Proposals for a COVID-19 Congressional
December 20, 2021
Advisory Commission in the 117th Congress: A
Jacob R. Straus
Comparative Analysis
Specialist on the Congress

Historically, Congress creates temporary advisory commissions to assist in the development of
public policy. Among other contexts, Congress has created commissions following a crisis,

including the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the 2008 financial crisis. In such
situations, advisory commissions may provide Congress with a high-visibility forum to assemble expertise that might not
exist within the legislative environment; allow for the in-depth examination of complex, crosscutting policy issues; and lend
bipartisan credibility to a set of findings and recommendations. In other situations, Congress may determine that an advisory
commission is unnecessary and instead prefer to utilize existing congressional oversight structures, such as standing or select
committees.
This report provides a comparative analysis of six congressional advisory commissions proposed in the 117th Congress that
would investigate various aspects of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) outbreak, governmental responses,
governmental pandemic preparedness, and the virus’s impact on the U.S. economy and society. Each proposed commission
would be similar in many respects, both to each other and to previous independent congressional advisory commissions.
Specifically, the proposed commissions would (1) exist temporarily; (2) serve in an advisory capacity; and (3) report a work
product detailing the commission’s findings, conclusions, and recommendations. Many of the proposed commissions also
would have unique elements, particularly concerning membership structure, appointment structure, and report deadlines.
This report compares and discusses the (1) membership structure, (2) appointment structure, (3) rules of procedure and
operation, (4) duties and reporting requirements, (5) commission powers, (6) staffing, and (7) funding of the six proposed
commission structures. The six proposals are
 H.R. 834 (National Commission on the COVID-19 Pandemic);
 H.R. 1306 (Commission on the Coronavirus Pandemic in the United States);
 H.R. 2212 (Pandemic Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Commission);
 S. 412 (Commission on the Coronavirus Pandemic in the United States);
 S. 1001 (Pandemic Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Commission); and
 S. 3203 (National Commission on the COVID-19 Pandemic).
This report will be updated as events warrant.

Congressional Research Service

link to page 21 link to page 32 Proposals for a COVID-19 Congressional Advisory Commission in the 117th Congress

Appendixes
Appendix. Comparison of Proposals to Create a COVID-19 Commission ................................... 17

Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 28

Congressional Research Service

Proposals for a COVID-19 Congressional Advisory Commission in the 117th Congress

Introduction
Congress has created temporary advisory commissions to assist in the development of public
policy. Recently, Congress has created commissions following crises, including the September 11,
2001, terrorist attacks,1 the 2008 financial crisis,2 and synthetic opioid trafficking.3 In such
situations, advisory commissions may provide Congress with a highly visible forum to convene
expertise that might not exist within the legislative environment; allow for the in-depth
examination of a complex, crosscutting policy problem; and lend bipartisan credibility to a set of
finding and recommendations.
As Congress considers its range of responses to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)
pandemic, the creation of one or more congressional advisory commissions is an option that
could provide a platform for evaluating various pandemic-related policy issues. Past
congressional advisory commissions have retrospectively evaluated policy responses, brought
together diverse groups of experts, and supplemented existing congressional oversight
mechanisms. Conversely, policymakers may determine that creating an advisory commission is
unnecessary and instead prefer to utilize existing congressional oversight structures, such as
standing or select committees,4 or already established oversight entities.5
This report provides a comparative analysis of six proposed congressional advisory commissions
introduced to date in the 117th Congress (2021-2022) that would investigate various aspects of the
COVID-19 pandemic. The six proposals are located in
 H.R. 834 (National Commission on the COVID-19 Pandemic);
 H.R. 1306 (Commission on the Coronavirus Pandemic in the United States);
 H.R. 2212 (Pandemic Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Commission);
 S. 412 (Commission on the Coronavirus Pandemic in the United States);
 S. 1001 (Pandemic Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Commission); and
 S. 3203 (National Commission on the COVID-19 Pandemic).
The structures of the six proposed commissions are similar in many respects, both to each other
and to previous independent advisory entities established by Congress.6 Specifically, the proposed

1 The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission; P.L. 107-306, §601, 116
Stat. 2408, November 27, 2002).
2 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (P.L. 111-21, §5, 123 Stat. 1624, May 20, 2009).
3 Commission on Combating Synthetic Opioid Trafficking (P.L. 116-92, §7221, 133 Stat. 2270, December 20, 2019).
4 For example, H.Res. 935 (116th Congress), agreed to April 23, 2020, established a Select Subcommittee on the
Coronavirus Crisis as a select investigative subcommittee of the House Committee on Oversight and Reform. The
House of Representatives reauthorized the Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis on January 4, 2021 (H.Res.
8, §4(f) (117th Congress)).
5 The CARES Act (P.L. 116-136) created several oversight entities for the implementation of the law. These include
the Pandemic Response Accountability Committee and the Congressional Oversight Commission. For more
information about COVID-19 oversight entities, see CRS Insight IN11343, The Pandemic Response Accountability
Committee: Organization and Duties, by Ben Wilhelm; CRS Insight IN11363, Congressional Oversight Provisions in
the Paycheck Protection Program and Health Care Enhancement Act, by Ben Wilhelm; CRS Report R46315,
Congressional Oversight Provisions in the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act (P.L. 116-
136), by Ben Wilhelm and William T. Egar; and CRS Insight IN11304, COVID-19 Congressional Oversight
Commission (COC), by Jacob R. Straus and William T. Egar.
6 Two potential analogous entities are the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (P.L. 110-181,
§841, 122 Stat. 230, January 28, 2008), and the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
(9/11 Commission; P.L. 107-306, §601, 116 Stat. 2408, November 27, 2002).
Congressional Research Service

1

link to page 21 Proposals for a COVID-19 Congressional Advisory Commission in the 117th Congress

commissions would be classified as congressional advisory commissions because they would (1)
exist temporarily; (2) serve in an advisory capacity; and (3) report a work product detailing the
commission’s findings, conclusions, and recommendations. Many of the proposed commissions
also have distinctive elements, particularly concerning membership structure, appointment
structure, and time line for reporting their work products to Congress.
This report compares the (1) membership structure, (2) appointment structure, (3) rules of
procedure and operation, (4) duties and reporting requirements, (5) powers, (6) staffing issues,
and (7) funding for each of the COVID-19 commissions proposed in the 117th Congress. The
Appendix, at the end of this report, provides a side-by-side comparison of major provisions of
the six proposals.
Membership Structure
Congress has created a variety of appointment structures for the naming of congressional
advisory commission members. Generally, commission statutes require that elected leaders (e.g.,
the President or congressional leaders) appoint commissioners, often with a specified balance
between the parties,. Commonly, statutory language specifies whether commissioners may be
current Representatives or Senators; whether they may be current federal, state, local, or tribal
government employees or officials;7 or whether they should be private citizens with specific
expertise or skills.
Congress might consider several matters related to a commission’s membership structure. They
include commission size, membership qualifications, commissioner compensation, and
requirements for partisan balance.
Size
There is significant variation in the size of congressional advisory commissions. Among the 161
identified congressional advisory commissions statutorily created between the 101st Congress
(1989-1990) and the 116th Congress (2019-2020), the median size was 12 members.8 The smallest
commission had 5 members and the largest had 33 members.9
The membership structure of each of the six proposed commissions would be similar to previous
independent advisory entities created by Congress. Four proposals (H.R. 834, H.R. 1306, S. 412,

7 For more information on commission membership, see CRS Report R40076, Congressional Commissions: Overview
and Considerations for Congress, by Jacob R. Straus; and CRS Report R45328, Designing Congressional
Commissions: Background and Considerations for Congress, by Jacob R. Straus. For a complete list of congressional
appointments to commissions, boards, and groups, see CRS Report RL33313, Congressional Membership and
Appointment Authority to Advisory Commissions, Boards, and Groups, by Jacob R. Straus.
8 CRS conducted a database search of a variety of relevant terms using Congress.gov for the 101st through 116th
Congresses (1989-2020) to capture all congressional commissions enacted into law. The universe of data included all
temporary multimember independent entities that (1) existed temporarily, (2) were statutorily created, (3) served in an
advisory capacity, (4) were appointed in part or whole by Members of Congress, and (5) reported to Congress. For
more information, see CRS Report R45328, Designing Congressional Commissions: Background and Considerations
for Congress, by Jacob R. Straus.
9 Five commissions created between the 101st and the 116th Congress had five members. The most recent is the
Congressional Oversight Commission for the CARES Act (P.L. 116-136). The largest commission is the United States
Semiquincentennial Commission (P.L. 114-196).
Congressional Research Service

