The Palestinians:
October 26, 2021
Background and U.S. Relations
Jim Zanotti
The Palestinians are an Arab people whose origins are in present-day Israel, the West
Specialist in Middle
Bank, and the Gaza Strip. Congress pays close attention—through legislation and
Eastern Affairs
oversight—to the ongoing conflict between the Palestinians and Israel.

The current structure of Palestinian governing entities dates to 1994. In that year, Israel

agreed with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to permit a Palestinian Authority (PA) to exercise limited
rule over Gaza and specified areas of the West Bank, subject to overarching Israeli military administration that
dates back to the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.
After the PA’s establishment, U.S. policy toward the Palestinians focused on encouraging a peaceful resolution to
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, countering Palestinian terrorist groups, and aiding Palestinian goals on governance
and economic development. Since then, Congress has appropriated more than $5 bil ion in bilateral aid to the
Palestinians, who rely heavily on external donor assistance.
Conducting relations with the Palestinians has presented chal enges for several Administrations and Congresses.
The United States has historical y sought to bolster PLO Chairman and PA President Mahmoud Abbas vis -à-vis
Hamas (a U.S.-designated terrorist organization supported in part by Iran). Since 2007, Hamas has had de facto
control within Gaza, making the security, political, and humanitarian situation there particularly fraught. The
Abbas-led PA stil exercises limited self-rule over specified areas of the West Bank. Given Abbas’s advanced age
(he was born in 1935), observers speculate about who wil succeed him and implications for the current situation
of divided rule in the West Bank and Gaza. In April 2021, Abbas controversial y postponed PA legislative and
presidential elections that had been scheduled for May and July, respectively. Domestic and international criticism
of corruption and authoritarian practices within the PA have since intensified amid PA authorities ’ repression of
dissenting voices and public protests.
Lack of progress toward peace with Israel has led the PLO to advocate the Palestinian cause more assertively in
international fora. A 2012 U.N. General Assembly resolution changed the non-member observer status of
“Palestine” at the United Nations from an entity to a “state.” Palestinians also have applied international legal
pressure on Israel. The Palestinians acceded to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in
April 2015, and the ICC opened an investigation in March 2021 that could conceivably bring charges against
Israeli, Palestinian, or other individuals for al eged war crimes committed in the West Bank and Gaza.
Under the Trump Administration, U.S. policy shifted in a direction that more explicitly favored Israel over the
Palestinians. Actions of note included suspending U.S. aid for the Palestinians, recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s
capital and opening an embassy there, and affording more favorable treatment to Israeli settlements in the West
Bank. In late 2020, the Administration brokered agreements to help Israel move toward more formal relations
with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco. PLO/PA leaders voiced opposition to the
agreements insofar as they signaled a change to Arab states’ previous stance that Israel should address Palestinian
negotiating demands as a precondition to improved ties.
Biden Administration officials have taken steps to improve U.S.-Palestinian ties, including through the resumption
of aid and a renewed emphasis on support for an eventual two-state solution. The Administration and Congress
face a number of key issues, including (1) the future of aid; (2) the feasibility of reopening certain diplomatic
offices in Jerusalem and Washington, DC; (3) reconstruction in Gaza following a May 2021 Israel-Hamas
conflict; (4) controversies over Israeli settlements in the West Bank; and (5) how to respond to Palestinian actions
in international fora (including the ICC). The trajectory of some of these issues may depend on a significant
PLO/PA change to welfare payments to or on behalf of individuals al egedly involved in acts of terrorism.
Congressional Research Service

link to page 5 link to page 40 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

Introduction
Since the United States established ties with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) during
the 1990s, Congress has played a significant role in shaping U.S. policymaking toward the
Palestinians. As successive Administrations have sought to facilitate a negotiated solution to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, counter Palestinian terrorist groups, and increase or decrease
assistance to Palestinians, congressional action has often influenced executive branch decisions.
After the signing of the Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles in 1993, Congress has appropriated
more than $5 bil ion in bilateral aid to the Palestinians, while placing a number of restrictions and
other conditions on certain types of aid. For background information, see CRS Report RS22967,
U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians, by Jim Zanotti.
Palestinian Overview and National Aspirations
The Palestinians are Arabs who live in the geographical area comprising present-day Israel, the
West Bank, and the Gaza Strip, or who have historical and cultural ties to that area. An estimated
5.2 mil ion Palestinians (98% Sunni Muslim, 1% Christian) live in the West Bank, Gaza Strip,
and East Jerusalem (see Table 1).1 Of these, about 2.2 mil ion are registered as refugees in their
own right or as descendants of the original refugees from the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. In addition,
approximately 635,000 Jewish Israeli citizens live in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.2 Of the
more than 6 mil ion diaspora Palestinians living outside of Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza, most
are in Arab states—with more than 3 mil ion registered as refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, and
Syria.3 For more information on Palestinian refugees, see Appendix A.
Table 1. Basic Facts for the West Bank and Gaza Strip
Statistic
West Bank
Gaza Strip
Combined
Population
3.1 mil ion
2.1 mil ion
5.2 mil ion
Refugees
828,000
1,386,000
2,214,000
Median age
21.9 (2019 est.)
18.0 (2020 est.)
-
Literacy rate (2018 est.)
-
-
97.2%
Population growth rate
1.7%
2.0%
-
Real GDP growth rate
-
-
-11.5% (2020 est.)

2.9% (2021 proj.)
GDP per capita at PPP
-
-
$5,316 (2020 est.)

$5,742 (2021 proj.)
Unemployment rate
15.0% (2020 est.)
43.0% (2020 est.)
25.9% (2020 est.)

24.9% (2021 proj.)
Export partners
-
-
Israel 84.2%,
(2017 est.)
Arab states 16.6%

1 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) projections for 2021. PCBS estimated as of 2017 that an additional
1.47 million Palestinians were Arab citizens of Israel.
2 Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook, West Bank. Figures for West Bank as of 2018, and East Jerusalem as of
2017.
3 See the portal of the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) at
https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work.
Congressional Research Service

1

link to page 46 link to page 40 link to page 49 link to page 40 link to page 40 link to page 49 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

Statistic
West Bank
Gaza Strip
Combined
Import partners
Israel 58.1%,
(2017 est.)
-
-
European Union
12.4%, Arab States
6.2%
Sources: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Central Intel igence Agency World Factbook, World Bank,
Economist Intel igence Unit, International Monetary Fund World Outlook Database, U.N. Relief and Works
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).
Notes: Figures are 2021 estimates or projections unless otherwise noted. Population figures exclude Israeli
settlers.
Since the early 20th century, the dominant Palestinian national goal has been to establish an
independent state in historic Palestine (the area covered by the British Mandate until the British
withdrawal in 1948). Over time, Palestinians have debated among themselves, with Israelis, and
with others over the nature and extent of such a state and how to achieve it. For more historical
background, see Appendix B and CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations,
by Jim Zanotti.
Today, Fatah and Hamas (a U.S.-designated terrorist organization) are the largest Palestinian
political movements (see Appendix A for profiles of both groups).4 The positions that their
leaders express reflect two basic cleavages in Palestinian society:
1. Between those (including many members of Fatah, including its leader Mahmoud
Abbas) who seek to establish a state in the West Bank and Gaza by nonviolent
means—negotiations, international diplomacy, civil disobedience—and those
(including Hamas) who insist on maintaining violence against Israel as an
option;5 and
2. Between those (Fatah) who favor a secular model of governance and those
(Hamas) who cal for a society governed more by Islamic norms.
The differences between these two factions are reflected in Palestinian governance (see
Appendix C). Since Hamas forcibly seized control of Gaza in 2007, it has exercised de facto rule
there, while Fatah’s leader Mahmoud Abbas—elected as president of the Palestinian Authority
(PA) in 2005—has headed the PA government based in the West Bank.
Having different Palestinian leaders in the two territories has complicated the question of who
speaks for the Palestinians both domestical y and international y. In the West Bank, the PA
exercises limited self-rule in specified urban areas (Areas A and B, as identified in a 1995 Israel-
PLO agreement) where Israel maintains overarching control.6 Both territories face socioeconomic
chal enges based on Israeli military measures such as property confiscation and demolition,

4 Hamas has been designated a Foreign T errorist Organization (FT O), a Specially Designated T errorist (SDT ), and a
Specially Designated Global T errorist (SDGT ) by the U.S. government.
5 See Appendix A for a discussion of different schools of thought within Fatah about maintaining violence against
Israel as an option.
6 T he PLO is the internationally recognized representative of the Palestinian people. Various Israel-PLO agreements
during the Oslo process in the 1990s created the PA as the organ of governance for limited Palestinian self -rule in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip. Officially, the PLO represents the Palestinian national movement in international bodies,
including the United Nations, often identified as “ Palestine” or “ State of Palestine.” Because Mahmoud Abbas is both
PLO chairman and PA president, U.S. officials and other international actors sometimes conflate his roles. For more
information on the two entities, see Appe ndix A, Appe ndix C , and the European Council on Foreign Relations’ online
resource Mapping Palestinian Politics at https://www.ecfr.eu/mapping_palestinian_politics/detail/institutions.
Congressional Research Service

2

link to page 20 link to page 22 link to page 49 link to page 52 link to page 8 link to page 9 link to page 9 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

Israeli movement and access restrictions, political uncertainty, longtime Palestinian dependence
on foreign aid, and domestic governance problems—with Gaza’s economic chal enges and
overal isolation more acute (see “Gaza’s Chal enges: Hamas and Post-Conflict Reconstruction,”
“PA West Bank Leadership Concerns,” Appendix C, and Appendix D). See Figure 1 and Figure
2 for maps of both territories.
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in the West Bank and Gaza
With its global reach, COVID-19 has significantly affected the West Bank and Gaza. As of October 7, the World
Health Organization identifies 441,882 confirmed cases and 4,465 deaths since March 2020, with Gaza accounting
for about 75% of active cases. Over 1,439,000 people have been vaccinated, representing around 48% of the target
population (age 16 and older), with approximately four-fifths of those people ful y vaccinated.7
During early 2021, disparities between Israeli residents with speedy access to vaccines and West Bank/Gaza
residents with little or no access led PA officials and some observers—including the World Bank—to cal for
greater efforts by Israel to share vaccines with Palestinians, and to assist the PA in procuring additional vaccines
more expeditiously.8 Additional y, some observers criticized PA officials for al egedly directing vaccines to “the
senior ranks of the governing party, al ies in the media and even to family members of top dignitaries.”9 Israel
agreed in June to advance up to 1.4 mil ion doses to the PA, but the PA canceled the deal amid popular concern
about the initial shipment approaching its expiration date.10 By the end of the summer, the PA had received
sufficient vaccine doses to inoculate most eligible West Bank/Gaza residents, but some vaccine hesitancy has been
reported.11

7 T he source for the data in this paragraph is World Health Organization (occupied Palestinian territory), “Coronavirus
disease 2019 (COVID-19) Situation Report 82,” October 7, 2021.
8 World Bank, Economic Monitoring Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, February 23, 2021, pp. 26-27. For
differing views on Israel’s responsibility for assisting Palestinians with vaccines, see Eyal Benvenisti, “ Israel is Legally
Obligated to Ensure the Population in the West Bank and Gaza Strip Are Vaccinated,” Just Security, January 7, 2021;
Alan Baker, “ Israel, the Palestinians, and the COVID-19 Vaccines: T he New Blood-Libel,” Jerusalem Center for
Public Affairs, January 14, 2021.
9 Adam Rasgon, “ Palestinians Finally Have Vaccines. Many Don't Want to T ake Them ,” New York Times, August 30,
2021.
10 Maayan Lubell, “ Israel says COVID-19 vaccines rejected by Palestinians were safe,” Reuters, June 19, 2021.
11 Rasgon, “Palestinians Finally Have Vaccines.”
Congressional Research Service

3

The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

Figure 1. Map of West Bank

Source: U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs occupied Palestinian territory, 2018,
adapted by CRS.
Note: Al boundaries and depictions are approximate.
Congressional Research Service

4

The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

Figure 2. Map of Gaza Strip

Source: U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs occupied Palestinian territory, 2020.
Note: Al boundaries and depictions are approximate.
International diplomacy aimed at resolving Israeli-Palestinian disputes and advancing Palestinian
national goals has stal ed, with no direct Israel-PLO negotiations since 2014. Palestinians
routinely assert that U.S. policy reflects a pro-Israel bias and a lack of sensitivity to PLO
Chairman and PA President Mahmoud Abbas’s domestic political rivalry with Hamas.12 In light
of the Israeli-Palestinian stalemate, Arab leaders with a range of domestic and other regional
concerns have focused less on championing the Palestinian cause. Many have built or
strengthened informal ties with Israel based on common concerns regarding Iran and other
perceived regional threats. In 2020, four countries—the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain,
Sudan, and Morocco—agreed to take steps toward formal diplomatic relations with Israel. Their
agreements with Israel are known as the Abraham Accords.13
Citing the lack of progress in negotiations with Israel, Abbas and other PLO/PA leaders have
sought support for Palestinian national aspirations and grievances in the United Nations and other
international fora. Some Palestinians advocate the idea of a binational or one-state idea as an

12 “FULL T EXT : Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas’ 2018 UN General Assembly Speech,” haaretz.com,
September 27, 2018.
13 For more information, see CRS Report R44245, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief, by Jim Zanotti.
Congressional Research Service

5

link to page 10

The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

alternative to a negotiated two-state solution with Israel (see Figure 3). In a September 2021
speech before the U.N. General Assembly, Abbas said:
I warn that undermining the two-State solution based on international law and UN
resolutions will open the way for other alternatives imposed on us by the situation on the
ground as a result of the continuation of the Israeli occupation of our State….
If the Israeli occupation authorities continue to entrench the reality of one apartheid state
as is happening today, our Palestinian people and the entire world will not tolerate such a
situation and circumstances on the ground will inevitably impose equal and full political
rights for all on the land of historical Palestine, within one State.14
Figure 3. Public Opinion Polling: Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
(Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip)

Source: CRS graphic, based on underlying pol ing data from Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research.
The “Palestinian question” is important not only to Palestinians, Israelis, and their Arab state
neighbors, but also to the United States and many other countries and actors around the world for
a variety of religious, cultural, and political reasons. For at least 75 years, the issue has been one
of the most provocative in the international arena.
Key U.S. Policy Considerations and Issues
Major U.S. policy priorities with the Palestinians over successive Administrations have included
facilitating or seeking a viable Israeli-Palestinian peace process, helping the West Bank-based PA
counter Hamas and other terrorist groups, and using aid to encourage Palestinian governance
reform and economic development.
During President Trump’s time in office, his Administration took a number of actions that favored
Israeli positions vis-à-vis the Palestinians, and also suspended aid to the Palestinians, as set forth
below.
Selected Trump Administration Policy Changes on Israeli-Palestinian Issues
December 2017
President Trump recognizes Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, prompting the PLO/PA
to cut off high-level diplomatic relations with the United States.
May 2018
The U.S. embassy opens in Jerusalem.

14 T ranscript of Abbas’s speech (September 24, 2021) available at
https://estatements.unmeetings.org/estatements/10.0010/20210924/7gIp44D6mxWV/8xz66G7sjKRg_en.pdf .
Congressional Research Service

6

The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

August 2018
The Administration ends U.S. contributions to the U.N. Relief and Works
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).
September 2018
The Administration reprograms FY2017 economic aid for the West Bank and
Gaza to other locations, and announces the closure of the PLO office in
Washington, DC.
January 2019
As a result of the Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-253), the
Administration ends al bilateral U.S. aid to the Palestinians.
March 2019
The U.S. consulate general in Jerusalem—previously an independent diplomatic
mission to the Palestinians—is subsumed under the authority of the U.S.
embassy to Israel. President Trump recognizes Israeli sovereignty claims in the
Golan Heights.
November 2019
Then-Secretary of State Michael Pompeo says that the Administration disagrees
with a 1978 State Department legal opinion stating that Israeli settlements in
the West Bank are inconsistent with international law.
November 2020
Secretary Pompeo announces that products imported to the United States from
Area C of the West Bank (where Israeli settlements and some Palestinian
residential areas are located) are to be marked as coming from Israel rather
than the West Bank.

