Phase 2 contracts.
Previously, Phase 1 and Phase 1A awards were given to
directing the Space Force to provide a report on the
ULA and SpaceX. DOD has identified 18 active contracts
cost-benefit analysis of selecting more than two launch
for the NSSL program, with obligations awarded to six
providers in future phases;
companies (see Figure 1).
drafting language in future NDAAs to authorize
Figure 1. Selected NSSL Contract Obligations, by
additional funds that allow the Space Force to diversify
Company, 2012-2019
its launch provider options by continuing to provide
development funds through LSA awards to launch
companies not selected for LSP contracts in Phase 2;
and/or
potential cost savings and associated risk of using
reusable launch vehicles for future solicitations.
Lastly, according to Space Force officials, efforts to
transition away from the RD-180 to a domestic U.S.
alternative engine or launch vehicle are ahead of schedule.
Even with a smooth, on-schedule transition away from the
RD-180 to an alternative engine or launch vehicle, the
performance and reliability record achieved with the RD-
180 to date would likely not be replicated until well beyond
2030; the RD-180 has approximately 81 consecutive
successful civil, commercial, and NSS launches since 2000.
CRS Products
CRS Report R46211, National Security Space Launch, by
Stephen M. McCall
Source: CRS analysis of the Federal Procurement Data System.
Stephen M. McCall, Analyst in Military Space, Missile
Notes: Totals as of July 2019, in mil ions of dol ars. Northrop
Grumman has acquired Orbital-ATK, previously known as Al iant
Defense, and Defense Innovation
Techsystems.
IF11531
ULA and SpaceX are currently the only space launch
providers certified to launch NSS payloads into orbit.
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Defense Primer: National Security Space Launch
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