2

link to page 22 Proposals for a COVID-19 Congressional Advisory Commission in the 117th Congress

and S. 3203) call for a commission of 10 members,10 and two proposals (H.R. 2212 and S. 1001)
call for a commission of 9 members.11
Qualifications
Congressional commission legislation often includes language that requires or suggests that
commission members possess certain substantive qualifications.12 Such provisions arguably make
it more likely that the commissioners are genuine policy experts, which may improve the
commission’s final work product.13
Each of the six proposed commissions includes at least one qualification on membership. In total,
the measures contain six different types of qualifications. They are
 a prohibition on the appointment of federal, state, local and/or tribal government
officials (H.R. 834, H.R. 1306, S. 412, S. 3203);14
 a prohibition on the appointment of individuals involved in the federal COVID-
19 pandemic response (H.R. 1306, S. 412);15
 a prohibition on the appointment of individuals who have a conflict of interest
with the commission’s duties and responsibilities (H.R. 834, S. 3203);16
 a “Sense of Congress” that commissioners are prominent U.S. citizens nationally
recognized in certain fields (H.R. 834, H.R. 1306, S. 412);17
 a requirement that members are prominent citizens with national recognition in
certain fields (H.R. 2212, S. 1001);18 and

10 H.R. 834, §5(a); H.R. 1306, §5(a); S. 412, §5(a); S. 3203, §2(c).
11 H.R. 2212, §4(b)(1); S. 1001, §4(b)(1).
12 Statutory language may require the appointing official to select members who are specifically qualified by virtue of
their education, knowledge, training, experience, expertise, distinguished service, or recognized eminence in a
particular field or fields. For example, the United States Commission on North American Energy Freedom statute
prescribed that commission nominees must be “knowledgeable on energy issues, including oil and gas exploration and
production, crude oil refining, oil and gas pipelines, electricity production and transmission, coal, unconventional
hydrocarbon resources, fuel cells, motor vehicle power systems, nuclear energy, renewable energy, biofuels, energy
efficiency, and energy conservation.” P.L. 109-58, §1423, 119 Stat. 1064, August 8, 2005.
13 In some instances, statutes establishing commissions have either provided for, or prohibited, the service of Members
of Congress as commissioners. Inclusion of legislators on such panels may help to ensure that Congress will be able to
exercise a certain degree of control over commission operations or outcomes. At the same time, commission service by
Members is arguably antithetical to two of the rationales for creating a commission in the first place: to reduce the
workload of Congress by delegating certain functions to temporary bodies and to produce independent advice.
14 H.R. 834, §5(b)(2); H.R. 1306, §5(b)(2)(A); S. 412, §(5(b)(2)(A); S. 3203, §2(c)(2)(B). Two proposed commissions
(H.R. 1306 and S. 412) would allow the appointment of “state employees at a public institution of higher education or
state-funded research institute” to the commission.
15 H.R. 1306, §5(b)(2)(B); S. 412, §5(b)(2)(B).
16 H.R. 834, §5(b)(4) & §9(d); S. 3203, §2(c)(2)(C). Additionally, H.R. 1306 (§5(b)(3)) and S. 412 (§5(b)(3)) would
require the commission to hire an ethics counsel who would submit to the relevant committees of Congress “a detailed
plan for identifying and resolving potential and actual conflicts of interest by any member of the commission.”
17 H.R. 834, §5(b)(3); H.R. 1306, §5(b)(4)(B); S. 412, §5(b)(4)(B). For a full list of qualifications for each commission,
see Table A-1.
18 H.R. 2212, §4(b)(3)(B); S. 1001, §4(b)(3)(B).
Congressional Research Service

3

Proposals for a COVID-19 Congressional Advisory Commission in the 117th Congress

 a requirement that each political party appoint at least 1 former governor, 1
public health expert, and 1 economic policy expert to the commission (H.R.
1306, S. 412).19
Compensation of Commission Members
Compensation generally takes two forms: direct compensation (pay) and reimbursement for travel
expenses. Approximately 30% of congressional advisory commission statutes specifically
authorize that commissioners receive direct compensation. When commissioners are paid, the
statute most frequently limits compensation to the daily equivalent of level IV of the Executive
Schedule.20 Nearly all commissions provide reimbursement for travel expenses.
Each of the six proposals would provide that commission members are compensated at a rate “not
to exceed the daily equivalent of basic pay” for Level IV of the Executive Schedule, “for each
day during which that member is engaged in the actual performance of duties of the
Commission.”21 Each proposed commission would also compensate members for travel expenses,
including a per diem.22
Partisan Limitations
Most congressional advisory commissions (70%) have a limit on the number of members
appointed from the same political party. Each of the six proposed commissions includes a limit on
commission members from each party. H.R. 834 would require that “each major political party
shall be represented by not fewer than five members of the Commission.”23 Each of the other
commissions would specify that “not more than 5 members of the Commission shall be from the
same political party.”24
Appointment Structure
No one system exists for appointing commission members. Past appointment considerations have
included partisan balance, how to fill vacancies, and the time limit for making appointments.
Commission legislation commonly uses at least one of three common appointment schemes. They
are as follows:
1. establishing legislation directly designates members of the commission, such as a
specific Cabinet official or congressional leader;25

19 H.R. 1306, §5(b)(4)(A); S. 412, §5(b)(4)(A).
20 In 2021, Level IV of the Executive Schedule is $172,500. See Office of Personnel Management, “Salary Table No.
2021-EX,” Pay & Leave: Salaries & Wages, effective January 2021, at https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/
pay-leave/salaries-wages/salary-tables/21Tables/exec/html/EX.aspx. For example, the 9/11 Commission (P.L. 107-306,
§608(a), 116 Stat. 2412, November 27, 2002) and the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (P.L. 111-21, §5(f), 123
Stat. 1629, May 20, 2009) provided that commission members could be compensated at a daily rate of basic pay.
21 H.R. 834, §10(a); H.R. 1306, §11(a); H.R. 2212, §7(a); S. 412, §11(a); S. 1001, §7(a); S. 3203, §2(h)(1).
22 H.R. 834, §10(b); H.R. 1306, §11(b); H.R. 2212, §7(b); S. 412, §11(b); S. 1001, §7(b); S. 3203, §2(h)(2).
23 H.R. 834, §5(b)(1).
24 H.R. 1306, §5(b)(1); H.R. 2212, §4(b)(4); S. 412, §5(b)(1); S. 1001, §4(b)(4); S. 3203, §2(c)(2)(A).
25 For example, the Commission on National Military Museum statute (P.L. 106-65, §2901(b)(2), 113 Stat. 881,
October 5, 1999) directly designated the Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, Transportation, and
of the Smithsonian Institution, the chair of the National Capital Planning Commission, and the chair of the U.S.
Congressional Research Service

4

link to page 10 Proposals for a COVID-19 Congressional Advisory Commission in the 117th Congress

2. congressional leaders make appointments, often with a balance between the
parties;26 or
3. selected leaders, such as committee chairs and ranking members, make
appointments themselves or recommend candidates to congressional leaders for
appointment.27
Each of the six commission proposals would have one appointment made by the President (who
would serve as the chair)28 and the rest by congressional leaders. Figure 1 shows the appointment
authority for each proposed commission, including the section on the chair and vice chair, if
applicable.

