Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations
October 5, 2021
The kingdom of Saudi Arabia, ruled by the Al Saud family since its founding in 1932,
wields considerable global influence through its administration of the birthplace of the
Christopher M. Blanchard
Islamic faith and by virtue of its large oil reserves. Close U.S.-Saudi official ties have
Specialist in Middle
survived a series of chal enges since the 1940s; a transition in the kingdom’s leadership
Eastern Affairs
and changing U.S. priorities are introducing new dynamics to the bilateral relationship.

Since 2015, U.S.-Saudi differences have emerged over Saudi human rights policies and

the war in neighboring Yemen, while shared concerns over Sunni Islamist extremist
terrorism and Iranian government policies have provided some renewed logic for continued strategic cooperation.
Successive U.S. Administrations have referred to the Saudi government as an important partner, and U.S. arms
sales and related security cooperation have continued with congressional oversight and some congressional
opposition. The Biden Administration has stated that it seeks to recalibrate U.S.-Saudi relations while maintaining
U.S. support for the kingdom’s security.
Since acceding to the throne in 2015, King Salman bin Abd al Aziz (age 85) has empowered his son Crown Prince
Mohammed bin Salman (age 36), the king’s successor and now the central figure in Saudi policymaking. The
Crown Prince has centralized control over security forces, sidelined potential rivals, and implemented economic
and social changes. The government has arrested some prominent figures and accused them of corruption and
sedition, including some royal family members. Ambitious plans for the transformation of the kingdom’s
economy under its Vision 2030 initiatives seek to provide opportunity for young Saudis (~40% under 25) and
bolster non-oil revenue. Increased U.S. domestic oil production has contributed to reductions in U.S. imports of
Saudi Arabian oil, but the kingdom’s energy policies remain of interest to U.S. decision makers in light of
enduring Saudi influence over global energy markets and Saudi energy exports to China and U.S. partners in Asia.
Abroad, the kingdom pursues a multidirectional foreign policy, and, in 2021, has engaged in talks with Iran.
The war in Yemen and Saudi Arabia’s military intervention against the Iran-backed Houthi movement there since
2015 have tested U.S.-Saudi ties and remain a focus of U.S.-Saudi engagement. Successive Administrations have
gradual y reduced U.S. support to Saudi-led coalition military operations in Yemen, but as of July 2021, U.S.
forces continue to provide Saudi forces military advice and limited information. Amid missile and drone attacks
on the kingdom in recent years attributed by U.S. officials to Iran and Iran-backed armed groups, the United
States in 2019 deployed more than 2,700 U.S. military personnel to the kingdom to bolster Saudi air and missile
defenses and support deterrence operations by U.S. fighter aircraft. Intermittent attacks on Saudi territory from
Yemen and Iraq continue. U.S. officials have stated their support for Saudi efforts to defend their territory, while
withdrawing some U.S. military platforms and personnel from the kingdom for use elsewhere.
U.S. government reports note continuing Saudi government restrictions on religious freedom and human rights,
including on public expression. With government supporters promoting the Crown Prince’s vision for the country
and assuming a more nationalist posture, Saudi liberals, moderates, and conservatives continue to advance visions
for domestic change that differ in their preferred pace and scope. Saudi leaders in 2018 reversed a long-standing
ban on women’s right to drive and in 2019 loosened restrictions on some other women’s rights, but over the same
period arrested a number of women’s rights advocates, human rights activists, and conservative critics of social
liberalization. Authorities have conditional y released some of those detained, but reject international scrutiny and
criticism as interference in Saudi domestic affairs. Demonstrations remain rare, and clashes involving Saudi
security forces have not spread beyond certain predominantly Shia areas of the oil-rich Eastern Province.
Some in Congress have grown critical of U.S. policy toward Saudi Arabia and the kingdom’s leadership in light
of Saudi policy in Yemen, the involvement of Saudi officials in the 2018 murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi,
and other human rights cases. Legislation proposed in the 117th Congress would impose human rights related
sanctions and/or condition bilateral defense cooperation (e.g. H.R. 1392, H.R. 1464, H.R. 1511, and H.Res. 175).
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Overview
The Biden Administration seeks to recalibrate longstanding U.S.-Saudi ties amid leadership
changes in the kingdom of Saudi Arabia and debate in the United States over foreign policy
priorities. Successive U.S. Administrations have sought partnership with the ruling Al Saud
family since the 1940s in light of their kingdom’s large oil reserves and Saudi Arabia’s global
religious and financial influence.1 The Al Saud monarchy has sought protection, advice,
investment, and armaments from the United States, looking to U.S. partners for assistance in
developing their country’s natural and human resources and in facing external and internal
threats. U.S. leaders have valued Saudi cooperation in security matters and general y have sought
to preserve the secure and apolitical flow of the kingdom’s energy resources to global markets.
Since 2011, significant shifts in the political and economic landscape of the Middle East have
focused international attention on Saudi domestic and foreign policies and driven social and
political debates among Saudis (see “Developments in Saudi Arabia” below). These regional
shifts, coupled with ongoing economic, social, and political changes in the kingdom, have made
sensitive issues such as political reform, human rights, corruption, security cooperation, and arms
sales more prominent in U.S.-Saudi relations than during some periods in the past.
Congress has paid increased attention to the kingdom’s human rights practices, its assertive
foreign policies, and its economic and social reform initiatives since King Salman bin Abd al Aziz
Al Saud (85) succeeded to the throne in 2015, and since the king’s son, Crown Prince
Mohammed bin Salman (36), became his designated successor in 2017. Now the central figure in
Saudi policymaking, the Crown Prince has centralized control over security forces, sidelined
potential rivals, implemented economic and social changes, and detained prominent figures and
accused them of corruption and sedition, including some royal family members. The kingdom’s
Vision 2030 initiatives seek to increase private sector activity and expand non-oil linked sources
of economic growth, employment, and government revenue. The Coronavirus Disease 2019
(COVID-19) pandemic slowed the kingdom’s economy and reduced demand for Saudi oil during
2020, but Saudi leaders have continued to implement reform plans buoyed by economic recovery
and higher oil revenues in 2021.
Counterterrorism and defense ties remain robust. Under Presidents Obama and Trump, the
executive branch notified Congress of proposed foreign military sales to Saudi Arabia of major
defense articles and services with a potential aggregate value of more than $147 bil ion
(Appendix B). The United States and Saudi Arabia concluded foreign military sales agreements
worth more than $100 bil ion from FY2009 through FY2020.
U.S. support to Saudi military operations in Yemen since 2015 and Saudi use of U.S.-origin
weaponry there has drawn new attention to U.S. arms sales and war powers debates (see “Arms
Sales, Security Assistance, and Training” below).2 Criticism in Congress of Saudi human rights
practices also has grown in scope and intensity, especial y following the October 2018 murder of
Saudi journalist and U.S. resident Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi government personnel.
President Trump was explicit about his desire to strengthen U.S. ties to Saudi leaders,3 which had
deteriorated during President George W. Bush’s Administration over Saudi nationals’

1 Saudi Arabia holds the second largest proven oil reserves in the world (16% of global total) and exported the second
most crude oil and petroleum products in the world in 2019.
2 For a summary of debates and congressional initiatives, see, CRS Report R45046, Congress and the War in Yemen:
Oversight and Legislation 2015-2020, by Jeremy M. Sharp, Christopher M. Blanchard, and Sarah R. Collins.
3 T he White House, Remarks by President T rump and Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman of the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia before Bilateral Meeting, March 20, 2018.
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involvement in the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, some Saudis’ support for extremism, and
the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. During President Obama’s tenure, differences over responses to
regional unrest and U.S. policy toward Iran further strained relations. The Trump Administration
opposed various congressional proposals to limit U.S. arms sales to the kingdom or to end U.S.
military support to Saudi-led coalition operations, even as it halted U.S. refueling of Saudi-led
coalition aircraft and pressed Saudi counterparts to respect the law of armed conflict and al ow
greater humanitarian access to Yemen.
In the wake of Khashoggi’s murder, Trump Administration officials signaled U.S. concern on
human rights issues, imposed sanctions on some Saudi officials, and pledged continued
investigation and advocacy on cases of concern, but resisted cal s from some in Congress to do
more.4 The Trump Administration engaged Saudi officials in civil nuclear cooperation talks (see
“Potential U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Cooperation”) and encouraged the kingdom to forgo acquisition of
nuclear fuel cycle technologies that could increase nuclear proliferation concerns. In 2019,
President Trump deployed U.S. military personnel and assets to Saudi Arabia in response to
escalating cross-border attacks on Saudi infrastructure. Press reports also suggest that senior
Trump Administration officials, including presidential adviser Jared Kushner, sought to convince
Saudi leaders to participate in the U.S.-brokered Abraham Accords initiative with Israel.
After a presidential campaign in which President Biden described Saudi Arabia as a “pariah” for
its human rights record, the Biden Administration since has stated its intent to recalibrate rather
than rupture the U.S.-Saudi relationship.5 President Biden has engaged King Salman, other U.S.
officials have engaged Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, and in July 2021, Deputy Defense
Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman visited the United States. The State Department has identified
elevating human rights issues and ending the war in Yemen as “key priorities.”6 President Biden
ceased U.S. military support for Saudi “offensive” military operations in Yemen and has directed
the withdrawal of some U.S. military personnel and defense systems deployed to the kingdom in
2019. The Biden Administration also reviewed U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia and suspended
two unspecified munitions sales. In 2021, U.S. officials have praised some Saudi reforms and
committed to supporting the kingdom in defending itself, while seeking a ceasefire in Yemen and
imposing some human rights-related sanctions on Saudi personnel.7
Some in Congress continue to cal for more tangible changes to the relationship and insist on
specific consequences for the Crown Prince after the U.S. intel igence community reported to
Congress in February 2021 that he “approved an operation in Istanbul, Turkey to capture or kil ”
Jamal Khashoggi.8 Saudi officials disputed the report’s conclusions. The Biden Administration
imposed additional sanctions on Saudi officials, but Administration officials have engaged with
senior Saudi leaders, including the Crown Prince, during 2021, indicating that the President and
his Administration are prepared to continue to work with the kingdom’s current leaders.9

4 e.g., White House, Statement of Administration Policy on H.J.Res. 37, February 11, 2019.
5 U.S. Department of State Spokesperson Ned Price, Press Briefing, Washington, DC, March 1, 2021.
6 Readout on Secretary Blinken’s Call with Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, February 6, 2021.
7 In March 2021, State Department Spokesperson Ned Price called U.S.-Saudi relations “important to U.S. interests”
and said the relationship “requires continued progress and reforms.” Press Briefing, Washington, DC, March 1, 2021.
8 Cate Edmonson, “ Democrats Push Biden to T ake Harder Line on Saudi Arabia,” New York Times, April 6, 2021; and,
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Assessing the Saudi Government's Role in the Killing of Jamal
Khashoggi,” February 26, 2021.
9 T he Biden Administration added a former Saudi intelligence official to the list of Saudi officials sanctioned by the
T rump Administration pursuant to the Global Magnitsky Act and imposed visa sanctions on 76 Saudis individuals
involved in the Khashoggi killing or in other acts of extraterritorial repression.
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Policy differences notwithstanding, U.S. and Saudi officials have long favored continuity in the
bilateral relationship over dramatic strategic shifts, despite some Saudis’ and Americans’ cal s for
fundamental changes. U.S. policy initiatives have aimed to help Saudi leaders address economic
and security chal enges in ways consistent with U.S. interests and values, but these goals, as in
the past, remain in tension. Changing U.S. security and energy interests and more independent,
ambitious, and nationalist leadership in Saudi Arabia may portend further divergence in priorities.
Table 1. Saudi Arabia Map and Country Data

Land: Area, 2.15 mil ion sq. km. (more than 20% the size of the United States); Boundaries, 4,431 km (~40% more
than U.S.-Mexico border); Coastline, 2,640 km (more than 25% longer than U.S. west coast)
Population: 34,783,757 (July 2021 est., ~38% non-nationals per 2019 U.N. data.); < 25 years of age: 40.2%
GDP (PPP): $1.609 tril ion (2019 est.)
GDP per capita, PPP: $46,962 (2019 est.)
Budget (revenues; expenditure; balance): $207.7 bil ion; $286.9 bil ion; $79.2 bil ion deficit (2020)
Proj. Budget (revenues; expenditure; balance): $248.0 bil ion; $270.7 bil ion; $22.7 bil ion deficit (2021 est.)
Unemployment Rates (Saudi nationals): 11.3%, Saudi females 22.3%, Saudi males 6.1% (Q2 2021, among
Saudi nationals unemployed, 52.2% are aged 20-34, and 49.6% have at least a Bachelor’s degree or equivalent)
Oil and natural gas reserves: 266.2 bil ion barrels (2018 est.); 8.619 tril ion cubic meters (2018 est.)
External Debt: $201 bil ion (2018 est.), -34.1% GDP (2020)
Net Foreign Exchange Reserves: ~$449 bil ion (2020)
Sources: CRS using U.S. Department of State, Esri, and Google Maps data (al 2013), CIA World Factbook
estimates (October 2021), IMF 2021 Article IV Consultation, and Saudi Ministry of Finance and General
Authority for Statistics projections and data (September 2021).