The Abraham Accords signal some change to Arab states’ previous insistence—as expressed in
the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative15—that Israel address Palestinian negotiating demands as a
precondition for improved ties.16 Although Israel reportedly agreed to suspend plans to annex part
of the West Bank as part of the UAE deal,17 PLO/PA officials denounced the deal as an
abandonment of the Palestinian national cause, claiming that the UAE had acquiesced to a West
Bank status quo that some observers label “de facto annexation.”18
Biden Administration Policies
The Biden Administration has made efforts to improve ties with the Palestinians, including by
revisiting some Trump-era actions. U.S. officials have resumed some types of aid to the
Palestinians, along with diplomatic engagement with Palestinian leaders. In a March 10, 2021,
hearing before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated
that the United States has an obligation to seek to advance the prospects for a two-state solution,
saying that it “is ultimately the only way that Israel wil truly be secure as a Jewish and
democratic state and the Palestinians wil have the state to which they are entitled.”19

15 T he Arab Peace Initiative offers a comprehensive Arab peace with Israel if Israel were to withdraw fully from the
territories it occupied in 1967, agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state with a capital in East Jerusalem, and
provide for the “ [a]chievement of a just solution to the Palestinian Refugee problem in accordance with UN General
Assembly Resolution 194.” T he initiative was proposed by Saudi Arabia and adopted by the 22-member League of
Arab States in 2002, and later accepted by the then-56-member Organization of the Islamic Conference (now the 57 -
member Organization of Islamic Cooperation) at its 2005 Mecca summit. T he text of the initiative is available at
http://www.bitterlemons.org/docs/summit.html.
16 Annelle Sheline, “ T rump’s Win Is a Loss for the Middle East,” Politico Magazine, August 14, 2020.
17 Jacob Magid, “ US assured UAE it won’t back Israel annexation before 2024 at earliest, T oI told,” Times of Israel,
September 13, 2020. For information on the annexation issue, see CRS Report R46433, Israel’s Possible Annexation of
West Bank Areas: Frequently Asked Questions, by Jim Zanotti.
18 Walid Mahmoud and Muhammad Shehada, “ Palestinians unanimously reject UAE-Israel deal,” Al Jazeera, August
14, 2020.
19 T ext of hearing transcript available at
Congressional Research Service

7

link to page 20 link to page 20 link to page 20 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

Regarding the U.S. position on Jerusalem, a spokesperson for President Biden confirmed in
February 2021 that “our embassy wil remain in Jerusalem, which we recognize as Israel’s
capital. The ultimate status of Jerusalem is a final status issue which wil need to be resolved by
the parties in the context of direct negotiations.”20
May 2021 Israel-Gaza Conflict
From May 10 through May 21, 2021, a conflict took place between Israel and Gaza-based militants led by Hamas.21
The fol owing were key aspects of the conflict:

Overview. Palestinian militants fired rockets with unprecedented intensity from Gaza into central Israel. The
Iron Dome anti-rocket system played a prominent role in defending Israeli population centers. Israel
conducted sustained air and artil ery strikes in Gaza. Additional y, intercommunal protests and violence took
place within Israel and Jerusalem—involving some Arab citizens of Israel, Palestinian residents of Jerusalem,
Jewish nationalists, and Israeli authorities.

Political context. Some factors that may have influenced the outbreak and trajectory of conflict included
tensions over Jerusalem during Ramadan, the presence of a new U.S. Administration, and significant domestic
political uncertainty for both Israelis and Palestinians (including a recent postponement of PA elections).

Fatalities. In exchanges of fire between Israel and Gaza, 12 people in Israel (including 2 Thai nationals) and
more than 250 people in Gaza (including more than 60 children) were kil ed.22 Amid unrest in the West Bank
during that same timeframe (May 10-21), a U.N. source estimates that Israeli security forces kil ed 27
Palestinians.23
In the conflict’s aftermath, President Biden committed to “working with the United Nations and other
international stakeholders to provide rapid humanitarian assistance and to marshal international support for the
people of Gaza and the Gaza reconstruction efforts” in partnership with the PA “in a manner that does not permit
Hamas to simply restock its military arsenal.”24 With Gaza under Hamas control, the obstacles to international y-
supported post-conflict recovery remain largely the same as after previous Israel-Hamas conflicts in 2008-2009,
2012, and 2014 (see “Gaza’s Chal enges: Hamas and Post-Conflict Reconstruction”).25 Because of the PA’s inability
to control security in Gaza, it has been unwil ing to manage donor pledges toward reconstruction.
The following are key issues for the Biden Administration and Congress.
U.S. Aid
The Biden Administration has resumed some economic development, security, and humanitarian
aid for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza (see also “Gaza’s Chal enges: Hamas and Post-
Conflict Reconstruction”). As noted earlier, in 2019 the Trump Administration suspended al U.S.
aid to the Palestinians,26 after a number of measures by the Administration and Congress in 2018

https://plus.cq.com/alertmatch/475423704?3&deliveryId=72574526&uid=congressionaltranscripts-6155787.
20 Niels Lesniewski, “ White House confirms Biden will keep embassy in Jerusalem,” Roll Call, February 9, 2021.
21 Another U.S.-designated terrorist organization, Palestine Islamic Jihad, also took part from Gaza.
22 Dina Kraft and Laura King, “ Israel’s Netanyahu, master of political survival, tested by conflict with Gaza,” Los
Angeles Tim es, May 23, 2021; “ 2 T hai workers killed, several people injured as Hamas bombards southern Israel,”
Tim es of Israel, May 18, 2021.
23 U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs – Occupied Palestinian T erritory, “ West Bank: Escalation
of Violence 13 April - 21 May 2021,” June 6, 2021.
24 White House, “ Remarks by President Biden on the Middle East ,” May 20, 2021.
25 David Makovsky, “Why Blinken Will Have a T ough Sell,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 25, 2021.
26 For more information on this development and subsequent legislative amendments that facilitated renewed
congressional appropriations of bilateral aid for the West Bank and Gaza starting in FY2020, see CRS Report R46274,
The Palestinians and Am endm ents to the Anti-Terrorism Act: U.S. Aid and Personal Jurisdiction , by Jim Zanotti and
Jennifer K. Elsea.
Congressional Research Service

8

link to page 14 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

to halt or limit various types of aid.27 Some of these measures reflected Trump Administration
policies that unsuccessfully sought to compel Palestinian leaders to resume dialogue with U.S.
officials and accept U.S. and Israeli negotiating demands. Other measures, such as the Taylor
Force Act (TFA, enacted in March 2018 as Div. S, Title X of P.L. 115-141, and discussed further
below), attracted bipartisan support.
In its FY2022 congressional budget justification, the State Department said:
U.S. foreign assistance for the West Bank and Gaza serves important U.S. interests,
including providing critical relief to those in great need and fostering economic
development and the conditions needed for a sustainable two-state solution.28 
Past Administrations have used similar rationales to justify U.S. aid to the Palestinians. After the
peace process began between Israel and the PLO in the 1990s, U.S. bilateral aid to the
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip supported U.S. efforts to incline the newly
established PA toward better governance and economic development, and away from violence
against Israel. Congress routinely attaches a number of conditions to aid to the Palestinians in
annual appropriations language.29
For background information on U.S. aid to the Palestinians, see CRS Report RS22967, U.S.
Foreign Aid to the Palestinians, by Jim Zanotti.
Bilateral Economic and Security Assistance
Nearly al bilateral aid appropriated by Congress for the Palestinians comes from the following
accounts (see Figure 4):
 Economic Support Fund (ESF) aid is the main channel for economic
development and humanitarian assistance through NGO implementing partners in
the West Bank and Gaza. The FY2022 congressional budget justification reads:
“Economic and humanitarian assistance programs improve the lives of mil ions
of Palestinians by providing immediate relief and advancing development across
sectors such as health, appropriate infrastructure, economic growth, and civil
society.”30
 International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funding
goes toward nonlethal assistance programs that the United States started for the
PA’s security forces and justice sector in the West Bank in 2008. According to the
FY2022 congressional budget justification: “Security assistance supports the
PA’s efforts to build professional and effective security and criminal justice
institutions that maintain security and stability in the West Bank, uphold the rule
of law, and contribute directly to regional security.”31

27 CRS Report RS22967, U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians, by Jim Zanotti.
28 State Department, FY2022 Congressional Budget Justification, Appendix 2, p. 254.
29 See, for example, sections 7037-7040, and 7041(k) of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260).
30 State Department, FY2022 Congressional Budget Justification, Appendix 2, p. 254.
31 State Department, FY2022 Congressional Budget Justification, Appendix 2, p. 308.
Congressional Research Service

9

link to page 15

The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

Figure 4. U.S. Bilateral Aid to the Palestinians, FY2012-FY2022

Sources: U.S. State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), adapted by CRS.
Notes: Al amounts are approximate. Some amounts (including al amounts for FY2021) have been appropriated
but not obligated. Amounts for FY2022 have been requested but not appropriated. NADR = Nonproliferation,
Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs, INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement, ESF = Economic Support Fund, OCO = Overseas Contingency Operations.
The Biden Administration ended the two-year moratorium on bilateral aid to the Palestinians by
notifying Congress (in March and April 2021, respectively) of its intent to obligate $75 mil ion in
FY2020 ESF and $40 mil ion in INCLE (about $37 mil ion from FY2016 appropriations and $3
mil ion from FY2017). According to a June 15, 2021, letter from Senate Foreign Relations
Committee (SFRC) Ranking Member James Risch to Representative Jamie Raskin, Ranking
Member Risch and some other Members placed an informal congressional hold on a portion of
the FY2020 ESF because of potential y differing views between the Members and the
Administration about whether the funds would directly benefit the PA.32 As mentioned below, the
Taylor Force Act (Div. S, Title X of P.L. 115-141) prohibits most ESF directly benefitting the PA
unless Palestinian leaders curtail domestical y popular payments that arguably incentivize acts of
terror. In September 2021, a media report said that Ranking Member Risch released the hold after
the Biden Administration real ocated $20 mil ion slated for infrastructure projects toward food
assistance (see Table 2).33

32 See the text of the letter at https://freebeacon.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/210615-TO-House-of-
Representatives-Jamie-Raskin-Response-to-Israel-Gaza-Letter-1.pdf.
33 Jacob Magid, “ T op Republican releases remaining Palestinian aid he held up for months,” Times of Israel, September
23, 2021.
Congressional Research Service

10

link to page 16 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

Table 2. Details Regarding $75 Million in FY2020 ESF
Initial March 2021 Budget
Final September 2021 Budget

$5.4 mil ion for civil society organizations and

$5.4 mil ion for civil society organizations and
independent media outlets.
independent media outlets in the West Bank.

$10 mil ion for operating costs for the East

$10 mil ion for operating costs for the East
Jerusalem Hospital Network.
Jerusalem Hospital Network.

$24.5 mil ion for water supply and sanitation needs 
$4.3 mil ion for water supply and sanitation needs
and related general services.
for vulnerable households in Gaza.

$4.2 mil ion for community engagement, job

$8.2 mil ion for community engagement, training,
placement, and psychosocial support for
and job placement for Palestinian youth.
Palestinian youth.

$15.5 mil ion in economic development assistance.

$8 mil ion in economic development assistance.

$11.4 mil ion for rapid response for vulnerable

$16.5 mil ion for municipal infrastructure in
populations in Gaza.
Bethlehem.

$20.2 in food assistance through the World Food

$6.4 mil ion for rapid response for vulnerable
Programme.
populations in Gaza.
Source: USAID.
U.S. Contributions to UNRWA
Additional y, the Administration has resumed voluntary contributions to the U.N. Relief and
Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). UNRWA provides education,
health care, and other social services to more than 5 mil ion registered Palestinian refugees in the
West Bank, Gaza, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria. It is funded almost entirely through voluntary
contributions from governments and other donors.
During FY2021, the Biden Administration provided $318.8 mil ion in contributions to UNRWA
(see Table 3). U.S. contributions come from the Migration and Refugee Assistance account,
which is administered through the State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and
Migration (PRM).
Some Members of Congress and Israeli officials want U.S. officials to pressure UNRWA to
reform some of its practices.34 While many supporters of the organization may agree with the
need for reform, some also argue that UNRWA provides critical humanitarian support to the
Palestinian refugee population.35
UNRWA Contributions: Conditions and Oversight
U.S. contributions to UNRWA are subject to various legislative conditions and oversight measures. Section 301(c)
of the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act (P.L. 87-195), as amended, says that “No contributions by the United States
shal be made to [UNRWA] except on the condition that [UNRWA] take[s] al possible measures to assure that
no part of the United States contribution shal be used to furnish assistance to any refugee who is receiving
military training as a member of the so-cal ed Palestine Liberation Army or any other guerril a type organization or
who has engaged in any act of terrorism.”

34 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Risch, McCaul: Biden Administration should have secured concessions
before resuming assistance to Palestinians,” April 7, 2021; Israeli Ambassador to the United States Gilad Erdan, quoted
in Pranshu Verma and Rick Gladstone, “ Reversing T rump, Biden Restores Aid to Palestinians,” New York Times, April
7, 2021.
35 See, for example, Better World Campaign, “Better World Campaign says UNRWA funding critical to U.S. interests
in the Middle East,” January 9, 2018.
Congressional Research Service

11

The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

Additional y, since FY2015, annual appropriations legislation (for example, Section 7048(d) of P.L. 116-260) has
included a provision requiring the State Department to report to Congress on whether UNRWA is

using Operations Support Officers to inspect UNRWA instal ations and reporting any inappropriate use;

acting promptly to address any staff or beneficiary violations of Section 301(c) or UNRWA internal policies;

implementing procedures to maintain its facilities’ neutrality, and conducting regular inspections;

taking necessary and appropriate measures to ensure Section 301(c) compliance and related reporting;

taking steps to ensure the content of educational materials taught in UNRWA-administered schools and
summer camps is consistent with the values of human rights, dignity, and tolerance and does not induce
incitement;

not engaging in financial violations of U.S. law, and taking steps to improve financial transparency; and

in compliance with U.N. audit requirements.
The State Department (specifical y PRM) and UNRWA have a nonbinding “Framework for Cooperation” in place
for calendar years 2021 and 2022,36 patterned after similar framework documents from before the Trump
Administration’s suspension of contributions in 2018. In the framework document, UNRWA has agreed to submit
a report to PRM semiannual y—alongside its annual operational report—as a way to evaluate UNRWA’s
compliance with U.S. legislative requirements.
In a September 2021 SFRC hearing on the nomination of Julieta Val s Noyes to serve as Assistant
Secretary of State for Population, Refugees, and Migration, Noyes said that the Biden
Administration shares concerns expressed by some Members via their summer 2021 introduction
of an UNRWA Transparency and Accountability Act (S. 2479 and H.R. 4721) that would further
condition U.S. contributions to UNRWA.37 However, Noyes asserted that the PRM-UNRWA
framework document (see textbox above) “accounts for the need to make changes and to redouble
efforts to ensure efficiency, the effectiveness and the neutrality of UNWRA.” Noyes also stated,
“UNRWA is a force for stability in the region by providing vital services to Palestinians in need,
education for school children, health care for people, and the only viable alternative to UNRWA
in those areas would be Hamas.”38
Table 3. Historical U.S. Government Contributions to UNRWA
(in $ mil ions, non-inflation adjusted)
Fiscal Year(s)
Amount
Fiscal Year(s)
Amount
1950-1989
1,473.3
2006
137.0
1990
57.0
2007
154.2
1991
75.6
2008
184.7
1992
69.0
2009
268.0
1993
73.8
2010
237.8
1994
78.2
2011
249.4
1995
74.8
2012
233.3
1996
77.0
2013
294.0
1997
79.2
2014
398.7
1998
78.3
2015
390.5

36 T ext available at https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/2021-2022-US-UNRWA-Framework-
Signed.pdf.
37 T ext of hearing transcript available at http://www.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-6341064?1.
38 Ibid.
Congressional Research Service

12

The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

Fiscal Year(s)
Amount
Fiscal Year(s)
Amount
1999
80.5
2016
359.5
2000
89.0
2017
359.3
2001
123.0
2018
65.0
2002
119.3
2019
-0-
2003
134.0
2020
-0-
2004
127.4
2021
318.8
2005
108.0
TOTAL
6,567.6
Sources: U.S. State Department and UNRWA.
Note: Al amounts are approximate.
Israeli-Palestinian Cooperative Programs
In the current Israeli-Palestinian context, where U.S. officials support the concept of negotiating a
permanent resolution but do not anticipate imminent progress on that point,39 the Administration
and Congress have pursued programs fostering Israeli-Palestinian cooperative action.
USAID Conflict Mitigation and Stabilization
Since 2002, the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) at the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) has provided a U.S. government vehicle for using foreign
assistance to support people-to-people reconciliation activities and counteracting sources of
instability and violent conflict. Congress began funding CMM projects for Israelis and
Palestinians in FY2004.40 According to Section 7060(g) of the FY2021 Consolidated
Appropriations Act (P.L. 116-260), CMM funding (which comes from either the Economic
Support Fund (ESF) or the Development Assistance (DA) accounts) is intended to “support
people-to-people reconciliation programs which bring together individuals of different ethnic,
religious, and political backgrounds from areas of civil strife and war.”
Through FY2012, Congress annual y designated $10 mil ion from CMM amounts for initiatives
in the Middle East. Starting in FY2013, Congress removed the directive. Nevertheless, the
executive branch continued al ocating a portion of the CMM funds appropriated for global use for
Israeli-Palestinian people-to-people initiatives. CMM projects for Israelis and Palestinians have
been administered through USAID, the U.S. Embassy to Israel, and the U.S. consulate general in
Jerusalem (before it was subsumed into the embassy in 2019).
In September 2018, the Trump Administration changed the CMM program by halting new grants
for initiatives involving Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. New people-to-people projects
were limited to including Arab citizens of Israel as the counterparts to Israeli Jews.41 This change
took place as part of the Trump Administration’s general suspension in 2018 and 2019 of most
U.S. aid benefitting Palestinians.

