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INSIGHTi

Russian Troop Movements and Tensions
Along the Ukrainian Border
November 19, 2021
Starting in mid-October 2021 and continuing through the beginning of November, social media and news
outlets have reported significant movement by Russian military forces, with limited Russian transparency,
on or near the Ukrainian border. These movements, which follow a similar military buildup in March-
April 2021 and Russia’s Zapad military exercises in September 2021, come amid increasingly aggressive
rhetoric reported from Russian policymakers about the so-called encroachment of NATO near Russia’s
borders and the geopolitical status of Ukraine. Many observers, including some in Congress, have
expressed concerns that such buildups and exercises could be the prelude to a second Russian invasion of
Ukraine or other significant events.
Russian Troop Deployments
Many analysts characterize Russia’s recent troop movements as significant and as falling outside normal
troop rotations or military exercises, due to the deployment of units over long distances and far away from
their usual training grounds. At the same time, some observers raise doubts that these recent movements
necessarily indicate Russia is preparing for an imminent incursion into Ukraine.
Recent reports center on Russia’s shift of
Figure 1. Russian Borders with Ukraine and
equipment and units from the 41st Combined
Belarus
Arms Army (CAA) from the Central Military
District, headquartered in Novosibirsk, Siberia.
Units from the 41st CAA reportedly had been
stationed at the Pogonovo training grounds
outside Voronezh since March; they did not return
to permanent basing after the conclusion of the
Zapad 2021 exercises in September (see Figure
1). In mid-October, social and news media reports
indicated these units, which include heavy
artillery and a battalion of Iskander-M short-range
ballistic missiles, were moving toward Yelnya, in
the Smolensk region on Belarus’s eastern border.

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Yelnya is home to the 144th Motor Rifle Division and has permanent basing facilities seen as more
appropriate for the long term garrisoning of units and equipment.
Analysts and media outlets also have reported the movement of two battalion-sized units (400-600
personnel) from the 4th Tank Division and 2nd Motorized Rifle Division of the 1st Guards Tank Army
(based outside Moscow) to Voronezh, closer to the Ukrainian border. Troops from Russia’s Southern
Military District also have conducted military exercises in Ukraine’s occupied Crimea region.
Russian Force Posture
Assessing the extent and possible intent of a Russian military buildup depends on what most analysts
consider Russia’s status quo military presence on the border of Ukraine and in occupied Crimea. A
comparison between this stance and the movement or presence of new units and personnel reveals that
Moscow had established significant capabilities in the region as part of its revamped force structure even
before the recent movements.
Since 2014, Russia has created new units in the Western and Southern Military Districts on the border
with Ukraine. Russia also has created two new armies, the 20th CAA in the Western Military District and
the 8th CAA in the Southern Military District, to oversee, coordinate, and manage command and control
of units transported to the border during a crisis or conflict.
In the Western Military District, covering the northern border with Ukraine and Belarus’s eastern border,
the 20th CAA (headquartered in Voronezh) is assessed to consist of two maneuver units: the 144th and 3rd
Motor Rifle Divisions. In the Southern Military District, Russia established the 8th CAA (headquartered in
Rostov-on-Don and Novocherkassk), which is assessed to consist of the 150th Motor Rifle Division and
the 20th Motor Rifle Brigade. The 8th CAA also reportedly commands separatist units in Donetsk and
Luhansk inside Ukraine. Both CAAs have support, artillery, air defense, and electronic warfare units.
Russia’s military capabilities in occupied Crimea center on (1) the Black Sea Fleet and (2) ground, air,
and coastal defense units focused on defending the peninsula and denying freedom of movement to
Ukrainian and foreign actors.
Observers consider Russia’s military forces in Crimea to be primarily defensively oriented. Russian
ground forces are concentrated under the 22nd Army Corps. Other units include the 810th marine infantry
brigade and a new airborne regiment. Although capable of defending Crimea, these units likely could not
undertake sustained offensive operations without reinforcement.
Possible Russian Intentions
Analysts have speculated about numerous possible motivations for the increased presence and movement
of Russian units on or near the Ukrainian border. Some possible motivations include
 The presence of units from other regions may be intended to fully staff the units and
CAAs established since 2014 on the Ukrainian border.
 The movement of the 41st CAA to Yelnya may reflect the Russian military’s concerns
regarding a potential future conflict requiring Russian intervention in Belarus. The
positioning of the 41st CAA could be intended to improve the Russian military’s ability to
rapidly conduct operations in Belarus or on Russia’s northwest border.
 Moscow may be preparing for a possible future conflict with Ukraine The positioning of
units and equipment closer to the Ukrainian border would enable a shorter mobilization
time for Russia, should it choose to conduct offensive operations or respond to a
Ukrainian effort to retake the Donbas militarily.

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 Moscow may be using troop movements to coerce Ukraine into negotiating a diplomatic
solution to the Donbas region on terms more favorable to Russia.
 Troop movements may be in response to what Russia views as increased U.S. and NATO
presence in the Black Sea and military and political support to Ukraine.
An additional motivation for conducting recent troop movements without transparency may be to increase
ambiguity regarding Russian intentions. These motivations are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
Initial U.S. Responses
In November 2021, Central Intelligence Agency Director Bill Burns traveled to Moscow for a series of
meetings with Russian officials, during which he reportedly conveyed U.S. concerns regarding Russian
troop movements. On November 10, Secretary of State Antony Blinken hosted Ukrainian Minister of
Foreign Affairs Dmytro Kuleba upon signing a new U.S.-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership.
During a joint press conference, Secretary Blinken stated, “We’re concerned by reports of unusual
Russian military activity near Ukraine” and noted, “any escalatory or aggressive actions would be of great
concern to the United States.”

Author Information

Andrew S. Bowen

Analyst in Russian and European Affairs




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