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INSIGHTi
Russian Troop Movements and Tensions
Along the Ukrainian Border
Updated December 6, 2021
Starting in mid-October 2021, social media and news outlets have reported significant movement by
Russian military forces, with limited Russian transparency, on or near the Ukrainian border. These
movements, which follow a similar military buildup in March-April 2021 and Russia’s Zapad military
exercises in September 2021, come amid increasingly aggressive rhetoric reported from Russian
policymakers about the so-called encroachment of NATO near Russia’s borders and the geopolitical
status of Ukraine. Many observers, including some in Congress, have expressed concerns that such
buildups and exercises could be the prelude to a second Russian invasion of Ukraine or other aggressive
actions.
Russian Troop Deployments
Many analysts and officials characterize Russia’s recent troop movements as significant and as falling
outside normal troop rotations or military exercises, due to the deployment of units over long distances
and far away from their usual training grounds. Of particular concern is the movement and pre-
positioning of equipment closer to the Ukrainian border, which is difficult and time-consuming to
transport. Pre-positioned equipment allows Russian units to quickly mobilize and conduct operations.
Several reports center on Russia’s shift of
Figure 1. Russian Borders with Ukraine and
equipment and units from the 41st Combined
Belarus
Arms Army (CAA) from the Central Military
District, headquartered in Novosibirsk, Siberia.
Units from the 41st CAA reportedly had been
stationed at the Pogonovo training grounds
outside Voronezh since March; they did not return
to permanent basing after the conclusion of the
Zapad 2021 exercises in September (see Figure
1). In mid-October, social and news media reports
indicated these units, which include heavy
artillery and a battalion of Iskander-M short-range
ballistic missiles, were moving toward Yelnya, on
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Belarus’s eastern border. Yelnya is home to the 144th Motor Rifle Division and has permanent basing
facilities seen as more appropriate for the long-term garrisoning of units and equipment. Other units from
the 41st CAA also have been documented on social media possibly moving toward the Ukrainian border,
leading some observers to speculate that most, if not all, of the 41st CAA is being relocated.
Analysts and media outlets have reported the movement of elements from the 4th Tank Division and 2nd
Motorized Rifle Division of the 1st Guards Tank Army (based outside Moscow) to Voronezh, closer to the
Ukrainian border. Troops from Russia’s Southern Military District also have conducted military exercises
in Ukraine’s occupied Crimea region. On December 3, the Washington Post reported that U.S.
intelligence has estimated the presence of some 75,000 Russian troops near Ukraine and in occupied
Crimea and reported on Russian plans that would involve the “extensive movement of 100 battalion
tactical groups with an estimated 175,000 personnel, along with armor, artillery, and equipment.” The
Biden Administration has shared intelligence with EU and NATO allies of the serious nature of the
Russian military buildup.
Russian Force Posture
Assessing the extent and possible intent of a Russian military buildup depends on what most analysts
consider Russia’s status quo military presence on the border of Ukraine and in occupied Crimea. A
comparison between this stance and the movement or presence of new units and personnel reveals that
Moscow had established significant capabilities in the region as part of its revamped force structure even
before the recent movements.
Since 2014, Russia has created new units in the Western and Southern Military Districts on the border
with Ukraine. Russia also has created two new armies, the 20th CAA in the Western Military District and
the 8th CAA in the Southern Military District, to oversee, coordinate, and manage command and control
of units transported to the border during a crisis or conflict.
In the Western Military District, covering the northern border with Ukraine and Belarus’s eastern border,
the 20th CAA (headquartered in Voronezh) is assessed to consist of two maneuver units: the 144th and 3rd
Motor Rifle Divisions. In the Southern Military District, Russia established the 8th CAA (headquartered in
Rostov-on-Don and Novocherkassk), which is assessed to consist of the 150th Motor Rifle Division and
the 20th Motor Rifle Brigade. The 8th CAA also reportedly commands separatist units in Donetsk and
Luhansk inside Ukraine. Both CAAs have support, artillery, air defense, and electronic warfare units.
Russia’s military capabilities in occupied Crimea center on (1) the Black Sea Fleet and (2) ground, air,
and coastal defense units focused on defending the peninsula and denying freedom of movement to
Ukrainian and foreign actors.
Observers consider Russia’s military forces in Crimea to be primarily defensively oriented. Russian
ground forces are concentrated under the 22nd Army Corps. Other units include the 810th marine infantry
brigade and a new airborne regiment. Although capable of defending Crimea, these units likely could not
undertake sustained offensive operations without reinforcement.
Possible Russian Intentions
Analysts have speculated about numerous possible motivations for the increased presence and movement
of Russian units on or near the Ukrainian border. Some possible motivations include
Moscow may be preparing for a possible future conflict with Ukraine. The positioning of
units and equipment closer to the Ukrainian border would enable a shorter mobilization
time for Russia, should it choose to conduct offensive operations or respond to a
Ukrainian effort to retake the Donbas militarily.
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Moscow may be using troop movements to coerce Ukraine into negotiating a diplomatic
solution to the Donbas region on terms more favorable to Russia.
Troop movements may be in response to what Russia views as increased U.S. and NATO
presence in the Black Sea and military and political support to Ukraine.
The presence of units from other regions may be intended to fully staff the units and
CAAs established since 2014 on the Ukrainian border.
The movement of the 41st CAA to Yelnya may reflect the Russian military’s concerns
regarding a potential future conflict requiring Russian intervention in Belarus. The
positioning of the 41st CAA could be intended to improve the Russian military’s ability to
rapidly conduct operations in Belarus or on Russia’s northwest border.
An additional motivation for conducting recent troop movements without transparency may be to increase
ambiguity regarding Russian intentions. These motivations are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
Author Information
Andrew S. Bowen
Analyst in Russian and European Affairs
Disclaimer
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