39 White House, “ Remarks by President Biden Before the 76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly ,”
September 21, 2021.
40 Edward Wong, “ U.S. Is Eliminating the Final Source of Aid for Palestinian Civilians,” New York Times, September
15, 2018.
41 Ibid. A 2020 USAID factsheet describing ongoing CMM grants for Israeli Jews and Arabs is available at
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/FINAL_2020_WBG_CMM_Fact_sheet.pdf .
Congressional Research Service

13

The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

In April 2021, the Biden Administration announced a resumption of many types of U.S. aid for
the Palestinians, including $10 mil ion for people-to-people programs involving Israelis and
Palestinians.42 On May 13, 2021, USAID sent formal notification to Congress of its intent to
obligate $10 mil ion in DA funding for these programs, rebranded as Conflict Mitigation and
Stabilization (CMS).43 The notification states:
In the West Bank and Gaza and Israel, people-to-people reconciliation activities and
associated capacity building technical assistance will be carried out to address issues of
common concern for Israelis and Palestinians. Consistent with other Reconciliation Fund
Programs managed by USAID, activities may include but are not limited to: programs that
facilitate cooperation and inclusion in the areas of general education, including for people
with disabilities; mental health; information and communications technology; agriculture
and trade; joint sports programs; peacebuilding skills development; and programs that
promote greater understanding and opportunities for peace between Israelis and
Palestinians through dialogue. Activities will be focused on “cross-border” projects
implemented through local and U.S. organizations, but may also include activities between
Jewish and Arab citizens of Israel.44
Funds Under Nita M. Lowey Middle East Partnership for Peace Act
As part of the FY2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act enacted in December 2020, the Nita M.
Lowey Middle East Partnership for Peace Act of 2020 (MEPPA, Div. K, Title VIII of P.L. 116-
260) authorized the establishment of the following two funds, as wel as $50 mil ion (Congress
can specify how to al ocate any future appropriations among the two authorized funds) for each
of the next five years (FY2022-FY2026):
The People-to-People Partnership for Peace Fund is authorized to be established by the
Administrator of USAID near the end of December 2021. If established, the fund would support
dialogue and reconciliation programs, as wel as other projects designed, as stated in MEPPA, “to
help build the foundation for peaceful co-existence between Israelis and Palestinians and for a
sustainable two-state solution and an initiative to promote Israeli-Palestinian economic
cooperation.”
Section 8004 of P.L. 116-260 provided authorizing language for the fund by adding Section 535
at the end of Chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2346 et seq.).
This section provides that the fund:
 could work through Israeli, Palestinian, or international organizations committed
to its purposes, including those that promote reconciliation between Israeli Jews
and Arabs;
 could receive contributions, such as from foreign governments and international
organizations; and
 would have an advisory board of experts appointed in a bipartisan fashion.
The Joint Investment for Peace Initiative was authorized to be established by the Chief
Executive of the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) any time after June

42 State Department, “ The United States Restores Assistance for the Palestinians,” April 7, 2021.
43 USAID underwent an organizational restructuring under the T rump Administration. For more, see the relevant
section in CRS Report R46656, Selected Trum p Adm inistration Foreign Aid Priorities: A Wrap -Up, coordinated by
Emily M. Morgenstern.
44 USAID FY2021 Congressional Notification #153, May 13, 2021.
Congressional Research Service

14

link to page 40 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

2021. If established, the initiative would, as stated in MEPPA, “provide investments in, and
support to, entities that carry out projects that contribute to the development of the Palestinian
private sector economy in the West Bank and Gaza,” and would “prioritize support to projects
that increase economic cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians.” A former PLO adviser has
raised concerns that the authorizing legislation does not explicitly preclude Israeli settlers in the
West Bank from receiving funding from the initiative.45
Any appropriations for the two funds would be subject to the same mission directives and vetting
practices that USAID applies to bilateral economic aid for the West Bank and Gaza. If both funds
are established, Section 8006(d) of P.L. 116-260 requires that USAID and DFC submit a joint
report to Congress no later than 90 days after the end of each fiscal year describing lessons
learned and best practices from their respective projects and investments, and how those projects
and investments have contributed to the funds’ purposes.
The congressional budget justification for FY2022 anticipates a total of $50 mil ion in
appropriations to be al ocated between the two funds.46
Taylor Force Act (TFA) and PLO/PA Payments “for Acts of Terrorism”
The Biden Administration has said that any resumption of aid to the Palestinians would comply
with the TFA. The TFA seeks to discourage certain PLO/PA payments “for acts of terrorism” by
prohibiting most Economic Support Fund aid (ESF) that “directly benefits” the PA. The TFA does
not further define what constitutes a direct benefit.
During the legislative process for the TFA, some Members of Congress argued that these PLO/PA
payments—made to Palestinians (and/or their families) who are imprisoned for or accused of
terrorism by Israel—provide incentives for Palestinians to commit terrorist acts. For more
information on violence and terrorism by Palestinians, see Appendix A.
Palestinian Payments for “Martyrs” and Prisoners
The Palestinian practice of compensating families who lost a member (combatant or civilian) in connection with
Israeli-Palestinian violence reportedly dates back to the 1960s.47 Palestinian payments on behalf of prisoners or
decedents in their current form apparently “became standardized during the second intifada [uprising] of 2000 to
2005.”48 Various PA laws and decrees since 2004 have established parameters for payments.49 U.S. lawmakers and
executive branch officials have condemned the practice to the extent it might incentivize violence, focusing
particular criticism on an apparent tiered structure that provides higher levels of compensation for prisoners who
receive longer sentences.50

45 Zaha Hassan, “ How a Proposed New Fund to Bolster the Palestinian Economy Stands to Benefit Israeli Settlers,”
Responsible Statecraft, September 2, 2020.
46 State Department, FY2022 Congressional Budget Justification, Appendix 2, pp. 258 -259.
47 Neri Zilber, “An Israel ‘Conspiracy T heory’ T hat Proved T rue—but Also More Complicated,” theatlantic.com, April
27, 2018.
48 Eli Lake, “T he Palestinian incentive program for killing Jews,” Bloomberg, July 11, 2016.
49 Yossi Kuperwasser, “Incentivizing T errorism: Palestinian Authority Allocations to T errorists and their Families,”
Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, at http://jcpa.org/paying-salaries-terrorists-contradicts-palestinian-vows-peaceful-
intentions/.
50 See, for example, Corker Opening Statement at Hearing on T aylor Force Act, July 12, 2017,
https://www.corker.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/news-list?ID=CFA1D96C-2FF8-4A70-9C29-49451ADD90AE; Joel
Gehrke, “ House passes bill that could cut off Palestinian Authority funding due to aid of terrorists’ families,”
Washington Exam iner, December 5, 2017. For an analysis arguing that these PLO/PA payments are not the primary
drivers of violence against Israel, see Shibley T elhami, “ Why the discourse about Palestinian payments to prisoners’
families is distorted and misleading,” Brookings Institution, December 7, 2020.
Congressional Research Service

15

link to page 9 link to page 46 link to page 49 link to page 49 link to page 52 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

As mentioned above, the TFA prohibits most ESF directly benefitting the PA, with specific
exceptions for the East Jerusalem Hospital Network, and a certain amount for wastewater projects
and vaccination programs. Thus, U.S. aid for economic development and humanitarian purposes
either is required to fit under those exceptions, or be deemed by an Administration not to directly
benefit the PA. As mentioned above, the Biden Administration modified its spending plan for
FY2020 ESF after some Members of Congress differed with the Administration on whether some
items in the initial plan would directly benefit the PA.
An Administration can only lift the TFA’s restrictions if it certifies that the PLO/PA has ended or
significantly changed the payments in question in such a way that they do not incentivize acts of
terrorism, and also certifies that the PLO/PA is taking additional steps to oppose violence against
Israelis and Americans.
The prospect of the PLO/PA significantly changing these payments may encounter strong
domestic opposition among Palestinians. Media reports in late 2020 suggested that the PA might
consider changes—if it could make them domestical y palatable—in hopes of removing obstacles
to U.S. aid.51 PA officials may also focus on recouping the full amount of taxes that Israel collects
on the PA’s behalf. After Congress and the Trump Administration enacted the TFA, Israel enacted
a law in 2018 by which it withholds the transfer of these taxes by the amount of PLO/PA
payments Israel estimates to be for acts of terrorism.52 Yet, President Abbas made the following
statement at his speech before the U.N. General Assembly in September 2021:
Why should we have to clarify and justify providing assistance to families of prisoners and
martyrs who are the victims of the occupation and its oppressive policies? We cannot
abandon our people and we will continue striving to free all our prisoners.53
According to a June 2021 public opinion poll, 70% of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza
oppose significant changes to the PLO/PA payments.54
Gaza’s Challenges: Hamas and Post-Conflict Reconstruction
The Gaza Strip (see Figure 2) presents complicated chal enges for U.S. policy. Hamas, Israel, the
PA, and several outside actors affect Gaza’s difficult security, political, and humanitarian
situations. Since Hamas seized de facto control within Gaza in 2007 (for more information on
Hamas and Gaza, see Appendix B and Appendix C), these situations have fueled periodic
violence between Israel and Hamas (along with other Palestinian militants based in Gaza) that
could recur in the future.
The precarious security situation in Gaza is linked to humanitarian conditions, and because Gaza
does not have a self-sufficient economy (see Appendix C and Appendix D), external assistance
largely drives humanitarian welfare. Gazans face chronic economic difficulties and shortages of
electricity and safe drinking water.55 Large transfers of aid to the PA (particularly from Western

51 Adam Rasgon and David M. Halbfinger, “Seeking Restart with Biden, Palestinians Eye End to Prisoner Payments,”
New York Tim es, November 19, 2020.
52 Ruth Levush, Law Library of Congress, “ Israel: Law on Freezing Revenues Designated for Palestinian Authority ,”
Updated December 30, 2020.
53 T ranscript of Abbas’s speech (September 24, 2021).
54 Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR), Public Opinion Poll No. 80, published June 15, 2021
(poll taken June 9-12, 2021).
55 For information on the situation, see U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs occupied Palestinian
territory (OCHA-oPt), Gaza Strip: Critical Humanitarian Indicators, at https://www.ochaopt.org/page/gaza-strip-
Congressional Research Service

16

link to page 46 link to page 53 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

countries, Arab states, and international organizations) have historical y been critical inputs for
the economy in the West Bank and Gaza, but according to the World Bank the PA received $488
mil ion in aid in 2020, 20% less than in 2019 and the lowest level in decades.56 According to PA
financial statements, the PA has received only around $100 mil ion in foreign aid for 2021
through August.57
The possibility that humanitarian crisis could destabilize Gaza has prompted some efforts aimed
at improving living conditions and reducing spil over threats. In fal 2018, Israel started al owing
shipments of Qatari fuel and cash into Gaza to partial y alleviate the electricity and funding
shortages.58 In early 2021, Qatar announced that it would increase its annual contribution to Gaza
by around 50% to $360 mil ion, and also pledged $60 mil ion to ease Gaza’s energy crisis by
helping build a natural gas pipeline to Gaza from Israel.59
Four large-scale conflicts took place between Israel and Gaza-based militants in 2008-2009,
2012, 2014, and 2021. In each of these conflicts, the militants fired rockets into Israel, while
Israel conducted airstrikes in Gaza targeting militants (for more information on threats to Israel
from Palestinian violence, see the textbox in Appendix B). Israel also launched some ground
operations in the 2008-2009 and 2014 conflicts. In the aftermath of each conflict, significant
international attention focused on the stil largely unfulfil ed tasks of:
 improving humanitarian conditions and economic opportunities for Palestinians
in Gaza; and
 preventing Hamas and other militants from reconstituting arsenals and military
infrastructure.
No significant breakthrough has occurred to reconcile civilian infrastructure needs with security
considerations. Officials in Gaza responsible for post-conflict reconstruction estimate that
rebuilding costs from the May 2021 conflict would be $479 mil ion, while remaining damages
from past conflicts would cost another $600 mil ion to repair.60 Although some countries,
including Qatar and Egypt, have pledged in 2021 to assist with reconstruction, international
actors only implemented around 15% of the rebuilding assistance pledged after the 2014 conflict,
due partly to the security concerns mentioned above.61
Major progress in reconstruction might require one or more of the following: (1) a political
reunification of Gaza with the West Bank, (2) reduced Israeli and Egyptian restrictions on access
and commerce, and/or (3) a long-term Hamas-Israel cease-fire. Egypt plays a key role in both
Israel-Hamas and Hamas-Fatah mediation.62

critical-humanitarian-indicators.
56 World Bank, Economic Monitoring Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, February 23, 2021, p. 14. Also see
Figure D-1.
57 Official PA financial statements available at http://www.pmof.ps/pmof/en/index.php.
58 Oren Liebermann, et al., “ Suitcases of $15M in cash from Qatar bring relief for Gaza,” CNN, November 11, 2018.
59 Aaron Boxerman, “ Qatar raises annual aid to Gaza to $360 million,” Times of Israel, January 31, 2021; “ Qatar says
to fund $60 million pipeline from Israel to Gaza,” Reuters, February 25, 2021.
60 Entsar Abu Jahal, “As reconstruction nears, Gaza fears donors won’t deliver on promises,” Al-Monitor, September
26, 2021.
61 Ibid.
62 Maged Mandour, “ Egypt’s Shifting Hamas Policies,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 26, 2021.
Congressional Research Service

17

The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

Political reunification would appear to depend on Hamas’s wil ingness to cede control of security
in Gaza to the PA. In the past, PA President Abbas has insisted that he wil not accept a situation
where PA control is undermined by Hamas’s militia.63
The May 2021 Israel-Hamas conflict disrupted the Qatari fuel shipments and cash payments to
Gaza that (as mentioned above) Israel had al owed since 2018. The fuel shipments resumed in
June 2021.64 Due to Israeli concerns about the potential for Hamas to divert money to its militia
or for other purposes, Qatar began an arrangement in October 2021 to provide money transfers to
needy families through the United Nations.65 However, this mechanism does not address the
unresolved issue of providing salaries to Gaza’s civil servants.66 Other Israel-Hamas disputes
have continued and could conceivably escalate, including over what Israel al ows into Gaza, and
Israelis in Hamas custody.67
PA West Bank Leadership Concerns
Uncertainty surrounds the future of Palestinian democracy and leadership. Questions include:
 Are future elections likely and what factors might influence their being held?
 Who might eventual y succeed Mahmoud Abbas (see textbox below for his biography) as
leader of the national movement?
 What chal enges exist to rule of law and civil liberties in the West Bank?

63 “Abbas: If PA not handed control of Gaza, Hamas must take full responsibility ,” Times of Israel, August 18, 2018.
64 “Israel allows fuel tankers into Gaza for first time since clashes,” jpost.com, June 28, 2021.
65 “Palestinians in Gaza receive $100 handouts from Qatar via UN scheme,” Agence France Presse, October 14, 2021.
66 Amos Harel, “ Hamas Is Eyeing a Prisoner Swap, While Israel Is Buying T ime with Limited Gestures,” haaretz.com,
October 11, 2021.
67 Ibid.
Congressional Research Service

18

The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

Mahmoud Abbas: Biography
Abbas (also known by his Arabic kunya as “Abu Mazen” or “the father of Mazen”—Abbas’s oldest son) is general y
regarded as the leader of the Palestinian national movement, given his status as the current PLO chairman, PA
president, and head of Fatah—having succeeded Yasser Arafat upon his death in 2004. Abbas was elected as PA
president in 2005 popular elections, and when his four-year term expired in 2009, the PLO Central Council voted
to extend his term indefinitely until new elections could take place.
Abbas was born in 1935 in Safed in what is now northern Israel. Abbas and his family left for Syria as refugees in
1948 when Israel was founded. He earned a B.A. in law from Damascus University and a Ph.D. in history from
Moscow’s Oriental Institute.68
Abbas was an early member of Fatah, joining in Qatar. In the 1970s and 1980s, Abbas became a top deputy to
Arafat when he headed Fatah and the PLO.69 Abbas played an important role in negotiating the various Israeli-PLO
agreements of the 1990s, and returned to the West Bank and Gaza in 1995 .
In March 2003, Abbas was named as the first PA prime minister, but was not given
ful authority because Arafat (then the PA president) insisted on retaining ultimate
decision-making authority and control over security services. Abbas resigned as
prime minister in September 2003, apparently as a result of frustration with Arafat,
the United States, and Israel.70
Since Abbas assumed the leadership of the Palestinian national movement after
Arafat’s death in 2004, he has been a part of the contentious negotiations and
disputes that have largely characterized Palestinian relations with the United States
and Israel, while also cooperating closely with both countries on security matters.
While Abbas praises “martyrs” for the Palestinian cause, he also has made
repeated public cal s for nonviolent approaches to resolving Palestinian disputes
with Israel.
Abbas appears motivated by a complex combination of factors that include safeguarding his personal authority and
legacy, preventing destabilization and violence, and protecting his family members.71 Some observers have argued
that Abbas’s rule became more authoritarian and corrupt after the Hamas takeover of Gaza in 2007 limited his
authority there, and left the PA without a functioning legislature or realistic prospects for future elections.72
Elections
Since divided rule took hold in 2007—with the Abbas-led PA in the West Bank, and Hamas in
Gaza—no PA presidential or legislative elections for the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem
have occurred, and the Palestinian Legislative Council has ceased to function. During the 14-year
West Bank-Gaza split, Fatah and Hamas have reached a number of Egypt-brokered agreements
aimed at ending the split and al owing elections to take place, but have general y not implemented
these agreements. Municipal elections for some West Bank cities and towns occurred in 2012 and
2017.