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Legislation in the 117th Congress
The kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s relations with the United States, the country’s stability, and its
future trajectory are subjects of continuing congressional interest. Saudi Arabia’s leaders have at
times acted contrary to U.S. preferences in recent years, while diversifying their relationships
with other global actors, advancing plans to pursue nuclear power generation, and seeking to
bolster their military self-sufficiency. Critics of Saudi decisions have been active in Congress
since 2015, but advocates for continued ties also have been vocal, and Congress has not acted to
curtail major executive branch initiatives with regard to the bilateral relationship.
In January 2021, House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Representative Gregory Meeks
introduced two joint resolutions of disapproval (H.J.Res. 15 and H.J.Res. 16) for munitions sales
to Saudi Arabia proposed by the Trump Administration. To date, the House has not considered the
joint resolutions further. As noted above, the Biden Administration suspended two unspecified
munitions sales to the kingdom.
Members of the 117th Congress also have proposed or considered the following legislation related
to Saudi Arabia:
 H.R. 4350 – the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 –
The bil as amended and passed by the House would require regular reporting to
Congress on improvements to the military capabilities of Iran-backed militias,
including the Houthis. The bil also includes amendments that would require the
suspension of U.S. sustainment and maintenance support to Saudi air force units
determined to be responsible for airstrikes resulting in civilian casualties in
Yemen with certain exemptions for territorial self-defense, counterterrorism
operations, and defense of U.S. government facilities or personnel;10 would
terminate U.S. military logistical support, and the transfer of spare parts to Saudi
warplanes conducting aerial strikes against the Houthis in Yemen and
permanently end intel igence sharing that enables offensive strikes and any U.S.
effort to command, coordinate, participate in the movement of, or accompany
Saudi-led coalition forces in the war in Yemen;11 and would extend the
prohibition on in-flight refueling to non-United States aircraft that engage in
hostilities in the ongoing civil war in Yemen enacted in Section 1273(a) of the
FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-92) for two years.12
 H.R. 4373 – the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related
Programs (SFOPS) Appropriations Act, 2022 – The bil as amended and
passed by the House would prohibit the use of funds made available by the act
for International Military Education and Training assistance to Saudi Arabia. It
further states that no funds made available by the bil and prior SFOPS acts
“should be obligated or expended by the Export-Import Bank of the United States
to guarantee, insure, or extend (or participate in the extension of) credit in
connection with the export of nuclear technology, equipment, fuel, materials, or
other nuclear technology-related goods or services to Saudi Arabia” unless the
Saudi government concludes a nuclear agreement with the United State pursuant

10 See amendment 30 as printed in H.Rept. 117-125, considered as H.Amdt. 114, September 23, 2021. House of
Representatives Roll Call vote number 279: https://clerk.house.gov/Votes/2021279.
11 See amendment 28 as printed in H.Rept. 117-125, considered as H.Amdt. 113, September 23, 2021. House of
Representatives Roll Call vote number 278: https://clerk.house.gov/Votes/2021278.
12 See amendment 247 as printed in H.Rept. 117-125, considered as part of en bloc amendment H.Amdt. 123,
September 23, 2021. House of Representatives Roll Call vote number 2 88: https://clerk.house.gov/Votes/2021288.
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to Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153); commits to
renouncing uranium enrichment and nuclear fuel reprocessing on its territory
under that agreement; and has signed and implemented an Additional Protocol to
its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy
Agency. The proposed provisions mirror the language on Saudi Arabia included
in the Fiscal Year 2021 SFOPS Appropriations Act [Division K, Section 7041(h),
P.L. 116-260]. For information about Saudi Arabia’s nuclear energy plans, see
“Potential U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Cooperation” below. The House voted to adopt
“plus-minus” amendments to the bil “to highlight opposition to U.S. political or
diplomatic support for the Saudi blockade of Yemen,” and, “to highlight the need
for stronger congressional oversight, robust human rights measures, and
transparency in U.S. arms sales to countries such as Saudi Arabia.”13
 H.R. 1392 – the Protection of Saudi Dissidents Act of 2021 – This bil would
prohibit for 120 days the sale of U.S. defense articles and services to “an
intel igence, internal security, or law enforcement agency or instrumentality of
the Government of Saudi Arabia.” During subsequent 120 day periods, such sales
would be prohibited if the President does not certify that Saudi Arabia is not
involved in the “forced repatriation, intimidation, or kil ing of dissidents in other
countries,” the unjust imprisonment of U.S. national or aliens approved for
permanent residence in the United States, limitations on the exit from Saudi
Arabia of such persons or their family members, and the torture of detainees.
Sales for use in the defense of Saudi Arabia from external threats and/or the
protection of U.S. personnel or facilities in Saudi Arabia would be exempt from
the bil ’s proposed restrictions. The President could waive the restrictions by
determining that such a waiver was in the “vital national security interests” of the
United States and submitting a written justification to Congress. The bil
additional y would require reports on “whether any official of the Government of
Saudi Arabia engaged in a consistent pattern of acts of intimidation or harassment
directed against Jamal Khashoggi or any individual in the United States” and
“whether and to what extent” any national of Saudi Arabia credentialed to a
Saudi diplomatic or consular facility in the United States “used diplomatic
credentials, visas, or covered facilities to facilitate monitoring, tracking,
surveil ance, or harassment of, or harm to, other nationals of Saudi Arabia living
in the United States” over the three year period prior to enactment. The bil
would require the closure of a Saudi diplomatic or consular facility in the
absence of a presidential certification that defined misuse of such facilities is not
occurring. Lastly, the bil would require the executive branch to report on
“whether and how the intel igence community fulfil ed its duty to warn Jamal
Khashoggi of threats to his life and liberty,” and, if not, why not. The House of
Representatives adopted the bil on April 20, 2021. [Agreed to by the Yeas and
Nays: (2/3 required): 350 – 71, Roll no. 130]
 H.R. 1464 - Saudi Arabia Accountability for Gross Violations of Human
Rights Act – The bil would impose visa-blocking sanctions on specified foreign
persons determined to have played a role in the kil ing of Jamal Khashoggi, and

13 See amendments 5 and 25 as printed in H.Rept. 117-110, considered as part of en bloc amendment #3 (H.Amdt. 91),
July 28, 2021. House of Representatives Roll Call vote number 241: https://clerk.house.gov/Votes/2021241. For
background on “plus-minus” amendments and their use, see CRS Report R46841, Changes in the House of
Representatives’ Initial Consideration of Regular Appropriations Measures, 113th -116th Congresses, by Kevin P.
McNellis.
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would require the State Department to report on incidents of arbitrary detention,
violence, and state-sanctioned harassment by Saudi Arabia against U.S. citizens
and their family members. The bil also would require the State Department to
make publicly available a report that describes whether and how State
Department concurrence with U.S. security assistance wil avoid identifying the
United States with governments that deny human rights and fundamental
freedoms to their people, in accordance with section 502B the Foreign Assistance
Act (22 U.S.C. 2304).
 H.R. 1511 – MBS Must Be Sanctioned Act – The bil would require the
President to impose property- and visa-blocking sanctions against Crown Prince
Mohammed bin Salman bin Abd al Aziz Al Saud, until specified actions were
taken with respect to the murder of Jamal Khashoggi and other human rights
concerns.
 H.R. 2506/S. 1146 – the Stopping Activities Underpinning Development In
Weapons of Mass Destruction Act or “SAUDI WMD Act” – The bil s would
require the President to report to the congressional foreign affairs and intel igence
committees “whether any foreign person knowingly exported, transferred, or
engaged in trade of any item designated under Category I of the [Missile
Technology Control Regime] MTCR Annex item with Saudi Arabia in the
previous three fiscal years” and what sanctions if any the President “has imposed
or intends to propose” on such persons. The bil would further prohibit (subject to
a waiver) the sale, transfer, or license for export to Saudi Arabia of arms in
Category III, IV, VII, or VIII on the United States Munitions List (with the
exception of ground-based missile defense systems) if the President finds that
Saudi Arabia within the preceding three fiscal years has imported technology for
uranium enrichment or nuclear fuel reprocessing or “engaged in nuclear
cooperation related to the construction of any nuclear-related fuel cycle facility or
activity that has not been notified to the IAEA and would be subject to
complementary access if an Additional Protocol were in force.” The bil s would
require an annual report on MTCR compliance and a United States strategy to
prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and missiles in the Middle East.
 S. 2142 – the Saudi Educational Transparency and Reform Act – would
require for ten years an annual report “reviewing educational materials published
by Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Education that are used in schools both inside the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and at schools throughout the world.”
 H.R. 3965 – the “Standing Against Houthi Aggression Act” – cites the Yemen-
based Ansaral ah/Houthi movement’s attacks on Saudi territory in directing the
executive branch to designate the Houthi movement as a foreign terrorist
organization and impose sanctions described in terrorism- and Yemen-related
executive orders.
 H.Res. 175 – The resolution would cal on the U.S. government to cease al arms
transfers to Saudi Arabia until the Saudi government takes additional steps to
hold individuals accountable for the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, stops any
extraterritorial surveil ance and harassment, releases individuals detained for
political expression, and ends its military operations in Yemen. Further, the
resolution cal s for (1) human rights-based sanctions against Saudi government
officials and certain other individuals, and (2) conditioning U.S. nuclear
cooperation with Saudi Arabia on the kingdom concluding a nuclear agreement
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with the United States guaranteeing its nuclear program’s strictly civilian
purposes and forgoing the enrichment of uranium or reprocessing of spent
nuclear fuel within Saudi territory.
For discussion of related legislation considered in the 116th Congress, see “Human Rights” and
“Conflict in Yemen” below.
Saudi Arabia and the Coronavirus Disease-2019 (COVID-19) Pandemic
Saudi authorities imposed border closures, visa restrictions, internal curfews, and travel limits in 2020 in response
to the COVID-19 pandemic. The government also reduced religious pilgrimage access, including limiting local and
foreign participation in the 2020 and 2021 Haj pilgrimages. As of October 4, 2021, the World Health
Organization confirmed official Saudi reporting of more than 547,000 total cases of COVID-19 and more than
8,700 deaths due to COVID-19. The new case rate has declined since June 2020, when the U.S. government cited
COVID-19 in al owing the voluntary departure of nonemergency U.S. personnel and dependents from the
kingdom. As of October 4, 2021, more than 53% of Saudi nationals reportedly had received ful doses of a
COVID-19 vaccine, and the kingdom hoped to have 70% of the population ful y vaccinated by months end. Saudi
authorities are implementing strict vaccination requirements for access to public and some private venues, and
recognize as vaccinated individuals who have received vaccines produced by Pfizer, AstraZeneca, Moderna, and
Johnson & Johnson. In August 2021, authorities restored access to the kingdom for tourism and religious
pilgrimage for individuals that have received these vaccines. Through October 2020, Saudi authorities had made
available at least $60 bil ion worth of fiscal and monetary resources and incentives to support private enterprises
and strengthen the Saudi health sector in response to the pandemic and economic downturn.14
Developments in Saudi Arabia
The kingdom faces considerable chal enges and opportunities at home and abroad. The central
dynamics in Saudi Arabia in recent years have been the rise to dominance of Crown Prince
Mohammed bin Salman, his divergence from previous patterns of Saudi leadership, and the
domestic and foreign policy changes he has introduced.
Political Structure and Leadership
Saudi Arabia is a monarchy governed in accordance with a 1992 Basic Law, and its legal system
is largely rooted in the Hanbali school of Sunni Islamic law as interpreted and applied by state-
appointed judges.15 Since 2011, some court reforms have strengthened the training of judges and
have sought to increase the consistency of judicial outcomes. In February 2021, the state
announced plans to draft and review a personal status law, civil transactions law, penal code of
discretionary sanctions, and law of evidence as part of a codification initiative that the Crown
Prince said seeks to “increase the reliability of procedures and oversight mechanisms as
cornerstones in achieving the principles of justice, clarifying the lines of accountability.”
The Basic Law states that male descendants of the kingdom’s founder, the late King Abd al Aziz
bin Abd al Rahman Al Saud (aka Ibn Saud, 1875-1953), shal rule the country. An appointed, 150-
member national Shura Council provides limited oversight and advisory input on some
government decisions, and municipal councils with both appointed and elected members serve as

14 See Annex A, T able A.1 Fiscal and Monetary Responses in the GCC countries in World Bank, Trading Together:
Reviving Middle East and North Africa Regional Integration in the Post-Covid Era, Middle East and North Africa
Economic Update, October 2020.
15 T he kingdom’s Islamic legal system is based on the Quran and traditions (hadith) of the Prophet Mohammed,
supplemented by limited civil service and commercial codes. Marwa Rashad, “Saudi Arabia announces new judicial
reforms in a move towards codified law,” Reuters, February 8, 2021 . For background, see Joseph A. Kéchichian, Legal
and Political Reform s in Saudi Arabia, New York, Routledge, 2013.
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fora for public input into local governance. The kingdom’s population is cultural y diverse, and
regional and tribal identities remain relevant in social and political life. Official discrimination,
Saudi government concerns about perceived Iranian efforts to destabilize the kingdom by
agitating Saudi Shia, and the Islamic State group’s anti-Shia terrorism have complicated efforts to
improve sectarian relations (see “Shia Minority Issues” below).
The Al Saud family has exercised sole control over state affairs since Ibn Saud and his al ies
conquered most of the Arabian Peninsula during the early 20th century and founded the
eponymous kingdom in the 1930s. King Salman bin Abd al Aziz Al Saud succeeded his late half-
brother King Abdullah bin Abd al Aziz following the latter’s death in January 2015. King Salman
in 2015 and 2017 announced dramatic changes to succession arrangements left in place by King
Abdullah, surprising observers of the kingdom’s politics. These changes resulted in King
Salman’s son, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman bin Abd al Aziz, being placed in line to
succeed his father (see Figure A-1, Figure A-2, and “Leadership and Succession” below). The
Crown Prince is a leading member of the generation of grandsons of Ibn Saud; members of this
generation are now assuming leadership roles in the kingdom’s security sector, politics, and
economy. The balances of power, interests, and influence among the rising generation of leaders
in the royal family are relatively opaque and appear to be evolving.
Political decision-making in the kingdom long reflected a process of consensus building among a
closed elite presided over by senior members of the ruling Al Saud family. In recent years, Crown
Prince Mohammed bin Salman has centralized decision-making in security and economic
affairs.16 Members of the conservative Salafist Sunni religious establishment long shaped
government decisions on social and legal issues, but there are questions about the extent of their
remaining influence. Some representatives of this community have endorsed swift and dramatic
changes to some social policies since 2015, while authorities have imprisoned others operating
outside state structures for disfavored foreign ties and possibly for opposing change.17 These
shifts are occurring in the midst of what one long-time observer of the kingdom’s politics has
described as “an aggressive nationalist rebranding”18 of the state and its vision of citizenship and
identity, led by the Crown Prince.
Several long-time observers of Saudi affairs have noted that the apparent leadership consolidation
that has taken place since 2015 represents a departure from patterns and practices among the Al
Saud that had prevailed in the kingdom since the mid-1960s.19 From the mid-1950s to the mid-
1960s, rivalry among the sons of the kingdom’s founder threatened to destabilize the country, and
leaders adopted a closed, consensus-based model for sharing power and managing state affairs.
Centralizing power since 2015 may have enabled King Salman and his son to make domestical y
controversial changes to some social, economic, and fiscal policies, but rival family members,

16 Kristin Smith Diwan, “Saudi Arabia Reassigns Roles within a More Centralized Monarchy,” Arab Gulf States
Institute in Washington, DC, January 22, 2019.
17 For an overview, see Raihan Ismail, “How is MBS’s consolidation of power affecting Saudi clerics in the
opposition?” Washington Post, June 4, 2019. For a detailed discussion, see Stéphane Lacroix, “Saudi Arabia and the
Limits of Religious Reform,” The Review of Faith & International Affairs, Vol. 17:2, pp. 97-101.
18 Vivian Nereim, “ ‘T raitor’ Is the New ‘Infidel’ as Nationalism Grips Saudi Arabia,” Bloomberg News, March 3,
2019.
19 E.g., Stig Stenslie, “T he End of Elite Unity and the Stability of Saudi Arabia,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 41,
No. 1, pp. 61-82, 2018; and, F. Gregory Gause III, “ Fresh Prince: T he Schemes and Dreams of Saudi Arabia’s Next
King,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2018; and, Gause, “Why the U.S. Should Stay Out of Saudi Politics,” Foreign
Affairs, December 18, 2018.
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disgruntled religious conservatives, and other constituencies may harbor resentment over lost
influence.
Internal Politics Appear Strained
The internal politics of the ruling Al Saud family remain a subject of international speculation.
Relationships among some leading royals have appeared unsettled since Crown Prince
Mohammed bin Salman’s appointment as heir apparent in 2017. The Crown Prince’s elevation
was accompanied by the demotion of his elder cousin, long-time counterterrorism official and
then-Minister of Interior Prince Mohammed bin Nayef bin Abd al Aziz, and authorities later
constrained Prince Mohammed bin Nayef’s personal activities before eventual y detaining him.20
In late 2017, a number of prominent royal family members and businessmen were detained for
months in the Ritz Carlton hotel in Riyadh as part of a declared anti-corruption campaign. Most
detainees were released after reaching undisclosed financial arrangements with authorities that in
total reportedly netted the state more than $100 bil ion.21 Authorities deny related al egations of
detainee abuse that continue to circulate. Some prominent individuals, including Prince Turki bin
Abdullah, the son of the late King Abdullah bin Abd al Aziz, reportedly were kept in
detention.22Bureaucratic changes and anti-corruption efforts initiated by the Crown Prince appear
to have contributed to his centralization of power and control over state finances.23
Rumored discontent among other royal family members has not manifested in documented,
public efforts to chal enge or undermine the Crown Prince’s agenda, but the reported detentions
of some prominent princes since 2017 suggests that some discord among them exists.24 In March
2020, former Crown Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, Prince Ahmed bin Abd al Aziz (the king’s full
brother), and some other royal family members reportedly were detained on suspicion of plotting
a coup d’état.25 In March 2021, the State Department described the reported arrests in its annual

