Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
October 6, 2021
The State of Qatar, a small Arab Gulf monarchy which has about 300,000 citizens in a total
population of about 2.4 million, has employed its ample financial resources to exert regional
Kenneth Katzman
influence, often independent of the other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi
Specialist in Middle
Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, and Oman) alliance. Qatar has
Eastern Affairs
fostered a close defense and security alliance with the United States and has maintained ties to a

wide range of actors who are often at odds with each other, including Sunni Islamists, Iran and
Iran-backed groups, and Israeli officials.

Qatar’s support for regional Muslim Brotherhood organizations and its sometimes controversial Al Jazeera media network
have contributed to a backlash against Qatar led by fellow GCC states Saudi Arabia and the UAE. In June 2017, Saudi
Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, joined by Egypt and a few other governments, severed relations with Qatar and imposed
limits on the entry and transit of Qatari nationals and vessels in their territories, waters, and airspace. The Trump
Administration sought a resolution of the dispute, in part because the rift was hindering U.S. efforts to formalize a broad front
of Arab states to counter Iran. During the rift, Qatar deepened relations with Turkey and Iran. On January 5, 2021, Saudi
Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt agreed to lift the blockade, and Qatar agreed to drop its pursuit of legal cases against
those countries in international organizations. The intra-GCC reconciliation process has since proceeded, albeit unevenly, and
particularly slowly with the UAE.
Qatar’s leaders work with the United States to secure the Persian Gulf, as do the other GCC leaders. The United States and
Qatar have had a formal Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) that reportedly addresses a U.S. troop presence in Qatar,
consideration of U.S. arms sales to Qatar, U.S. training, and other defense cooperation. Under the DCA, Qatar hosts more
than 8,000 U.S. forces and the regional headquarters for U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) at various military facilities,
including the large Al Udeid Air Base. U.S. forces deployed at these facilities participate in operations throughout the region.
Qatar is a significant buyer of U.S.-made weaponry, including combat aircraft. In January 2018, Qatar and the United States
inaugurated a “Strategic Dialogue” that has included discussion of efforts to improve accommodations for U.S. personnel
deployed to Al Udeid Air Base, which has been used extensively in the U.S. operation to evacuate U.S. personnel and
Afghan allies from Afghanistan in the summer of 2021. Qatar has been active as a mediator between the international
community and the new Taliban regime there, and Doha has served as the temporary location for a U.S. embassy to
Afghanistan after U.S. Embassy Kabul closed in the course of the U.S. withdrawal. In 2017, the United States and Qatar
signed a broad memorandum of understanding to cooperate against international terrorism.
The voluntary relinquishing of power in 2013 by Qatar’s former Amir (ruler) departed from GCC patterns of governance in
which leaders generally remain in power for life. At the same time, apparently out of concern for opening up divisions in
Qatari society and politics, Qatar delayed holding elections for a legislative body for several years, but the first vote for 30
out of 45 seats of the “Shura Council” was held on October 2, 2021. U.S. and international reports, which are scrutinizing
Qatar as its hosting of the World Cup soccer tournament approaches in 2022, criticize Qatar for not adhering to international
standards of labor rights practices, but credit it for taking steps to improve the conditions for expatriate workers.
Like other GCC states, Qatar is wrestling with the fluctuations in global hydrocarbons prices that started in 2014 and were
compounded by the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. As of early October, Qatar has reported about
237,000 infections and 600 deaths from the disease, which has affected Qatar’s expatriate population disproportionately.
Qatar has been able to weather economic headwinds because of its small population, substantial financial reserves, and its
favorable business conditions for entrepreneurs. But, Qatar shares with virtually all the other GCC states a lack of economic
diversification and reliance on revenues from sales of hydrocarbon products. On December 3, 2018, Qatar withdrew from the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in order to focus on its natural gas export sector; Qatar has the third
largest proven reserves of natural gas in the world.
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Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

Brief History
Prior to 1867, Qatar was ruled by the family of the leaders of neighboring Bahrain, the Al
Khalifa. That year, an uprising in the territory led the United Kingdom, then the main Western
power in the Persian Gulf region, to instal a leading Qatari family, the Al Thani, to rule over what
is now Qatar. The Al Thani family claims descent from the central Arabian tribe of Banu Tamim,
the tribe to which Shaykh Muhammad ibn Abd Al Wahhab, the founder of Wahhabism,
belonged.1 Thus, Qatar official y subscribes to Wahhabism, a conservative Islamic tradition that it
shares with Saudi Arabia.
In 1916, in the midst of World War I and after the Ottoman Empire relinquished its territorial
claims over Qatar, the Al Thani family signed an agreement under which Qatar formal y became a
British protectorate. In 1971, after Britain announced it would no longer exercise responsibility
for Persian Gulf security, Qatar and Bahrain considered joining with the seven emirates
(principalities) that were then cal ed the “Trucial States” to form the United Arab Emirates
(UAE). However, Qatar and Bahrain decided to become independent rather than join that union.
The UAE was separately formed in late 1971. Qatar adopted its first written constitution in April
1970 and became fully independent on September 1, 1971. The United States opened an embassy
in Doha in 1973. The United States is currently represented by Charge D’Affaires John
Desrocher, appointed to that post in June 2021.
Table 1. Senior Leaders of Qatar
Position
Leader
Amir (ruler) and Minister of Defense
Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani (since 2013)
Deputy Amir and Crown Prince (heir apparent)
Abdul ah bin Hamad Al Thani (since 2014)
Prime Minister and Minister of Interior
Khalid bin Khalifa bin Abdulaziz Al Thani (since 2020)
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State for
Khalid bin Mohamed Al Attiyah (since 2017)
Defense Affairs
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs
Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani (since 2017)
Minister of Finance
Ali Sharif al-Imadi (since 2013)
President of the Shura Council
Ahmad bin Abdal ah bin Zaid Al Mahmoud (since 2017)
Ambassador to the United States
Mishal bin Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani (since 2017)
Source: Qatari Government Websites.

1 Information in this section is taken from Bernard Haykel, “Qatar and Islamism,” Policy Brief: Norwegian
Peacebuilding Resource Centre, February 2013.
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Figure 1. Qatar at-a-Glance