68 Some Jewish groups allege that Abbas’s doctoral thesis and a book based on the thesis (entitled The Other Side: The
Secret Relationship Between Nazism and Zionism ) downplayed the number of Holocaust victims and accused Jews of
collaborating with the Nazis. Abbas has maintained that his work merely cited differences between other historians on
Holocaust victim numbers, and has stated that “T he Holocaust was a terrible, unforgivable crime against the Jewish
nation, a crime against humanity that cannot be accepted by humankind.” “Profile: Mahmoud Abbas,” BBC News,
November 29, 2012.
69 One of the Black September assassins involved in the 1972 Munich Olympics terrorist attack that killed 11 Israeli
athletes has claimed that Abbas was responsible for financing the attack, even though Abbas “ didn’t know what the
money was being spent for.” Alexander Wolff, “T he Mastermind,” Sports Illustrated, August 26, 2002.
70 James Bennet, “T he Mideast T urmoil: T he Leadership; Abbas Steps Down, Dealing Big Blow to U.S. Peace Plan,”
New York Tim es, September 7, 2003.
71 See, for example, Daoud Kuttab, “Abbas bids adieu,” Al-Monitor, August 1, 2018.
72 Ibid.; Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2021, “West Bank.”
Congressional Research Service

19

link to page 24

The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

In January 2021, the PA announced plans to hold legislative and presidential elections later in the
year. In April, however, President Abbas postponed the elections, claiming that he did so because
Israel was unwil ing to al ow East Jerusalem residents to vote. Some observers argue that Abbas
may have been more concerned that Fatah could fare poorly in elections because of two
breakaway electoral lists headed by former Fatah members, and the possibility that these lists
might coordinate with Hamas to marginalize him and Fatah.73
After Hamas’s May 2021 conflict with Israel, Hamas’s favorability with Palestinians surpassed
Fatah’s in a June 2021 public opinion poll (see Figure 5). The poll suggested that many
Palestinians viewed Hamas as defending Jerusalem for them, while also viewing Abbas as largely
self-interested in postponing elections.74 Hamas lost some of its advantage over Fatah in another
poll in September 2021.
Figure 5. Public Opinion Polling: Support for Domestic Political Factions
(Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip)

Source: CRS graphic, based on underlying pol ing data from Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research.
In his September 2021 U.N. General Assembly speech, Abbas claimed that the PA stil plans to
hold elections as soon as Israel al ows the participation of Palestinians from East Jerusalem. He
said that in the meantime, he would continue pursuing efforts to forge a unity government that
would end the West Bank-Gaza split, and that additional municipal elections would occur in
coming months.75
The historical memory of Hamas’s surprise victory in the last PA elections to be held—the
legislative elections of 2006—could affect various actors’ views on whether and how to hold
future PA elections. After Hamas assumed control over PA ministries with its legislative majority,
the United States and other Western actors significantly restructured assistance for the PA to
prevent its use by those ministries. Changes made to U.S. law and annual appropriations
legislation (see textbox below) remain possible constraints on aid to PA governments with Hamas

73 Daoud Kuttab, “ Palestinian president decides —on his own— to postpone elections,” Al-Monitor, April 30, 2021.
74 Joseph Krauss, “ Poll finds dramatic rise in Palestinian support for Hamas,” Associated Press, June 15, 2021.
75 T ranscript of Abbas’s speech (September 24, 2021).
Congressional Research Service

20

The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

participation or influence. The ensuing 2006-2007 struggle between Fatah and Hamas for control
of the PA—fueled in part by external actors—contributed to the 2007 West Bank-Gaza split that
created the divided rule of today.
Fatah-Hamas “Unity Government” Scenario and U.S. Aid
Per regular annual appropriations provisions, U.S. aid is general y not permitted for a power-sharing PA
government that includes Hamas as a member, or that results from an agreement with Hamas and over which
Hamas exercises “undue influence.” This general restriction is only lifted if the President certifies that the PA
government, including al ministers, has “publicly accepted and is complying with” the fol owing two principles
embodied in Section 620K of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended by the Palestinian Anti-Terrorism
Act of 2006 (PATA, P.L. 109-446): (1) recognition of “the Jewish state of Israel’s right to exist” and (2) acceptance
of previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements.76 If the PA government is “Hamas-control ed,” PATA applies additional
conditions, limitations, and restrictions on aid.
If future elections happen, it is unclear what implications they wil have for Palestinian
governance and international relationships. Open questions include whether elections can take
place in a free and fair manner, include international observers, and garner acceptance from both
Fatah and Hamas in the event of adverse outcomes for either.77
Succession
Speculation surrounds who might lead the PA, PLO, and Fatah upon the end of Abbas’s tenure—
whether via elections or otherwise.
Marwan Barghouti—a major Fatah leader who has supported negotiating with Israel at times,
and armed resistance against Israel at other times—is more popular than Abbas in public opinion
polls.78 Barghouti joined one of the breakaway electoral lists during the abortive campaign in
early 2021.
Other Palestinian leaders who could be involved in succeeding Abbas include
 Mohammed Dahlan was a top security figure in Gaza under Arafat who is based
in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). His apparent involvement with Israel-UAE
normalization has fueled some speculation about regional and international
support for him in future PLO/PA leadership.79 While Dahlan has some political
support in the West Bank and Gaza, he remains a pariah within Fatah leadership.
The faction expel ed him in 2011 after he and Abbas had a fal ing out, and in
2014 a PA court convicted him in absentia of libel, slander, and contempt of
Palestinian institutions.
 Majid Faraj (arguably Abbas’s most trusted security figure) and Salam Fayyad
(a previous PA prime minister) are prominent international y, but have little
domestic popular support.
 Mohammed Shtayyeh (PA prime minister since 2019) is an international y
visible Fatah insider.

76 P.L. 116-260, §7040(f).
77 “Uncertainty as Palestine’s Abbas announces elections,” Al Jazeera, January 17, 2021.
78 PCPSR, Public Opinion Poll No. 81, published September 21, 2021 (poll taken September 15-18, 2021).
79 See, for example, Neri Zilber, “T he T alented Mr. Dahlan,” Newlines Magazine, November 11, 2020.
Congressional Research Service

21

link to page 49 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

 Nasser al Qudwa (a former PLO diplomat and Arafat’s nephew) is another
international y visible figure who was expel ed from Fatah in March 2021 for
forming a breakaway electoral list (which Barghouti later joined).
 Mahmoud al Aloul and Jibril Rajoub have political heft within Fatah, but
relatively less international experience.
Governance and Human Rights Concerns
The PA has executive, legislative, and judicial organs of governance (see Appendix C for an
overview), but in practical terms, President Abbas has few domestic checks on his power. The
West Bank-Gaza split rendered the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) inoperative in 2007.
Since then, Abbas has appointed prime ministers and other cabinet officials without legislative
approval and has governed by presidential decree. He dissolved the PLC in 2018 pending future
elections. Some Palestinian judges and other observers have protested President Abbas’s
heightened control over the judiciary.80 In 2016, he created a new Constitutional Court made up
of his appointees, and in 2019 he restructured the High Judicial Council that supervises the
judicial system and nominates judges.81
In March 2021, President Abbas issued a decree that requires non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) to submit their yearly plans of action and budgets to the PA.82 Because of the new layer
of requirements that the decree adds to existing regulations on NGOs, some observers interpret it
as giving the PA significant control over the civil society sector in the West Bank.83
Within this governing context, Abbas and the PA routinely face al egations of corruption and non-
transparency.84 The State Department has noted continuing claims of corruption among Fatah
officials, “particularly related to favoritism and nepotism in public-sector appointments.”85
Some developments in 2021 have highlighted domestic and international concerns about PA
governance. PA authorities reportedly increased repressive measures against public dissent after
Abbas postponed 2021 PA legislative and presidential elections.86 These measures, which
continued in the wake of the Israeli-Palestinian violence in May 2021, have included the reported
arrest of dozens of people for political activity criticizing the PA.87
In June 2021, Nizar Banat, a prominent activist from Hebron who also had been a candidate in
the postponed legislative elections, died shortly after PA forces detained him for posting online
critiques of PA policies. Claims from Banat’s family and other evidence suggest that the
authorities may have beaten him to death.88

80 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2021, “West Bank.”
81 European Council on Foreign Relations, Mapping Palestinian Politics website,
https://ecfr.eu/special/mapping_palestinian_politics/justice_system/.
82 Isabel Kershner and Adam Rasgon, “ Critic’s Death Puts Focus on Palestinian Authority’s Authoritarianism ,” New
York Tim es, July 7, 2021; Qassam Muaddi, “ Palestinian Authority’s push to regulate NGOs raises fear of power grab,”
Middle East Eye, March 3, 2021.
83 Muaddi, “Palestinian Authority’s push to regulate NGOs raises fear of power grab.”
84 “Criticism of Palestinian security forces raises pressure on Abbas,” Reuters, June 30, 2021.
85 State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2020: Israel, West Bank, and Gaza.
86 Patrick Kingsley, “Palestinian Vote Postponed, Prolonging T ensions,” New York Times, April 30, 2021.
87 Adam Rasgon, “ Palestinian Authority Critic Dies While Under Arrest, Igniting a Demonstration,” New York Times,
June 25, 2021.
88 Joseph Krauss, “ Critic of Palestinian Authority dies after violent arrest ,” Associated Press, June 24, 2021.
Congressional Research Service

22

The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

The State Department spokesperson expressed deep disturbance over Banat’s death and its
reported circumstances. He further said:
We urge the Palestinian Authority to conduct a thorough and transparent investigation and
to ensure full accountability in this case. We have serious concerns about Palestinian
Authority restrictions on the exercise of freedom of expression by Palestinians and
harassment of civil society activists and organizations.89
In September, the PA charged 14 security personnel in a military court in connection with Banat’s
death, but some observers expressed skepticism that the proceedings would significantly change
the PA’s approaches to dissent.90
Heightened concerns regarding PA human rights abuses create a dilemma for U.S. officials who
resumed security assistance for the PA in 2021 and general y seek to strengthen the PA relative to
Hamas.91 A U.S. embassy spokesperson was quoted in July 2021 as saying that U.S. security
assistance for the PA is intended to “to assist in the development of credible institutions of
governance” in addition to strengthening Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation.92
Additional concerns expressed by governments and human rights monitors regarding PA practices
on rule of law and civil liberties include:
 Internet restrictions. In 2017, President Abbas issued the Electronic Crimes Law,
prescribing heavy fines and lengthy prison terms for a range of vaguely defined offenses,
including the publication or dissemination of material that is critical of the state, disturbs
public order or national unity, or harms family and religious values.93
 Criminal justice. Some reports persist of arbitrary arrest, detention without trial or
charges, torture, abuse, and isolation.94
 Treatment of women. Some reports persist of employment discrimination and repressive
work conditions for women. Additional y, while the PA has taken some steps toward
greater legal protection for women, stronger laws or enforcement of the laws may be
possible in preventing forms of discrimination or il -treatment, including rape and
harassment. In a climate where domestic violence may be underreported, one in five
married women claim that their spouse has abused them.95
Israeli-Palestinian Diplomacy and Diplomatic Offices
Biden Administration officials have said that they seek to preserve the viability of a negotiated
two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while playing down near-term prospects for
direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. At his September 2021 U.N. General Assembly speech,
President Biden said:

89 State Department, “ Death of Palestinian Activist Nizar Banat ,” June 24, 2021.
90 Adam Rasgon, “ Palestinian Authority Indicts 14 Security Force Members in Activist’s Death ,” New York Times,
September 6, 2021.
91 Michael J. Koplow, “Holding Your Nose with the Palestinian Authority,” Israel Policy Forum, July 1, 2021.
92 Kershner and Rasgon, “ Critic’s Death Puts Focus on Palestinian Authority’s Authoritarianism .”
93 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2021, “West Bank.”
94 State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2020: Israel, West Bank, and Gaza.
95 Ibid.
Congressional Research Service

23

The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

But I continue to believe that a two-state solution is the best way to ensure Israel—Israel’s
future as a Jewish, democratic state living in peace alongside a viable, sovereign, and
democratic Palestinian state.
We’re a long way from that goal at this moment, but we must never allow ourselves to give
up on the possibility of progress.96
Previously, in May 2021, Secretary Blinken spoke out against steps taken by Israelis or
Palestinians that he said could risk sparking violence and undermining the vision of two states—
including settlement activity, demolitions, evictions, incitement to violence, and payment to
terrorists.97
During his September 2021 U.N. General Assembly speech, President Abbas said that the
Palestinians are “ready to work throughout this year on the delineation of borders and solving al
final status issues under the auspices of the international Quartet and in accordance with United
Nations resolutions.”98 Abbas also stated that if Israel does not withdraw from the territory it
occupied in 1967 within a year, the Palestinians would pursue a ruling on the legality of the
occupation at the International Court of Justice, while also implying that the PLO may revisit its
recognition of Israel’s right to exist that took place alongside the 1993 Declaration of Principles.
In August 2021, Abbas had met Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz—his first meeting with an
Israeli cabinet minister since 2010. Gantz said that the two agreed on steps to improve security
coordination and assist the PA financial y, including a $155 mil ion Israeli loan.99 Shortly after
that meeting, Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett said that while Israel is open to helping the
PA economical y, Israel has no intention of engaging in a diplomatic process at the time.100
In addition to the loan mentioned above, Israel has taken some steps to improve Palestinians’
circumstances, “including issuing 15,000 new work permits inside Israel for [West Bank]
Palestinians… re-establishing Joint Economic Committees to discuss future projects, al owing
reunification (i.e. legal status) for Palestinian spouses in the West Bank, and tentatively approving
2,000 new housing units for Palestinians in the part of the West Bank under full Israeli
control.”101 In October 2021, Israeli authorities announced an additional 3,000 work permits
inside Israel for Gazans.102 However, some critics charge that the measures mirror past Israeli
efforts to manage the conflict’s effects unilateral y rather than responsively address its causes
through dialogue and negotiation with Palestinians.103
Israeli Terrorist Designations Against Palestinian Civil Society Groups
In October 2021, Defense Minister Gantz—apparently acting with the approval of the state prosecutor, but
without consulting Prime Minister Bennett or other key cabinet ministers—announced the designation of six

96 White House, “ Remarks by President Biden Before the 76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly ,”
September 21, 2021.
97 State Department, “ Secretary Antony J. Blinken at a Press Availability,” Jerusalem, May 25, 2021.
98 T ranscript of Abbas’s speech (September 24, 2021). T he international Quartet includes the United States, European
Union, Russia, and the U.N. Secretary-General’s office.
99 Yaniv Kubovich, “Gantz Says Agreed with Abbas on Confidence-building Measures, Including $155m Loan,”
haaretz.com, August 30, 2021.
100 Ibid.
101 Neri Zilber, “Israel’s new plan is to ‘shrink,’ not solve, the Palestinian conflict. Here’s what that looks like,” CNN,
September 16, 2021.
102 “Israel announces 3,000 new Gaza work permits,” Al-Monitor, October 20, 2021.
103 Zilber, “Israel’s new plan is to ‘shrink,’ not solve, the Palestinian conflict.”
Congressional Research Service

24

The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

Palestinian civil society groups as terrorist organizations under Israeli law because of purported links to the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization).104 According to the
New York Times, “The six [groups] are variously involved in highlighting rights abuses by Israel, the Palestinian
Authority and Hamas, as wel as in promoting the rights of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails, women,
farmworkers and children.”105 The designations, which have sparked some domestic and international criticism,
could significantly curtail these groups’ funding and activities, and subject their supporters to Israeli criminal
prosecution. Some of the groups receive funding from the European Union and other international actors. In
response to a U.S. request for clarification, Israeli officials were preparing as of late October to share evidence
that they claim supports the terrorist designations.106
As part of the Biden Administration’s efforts to reengage with the Palestinians, then-Acting U.S.
Representative to the United Nations Richard Mil s said in January 2021 that the Administration
would “take steps to re-open diplomatic missions that were closed by the last U.S.
administration.”107 This statement apparently refers to (1) the U.S. consulate general in
Jerusalem—which had operated for decades as an independent diplomatic mission engaging the
Palestinians—that the Trump Administration merged into the U.S. embassy to Israel in 2019; and
(2) the PLO representative office in Washington, DC, which the Trump Administration caused to
close in 2018.
U.S. Consulate in Jerusalem
Since Ambassador Mil s’s January statement, Biden Administration officials have repeated their
intention to reopen the U.S. consulate in Jerusalem, without specifying the timing. One media
report says that the Administration has agreed to delay the consulate’s reopening until sometime
after a critical budget deadline for Israel’s new government in mid-November 2021.108 However,
Israeli Justice Minister Gideon Sa’ar said in October that Israel would continue to oppose the
consulate’s reopening after this deadline. In previously stating his opposition to the reopening,
Israeli Foreign Minister Yair Lapid voiced concerns that it could destabilize Israel’s government
and insisted that “Jerusalem is the sovereign capital of Israel and Israel alone.”109 Additional y,
Prime Minister Bennett revealed that he expressed displeasure about the proposed reopening in
his August White House visit with President Biden.110
Since the 2019 merger of the U.S. consulate general in Jerusalem into the U.S. embassy to Israel,
U.S. diplomats in Jerusalem have conducted relations with the Palestinians via the embassy’s
Palestinian Affairs Unit (PAU). Reversing the merger would presumably reestablish the consulate
as an independent diplomatic mission that would work in paral el with, rather than as a part of,
the embassy.
A senior Palestinian official was quoted in October 2021 as saying that reopening the consulate is
more important to Palestinians than the PLO office in Washington, DC, because “the consulate is