20 Prior to Prince Mohammed bin Nayef’s March 2020 detention, former U.S. intelligence official Bruce Riedel had
said that the prince had been under “ house arrest” or “ palace arrest.” Video footage of the prince meeting in September
2019 with the family of a slain personal guard of King Salman appeared on social media. See Riedel, “Four years into
Salman’s reign, Saudi Arabia more unpredictable than ever,” Al Monitor, January 16, 2019; and Riedel, interview with
Martin Smith, PBS Frontline, October 1, 2019.
21 David Kirkpatrick, “ Saudis End Purge T hat Began With Hundreds Locked in the Ritz-Carlton,” New York Times,
January 31, 2019; and, Devon Pendleton and Simone Foxman, “ Freed Saudis Resurface Billions Poorer After Prince’s
Crackdown,” Bloomberg News, February 2, 2019.
22 Human Rights Watch, “Saudi Arabia: Clarify Status of ‘Corruption’ Detainees,” February 18, 2019.
23 See Justin Scheck and Bradley Hope, “ ‘I Am the Mastermind’: Mohammed bin Salman’s Guide to Getting Rich ,”
Wall Street Journal, May 16, 2018; and, Devon Pendleton, “ Saudi Prince’s Rise to Power T urns Him into a Billionaire
Boss,” Bloom berg News, August 10, 2019.
24 Some members of the royal family reportedly objected to some changes under the leadership of King Salman and
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in a series of intra-family letters reported after 2015, during meetings of the
Allegiance Council, and through other channels. T he detention of Prince Mohammed bin Nayef and Prince Ahmed bin
Abd al Aziz in 2020 amid allegations of a coup plot suggested that the current leaders’ concerns about discontented
family members had grown more severe. See David Ignatius, “A Cyclone Brews over Saudi Arabia,” Washington Post,
October 13, 2015; Hugh Miles, “Saudi Royal Calls for Regime Change in Riyadh,” The Guardian (UK) September 28,
2015; Simon Henderson, “Meet the Next Generation of Saudi Rulers,” Foreign Policy, November 10, 2017; Vivian
Nereim, “ Saudi Prince Addresses Questions of Loyalty After London Video,” Bloom berg News, September 5, 2018;
and, Reuters, “ In Saudi Arabia, criticism of Crown Prince grows after attack,” October 2, 2019.
25 See Stephen Kalin and Marwa Rashad, “Saudi Arabia detains senior royals for alleged coup plot, including king's
brother: sources,” Reuters, March 6, 2020; Summer Said, Justin Scheck, and Warren Strobel, “T op Saudi Royal Family
Members Detained,” Wall Street Journal, March 6, 2020; Summer Said and Jared Malsin, “ Saudi Authorities Begin
Release of Princes Questioned in Roundup,” Wall Street Journal, March 8, 2020.
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human rights report on Saudi Arabia for 2020.26 In June 2021, NBC News reported that Prince
Mohammed bin Nayef remains detained and al egedly has suffered physical abuse.27 Lawyers for
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman have levied corruption al egations against a high-ranking
former colleague of Prince Mohammed bin Nayef in court filings.28 Saudi and U.S. officials have
not commented on the record about the reported arrests, detentions, or charges.
Security Issues
In its February 2021 report to Congress on the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, the Office of the
Director for National Intel igence stated, “since 2017, the Crown Prince has had absolute control
of the Kingdom's security and intel igence organizations.”29 The king has replaced the leaders of
key Saudi military and internal security services, while concentrating powers and influence
diffused formerly across several security bureaucracies (and the senior princes who led them)
under the new Presidency for State Security that reports to the king and crown prince. As Defense
Minister since 2015, the crown prince has outlined goals for unifying the kingdom’s military
command structure and for increasing the domestic production of military hardware overseen by
the new General Authority for Military Industries (GAMI) and its implementing arm, Saudi
Arabian Military Industries (SAMI).30 GAMI intends to host a high profile defense industry expo
in the kingdom in March 2022, aimed at attracting additional investment.
Shifts in Saudi foreign policy toward a more assertive posture—exemplified by the kingdom’s
military operations in neighboring Yemen and a series of regional moves intended to counteract
Iranian initiatives—have accompanied the post-2015 leadership changes. The crown prince and
his brother, former Saudi Ambassador to the United States and current Deputy Minister of
Defense Prince Khalid bin Salman bin Abd al Aziz, have presided over Saudi military operations
in Yemen since 2015. The operations have sought to reverse the ouster of Yemen’s transitional
government by the Zaydi Shia Ansarallah (aka Houthi) movement and backers of the late former
Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh (see “Conflict in Yemen” below).
Related violence has not been confined to Yemen. Cross-border attacks from Yemen and missile,
rocket, and drone strikes on infrastructure in Saudi Arabia, including critical energy sector

26 T he State Department reported: “ In early March [2020] authorities reportedly detained four senior princes: Prince
Ahmed bin Abdulaziz, King Salman’s full brother; his son, Prince Nayef bin Ahmed, a former head of army
intelligence; Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, former crown prince and interior minister; and his younger brother, Prince
Nawaf bin Nayef. T he detentions were not announced by the government ... In August lawyers representing Prince
Mohammed bin Nayef said they were increasingly concerned about his well-being, alleging that his whereabouts
remained unknown five months after he was detained and stating that he had not been allowed visits by his p ersonal
doctor. Prince Nawaf’s lawyers stated he was released in August, but there were no updates on the other three as of
year’s end.” U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights, 2020, Saudi Arabia, March 31, 2021.
27 Raf Sanchez and Ken Dilanian, “Saudi intel chief who saved U.S. lives was detained, allegedly mistreated by Saudi
government ,” NBC News, June 30, 2021.
28 Stephen Kalin and Bradley Hope, “ Saudi Arabia’s Ousted Spymaster Is Accused of Embezzling Billions,” Wall
Street Journal, January 27, 2021.
29 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Assessing the Saudi Government's Role in the Killing of Jamal
Khashoggi,” February 26, 2021.
30 GAMI is now the focal point for all major security sector procurement, and SAMI is the entit y responsible for
contracting and ensuring that Vision 2030 goals are met for local procurement and production, technology transfer, and
local employment. The broad Vision 2030 goals for SAMI are to localize 50% of the kingdom’s defense spending by
2030 (currently ~2%), to export goods and services worth 5 billion Saudi riyals, create 40,000 jobs, and contribute 14
billion Saudi riyals ($3.7 billion) to GDP. See also, Neil Partrick, “ Saudi Defense and Security Reform,” Carnegie-
Sada, March 31, 2018; and, Yezid Sayegh, “ T he Warrior Prince,” Carnegie - Diwan, October 24, 2018.
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infrastructure, have changed global perceptions of security in Saudi Arabia. U.S. officials have
attributed different cross-border incidents to Yemeni, Iraqi, and Iranian actors.31 A September
2019 drone and cruise missile attack on the oil production facility at Abqaiq significantly, if
temporarily, disrupted Saudi oil operations and il ustrated the potential global consequences of
regional military confrontation between Iran and Saudi Arabia. In June 2021, the U.S. State
Department warned that
Missile and drone attacks perpetrated by Iran and Iran-supported militant groups represent
a significant threat. The Islamic Republic of Iran has supplied Yemen -based Houthis and
other regional proxy groups with weapons to conduct destructive and sometimes lethal
attacks using drones, missiles, and rockets against a variety of Saudi sites, including critical
infrastructure, civilian airports, military bases, and energy facilities throughout the country,
as well as vessels in Red Sea shipping lanes. Recent attacks were aimed at targets
throughout Saudi Arabia including Riyadh, Jeddah, Dhahran, Jizan, Khamis Mushayt, the
civilian airport in Abha, Al Kharj, military installations in the south, as well as oil and gas
facilities. Debris from intercepted drones and missiles represents a significant risk to
civilian areas and populations.32
In August 2021, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East Dana Stroul
described the Iran-backed militia and Houthi cross-border attack threat to Saudi Arabia and U.S.
citizens there as follows:
What we see across the region is Iranian arming, training, and funding of terrorist groups,
nonstate actors, and militias across the region, all of which aim to undermine the
governments and the partners that we want to work with, terrorize civilians, and prevent
them from achieving stability. In the Yemen context, we have seen more attacks from the
Houthis launched at Saudi Arabia in the first half of this year than we have for several prior
years. Iran is increasing the lethality and complexity of both the equipment and the
knowledge it transfers to the Houthis so that they can attack Saudi territory, Saudi civilians,
and there's also a very sizable U.S. population in Saudi Arabia that is under risk because
of the Iran-backed Houthi attacks.33
Leadership and Social Change
In recent years, Saudi leaders have sought to manage vocal demands from the kingdom’s
relatively young population—67% of the kingdom’s 20 mil ion citizens are under 35—for
improved economic opportunities, and, from some Saudis, for freer expression, increased
political participation, and more open social conditions. The royal family has apparently balanced
its efforts to be responsive to popular demands against its desire to retain power, its commitments
to preserve conservative Islamic and social traditions, and its need to address a host of regional
and domestic security threats.
The king and crown prince have introduced social reforms that have curtailed public powers long
enjoyed by religious conservatives, introduced new public entertainment opportunities, and
enabled women to participate in society on a more uniform and open basis. Experienced
observers of the kingdom emphasize the significance of these changes for the social and

31 Stephen Kalin, Michael R. Gordon, and Warren P. Strobel, “ Aerial Attacks on Saudi Arabia Expose Vulnerability of
U.S. Ally,” Wall Street Journal, February 19, 2021.
32 U.S. Department of State, Saudi Arabia T ravel Advisory, September 17, 2019.
33 Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East Dana Stroul, T estimony before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central Asia and Counterterro rism, August 10, 2021.
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economic lives of Saudi citizens.34 In 2021, announcements of further legal reform plans and
changes to state guidance to limit the use of mosque loudspeakers and loosen requirements for
closures for daily prayer times have signaled leaders’ intention to further move away from
standards long championed by some religious conservatives.35
Social and economic policy changes—while transformative in some respects—have demonstrated
some consideration for the interests and potential objections of domestic constituencies, including
religious and social conservatives. Many young Saudis reportedly have embraced the crown
prince’s leadership and initiatives, while some Saudis, including elites, reportedly have various
doubts and concerns.36 Formal and informal limits on public discourse complicate efforts to
measure public and elite opinion authoritatively. More intense state scrutiny since 2017 of the
press, social media, and other public channels for expressing dissent in the kingdom may mask
(and potential y amplify) some discontent.
Saudi leaders have not initiated comparable liberalizing changes to the kingdom’s political
system, including to laws and rules that restrict public debate, expression, and association. To the
contrary, in recent years, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has acted to centralize authority,
resources, and decision making under his control in anticipation of his succession to the throne.
Advocacy for constitutional monarchy, power sharing, or democratic governance represents a
chal enge to the Al Saud family’s exclusive control over the state. Various groups have submitted
petitions since the 1990s for more accountable governance, but to date the Al Saud family has not
made any fundamental institutional concessions to share power. Laws criminalizing criticism of
leaders and state policies remain in effect, as do national security laws targeting broadly defined
involvement with terrorism and sedition.
Security forces monitor and tightly limit political and social activism within the country and,
reportedly, among Saudi expatriates.37 The government has defined the domestic security
environment since the mid-1990s by persistent Al Qaeda and Islamic State terrorist threats and,
since uprisings swept the Arab world in 2011, by concern about potential political unrest and
economic stagnation. Critics of the regime span the ideological spectrum from secular liberals to
conservative theocrats.
Several Saudis human rights activists who have been detained or convicted of various crimes in
recent years have had their sentences reduced and/or been conditional y released since December
2020. Some observers attribute these changes to a desire among the kingdom’s leadership to
reduce points of friction with the new U.S. Administration. Other activists and prominent clerics
remain in prison in an environment that one long-time observer of Saudi affairs describes as “in
some ways even more authoritarian than it has been in the past.”38

34 For an overview, see Priyanka Boghani, “T he Paradox of Saudi Arabia’s Social Reforms,” PBS Frontline, October 1,
2019. See also comments by Kristen Smith Diwan in Anuj Chopra, “Saudi Arabia wins plaudits for ending ban on
women driving,” Agence France Presse, September 27, 2017.
35 Reuters, “Saudi minister defends order to turn down the volume on mosques,” May 31, 2021; Reuters, “ Saudi shops
can stay open during prayer times -business group circular,” July 16, 2021.
36 Reuters, “In Saudi Arabia, criticism of Crown Prince grows after attack,” October 2, 2019; and Michael Amon and
Donna Abdulaziz, “New Social Rules Leave Saudis Confused About How to Behave,” Wall Street Journal, March 31,
2019.
37 T he 2020 U.S. State Department report on human rights conditions in Saudi Arabia cites “ engaging in harassment
and intimidation against Saudi dissidents living abroad” among significant human rights issues with the kingdom.
38 Soli Özel, “Deciphering Saudi Arabia in the Biden Era: T hree questions to Francis Gregory Gause III,” Institut
Montaigne, June 17, 2021.
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Economic Reform, Fiscal Priorities, and Administrative Changes
Saudi leaders are simultaneously managing ambitious and political y sensitive fiscal
consolidation and economic transformation initiatives. High prices in international oil markets
amplified oil export earnings for most of the period from 2005 to 2014, generating significant
fiscal surpluses and leaving the kingdom with sizeable foreign reserves and low levels of official
debt.39 After 2011, the government expanded spending programs to improve housing and
infrastructure, raise public sector wages, expand education, and ease the burdens of
unemployment. This spending created new fiscal burdens, even as state oil revenues decreased
more than non-oil revenues grew from 2014 through 2017 (Figure 1).
Saudi leaders used accumulated financial reserves and borrowed funds domestical y and
international y to finance deficit spending, and, in 2015, embarked on new initiatives to reshape
the kingdom’s economy.40 Authorities have introduced new taxes, reduced some public subsidies,
and taken other fiscal measures to improve state finances, tailoring implementation and in some
cases offering temporary financial support to citizens to ease burdens at the household level.
Figure 1. Saudi Arabia: Select Revenues and Expenditures Data
In bil ions of dol ars