Area
11,586 sq. km (slightly smal er than Connecticut)
People
Population: 2.3 mil ion, of which about 90% are expatriates
Religions: Muslim 68%, of which about 90% are Sunni; Christian 14%; Hindu 14%; 3% Buddhist; and
1% other. Figures include expatriates.
Ethnic Groups: Arab 40%; Pakistani 18%; Indian 18%; Iranian 10%; other 14%. Figures include
expatriates. Virtual y al citizens are Arab.
Economy
Gross Domestic Product (GDP): $350 bil ion on purchasing power parity (ppp) basis
GDP per capita: $125,000 on ppp basis
Inflation: 0.6%
GDP Growth Rate: 1.5% in 2019; -3% in 2020
Export Partners: (In descending order) Japan, South Korea, India, China, Singapore, UAE
Import Partners: (In descending order) United States, China, Germany, Japan, Britain, Italy
Oil and Gas
Oil Exports: Slightly more than 700,000 barrels per day. Negligible amounts to the United States.
Producer of condensates (light oil) vital to S. Korean petrochemical industry.
Gas (LNG) Exports: 126 bil ion cubic meters per year
Sources: Graphic created by CRS. Map borders and cities generated by Hannah Fischer using data from
Department of State; World Bank Group, Esri; and Google Maps. At-a-glance information from CIA World
Factbook, Economist Intel igence Unit Country Report: Qatar; World Bank; http://www.statista.com.
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Governance
Qatar’s governing structure approximates that of the other states of the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman) in that it is led by a hereditary
Amir (literal y “prince,” but interpreted as “ruler”), Shaykh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani.2 He
became ruler in June 2013 when his father, Amir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, relinquished
power voluntarily—an unprecedented move in the modern Gulf. The Amir governs through a
prime minister, who is a member of the Al Thani family, and a cabinet, several of whom are
members of the Al Thani or other prominent families. On January 28, 2020, the Amir appointed a
new Prime Minister, U.S.-educated Khalid bin Khalifa bin Abdulaziz Al Thani. The Amir’s
younger brother, Shaykh Abdullah bin Hamad, is deputy Amir and the heir apparent.
Political parties are banned and authorities prohibit political y oriented associations. Political
disagreements in Qatar are aired mainly in private as part of a process of consensus building in
which the leadership tries to balance the interests of the country’s families. There have been no
significant protests by Qatari citizens in many years, but some in the large expatriate community
have sometimes protested for improved working conditions. On the other hand, the elections were
held on October 2, 2021, for a Shura (Advisory) Council, a legislative body that wil expand
popular participation in national decisionmaking.
Qatari citizens approved a constitution in a 2003 referendum, by a 98% vote in favor. The
document affirms that Qatar is a hereditary emirate, specifies Islamic law as a key source of
legislation,3 and provides for elections for 30 of the 45 seats of the country’s Advisory Council
(Majlis Ash-Shura, Shura Council), a national legislative body. According to the constitution, the
Shura Council is empowered to remove ministers (two-thirds majority vote), approve a national
budget, and to draft and vote on proposed legislation, although subject to a veto by the Amir. Stil ,
it remains unclear how much influence the new Shura Council wil have on sensitive issues such
as foreign and defense policy, economic and energy policy, and citizenship laws.
The country has long held elections for a 29-seat Central Municipal Council, which advises the
government on local public services. Elections for the fifth Council (each serving a four-year
term) were held in April 2019. Voter registration was lower than expected; roughly 1 in 13 Qatari
adults cast bal ots.4
October 2, 2021, Shura Council Election
Qatar’s leaders long delayed the Shura Council elections, reportedly out of concern that the
elections would divide Qataris and potential y provide opportunity for Qatar’s neighbors to
interfere in Qatari politics. Apparently deciding that the country should move forward to expand
political participation, in October 2019, the Amir ordered the establishment of a committee,
chaired by the Prime Minister, to organize the first Council elections.5 In November 2020, the
Amir announced the first Shura Council elections would take place in October 2021. An election
law adopted in early August 2021 to govern the Council elections requires voters to be above 18
years old, be “original” Qataris (families present in Qatar prior to 1930), be born in Qatar, and

2 Shaykh is an honorific term.
3 Amy Hawthorne, “Qatar’s New Constitution: Limited Reform from the T op,” August 26, 2008.
4 Justin Gengler, “Qatar’s first elections since 2017 reveal unexpected impact of GCC crisis,” Al Monitor, April 24,
2019.
5 “Qatar takes step toward first Shura Council election: QNA agency,” Reuters, October 31, 2019.
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have Qatari grandfathers. Candidates are also to be fluent in Arabic. That definition excluded
from voting many members of the Al Murrah tribe, which is nomadic, and many of whom do not
have Qatari citizenship. Several hundred Al Murrah protested the election law on August 9,6 and
have continued to argue their exclusion through established complaint processes after the October
2 election.
According to Qatari officials, 284 candidates ran in the October 2, 2021, election, of which 28
were women. Campaigning was said to focus on appeals to familial and tribal relationships rather
than issues and differences of opinion among competing candidates. The turnout was about 63%
of eligible voters. None of the women was elected. The government noted in post-election
releases that the Amir wil soon appoint the 15 remaining seats of the Shura Council to “ensure
representation across communities in Qatar,” but no date for those appointments has been
announced.
Human Rights Issues7
The State Department human rights report for 2020 identifies the most significant human rights
problems in Qatar as
restrictions on free expression, including criminalization of libel; restrictions on peaceful
assembly and freedom of association, including prohibitions on political parties and labor
unions; restrictions on migrant workers’ freedom of movement; limits on the ability of
citizens to choose their government in free and fair elections; lack of investigation of and
accountability for violence against women; criminalization of consensual same-sex sexual
conduct; and reports of forced labor.
A National Human Rights Committee (NHRC), which investigates al egations of human rights
abuses, operates independently, but it is funded largely by the Qatar Foundation that is run by the
Amir’s mother, Shaykha Moza. Among the NHRC’s functions is to monitor the situation of about
1,000-2,000 stateless residents (“bidoons”),8 mostly members of families whose citizenship was
revoked decades ago for opposing Qatar’s leaders. Although the constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, the Amir appoints al judges.
Freedom of Expression
Despite the absence of open opposition among the citizenry, the 2011 “Arab Spring” uprisings
apparently prompted the government to increase penalties for criticizing the leadership. In 2014,
the government approved a cybercrimes law that provides for up to three years in prison for
spreading “false news.” One law, enacted in January 2020, authorizes imprisonment for anyone
who “broadcasts, publishes, or republishes false or biased rumors, statements, or news, or
inflammatory propaganda, domestical y or abroad, with the intent to harm national interests, stir
up public opinion, or infringe on the social system or the public system of the state.”9 Qatari
officials assert that the law targets those who organize violent opposition activities.

6 “Protests in Doha: T he Qatari Citizenship Is Not Enough for Voting,” Al Bawaba, August 10, 2021.
7 Much of the information in this section is based on U.S. Department of State, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices: Qatar, March 30, 2021.
8 Bidoon is the Arabic word for “without,” and refers to persons without documentation for their residency in country.
9 Amnesty International, “Qatar: Repressive new law further curbs freedom of expression,” January 20, 2020.
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Al Jazeera Media Network
According to the 2020 State Department human rights report, the government owns and partial y
funds the Al Jazeera Media Network, which has evolved since its establishment in the mid-1990s
into a global media organization. A U.S.-based representative for Al Jazeera says that, in 2011, its
legal standing was changed to an independent legal entity with characteristics similar to a U.S.
non-profit.10 The network features a wide range of guests from al over the region debating issues;
Arab leaders have sometimes reacted to the network’s critical coverage by closing Al Jazeera’s
bureaus or imprisoning its journalists. The network has run stories that criticize Qatar, including
on the situation of expatriate laborers.11 The State Department quotes “some observers and former
Al Jazeera employees” as al eging that Qatar’s government “influences” Al Jazeera content.12
Officials in the United Arab Emirates and other neighboring countries have sometimes criticized
Al Jazeera for providing a platform for Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, and other Islamists to
promote their ideology.13 Some Members of Congress have asserted that Al Jazeera is an arm of
the Qatar government and that its U.S. bureau should be required to register under the Foreign
Agents Registration Act (FARA).14

10 Information provided to CRS in August 2020 by CLS Strategies, a firm that represents Al Jazeera in the United
States.
11 See, e.g., “Renewed Calls for Qatar to Address T reatment of Migrant Workers,” Al Jazeera, September 19, 2019.
12 U.S. Department of State, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Qatar, March 30, 2021.
13 Jared Malsin, “ In the Eye of the Storm: Can Al Jazeera Survive the Gulf Crisis?” Time, August 21, 2017.
14 Office of Senator T om Cotton, “ Lawmakers Seek FARA Evaluation of Qatari-owned Al Jazeera,” press release, June
19, 2019.
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Qatari Leadership

Shaykh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani
Shaykh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani was born on June 3, 1980. He is the fourth son of
the former Amir, Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, and the ninth Al Thani ruler in Qatar.
He was appointed heir apparent in August 2003 when his elder brother, Shaykh
Jasim, renounced his claim, reportedly based on his father’s lack of confidence in
Shaykh Jasim’s ability to lead. Shaykh Tamim became Amir on June 25, 2013, when
Amir Hamad stepped down in a voluntary transfer of power that was unprecedented
for Qatar and the Gulf region. Amir Tamim was educated at Great Britain’s
Sherbourne School and graduated from its Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst in
1998, from which his father graduated in 1971. Amir Tamim heads the Qatari
Investment Authority, which has bil ions of dol ars of investments in Europe, the
United States, and elsewhere. He is reportedly highly popular for resisting Saudi-led
pressure during the intra-GCC crisis.

Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani
Amir Tamim’s father, Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, seized power from his
father, Amir Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani, in June 1995, during his father’s absence in
Europe. In 1972, after finishing his education in Britain and assuming command of
some Qatari military units, Hamad had helped his father depose his grandfather in a
bloodless seizure of power while then-Amir Ahmad bin Ali Al Thani was on a
hunting trip in Iran.
While Shaykh Hamad is no longer Qatar’s ruler, he, his wife, and several of their
other children remain key figures in the ruling establishment. Qatari media refer to
Shaykh Hamad as “The Father Amir” and acknowledge that he has some continuing
role in many aspects of policy. His favored wife (of three), Shaykha Moza al-Misnad
Al Thani, continues to chair the powerful Qatar Foundation for Education, Science,
and Community Development (QF). The QF runs Doha’s Education City, where
several Western universities have established branches and which is a large investor
in the United States and Europe. One daughter (and ful sister of the current Amir),
Shaykha Mayassa, chairs the Qatar Museums, a major buyer of global artwork.
Another daughter, Shaykha Hind, is vice chairman of the QF. Both daughters
graduated from Duke University. Another relative, Hamad bin Jasim Al Thani,
remains active in Qatar’s investment activities and international circles. During Amir
Hamad’s rule, Shaykh Hamad bin Jasim was Foreign Minister, Prime Minister, and
architect of Qatar’s relatively independent foreign policy. Shaykh Hamad’s father,
former Amir Khalifa bin Hamad, died in October 2016.
Sources: various press, and Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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Women’s Rights
According to the State Department, social and legal discrimination against women continues,
despite the constitutional assertion of equality.15 The application of Islamic law, which is not
gender-neutral on marriage, divorce, child custody and guardianship, and inheritance, as wel as a
lack of laws against domestic violence, contribute to this gender inequality.16 Laws prevent
women from passing citizenship to their children, though a 2018 permanent residency law has
created a mechanism for children born to Qatari women married to non-Qatari men to access
government health and education. Guardianship laws require women to obtain permission from
their male guardians to travel alone before the age of 25 if they are unmarried, as wel as “to
marry, obtain a government scholarship to pursue higher education, work in government, and
obtain some reproductive health care.”17
Women in Qatar drive and own property, and constitute about 15% of business owners and more
than a third of the overal workforce, including as professionals. Women serve in public office,
such as minister of public health, chair of the Qatar Foundation, head of the General Authority for
Museums, and ambassadors to the United Nations and several countries. Qatar’s constitution
recognizes the right of women to vote and hold office, and two women have been elected at the
municipal council level. In November 2017, the Amir appointed four women to the Majlis As-
Shura for the first time in the body’s history.18 As noted above, however, none of the women
candidates was elected in the October 2, 2021, Shura Council elections. In December 2019, the
spokeswoman for the Foreign Ministry, Lolwah Al Khater, was appointed “assistant minister” of
Foreign Affairs (number two at the Foreign Ministry).19
Trafficking in Persons and Labor Issues20
The State Department’s Trafficking in Persons report for 2020 maintained Qatar at a Tier 2
ranking on the basis that the government makes significant efforts to comply with the minimum
standards for the elimination of trafficking. Qatar has enacted a Domestic Worker Law to better
protect those workers and it has established a coordinating body for anti-trafficking initiatives.
Stil , Qatar remains a destination country for men and women subjected to forced labor and, to a
much lesser extent, forced prostitution. Female domestic workers remain vulnerable to trafficking
due to their positioning in private residences. Alongside the January 2018 U.S.-Qatar “Strategic
Dialogue,” the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding to create a framework to
combat trafficking in persons.21
The State Department assesses Qatar’s labor laws as not adequately protecting the rights of
workers to form and join independent unions, conduct legal strikes, or bargain collectively. Qatari
law does not prohibit anti-union discrimination or provide for reinstatement of workers fired for
union activity. Yet, the State Department credits the country with taking steps to protect labor
rights, including for expatriate workers. In 2016, a labor reform law went into effect that provided

15 U.S. Department of State, 2020 Country Report on Human Rights: Qatar, March 2021.
16 CRS Report R46423, Women in the Middle East and North Africa: Issues for Congress, by Zoe Danon and Sarah R.
Collins.
17 Human Rights Watch, “Everything I Have to Do is Tied to a Man”: Women and Qatar’s Male Guardianship Rules,
March 29, 2021.
18 Inter-Parliamentary Union, “IPU welcomes appointment of four women to Qatar’s Parliament ,” November 13, 2017.
19 “Amir appoints Lolwah AlKhater as Assistant to FM.” Gulf Times, December 2, 2019.
20 T his section is based on the U.S. Department of State, 2020 Trafficking in Persons Report, June 25, 2020.
21 U.S. Embassy in Qatar, “ Joint Statement of the Inaugural United States-Qatar Strategic Dialogue,” media note,
January 30, 2018.
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for changes to the “kafala” system (sponsorship requirement for foreign workers) to enable
employees to switch employers at the end of their labor contracts rather than having to leave
Qatar. The law abolished the kafala system entirely at the end of 2019, and further reforms that
took effect in August 2020, established a monthly minimum wage of $275 and provide for stricter
penalties for those that fail to provide their mostly expatriate labor force with adequate housing.
The government also has increased its cooperation with the International Labor Organization
(ILO) to help expatriate workers obtain their rights.
Scrutiny of Qatar’s labor practices has centered on the plight of the many expatriate workers
hired to prepare for the 2022 FIFA World Cup soccer tournament. An Amnesty International
report from September 2019 al eged that workers sometimes are not paid for work and adequate
dispute resolution mechanisms are lacking.22 The Qatar government responded by stating: “Many
of the cases included in the report precede recent legislative amendments—including the
establishment of the Committees for the Settlement of Labour Disputes. These have significantly
improved the processes and increased the speed for resolving labour disputes.” Hundreds of
expatriate workers demonstrated in August 2019 against poor working conditions and unpaid and
delayed wages. Some studies suggested that crowded conditions for expatriate laborers in Qatar
fueled a relatively high per capita infection rate from COVID-19 in the spring of 2020.23
Religious Freedom24
Qatar’s constitution stipulates that Islam is the state religion and Islamic law is “a main source of
legislation,” but Qatari laws also incorporate secular legal traditions. The overwhelming majority
(about 95%) of Qatari citizens are Sunni Muslims, possibly explaining an absence of observable
sectarian tensions. The government permits eight registered Christian denominations to worship
publicly at the Mesaymir Religious Complex, and it has al owed the Evangelical Churches
Al iance of Qatar to build a church. Hindu, Jewish, Buddhists, or other non-Muslim religious
groups are registered with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and they have established vil as and
private homes as houses of worship. According to the International Religious Freedom report for
2019, in January 2019, a delegation led by the Secretary of State met with senior counterparts in
Doha and signed a statement of intent to “support the shared ideals of tolerance and appreciation
for diversity.”
Foreign Policy
Qatar uses its ample financial resources to support a foreign policy that attempts to influence
outcomes in the region. Its policies have enabled Qatar to mediate some regional conflicts, as
wel as to back regional actors at odds with those supported by some of the other GCC states.
Qatar has at times also used its military forces in its interventions. Regional and bilateral issues
reportedly constitute the focus of high-level U.S.-Qatar meetings.25