Commission of Fine Arts.
26 For example, the National Bipartisan Commission on the Future of Medicare (P.L. 105-33, §4021(c), 111 Stat. 348,
August 5, 1997) had six members appointed by the Senate majority leader in consultation with the Senate minority
leader, six members appointed by the Speaker of the House in consultation with the House minority leader, and one
jointly appointed by the President, Senate majority leader, and Speaker of the House.
27 For example, the Antitrust Modernization Commission (P.L. 107-273, §11054(a)(1), 116 Stat. 1857, November 2,
2002) had four members appointed by the President, with “members of the opposing party [appointed] only on the
recommendation of the leaders of Congress from that party.”
28 H.R. 834, §5(a)(1); H.R. 1306, §5(a)(1); S. 412, §5(a)(1); S. 3203, §2(c)(2)(B).
Congressional Research Service

5

Proposals for a COVID-19 Congressional Advisory Commission in the 117th Congress

Figure 1. Proposed COVID-19 Commission Appointment Authority
Using Congressional Leadership in the first session of the 117th Congress (2021)

Source: CRS analysis of H.R. 834, H.R. 1306, H.R. 2212, S. 412, S. 1001, and S. 3203.
Note: In H.R. 834, H.R. 1306, S. 412, and S. 3203, the vice chair would be “appointed by the leader of the
Senate whose political party is other than the political party of the President (regardless of whether such
individual is the majority or minority leader), in consultation with the leader of the House of Representatives
whose political party is other than the political party of the President (regardless of whether such individual is
the Speaker of the House of Representatives or the minority leader).” The table text notes the position of the
appointing officials in the first session of the 117th Congress (2021).
In general, a commission’s appointment scheme can affect both the commission’s ability to fulfill
its statutory duties and its final work product. For instance, if the commission’s statute only
provides for the appointment of Members of Congress, it arguably might not have the technical
expertise or diversity of knowledge to complete its duties within the time given by statute.
Similarly, if the appointment scheme includes qualifying provisos so specific that only a small set
of private citizens could serve on the panel, the commission’s final work product may arguably
only represent a narrow range of viewpoints. Four bills (H.R. 834, H.R. 1306, S. 412, and S.
3203) would prohibit the appointment of federal, state, local, or tribal government officers or
employees.29 None of the proposed COVID-19 commission bills specify whether Members of

29 H.R. 834, §5(b)(2); H.R. 1306, §5(b)(2); S. 412, §5(b)(2); S. 3203, §2(c)(1)(B).
Congressional Research Service

6

link to page 22 Proposals for a COVID-19 Congressional Advisory Commission in the 117th Congress

Congress might serve on the commission, although each bill would likely prohibit the
appointment of Members of Congress since they might be considered federal employees.
Partisan Balance in Appointment Authority
Congress structures most congressional advisory commissions to be bipartisan, with the
congressional leaders of the two major parties appointing an even (or near-even) number of
members. A bipartisan character may make a commission’s findings and recommendations more
politically acceptable to diverse viewpoints. Similarly, commission recommendations that are
perceived as partisan may have difficulty gaining support in Congress.
In some cases, bipartisanship also can arguably impede a commission’s ability to complete its
mandate. In situations where Congress tasks a commission with studying divisive or partisan
issues, the appointment of an equal number of majority and minority commissioners may serve to
promote partisanship within the commission rather than suppress it, raising the possibility of
deadlock where neither side can muster a majority to act.
Each of the six proposals would employ an appointment structure where leaders in both the
congressional majority and minority parties would make an equal number of appointments. H.R.
2212 and S. 1001 would provide two appointments each to the Senate majority leader, Senate
minority leader, Speaker of the House, and House minority leader, in addition to one presidential
appointment.30 H.R. 834, H.R. 1306, S. 412, and S. 3203 would provide two appointments each to
the senior member of the majority leadership of the Senate, the senior member of the majority
leadership of the House, the senior member of the minority leadership of the Senate, and the
senior member of the minority leadership of the House. Additionally, the vice chair would be
“appointed by the leader of the Senate whose political party is other than the political party of the
President (regardless of whether such individual is the majority or minority leader), in
consultation with the leader of the House of Representatives whose political party is other than
the political party of the President (regardless of whether such individual is the Speaker of the
House of Representatives or the minority leader),” and one appointed by the president.31 See
Table A-1 for more specific appointment authority in each measure.
Vacancies
All six proposals would provide that commission vacancies do not affect the commission’s
powers and would be filled in the same manner as the original appointment.
Timeline of Actions
Congressional advisory commissions exist temporarily and have a statutorily defined timeline to
complete a work product. Statutory language generally includes benchmark dates for specific
tasks. The most common deadlines included in commission statutes are those for
 member appointment;32

30 H.R. 2212, §4(b)(1); S. 1001, §4(b)(1).
31 H.R. 834, §5(a); H.R. 1306, §5(a); S. 412, §5(a); S. 3203, §2(c). H.R. 834, H.R. 1306, and S. 412 would provide that
the vice chair is chosen by the Senate leader of the opposite party of the President, in consultation with the House
leader of the opposite party of the President. S. 3203 would provide that the vice chair is chosen by the House leader of
the opposite party of the President, in consultation with the Senate leader of the opposite party of the President.
32 Nearly all commissions require that commission members are appointed within a particular time period. Typically,
Congressional Research Service

7

link to page 13 Proposals for a COVID-19 Congressional Advisory Commission in the 117th Congress

 first meeting;33
 report due date;34 and
 termination of commission activities.35
Figure 2 reports the deadlines for the six proposed commissions.

the appointment deadlines are tied to enactment and can range from several weeks to several months. For example, the
deadline for appointments to the 9/11 Commission was December 15, 2002, 18 days after enactment of the act (P.L.
107-306, 116 Stat. 2408, November 27, 2002); the deadline for the Antitrust Modernization Commission was 60 days
after enactment (P.L. 107-273; 116 Stat. 1856, November 2, 2002); and the deadline for appointment to the
Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan was 120 days after enactment (P.L. 110-181; 122 Stat.
230; January 28, 2008).
33 Most commission statutes are prescriptive in when the commission’s first meeting should take place. This can ensure
that the commission begins its work in a timely manner and completes its work by any reporting deadline included in
the authorizing legislation.
34 The length of time a congressional commission has to complete its work is arguably one of the most consequential
decisions when designing an advisory entity. If the entity has a short window of time, the quality of its work product
may suffer or it may not be able to fulfill its statutory mandate on time. A short deadline may also affect the process of
standing up a new commission. The selection of commissioners, recruitment of staff, arrangement of office space, and
other logistical matters may require expedited action if short deadlines need to be met. On the other hand, if the
commission is given a long period to complete its work, it may undermine one of a commission’s primary legislative
advantages, the timely production of expert advice on a current matter.
35 As temporary entities, congressional advisory commissions statutorily terminate. Termination dates are often linked
to a fixed period after the commission’s establishment, the selection of members, or the submission date of the final
report. In limited cases, some commission statutes specify a specific calendar date for termination.
Congressional Research Service

8

Proposals for a COVID-19 Congressional Advisory Commission in the 117th Congress

Figure 2. Proposed COVID-19 Commission Deadlines

Source: CRS analysis of H.R. 834, H.R. 1306, H.R. 2212, S. 412, S. 1001, and S. 3203.
Notes: Several conditions apply to the timing of interim and final reports. In H.R. 1306 (§13(e)) and S. 412
(§13(e)) “the submission and publication of the final report .. may be delayed by 90 days upon the agreement of
a majority of the members of the Commission. The Commission may make not more than three 90-day
extensions. The Commission shall notify the President, Congress, and the public of each such extension.” In H.R.
2212 (§5(g)-(h)) and S. 1001 (§5(g)-(h)), after the commission issues its initial report, the commission would
solicit public comments on the report and consult with the chair and ranking member of the House and Senate
committees of jurisdiction and the heads of agencies with enforcement jurisdiction on the content of the initial
report. Within 90 days of the conclusion of the comment period, the commission would issue a revised final
report, including legislative language to implement the commission’s recommendations. In S. 3203 (§2(j)(3)), the
commission could extend the deadline for the final report by not more than 120 days with a vote of no fewer
than eight commission members. The commission would not be allowed to vote for more than one extension.
Rules of Procedure and Operations
Absent statutory guidance—either in general law or in the authorizing legislation—advisory
commissions have varied widely in how they adopt their rules of procedure. In general, three
models exist: formal written rules, informal rules, and the reliance on norms. Individual advisory
entities use all three of these models for different types of decisionmaking.
A variety of factors may influence the choice to adopt written rules or rely on informal norms to
guide commission procedure. These include the entity’s size, the frequency of meetings, member
preferences regarding formality, the level of collegiality among members, the commission’s
Congressional Research Service