Source: International Monetary Fund Article IV reports, 2012-2021. Saudi Arabia Ministry of Finance, Pre-
budget Statement 2022, September 30, 2021.
Note: The Saudi riyal is pegged to the U.S. dol ar at a rate of one USD to 3.75 SAR. The kingdom’s September
2021 updates did not include specific projections about oil and non-oil revenues, and the data for those
categories in Figure 1 reflects previous projections.
The kingdom’s Vision 2030 plans seek to promote growth in non-oil related sectors of the
economy and to generate state revenues from non-oil sources, including from a value added tax

39 According to the U.S. State Department’s 2019 Investment Climate Statement for Saudi Arabia, the Saudi Arabian
Monetary Authority’s (SAMA) foreign reserve holdings “peaked at USD 746 billion in mid-2014.” T he report states
that “SAMA’s foreign reserves stood at approximately USD 497 billion at the end of 2018. ”
40 From 2014 through 2018, Saudi officials drew more than $234 billion from state reserves, and national government
debt increased from 5.8% of GDP to 19.1%, as new domestic and international bonds were issued to help meet revenue
needs. IMF Country Report No. 19/290, Staff Report for the 2019 Article IV Consultation, September 9, 2019. Reuters
estimated in July 2019 that the kingdom has issued more than $60 billion in bonds since the end of 2016. Davide
Barbuscia and T om Arnold, “Saudi Arabia raises 3 billion with debut euro bond,” Reuters, July 2, 2019.
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(VAT) that the government introduced in 2018 (and tripled to 15% in July 2020 in response to
budget pressures). Non-oil related state revenues have grown more rapidly since 2017 and
increased during 2020 and 2021, even as the kingdom waived some taxes, fees, and utility
charges as COVID-19-related relief measures on Saudi households and businesses. Saudi officials
revised their revenue expectations upward in September 2021 reflecting projected growth in oil
and non-oil revenues, along with additional savings in public expenditure (Figure 1).
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman presides over the kingdom’s national economic
transformation initiatives as head of the Council of Economic and Development Affairs and
chairman of the board of the kingdom’s sovereign wealth fund—the Public Investment Fund, PIF.
Under King Salman’s auspices, the Crown Prince has directed changes to the leadership of
economic and administrative bodies across the Saudi government, and in April 2021 announced
plans to centralize decision-making further under a new Budget Bureau and Policies Office.
Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 initiatives,41 National Transformation Plan, and Fiscal Balance Plan
seek to expand employment opportunities for young Saudis while attracting foreign investment to
new sectors and creating new sources of non-oil-based state revenue and private sector activity.42
Successive Saudi leaders have pursued these goals, but with more narrow and gradual targets than
the Vision 2030 initiative.
Following an assessment of progress toward Vision 2030 goals in early 2021, the Crown Prince
announced plans to direct additional public and private investment toward the plan’s efforts.
Under the “Shareek” initiative, the government has directed large publicly listed Saudi companies
to redirect dividends toward capital investment in the domestic economy.43 Saudi leaders have
announced that companies seeking state contracts in Saudi Arabia wil be expected to have their
regional headquarters in the kingdom by 2024, setting up an explicit rivalry with established
business hubs such as Dubai in the United Arab Emirates.44 The kingdom also is continuing to
invest in several “giga-projects” to create new thematic hubs of economic activity, including the
NEOM45 project in the kingdom’s northwest, the Red Sea Project tourism zone along the western
coast, and the Qiddiya entertainment and sports complex near Riyadh.46
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) general y has commended reform goals and efforts under
Vision 2030 and the National Transformation Plan, which in part reflect long-standing IMF
recommendations for structural reforms to encourage private sector growth, diversify revenue

41 Vision Realization Plans guide the implementation of Vision 2030 programs across various sectors.
42 See, IMF Article IV Reports, 2017-2021 and, “ The $2 T rillion Project to Get Saudi Arabia’s Economy Off Oil,”
Bloom berg Businessweek, April 25-May 1, 2016; Ben Hubbard and Kate Kelly, “ Saudi Arabia’s Grand Plan to Move
Beyond Oil: Big Goals, Bigger Hurdles,” New York Tim es, October 25, 2017; Ahmed Al Omran, “ Saudi Arabia’s
sleepy city offers prince a cautionary tale,” Financial Tim es (UK), May 27, 2018; Al Omran, “ Record numbers of
foreign workers leave Saudi Arabia,” Financial Tim es (UK), July 10, 2018; and, Rory Jones, “ In Rare Step, Saudi’s
Sovereign-Wealth Fund Raises $11 Billion Loan,” Wall Street Journal, September 17, 2018.
43 Ghaida Ghantous and Saeed Azhar, “Saudi Arabia announces $1.3 trillion private sector investment push led by
Aramco, SABIC,” March 30, 2021; and, Karen E. Young, “MbS has a new growth story,” Amwaj Media/American
Enterprise Institute, April 6, 2021.
44 See Matthew Martin, Vivian Nereim and Zainab Fattah, “Saudi Arabia Adds Pressure on Global Firms to Move to
Riyadh,” Bloomberg News, February 16, 2021, Zainab Fattah, “Saudi T V Stations Begin Shift to Riyadh in Challenge
to Dubai,” Bloomberg News, September 1, 2021.
45 According to NEOM officials “T he name ‘NEOM’ is derived from two words. T he first three letters from the
Ancient Greek prefix neo-meaning ‘new’. T he fourth letter is from the abbreviation of Mostaqbal, an Arabic word
meaning ‘future’.”
46 Andrew England and Ahmed al Omran, “ Saudi prince powers ahead with futuristic city and sports giga-projects,”
Financial T imes (UK), August 16, 2020.
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sources, and improve employment opportunities for young Saudis.47 Historical y, Saudi
policymakers have faced challenges in balancing these types of reforms with concerns for the
preservation of regime and national security, social stability, and cultural and religious values.
Fluctuations in global oil demand and market prices are another factor shaping decision economic
and fiscal decision-making. Global oil demand has recovered from 2020 lows, and market
conditions in 2021 are bolstering Saudi oil revenues and relieving related fiscal pressure on state
finances. The kingdom’s 2021 budget reduced state spending, but projected a substantial deficit
until rising oil revenues led the kingdom to revise its deficit projection downward in September
2021.48 The kingdom’s officials are confident they wil achieve their goal of balancing the budget
by 2023, but the IMF expects the budget to reach balance in 2026.49
In October 2020, the World Bank projected that the forecast recovery level for the region’s
economies “is not V-shaped,”50 but IMF staff concluded in July 2021 that the Saudi economy is
“recovering wel ,” and expect the non-oil sectors to continue growing in spite of cuts in state
spending.51 IMF officials also stated their view that “remaining pandemic-related policy support
should be carefully withdrawn to continue supporting the ongoing recovery, while the Vision
2030 reform agenda should continue to be implemented to promote strong, sustained, diversified,
inclusive, and greener growth.”52 Saudi authorities may reevaluate some reform targets and
initiatives when deciding about the timing and extent of further rollbacks of economic support
measures instituted during the pandemic.53
Human Rights, Gender Issues, and Minority Relations
Human Rights
According to the U.S. State Department’s 2020 report on human rights in Saudi Arabia, Saudi law
provides that “the State shall protect human rights in accordance with Islamic sharia.”54 Saudi law
does not guarantee freedom of assembly, expression, religion, the press, or association; rather, the
government strictly limits each of them. Limited freedom of association exists in practice, but
political parties are prohibited, as are any groups in opposition to the government.55 Critics of the
kingdom’s record on human issues have highlighted the fact that since the 1990s, authorities have
periodical y detained, fined, or arrested individuals associated with protests or public advocacy.

47 Ibid.
48 Jadwa Investment, Saudi Chartbook – July 2021, “Key Data”, p. 14, and Saudi Arabia Ministry of Finance, Pre-
budget Statement 2022, September 30, 2021.
49 International Monetary Fund (IMF), IMF Executive Board Concludes 2021 Article IV Consultation with Saudi
Arabia, July 8, 2021. T he Saudi government’s fiscal consolidation plans seek to balance the k ingdom’s budget by 2023,
an adjustment from earlier plans to achieve balance by 2020.
50 World Bank, Trading Together: Reviving Middle East and North Africa Regional Integration in the Post-Covid Era,
Middle East and North Africa Economic Update, October 2020, p. 9.
51 IMF, IMF Executive Board Concludes 2021 Article IV Consultation with Saudi Arabia, July 8, 2021.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid, and IMF, Economic Prospects and Policy Challenges for the GCC Countries, October 25, 2020.
54 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2020, Saudi Arabia, March 30, 2021.
55 In September 2020, a group largely made up of Saudi expatriates launched the National Assembly Party, which
“aims to institute democracy as a form of government in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.” See https://the-naas.com/en.
See also, Reuters, “Saudi dissidents form pro-democracy political group,” September 23, 2020.
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The State Department reports that in 2020, the judiciary, the public prosecutor’s office, and the
State Security Presidency (the top security and intel igence directorate) “were not independent
entities, as they were required to coordinate their decisions with executive authorities, with the
king and crown prince as arbiters.” This remains the case. A Specialized Criminal Court presides
over trials in terrorism cases, including cases involving individuals accused of violating
restrictions on political activity and public expression contained in counterterrorism and
cybercrimes laws adopted since 2008.56
Since 2017, Saudi authorities have changed some gender-related policies (see “Women’s Rights”
below) and altered regulations and practices to al ow some new social and public entertainment
activities. They also have moved, however, to further restrict the activities of groups and
individuals advocating for political and social change and/or campaigning on behalf of
individuals detained for political or security reasons, including advocates for the rights of
terrorism suspects. According to the State Department, in recent years dozens of individuals have
been detained because of their “activism, criticism of government leaders, impugning Islam or
religious leaders, or ‘offensive’ internet postings,”57 or for “associations and views deemed to be
supportive of groups the government declared il egal or extremist (including the Muslim
Brotherhood),”58 which the kingdom considers to be a terrorist organization.
Those detained and charged include prominent women’s rights activists, as wel as religious and
tribal figures presumed to be critical of the government or its recent social reforms, and, in some
cases, who Saudi authorities accuse of linkages with the Muslim Brotherhood.59 Public backlash
in the kingdom and beyond to potential executions in some cases could be considerable in light of
the transnational media visibility that several of the accused clerics have long enjoyed and their
large, global social media followings.60 An online “Prisoners of Conscience” campaign monitors
and provides updates on reported details about the detention of activists, clerics, and other
citizens.61

56 See American Bar Association Center for Human Rights, Saudi Arabia: Counterterror Court Targets Activists, April
2019. In the context of the United Nations (U.N.) Human Rights Council’s 2018 Universal Periodic Review, the U.N.
Committee Against T orture expressed concern that Saudi Arabia’s “ 2014 counter-terrorism law contained an extremely
broad definition of terrorism, which would enable the criminalization of some acts of peaceful expression .” U.N.
Human Rights Council, Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, Compilation on Saudi Arabia, U.N.
Document A/HRC/WG.6/31/SAU/2, August 30, 2018, p.3.
57 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2020, March 30, 2021. In 2018, Saudi
prosecutors announced their intent to prosecute for cybercrime individuals who produce or distribute content that
“mocks, provokes or disrupts public order, religious values and public morals.” Arab News (Jeddah), “ Saudi Arabia to
penalize individuals who create or promote social media content that disrupts public order ,” September 5, 2018.
58 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2019, Saudi Arabia, March 11, 2020.
59 T hose detained include prominent conservative religious figures such as Salman al Awda, Safar al Hawali, Ali al
Omari, Nasir al Umar, Awad al Qarni, and Abd al Aziz al Fawzan. Several have been harsh critics of U.S. policy in the
past, and in some cases signed letters calling for armed resistance to the U.S. military presence in Iraq. Some, like
Awda and Hawali, were associated with the Islamist “ awakening” (sahwa) movement of the 1990s and faced lengthy
detentions followed by conditional release. Saudi prosecutors have announced their intention to seek the death penalty
against some of the detained religious figures for their involvement with the International Union of Muslim Scholars,
which the kingdom considers to be a terrorist organization. See Lacroix, op cit.; Reuters, “Saudi clerics detained in
apparent bid to silence dissent,” September 10, 2017; Ben Hubbard, “ Saudi Prince, Asserting Power, Brings Clerics to
Heel,” New York Tim es, November 5, 2017; and, Reuters, “ Saudi Arabia arrests prominent cleric Safar al-Hawali –
activists,” July 12, 2018.
60 For a critical account, see Yasmine Farouk, “T he Penalties of a Death,” Carnegie Middle East Cen ter, Diwan,
September 17, 2018.
61 Available in English at https://twitter.com/m3takl_en?lang=en, and Arabic at https://twitter.com/m3takl.
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The Murder of Jamal Khashoggi
On October 2, 2018, Saudi government officials murdered Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi Arabian
consulate in Istanbul, Turkey.62 They al egedly subdued and dismembered him and then left the country.63
Khashoggi, a prominent media figure and former official diplomatic advisor, openly and pointedly had criticized
decisions taken by King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, both before and a fter Khashoggi moved
to the United States in 2017. According to personal acquaintances, Khashoggi had sought but not received lawful
permanent resident status in the United States.
Khashoggi’s kil ing led some in Congress to question the responsibility of senior Saudi leaders for the incident and
their competence, reliability, and rectitude as partners of the United States. The Trump and Biden Administrations
have sanctioned some Saudi officials implicated in the murder (see below). Saudi authorities prosecuted some
suspects; a trial of 11 defendants began in January 2019. Saudi authorities restricted access to the proceedings, but
al owed observers from some Saudi NGOs and from the embassies of the five permanent members of the U.N.
Security Council and Turkey to attend. Amid press reporting on the pace and limited reach of the trial, the State
Department said in June 2019 that, “the Saudi prosecutor has taken important steps toward accountability for the
kil ing of Jamal Khashoggi, but more needs to be done,” and cal ed for “a fair and transparent judicial process
without undue delay.”64
In December 2019, eight of those accused were convicted, with five receiving death sentences and three receiving
prison sentences. The names of those convicted were not publicly released. In September 2020, Saudi courts
reduced the death sentences to prison terms of varying lengths. The crown prince’s adviser Saud al Qahtani and
Saudi intel igence official Major General Ahmed al Asiri were investigated and cleared by Saudi prosecutors of
wrongdoing.
As the anniversary of Khashoggi’s death approached in 2019, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman denied
ordering Khashoggi’s murder and said, “When a crime is committed against a Saudi citizen by officials working for
the Saudi government, as a leader I must take responsibility. This was a mistake. And I must take al actions to
avoid such a thing in the future.”65 Cal ing the kil ing “a heinous crime,” he dismissed reported U.S. intel igence
community conclusions66 about his knowledge and role and said, “If there is any such information that charges me,
I hope it is brought forward publicly.”67
In February 2021, U.S. Director for National Intel igence Avril Haines released a declassified report to Congress
assessing that “Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman approved an operation in Istanbul, Turkey to
capture or kil Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi.”68 The Saudi Foreign Ministry released a statement noting the U.S.
government report and saying that “the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia completely rejects the negative, false and
unacceptable assessment in the report pertaining to the Kingdom’s leadership, and notes that the report contained
inaccurate information and conclusions.”69
The State Department in 2020 cited “reports of disappearances carried out by or on behalf of
government authorities,” and reports that while Saudi law prohibits torture, in 2020, “multiple