22 Amnesty International, All Work No Pay: The Struggle of Qatar’s Migrant Workers for Justice, September 19, 2019.
23 “T hese two countries are tiny, rich and have the world’s highest coronavirus infection rates,” Associated Press, July
23, 2020.
24 T his section draws from the U.S. Department of State, 2019 Report on International Religious Freedom , June 10,
2020.
25 U.S. Embassy in Qatar, “ Joint Statement of the Third U.S.-Qatar Strategic Dialogue,” media note, September 18,
2020.
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Qatar and the Intra-GCC Dispute
A consistent source of friction within the GCC has been Qatar’s relationship with Muslim
Brotherhood movements. Qatari officials maintain that the Brotherhood, a political Islamist
movement, participates in the legitimate political process. UAE leaders, in particular, assert that
the Brotherhood seeks to destabilize established governments in the region. In 2014, differences
over this and other issues led Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain to withdraw their ambassadors
from Doha, returning them several months later after Qatar pledged to implement a November
2013 commitment to end support for Muslim Brotherhood-linked organizations.26 The differences
erupted again in June 2017 when Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, joined by Egypt and
Jordan, cut diplomatic relations with Qatar and imposed limits on the entry and transit of Qatari
nationals and vessels in their territories, waters, and airspace. These countries presented Qatar
with 13 demands as conditions for lifting the blockade, including closing Al Jazeera, severing
relations with the Muslim Brotherhood, scaling back relations with Iran, and closing a Turkish
military base in Qatar.27 Amir Tamim expressed openness to negotiations but said Qatar would
not “surrender” its sovereignty by agreeing to the demands.
President Trump initial y echoed criticism of Qatar’s policies, and mediation of the rift was
spearheaded by then-Secretary of State Rex Til erson who, working with Kuwaiti leaders,
conducted “shuttle diplomacy” in the region during July 2017. A U.S. envoy appointed in 2017 to
work on the issue, General (retired) Anthony Zinni, resigned in 2019. In July 2019, Jordan started
a thaw in the boycott by restoring diplomatic relations with Qatar.28 During October 2019-January
2020, Qatar and Saudi Arabia held high-level direct talks, but the talks were suspended in early
January 2020.29
At the 41st GCC summit in Al-Ula, Saudi Arabia, on January 5, 2021, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the
UAE, and Egypt announced that they would be restoring diplomatic relations with Qatar, while
Qatar agreed to drop its pursuit of legal cases against those countries in international
organizations. The Al-Ula Declaration does not make direct reference to the 13 demands
original y articulated in June 2017, but rather to restoring “collaboration among al Member
States” and strengthening “the bonds of brotherhood among them.”30 Direct flights between Doha
and Riyadh resumed on January 11, and flights between Qatar and the other blockading nations
resumed on January 18.31 A senior UAE official visited Qatar on August 26, the first such visit in
over four years, to discuss “.. ways to further develop cooperation.. especial y in the economic
and trade fields...”32 And, in late September, the Amir, the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, and the
UAE National Security Advisor met at a Red Sea resort, signaling an acceleration of the thaw.
Analysts expect the normalization between GCC countries to boost Qatar’s tourism sector,

26 Cable News Network released the text of the November 2013 agreement, which was signed between Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, and Qatar. T he November 2014 agreement was among all the GCC states except Oman.
27 T he list of demands can be found at “ List of demands on Qatar by Saudi Arabia, other Arab nations,” Associated
Press, June 23, 2017.
28 “Inching Away from Saudi-UAE Axis, Jordan Restores T ies with Qatar,” Al Jazeera English, July 9, 2019.
29 Qatar says talks to end GCC crisis were suspended in January, Al Jazeera, February 15, 2020.
30 T uqa Khalid, “ Full transcript of AlUla GCC Summit Declaration: Bolstering Gulf unity ,” Al Arabiya, January 6,
2021; Sultan Barakat, “ Qatar-GCC agreement: A victory for measured diplomacy,” opinion, Al Jazeera, January 8,
2021.
31 Isabel Debre, “ Qatar-Saudi Arabia direct flights resume amid Gulf detente,” AP News, January 11, 2021; Egypt,
UAE resume first Qatar flights after blockade,” Al Jazeera, January 18, 2021.
32 “Emir of Qatar receives delegation led by T ahnoun bin Zayed,” Emirates News Agency, August 26, 2021.
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improve attendance at the 2022 World Cup in Doha, and improve economic cooperation in the
region more general y.33
The intra-GCC rift had roots in and implications for the broader region:
 In Egypt, Qatar supported, political y and financial y, the government of Muslim
Brotherhood-linked figure, Muhammad Morsi, who was elected president in
2012. The UAE and Saudi Arabia backed Morsi’s ouster by Egypt’s military in
2013 and have financial y backed the regime of former military leader and now
President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.
 In Libya, Qatar joined the United States and several GCC and other partner
countries in air operations to help oust Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi in
2011. Subsequently, Qatar, reportedly in partnership with Turkey, has supported
the U.N.-backed government in Tripoli, which is supported by Muslim
Brotherhood-linked factions. The UAE, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia support ex-
military commander Khalifa Haftar, who controls large parts of eastern and
northern Libya and who sought to seize control of Tripoli in 2019.34
 In Yemen, in 2015, Qatar joined the Saudi-led military coalition to battle Iran-
backed Zaidi Shiite Houthi rebels, including deploying about 1,000 military
personnel, along with armor, to guard the Saudi border from Houthi incursions.
The Qatari Air Force also flew air strikes against the Houthis.35 As a result of the
intra-GCC rift, in mid-2017 Qatar withdrew from the mission.
 In Syria, Qatar provided funds and weaponry to rebels fighting the regime of
President Bashar Al Asad, including those reportedly linked to the Muslim
Brotherhood.36 Qatar also claimed that its ties to Jabhat al Nusra (JAN), an Al
Qaeda affiliate that was designated by the United States as a Foreign Terrorist
Organization (FTO), were instrumental in persuading the group to sever its ties to
Al Qaeda in 2016, and to release its Lebanese and Western prisoners.37
Iran
Qatari leaders have consistently pursued dialogue with Iran to reduce regional tensions, while
simultaneously cooperating with U.S. efforts to counter Iran strategical y. In solidarity with its
GCC partners, Qatar withdrew its Ambassador from Tehran in January 2016 during a Saudi-
Iranian rift over the Saudi execution of a dissident Shiite cleric. However, Qatar turned to Iran to
help it cope with the GCC rift, including by importing Iranian foodstuffs and by overflying
Iranian airspace to fly around the GCC countries that were boycotting Qatar. Qatar Airways paid
Iran over $130 mil ion per year in overflight fees.38 In August 2017, Qatar restored full diplomatic

33 Davide Barbuscia and Saeed Azhar, “Gulf economy gets a boost from healing of Saudi-Qatar rift,” Reuters, January
5, 2021; Aarti Nagraj, “ AlUla agreement: What does resetting ties with Qatar mean for the GCC region?” Gulf
Business, February 11, 2021.
34 U.N. Security Council, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on Libya Established Pursuant to Resolution 1973
(2011), March 9, 2016. For information on the conflict in Libya, see CRS In Focus IF11556, Libya and U.S. Policy, by
Christopher M. Blanchard.
35 Author conversations with Qatar Embassy personnel, 2019.
36 Anand Gopal and Jeremy Hodge, Social Networks, Class, and the Syrian Proxy War, International Security Report,
New America, April 6, 2021.
37 “Analysts: Saudi Arabia, Qatar, pushed al-Nusra Front to break with al-Qaeda,” Agencia EFE, July 29, 2016.
38 “UN aviation ruling could deny Iran hundreds of millions of dollars,” Fox News, July 14, 2020.
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relations with Iran, and Qatar did not support the May 8, 2018, U.S. withdrawal from the 2015
multilateral Iran nuclear agreement, instead stating that efforts to “denuclearize” the region
should not lead to “escalation.”39 Through mutual visits of high-ranking officials, Qatar and Iran
sought to de-escalate the U.S.-Iran tensions in the Gulf in 2019,40 and Qatar reportedly has sought
to start a formal dialogue between the GCC and Iran to lower Gulf tensions. Qatar and Iran have
shared a large natural gas field in the Persian Gulf without incident, although some Iranian
officials have occasional y accused Qatar of cheating on the arrangement.41
Israeli-Palestinian Issues/Hamas42
Qatar has maintained contact with al parties in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, including hosting a
visit by then-Prime Minister of Israel Shimon Peres in 1996 and al owing Israel to open a formal
trade office in Doha from 2000 until the 2009 Israel-Hamas conflict erupted. However, smal
levels of direct Israel-Qatar trade, as wel as visits to Doha by Israeli security officials, athletes,
doctors, and other Israelis, reportedly continued after that clash.43 Amir Tamim regularly accuses
Israel of abuses against the Palestinians and expresses support for Palestinian efforts to gain full
United Nations membership and recognition.44
Qatar has engaged with the Islamist group Hamas, a Muslim Brotherhood offshoot and U.S.-
designated terrorist group that has exercised de facto control of the Gaza Strip since 2007. Qatari
officials assert that their engagement with Hamas can help foster Israeli-Palestinian peace.45
Some of Hamas’s top leaders have been based in Doha, and the current leader of its political
bureau, Ismail Haniyeh, reportedly relocated there in 2020.46 Much of Qatar’s leverage with
Hamas and Israel comes in the form of substantial financial aid it provides to the people of Gaza,
which Israeli officials support as a means of promoting calm on the Israel-Gaza border.47 Qatar’s
aid is provided through a “Gaza Reconstruction Committee” headed by Qatari official
Mohammad Al-Emadi, who serves informal y as an envoy to Israel. In March 2020, Qatar
donated $10 mil ion to the Palestinian Authority to help it cope with the COVID-19 outbreak. In
June 2020, Qatar reportedly threatened to suspend the payments to Gaza if Israel proceeded with
its plans to annex some West Bank areas.48 Qatar criticized the August 13, 2020, UAE-Israeli
announcement of a commitment to normalized relations (“Abraham Accords”) as a UAE betrayal
of the Palestinian cause, and indicated that Qatar would not join the Accords unless and until
there were a broader Israel-Palestinian settlement. Qatar was a key mediator to end eleven days of
clashes between Israel and Hamas in May 2021, reportedly facilitated, in part, by new pledges of
Qatari aid to Gaza.49