9

link to page 22 Proposals for a COVID-19 Congressional Advisory Commission in the 117th Congress

duration, and the amount of procedural guidance provided by the authorizing statute. None of the
six COVID-19 commission proposals would require the adoption of written rules or specify
procedures for adopting rules.
Statutory language routinely specifies other rules of procedure or operations. These include
quorum requirements, public access to commission meetings and reports, and the applicability of
the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA). For a comparison of each proposed commission’s
specified rules of procedures and operations, see Table A-1.
Quorum
Most commission statutes define a quorum for commission business. Usually, the statute defines
a quorum as a majority of commission members, but occasionally the statute requires a
supermajority. All six bills would establish a quorum requirement. H.R. 834, H.R. 1306, S. 412,
and S. 3203 would all set quorum at 6 of 10 members.36 H.R. 2212 and S. 1001 would set quorum
at 5 of 9 members.37
Public Access
Public access to commissions can take several forms. Most common are requirements that
commission meetings be open to the public and that the commission’s final report is publicly
available. All six bills would require commission meetings to be open to the public.38 Each bill
would also require that commission reports are publicly available.39
FACA Applicability
The Federal Advisory Committee Act mandates certain structural and operational requirements,
including formal reporting and oversight procedures, for certain federal advisory entities that
provide advice to the executive branch.40 Each bill would exempt the commission from FACA.41
Duties and Reporting Requirements
Most congressional commissions are policy commissions—temporary bodies that study particular
policy problems or review a specific event and report their findings to Congress.42

36 H.R. 834, §5(c); H.R. 1306, §5(c)(3); S. 412, §5(c)(3); and S. 3203, §2(c)(3).
37 H.R. 2212, §4(g); S. 1001, §4(g).
38 H.R. 834, §8(b) & (d); H.R. 1306, §8(b)(1); H.R. 2212, §4(f); S. 412, §8(b)(1); S. 1001, §4(f); S. 3203, §2(f)(2)(A).
39 H.R. 834, §8(c)(2); H.R. 1306, §13(c); H.R. 2212, §5(g)(3); S. 412, §13(c); S. 1001, §5(g)(3); S. 3203, §2(b)(2),
§2(3)(5)(B), & §2(j)(1).
40 5 U.S.C. Appendix. For more information about the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), see CRS Report
R44253, Federal Advisory Committees: An Introduction and Overview, by Meghan M. Stuessy; and CRS Report
R44232, Creating a Federal Advisory Committee in the Executive Branch, by Meghan M. Stuessy.
41 H.R. 834, §8(a); H.R. 1306, §8(a); H.R. 2212, §4(h); S. 412, §8(a); S. 1001, §4(h); S. 3203, §2(f)(1).
42 For more information on policy commissions, see CRS Report R40076, Congressional Commissions: Overview and
Considerations for Congress, by Jacob R. Straus. Other commissions are commemorative commissions—entities
established to commemorate a person or event, often to mark an anniversary. For more information on commemorative
commissions, see CRS Report R41425, Commemorative Commissions: Overview, Structure, and Funding, by Jacob R.
Straus.
Congressional Research Service

10

link to page 15 Proposals for a COVID-19 Congressional Advisory Commission in the 117th Congress

General Duties
All six of the proposed commissions would have duties that are analogous to past policy
commissions. While the specific mandates of each proposed commission would differ somewhat,
all six proposed commissions would investigate aspects of the COVID-19 pandemic and submit
one or more reports to Congress and the President. Generally, the reports would include the
commission’s findings, conclusions, and recommendations for legislative action.43 Table 1
reports the general duties of the six proposed commissions (excerpted from the Congress.gov
summaries of each measure).
Table 1. General Duties of Proposed COVID-19 Commissions, 117th Congress
Bill
General Duties
H.R. 834
Investigate and report on the nation’s preparedness for and response to the COVID-19 (i.e.,
coronavirus disease 2019) pandemic (§§3, 4, & 6).
H.R. 1306
Investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding the COVID-19 (i.e., coronavirus disease 2019)
pandemic. This investigation must include the preparedness for and response to the disease by
federal, state, territorial, tribal, and local governments (§§4 & 6).
H.R. 2212
Make recommendations and propose legislation for modification, consolidation, harmonization, or
repeal of regulations to reduce compliance costs, encourage growth and innovation, improve
competitiveness, and protect public safety. The commission must give priority to regulations (1) the
repeal or modification of which may assist recovery or response to the COVID-19 (i.e., coronavirus
disease 2019) pandemic and future pandemics, (2) that impose disproportionately high costs on a
small entity, (3) that create substantial recurring paperwork burdens or transaction costs, or (4) that
could be made more effective while reducing regulatory costs (§§2 & 5).
S. 412
Investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding the COVID-19 (i.e., coronavirus disease 2019)
pandemic. This investigation must include the preparedness for and response to the disease by
federal, state, territorial, tribal, and local governments (§§4 & 6).
S. 1001
Make recommendations and propose legislation for modification, consolidation, harmonization, or
repeal of regulations to reduce compliance costs, encourage growth and innovation, improve
competitiveness, and protect public safety. The commission must give priority to regulations (1) the
repeal or modification of which may assist recovery or response to the COVID-19 (i.e., coronavirus
disease 2019) pandemic and future pandemics, (2) that impose disproportionately high costs on a
small entity, (3) that create substantial recurring paperwork burdens or transaction costs, or (4) that
could be made more effective while reducing regulatory costs (§§2 & 5).
S. 3203
Investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding the COVID-19 (i.e., coronavirus disease 2019)
pandemic. The investigation must include preparedness for and responses to the disease by federal,
state, territorial, tribal, and local governments (§§2(b) & (d)).
Source: Congress.gov legislative summaries and CRS analysis of bil text.
Reports
Each proposed commission would issue reports detailing its findings, conclusions, and
recommendations. Reports generally take on two forms: interim reports and final reports. Interim
or initial reports allow the commission to provide an update(s) to Congress and the President on
the status of its activities or otherwise publish information on aspects of the commission’s work.

43 H.R. 834, §12; H.R. 1306, §13(a)-(e); H.R. 2212, §5(h); S. 412, §13(a)-(e); S. 1001, §5(h); S. 3203, §2(j).
Congressional Research Service

11

link to page 13 link to page 22 Proposals for a COVID-19 Congressional Advisory Commission in the 117th Congress

H.R. 2212, S. 1001, and S. 3203 would all require some form of interim report.44 H.R. 834, H.R.
1306, and S. 412 would make interim report(s) optional.45
Final reports provide details of the commission’s work, findings, and recommendations. In some
cases, suggested legislative language accompanies the final reports. Each of the six commissions
would be required to submit a final report to Congress and the President.46 H.R. 2212 and S. 1001
would require the commission to issue a report, consult with the chair and ranking members of
relevant House and Senate Committees, solicit public feedback, and subsequently make final
report adjustments.47
Commissions are generally required to submit their final report within a specific timeframe. Each
of the six proposed commissions would have a specified time limit on submitting its final report.
Those timeframes are listed in Figure 2.
Expedited Procedures
Congress sometimes enacts expedited, or “fast track,” rules in law providing for the consideration
of legislation in one or both chambers. These statutory provisions contemplate that the House and
Senate will consider certain bills or resolutions under expedited procedures instead of the regular
parliamentary procedures used to consider most legislation.48 Such expedited procedures are
sometimes included in the authorizing language creating congressional advisory commissions,
and establish special procedures for committee and floor action on the commission’s
recommendations.49 Such procedures establish strict deadlines on committee consideration of a
bill embodying the commission’s recommendations and limit debate and amendment on the
measure when it is considered on the chamber floor. Significantly, such “fast track” procedures
allow a simple majority of the Senate to call up and reach a final vote on a commission bill
without having to assemble a supermajority to end debate (invoke cloture).
Two commission bills (H.R. 2212 and S. 1001) contain expedited procedures providing for the
consideration of “recommended legislative language to implement the recommendations”
contained in the commission’s final report.50
Commission Powers
Each of the six bills would provide the proposed commission with certain powers (see Table A-1
for specifics). One broad issue for commissions is who might be authorized to execute such
powers. In general, in some cases, the commission itself executes its powers, with the
commission deciding whether to devise rules and procedures for the general use of such power. In
other cases, the legislation specifically authorizes the commission to give discretionary power to