62 According to Saudi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Adel al Jubeir, “ He was murdered by agents of the Saudi
government without authorization, without permission .” Remarks of Saudi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Adel al
Jubeir, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, NY, September 24, 2019.
63 U.N. Document A/HRC/41/CRP.1, June 19, 2019.
64 Summer Said, Michael Amon, and Dion Nissenbaum, “ In Khashoggi Murder T rial, Absence of Crown Prince
Mohammad’s Aide Stands Out ,” Wall Street Journal, June 22, 2019.
65 Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman interview with Norah O’Donnell, CBS 60 Minutes, September 30, 2019.
66 “CIA Intercepts Underpin Assessment Saudi Crown Prince T argeted Khashoggi,” Wall Street Journal, December 1,
2018.
67 Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman interview with Norah O’Donnell, CBS 60 Minutes, September 30, 2019.
68 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Assessing the Saudi Government's Role in the Killing of Jamal
Khashoggi,” February 26, 2021.
69 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Ministry of Foreign Affairs (@KSAmofaEN), T witter, February 26, 2021, 4:23 PM (EST ).
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human rights organizations, the United Nations, and independent third parties noted numerous
reports of torture and mistreatment of detainees by law enforcement officers.”70
In 2020, a co-founder of the Saudi Civil and Political Rights Association (ACPRA), Abdullah al
Hamid, died in prison, where he was serving a lengthy sentence for questioning the integrity of
government officials and “breaking al egiance to the ruler,” among other charges.71 ACPRA,
founded in 2009 and shuttered in 2013, had pressed the state to respect human rights and cal ed
for transition to a constitutional monarchy. Other ACPRA members remain imprisoned.
Saudi courts and prosecutors have reviewed several high profile non-ACPRA cases since early
2020, including some involving U.S.-Saudi dual citizens, and have commuted death sentences
and reduced prison terms for some detainees.
Religious Freedom and Trafficking in Persons Status
In 2020, the State Department listed Saudi Arabia as a Tier 2 Watch List country pursuant to the
Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA, 22 U.S.C. Ch. 78). The new designation as a Tier 2
Watch List country indicates that the U.S. government considers the kingdom to be a country
whose government does not fully meet the TVPA’s minimum standards but is now making
“significant efforts” to do so. The State Department previously had listed Saudi Arabia as a Tier 3
Watch List country. 72 In October 2019, President Trump had partial y waived the previous
applicability of TVPA penalties to Saudi Arabia as a Tier 3 country to al ow for U.S. defense sales
to Saudi Arabia under the Foreign Military Sales program to continue.73
Saudi Responses and Initiatives
In general, Saudi authorities broadly reject most international cal s for action on specific human
rights-related cases, which they describe as attempts to subvert Saudi sovereignty or undermine
the kingdom’s judicial procedures.74 In November 2018, Saudi authorities formal y described the
kingdom’s human rights laws and practices and responded to assessments of the kingdom’s
human rights record in the context of the United Nations Human Rights Council Universal
Periodic Review.75
Some human rights concerns have gained greater prominence in Saudi state entities’ domestic and
international messaging. A government-appointed Human Rights Commission (HRC) is

70 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2020, Saudi Arabia, March 30, 2021.
71 Aziz El Yaakoubi, “Prominent Saudi rights activist dies in prison, sources say,” Reuters, April 24, 2020.
72 U.S. Department of State, Office to Monitor and Combat T rafficking in Persons, 2020 T rafficking in Persons Report:
Saudi Arabia, June 2020. According to the State Department, “ key achievements” supporting the upgrade “ included
enactment of the country’s first -ever national referral mechanism (NRM), developed in close partnership with
international organizations. T he government transparently reported comprehensive datasets, which included
significantly increased numbers of prosecutions and convictions under the anti-trafficking law (including of Saudi
nationals and forced labor crimes), in addition to numbers of victims identified and referred for car e. Authorities also
criminally convicted and sentenced to stringent imprisonment terms two Saudi officials complicit in trafficking crimes
during the year.”
73 U.S. President (T rump), “Presidential Determination with Respect to the Efforts of Foreign Govern ments Regarding
T rafficking in Persons,” Daily Compilation of Presidential Documents, 201 9 DCPD no. 201900739, October 18, 2019,
pp. 6-7.
74 For example, in November 2020, Saudi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Adel al Jubeir said “our judiciary is
independent and we do not allow people to lecture us or dictate to us what we should and shouldn’t do.” BBC News,
“Saudi minister Adel al-Jubeir plays down G20 summit boycott calls,” November 21, 2020.
75 See U.N. Documents A/HRC/40/4, December 26, 2018; and A/HRC/40/2, June 3, 2019.
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responsible for monitoring human rights conditions, providing information about human rights
standards to state entities, fielding complaints, referring cases of violations for criminal
investigation, and interacting with foreign third parties on human rights issues. Statements by
government and HRC officials in 2021 committed the kingdom to “eliminating racism,
xenophobia, and discrimination for al ” and guaranteeing the “equal right to work without any
discrimination on the basis of gender or any other forms of discrimination.”76 Limitations on
Saudi citizens’ rights to free expression may limit outsiders’ ability to assess progress toward
these goals objectively.
Women’s Rights
Women’s rights issues in Saudi Arabia remain subject to international scrutiny and are a matter of
debate in the kingdom. Saudi women have long faced enforced gender segregation and
comprehensive legal and de facto restrictions in family and personal matters, travel, employment,
and interaction with public bureaucracies. These restrictions are based on conservative
interpretations of Islam and social practices that were adapted and enforced by state authorities
and to varying degrees by family and social networks amidst urbanization and dramatic
socioeconomic changes in the kingdom during the 20th century.77
Recent policy changes have removed some official restrictions, though in some sectors and cases,
rules empowering women’s male “guardians” (husbands or designated male relatives) continue to
apply. In April 2017, King Salman ordered government agencies to review guardianship rules that
restrict women’s access to government services and to remove those rules that lack a basis in
Islamic law, as interpreted by the kingdom’s judicial establishment.78 In September 2017, the
government directed ministries to prepare regulations to recognize women’s rights to drive, and
in June 2018, Saudi women began driving with state approval. In August 2019, the government
announced amendments to regulations and to civil status and labor laws that now enable Saudi
women to obtain travel documents, assert civil status in dealing with the government, have
custody of their children, and work without a guardian’s permission. A planned personal status
law and recently enacted changes meant to ensure more standard judicial procedures and rulings
could reduce judicial discretion and provide more consistent rulings regardless of gender.79
Informal y, societal and family practices also restrict many women’s social and personal
autonomy.80 The 2020 State Department report on human rights in the kingdom noted changes

76 Saudi Human Rights Commission (@HRCSaudi_EN), T witter, February 26, 2021, 2:40 PM (EST ); and, Saudi
Gazette (Jeddah), “ Citizens have equal right to work; ‘men only’ ad is a violation: Ministry,” February 22, 2021.
77 As the Saudi state and economy developed, the state embraced and promoted religious and social views common to
conservative interior areas allied to the Al Saud family and favored these views in developing rules r equiring gender
segregation. In other areas of the kingdom, “ previously customs, social conventions, and judicial principles were
flexible, changing, and highly diversified across regions and social groups, each marked by a different history and
diverse influences, and following different Islamic judicial schools.” Amélie Le Renard “ ‘Only for Women:’ Women,
the State, and Reform in Saudi Arabia,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 62, No. 4 (Autumn, 2008), pp. 610-629, p. 613. See
also Madawi al Rasheed, A Most Masculine State: Gender, Politics and Religion in Saudi Arabia , Cambridge
University Press (Cambridge, UK), 2013.
78 Human Rights Watch, Saudi Arabia: ‘Unofficial’ Guardianship Rules Banned, May 9, 2017.
79 Nora Jaber, “T he New Saudi Personal Status Law: An Opportunity for Meaningful Gender Reform?” London School
of Economics Middle East Centre Blog, February 15, 2021; and, Rawan Radwan, “ Saudi legal reforms ‘to speed access
to justice’” Arab News (Jeddah), February 8, 2021.
80 For background on the guardianship system and related activism, see Human Rights Watch, Boxed In: Women and
Saudi Arabia’s Male Guardianship System , July 2016; Nora Doaiji, “Saudi Women’s Online Activism: One Year of
the ‘I Am My Own Guardian’ Campaign,” Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington (AGSIW), October 2017; and,
Margaret Coker, “ How Guardianship Laws Still Control Saudi Women,” New York Tim es, June 22, 2018.
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that “granted women many of the same rights enjoyed by men pertaining to travel abroad, civil
status, and employment” but stated that women “continued to face discrimination under law and
custom,” including “primarily in rural areas” where there were reports that “government and
nongovernment entities continued to require women to obtain guardian permission prior to
providing services.”81 Saudi Arabia ranked the lowest global y for its legal discrimination against
women in the 2019/2020 Women, Peace and Security Index.82
Changes implemented and proposed since 2017 nevertheless have been accompanied by the
detention and trial of some prominent female proponents.83 The State Department reported that in
2020, “authorities arrested and abused women’s rights activists perceived as critical or
independent of the government.” Saudi authorities al ege that some of those detained have had
il egal ties to foreign entities. In February 2021, authorities released activists Loujain Hathloul
and Maya’a al Zahrani conditional y following December 2020 sentencing hearings. A court
upheld Hathloul’s reduced sentence on appeal in March 2021. Authorities also released fel ow
activists Nouf Abdulaziz and Samar Badawi conditional y in 2021.84
The kingdom has increased its recognition of women’s political rights and its inclusion of women
in state bureaucracies in recent years, but the State Department reported that as of 2020, “societal
and institutional gender discrimination continued to exclude women from some aspects of public
life.” The late King Abdullah (d. 2015) expanded the size of the national advisory Shura Council
to include 30 women,85 and he recognized women’s right to vote and stand as candidates in the
country’s third municipal council election in December 2015. Authorities did not grant female
candidates quota or list preferences. Women won 21 of the 2,106 seats, and the Minister for
Municipal and Rural Affairs appointed 17 other women to seats.86 Subsequent changes to state
policies regarding gender interactions in public may increase female candidates’ ability to
campaign in future elections and organize through public and private associations.
“Religious Police” and Gender Segregation
King Salman, like the late King Abdul ah, has moved to limit and redefine some of the responsibilities and powers
of the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice (CPVPV), often referred to by non-Saudis
as “religious police,” in response to some public concerns. A government-endorsed entity, the CPVPV held a
prominent public role in enforcing standards of religious observance and gender segregation norms for decades. In
2016, the government stripped the CPVPV of certain arrest powers, required its personnel to meet certain
educational standards, and instructed them to improve their treatment of citizens. While the CPVPV remains
operational, the State Department reported that in 2020, its “authorities were greatly curtailed compared with
past years.” Mixing between genders has become more common at some public events, and the government has
loosened regulations that required some businesses to provide for gender segregation on their premises.

81 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2019, Saudi Arabia, March 11, 2020.
82 T hese findings pre-date legal and administrative changes undertaken by Saudi Arabia in 2019 regarding guardianship
laws. Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security and Peace Research Institute Oslo, Wom en, Peace and
Security Index 2019/20, October 2019.
83 See Ben Hubbard, “Saudi Arabia Agrees to Let Women Drive,” New York Times, September 26, 2017; Kareem
Fahim and Loveday Morris, “Saudi Arabia Detains Women’s Rights Advocates Who Challenged Driving Ban,”
Washington Post, May 18, 2018; and, Margherita Stancati, “ Saudi Arabia Detains More Women’s Rights Activists,”
Wall Street Journal, August 1, 2018.
84 Aya Batrawy, “T wo Saudi women’s rights activists released from prison,” Associated Press, June 27, 2021.
85 See Hala Aldosari, “All the King’s Women: New Shura Council Members Stir Gender Debate,” AGSIW, May 11,
2017.
86 George Sadek, “FALQs: Saudi Arabia Municipal Elections – Women Participate for the First T ime,” Law Library of
Congress, December 22, 2015; National Public Radio (NPR), “Saudi Women React to Election Results,” December 20,
2015; and, NPR, “After Historic Elections in Saudi Arabia, What’s T he Future for Women?” December 22, 2015.
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Periodic incidents involving the CPVPV or private security personnel and the government’s changes to rules
governing public morality continue to shape related debates among Saudis. While many Saudis have embraced
social changes introduced since 2015, others have been outspoken in their criticism of changes to rules concerning
public dress, public performances, and gender segregation.87 Some Saudi social media users explicitly cal for the
re-empowerment of the CPVPV.
Shia Minority Issues
Saudi Arabia’s Shia Muslim minority communities have historical y faced discrimination and
periodic violence, although more recent outreach by government authorities and attempts at
integration and inclusion have improved intercommunal relations somewhat.88 Since 2014,
Islamic State terrorist attacks against Shia communities, low-level unrest in some Eastern
Province Shia communities, and certain protests by students and families of Shia detainees have
created strains on order and stability. Some members of Saudi Shia communities look to Iranian,
Iraqi, or other clerics outside the kingdom for religious guidance, and Saudi authorities remain
particularly sensitive about Shia Saudis potential ties to Iran.
Some domestic clashes intensified in the wake of the 2016 execution of outspoken Shia cleric
Nimr al Nimr: Shia protestors conducted arson attacks against public buildings and shooting
attacks kil ed and injured Saudi security personnel. A court convicted Nimr of incitement to
treason and involvement with individuals responsible for attacks on security forces. Explosions
and gunfire have periodical y kil ed and injured Saudi security officers in and around Nimr’s
home vil age Al Awamiya and nearby Qatif since mid-2017. Saudi security operations and clashes
with armed locals resulted in the destruction of areas of Al Awamiya in August 2017. The Saudi
government completed reconstruction of Al Awamiya’s town center in February 2019.89 U.S.
travel advisories state that U.S. government personnel remain restricted from travel to Al
Awamiya and Qatif because the U.S. government “has limited ability to provide emergency
services to U.S. citizens” in those areas.90
Saudi courts also have handed down lengthy jail terms and travel bans for Shia protestors and
individuals accused of attacking security force personnel. Several Shia individuals suspec ted of
involvement in violence have been kil ed in clashes with security forces, and other individuals
convicted of crimes related to such confrontations have been executed. In April 2019, Saudi
authorities executed 33 Shia individuals convicted of involvement in related unrest, attacks, or
espionage.91 In 2021, Saudi authorities commuted the death sentences of Al Nimr’s nephew and
two other Saudi Shia men who were al convicted as minors of related crimes.92

