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Updated December 13, 2021
The Marine Corps’ Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV)
Background
According to the Marine Corps:
Figure 2. Amphibious Combat Vehicle Ashore
The Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) is the
Corps’ next-generation vehicle designed to move
Marines from ship to shore (Figure 1). Designed to
replace the Corps’ aging Amphibious Assault
Vehicle (AAV – in service since 1972), the ACV
will be the primary means of tactical mobility for
the Marine infantry battalion at sea and ashore
(Figure 2). The ACV will possess ground mobility
and speed similar to the M1A1 tank during
Source: https://www.baesystems.com/en-us/multimedia/amphibious-
sustained operations ashore and have the capability
combat-vehicle-1-1—acv-1-1-, accessed February 3, 2021.
to provide organic, direct fire support to dismounted
infantry in the attack. The ACV will support
Current Program Status
expeditionary mobility capability and capacity with
In June 2018, the ACV entered Low-Rate Initial Production
balanced levels of performance, protection and
(LRIP) with BAE Systems selected for the first 30 vehicles
payload.
to be delivered in fall 2019. In November 2020, the ACV
achieved Initial Operational Capability (IOC). In December
There are currently four ACV variants planned: (1) a
2020, a Full-Rate Production (FRP) decision was reportedly
Personnel Variant, which can carry three crew members
made by the Marine Corps after having been delayed from
with 13 Marines and two days of combat equipment and
September 2020 due to issues related to Coronavirus
supplies; (2) a Command and Control Variant; (3) a
Disease 2019. The current planned acquisition objective of
Recovery Variant; and (4) a 30-mm Gun Variant. The
632 ACVs would replace AAVs in Assault Amphibian
Marines intend for the ACV to provide effective land and
battalions. The previous acquisition objective of 1,122
tactical water mobility (ship-to-shore and shore-to-shore),
ACVs was reduced in accordance with Marine Corps Force
precise supporting fires, and high levels of force protection
Design 2030 modernization efforts (see CRS Insight
intended to protect against blasts, fragmentation, and
IN11281, New U.S. Marine Corps Force Design Initiatives,
kinetic energy threats.
by Andrew Feickert). Reportedly, ACV production is to
take place at BAE Systems facilities in Virginia, California,
Figure 1. Amphibious Combat Vehicle in
Michigan, South Carolina, and Pennsylvania.
Ship-to-Shore Mode
Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) is a programmatic
decision made when manufacturing development is completed
and there is an ability to produce a small-quantity set of
articles. It also establishes an initial production base and sets
the stage for a gradual increase in the production rate to
allow for Ful -Rate Production (FRP) upon completion of
Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E).
Full-Rate Production (FRP) is a decision made that allows
for government contracting for economic production
quantities fol owing stabilization of the system design and
validation of the production process.
Source: https://www.baesystems.com/en-us/multimedia/amphibious-
combat-vehicle-11-acv-11, accessed February 3, 2021.
Initial Operational Testing Observations
During Marine Corps initial operational test and evaluation
(IOT&E) conducted from June to September 2020, the
Department of Defense Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation (DOT&E) noted the following:
The ACV demonstrated water mobility and the ability to
self-deploy from the beach, cross the surf zone, enter the
ocean, and embark aboard amphibious shipping. The
https://crsreports.congress.gov
The Marine Corps’ Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV)
infantry rifle company equipped with the ACV was able
accompany Senate Appropriations Committee-released Department
to deploy from amphibious shipping, maneuver on the
of Defense Appropriations Act, 2022, p. 172 (RDT&E) and p. 116
beach, and conduct subsequent offensive and defensive
(Procurement).
operations ashore.