44 H.R. 2212, §5(g)(1); S. 1001, §5(g)(1); S. 3203, §2(j)(1).
45 H.R. 834, §12(a); H.R. 1306, §13(a); S. 412, §13(a).
46 H.R. 834, §12(b); H.R. 1306, §13(b); H.R. 2212, §5(h); S. 412, §13(b); S. 1001, §5(h); S. 3203, §2(j)(3)(A).
47 H.R. 2212, §5(g)(5) & §5(h); S. 1001, §5(g)(5) & §5(h).
48 For more information on expedited or “fast-track” legislative procedures, see CRS Report RS20234, Expedited or
“Fast-Track” Legislative Procedures, by Christopher M. Davis.
49 For example, see CRS Report R43102, “Fast Track” Legislative Procedures Governing Congressional
Consideration of a Defense Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) Commission Report, by Christopher M. Davis.
50 H.R. 2212, §5(i); S. 1001, §5(i).
Congressional Research Service

12

Proposals for a COVID-19 Congressional Advisory Commission in the 117th Congress

subcommittees or individual commission members.51 Finally, the legislation itself might grant
certain powers to individual members of the commission, such as the chair.52
Hearings and Evidence
Commissions commonly hold meetings to collect information and hear testimony from outside
experts or government officials in the course of conducting a study. All six bills would provide
the proposed commission with the power to hold hearings, take testimony, and receive evidence.53
Four commission bills (H.R. 834, H.R. 1306, S. 412, and S. 3203) would provide the power to
administer oaths to witnesses.54
Subpoenas
On occasion, Congress grants a congressional advisory commission subpoena authority to help
the commission gather information. Congressional commission subpoena authority is relatively
infrequent. Since the 101st Congress (1989-1990), CRS has identified 12 congressional
commissions as having subpoena authority.55
Four of the bills would provide the commission subpoena power. H.R. 834, H.R. 1306, S. 412,
and S. 3203 would provide that subpoenas could only be issued by either (1) agreement of the
chair and vice chair, or (2) an affirmative vote of a specified number of commissioners.56 H.R.
834 and S. 3203 would require six commissioners to vote to issue a subpoena. H.R. 1306 and S.
412 would require an affirmative majority vote.
Administrative Support
All six bills would provide that the commission may obtain administrative support services from
the General Services Administration (GSA). GSA provides administrative support to dozens of
federal entities, including congressional advisory commissions.57 Each of the six bills would

51 For example, the National Commission on Defense and National Security (P.L. 101-511, §3, 104 Stat. 1899,
November 5, 1990) provided that “Any member or agent of the Commission may, if so authorized by the Commission,
take any action which the Commission is authorized to take by this section” [§8(b)].
52 For example, the Women’s Progress Commemoration Commission (P.L. 105-341, §3, 112 Stat. 3197, October 31,
1998) provided that “The Commission may secure directly from any Federal department or agency such information as
the Commission considers necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act. At the request of the Chairperson of the
Commission, the head of such department or agency shall furnish such information to the Commission” (emphasis
added) [§5(b)].
53 H.R. 834, §7(a)(1); H.R. 1306, §7(a)(1); H.R. 2212, §6(a); S. 412, §7(a); S. 1001, §6(a); S. 3203, §2(e)(1)(A).
54 H.R. 834, §7(a)(1)(A); H.R. 1306, §7(a)(1)(a); S. 412, §7(a)(1)(A); S. 3203, §2(e)(1)(A)(i).
55 The 12 commissions are as follows: National Commission on Financial Institution Reform, Recovery, and
Enforcement (P.L. 101-647, §2553), Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy (P.L. 103-236,
§904), National Commission on Restructuring the Internal Revenue Service (P.L. 104-52), National Gambling Impact
Study Commission (P.L. 104-169, §3), National Commission for the Review of the National Reconnaissance Office
(P.L. 106-120, §702), National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (P.L. 107-306, §603),
National Commission for the Review of Research and Development Programs of the United States Intelligence
Community (P.L. 107-306, §1002), National Prison Rape Reduction Commission (P.L. 108-79, §7), Human Space
Flight Independent Investigation Commission (P.L. 109-155, §825), Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (P.L. 111-21,
§5), Cyberspace Solarium Commission (P.L. 115-232, §1652), and Commission on the State of the U.S. Olympics and
Paralympics (P.L. 116-189, §11).
56 H.R. 834, §7(a)(2), H.R. 1306, §7(a)(2), S. 412, §7(a)(2), S. 3203, §2(e)(1)(B).
57 U.S. General Services Administration, “Presidential & Congressional Commission, Boards or Small Agencies,” at
Congressional Research Service

13

link to page 18

Proposals for a COVID-19 Congressional Advisory Commission in the 117th Congress

provide that the commission reimburse GSA for its services.58 Two bills (H.R. 2212 and S. 1001)
would also provide that the commission may obtain space for the commission from the Architect
of the Capitol.59 Four bills (H.R. 834, H.R. 1306, S. 412, and S. 3203) also specify that other
departments or agencies could provide the commission with funds, facilities, staff, and other
services.60
Other Powers
Commissions generally require statutory authority to engage in certain activities. These might
include information gathering, contracting, using the U.S. mail in the same manner as an
executive branch agency, or accepting donations or gifts. Figure 3 lists common commission
powers included in the six commission bills.
Figure 3. COVID-19 Commissions: Other Common Powers

Source: CRS analysis of commission bil s.

https://www.gsa.gov/resources-for/presidential-congressional-commissions-boards-or-small-agencies.
58 H.R. 834, §7(d)(1); H.R. 1306, §7(d)(1); H.R. 2212, §§6(e) & 7(f); S. 412, §7(d)(1); S. 1001, §§6(e) & 7(f); S. 3203,
§2(e)(4)(A).
59 H.R. 2212, §6(e); S. 1001, §6(e).
60 H.R. 834, §7(d)(2); H.R. 1306, §7(d)(2); S. 412, §7(d)(2); S. 3203, §2(e)(4)(C).
Congressional Research Service

14

Proposals for a COVID-19 Congressional Advisory Commission in the 117th Congress

Staffing
Commission statutes generally authorize the commission to hire staff. Rather than mandate a
specific staff size, many commission statutes specifically authorize the appointment of a staff
director and provide the commission authority to hire other personnel as necessary, subject to the
limitations of available funds. Most congressional commission statutes also authorize the
commission to hire consultants, procure intermittent services, and request that federal agencies
detail personnel to aid the commission’s work. Each of the COVID-19 commission proposals
contains staffing provisions commonly found in congressional advisory commission legislation.
Director and Commission Staff
All six bills would provide that the commission may hire staff without regard to certain
competitive service laws and would limit staff salaries to level V of the Executive Schedule.61
Several other staffing features are included in the bills. They are as follows:
 Two bills (H.R. 1306 and S. 412) would require that staff be nonpartisan.62
 Two bills (H.R. 2212 and S. 1001) would require that the “executive director of
the Commission shall be subject to confirmation by the Commission.”63
 Two bills (H.R. 2212 and S. 1001) would require that the Congressional
Accountability Act of 1995 apply to the commission and its employees.64
Detailees
When authorized, some commissions may have federal agency staff detailed to the commission.
All six bills would authorize the detail of federal employees to the commission, without
reimbursement.65
Experts and Consultants
All six bills would provide the commission with the authority to hire experts and consultants.
Four bills (H.R. 834, H.R. 1306, S. 412, and S. 3203) would limit the rate of pay for consultants
to level IV of the Executive Schedule.66 Two bills (H.R. 2212 and S. 1001) would limit the rate of
pay for consultants to level V of the Executive Schedule.67