87 Michael Amon and Donna Abdulaziz, “New Social Rules Leave Saudis Confused About How to Behave,” Wall
Street Journal, March 31, 2019.
88 Kristin Smith Diwan, “Saudi Nationalism Raises Hopes of Greater Shia Inclusion,” AGSIW, May 3, 2018.
89 BBC, “Awamiya: Inside Saudi Shia town devastated by demolitions and fighting,” August 16, 2017; Saudi Gazette,
“Work on Awamiya development in full swing,” August 4, 2018; and, Al Arabiya, “T he ‘Center of al-Awamiyah’
injects fresh hope in Saudi Arabia’s al-Qatif,” February 1, 2019.
90 U.S. Department of State, Saudi Arabia T ravel Advisory, June 16, 2021.
91 Human Rights Watch, “Saudi Arabia: Mass Execution of 37 Men,” April 24, 2019.
92 Amnesty International, “Saudi Arabia: Withdrawal of death sentences for three Shi’a activists arrested as teenagers a
welcome move,” February 8, 2021.
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Terrorism Threats and Bilateral Cooperation
The Saudi Arabian government states that it views Al Qaeda, Al Qaeda affiliates, the Islamic
State (IS, aka ISIS/ISIL or the Arabic acronym Da’esh), other Salafist-jihadist groups, and their
supporters as direct threats to Saudi national security.
From 2014 through 2017, the aggressive expansion of the Islamic State in neighboring Iraq and in
Syria and the group’s attacks inside Saudi Arabia created alarm in the kingdom. At the height of
their power, Islamic State leaders declared war against the Saudi royal family, condemning
official Saudi clerics, and urging attacks inside the kingdom. Islamic State affiliates claimed
responsibility for a series of deadly attacks against Saudi security forces and members of the
kingdom’s Shia minority across the country along with a failed suicide bombing in 2016 against
the U.S. Consulate General in Jeddah. A similar campaign of violence by Al Qaeda supporters
shook the kingdom in the mid-2000s.
Saudi counterterrorism operations appear to have succeeded in reducing the threats posed by IS
and AQ sympathizers, and the pace of attacks by and reported arrests of IS and AQ supporters has
declined. Nevertheless, June 2021 U.S. State Department travel advisory for Saudi Arabia
cautioned, “terrorist groups continue plotting possible attacks” and said that “terrorists may attack
with little or no warning.”93
Saudi and U.S. officials agree that the Islamic State and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP)—based in Yemen and led by Saudi nationals—pose continuing terrorist threats to the
kingdom. Following the January 2016 execution by the Saudi government of dozens of convicted
AQAP suspects, including some prominent ideologues, Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri
released a statement condemning the kingdom and cal ing for revenge. Some observers, including
some Members of Congress, have expressed concern about the apparent strengthening of AQAP
during the course of the ongoing conflict in Yemen.94
In December 2019, a member of the Royal Saudi Air Force kil ed three people and wounded eight
at Naval Air Station Pensacola in Florida: AQAP claimed credit for the attack and the gunman
coordinated with AQAP personnel in advance. According to the State Department, “the
Government of Saudi Arabia continues to work closely with the United States on the
investigation.”95
Saudi leaders also seek support from their regional neighbors and from the United States to
confront efforts by Iran and their Hezbollah al ies to destabilize Yemen through support for the
Ansarallah/Houthi movement (see “Conflict in Yemen” below).
Terrorist Financing and Material Support: Concerns and Responses
Official U.S. views of Saudi counterterrorism policy have evolved since the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001 (see Appendix C). Through 2018, U.S. government reports indicated that
financial support for terrorism from Saudi individuals remained a threat to the kingdom and the
international community, even though the Saudi government had “reaffirmed its commitment to
countering terrorist financing in the Kingdom and the Gulf region.”96 The U.S. government now

93 U.S. Department of State, Saudi Arabia T ravel Advisory, June 1 6, 2021.
94 See, for example, Letter from 55 House Members to President Donald T rump, April 10, 2017.
95 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on T errorism 2019, June 2020.
96 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on T errorism 2017, September 2018. The report included nearly identical
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credits the kingdom with taking terrorism threats seriously and described the Saudi government in
December 2020 as “a strong partner in regional security and counterterrorism efforts.”97 Saudi
Arabia co-chairs the Counter-ISIS Finance Group of the Global Coalition to Counter ISIS
alongside Italy and the United States.
Overal , according to the State Department’s 2019 Country Reports on Terrorism coverage of
Saudi Arabia,
Saudi authorities worked closely with the United States to implement counterterrorism
commitments and to develop new capabilities to “monitor and counter extremist
messaging.”... In 2019, Saudi Arabian government officials continued to work closely with
their U.S. counterparts to deploy a comprehensive and well-resourced CT strategy that
included vigilant security measures, regional and international cooperation, and measures
to counter terrorist radicalization and recruitment. ... As in previous years, Saudi Arabia
was a full partner and active participant in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS and provided
significant operational and logistical support for Coalition activities in Syria and Iraq. ..
The government reported that it continued to work to constrain the discriminatory content
of its education, satellite, and religious advocacy output both overseas and domesticaly.
Nevertheless, its decades-long support for organizations that propagated intolerant
interpretations of Islam overseas remained a concern, as did uneven implementation of
educational content reform.98
Saudi authorities forbade Saudi citizens from travel ing to Syria to fight and have taken steps to
limit the flow of privately raised funds from Saudis to armed Sunni groups and charitable
organizations in Syria.99 In January 2014, the kingdom issued a decree setting prison sentences
for Saudis found to have travel ed abroad to fight with extremist groups, including tougher
sentences for any members of the military found to have done so. The decree was followed by the
release in March 2014 of new counterterrorism regulations under the auspices of the Ministry of
Interior outlawing support for terrorist organizations including Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, as
wel as organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood.100 The regulations drew scrutiny and
criticism from human rights advocates concerned about further restrictions of civil liberties. The
2019 State Department terrorism report observed, “Some international human rights and press
groups continued to assert that the Kingdom has misused counterterrorism laws to prosecute
religious and political dissidents, women’s rights activists, and prominent Saudi clerics.”101

language from the 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016 reports. See also U.S. Department of State, 2016 International Narcotics
Control Strategy Report (INCSR)—Volume II: Money Laundering and Financial Crimes Country Database, July 2016.
97 U.S. Department of State Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Relations With Saudi Arabia, Bilateral Relations Fact
Sheet, December 15, 2020.
98 U.S. Department of Stat e, Country Reports on T errorism 2019, June 2020. T he 2016 report had stated that “Despite
serious and effective efforts to counter the funding of terrorism within the Kingdom, some individuals and entities in
Saudi Arabia probably continued to serve as sources of financial support for terrorist groups.”
99 In 2016, the Saudi Ministry of Interior reported that there were then “ 2,093 Saudis fighting with terrorist
organizations in conflict zones, including ISIS, with more than 70 percent of them in Syria .” U.S. Department of State
Bureau of Counterterrorism, Country Reports on T errorism 2016, August 2017. A report by the private consultancy
T he Soufan Group cites a 2016 Saudi Ministry of Interior estimate that more than 3,200 Saudi foreign fighters had
travelled abroad, with 760 having returned home, and more than 7,000 Saudi nationals had been “ stop listed” by
T urkish interior security officials. See, Richard Barrett, Beyond the Caliphate: Foreign Fighters and the Threat of
Returnees, T he Soufan Group, October 2017.
100 Saudi Ministry of Interior, List of the Security and Intellectual Prohibitions for the Citizens and Residents, Saudi
Press Agency, March 7, 2014.
101 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on T errorism 2019, June 2020.
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U.S. Foreign Assistance to Saudi Arabia
U.S. training and security support to Saudi Arabia is overwhelmingly Saudi funded via Foreign
Military Sales and other contracts, reflecting Saudi ability to pay for costly programs (and
limiting opportunities for Congress to affect cooperation directly through appropriations
legislation). From 2002 through 2018, Saudi Arabia received roughly $10,000 - $25,000 per year
in International Military Education and Training (IMET) assistance authorized by the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961. This nominal amount made the kingdom eligible for a discount on
training that it purchased through the Foreign Military Sales program for training initiatives
overseen by the U.S. Military Training Mission (USMTM) and other U.S. entities.102 Successive
Administrations waived congressional y enacted restrictions on the provision of this assistance
and argued that the aid and related discount supported continued Saudi participation in U.S.
training programs, which in turn supported the maintenance of important military-to-military
relationships and improved Saudi capabilities.103
President Trump’s FY2018 budget request sought $10,000 in IMET for Saudi Arabia, but the
requests for FY2019 and in latter years have not specifical y asked for the funds. The FY2019
Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2020 Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, and FY2021
Omnibus and COVID Relief and Response Act prohibit the use of funds made available by the
acts for IMET assistance for the kingdom (Section 7077 of Division F, P.L. 116-6; Section
7041(h) of Division G, P.L. 116-94; and Section 7041(h) of Division K, P.L. 116-260,
respectively).
The FY2020 and FY2021 appropriations acts also state that no funds appropriated by the acts and
prior acts “should be obligated or expended” by the Export-Import Bank to support nuclear
exports to Saudi Arabia until Saudi Arabia has an agreement in effect pursuant to Section 123 of
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (AEA, 22 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.); commits to
renouncing uranium enrichment and reprocessing; and has signed an Additional Protocol to its
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Arms Sales, Security Assistance, and Training
Arms Sales and U.S. Military Presence
Saudi Arabia’s armed forces have relied on U.S. arms sales, training, and maintenance support for
decades. Congress has historically supported U.S. arms sales to the kingdom, while seeking to
maintain Israel’s qualitative military edge (QME) over potential Arab adversaries and expressing
concern about the merits or terms of individual sales cases in some instances. Some Members of
Congress have at times expressed concern about the potential for U.S. arms sales to contribute to
or help drive arms races in the Gulf region and broader Middle East and, since 2015, about Saudi
use of U.S.-origin weaponry in Yemen.

102 Section 21(c) of P.L.90-629, the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), states that IMET recipient countries are eligible
to purchase non-IMET training at reduced cost. Section 108(a) of P.L. 99-83 amended t he AECA to provide this
reduced cost benefit to IMET recipients. T he U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) implements the
authority provided in P.L. 99-83 to apply a lower cost to U.S. military training purchased by Saudi Arabia and other
IMET recipient countries through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program.
103 From 2004 to 2009, Congress adopted several legislative proposals to prohibit the extension of U.S. for eign
assistance to Saudi Arabia. T he George W. Bush and Obama Administrations subsequently issued national security
waivers enabling the assistance to continue.
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Congressional majorities long backed continued arms sales to U.S. partners in the Gulf region,
including Saudi Arabia, as a means of improving interoperability, reducing the need for U.S.
deployments, deterring Iran, and supporting U.S. industry. Since 2009, a series of high-value U.S.
proposed arms sales to Saudi Arabia have been announced, including the 2010 announcement that
the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) would reconstitute and expand its main fighter forces with
advanced U.S. F-15 aircraft (see Table B-1). In May 2017, President Trump signaled a
continuation and deepening of bilateral defense cooperation, announcing completed and proposed
defense sales during his visit to Riyadh with a potential value of more than $110 bil ion. The sales
include cases that the Obama Administration had proposed and notified to Congress, cases
developed under the Obama Administration on which Congress had been preliminarily consulted,
and new sales that remain under development.
Ongoing and proposed sale cases are set to considerably improve Saudi military potential, and
executives in both countries have referred to them as symbolic commitments to cooperation
during a period of regional turmoil and leadership change. As with past sales, Saudi investments
in maintenance and training and decisions about force posture and command arrangements wil
shape the net effect new acquisitions have on Saudi military readiness and capabilities.
Since 2015, Saudi and Emirati use of U.S. weaponry in Yemen has prompted additional
congressional scrutiny of new sales to those countries, although, to date, Congress has not acted
to final y block any proposed sales. In the 116th Congress, majorities in the House and Senate
rejected the Trump Administration’s May 2019 use of emergency arms sales authority to expedite
sales of air-to-ground munitions and other defense systems to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
Emirates. However, Congress did not vote to overcome presidential vetoes of related resolutions
of disapproval (S.J.Res. 36, S.J.Res. 37, and S.J.Res. 38). In April 2019, Congress also directed
the President “to remove United States Armed Forces from hostilities in or affecting the Republic
of Yemen, except United States Armed Forces engaged in operations directed at al Qaeda or
associated forces,” but the Senate did not vote to overcome President Trump’s veto of S.J.Res. 7.
(See CRS Report R45046, Congress and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2020
and Table B-2 below).
The United States Military Training Mission (USMTM) in Saudi Arabia and the Saudi Arabian
National Guard Modernization Program (PM-SANG) oversee U.S. defense cooperation with the
kingdom. They have been active under special bilateral agreements and funded by Saudi
purchases since the 1950s and 1970s, respectively. Hundreds of U.S. military personnel are
deployed to Saudi Arabia in support of these programs and paral el programs for Saudi Ministry
of Interior and other security forces (see below).104 Saudi military, national guard, and interior
security forces had, until 2017, been under the leadership of three different senior members of the
royal family. Post-2017 leadership changes and Saudi plans to increase self-sufficiency in defense
production may affect future acquisition of U.S. weapons and training among these forces.105
As noted above, President Trump deployed additional U.S. military personnel and platforms to
Saudi Arabia following the September 2019 drone and missile attacks on Saudi oil facilities.106 In

104 As of March 2021, the Department of Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) reported that there were 804 U.S.
military personnel (including 597 active duty forces) in Saudi Arabia.
105 Katie Paul, “Saudi prince, relieved from National Guard, once seen as throne contender,” Reuters, November 4,
2017; and, Glen Carey and Zaid Sabah, “Saudi King Replaces Military Commanders as Yemen War Lingers On,
Bloom berg, February 26, 2018.
106 In October 2019, the Department of Defense announced that since September 2019, it had extended or authorized
deployments to the kingdom for an additional 3,000 U.S. personnel “ to assure and enhance the defense of Saudi
Arabia.” T he deployments included two fighter squadrons, one air expeditionary wing, two Patriot missile defense
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June 2021, President Biden reported to Congress that there were approximately 2,700 U.S.
military forces in the kingdom, deployed “to protect United States forces and interests in the
region against hostile action by Iran or Iran-backed groups.”107 President Biden confirmed that
these U.S. troops, “operating in coordination with the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, provide air and missile defense capabilities and support the operation of United States
fighter aircraft.”
Press reports citing unnamed U.S. officials indicate the Administration is withdrawing some U.S.
military personnel and missile defense and air defense platforms from the kingdom as part of a
broader real ocation of resources in the Gulf region.108 This withdrawal has been coordinated with
Saudi officials, who have said it has been “carried out through common understanding and
realignment of defense strategies.”109 Saudi defense officials have stated that Saudi military
capabilities are sufficient to defend the kingdom’s territory, and they have welcomed additional
missile defense support from U.S.-al y Greece.110 In August 2021, a State Department official
said in testimony before Congress that the Biden Administration “recognizes that Saudi Arabia
faces significant threats to its territory, and we are committed to working together to help Riyadh
strengthen its defenses.”111
President Trump stated that Saudi Arabia agreed to finance the additional costs of U.S.
deployment and operations undertaken in 2019, and the Department of Defense has reported to
Congress on related Saudi contributions.112 Saudi Arabia pays for the incremental costs of regular
U.S. military training and advisory activities through Foreign Military Sales cases. In the past, the
kingdom contributed bil ions of dollars to offset the incremental costs of U.S. military operations
during the 1991 Gulf War.113 Current law provides for acceptance of burden sharing contributions
by designated countries and regional organizations (see 10 U.S.C. 2609 and 10 U.S.C. 2350j).