104 “Shin Bet, Foreign Ministry rep heading to US over outlawed Palestinian groups,” Times of Israel, October 24,
2021.
105 Patrick Kingsley, “ Palestine Rights Groups Called T errorists by Israel,” New York Times, October 23, 2021.
106 “Shin Bet, Foreign Ministry rep heading to US.”
107 U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Ambassador Richard Mills, “ Remarks at a UN Security Council Open Debate
on the Situation in the Middle East (via VT C),” January 26, 2021.
108 Shalom Yerushalmi, “ Bennett suggested Biden reopen consulate in Ramallah or Abu Dis, US said no ,” Times of
Israel, September 28, 2021.
109 “Israel opposes Biden plan to reopen U.S. Palestinian mission in Jerusalem ,” Reuters, September 1, 2021.
110 Yerushalmi, “ Bennett suggested Biden reopen consulate.”
Congressional Research Service

25

link to page 33 link to page 31 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

the seed of the American Embassy to the future Palestinian state and a statement about everything
related to the administration’s position on Jerusalem.”111 As Israelis and Palestinians continue to
vie for U.S. and international validation of Jerusalem’s role in their respective national
narratives,112 Israeli-Palestinian tensions over Jerusalem persist, including on issues such as:
 Access to, worship at, and Israeli security measures at holy sites, especial y the Temple
Mount/Haram al Sharif “status quo.”113
 East Jerusalem property issues, particularly actions by Israeli officials toward building
new Jewish settlements and neighborhoods (see “Israeli Settlements in the West Bank”),
or favoring Jewish residents or claimed historical sites over Palestinian ones.114
PA officials are unsure whether the U.S. consulate, if reopened, would be located at the West
Jerusalem (Agron Road) location of the former consulate general (and current PAU) or the East
Jerusalem (Nablus Road) location currently known as “America House”—the educational and
cultural arm of the PAU (see Figure 6).115 Reportedly, Israeli Prime Minister Bennett was
unsuccessful in August in an effort to convince President Biden to open a consulate somewhere in
the West Bank near (but not within) Jerusalem, such as Ramal ah or the town of Abu Dis.116

111 Jack Khoury and Jonathan Lis, “ Palestinian Officials Say U.S. Seeks to Reopen Consulate Serving East Jerusalem
After Israel Approves Budget ,” haaretz.com, October 3, 2021.
112 For background information see CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti; and
CRS Report R46433, Israel’s Possible Annexation of West Bank Areas: Frequently Asked Questions, by Jim Zanotti.
113 Patrick Kingsley and Adam Rasgon, “ Quietly Allowing Jewish Prayer on T emple Mount ,” New York Times, August
24, 2021. For a description of the “status quo,” see CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by
Jim Zanotti.
114 “Sheikh Jarrah: Why could Palestinians lose their homes in Jerusalem?” BBC News, August 3, 2021; Stefanie
Glinski, “A Razed Building and Another Possible Flash Point in East Jerusalem,” foreignpolicy.com, July 1, 2021.
115 Khoury and Lis, “ Palestinian Officials Say U.S. Seeks to Reopen Consulate.”
116 Ibid.
Congressional Research Service

26

The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

Figure 6. Jerusalem: Key Sites
(including various facilities of the U.S. Embassy to Israel)

Notes: Al boundaries are approximate.
Reestablishing the consulate would probably require Israel’s approval given the need for
cooperation from Israeli authorities to issue visas to and help protect U.S. diplomats.117 Given
Israel’s insistence that the entire Jerusalem municipality is its capital and the tenuous nature of
the current multi-party Israeli government coalition, Israeli approval for a separate U.S.
diplomatic mission in Jerusalem focusing on the Palestinians could be political y fraught.
Members in both Houses have written letters to President Biden sharing varying opinions on a
possible consulate reopening.118
It is unclear whether Israel’s approval of a U.S. consulate reopening is essential y a practical
matter—given Israel’s control over Jerusalem—or is also founded on law such as the 1963
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.119 President Trump’s December 2017 proclamation on
Jerusalem recognized it as Israel’s capital, but did not delineate specific boundaries of Israeli
sovereignty in Jerusalem.120 After the May 2018 opening of the U.S. embassy in Jerusalem, the
U.S. consulate general continued to operate independently until it was subsumed into the embassy

117 Shira Efron and Ibrahim Eid Dalalsha, “Reopening the U.S. Consulate in Jerusalem: Subject to Isra eli Discretion?”
Israel Policy Forum, January 14, 2021.
118 See one letter from Senators at https://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/6bac9328-6a10-4228-bbcb-
c2af5e37c891/1B79ECA7429EFB5EA32C8B67826E7BA8.06.07.21 -letter-to-biden-on-palestinian-diplomatic-
relations.pdf; and one letter from Representatives at https://jstreet.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Letter-to-POTUS-
on-T rump-Israel-Policy-Rollback.pdf.
119 For varying views, see Efron and Dalalsha, “Reopening the U.S. Consulate”; Alan Baker, “ A U.S. Consulate for the
Palestinians Should Be on Palestinian T erritory – Not in Jerusalem,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, July 15,
2021. T he text of the Vienna Convention is available at
https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_2_1963.pdf .
120 Presidential Proclamation 9683 of December 6, 2017, “Recognizing Jerusalem as the Capital of the State of Israel
and Relocating the United States Embassy to Israel to Jerusalem,” available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2017-12-11/pdf/2017-26832.pdf.
Congressional Research Service

27

The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

in March 2019. Several other countries have operated independent consulates within Jerusalem
for decades and continue to do so, including the United Kingdom and France.
PLO Office in Washington, DC
In September 2018, the State Department announced that the office maintained by the PLO in
Washington, DC, would cease operating. Though not diplomatical y accredited, the office had
functioned since the 1990s as a focal point for U.S.-Palestinian relations.
PLO Office in Washington, DC: Timeline of Key Events
1978
PLO opens office in Washington, DC, to disseminate information about itself and the Palestinian
cause.
1987
Congress passes the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987 (Title X of P.L. 100-204), which determines that
“the PLO and its affiliates are a terrorist organization” and (under Section 1003) prohibits the PLO
from maintaining an office in the United States. President Reagan signs P.L. 100-204 in December but
adds a signing statement saying that “the right to decide the kind of foreign relations, if any, the
United States wil maintain is encompassed by the President’s authority under the Constitution,
including the express grant of authority in Article II, Section 3, to receive ambassadors.”121 The State
Department instructs the PLO to close its office.
1994
As the Oslo peace process gets underway, the PLO opens a representative office in Washington ,
DC. Despite the prohibition of a PLO office in P.L. 100-204, Congress provides waiver authority to
the executive branch.
1997
The PLO office briefly closes after a lapse in waiver authority, and reopens after Congress
reinstitutes the waiver and the executive branch exercises it.
2017
The State Department announces in November that it cannot renew the waiver (required every six
months in annual appropriations legislation) because of statements made by Palestinian leaders about
the International Criminal Court (ICC),122 but al ows the PLO office to remain open so long as its
activities are limited “to those related to achieving a lasting, comprehensive peace between the
Israelis and Palestinians.”123 A State Department spokesperson justifies the actions by saying that
they “are consistent with the president's authorities to conduct the foreign relations of the United
States.”124
2018
The State Department announces the closure of the PLO office in September.

It is unclear whether the Administration can legal y authorize the PLO to reopen its Washington
office. Under the annual appropriations language found in Section 7041(k) of the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260), the general prohibition in Section 1003 of the Anti-
Terrorism Act (ATA, Title X of P.L. 100-204) on a PLO office can general y only be waived by
the President if he can certify that Palestinian leaders have not “actively supported an ICC
investigation against Israeli nationals for al eged crimes against Palestinians.” The State
Department determined in November 2017 that this waiver requirement had not been met because
of Palestinian statements regarding ICC proceedings relating to Israelis. However, in September

121 President Ronald Reagan, Statement on Signing the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and
1989, December 22, 1987, available at https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/statement -signing-the-foreign-
relations-authorization-act-fiscal-years-1988-and-1989.
122 State Department Press Briefing, November 21, 2017.
123 Josh Lederman, “ US backtracks on decision to close Palestinian office in DC,” Associated Press, November 24,
2017.
124 T hen-State Department spokesperson Edgar Vasquez, quoted in “ US backtracks on decision to close Palestinian
office in DC,” Associated Press, November 24, 2017.
Congressional Research Service

28

The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

2018, the Justice Department issued a memorandum opinion for the State Department’s legal
adviser stating that Congress cannot dictate State Department actions regarding the status of the
PLO office—via the ATA or other legislation—because the President has exclusive constitutional
authority “to receive foreign diplomatic agents in the United States and to determine the
conditions under which they may operate.”125
A separate question is whether the PLO would be wil ing to reopen its Washington office. Under
the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act of 2019 (PSJVTA, Section 903
of P.L. 116-94), which became law in December 2019, the PLO’s establishment of an office in the
United States could subject it to liability in U.S. courts for terrorism-related lawsuits. The extent
to which Congress can provide by statute that a foreign entity is deemed to consent to personal
jurisdiction by establishing or maintaining facilities in the United States appears to be untested in
the U.S. legal system.126 However, the PSJVTA provision has reportedly given Palestinian
officials and advisers pause about reopening the PLO office, and has led them to engage with the
Administration and Congress about a possible amendment to the PSJVTA to facilitate the office’s
reopening.127
The Two-State Solution Act (H.R. 5344), introduced by some Members of Congress in September
2021, would, among other things, amend the ATA to provide the President with a standing option
to waive the prohibition on a PLO office in the United States for national security reasons
(renewable every six months). The bil also would make it easier to terminate the ATA completely
if the PLO/PA discontinues payments targeted by the TFA “for acts of terrorism.”
Israeli Settlements in the West Bank
Israeli settlements in the West Bank have presented longstanding policy chal enges for U.S.
officials and lawmakers.128 As mentioned above, the Trump Administration took a number of
actions apparently aimed at providing greater legitimacy to Israeli settlements in the West
Bank.129 Biden Administration officials have not announced whether they intend to reverse or
otherwise address these Trump Administration actions, but have specified that the United States
would urge Israel to avoid settlement activity or annexation of territory.130
Near the end of the Obama Administration in December 2016, the U.N. Security Council adopted
Resolution 2334, with the United States abstaining and al other Security Council members in
favor. Resolution 2334 reaffirmed that Israeli settlements in the West Bank (including East
Jerusalem) violate international law, and cal ed upon states to “distinguish, in their relevant
dealings,” between the territory of Israel and of the West Bank.131

125 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, Statutory Restrictions on the PLO’s Washington Office,
September 11, 2018, available at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opinions/attachments/2021/01/19/2018-09-
11-plo-office.pdf.
126 For background information on PSJVT A and this issue, see CRS Report R46274, The Palestinians and Amendments
to the Anti-Terrorism Act: U.S. Aid and Personal Jurisdiction , by Jim Zanotti and Jennifer K. Elsea.
127 “Biden pledge to reopen PLO mission in Washington faces legal hurdles,” Reuters, January 29, 2021.
128 CRS Report R46433, Israel’s Possible Annexation of West Bank Areas: Frequently Asked Questions, by Jim
Zanotti; CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.
129 Abigail Williams and Saphora Smith, “ Pompeo becomes first secretary of state to visit Israeli settlement,” NBC
News, November 19, 2020.
130 U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Ambassador Richard Mills; State Department, “ Secretary Antony J. Blinken at
a Press Availability.”
131 T he most-cited international law pertaining to Israeli settlements is the Fourth Geneva Convention, Part III, Section
Congressional Research Service

29

link to page 34

The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

Israeli officials have continued construction-related announcements regarding settlements in the
West Bank and East Jerusalem. In January 2021, the planning authority that operates under Israeli
military jurisdiction approved plans for hundreds of additional homes in settlements whose
expansion deep within the West Bank could increase the difficulty of negotiating borders between
Israel and a future Palestinian state.132 Some observers say that construction plans moving
forward in certain areas of East Jerusalem and its West Bank vicinity could present major
obstacles to the territorial contiguity of a future Palestinian state (see Figure 7).133
Figure 7. Selected Planned Settlement Construction Areas in the West Bank
and East Jerusalem

Source: Ha’aretz.

III, Article 49 Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Tim e of War, August 12, 1949, which states in its last
sentence, “ T he Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it
occupies.” Israel maintains that the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) does not fall under the international law
definition of “occupied territory,” but is rather “disputed territory” because the previous occupying power (Jordan) did
not have an internationally recognized claim t o it (only a few countries recognized Jordan’s 1950 annexation of the
West Bank). Israel claims that given the demise of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I and the end of the
British Mandate in 1948, Israel claims that no international actor has superior legal claim to the West Bank. Israel
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israeli Settlements and International Law, November 30, 2015. Jordan renounced its
claims to the West Bank in 1988 in favor of the PLO. While Israel applies civilian law to East Jer usalem, it considers
the rest of the West Bank to be “disputed territory.”
132 Peace Now, “ 780 Settlement Housing Units Approved Ahead of US Presidential T ransition ,” January 17, 2021. See
also David Makovsky, Building Bridges for Peace: U.S. Policy Toward Arab States, Palestinians, and Israel,
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 2021, pp. 9 -10.
133 Jonathan Lis and Nir Hasson, “ Israel Advances T housands of Housing Units in East Jerusalem as Biden Remains
Silent,” haaretz.com, October 14, 2021.
Congressional Research Service

30

link to page 54 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

In October 2021, the State Department spokesperson voiced U.S. concern about prospective
Israeli actions to advance settlements deep in the West Bank, and cal ed upon Israel and the PA to
“refrain from unilateral steps that exacerbate tension and undercut efforts to advance a negotiated
two-state solution. This certainly includes settlement activity, as wel as retroactive legalization of
settlement outposts.”134
International Organizations
In General
The PLO has pursued a number of initiatives—either directly or with the help of supportive
countries—in international organizations to advance its claims to statehood and other positions it
takes vis-à-vis Israel. The United States and Israel general y oppose these initiatives and criticize
international organizations for negative treatment of Israel.
In February 2021, Secretary of State Blinken announced that the United States would reengage
with the U.N. Human Rights Council—from which the Trump Administration withdrew in June
2018—as an observer.135 As part of his announcement, Secretary Blinken said
We recognize that the Human Rights Council is a flawed body, in need of reform to its
agenda, membership, and focus, including its disproportionate focus on Israel. However,
our withdrawal in June 2018 did nothing to encourage meaningful change, but instead
created a vacuum of U.S. leadership, which countries with authoritarian agendas have used
to their advantage.136
For more on Palestinian initiatives in international fora, see Appendix E.
International Criminal Court (ICC) Actions137
Background
The International Criminal Court (ICC) is in the early stages of an investigation into possible
crimes committed by Israelis and Palestinians in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and
the Gaza Strip since June 13, 2014. The ICC can exercise jurisdiction over al eged genocide, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity (“ICC crimes”) that occur on the territory of or are
perpetrated by nationals of an entity deemed to be a State
 after the Rome Statute enters into force for a State Party;
 during a period of time in which a nonparty State accepts jurisdiction; or
 pursuant to a U.N. Security Council resolution referring the situation in a State to
the ICC.
The following actions by Palestinian leaders have influenced the overal context in which the
ICC’s actions have taken place:
 In January 2015, Palestinian leaders deposited an instrument of accession for the
“State of Palestine” to become party to the Rome Statute of the ICC, after

134 State Department Press Briefing, October 22, 2021.
135 In October 2021, the United States regained its membership seat on the Council.
136 Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, “ U.S. Decision T o Reengage with the UN Human Rights Council,” February
8, 2021.
137 Matthew C. Weed, Specialist in Foreign Policy Legislation, assisted in preparing this subsection.
Congressional Research Service

31

link to page 54 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

declaring acceptance in December 2014 of ICC jurisdiction over crimes al egedly
“committed in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, since
June 13, 2014.”
 Later in January 2015, the U.N. Secretary-General, acting as depositary, stated
that the Rome Statute would enter into force for the “State of Palestine” on April
1, 2015.138
 Later that same month, the ICC Prosecutor opened a preliminary examination
into the “situation in Palestine” to determine “whether there is a reasonable basis
to proceed with an investigation” against Israelis, Palestinians, or others, having
found that the Palestinians had the proper capacity to accept ICC jurisdiction in
light of the November 2012 adoption of U.N. General Assembly Resolution
67/19.139 As mentioned in Appendix E, Resolution 67/19 had changed the
permanent U.N. observer status of the PLO (aka “State of Palestine”) from an
“entity” to a “non-member state.”
 Palestinian leaders provided information to the ICC on al eged Israeli crimes
regarding both the summer 2014 Israel-Gaza conflict and settlement activity in
the West Bank. In May 2018, Palestinian leaders made a formal referral of the
“situation in Palestine” to the Prosecutor.140
As referenced above, the State Department cited Palestinian actions relating to the ICC in
connection with the 2018 closure of the PLO office in Washington, DC. Various U.S. and Israeli
officials have denounced Palestinian efforts that could subject Israelis to ICC investigation or
prosecution.141 Neither the United States nor Israel is a State Party to the Rome Statute.
Palestinian accession and acceptance of jurisdiction grant the ICC Prosecutor authority to
investigate al al eged ICC crimes committed after June 13, 2014, by any individual—Israeli,
Palestinian, or otherwise—on “occupied Palestinian territory.” However, Palestinian actions do
not ensure any formal ICC prosecution of al eged ICC crimes. A party to the Rome Statute can
refer a situation to the Court and is required to cooperate with the Prosecutor on investigations,
but it is the role of the Prosecutor to determine whether to bring charges against and prosecute an
individual. In addition, a case is inadmissible before the ICC if it concerns conduct that is the
subject of “genuine” legal proceedings (as described in Article 17 of the Statute) brought by a
state with jurisdiction, including a state (such as Israel) that is not party to the Statute.
The ICC Prosecutor is required to notify al states with jurisdiction over a potential cas e, and such
states are afforded the opportunity to chal enge ICC jurisdiction over a case on inadmissibility
grounds.