61 H.R. 834, §9(a); H.R. 1306, §10(a)(1); H.R. 2212, §7(c); S. 412, §10(a)(1); S. 1001, §7(c)(3); S. 3203, §2(g)(1)(A).
For 2021, level V of the Executive Schedule is $161,700. For more information, see “Salary Table No. 2021-EX,” at
https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/salaries-wages/salary-tables/pdf/2021/EX.pdf.
62 H.R. 1306, §10(a)(2); S. 412, §10(a)(2).
63 H.R. 2212, §7(c)(1); S. 1001, §7(c)(2).
64 H.R. 2212, §7(g); S. 1001, §7(g). For more information on the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995, see CRS
Legal Sidebar LSB10384, The Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 Reform Act: An Overview, by Christine J.
Back; and CRS In Focus IF10775, Office of Compliance: Background Information, by Ida A. Brudnick.
65 H.R. 834, §9(b); H.R. 1306, §10(b); H.R. 2212, §7(c)(3); S. 412, §10(b); S. 1001, §7(c)(3); S. 3203, §2(g)(2).
66 H.R. 834, §9(c); H.R. 1306, §10(c); S. 412, §10(c); S. 3203, §2(g)(3).
67 H.R. 2212, §7(d); S. 1001, §7(d).
Congressional Research Service

15

Proposals for a COVID-19 Congressional Advisory Commission in the 117th Congress

Security Clearances
Four bills (H.R. 834, H.R. 1306, S. 412, and S. 3203) would require federal agencies and
departments to cooperate with the commission to provide members and staff appropriate security
clearances.68
Funding and Costs
Commissions generally require funding to meet their statutory goals. When designing a
commission, policymakers might consider both how Congress might fund the commission and
how much money the commission would be authorized to receive. Factors that might affect
commission expenditures, and therefore funding, include member and staff salaries and benefits,
contracting, administrative support reimbursement, the number of meetings, and travel
expenditures. A commission’s duration can also significantly affect its cost; past congressional
commissions have been designed to last anywhere from several months to several years.69
All six proposals specify a commission funding mechanism. Four bills (H.R. 834, H.R. 2212, S.
1001, and S. 3203) would authorize the appropriation of “such sums as may be necessary” for the
commission, with the money available for the life of the commission.70 Two bills (H.R. 834 and
S. 3203) further specify that if the commission requires additional funds, the chair must notify
Congress.71 Two bills (H.R. 1306 and S. 412) would authorize $50 million, with the money
available until expended.72

68 H.R. 834, §11; H.R. 1306, §12; S. 412, §12; S. 3203, §2(i).
69 For more information on commission funding, see CRS Report R45826, Congressional Commissions: Funding and
Expenditures, coordinated by Jacob R. Straus.
70 H.R. 834, §13(a); H.R. 2212, §9; S. 1001, §9; S. 3203, §2(l)(1).
71 H.R. 834, §13(c); S. 3203, §2(l)(3).
72 H.R. 1306, §14; S. 412, §14.
Congressional Research Service

16

link to page 22 link to page 22 Proposals for a COVID-19 Congressional Advisory Commission in the 117th Congress

Appendix. Comparison of Proposals to Create a
COVID-19 Commission
Table A-1 provides a side-by-side comparison of major provisions of the six bills analyzed in this
report to create a congressional advisory commission on COVID-19. For each bill, Table A-1
compares the membership structure, appointment structure, rules of procedure and operation,
duties and reporting requirements, proposed commission powers, staffing provisions, and
funding.

Congressional Research Service

17

Table A-1. Comparison of 117th Congress Proposals to Create a Congressional Advisory Commission on COVID-19

H.R. 834
H.R. 1306
H.R. 2212
S. 412
S. 1001
S. 3203
Commission Name
National Commission
Commission on the
Pandemic
Commission on the
Pandemic
National
on the COVID–19
Coronavirus
Preparedness,
Coronavirus
Preparedness,
Commission on
Pandemic
Pandemic in the
Response, and
Pandemic in the
Response, and
the COVID–19
United States
Recovery
United States
Recovery
Pandemic
Commission
Commission
Total Members
10
10
9
10
9
10
Appointments
1 (chair) by the
1 (chair) by the
1 (chair) by the
1 (chair) by the
1 (chair) by the
1 (chair) by the
President;
President;
President
President;
President;
President;
1 (vice chair) by the
1 (vice chair) by the
2 by Senate majority
1 (vice chair) by the
2 by Senate majority
1 (vice chair) by
leader of the Senate
leader of the Senate
leader;
leader of the Senate
leader;
the leader of the
of the party opposite
of the party opposite
2 by Senate minority
of the party opposite
2 by Senate minority
House of the
the President, in
the President in
leader;
the President in
leader;
party opposite
consultation with the
consultation with the
consultation with the
the President, in
leader of the House
House leader from
2 by Speaker of the
House leader from
2 by Speaker of the
consultation
of the party opposite
the same party;
House; and
the same party;
House; and
with the leader
the President;
2 by the senior
2 by the House
2 by the senior
2 by the House
of the Senate
2 by the senior
member of the Senate minority leader.
member of the Senate minority leader.
party opposite
member of the Senate Democratic Party
§4(b)(1)
Democratic Party
§4(b)(1)
the President;
majority party
leadership;
leadership;
2 by the senior
leadership;
2 by the senior
2 by the senior
member of the
2 by the senior
member of the Senate
member of the Senate
Senate
member of the House Republican Party
Republican Party
Democratic
majority party
leadership;
leadership;
Party;
leadership;
2 by the senior House
2 by the senior
2 by the senior
2 by the senior
Republican Party
member of the House
member of the
member of the Senate leadership; and
Democratic Party
House
minority party
Republican
2 by the senior House
leadership; and
leadership; and
Party;
Democratic Party
2 by the senior
2 by the senior
leadership.
member of the House
2 by the senior
member of the House
member of the
§5(a)
Republican Party
minority party
leadership.
Senate
leadership.
Republican
§5(a)
Party; and
§5(a)
CRS-18

H.R. 834
H.R. 1306
H.R. 2212
S. 412
S. 1001
S. 3203
2 by the senior
member of the
House
Democratic
Party.
§2(c)
Commissioner
Commission
Commission
Commission
Commission
Commission
Commission
Compensation and
members may receive
members may receive
members may receive
members may receive
members may receive
members may
Travel Expenses
compensation not to
compensation not to
compensation at level
compensation not to
compensation at level
receive
exceed level IV of the
exceed level IV of the
IV of the Executive
exceed level IV of the
IV of the Executive
compensation
Executive Schedule.
Executive Schedule.
Schedule.
Executive Schedule.
Schedule.
not to exceed
§10(a)
§11(a)
§7(a)
§11(a)
§7(a)
level IV of the
Executive

Schedule.
Travel expenses
Travel expenses
Travel expenses
Travel expenses
Travel expenses
§2(h)(1)
reimbursed.
reimbursed.
reimbursed.
reimbursed.
reimbursed.
Travel expenses
§10(b)
§11(b)
§7(b)
§11(b)
§7(b)
reimbursed.
§2(h)(2)
Partisan Balance
Each major political
Not more than 5
Not more than 5
Not more than 5
Not more than 5
Not more than
party shall be
members (out of 10)
members (out of 9)
members (out of 10)
members (out of 9)
5 members (out
represented by not
from the same
from the same
from the same
from the same
of 10) from the
fewer than 5
political party.
political party.
political party.
political party.
same political
members (out of 10).
§5(b)(1)
§4(b)(4)
§5(b)(1)
§4(b)(4)
party.
§5(b)(1)
§2(c)(2)(a)
Other Commissioner
No officers or
No officers or
Chair shall be an
No officers or
Chair shall be an
No officers or
Qualifications
employees of federal,
employees of federal,
individual with
employees of the
individual with
employees of
state, or local
state, tribal, local, or
expertise and
federal, state, tribal,
expertise and
federal, state, or
governments.
territorial
experience in
local, or territorial
experience in
local
§5(b)(2)
governments, except
rulemaking.
government, except
rulemaking.
governments.
state employees at a
state employees at a