39 Qatar Foreign Ministry Statement, May 9, 2018.
40 T he Latest: Qatar trying to defuse tensions amid Iran crisis, Fox News, May 16, 2019.
41 “Iran, Qatar, Face off Over North Field, South Pars, Oil and Gas News,” June 6-12, 2016.
42 See CRS Report R44245, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief, by Jim Zanotti, and CRS Report RL34074,
The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.
43 “Qatar cozies up to Israel, again,” Electronic Intifada, February 26, 2020.
44 “Israel Doesn’t Want Peace: Emir,” Qatar The Peninsula, September 29, 2015.
45 Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “ Press Conference of His Excellency Minister of Foreign Affairs in Paris,” June
12, 2017.
46 “Hamas leader Haniyeh decides to settle in Qatar – report,” Jerusalem Post, February 2, 2020.
47 Neville T eller, “What Do You Make of Qatar?,” The Jerusalem Post, September 19, 2019.
48 “Qatar to suspend Gaza payments to pressure Israel over annexation,” Axios, June 23, 2020.
49 ”Israel and Hamas Near Cease-Fire Amid Mounting Pressure.” Wall Street Journal, May 19, 2021.
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Qatar’s critics assert that the country’s relations with Hamas leaders constitute support for a
terrorist organization. In the 115th Congress, the Palestinian International Terrorism Support Act
of 2017 (H.R. 2712), which was ordered to be reported to the full House on November 15, 2017,
appeared directed at Qatar by sanctioning foreign governments determined to be providing
financial or other material support to Hamas or its leaders. Versions of that bil introduced in the
116th Congress, H.R. 1850 and S. 2680, did not directly reference Qatar as supporting Hamas and
contained exceptions for purely humanitarian aid.50 H.R. 1850 passed the House on July 23, 2019,
by voice vote. The bil was reintroduced in the 117th Congress (H.R. 261).
Afghanistan/Taliban Office
Qatar did not recognize the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan when the
movement ruled during 1996-2001. However, the stalemate in the conflict there apparently
contributed to a Qatari decision, with U.S. support, to al ow the Taliban to open a representative
office in Doha in 2013, through which moderate Taliban figures could engage with outside
stakeholders in the Afghan situation. U.S.-Taliban talks led to a May 2014, exchange of captured
U.S. soldier Bowe Bergdahl for five Taliban figures who subsequently joined the Taliban office in
Doha. After the Trump Administration decided to engage the Taliban with the intent of winding
down U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, Qatar brokered and hosted many rounds of talks between
the United States and Taliban representatives, culminating in a U.S.-Taliban peace agreement that
was signed in Doha on February 29, 2020 (“Doha Agreement”). Doha also hosted several rounds
of talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban on a political solution for Afghanistan,
which proved unsuccessful.51 In addition, Qatar’s contacts with the Haqqani Network, a U.S.-
designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) that is an al y of the Taliban, helped produce a
November 2019 prisoner exchange that included the release from Afghan custody of Anas
Haqqani, the brother of the deputy leader of the Taliban movement, Sirajuddin Haqqani.52
During 2001-2021, Qatari ground forces did not deploy to Afghanistan, but U.S. forces engaged
there used Qatari facilities, and Qatar’s air force delivered cargo and provided other logistical
support to U.S. forces. Following the Taliban’s August 2021 takeover of the country, Qatar helped
the United States evacuate U.S. and Afghan citizens from Kabul. In addition to other support, a
Qatari diplomat to Afghanistan reportedly escorted smal groups of Americans into the Kabul
airport for evacuation.53 After the completion of the U.S. withdrawal on August 30, several Qatar
Airways charter flights evacuated U.S. and other nationals, facilitated by Qatari technical support
that enabled Kabul airport to reopen. Senior U.S. officials, including in visits to Doha in
September 2021 by Secretary of State Blinken and Secretary of Defense Austin, thanked Qatar
for its help in the evacuation operation, as wel as for its hosting, in Doha, of a temporary U.S.
embassy to Afghanistan. U.S. Embassy Kabul was closed in conjunction with the U.S. withdrawal
and Taliban takeover, and its diplomats were transferred to Doha. Also in September, Qatar’s
Foreign Minister became the first senior foreign official to visit Kabul for official meetings with
Taliban government leaders; he also met with senior figures from the ousted government,

50 “Eliot Engel Weakens Hamas Sanctions Bill After Lobbying from Qatar,” New York Post, September 21, 2019.
51 Mjuab Mashal, “Afghanistan Peace T alks Open in Qatar, Seeking End to Decades of War ,” New York Times,
September 12, 2020. See also CRS Report R45122, Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief, by Clayton
T homas.
52 “Afghan Government Releases Militants In Apparent Exchange For American, Australian Captives,” RFE/RL,
November 11, 2019.
53 “Biden says safe zone around Kabul airport to expand, as Pentagon enlists commercial airlines to aid evacuations,”
Washington Post, August 22, 2021.
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including former president Hamid Karzai and former chief executive officer Dr. Abdullah
Abdullah, who sought unsuccessfully to broker a broad-based Afghan government. He and other
Qatari officials have sought to pressure the Taliban to respect rights and protect civilians.54
Qatar also came in for some criticism for its difficulties handling the large number of evacuees
sent to Al Udeid Air Base in a short period of time. About 40,000 evacuees were processed at that
base by the time the last U.S. soldier left Kabul on August 30. Reports from the first week of
evacuations found that evacuees were facing unsanitary and crowded conditions at Al Udeid.
DOD and Department of State officials told news outlets that they were working to reduce
bottlenecks and deploy extra staff to al eviate the “dire conditions” at Al Udeid.55 Security
screening processes at Al Udeid detected at least one Afghan evacuee with potential ties to ISIS,
and at least 100 others were flagged for potential matches to intel igence agency watch lists. In
most of those cases, the individuals were ultimately cleared by follow-on screening.56
Other Qatari Relationships and Mediation Efforts
Elsewhere in the region
 In March 2021, Qatar, along with Turkey and Russia, launched new consultations
to reach a political settlement to the Syrian civil war, in line with U.N.
resolutions, as wel as to discuss mechanisms to deliver humanitarian aid.57
 In Sudan, Qatar provided funds and promises of investment to achieve a series of
agreements between the government and various rebel factions in Darfur.58
Qatar’s influence in Sudan in the aftermath of the ouster of longtime President
Omar Hassan Al Bashir in 2019 is uncertain, amid competition with other GCC
states for influence there.
U.S.-Qatar Defense and Security Cooperation59
U.S.-Qatar defense and security relations are extensive, including through a “Strategic Dialogue”
that first convened in January 2018. The U.S-Qatar defense relationship emerged after the six
Gulf monarchies formed the GCC in late 1981 to back Iraq against the threat posed by Iran in the
1980-88 Iran-Iraq War. In the latter stages of that war, Iran attacked international shipping in the
Gulf and some Gulf state oil loading facilities, but none in Qatar. GCC forces participated in the
U.S.-led military coalition that expel ed Iraq from Kuwait in February 1991, and Qatari armored
forces helped defeat an Iraqi attack on the Saudi town of Khafji in January 1991.
Qatar is a member of the U.S.-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS (the Islamic State
organization). In 2014, Qatar flew some airstrikes in Syria against Islamic State positions.
However, by the end of 2014, the coalition ceased identifying Qatar as a participant in coalition
strikes inside Syria. In 2019, Qatar indicated it would join the U.S.-led maritime security mission
(Operation Sentinel) intended to deter Iran from further attacks on commercial shipping in the