138 U.N. Secretary-General Rome Statute Depositary Notification for the State of Palestine, January 6, 2015,
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2015/CN.13.2015-Eng.pdf.
139 ICC Press Release, “ T he Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, opens a preliminary
examination of the situation in Palestine,” January 16, 2015.
140 ICC Statement, “ Statement by ICC Prosecutor, Mrs Fatou Bensouda, on the referral submitted by Palestine,” May
22, 2018.
141 See, for example, “ Bolton warns ICC not to go after Israel, confirms closure of PLO’s DC office,” Times of Israel,
September 10, 2018.
Congressional Research Service

32

The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

Investigation of Possible Crimes in West Bank and Gaza
On March 3, 2021, then-ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda announced that she was opening an
investigation of possible ICC crimes in the West Bank and Gaza.142 She had previously sought a
ruling from a pre-trial chamber to confirm her determination that the ICC has jurisdiction over the
situation general y, and to determine the extent of the Court’s territorial jurisdiction
specifical y.143 In a 2-1 decision, the chamber ruled in February 2021 that the ICC has jurisdiction
in the West Bank and Gaza (including East Jerusalem), based on the Palestinians’ status as a State
Party to the Rome Statute.144 Israel had argued that the ICC should not have jurisdiction in those
territories because Palestinians do not have sovereign control there.145
Broader Impact of ICC Pre-Trial Chamber Ruling?
The ICC pre-trial chamber’s February 2021 decision stated that because the ICC exercises jurisdiction over
natural persons rather than states, its decision “is strictly limited to the question of jurisdiction set forth in the
Prosecutor’s Request and does not entail any determination on the border disputes between Palestine and Israel.”
According to one commentator, Palestinians and other international actors could use the decision to support for
Palestinian statehood and territorial claims.146
In response to the opening of an ICC investigation, Secretary of State Blinken said on March 3:
The United States firmly opposes and is deeply disappointed by this decision. The ICC has
no jurisdiction over this matter. Israel is not a party to the ICC and has not consented to the
Court’s jurisdiction, and we have serious concerns about the ICC’s attempts to exercise its
jurisdiction over Israeli personnel. The Palestinians do not qualify as a sovereign state and
therefore, are not qualified to obtain membership as a state in, participate as a state in, or
delegate jurisdiction to the ICC.…
Moreover, the United States believes a peaceful, secure and more prosperous future for the
people of the Middle East depends on building bridges and creating new avenues for
dialogue and exchange, not unilateral judicial actions that exacerbate tensions and undercut
efforts to advance a negotiated two-state solution.
We will continue to uphold our strong commitment to Israel and its security, including by
opposing actions that seek to target Israel unfairly.147

142 ICC, “ Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, respecting an investigation of the Situation in Palestine ,”
March 3, 2021.
143 ICC, “ Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, on the conclusion of the preliminary examination of the
Situation in Palestine, and seeking a ruling on the scope of the Court’s territorial jurisdiction ,” December 20, 2019.
144 ICC, “ Decision on the ‘Prosecution request pursuant to article 19(3) for a ruling on the Court’s territorial
jurisdiction in Palestine,’” February 5, 2021. In a partly dissenting opinion (available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/
RelatedRecords/CR2021_01167.PDF), Judge Péter Kovács argued that the ICC’s jurisdiction in the West Bank should
be limited to the competences transferred to the PA in the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip, leading to an interpretation that might require Israel’s consent to ICC investigations of Israeli
nationals.
145 Israeli Attorney General, The International Criminal Court’s Lack of Jurisdiction over the So -Called “Situation in
Palestine,” December 20, 2019. Germany, Brazil, Australia, Uganda, the Czech Republic, Austria, and Hungary had
filed am icus curiae briefs with the pre-trial chamber offering arguments in line with Israel’s objections to territorial,
while the League of Arab States and Organization of Islamic Cooperation had filed briefs in support of territorial
jurisdiction.
146 T ovah Lazaroff, “ Eight things to know about the ICC war crimes suits against Israel,” jpost.com, February 7, 2021.
147 Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, T he United States Opposes the ICC Investigation into the Palestinian
Situation, March 3, 2021.
Congressional Research Service

33

The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

On March 11, 54 Senators sent a letter to Secretary Blinken commending his statements, and
urging him to work with like-minded international partners to “steer the ICC away from further
actions that could damage the Court’s credibility by giving the appearance of political bias.”148
While Palestinian leaders (from both the PLO/PA and Hamas) welcomed the news of an ICC
investigation,149 leading Israeli political figures roundly denounced it, with then-Prime Minister
Binyamin Netanyahu cal ing the decision to investigate biased and anti-Semitic.150
It is unclear how the current Prosecutor, Karim Khan,151 might choose to handle the investigation.
The investigation could focus on a number of possible war crimes from Israeli and Palestinian
actions, including:
 actions by Israel, Hamas, and other Palestinian militant groups during their 2014
and 2021 Gaza conflicts;
 lethal force used by Israeli soldiers in 2018-2019 against some Palestinian
protestors in Gaza seeking to breach or approach the administrative boundary
with Israel;
 other Israeli actions in and around the West Bank and Gaza, including settlement
activity; and
 possible PA (West Bank) and Hamas (Gaza) human rights abuses.
An investigation could take months or years before the Prosecutor makes decisions on bringing
specific charges against individuals. As mentioned above, if an ICC investigation produces any
case against Israelis or Palestinians concerning conduct that is the subject of “genuine” legal
proceedings by a state having jurisdiction, it would be inadmissible. In Bensouda’s March 3
announcement of the investigation, she said:
As a first step, the Office [of the Prosecutor] is required to notify all States Parties and
those States which would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crimes concerned about
its investigation. This permits any such State to request the Office to defer to the State’s
relevant investigation of its own nationals or others within its jurisdiction in relation to
Rome Statute crimes referred to in the notification (subject to possible Pre-Trial Chamber
review).152
Possible U.S. Responses
It is unclear what diplomatic or other measures the Biden Administration might take to counter an
ICC investigation focused on the West Bank and Gaza. Under Executive Order 13928 from June
2020, President Trump authorized sanctions against foreign persons or entities involved in or
supporting ICC investigations or actions targeting U.S. personnel or personnel of U.S. al ies

148 T ext of letter available at https://www.portman.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/portman-cardin-lead-bipartisan-
senate-call-secretary-blinken-continue.
149 “ICC prosecutor opens war crimes probe in Palestinian territories,” Al Jazeera, March 3, 2021.
150 “Netanyahu: ICC war crimes probe is ‘pure antisemitism,’” jpost.com, March 4, 2021.
151 Before becoming the ICC Prosecutor in June 2021, Khan served as the Special Adviser and Head of the
Investigative T eam established pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 2379 (2017) to promote accountability
efforts for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes committed by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant
(ISIL) in Iraq.
152 ICC, “ Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, respecting an investigation of the Situation in Palestine ,”
March 3, 2021.
Congressional Research Service

34

The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

without the consent of the home government of those personnel.153 In September 2020, the Trump
Administration imposed sanctions under E.O. 13928 against Prosecutor Bensouda and another
top ICC official in connection with an investigation regarding Afghanistan that could subject U.S.
personnel to prosecution.154 President Biden lifted these sanctions in April 2021 while stating
continued U.S. objections to ICC assertions of jurisdiction over U.S. and al ied personnel.155
Role of Congress
As Congress exercises oversight over U.S. policy regarding Israeli-Palestinian developments, and
considers legislative options—including on annual appropriations for the Palestinians, Members
may consider a number of issues, including the following:
 various aspects of U.S.-Palestinian relations, including foreign aid and the
possible reopening of diplomatic offices;
 the status of Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy and how it relates to Israel’s
normalization of relations with some Arab states;
 Israeli settlement activity in the West Bank;
 Palestinian international initiatives and the ICC’s investigation into possible
Israeli and Palestinian war crimes in the West Bank and Gaza;
 human rights, humanitarian, and economic development concerns;
 countering terrorism from Hamas and other groups;
 the surrounding region’s effects on the West Bank and Gaza, and vice versa; and
 Palestinian domestic leadership and civil society.
Some key factors could influence issues for Congress. These factors include whether the PLO/PA
significantly changes welfare payments to or on behalf of individuals al egedly involved in acts of
terrorism, the extent to which Israeli legal institutions and proceedings might preclude the ICC
from prosecuting cases against Israeli personnel, and how various PA domestic developments
(elections, leadership succession, and governance concerns) unfold. Consideration of these
factors takes place within the context of Biden Administration efforts to improve ties with the
Palestinians, existing legislation such as the TFA, ongoing debate regarding various unilateral
Israeli and Palestinian actions, and more visible Israel-Arab state relations.

153 Executive Order 13928, Blocking Property of Certain Persons Associated with t he International Criminal Court ,
June 11, 2020. Prior to E.O. 13928, 67 Senators and 262 Representatives sent letters to then -Secretary of State Michael
Pompeo asserting that ICC jurisdiction in the West Bank and Gaza would be improper, and urging him to suppo rt Israel
in challenging it. T he text of the Senators’ letter is available at https://www.cardin.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/
cardin-portman-lead-bipartisan-senate-call-for-pompeo-to-defend-israel-against -politically-motivated-investigations-
by-the-international-criminal-court, and the text of the Representatives’ letter is available at https://luria.house.gov/
sites/luria.house.gov/files/wysiwyg_uploaded/
2020.05.12%20Luria%20Gallagher%20letter%20to%20Sec%20Pompeo%20on%20ICC.pdf .
154 T reasury Department, Office of Foreign Assets Control, “ Blocking Property of Certain Persons Associated with the
International Criminal Court Designations,” September 2, 2020. For background information, see CRS Insight
IN11428, International Crim inal Court: U.S. Sanctions in Response to Investigation of War Crim es in Afghanistan , by
Matthew C. Weed and Dianne E. Rennack.
155 White House, “ Executive Order on the T ermination of Emergency With Respect to the International Criminal
Court ,” April 1, 2021.
Congressional Research Service

35

The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

Appendix A. Key Palestinian Factions and Groups
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
The PLO is recognized by the United Nations (including Israel since 1993) as the sole legitimate
representative of the Palestinian people, wherever they may reside. It is an umbrel a organization
that includes 10 Palestinian factions (but not Hamas or other Islamist groups). The PLO was
founded in 1964, and, since 1969, has been dominated by the secular nationalist Fatah movement.
Organizational y, the PLO consists of an Executive Committee, the Palestinian National Council
(or PNC, its legislature), and a Central Council.156
After waging guerril a warfare against Israel under the leadership of Yasser Arafat, the PNC
declared Palestinian independence and statehood in 1988. This came at a point roughly coinciding
with the PLO’s decision to publicly accept the “land-for-peace” principle of U.N. Security
Council Resolution 242 and to contemplate recognizing Israel’s right to exist. The declaration had
little practical effect, however, because the PLO was in exile in Tunisia and did not define the
territorial scope of its state.157 The PLO recognized the right of Israel to exist in 1993 upon the
signing of the Declaration of Principles between the two parties.
While the Palestinian Authority (PA) maintains a measure of self-rule over various areas of the
West Bank, as wel as a legal claim to self-rule over Gaza despite Hamas’s security presence,158
the PLO remains the representative of the Palestinian people to Israel and other international
actors. Under the name “State of Palestine,” the PLO maintains a permanent observer mission to
the United Nations in New York and in Geneva as a “non-member state,” and has missions and
embassies in other countries—some with full diplomatic status. The PLO also is a full member of
both the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.
Fatah
Fatah, the secular nationalist movement formerly led by Yasser Arafat, has been the largest and
most prominent faction in the PLO for decades. Since the establishment of the PA and limited
self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza in 1994, Fatah has dominated the PA, except during the
period of partial Hamas rule in 2006-2007. Yet, popular disil usionment has come from the failure
to establish a Palestinian state, internecine violence, corruption, and poor governance. Arafat’s

156 T he PNC consists of more than 700 members, a majority of whom are from the diaspora. T he Central Council is
chaired by the PNC president and has 124 members—consisting of the entire Executive Committee, plus (among
others) representatives from Fatah and other PLO factions, the Palestinian Legislative Council, and prominent interest
groups and professions. T he Central Council functions as a link between the Executive Committee and the PNC. Either
the PNC or the Central Council reportedly can elect the 18 members of the Executive Committee, which functions as a
cabinet —with each member assuming discrete responsibilities—and the Executive Committee elects its own
chairperson. T he European Council on Foreign Relations’ online resource Mapping Palestinian Politics at
https://www.ecfr.eu/mapping_palestinian_politics/detail/institutions is a source for much of the PLO organizational
information in this paragraph.
157 T he declaration included the phrase: “ T he State of Palestine is the state of Palestinians wherever they may be.” T he
text is available at http://www.mideastweb.org/plc1988.htm.
158 T he PA’s legal claim to self-rule over Gaza is subject to the original Oslo-era agreements of the 1990s, the
agreements between Israel and the PA regarding movement and access that were formalized in November 2005 shortly
after Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza, and the June 2014 formation of a PA government with formal sway over both the
self-rule areas in the West Bank and Gaza.
Congressional Research Service

36

The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

2004 death removed a major unifying symbol, further eroding Fatah’s support under Mahmoud
Abbas.
Fatah’s charter, dating back to the 1960s, stil includes clauses cal ing for the destruction of the
Zionist state and its economic, political, military, and cultural supports, despite the PLO’s 1993
acknowledgment of Israel’s right to exist.159 Abbas routinely expresses support for “legitimate
peaceful resistance” to Israeli occupation under international law, complemented by negotiations.
However, some of the other Fatah Central Committee members are either less outspoken in their
advocacy of nonviolent resistance than Abbas, or reportedly explicitly insist on the need to
preserve the option of armed struggle.160
Other PLO Factions and Leaders
Factions other than Fatah within the PLO include secular groups such as the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization), the Democratic Front for
the Liberation of Palestine, and the Palestinian People’s Party. Al of these factions have minor
political support relative to Fatah and Hamas.
A number of Palestinian politicians and other leaders without traditional factional affiliation have
successfully gained followings domestical y and in the international community under the PLO’s
umbrel a, even some who are not formal y affiliated with the PLO. These figures—such as Salam
Fayyad, Hanan Ashrawi (a female Christian), and Mustafa Barghouti—often have competing
agendas. Several of them support a negotiated two-state solution, general y oppose violence, and
appeal to the Palestinian intel ectual elite and to prominent Western governments and
organizations.
Non-PLO Factions
Hamas
Overview
Hamas (an Arabic acronym for “Islamic Resistance Movement”) is a U.S.-designated terrorist
organization and Fatah’s main rival for leadership of the Palestinian national movement.
Countering Hamas is a focal point for Israel and the United States.
Hamas grew out of the Muslim Brotherhood, a religious and political organization founded in
Egypt in 1928 with affiliates and sympathizers throughout the Arab world. Hamas’s emergence as
a major political and military group can be traced to the first Palestinian intifada (or uprising),
which began in the Gaza Strip in 1987 in resistance to what Hamas terms the Israeli occupation of
Palestinian-populated lands. The group presented an alternative to Yasser Arafat and his secular
Fatah movement by using violence against Israeli civilian and military targets just as Arafat began