§4(b)(3)(A)
§4(b)(3)(A)
§2(c)(2)(B)
public institution of
public institution of
Sense of Congress
higher education or

higher education or

that commissioners
state-funded research
Members shall be
state-funded research
Members shall be
Members cannot
should be prominent
institute; nor have
prominent U.S.
institute; nor have
prominent U.S.
have conflicts of
U.S. citizens, with
held a federal
citizens with national
held a federal
citizens with national
interest.
national recognition
government position
recognition and a
government position
recognition and a
CRS-19

H.R. 834
H.R. 1306
H.R. 2212
S. 412
S. 1001
S. 3203
and significant
that dealt with the
significant depth of
that dealt with the
significant depth of
§2(c)(2)(C)
experience and
COVID-19 pandemic.
experience in matters
COVID-19 pandemic.
experience in matters
expertise in such
§5(b)(2)
relating to
§5(b)(2)
relating to
professions as
government service,
government service,
governmental service,

regulatory policy,

regulatory policy,
science, health, law,
Members appointed
public health,
Members appointed
public health,
public administration,
by each political party
economics, federal
by each political party
economics, federal
intelligence gathering,
should include one
agency management,
should include one
agency management,
commerce, logistics,
former governor, one
public administration,
former governor, one
public administration,
and foreign affairs.
public health expert,
and law.
public health expert,
and law.
§5(b)(3)
and one economic
§4(b)(3)(B)
and one economic
§4(b)(3)(B)
policy expert.
policy expert.

§5(b)(4)(A)
§5(b)(4)(A)
Member cannot have
conflicts of interest.

§5(b)(4); §9(d)
Sense of Congress
Sense of Congress
that commissioners
that commissioners
be prominent U.S.
be prominent U.S.
citizens with national
citizens with national
recognition and
recognition and
significant experience
significant experience
in such professions as
in such professions as
governmental service,
governmental service,
public health, global
public health, global
health, infectious
health, infectious
diseases, pandemic
diseases, pandemic
preparedness and
preparedness and
response,
response,
humanitarian
humanitarian
response and relief,
response and relief,
scientific research,
scientific research,
public administration,
public administration,
intelligence gathering,
intelligence gathering,
commerce, national
commerce, national
security, and foreign
security, and foreign
affairs.
affairs.
§5(b)(4)(B)
§5(b)(4)(B)
CRS-20

H.R. 834
H.R. 1306
H.R. 2212
S. 412
S. 1001
S. 3203
Deadline for
Appointments to be
Appointments to be
Appointments to be
Appointments to be
Appointments to be
Appointments
Appointment
made within 90 days
made within 60 days
made with 30 days of
made within 60 days
made within 30 days
to be made
of enactment.
of enactment.
enactment.
of enactment.
of enactment.
within 30 days
§5(b)(5)
§5(b)(5)
§4(b)(2)
§5(b)(5)
§4(b)(2)
of enactment.
§2(c)(2)(D)
Chairperson Selection
Chair appointed by
Chair appointed by
Chair appointed by
Chair appointed by
Chair appointed by
Chair appointed
the President.
President
the President.
the President.
the President.
by the President.

§4(b)(1)

§4(b)(1)

Vice chair appointed
Vice chair by the
Vice chair by the
Vice chair by the
by leader of the
Senate leader of the
Senate leader of the
leader of the
Senate party opposite
party opposite the
party opposite the
House of the
the President in
President in
President in
party opposite
consultation with the
consultation with the
consultation with the
the President in
leader of the House
House leader of the
House leader of the
consultation
party opposite the
same party.
same party.
with the leader
President.
§5(a)
§5(a)
of the Senate
§5(a)
party opposite
the President.
§2(c)
First Meeting
As soon as
Within 45 days after
Not later than 15
Within 45 days after
Not later than 15
As soon as
practicable.
the appointment of all days after the
the appointment of all days after the
practicable, but
§5(b)(6)
commission members. appointment of all
commission
appointment of all
not later than 15
§5(c)(1)
commission members. members.
commission
days after
§4(c)
§5(c)(1)
members.
appointment of
§4(c)
all commission
members.
§2(c)(2)(E)

Meetings should
be in person,
unless in-
person meetings
would pose a
health risk or
significant
CRS-21

H.R. 834
H.R. 1306
H.R. 2212
S. 412
S. 1001
S. 3203
practical
challenges.
§2(c)(4)
Rules of Procedure
Six members
Commission shall
Commission shall
Commission shall
Commission shall
Commission
constitute a quorum.
meet upon the call of
meet at the call of the meet upon the call of
meet at the call of the shall meet at the
§5(c)
the chair or a
chair.
the chair or a
chair.
call of the chair
majority of members.
majority of members.
or a majority of

§4(e)
§4(e)
§5(c)(2)
§5(c)(2)
members.
Findings, conclusions,

§2(c)(3)
and recommendations
Five members

Five members
contained in final
Six members
constitute a quorum.
Six members
constitute a quorum.

reports must be
constitute a quorum.
§4(g)
constitute a quorum.
§4(g)
Six members
agreed to by a
§5(c)(3)
§5(c)(3)
constitute a
majority of members.

quorum.
§12(b)
Initial report
Initial report
§2(c)(3)
approved by not
approved by not
fewer than five
fewer than five
members.
members.
§5(g)(2)
§5(g)(2)
Powers
Hold hearings and
Hold hearings and
Hold hearings and
Hold hearings and
Hold hearings and
Hold hearings
gather evidence.
gather evidence.
gather evidence.
gather evidence.
gather evidence.
and gather

evidence.
Issue subpoenas.
Issue subpoenas.
Obtain information
Issue subpoenas.
Obtain information
Issue subpoenas.

from federal agencies.

from federal agencies.

Contracting authority. Contracting authority.
Contracting authority.
Contracting
authority.

Obtain administrative

Obtain administrative
support from
support from

Obtain information
Obtain information
Architect of the
Obtain information
Architect of the
from federal agencies.
from federal agencies.
Obtain
Capitol and GSA.
from federal agencies.
Capitol and GSA.
information

from federal,
Obtain administrative
Obtain administrative
Accept and use gifts
Obtain administrative
Accept and use gifts
state, local and
support from GSA
support from GSA
of services or
support from GSA
of services or
tribal
and other agencies.
and other agencies.
property.
and other agencies.
property.
governments.

CRS-22

H.R. 834
H.R. 1306
H.R. 2212
S. 412
S. 1001
S. 3203
Accept and use gifts
Accept and use gifts
Utilize postal service
Accept and use gifts
Utilize postal service
Obtain
of services or
of services or
in the same manner
of services or
in the same manner
administrative
property.
property.
as federal agencies.
property.
as federal agencies.
support from

§6

§6
GSA and other
agencies.
Utilize postal service
Utilize postal service
Utilize postal service

in the same manner
in the same manner
in the same manner

Solicit public
as federal agencies.
as federal agencies.
as federal agencies.
comments and
Accept and use
§7
§7
§7
conduct outreach.
gifts of services
or property.
§5(c)-(d)