54 “Qatar calls on T aliban to protect civilians,” AFP, August 17, 2021.
55 Jordan Williams, “Afghan refugees living in ‘dire conditions’ at US air base: report,” T he Hill, August 24, 2021.
56 T ara Copp, “ Kabul Evacuee With Potential ISIS T ies Detained at Qatar Base,” Defense One, August 24, 2021.
57 “T urkey, Russia, Qatar to push for political resolution in Syria,” Reuters, March 11, 2021.
58 UNAMID, “ Doha Document for Peace in Darfur,” May 31, 2011.
59 Much of this section is derived from: U.S. Department of State, “ U.S. Security Cooperation With Qatar,” fact sheet,
January 20, 2021.
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Gulf, which includes Bahrain, UAE, and Saudi Arabia.60 The Qatar government has not
announced whether it is participating in that mission, which began operations in late 2019.
Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA)
The United States and Qatar signed a formal DCA on June 23, 1992, and it was renewed for 10
years, reportedly with some modifications, in December 2013. The text of the pact is classified,
but it reportedly addresses U.S. military access to Qatari military facilities, prepositioning of U.S.
armor and other military equipment, and U.S. training of Qatar’s military forces.61 More than
8,000 U.S. military personnel are deployed at the various facilities in Qatar, including Al Udeid
Air Base, discussed further below.62
Qatar’s force of about 16,500 is the smal est in the region except for Bahrain. Of that force, about
12,000 are ground forces, 2,500 are naval forces, and 2,000 are air forces. Qatar has sought to
compensate for the smal size of its force with purchases of advanced weaponry such as U.S.-
made combat aircraft and German-made Leopard tanks,63 as discussed further below.
Al Udeid Air Base (Air Force/CENTCOM)64
Most of the U.S. military personnel in Qatar are U.S. Air Force personnel based at the large Al
Udeid air base southwest of Doha.65 Al Udeid Base also hosts the forward headquarters for
CENTCOM. U.S. personnel deployed to Qatar participate in U.S. operations such as Operation
Inherent Resolve (OIR) against the Islamic State organization, and they provide a substantial
capability against Iran. In conjunction with U.S.-Iran tensions since mid-2019, the United States
deployed F-22 combat aircraft to Al Udeid.
The U.S.-Qatar Strategic Dialogue has produced agreements to expand defense and security
cooperation, including the possibility of “permanent” U.S. basing there, centered on the
expansion and improvements of Al Udeid over the next two decades. In January 2019, during the
second U.S.-Qatar Strategic Dialogue, the Qatar Ministry of Defense and the U.S. Department of
Defense signed a memorandum of understanding that DOD referred to as a “positive step towards
the eventual formalization of Qatar’s commitment to support sustainment costs and future
infrastructure costs at [Al Udeid Air Base].”66Al Udeid has been steadily expanded and enhanced
with Qatari funding (over $8 bil ion to support U.S. and coalition operations at Al Udeid since
2003) and about $500 mil ion in U.S. military construction funding since 2003.67 Qatar reportedly

60 “Qatar, Kuwait told U.S. they will join naval coalition, official says,” Reuters, November 25, 2019.
61 U.S. Library of Congress, Country Studies: Persian Gulf States, 1994. Some provisions of DCA’s with other GCC
states are discussed in Sami Hajjar, U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects (U.S. Army War
College: Strategic Studies Institute), March 2002, p. 27.
62 U.S. Department of State, “ Coordinator for Counterterrorism Ambassador Nathan A. Sales T ravels to Qatar,” media
note, August 12, 2020.
63 “Qatar is now one of the most well-equipped military forces in the Middle East ,” Army Recognition, July 20, 2020.
64 U.S. Department of State, “Joint Statement of the Inaugural United States-Qatar Strategic Dialogue,” media note,
January 30, 2018.
65 Adam T aylor, “ As T rump tries to end ‘endless wars,’ America’s biggest Mideast base is getting bigger,” The
Washington Post, August 21, 2019.
66 U.S. Department of Defense, “U.S. and Qatar sign MoU Reaffirming Qatar’s Commitment to Supporting U.S.
Military Activities at Al Udeid Air Base,” press release, January 14, 2019.
67 Figures compiled by CRS.
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is providing another $1.8 bil ion for the Al Udeid expansion plan.68 The FY2021 National
Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 116-283) authorized $790 mil ion for military construction
projects for Al Udeid, pursuant to an agreement with the State of Qatar for required in-kind
contributions. In 2018, the State Department approved the sale to Qatar of equipment, with an
estimated value of about $200 mil ion, to upgrade its Air Operation Center.
As Saliyah Facility (Army) and Hamad Port
From 1992 until 2021, the U.S. Army component of U.S. Central Command prepositions armor
(enough to outfit one brigade) at Camp As Sayliyah outside Doha. U.S. armor stationed in Qatar
was deployed in Operation Iraqi Freedom that removed Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq in
2003. Because the ground force threat to the Gulf from Iraq has largely ended since the 2003 Iraq
war, the Defense Department has de-emphasized prepositioning armor in Qatar. The As Sayliyah
facility was closed in June 2021.69 By contrast, the naval threat in the Gulf has increased, and
Qatar has been expanding the Hamad Port to be able to potential y accommodate larger U.S.
Navy operations.
U.S. Arms Sales to Qatar
Over the past two decades, Qatar has shifted its weaponry mix from European sources toward
U.S.-made equipment.70 According to the State Department military cooperation factsheet cited
above, the United States has $25 bil ion dollars in active government-to-government sales cases
with Qatar under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system, and, since 2014, the United States has
authorized the permanent export of over $2.8 bil ion in defense articles to Qatar via the Direct
Commercial Sales (DCS) process. Qatar has a 100% favorable rate on Blue Lantern end-use
monitoring (EUM) checks for direct commercial sales and a “satisfactory” rating for the FMS
Golden Sentry EUM monitoring program.
 Tanks. Qatar fields 30 French-made AMX-30s main battle tanks and, since 2016,
Germany has delivered 62 “Leopard 2” tanks to Qatar. Qatar has not purchased
U.S.-made tanks, to date.
 Combat Aircraft. On November 17, 2016, based on a Qatari request in 2013, the
Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress of the potential
sale to Qatar of up to 72 U.S.-made F-15s, with an estimated value of $21
bil ion.71 The approval came after an evaluation of the sale with respect to the
U.S. legal requirement to preserve Israel’s “Qualitative Military Edge” (QME).72
During June-December 2017, the United States and Qatar signed agreements for
Qatar to purchase of al 72 of them, with deliveries to be completed by 2023.
Qatar signed a $7 bil ion agreement in May 2015 to buy 24 French-made Rafale