159 Fatah is the predominant member faction of the PLO, and the PLO formally recognized Israel’s right to exist
pursuant to the “Letters of Mutual Recognition” of September 9, 1993 (although controversy remains over whether the
PLO charter has been amended to accommodate this recognition ).
160 T he Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades (AAMB) is a militant offshoot of Fatah that emerged in the West Bank early in the
second intifada and later began operating in Gaza as well. It was added to the State Department’s list of Foreign
T errorist Organizations in March 2002. In line with the Abbas-led PA’s effort to centralize control, the Brigades
lowered its profile in the West Bank after 2007. However, some observers have noted that militant elements remain
within Fatah, including some members of the AAMB, and are generally known as the T anzim. See, f or example,
Michael Milshtein, “ Fateh’s ‘T anzim’ Formations: a potential challenge that is liable to intensify in the face of
scenarios of deterioration in the Palestinian arena,” IDC Herzliya Institute for Policy and Strategy, June 2020.
Congressional Research Service

37

link to page 46 link to page 49 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

negotiating with Israel. Hamas took a leading role in attacks against Israelis—including suicide
bombings targeting civilians—during the second intifada (between 2000 and 2005—see
Appendix B for more information on the two intifadas and Palestinian violence and terrorism).
Shortly after Arafat’s death in 2004, the group decided to directly involve itself in politics. In
2006, a year after the election of Fatah’s Mahmoud Abbas as PA president, and just a few months
after Israel’s military withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, Hamas defeated Fatah in Palestinian
Legislative Council elections. Subsequently, Israel, the United States, and others in the
international community have sought to neutralize or marginalize Hamas. As discussed in
Appendix C, Hamas seized control of Gaza in 2007 and has exercised de facto rule there since
then.
According to the State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism for 2019, Hamas “comprises
several thousand Gaza-based operatives.”
Ideology, Organization, and Leadership
Hamas’s ideology combines Palestinian nationalism with Islamic fundamentalism. Hamas’s
founding charter committed the group to the destruction of Israel and the establishment of an
Islamic state in al of historic Palestine.161 A 2017 document updated Hamas’s founding
principles. It clarified that Hamas’s conflict is with the “Zionist project” rather than the Jews, and
expressed wil ingness to accept a Palestinian state within the 1949/50-1967 armistice lines if it
results from “national consensus.”162
Since Hamas’s inception during the first intifada in 1987, it has maintained its primary base of
support and particularly strong influence in the Gaza Strip. It also has a significant presence in the
West Bank and in various Arab countries.
The leadership structure of Hamas is opaque, and much of the open source reporting available on
it cannot be independently verified. It is unclear who controls strategy, policy, and financial
decisions. In previous years, some external leaders reportedly sought to move toward a less
militant stance in exchange for Hamas obtaining a significant role in the PLO, which represents
Palestinians internationally.
Overal policy guidance comes from a Shura (or consultative) Council, with reported
representation from the West Bank, Gaza, and other places. Qatar-based Ismail Haniyeh is the
overal leader of Hamas’s political bureau (politburo). Yahya Sinwar, previously a top
commander from Hamas’s military wing, is the movement’s leader for Gaza.163 The militia,
known as the Izz al Din al Qassam Brigades,164 is led by Muhammad Deif,165 and may seek to
drive political decisions via its control over security. Haniyeh, Sinwar, and Deif have al been
named by the Treasury Department as Specially Designated Global Terrorists.

161 For the English translation of the 1988 Hamas charter, see http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hamas.asp.
162 “Hamas in 2017: T he document in full,” Middle East Eye, May 1, 2017. T his document, unlike the 1988 charter,
does not identify Hamas with the Muslim Brotherhood.
163 Yaniv Kubovich, “ T here’s Something New About Hamas’ Leader in Gaza Since the War – and Israel Is
Concerned,” haaretz.com, July 20, 2021.
164 Izz al Din al Qassam was a Muslim Brotherhood member, preacher, and leader of an anti-Zionist and anticolonialist
resistance movement in historic Palestine during the British Mandate period. He was killed by British forces on
November 19, 1935.
165 For a profile of Deif, see Joshua Nevett, “ Mohammed Deif: T he one-eyed Hamas chief in Israel's crosshairs” BBC
News, May 31, 2021.
Congressional Research Service

38

The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

External Support
Hamas reportedly receives support from a number of sources, including some states. Along with
some other non-PLO factions, Hamas has historical y received much of its political and material
support (including funding, weapons, and training) from Iran. Hamas became distant from Iran
when it broke with Syria’s government in the early years of the country’s civil war. However, the
Hamas-Iran relationship reportedly revived—including financial y—around 2017.166
In 2014, a Treasury Department official stated publicly that Qatar “has for many years openly
financed Hamas.”167 Qatari officials have denied that their government supported Hamas
financial y and have argued that their policy is to support the Palestinian people.
In addition to external assistance from states, Hamas has other sources of support. According to
the State Department’s profile of Hamas in its Country Reports on Terrorism for 2019, the group
“raises funds in Gulf countries” and “receives donations from some Palestinian and other
expatriates as wel as from its own charity organizations.”
Some reports claim that Hamas officials use Turkey as a base of operations.168 Turkish President
Recep Tayyip Erdogan periodical y hosts top Hamas officials and expresses support for the
group’s political aims.
On January 11, 2021, Representative Brian Mast introduced the Palestinian International
Terrorism Support Prevention Act of 2021 (H.R. 261). The bil , which is virtual y identical to a
bil introduced during the 116th Congress (H.R. 1850), would require the President to report to
Congress on foreign sources of support for Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad, and impose
sanctions on these sources as specified, subject to a waiver for national security reasons.
Other Rejectionist Groups
Several other smal Palestinian groups continue to reject the PLO’s decision to recognize Israel’s
right to exist and to conduct negotiations. They remain active in the West Bank and Gaza and
retain some ability to carry out terrorist attacks and other forms of violence to undermine efforts
at cooperation and conciliation. In Gaza, some observers speculate that Hamas permits or even
supports the operations of some of these groups, including those with a presence in Egypt’s Sinai
Peninsula, without avowing ties to them. Such groups provide Hamas opportunities to tacitly
acquiesce to attacks against Israel while avoiding direct responsibility.
Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
The largest of these other groups is Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), a U.S.-designated terrorist
organization that, like Hamas, is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood and receives support
from Iran. PIJ emerged in the 1980s in the Gaza Strip as a rival to Hamas.
Since 2000, PIJ has conducted several attacks against Israeli targets (including suicide bombings),
kil ing scores of Israelis.169 PIJ militants in Gaza sometimes take the lead in firing rockets into

166 See, for example, Shlomi Eldar, “Hamas turns to Iran,” Al-Monitor, July 6, 2017.
167 Remarks of Under Secretary for T errorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen bef ore the Center for a New
American Security on “ Confronting New T hreats in T errorist Financing,” March 4, 2014.
168 “Israel dismantles money transfer channel between Hamas operatives in T urkey and West Bank ,” i24News,
February 15, 2021; “ Revealed: How a bank in T urkey funded Hamas terror operations,” Arab News, October 20, 2020.
169 Suicide bombing figures culled from Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/
T errorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/Palestinian+terror+before+2000/
Suicide%20and%20Other%20Bombing%20Attacks%20in%20Israel%20Since.
Congressional Research Service

39

The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

Israel—perhaps to pressure Hamas into matching its hardline tactics or to demonstrate its
credentials as a resistance movement to domestic audiences and external supporters.
PIJ’s ideology combines Palestinian nationalism, Sunni Islamic fundamentalism, and Shiite
revolutionary thought (inspired by the Iranian revolution). PIJ seeks liberation of al of historic
Palestine through armed revolt and the establishment of an Islamic state, but unlike Hamas has
not established a social services network, formed a political movement, or participated in
elections. Perhaps largely for these reasons, PIJ has not approached the same level of support
among Palestinians as Hamas. Some PIJ leaders reside in Syria, Lebanon, or other Arab states.
According to the State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism for 2019, “PIJ has close to
1,000 members.”
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC)
Another—though smal er—Iran-sponsored militant group designated as an FTO is the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC). PFLP-GC is a splinter group
from the PFLP. According to the State Department’s 2019 Country Reports on Terrorism, PFLP-
GC’s operates in Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza and has several hundred members. Its founder,
Ahmed Jibril, died in Damascus (presumably of natural causes) in July 2021. His longtime
deputy, Talal Naji, was elected to replace him.170
Salafist Militant Groups
A number of smal Palestinian Salafist-Jihadist militant groups evincing affinities toward groups
such as Al Qaeda or the Islamic State have arisen in the Gaza Strip. Some Salafist groups
reportedly include former Hamas militia commanders who became disaffected by actions from
Hamas that they deemed to be overly moderate. Salafist groups do not currently appear to
threaten Hamas’s rule in Gaza.
Palestinian Refugees
Of the some 700,000 Palestinians displaced before and during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, about
one-third ended up in the West Bank, one-third in the Gaza Strip, and one-third in neighboring
Arab countries. According to the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the
Near East (UNRWA), there are more than 5 mil ion registered refugees (comprising original
refugees and their descendants) in UNRWA’s areas of operation—the West Bank, Gaza, Jordan,
Syria, and Lebanon. Jordan offered Palestinian refugees citizenship, partly owing to its previous
unilateral annexation of the West Bank (which ended in 1988), but the other refugees in the
region are general y stateless and therefore limited in their ability to travel. Many of the refugees
remain reliant on UNRWA for food, health care, and education.
For political and economic reasons, Arab host governments general y have not actively supported
the assimilation of Palestinian refugees into their societies. Even if able to assimilate, many
Palestinian refugees hold out hope of returning to the homes they or their ancestors left behind or
possibly to a future Palestinian state. Many assert a sense of dispossession and betrayal over
never having been al owed to return to their homes, land, and property. Some Palestinian factions
have organized followings among refugee populations, and militias have proliferated at various
times in some refugee areas. The refugees seek to influence both their host governments and the
PLO/PA to pursue a solution to their claims as part of any final status deal with Israel.

170 Albert Aji, “ Syria-based breakaway Palestinian faction elects new leader,” Associated Press, July 18, 2021.
Congressional Research Service

40

The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

For additional information on Palestinian refugees and UNRWA, see CRS Report RS22967, U.S.
Foreign Aid to the Palestinians, by Jim Zanotti.
Congressional Research Service

41

The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

Appendix B. Historical Background
Various perspectives exist on the nature of Palestinian political identity while the area of historic
Palestine was a part of the province of Greater Syria within the Ottoman Empire.171 This identity
developed further during the British Mandate period (1923-1948). Although in 1947 the United
Nations intended to create two states in Palestine—one Jewish and one Arab—with its partition
plan (General Assembly Resolution 181), only the Jewish state came into being. Varying
explanations for the failure to found an Arab state alongside a Jewish state in mandatory Palestine
place blame on the British, the Zionists, neighboring Arab states, the Palestinians themselves, or
some combination of these groups.172
As the state of Israel won its independence in 1947-1948, roughly 700,000 Palestinians were
driven or fled from their homes, an occurrence Palestinians cal the nakba (“catastrophe”). Many
ended up in neighboring states (Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan) or in Arab Gulf states such as
Kuwait. Palestinians remaining in Israel became Israeli citizens. Those who were in the West
Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza were subject to Jordanian and Egyptian
administration, respectively. With their population in disarray, and no clear hierarchical structure
or polity to govern their affairs, Palestinians’ interests were largely represented by Arab states that
had conflicting interests.
1967 was a watershed year for the Palestinians. In the June Six-Day War, Israel decisively
defeated the Arab states who had styled themselves as the Palestinians’ protectors, seizing East
Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip (as wel as the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt and the
Golan Heights from Syria). Thus, Israel gained control over the entire area that constituted
Palestine under the British Mandate. Israel’s territorial gains provided buffer zones between
Israel’s main Jewish population centers and its traditional Arab state antagonists. These buffer
zones remain an important part of the Israeli strategic calculus to this day.
After the 1967 war, Israel only effectively annexed East Jerusalem (as wel as the Golan Heights),
leaving the West Bank and Gaza under military occupation. However, both territories became
increasingly economical y linked with Israel. Furthermore, Israel presided over the settlement of
thousands of Jewish civilians in both territories (although many more in the West Bank than
Gaza)—official y initiating some of these projects and assuming security responsibility for al of
them. Settlement of the West Bank increased markedly once the Likud Party, with its vision of a
“Greater Israel” extending from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River, took power in 1977.
Having Israelis settle in the West Bank presented some economic and cultural opportunities for
Palestinians, but also new chal enges to their identity and cohesion, civil rights, and territorial
contiguity. These chal enges persist and have since intensified.
The Arab states’ defeat in 1967, and Israeli rule and settlement of the West Bank and Gaza,
al owed the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to emerge as the representative of
Palestinian national aspirations. Founded in 1964 as an umbrel a organization of Palestinian
factions and militias in exile under the aegis of the League of Arab States (Arab League), the PLO
asserted its own identity after the Six-Day War by staging guerril a raids against Israel from
Jordanian territory. The late Yasser Arafat and his Fatah movement gained leadership of the PLO
in 1969, and the PLO subsequently achieved international prominence on behalf of the

171 See, for example, Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness, New
York: Columbia University Press, 1997; James L. Gelvin, The Israel-Palestine Conflict: One Hundred Years of War,
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
172 See, for example, Edward Said, The Question of Palestine, New York: T imes Books, 1979; Barry Rubin, Israel: An
Introduction, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012.
Congressional Research Service

42

The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

Palestinian national cause—representing both the refugees and those under Israeli rule in the West
Bank and Gaza. Often this prominence came infamously from acts of terrorism and militancy.
Although Jordan forced the PLO to relocate to Lebanon in the early 1970s, and Israel forced it to
move from Lebanon to Tunisia in 1982, the organization and its influence survived. In 1987,
Palestinians inside the West Bank and Gaza rose up in opposition to Israeli occupation (the first
intifada, or uprising), leading to increased international attention and sympathy for the
Palestinians’ situation. In December 1988, as the intifada continued, Arafat initiated dialogue with
the United States by renouncing violence, promising to recognize Israel’s right to exist, and
accepting the “land-for-peace” principle embodied in U.N. Security Council Resolution 242.173
Arafat’s turn to diplomacy with the United States and Israel may have been partly motivated by
concerns that if the PLO’s leadership could not be repatriated from exile, its legitimacy with
Palestinians might be overtaken by local leaders of the intifada in the West Bank and Gaza (which
included Hamas). These concerns intensified when Arafat lost much of his Arab state support
following his political backing for Saddam Hussein’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait.
After direct secret diplomacy with Israel brokered by Norway, the PLO recognized Israel’s right
to exist in 1993, and through the “Oslo agreements” gained limited self-rule for Palestinians in
Gaza and parts of the West Bank—via the creation of the PA. The agreements were gradual y and
partial y implemented during the 1990s, but the expectation that they would lead to a final-status
peace agreement has not been realized.
Palestinian Violence and Terrorism Since the Oslo Agreements
Various Palestinian groups have engaged in a variety of methods of violence since the Israel-PLO agreements of
the 1990s, kil ing hundreds of Israelis—both military and civilian.174 Palestinians who insist that they are engaging in
asymmetric warfare with a stronger enemy point to the thousands of deaths inflicted on Palestinians by Israelis
since 1993,175 some through acts of terrorism aimed at civilians.176
Palestinian militants in Gaza periodical y fire rockets and mortars into Israel indiscriminately. The possibility that a
rocket threat could emerge from the West Bank is one factor that Israelis have cited in explaining their reluctance
to consider a ful withdrawal from there.177 Although Palestinian militants maintain rocket and mortar arsenals,
Israel’s Iron Dome defense system reportedly has decreased the threat to Israel from these projectiles.178
Additional y, tunnels that Palestinian militants in Gaza used somewhat effectively in a 2014 conflict have been

173 UNSCR 242, adopted in 1967 shortly after the Six-Day War, calls for a “just and lasting peace in the Middle East”
based on (1) “Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the [1967 Six-Day War]” and (2)
“T ermination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial
integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and
recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.”
174 Statistics available from B’T selem (T he Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied T erritories)
website at http://www.btselem.org/statistics.
175 Ibid.
176 T he most prominent attack by an Israeli civilian against Palestinians since 1993 was the killing of at least 29
Palestinians (and possibly between 10 to 23 more) and the wounding of about 150 more by Israeli settler Baruch
Goldstein (a Brooklyn-born former military doctor) at the Ibrahimi Mosque (Mosque of Abraham) in the Cave of the
Patriarchs in Hebron on February 25, 1994 (the Jewish holy day of Purim) while the victims were at prayer. See George
J. Church, “When Fury Rules,” Time, March 7, 1994. T his incident has been cited by many analysts as a provocation
for the Palestinian suicide bombing campaign that followed.
177 See, for example, Hirsh Goodman, “ T he Dangers of a Unilateral Israeli Withdrawal from the West Bank and
Eastern Jerusalem,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 2017.
178 Sebastien Roblin, “How Hamas’ Arsenal Shaped the Gaza War o f May 2021,” forbes.com, May 25, 2021. For more
on Iron Dome, see CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by Jeremy M. Sharp.
Congressional Research Service

43

link to page 49 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

neutralized to some extent by systematic Israeli efforts, with some financial and technological assistance from the
United States.179
Since 2018, some Palestinians—with reported encouragement from Hamas—have tried to breach fences dividing
Gaza from Israel, or have used incendiary kites or bal oons to set fires to arable land in southern Israel.180 The
purpose of these tactics may be to provoke Israeli responses that evoke international sympathy for Palestinians
and criticism of Israel—a dynamic that bolstered Palestinian national aspirations in the late 1980s during the first
intifada.181
Isolated attacks stil occur within Israel and the West Bank. Some are perpetrated by Palestinians who are
unaffiliated with terrorist groups and who use smal arms or vehicles as weapons. Antipathy between Jewish
settlers and Palestinian residents in the West Bank leads to occasional attacks on both sides. Some militants have
staged attacks at or near Gaza border crossings and attempted to capture Israeli soldiers there.
Many factors have contributed to the failure to complete the Oslo process. A second Palestinian
intifada from 2000 to 2005 was marked by intense terrorist violence inside Israel. In response,
Israel took actions that it asserted were necessary to safeguard its citizens’ security, rendering
unusable much of the PA infrastructure built over the preceding decade. During the second
intifada, U.S.- and international y supported efforts to restart peace negotiations under various
auspices failed to gain traction.
After Arafat’s death in 2004 and his succession by Mahmoud Abbas, Israel unilateral y withdrew
its settlers and military forces from Gaza in 2005. Despite forswearing responsibility for Gaza,
Israel has continued to control most of Gaza’s borders, airspace, maritime access, and even
various buffer zones within the territory. The limited self-rule regime of the PA was undermined
further by Hamas’s legislative election victory in 2006, and its takeover of Gaza in 2007. Having
different Palestinian leaders controlling the West Bank and Gaza since then has complicated the
question of who speaks for the Palestinians both domestical y and international y (see
Appendix C).