batteries, and one T erminal High Altitude Areas Defense System (T HAAD). Department of Defense Statemen t on
Deployment of Additional U.S. Forces and Equipment to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, October 11, 2019. In a
November 2019 letter to Congress, President T rump said, “ T hese personnel will remain deployed as long as their
presence is required” to fulfill missions described in the letter. T hese include “ to improve defenses against air and
missile threats in the region,” “ to support the operation of United States fighter aircraft from the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia,” and, “ to assure our partners, deter further Iranian provocative behavior, and bolster regional defensive
capabilities.” T ext of a Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro
T empore of the Senate, November 19, 2019.
107 T ext of a Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro T empore of
the Senate, June 8, 2021.
108 Gordon Lubold, Nancy A. Youssef, and Michael R. Gordon, “U.S. Military to Withdraw Hundreds of T roops,
Aircraft, Antimissile Batteries From Middle East ,” Wall Street Journal, June 18, 2021.
109 Associated Press, “ U.S. removes advanced missile defense system from Saudi Arabia,” September 11, 2021.
110 Ibid, and, Saudi-U.S. T rade Group, “ After U.S. Withdrawal of Patriot Missiles, Greece Delivers System to Saudi,”
September 15, 2021.
111 T estimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Regional Affairs (Bureau of Political-Military Affairs) Mira
Resnick before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central A sia, and
Counterterrorism, August 10, 2021.
112 President T rump remarks at joint news conference with Italian President Sergio Mattarella, October 16, 2019.
113 Contributions were made via the Defense Cooperation Account authority (10 U.S.C. 2608) established by Congress
at the executive branch’s request in October 1990 following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait ( P.L. 101-403). Congress
established additional terms for the reimbursement of costs and oversight reporting in the March 1991 supplemental
appropriations act (P.L. 102-25). See United States Costs in the Persian Gulf Conflict and Foreign Cont ributions to
Offset such Costs, Report #21, October 15, 1992; and, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Final Report to Congress
Pursuant to T itle V of P.L. 102-25, April 1992.
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Support to Saudi Military Operations in Yemen
Saudi Arabia established a coalition in March 2015 to engage in military operations in Yemen
against the Ansarallah/Houthi movement and loyalists of the previous president of Yemen, the
late Ali Abdullah Saleh (see “Conflict in Yemen”).114 The Houthi-Saleh al iance ousted the
international y recognized interim government of Yemen in January 2015. The war in Yemen has
continued since then, leading, according to the United Nations, to one of the world’s largest
humanitarian crises. Presidents Obama, Trump, and Biden have expressed U.S. support for the
Saudi-led coalition’s operations in Yemen as a bulwark against Iranian regional interference.
They also have implored the Saudis, their partners, and the Houthis to improve humanitarian
access, pursue a settlement to the conflict, and take measures to prevent civilian casualties. Saudi
leaders frequently state that the coalition military campaign is an act of legitimate self-defense
because of their Yemeni adversaries’ repeated and, at times, deadly, cross-border missile and
drone attacks. After an August 2021 Houthi attack on Saudi Arabia damaged a civilian airliner
and injured civilians, State Department Spokesperson Ned Price said, “The fact is that our
partner, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, does face a threat from Yemen. We are standing with our
partner.”115
The United States’ role in supporting the Saudi-led coalition’s military operations in Yemen has
evolved over time.116 As noted above, concerns about Yemeni civilian deaths in Saudi airstrikes,
the operation’s contribution to grave humanitarian conditions, and gains by Al Qaeda and Islamic
State supporters have led some Members of Congress and U.S. officials to urge al parties to seek
a settlement. In the 114th Congress, some Members scrutinized and attempted to halt proposed
sales of thousands of guided air-to-ground munitions and tanks to Saudi Arabia in the context of
concerns about the Saudi military’s conduct in Yemen. President Obama maintained U.S.
logistical support for Saudi operations in Yemen but decided in 2016 to reduce U.S. personnel
support and limit certain U.S. arms transfers, including planned air-to-ground munitions sales.
In the 115th Congress, debate over arms sales continued, and Congress passed legislation
prohibiting the obligation or expenditure of U.S. funds for in-flight refueling operations of Saudi
and Saudi-led coalition aircraft that were not conducting select types of operations if certain
certifications could not be made and maintained (Section 1290 of the FY2019 National Defense
Authorization Act, P.L. 115-232).117 The Trump Administration issued required certifications in

114 In early December 2017, the Houthi-Saleh alliance unraveled, culminating in the killing of former President Saleh
on December 4, 2017.
115 U.S. Department of State Spokesperson Ned Price, Press Briefing, Washington, DC, September 2, 2021.
116 For background on the evolution of U.S. military support to Saudi Arabia and the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, see
CRS Report R45046, Congress and the War in Yem en: Oversight and Legislation 2015 -2020.
117 Until November 2018, U.S. in-flight refueling to the militaries of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)
was conducted pursuant to the terms of bilateral Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSAs) between the
Department of Defense and the respective ministries of each country. Some retransfers of fuel services were provided
to Saudi-led coalition members, and in 2015, Saudi Arabia received general purpose bombs retransferred by the United
Arab Emirates. ACSA agreements are governed by 10 U.S.C. 2341-2350. The U.S. agreement with Saudi Arabia was
signed in May 2016. Prior to May 2016, a “ Joint Staff Execute Order signed on March 27, 2015, directed DOD to
provide aerial refueling support to the SLC [Saudi-led coalition], if requested, and st ated that the support would be
provided on a reimbursable basis either through foreign military sales (FMS) or an ACSA. ” U.S. Government
Accountability Office, Defense Logistics Agreem ents: DOD Should Im prove Oversight and Seek Paym ent from
Foreign Partners for Thousands of Orders It Identifies as Overdue, GAO-20-309, March 20, 2020, Appendix IV.
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September 2018 but announced an end to U.S. refueling support weeks later.118 Saudi Arabia and
the United Arab Emirates agreed to reimburse the United States for the costs of refueling.119
President Trump chose to proceed with precision guided munition technology sales that the
Obama Administration had deferred, and, as discussed above, in May 2019 invoked emergency
authority under the Arms Export Control Act to proceed with proposed sales that simple
majorities in both chambers in Congress opposed. The decision followed President Trump’s April
2019 veto of S.J.Res. 7, through which Congress sought to direct an end to U.S. military
involvement with non-counterterrorism missions in Yemen (see CRS Report R45046, Congress
and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2020).120
President Biden has “directed an end to United States support for the Saudi‑led Coalition's
offensive military operations against the Houthis in Yemen.”121 According to his June 2021
consolidated war powers report to Congress, “United States Armed Forces, in a non‑combat role,
continue to provide military advice and limited information to regional forces for defensive and
training purposes only as they relate to the Saudi-led Coalition's campaign against the Houthis in
Yemen. Such support does not involve United States Armed Forces in hostilities with the Houthis
for the purposes of the War Powers Resolution.” U.S. forces reportedly have deployed to Saudi
Arabia on a periodic basis for these and other purposes, including advisers for border security and
anti-missile purposes.122
The Biden Administration paused the implementation of some arms sales approved by President
Trump, and an Administration review reportedly has recommended not proceeding with
previously approved sales of air-to-ground munitions and related technologies to the kingdom.123
Other sales and deliveries of defense articles and services continue pursuant to the Foreign
Military Sales and Direct Commercial Sales procedures established in the Arms Export Control
Act, including maintenance and service contracts.
The 117th Congress continues to consider proposals that would place conditions on or direct an
end to U.S. military support to coalition operations in Yemen. In July 2021, the House voted to
adopt “plus-minus” amendments to the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 2022 “to highlight opposition to U.S. political or diplomatic
support for the Saudi blockade of Yemen,” and, “to highlight the need for stronger congressional
oversight, robust human rights measures, and transparency in U.S. arms sales to countries such as

118 In September 2018, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo certified to Congress that the governments of Saudi Arabia and
the United Arab Emirates were “ undertaking demonstrable actions to reduce the risk of harm to civilians and civilian
infrastructure resulting from military operations” pursuant to Section 1290 of the FY2019 John S. McCain National
Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 115-91). Some Members of Congress criticized the certification.
119 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Defense Logistics Agreements: DOD Should Improve Oversight and Seek
Paym ent from Foreign Partners for Thousands of Orders It Identifies as Overdue, GAO-20-309, March 20, 2020,
Appendix IV.
120 President Donald T rump, Presidential Veto Message to the Senate to Accompany S.J.Res. 7, April 16, 2019.
121 T ext of a Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro T empore of
the Senate, June 8, 2021.
122 Ibid. Press reports also have included unconfirmed details about U.S. border security and counter -missile operations.
Helene Cooper, T homas Gibbons-Neff and Eric Schmitt , “ Army Special Forces Secretly Help Saudis Combat T hreat
From Yemen Rebels,” New York Tim es, May 18, 2018.
123 In April 2021, the New York T imes cited unnamed U.S. officials as saying the Administration “ plans to suspend the
sale of air-to-ground offensive weapons used by fixed-wing aircraft ” to Saudi Arabia, including “ systems that can turn
regular bombs into precision-guided munitions.” Michael Crowley and Edward Wong, “ U.S. Is Expected to Approve
Some Arms Sales to U.A.E. and Saudis,” New York Tim es, April 14, 2021.
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Saudi Arabia.”124 Several amendments adopted in the House version of the FY2022 National
Defense Authorization Act also would limit certain U.S. support to Saudi Arabia based on its
operations in Yemen (see “Legislation in the 117th Congress”).
Assistance to the Saudi Ministry of Interior
U.S.-Saudi counterterrorism and internal security cooperation expanded after 2008, when a
bilateral technical cooperation agreement established a U.S.-interagency critical infrastructure
protection advisory mission to the kingdom. The agreement was extended in 2013 through
2023.125 U.S. government Country Reports on Terrorism entries for Saudi Arabia report that
security and counterterrorism cooperation programs are ongoing and productive, suggesting that
2017 changes of leadership in the Ministry of Interior (MOI), the creation of the Presidency for
State Security, and the consolidation of security authority under the crown prince have not
disrupted U.S.-Saudi security cooperation.126
The Office of the Program Manager-Ministry of Interior (OPM-MOI) is a Saudi-funded, U.S.-
staffed senior advisory mission that embeds U.S. advisors into key security, industrial, energy,
maritime, and cybersecurity offices within the Saudi government, including with the Ministry of
Interior and Presidency for State Security. In 2018, the State Department Office of Inspector
General said the program “facilitates the transfer of technical knowledge, advice, skil s, and
resources from the United States to Saudi Arabia in the areas of critical infrastructure protection
and public security.”127 According to a 2016 State Department report, the OPM-MOI program
seeks to help Saudi Arabia “improve its ability to thwart terrorists before they act and to defend
against terrorist attacks if they occur.”128
In coordination with these advisory efforts, the U.S. Army Material Command-Security
Assistance Command (USASAC) oversees a Saudi-funded Ministry of Interior Military
Assistance Group (MOI-MAG). In 2019, USASAC described the MOI-MAG program as “the
only U.S. military organization that advises and trains another country’s Ministry of Interior
security forces.”129 Under MOI-MAG programs, U.S. Army personnel “provide security
assistance training to include marksmanship, patrolling perimeters, setting up security
checkpoints, vehicle searches at entry control point, rules of engagement toward possible threats
and personnel screening” as wel as “courses similar to standard Army courses to include the
Army Basic Instructors' Course, basic officers' course, airborne training, flight training and
military police training.”130

124 See amendments 5 and 25 as printed in H.Rept. 117-110 on H.R. 4373, considered as part of en bloc amendment #3
to H.R. 4373, July 28, 2021. House of Represent atives Roll Call vote number 241:
https://clerk.house.gov/Votes/2021241. For background on “ plus-minus” amendments and their use, see H.R. 4373
CRS Report R46841, Changes in the House of Representatives’ Initial Consideration of Regular Appropriations
Measures, 113th-116th Congresses, by Kevin P. McNellis.
125 Adriane Elliot, “Security assistance growth prompts restructuring,” U.S. Army, September 2, 2015.
126 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on T errorism 2018, November 2019.
127 U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, “Inspection of Embassy Riyadh and Constituent Posts, Saudi
Arabia,” ISP-I-18-17, May 2018.
128 “Counterterrorism Coordination with Saudi Arabia” in U.S. Department of State Bureau of Counterterrorism,
Country Reports on T errorism 2015, April 2016. T he program is m odeled loosely on embedded advisory and
technology transfer programs of the U.S.-Saudi Joint Commission for Economic Cooperation, established in the 1970s.
129 USASAC Public Affairs, “MOI-MAG advise and train in Saudi Arabia,” November 6, 2019.
130 Ibid.
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According to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, from FY2009 through FY2017, the U.S.
government had reached and/or implemented sales agreements worth $287 mil ion in support of
Saudi Ministry of Interior programs.131 An additional $52 mil ion in sales were implemented from
FY2018 to FY2020.132
U.S.-Saudi Trade and Investment
Saudi Arabia was the second largest U.S. trading partner in the Middle East by overal value in
2020.133 According to the U.S. International Trade Administration, U.S. imports from Saudi
Arabia in 2019 were worth $13.4 bil ion and in 2020 were worth $8.9 bil ion (down from $24.1
bil ion in 2018). In 2019, U.S. exports to Saudi Arabia were valued at $14.3 bil ion (up from more
than $13.6 bil ion in 2018). U.S. exports to the kingdom were worth $11.1 bil ion in 2020.
To a considerable extent, U.S. imports of hydrocarbons from Saudi Arabia and U.S. exports of
commercial y sold weapons, machinery, and vehicles to Saudi Arabia have dictated the annual
value of U.S.-Saudi trade. Fluctuations in the volume and value of U.S.-Saudi oil trade account
for corresponding changes in the value of U.S. imports from Saudi Arabia in recent years. The
value of U.S. exports to Saudi Arabia has fluctuated relatively less.
Increases in U.S. domestic oil production since 2010 have contributed to reductions in the volume
of U.S. oil imports from Saudi Arabia. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration
(EIA), as of May 2021, Saudi Arabia was the fourth-largest source of U.S. crude oil imports,
providing an average of 395 thousand barrels per day of the 8.5 mil ion barrels per day (mbd) in
gross U.S. crude oil imports, behind Canada, Mexico, and Russia.134
According to the State Department’s 2021 Investment Climate Statement on Saudi Arabia, the
kingdom continues to facilitate increased foreign participation in the kingdom’s private sector in
connection with its Vision 2030 initiatives. The report highlights the conversion of the Saudi
Arabian General Investment Authority into the Ministry of Investment and the Saudi-government
led domestic investment initiative announced in 2021.135 The report also observes “pressure to
generate non-oil revenue and provide more jobs for Saudi citizens... may weaken the country’s
investment climate going forward.” The report notes that “investor concerns persist ...over the
rule of law, business predictability, and political risk.”
The U.S. Trade Representative’s (USTR) 2021 National Trade Estimate Report notes progress
and cooperation in certain areas and discusses some trade barriers, including U.S. concerns with
some Saudi regulations, intel ectual property rights (IPR) policies, and limits on foreign
investment.136 The U.S. government has praised the Saudi government’s creation of a dedicated