Foreign Military Sales
While the ACV demonstrated good operational
There are no reported Foreign Military Sales actions
availability and maintainability during IOT&E, it did
associated with the ACV.
not meet its 69-hour mean time between operational
mission failures (MTBOMF) threshold. The
Potential Issue for Congress
government-furnished Remote Weapons System
(RWS)—an internally controlled, exterior-mounted MK
Ability to Egress a Floundering ACV at Sea
19 automatic grenade launcher or M2 .50 caliber heavy
As previously noted in DOT&E’s 2020 Annual Report,
machine gun was the source of the largest number of
“interior space within the ACV is limited, making rapid
operational mission failures (OMFs). The government-
ingress and egress difficult.” This, combined with problems
furnished RWS reliability issue was reported by the
accommodating full-equipped infantry Marines also noted
Government Accountability Office (GAO) in 2019.
in the report, suggests a suboptimal situation that could
The ACV accommodated three crew and 13 embarked
raise potential safety concerns. A 2014 academic study on
infantry. Due to the placement and number of blast
AAV safety noted the following:
mitigating seats, interior space within the ACV is
A 2014 Naval Postgraduate School study of Marine
limited, making rapid ingress and egress difficult.
Corps assault amphibian vehicle emergency egress
Infantry Marines noted that the troop seats were not
scenarios found the more Marines put into the back
contoured to fit body armor configurations, leading to
of the AAV, the longer it will take for them to
discomfort during long range ship-to-objective missions.
egress from the vehicle due to the lack of
maneuverability afforded by their body armor and
Reportedly, the Marines initiated corrective actions after the
other essential gear.
DOT&E report was published. In September 2021, the
Marines suspended amphibious use of the ACV due to
This concern is heightened by the August 2020 incident off
towing mechanism problems. In November 2021, the
San Clemente Island, CA, when an AAV floundered at sea
Marines began testing modifications to the towing
during training, killing nine sailors and Marines, reportedly
mechanism in order to resume amphibious operations once
the AAV’s deadliest training incident in its history.
the problem is repaired.
Because of the noted safety implications, Congress might
Budgetary Information
wish to examine this particular aspect of the ACV’s design.
Potential areas for examination could include the following:
Table 1. FY2022 Navy Budget Request—ACV
How much more or less survivable is the ACV in its
Total
present configuration than an AAV when it flounders at
Total Request
Request
sea?
Funding Category
($M)
(Qty)
RDT&E
80.7
—
How was “egress at sea” tested by BAE and the Marines
during the ACV’s design and development? Is such
Procurement
532.4
92
testing done by simulation, or are live tests conducted
Source: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
under controlled conditions with actual test subjects?
(Comptrol er)/Chief Financial Officer, Program Acquisition Cost by
Weapon System: United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year
What, if any, ACV design solutions are under
2022 Budget Request, May 2021, p. 3-10.
consideration to improve emergency egress at sea?
Notes: RDT&E = Research, Development, Test & Evaluation: $M =
U.S. Dollars in Mil ions; Qty = FY2022 Procurement Quantities.
What additional personal protective equipment (PPE)
solutions might be available to Marines to enhance their
Table 2. FY2022 ACV Defense Authorizations
survivability in the event of floundering at sea?
and Appropriations
What, if any, nonmaterial solutions, such as revised
loading or operational procedures or limitations on
Authorized
Appropriated
numbers of embarked Marines, are under consideration?
Funding Category
($M)
($M)
RDT&E
$80.7 (S. 1605)
$61.9 (H.R. 4432)
For a more detailed historical discussion of the ACV Program,
$80.7 (S. 3023)
see CRS Report R42723, Marine Corps Amphibious Combat
Vehicle (ACV): Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew
Procurement
$532.4 (S. 1605) $505.5 (H.R. 4432)
Feickert.
$520.6 (S. 3023)
Sources: Rules Committee Print 117-21, Text of House
Amendment to S. 1605, p. 1832 (RDT&E) and p. 1817
Andrew Feickert, Specialist in Military Ground Forces
(Procurement); H.Rept. 117-88 to accompany H.R. 4432, p. 260
(RDT&E) and p. 200 (Procurement); Explanatory Statement to
IF11755
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The Marine Corps’ Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV)
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