Utilize postal
service in the
same manner as
federal agencies.
§2(e)
Subpoena Process
Subpoena may be
Subpoena may be
No provision
Subpoena may be
No provision-
Subpoena may
issued with the
issued with the
issued with the
be issued by
agreement of the
agreement of the
agreement of the
agreement of
chair and vice chair,
chair and vice chair,
chair and vice chair,
the chair and
or a vote of six
or a vote by majority
or a vote by majority
vice chair, or a
commissioners.
of commissioners.
of commissioners.
vote of six
§7(a)(2)
§7(a)(2)
§7(a)(2)
commissioners.
§2(e)(1)(B)
Reporting
Final report to be
Final report to be
Initial report not later
Final report to be
Initial report not later
Interim report
Requirements
submitted to
submitted to
than 90 days after
submitted to
than 90 days after
to Congress and
Congress and the
Congress and the
commission meeting
Congress and the
commission meeting
the President
President within 18
President within 18
to review public
President within 18
to review public
not later than
months of enactment.
months of the date of
comments.
months of the date of
comments.
one year after

appointment of all

appointment of all

enactment.
commission members.
commission
May submit interim
Final report to

members.
Final report to
reports to Congress

Congress within 90
Congress within 90
Final report
and the President.
May submit interim
days of the end of 60-

days of the end of 60-
within 20
§12
report.
day (second)
May submit interim
day (second)
months of the
comment period on
report.
comment period on
commission’s
the initial report.
the initial report.
first meeting.
CRS-23

H.R. 834
H.R. 1306
H.R. 2212
S. 412
S. 1001
S. 3203
Final report may be
§5(g)-(h)
Final report may be
§5(g)-(h)

delayed by 90 days by
delayed by 90 days by
Final report can
a majority vote.
a majority vote.
be delayed not

more than 120
Commission can vote
Commission can vote
days with a vote
to extend final report
to extend final report
of no fewer than
up to three times.
up to three times.
eight members.
Only one
§13
§13
extension is
available and the
commission
must notify
Congress and
the President.
§2
Staff
Chair, in consultation
Chair, in consultation
Chair may appoint
Chair, in consultation
Chair may appoint
Chair, in
with vice chair and in
with vice chair and in
and fix compensation
with vice chair and in
and fix compensation
consultation
accordance with rules
accordance with rules of staff, without
accordance with rules of staff, without
with vice chair
set by the
set by the
regard to certain civil
set by the
regard to certain civil
and in
commission, may
commission, may
service laws.
commission, may
service laws.
accordance with
appoint and fix
appoint and fix

appoint and fix

rules set by the
compensation of staff,
compensation of staff,
compensation of staff,
commission,
without regard to
without regard to
Staff compensation
without regard to
Staff compensation
may appoint and
certain civil service
certain civil service
may not exceed level
certain civil service
may not exceed level
fix
laws.
laws.
V of the Executive
laws.
V of the Executive
compensation of
Schedule.
Schedule.

staff, without
§7(c)
§7(c)
regard to
Personnel are federal
Staff is nonpartisan.
Staff is nonpartisan.
certain civil
employees.

service laws.

Personnel are federal
Personnel are federal

Staff compensation
employees.
employees.
Personnel are
may not exceed level

federal
V of the Executive
employees.
Schedule.
Staff compensation
Staff compensation
may not exceed level
may not exceed level

§9(a)
V of the Executive
V of the Executive
Staff
Schedule.
Schedule.
compensation
CRS-24

H.R. 834
H.R. 1306
H.R. 2212
S. 412
S. 1001
S. 3203
§10(a)
§10(a)
may not exceed
level V of the
Executive
Schedule.
§2(g)(1)
Detailees
Federal employees
Federal employees
Federal employees
Federal employees
Federal employees
Federal
may be detailed to
may be detailed to
may be detailed to
may be detailed to
may be detailed to
employees may
the commission
the commission
the commission
the commission
the commission
be detailed to
without
without
without
without
without
the commission
reimbursement to
reimbursement to
reimbursement to
reimbursement to
reimbursement to
without
their home agency.
their home agency.
their home agency.
their home agency.
their home agency.
reimbursement
§9(b)
§10(b)
§7(c)(3)
§10(b)
§7(c)(3)
to their home
agency.
§2(g)(2)
Consultants
Commission may
Commission may
No provision
Commission may
No provision
Commission
procure services of
procure services of
procure services of
may procure
experts and
experts and
experts and
services of
consultants at daily
consultants at daily
consultants at daily
experts and
rates not to exceed
rates not to exceed
rates not to exceed
consultants at
level IV of the
level IV of the
level IV of the
daily rates not
Executive Schedule.
Executive Schedule.
Executive Schedule.
to exceed level
§9(c)
§10(c)
§10(c)
IV of the
Executive
Schedule.
§2(g)(3)
Termination
60 days after final
120 days after final
90 days after final
120 days after final
90 days after final
90 days after
report submitted.
report submitted.
report submitted.
report submitted.
report submitted.
final report
§12(c)
§13(f)
§8
§13(f)
§8
submitted.
§2(k)
Funding
Authorize
Authorize $50
Authorize
Authorize $50
Authorize
Authorize
appropriation of such
mil ion, available until
appropriation of such
mil ion, available until
appropriation of such
appropriation of
sums as necessary,
termination.
sums as necessary,
termination.
sums as necessary,
such sums as
available until
§14
without fiscal year
§14
without fiscal year
necessary,
termination.
limitation.
limitation.
available until
§13
§9
§9
termination.
CRS-25

H.R. 834
H.R. 1306
H.R. 2212
S. 412
S. 1001
S. 3203
§2(l)
FACA Applicability
FACA shall not apply
FACA shall not apply
FACA shall not apply
FACA shall not apply
FACA shall not apply
FACA shall not
to the commission.
to the commission.
to the commission.
to the commission.
to the commission.
apply to the
§8(a)
§8(a)
§4(h)
§8(a)
§4(h)
commission.
§2(f)(1)
Other Features
Hold public meetings
Hold public meetings
Hold public meetings
Hold public meetings
Hold public meetings
Hold public
and hearings to the
and hearings.
and hearings.
and hearings.
and hearings.
meetings and
extent appropriate.
§8(b)-(c)
§4(f)
§8(b)
§4(f)
hearings.
§8(b)&(d)

§2(f)(2)

Preserve the records
Expedited procedures Preserve the records
Expedited procedures
Maintain and dispose
of the commission
in Congress for
of the commission
in Congress for
Federal agencies
of records the same
and provide to
legislative
and provide to
legislative
wil help with
as federal agencies.
National Archives not recommendations.
National Archives not recommendations.
security
§8(c)
later than 120 days
§5(i)
later than 120 days
§5(i)
clearances for
after final report
after final report
members and

submission.

submission.

staff.
Federal agencies wil
§9
May request GAO
§9
May request GAO
§2(i)
help with security
and OIRA assistance.
and OIRA assistance.
clearances for

§7(c)(4)
§7(c)(4)
members and staff.
Federal agencies wil
Federal agencies wil

§11
help with security
help with security
clearances for
Congressional
clearances for
Congressional
members and staff.
Accountability Act of
members and staff.
Accountability Act of
§12
1995 shall apply to
§12
1995 shall apply to
the commission and
the commission and

its employees.

its employees.
GAO monitors the
§7(g)
GAO monitors the
§7(g)
implementation of
implementation of
commission

commission

recommendations and Requirements for
recommendations and Requirements for
reports to Congress
public comments and
reports to Congress
public comments and
one year after report
consultation with
one year after report
consultation with
issued.
Congress
issued.
Congress
§13(g)
§5
§13(g)
§5

CRS-26

H.R. 834
H.R. 1306
H.R. 2212
S. 412
S. 1001
S. 3203
Hire an ethics counsel
Hire an ethics counsel
and submit to
and submit to
Congress a detailed
Congress a detailed
plan for identifying
plan for identifying
and resolving conflicts
and resolving conflicts
of interest.
of interest.
§4(b)(3)
§4(b)(3)
Source: CRS analysis of H.R. 834, H.R. 1306, H.R. 2212, S. 412, S. 1001, S. 3203.

CRS-27

Proposals for a COVID-19 Congressional Advisory Commission in the 117th Congress

Author Information

Jacob R. Straus

Specialist on the Congress

Acknowledgments
Tyler Wolanian, research assistant, provided support for the collection and verification of the data. Mari
Lee, visual information specialist, designed the report’s figures.

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to
copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

Congressional Research Service
R46994 · VERSION 1 · NEW
28