68 “’ America’s biggest Mideast base is getting bigger,” op. cit.
69 “Curtain falls on ASG-Qatar after three decades supporting readiness, resilience.” News: First T heater Sustainment
Command, June 24, 2021.
70 Information on Qatar’s existing military forces and equipment is derived from T he International Institute for
Strategic Studies, “T he Military Balance: T he Middle East and North Africa.”
71 Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) T ransmittal Number 16-58. T he FY2016 National Defense
Authorization Act (Section 1278 of P.L. 114-92) required a DOD briefing for Congress on the sale, including its effect
on Israel’s QME.
72 For information on the QME requirement, see CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by Jeremy M.
Sharp.
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aircraft,73 and deliveries began in early 2019. In September 2017, Qatar signed a
“Statement of Intent” with the United Kingdom to purchase 24 Typhoon combat
aircraft.
 Attack Helicopters. In 2012, the United States sold Qatar AH-64 Apache, UH-
60 M Blackhawk, and MH-60 helicopters, with an estimated value of about $6.6
bil ion. On April 9, 2018, DSCA announced that the State Department had
approved a sale to Qatar of 5,000 Advanced Precision Kil Weapons Systems II
Guidance Sections for use on the Apaches, with an estimated value of $300
mil ion. On May 9, 2019, DSCA notified Congress of a possible sale of another
24 AH-64E Apaches to help Qatar defend its oil and gas platforms, at an
estimated cost of $3 bil ion. S.J.Res. 26 was introduced on May 14, 2019, to
prohibit the sale but, after the Administration stated an intent to veto the bil , a
motion to discharge the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations from further
consideration of the bil failed 42-57.74
 Short-Range Missile and Rocket Systems. During 2012-2016, the United
States sold Qatar Hel fire air-to-ground missiles, Javelin guided missiles, the
M142 High Mobility Artil ery Rocket System (HIMARS), the Army Tactical
Missile System (ATACMS), and the M31A1 Guided Multiple Launch Rocket
System (GMLRS). On April 22, 2016, DSCA notified to Congress a potential
sale to Qatar of 252 RIM-116C Rolling Airframe Tactical Missiles and 2 RIM
116C-2 Rolling Airframe Telemetry Missiles, at an estimated cost of $260
mil ion.75 A July 2019, joint U.S.-Qatar statement said that Qatar had
recommitted to a 2018 agreement to buy 40 National Advanced Surface-to-Air
Missile Systems (NASAM) at an estimated value of $215 mil ion. On July 10,
2019, Raytheon announced that Qatar wil be the first country to purchases its
Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile – Extended Range (AMRAAM-ER)
weapon.76
 Ballistic Missiles. At its national day parade in December 2017, the Qatari
military displayed a newly-purchased SY 400-BP-12A bal istic missile, which
has a 120-mile range and is considered suited to a surface attack mission.77
 Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD). Qatar has purchased various U.S.-made BMD
systems, consistent with U.S. efforts to promote a coordinated Gulf missile
defense capability against Iran’s missile arsenal. In 2012, the United States sold
Qatar Patriot Configuration 3 (PAC-3, made by Raytheon) fire units and missiles
at an estimated value of nearly $10 bil ion. Also that year, the United States
agreed to sel Qatar the Terminal High Altitude Area Air Defense (THAAD), the
most sophisticated ground-based missile defense system the United States has
made available for sale.78 No THAAD purchase has been finalized.

73 T om Hussain, “Is France Positioning Itself for Lead Role in Persian Gulf?” McClatchy, M ay 1, 2015; Awad Mustafa
and Joe Gould, “ Senators Begin Push for Jet Sales to Kuwait, Qatar,” Defense News, January 22, 2016.
74 Marianne Levine, “Senate fails to block arms sales to Bahrain and Qatar,” Politico, June 13, 2019.
75 DSCA T ransmittal Number 16-07.
76 Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 11, 2019.
77 “Why is Qatar Showing Off its New Short -Range Ballistic Missile Arsenal?” Al Arabiya English, December 20,
2017.
78 DSCA announcement, November 5, 2012, http://www.dsca.mil/major-arms-sales/qatar-terminal-high-altitude-area-
defense-thaad.
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 Naval Vessels. In 2016, DSCA transmitted a proposed sale to Qatar of an
unspecified number of U.S.-made Mk-V fast patrol boats, along with other
equipment, with a total estimated value of about $124 mil ion. In August 2017,
Qatar finalized a purchase from Italy of four multirole corvette ships, two fast
patrol missile ships, and an amphibious logistics ship, estimated at $5 bil ion.79
Other Defense Partnerships
Qatar has developed defense relations with several other partners.
 NATO. Qatar established relations with NATO under the “Istanbul Cooperation
Initiative” (ICI). Qatar’s Ambassador to Belgium serves as the interlocutor with
NATO, the headquarters of which is based near Brussels. In June 2018, Qatar’s
Defense Minister said that his country’s long-term “ambition” is to join NATO.80
 France. Prior to 2000, Qatar bought most of its major combat systems from
France. In March 2019, France and Qatar signed agreements on defense
information exchange, cooperation to combat cybercrime, and education.81
 Turkey. Turkey helped Qatar cope with the intra-GCC rift by increasing food
exports to Qatar. Turkey also added more than 1,500 troops to its Tariq bin Ziyad
base in Qatar, which was established in 2014, and it opened a second military
base in Qatar in September 2019.82 To limit Turkey’s influence in the Gulf, the
Saudi-led boycotting states demanded that Qatar close the Turkish bases.83
 Russia. Since 2016, Qatar has broadened its relationship with Russia, including
with several visits to Russia by Amir Tamim, apparently in recognition of
Russia’s heightened role in the region. One of Qatar’s sovereign wealth funds has
increased its investments in Russia, particularly in the Rosneft energy firm. Qatar
is reportedly considering buying the S-400 sophisticated air defense system,84 but
U.S. opposition and the potential for U.S. sanctions for the sale apparently has
contributed to Qatar’s lack of movement to complete the purchase. Section 231
of the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA, P.L.
115-44) sanctions persons or entities that conduct transactions with Russia’s
defense or intel igence sector.
Counter-terrorism Cooperation85
According to the State Department, “The United States and Qatar continued to increase CT
[counter-terrorism] cooperation in 2019, building on progress made after the U.S. Secretary of
State and Qatari Foreign Minister signed a CT MOU [memorandum of understanding] in July

79 “Qatar’s EUR5 Billion Naval Deal with Italy Sees T hree Ship T ypes to Be Delivered,” IHS Jane’s Navy
International, June 17, 2016.
80 Benas Gerdziunas, “NAT O dashes membership hopes of Qatar,” Politico, June 6, 2018.
81 “Qatar, France sign 5 defense, security deals,” Xinhua, March 28, 2019.
82 Stasa Salacanin, “T urkey expands its military base and influence in Qatar,” The New Arab, September 10, 2019.
83 “UAE official says T urkish base in Qatar destabilises region,” Reuters, October 10, 2020; “ How Qatar and T urkey
came together,” The Econom ist, January 21, 2021.
84 “Qatar still studying Russian defense system, minister says,” Reuters, March 4, 2019.
85 Much of the information in this section is taken from: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for
Counterterrorism, “Country Reports on T errorism 2019: Qatar,” released June 2020 (latest available).
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2017.” The State Department’s recent reports on international terrorism state that U.S. technical
assistance to Qatari law enforcement and judicial agencies have increased. A Department of
Justice resident legal advisor has been stationed in Qatar since April 2018, providing technical
assistance to Qatar’s CT efforts and building prosecutorial capacity. In November 2018, Qatar
began using its own funds to pay for a three-year U.S. Department of State Anti-Terrorism
Assistance (ATA) training program, including training pertinent to Qatar’s preparations to host
the FIFA World Cup in 2022. There were no terrorist incidents in Qatar in 2019 or 2020.
At the same time, Qatar’s efforts to prevent the movement of terrorists in or through Qatar were
at times said to be lacking. At least one high-ranking Qatari official provided support to Al Qaeda
figures residing in or transiting Qatar, including suspected September 11, 2001, attacks
mastermind Khalid Shaykh Mohammad.86
Terrorism Financing Issues
U.S. officials credit Qatar with taking steps to prevent terrorism financing and the movement of
suspected terrorists into or through Qatar. According to the State Department, the Qatari
government passed a new AML/CFT (anti-money laundering/countering the financing of
terrorism) law in 2019 and sought feedback from the International Monetary Fund and the U.S.
government during the drafting process. Qatar continued to maintain restrictions, imposed in
2017, on the overseas activities of Qatari charities, requiring al such activity to be conducted
through one of two approved charities in an effort to better monitor charitable giving for terrorist
financing abuse.
The country is a member of the Middle East North Africa Financial Action Task Force
(MENAFATF), a regional body that coordinates efforts combatting money laundering and
terrorism financing. In February 2017, Qatar hosted a meeting of the “Egmont Group” consisting
of 152 country Financial Intel igence Units. Qatar is also a member of the Terrorist Financing
Targeting Center (TFTC), a U.S.-GCC initiative announced in May 2017 and Qatar joined the
United States and other TFTC countries in designating terrorists affiliated with Al Qaeda and IS
later in 2017. In September 2021, the United States and Qatar conducted a joint operation to
uncover and sanction a Gulf-based financing network used by Lebanese Hezbollah, a designated
FTO that is extensively linked to Iran.87
Countering Violent Extremism
State Department officials maintain that: “Qatar has made significant strides in addressing state-
sourced internal and external support for educational and religious content espousing intolerance,
discrimination, sectarianism, and violence, although examples are stil found in textbooks and
disseminated through satel ite television and other media.” Qatar has hosted workshops and
participated in regional meetings on the issue.
Economic Issues amid COVID-19 and the GCC Rift
Qatar has been wrestling with volatility in world energy prices since mid-2014, and the economic
effects of the intra-GCC rift and the COVID-19 pandemic. About 40% of Qatar’s food was