179 CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by Jeremy M. Sharp.
180 Mark Landler, “ As Violence Flares, Kushner T hreatens to Abandon Plan to Rebuild Gaza,” New York Times, July
23, 2018.
181 See, for example, Hussein Ibish, “ T he Nonviolent Violence of Hamas,” foreignpolicy.com, April 6, 2018.
Congressional Research Service

44

The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

Appendix C. Palestinian Governance
Achieving effective and transparent governance over the West Bank and Gaza and preventing
Israeli-Palestinian violence has proven elusive for Palestinian leaders since their limited self-rule
experiment began in 1994. The split established in 2007 between the Abbas-led PA in the West
Bank and Hamas in Gaza exacerbated these difficulties.
Palestinian Authority (PA)
The Palestinian National Authority (or Palestinian Authority, hereafter PA) was granted limited
rule under Israeli occupational authority in the Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank in the mid-
1990s, pursuant to the Oslo agreements.182 One of the PLO’s options is to restructure or dissolve
the PA (either in concert with Israel or unilateral y) pursuant to the c laim that the PA is a
constitutional creature of PLO agreements with Israel.183
Although not a state, the PA is organized like one—complete with executive, legislative, and
judicial organs of governance, as wel as security forces. Ramal ah is its de facto seat, but is not
considered to be the PA capital because of Palestinian political consensus that Jerusalem (or at
least the part east of the 1949-1967 Israel-Jordan armistice line, or “Green Line”) should be the
capital of a Palestinian state.
The executive branch has both a president and a prime minister-led cabinet, and the Palestinian
Legislative Council (PLC) is the PA’s legislature (sidelined since Hamas’s takeover of Gaza in
2007). The judicial branch has separate high courts to decide substantive disputes and to settle
controversies regarding Palestinian basic law, and also includes a High Judicial Council and
separate security courts. As mentioned above, President Abbas created and appointed justices to a
new Constitutional Court in 2016. The electoral base of the PA is composed of Palestinians from
the West Bank, Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip.
Leadership succession within the PA after Mahmoud Abbas leaves office could present Hamas
with opportunities to increase its influence, especial y if the process does not definitively
concentrate power around one or more non-Hamas figures. Though Hamas members have not run
in past presidential elections, one or more could potential y run in future elections.
Under Article 37 of the Palestinian Basic Law,184 it appears that if Abbas were to leave office, the
speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council (currently Aziz Dweik, a member of Hamas) would
take over duties as president for a period not to exceed 60 days, by which time elections for a
more permanent successor are supposed to take place.
Succession to the PA presidency could be determined by elections or under the Palestinian Basic
Law. Abbas’s term of office was supposed to be four years, with a new round of elections initially
planned for 2009 that would have al owed Abbas to run for a second and final term. However, the
split between the Abbas-led PA in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza has indefinitely postponed
PA elections, with the last presidential election having taken place in 2005 and the last legislative

182 T he relevant Israel-PLO agreements that created the PA and established its parameters were the Agreement on the
Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, dated May 4, 1994; and the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip, dated September 28, 1995.
183 T he PA was originally intended to be a temporary, transitional mechanism for the five-year period prescribed for
final-status negotiations, not an indefinite administrative authority.
184 T he Palestinian Basic Law is the set of laws that govern the PA. T he Palestinian Legislative Council originally
passed it in 1997, and PA President Yasser Arafat ratified it in 2002. Some amendments have occurred since.
Congressional Research Service

45

link to page 8 link to page 9 link to page 20 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

election in 2006. In December 2009, the PLO’s Central Council voted to extend the terms of both
Abbas and the current PLC until elections can be held. This precedent could lead to PLO action in
selecting or attempting to select a successor to Abbas as PA president.
West Bank
The PA administers densely populated Palestinian areas in the West Bank subject to supervening
Israeli control under the Oslo agreements (see Figure 1 for map).185 Israel Defense Forces (IDF)
soldiers regularly mount arrest operations to apprehend wanted Palestinians or foil terrorist plots.
They maintain permanent posts throughout the West Bank and along the West Bank’s
administrative borders with Israel and Jordan to protect Jewish settlers and broader security
interests. The IDF sometimes takes measures that involve the expropriation of West Bank land or
dispossession of Palestinians from their homes and communities.
Coordination between Israeli and PA authorities general y takes place discreetly, given the
political sensitivity for PA leaders to be seen as collaborating with Israeli occupiers. In 2002, at
the height of the second intifada, Israel demonstrated its ability to reoccupy PA-controlled areas
of the West Bank in what it cal ed Operation Defensive Shield. The IDF demolished many official
PA buildings, Palestinian neighborhoods, and other infrastructure.186
Gaza
Hamas’s security control of Gaza (see Figure 2 for map) presents a conundrum for the Abbas-led
PA, Israel, and the international community. They have been unable to establish a durable
political-security framework for Gaza that assists Gaza’s population without bolstering Hamas.
For more information, see “Gaza’s Chal enges: Hamas and Post-Conflict Reconstruction.”
Hamas’s preeminence in Gaza can be traced to 2006-2007. After victory in the 2006 PA
legislative elections, Hamas consolidated its power in Gaza—while losing it in the West Bank—
through violent struggle with Fatah in June 2007. Hamas’s security forces have maintained power
in Gaza ever since, even after its de facto government relinquished nominal responsibility to the
PA in June 2014. The State Department and some NGOs have raised concerns about possible
Hamas violations of the rule of law and civil liberties.187
Since Hamas’s 2007 takeover of Gaza, Israeli and Egyptian authorities have maintained strict
control over Gaza’s border crossings.188 Israel justifies the restrictions it imposes as a way to deny
Hamas materials to reconstitute its military capabilities. However, the restrictions also limit

185 T he two agreements that define respective Israeli and PA zones of control are (1) the Israeli-Palestinian Interim
Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, dated September 28, 1995; and (2) the Protocol Concerning the
Redeployment in Hebron, dated January 17, 1997 . East Jerusalem is excluded from these agreements, as Israel has
effectively annexed it.
186 Anna Ahronheim, “Fifteen years after Op. Defensive Shield, situation on the ground completely different,”
jpost.com, April 24, 2017.
187 State Department, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Israel, West Bank, and Gaza; Amnesty
International, Palestine (State of) 2020/21.
188 In November 2005, Israel and the PA signed an Agreement on Movement and Access, featuring U.S. and European
Union participation in the travel and commerce regime that was supposed to emerge post -Gaza disengagement, but this
agreement was never fully implemented. In September 2007, three months after Hamas’s takeover of Gaza, the closure
regime was further formalized when Israel declared Gaza to be a “hostile entity.” Depending on circumstances since
then, Israel has eased and re-tightened restrictions on various imports and exports. Gisha – Legal Center for Freedom of
Movement, Gaza Up Close, September 1, 2021. Widespread unemployment and poverty persist.
Congressional Research Service

46

link to page 40 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

commerce, affect the entire economy, and delay humanitarian assistance.189 For several years,
Hamas compensated somewhat for these restrictions by routinely smuggling goods into Gaza
from Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula through a network of tunnels. However, after Egypt’s military
regained political control in July 2013, it disrupted the tunnel system.
Observers routinely voice concerns that if current arrangements continue, the dispiriting living
conditions that have persisted since Israel’s withdrawal in 2005 could feed radicalization within
Gaza and pressure its leaders to increase violence against Israel for political ends.190 Israel
disputes the level of legal responsibility for Gaza’s residents that some international actors claim
it retains—given its continued control of most of Gaza’s borders, airspace, maritime access, and
various buffer zones within the territory.
Within limited parameters amid Gaza’s political uncertainties and access restrictions, UNRWA
and other international organizations and nongovernmental organizations take care of many
Gazans’ day-to-day humanitarian needs. These groups play significant roles in providing various
forms of assistance and trying to facilitate reconstruction from previous conflicts. For more
information on Palestinian refugees, see Appendix A.

189 World Bank, Economic Monitoring Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, June 2, 2020, p. 24.
190 U.N. OCHA-oPt, Humanitarian Needs Overview OPT 2021, December 2020.
Congressional Research Service

47

link to page 53 The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

Appendix D. Palestinian Economy
The economy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip faces structural difficulties—with Gaza’s real per
capita income about half that of the West Bank’s.191 Palestinians’ livelihoods largely depend on
their ties to Israel’s relatively strong economy. Israel is the market for about 84% of West
Bank/Gaza exports, and the source for about 56% of West Bank/Gaza imports.192 Palestinians are
constrained from developing other external ties because of the layers of control that Israel has put
in place to enforce security.
Because the PA has been unable to become self-sufficient, it has been acutely dependent on
foreign assistance. Facing a regular annual budget deficit of over $1 bil ion (and wel beyond that
amount for 2020 and 2021 given COVID-19), PA officials have traditional y sought aid from
international sources to meet the PA’s financial commitments (see Figure D-1). As of August
2021, external donor funding for the calendar year (including from Arab states and European
governments) was at a historical y low level of $100 mil ion.193
Part of the PA’s financial problems stem from a payroll that has become increasingly bloated over
the PA’s 27-year existence. Domestic corruption and inefficiency also appear to pose
difficulties.194 Absent fundamental changes in revenue and expenses, the PA’s fiscal dependence
on external sources is likely to continue.

191 World Bank, Economic Monitoring Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, March 19, 2018, pp. 22-23.
192 Economist Intelligence Unit, Palestine Country Report (accessed March 12, 2021), based on 2019 figures.
193 Official PA financial statements available at http://www.pmof.ps/pmof/en/index.php.
194 See, e.g., Elliott Abrams, “Corruption in the Palestinian Authority,” Council on Foreign Relations, April 5, 2018.
Congressional Research Service

48

The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

Figure D-1. International Donor Funding to the Palestinian Authority

Source: Hugh Lovatt, “The end of Oslo: A new European strategy on Israel-Palestine,” European Council on
Foreign Relations, December 9, 2020.
Lacking sufficient private sector employment opportunities in the West Bank and Gaza, many
Palestinians have historical y depended on easy entry into and exit out of Israel for their jobs and
goods. Yet, the second intifada that began in 2000 reduced this access considerably. Israel
constructed a West Bank separation barrier and increased security at crossing points, and
unilateral y “disengaged” (withdrew its settlements and official military contingent) from Gaza in
2005. Israel now issues permits to control access. Its security forces significantly limit the flow of
people and goods to flow between Israel and Gaza, while periodical y halting these flows
between Israel and the West Bank.
The Palestinians’ alternatives to functional dependence on Israel’s economy include
 attracting investment and building a self-sufficient economy;
 looking to neighboring Egypt and Jordan (which struggle with their own political
and economic problems) for economic integration; or
 depending indefinitely on external assistance.
For the West Bank and Gaza to attract enough long-term investment to become more self-
sufficient, most observers agree that uncertainties regarding the political and security situation
and Israeli restrictions on the movement of goods, people, and capital would need to be
significantly reduced.195 Such changes may be untenable absent an overal resolution of Israeli-
Palestinian disputes. In the meantime, donors and lenders occasional y provide emergency
funding to stave off fiscal crisis.

195 World Bank, June 2, 2020.
Congressional Research Service

49

The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

Appendix E. Palestinian Initiatives in
International Fora
The PLO has pursued a number of international initiatives—opposed by the United States and
Israel—that are part of a broader effort to obtain greater international recognition of Palestinian
statehood. Some 139 out of 193 U.N. member states reportedly have formal y recognized the
state of Palestine that the PLO declared in 1988.196
The PLO’s international initiatives are centered on the United Nations. In September 2011, PLO
Chairman Abbas applied for Palestinian membership in the United Nations. Official y, the
application remains pending in the Security Council’s membership committee, whose members
did not achieve consensus during 2011 deliberations.197 The application for Palestinian
membership would likely face a U.S. veto if it came to a future vote in the Security Council. In
fal 2011, the Palestinians obtained membership in the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO).198
Under U.S. laws passed in 1990 and 1994,199 Palestinian admission to membership in UNESCO
in 2011 triggered the withholding of U.S. assessed and voluntary financial contributions to the
organization. If the Palestinians were to obtain membership in other U.N. entities, the 1990 and
1994 U.S. laws might trigger withholdings of U.S. financial contributions to these entities.200
Such withholdings could adversely affect these entities’ budgets and complicate the conduct of
U.S. foreign policy within the U.N. system and other multilateral settings. The following are
some other significant steps for the PLO in international fora:

196 A list from the PLO’s observer mission to the United Nations is available at https://palestineun.org/about -
palestine/diplomatic-relations/. It does not include the United States, Canada, Japan, or most Western European
countries, but does include China, India, and Russia.
197 United Nations Security Council, “ Report of the Committee on the Admission of New Members concerning the
application of Palestine for admission to membership in the United Nations,” S/2011/705, November 11, 2011.
Paragraph 19 of this report provides a summary of the varying views that committee members advanced r egarding
Palestinian membership: “ T he view was expressed that the Committee should recommend to the Council that Palestine
be admitted to membership in the United Nations. A different view was expressed that the membership application
could not be supported at this time and an abstention was envisaged in the event of a vote. Yet another view expressed
was that there were serious questions about the application, t hat the applicant did not meet t he requirements for
membership and that a favourable recommendat ion to the General Assembly would not be supported.”
198 For more information, see CRS Report R42999, The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO), by Luisa Blanchfield and Marjorie Ann Browne.
199 P.L. 101-246 (Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991) and P.L. 103-236 (Foreign
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995).
200 In May 2018, the Palestinians obtained membership in the U.N. Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), but
without consequences under U.S. law because the United States is not a member of or donor to UNIDO.
Congressional Research Service

50

The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

 On November 29, 2012, the U.N. General Assembly adopted Resolution 67/19.
The resolution changed the permanent U.N. observer status of the PLO
(recognized before as “Palestine” and now as “State of Palestine” within the U.N.
system) from an “entity” to a “non-member state.”201
 In 2016, the Palestinians acceded to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC).202
 In 2017, the Palestinians obtained membership in Interpol.
 In 2018, the Palestinians applied to join the U.N. Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD)203 and deposited an instrument of accession to the
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) with the U.N. Secretary General.204

Author Information

Jim Zanotti

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should n ot be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to
copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

201 T he PLO has had permanent observer status at the United Nations since 1974. Following the adoption of Resolution
67/19, the “State of Palestine” maintains many of the capacities it had as an observ er entity—including participation in
General Assembly debates and the ability to co-sponsor draft resolutions and decisions related to proceedings on
Palestinian and Middle East issues. Despite its designation as a state, the “State of Palestine” is not a member of the
United Nations, and therefore does not have the right to vote or to call for a vote in the General Assembly on
resolutions. However, in November 2013, the “State of Palestine” participated in the balloting for a judge for the
International T ribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Article 13, Section 2(d) of the Statute for the T ribunal (Annex to
U.N. Doc. S/25704, adopted pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 827 (1993), as subsequently amended)
includes “non-Member States maintaining permanent observer missions at United Nations Headquarters” in the
election of the tribunal’s judges.
202 UNFCCC website, State of Palestine Joins Convention, March 15, 2016.
203 UNCT AD website, State of Palestine expresses intent to join UNCT AD, May 24, 2018.
204 Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) website, State of Palestine Accedes to the Chemical
Weapons Convention, May 23, 2018. T he OPCW later announced that the “State of Palestine” had become a State
Party to the CWC and an OPCW Member State. OPCW website, State of Palestine Joins the Organisation for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, June 21, 2018.
Congressional Research Service
RL34074 · VERSION 52 · UPDATED
51