86 Final Report of the National Commission on T errorist Attacks upon the United States.
87 Department of the Treasury. “ The United States and Qatar T ake Coordinated Action against Hizballah Financiers.”
September 29, 2021.
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imported from Saudi Arabia prior to the intra-GCC crisis, and there were reports of runs on stocks
of food when the blockade began in June 2017. However, Qatar’s main sovereign wealth fund,
run by the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), as wel as funds held by the Central Bank, total
about $350 bil ion, according to Qatar’s Central Bank, giving the country a substantial ability to
weather financial demands.88 The government was able to procure similar goods from Turkey,
Iran, and India. After an initial spike of COVID-19 cases in the spring of 2020, government-
mandated lockdowns, social distancing, and travel restrictions resulted in a relatively low number
of deaths through the end of 2020, and a total of about 600 deaths from the disease to date. Over
75% of the population (including expatriates) have been fully vaccinated to date, using both the
Pfizer-BioNTech and Moderna vaccines.89 Qatar’s 2020 budget, announced in December 2019,
anticipated a surplus of about $1.2 bil ion,90 but the economic effects of COVID-19 are expected
to put the country’s budget into deficit for al of 2021.91 As a public health crisis, observers have
noted that the infection spread most rapidly among Qatar’s expatriate labor population that often
live in crowded conditions.92
Large oil and gas reserves and its smal citizen population have combined to make Qatar the
country with the world’s highest per capita income. Oil and gas stil account for over 90% of
Qatar’s export earnings, and over half of government revenues. Proven oil reserves of about 25
bil ion barrels enable Qatar to continue its current levels of oil production (about 700,000 barrels
per day) for over 50 years. Its proven reserves of natural gas are about 13% of the world’s total
and it is the second largest exporter of natural gas in the world. 93 In 2018, Qatar withdrew from
the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in order to focus on its more
high-priority natural gas exports. Qatar is the source of the gas supplies for the Dolphin Gas
Project established by the UAE in 1999 and which became operational in 2007. The project
involves production and processing of natural gas from Qatar’s offshore North Field, which is
connected to Iran’s South Pars Field (see Figure 2), and transportation of the processed gas by
subsea pipeline to the UAE and Oman.94 Qatar Petroleum announced in early 2021 that it wil
boost LNG output by about 40% by 2026 through expansion projects at its North Field.95 Qatar
did not reduced its gas supplies to the other GCC states as retaliation for the blockade. Some
economic data is presented in Figure 1.
U.S.-Qatar Economic Relations
In contrast to the two least wealthy GCC states (Bahrain and Oman), which have free trade
agreements (FTAs) with the United States, Qatar and the United States have not negotiated an
FTA. However, in April 2004, the United States and Qatar signed a Trade and Investment
Framework Agreement (TIFA). Qatar has used the benefits of the more limited agreement to

88 “Qatar Has $340 Billion in Reserves, Can Withstand ‘Any Kind of Shock,’ Central Bank Says,” Istanbul Sabah
Online, July 10, 2017; Arwa Ibrahim, “ Beating the blockade: How Qatar prevailed over a siege,” Al Jazeera, June 5,
2020.
89 World Health Organization, “Qatar,” Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard, accessed April 2, 2021; State of
Qatar, Ministry of Public Health, “Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19),” 2021.
90 “Qatar Announces 2020 Budget, its Biggest in Five Years,” Al Jazeera, December 19, 2019.
91 David Barbuscia, “ Qatar expects $9.5 billion deficit next year on lower revenues,” Reuters, December 11, 2020.
92 “Coronavirus spreads “exponentially” in Qatar’s labor camps,” CBS News, March 15, 2020.
93 CIA, The World Factbook.
94 Dolphin Energy website, http://www.dolphinenergy.com/en/6/about-dolphin-energy/about-us.
95 Jessica Jaganathan, “Analysis: Qatar tightens global gas market grip with bold expansion moves,” Reuters, March
16, 2021.
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undertake large investments in the United States, including the City Center project in Washington,
DC. Also, several U.S. universities and other institutions, such as Cornel University, Carnegie
Mel on University, Georgetown University, Brookings Institution, and Rand Corporation, have
established branches and offices at the Qatar Foundation’s Education City outside Doha. The
joint statement of a 2018 U.S.-Qatar Strategic Dialogue “recognized” QIA’s commitment of $45
bil ion in future investments in U.S. companies and real estate.
According to the U.S. Census Bureau’s “Foreign Trade Statistics” compilation, in 2020, U.S.
exports to Qatar were about $3.4 bil ion, and U.S. imports from Qatar were about $1.2 bil ion.
U.S. exports to Qatar consist mainly of aircraft, machinery, and information technology. U.S.
imports from Qatar consist mainly of petroleum products, but U.S. imports of Qatar’s crude oil or
natural gas have declined to negligible levels in recent years, reflecting the significant increase in
U.S. domestic production. State-run Qatar Petroleum is a major investor in the emerging U.S.
LNG export market.96
Qatar’s airline, Qatar Airways, has been a major buyer of U.S. commercial aircraft, although the
status of additional planned purchases of U.S. aircraft is unclear in light of the effects of the
COVID-19 pandemic on air travel.97 Some U.S. airlines have chal enged Qatar Airways’ benefits
under a U.S.-Qatar “open skies” agreement. The U.S. carriers assert that the airline’s privileges
under that agreement should be revoked because the airline’s aircraft purchases are subsidized by
Qatar’s government, giving it an unfair competitive advantage.98 The United States and Qatar
reached a set of “understandings” on civil aviation on January 29, 2018, committing Qatar
Airways to financial transparency and containing some limitations on the airline’s ability to pick
up passengers in Europe for flights to the United States. Some assert that Qatar Airway’s 2018
purchase of Air Italy might represent a violation of those limitations.
U.S. Assistance
In large part because of its wealth, Qatar receives virtual y no U.S. assistance. At times, smal
amounts of U.S. aid have been provided to help Qatar develop capabilities to prevent smuggling
of arms and narcotics, and the movement of terrorists or proliferation-related gear into Qatar or
around its waterways. In FY2016, the United States spent about $100,000 on programs in Qatar,
about two-thirds of which was for counter-narcotics programming. In FY2017, the United States
provided a total of $78,000 in aid to Qatar, of which $53,000 was for programs to support Qatar’s
counter-narcotics capabilities. The remainder was for maternal and other health programs.
Virtual y no U.S. aid of any kind was provided for Qatar programs in FY2019, the last fiscal year
for which precise data is available.

96 Adam Schreck, “AP Interview: Qatar Energy Minister Wants ‘Fair’ Oil Price,” Associated Press, May 24, 2016.
97 T he White House announced after the July 9 T rump-T amim meeting that Qatar Airways would buy (1) five Boeing
777 Freighters; (2) large-cabin aircraft from Gulfstream; and (3) GE jet engines and services to power its 787 and 777
aircraft. White House, “U.S.-Qatar Joint Statement,” July 9, 2019.
98 Frank Kane, “Open Skies Dispute Between US and Gulf Airlines Escalates,” The National, January 30, 2016.
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Figure 2. Map of Qatari Energy Resources and Select Infrastructure

Source: U.S. Energy Information Agency, as adapted by CRS.

Author Information

Kenneth Katzman

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Acknowledgments
This report was prepared with the assistance of Sarah Collins, Research Assistant, Middle East and Africa
Section.
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Congressional Research Service
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