131 Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) Fiscal Year Series Data, September 30, 2018. From FY2015
onward, DSCA tracked the implementation of sales in the fiscal year of implementation, rather than agreements
reached.
132 DSCA response to CRS inquiry, August 31, 2021.
133 Based on U.S. Department of Commerce International Trade Administration Global Patterns of U.S. Merchandise
T rade, July 2021. Comparable 2020 figures for Israel, the top U.S. trading partner in the Middle East, were more than
$10.1 billion in U.S. exports and more than $15.2 billion in U.S. imports from Israel. U.S. exports to the United Arab
Emirates in 2019 were wort h more than $20 billion, and in 2020 were worth more than $14.7 billion.
134 Based on EIA data, “ Weekly Imports & Exports: Crude” and “ Weekly Preliminary Crude Imports by Country of
Origin,” Four Week Averages, January 31, 2020.
135 U.S. Department of State, Investment Climate Statement, Saudi Arabia, July 21, 2021.
136 U.S. T rade Representative, National T rade Estimate Report on Foreign T rade Barriers, March 2021, pp. 451-457.
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intel ectual property protection agency but reports that “continued lack of effective protection of
IPR in the pharmaceutical sector remains a significant concern.”137 USTR placed Saudi Arabia on
its Priority Watch List in its 2021 Special 301 report on IPR.138
Events since 2017 have demonstrated interrelations among Saudi politics, regional security, and
the kingdom’s economic transformation plans. International observers and investors appear to be
weighing these factors from a variety of perspectives. Foreign private sector actors seeking to
participate in and profit from new investment and expanded business opportunities in the
kingdom have had to navigate political and security developments that have created uncertainty.
Foreign government actors seeking to support Saudi Arabia’s transformation plans as a hedge
against political instability that could result from the initiatives’ failure have faced related
chal enges in convincing investors to make long-term commitments. The kingdom’s adversaries
have leveraged relatively low cost, high impact attacks to amplify investors’ doubts.
Energy Issues
Global Energy Trends and Saudi Policy
Saudi Arabia holds the second largest proven oil reserves in the world (17.2% of global total) and
produced 12.5% of the oil produced by volume global y in 2020, second to the United States.139
Saudi Arabia is also the largest exporter of crude oil. A September 2019 missile and drone attack
on critical oil facilities at Abqaiq and Khurais and an attempted attack on export facilities in
March 2021 highlight ongoing security threats to the kingdom’s energy infrastructure and, by
extension, to its energy exports and world economies.140 In 2020, Asian economies remained the
leading importers of Saudi crude oil exports, with Japan, China, South Korea, and India as the top
buyers.141 Saudi officials have ordered the expansion of Saudi Aramco’s oil production capacity
to 13 mil ion barrels per day (mbd) from its current maximum capacity of approximately 12
mbd.142 In 2020, Saudi Arabia consumed 3.5 mbd of its 11 mbd production; historical y Saudi oil

137 U.S. Department of State, Investment Climate Statement, Saudi Arabia, July 21, 2021.
138 T he Special 301 Report (Report) is the result of an annual review of the state of intellectual property (IP) protection
and enforcement in U.S. trading partners around the world, which the Office of the United States T rade Representative
(UST R) conducts pursuant to Section 182 of the T rade Act of 1974, as amended (the T rade Act, 19 U.S.C. § 2242).
UST R, “UST R releases Annual Special 301 Report on Intellectual Property Protection,” April 30, 2021.
139 BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2021.
140 Katie McQue and Herman Wang, “Saudi Aramco facilities reportedly targeted by Houthi missile bombardment,”
S&P Global Platts, March 7, 2021.
141 Sambit Mohanty and Gawoon Phil Vahn, “Asia’s fragile recovery path can ill afford oil upheaval, price gyrations,”
S&P Global Platts, March 10, 2021; Sharon Cho and Serene Cheong, “ Saudi Oil-Price Hike May Be T oo Much for
Delta-Ravaged Asia,” Bloom berg News, July 29, 2021; and “ Oil: Inter-area movements” in BP Statistical Review of
World Energy 2021.
142 According to Saudi Aramco, “ T he Government determines the Kingdom’s maximum level of crude oil production
in the exercise of its sovereign prerogative and requires Aramco to maintain maximum sustainable capacity (MSC). As
at December 31, 2020, Aramco’s MSC was maintained at 12.0 mmbpd of crude oil. On March 11, 2020, the
Government mandated Aramco to increase its MSC to 13.0 mmbpd. Aramco is proceeding with detailed engineering
and implementing the Government’s directive to increase MSC.” Saudi Aramco Annual Report, 2020. According to
Bloomberg, “ Aramco defines its maximum sustainable capacity as the amount of crude it can bring into production
within three months and sustain for at least a year.” Julian Lee, “ Saudi Recovery from Oil Attack Isn’t All It Seems,”
Bloom berg News, September 27, 2019.
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consumption, which has declined since 2015, has been mainly for transportation and electricity
generation.143
The Saudi government receives a dividend from the state-owned oil company Saudi Aramco that
finances most of the state budget. A trend of lower oil prices from 2014 through mid-2017 caused
some public and official financial concern in the kingdom. To meet related fiscal chal enges,
Saudi authorities devised a three-track strategy:
1. Negotiation of agreements with certain oil producers to reduce and control global
oil output,
2. Increases in domestic electricity and gasoline prices to reduce oil consumption in
the kingdom, and
3. A plan to offer public shares in Saudi Aramco and reinvest proceeds in the
kingdom’s Public Investment Fund (PIF) and thereby help finance the
development of non-oil economic sectors and revenue sources.
Negotiations with OPEN Members and Certain Non-OPEC Producers. Mutual reliance on
oil export revenues creates paral el interests and competition for market share among Saudi
Arabia, Russia, and other countries that depend on oil export revenues. General y speaking,
members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) have sought to keep
oil markets adequately balanced by adjusting production levels with the stated goal of
maintaining oil market and price stability. As a high volume oil producer with large-scale,
flexible production and export capacity, Saudi Arabia has played an influential role in oil markets
for decades.144
In recent years, Saudi authorities have managed their production levels amid increasing output
and exports from U.S. tight (aka “shale”) oil producers and changing demand conditions in global
oil markets. To mitigate the price-lowering effects of surplus supply, Saudi Arabia in 2016
convinced fel ow members of OPEC to embrace shared productions cuts and reached an
agreement with the “OPEC+” group (Russia and 10 other non-OPEC countries) to support a
production cut arrangement. Some market observers credit this arrangement with broadly
stabilizing prices after its announcement.145 Officials from Saudi Arabia and the OPEC+ countries
since have agreed serial y to extend their joint production cuts, with some iterative revisions to
country production levels to accommodate market and producer nation conditions. Saudi officials
periodical y have instituted additional voluntary cuts to shape market conditions and preserve
OPEC+ member countries’ commitment to the deal.
Saudi-Russian negotiations have been central to the duration of the OPEC+ arrangement. In June
2018, Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman and Russian President Vladimir Putin announced a
bilateral energy cooperation agreement that Saudi and Russian Energy Ministers said would seek
“a balanced market that is supported by a reliable and sufficient supply.”146 At times, however,
reported Saudi-Russian disagreements have led to divergent approaches, such as in March 2020,
when disagreement about the appropriate response to the onset of COVID-19 led Saudi Arabia to

143 BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2021; and, Jim Krane, “Energy Governance in Saudi Arabia: An
Assessment of the Kingdom’s Resources, Policies, And Climate Approach,” January 2019.
144 Anjli Raval, “Saudi Arabia loses oil market share to rivals in key nations,” Financial Times (UK), March 28, 2016;
and, Grant Smith, “Saudis T ake Iran’s Oil-Market Share, Keeping OPEC Supply Steady,” Bloomberg News, June 3,
2019.
145 See the “ Declaration of Cooperation” here: https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/publications/4580.htm.
146 RFE/RL, “ Russia, Saudi Arabia Agree T o Expand Cooperation On Oil, Gas,” June 15, 2018.
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announce plans to increase oil production and reduce their official sel ing price. Benchmark oil
prices plummeted, setting off one of the most volatile oil price periods on record.147
In April 2020, OPEC+ countries agreed to continue managing their production levels in a bid to
bolster prices against the effects of declines in oil demand stemming from the COVID-19
pandemic. These efforts led to historical y large oil production cuts. As petroleum demand has
increased and inventory levels have declined, OPEC+ is now in the process of unwinding
production cuts and adding more supply. The current agreement is in effect until the end of 2022,
but can be adjusted as market conditions warrant.148
Domestic Energy Policy and Consumption. Saudi Arabia consumes the most oil by volume in
the Middle East.149 Oil consumption for electricity generation was estimated in 2018 at an
average of 400,000 barrels per day (bpd), down from a record high near 900,000 bpd in 2015.150
As of 2017, oil and natural gas generated 40% and nearly 60% of the kingdom’s electricity,
respectively. The use of domestical y produced oil and petroleum products for power generation
imposes a fiscal tradeoff, with opportunities lost for export revenue in an environment where
market trends have strained Saudi state finances in some recent years. Saudi Arabia is the 8th
largest producer of natural gas, but does not export any of it.
Plans for electricity generation to meet projected consumption growth reflect an intent to increase
the role of natural gas, renewables, and, possibly, nuclear power. The National Renewable Energy
Program’s current targets cal for the kingdom to develop 27.3 gigawatts (GW) of renewable
energy generation capacity by 2024 and 58.7 GW by 2030. Thirty percent of the target is to be
met through tendered projects managed by the Renewable Energy Project Development Office of
the Vision 2030 initiative, with Public Investment Fund partnerships with international investors
making up the balance.151
Saudi oil consumption has declined since 2015, partly because of government-imposed domestic
price increases to curb demand.152 Prior to increases on prices of subsidized domestic oil
products, some reports warned that the volume of oil consumed in Saudi Arabia could exceed oil
exports by 2030 if domestic energy consumption patterns did not change.153 In July 2021, the
IMF reported that “investments in renewable energy are expected to reach $50 bil ion by 2023
and meet 49 percent of domestical y needed electricity in 2030 (0.2 percent in 2019).”154
Saudi Aramco IPO. Saudi officials delayed plans for a global public offering of shares in Saudi
Aramco but proceeded with a domestic offering in December 2019.155 Corresponding proceeds of
the offering netted the PIF more than $29 bil ion, less than previous possible estimates of $100

147 Jinjoo Lee, “How a T enuous Saudi-Russia Oil Alliance Could Melt Down,” Wall Street Journal, August 7, 2020.
148 Rania Gamal, Olesya Astakhova, and Ahmad Ghaddar, “OPEC+ agrees oil supply boost after UAE, Saudi reach
compromise” Reuters, July 19, 2021.
149 “Oil: Consumption – T onnes” in BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2021.
150 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Saudi Arabia used less crude oil for power generation in 2018,” June 3,
2019.
151 Middle East Economic Digest, “Saudi Arabia resets renewable energy goals,” January 22, 2019.
152 BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2021; and, IMF Country Report No. 21/149, July 8, 2021.
153 Glada Lahn and Paul Stevens, Burning Oil to Keep Cool: The Hidden Energy Crisis in Saudi Arabia , Chatham
House (UK), December 2011; and, John Sfakianakis, “Saudi Arabia’s Essential Oil,” Foreign Affairs, January 8, 2014.
154 IMF Country Report No. 21/149, July 8, 2021.
155 Matthew Campbell and Glen Carey, “Aramco’s Stalled IPO T arnishes Saudi Prince’s Grand Vision,” Bloomberg,
August 23, 2018; Arash Massoudi, Anjli Raval, and Simeon Kerr, “ Saudi Aramco abandons international roadshow for
IPO,” Financial Tim es (UK), November 18, 2019.
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bil ion.156 The PIF continues to invest the proceeds to support Saudi economic transformation
initiatives, and the Crown Prince has indicated that a further share offering is contemplated in the
future.157 Market analysts vigorously debated the potential value of the share offering prior to its
announcement, with Saudi officials reportedly hoping for a valuation of $2 tril ion and share
offering plans suggesting a valuation of $1.6 tril ion to $1.7 tril ion.158 In connection with the
offering, Saudi Aramco pledged to deliver a $75 bil ion annual dividend to investors, most of
which accrues to the Saudi government as the company’s main shareholder. Saudi Aramco
continues to pay income tax and royalties to the Saudi government as wel . Saudi Aramco has
borrowed funds to meet its dividend requirements thus far, and has taken some cost-cutting
measures.159 The company’s profits recovered in 2021 as global oil prices rebounded.
Carbon Dioxide Emissions and Climate Policy. Domestic carbon dioxide emissions in Saudi
Arabia increased rapidly from the 1960s onward as the kingdom used proceeds from oil exports
to develop its economy and raise the standard of living of its population, which grew from 4
mil ion in 1960 to more than 30 mil ion in 2019 (including foreign nationals). Saudi domestic
emissions have declined since 2016.160 Saudi Arabia’s net greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions per
capita are among the highest in the world, at about 19 metric tons per capita (t/c, compared with
the United States at 18 t/c and the world average at 6.5 t/c).161
Global consumption of Saudi oil contributes to global carbon dioxide emissions. Saudi
representatives have taken positions in international climate policy negotiations that appear to
reflect the kingdom’s preferences and prerogatives as a major producer, exporter, and consumer
of fossil fuels and as a recently developed, if relatively wealthy, country. The kingdom’s
representatives argue that the interests and needs of developing countries should be given more
consideration when it comes to reductions in fossil fuel-derived carbon emissions and financial
transfers to meet agreed diversification targets.162
Saudi representatives suggest that major carbon consumers, particularly legacy consumers in
developed industrialized economies, should bear more of the burden for emissions reductions and
energy transition financing than developing countries or more recently developed countries. In
this context, officials have also taken strong positions in international climate change negotiations
to seek compensation for “Loss and Damage” from policies of other countries that might reduce
demand for fossil fuels, as wel as compensation for damages due to the effects of climate change.
(The United States limits negotiations on this topic).

156 Summer Said, “ Potential Saudi Aramco IPO Wouldn’t Include Oil Reserves,” Wall Street Journal, January 24,
2016; Alan Livsey, “ Lex in depth: T he $2tn Saudi Aramco question,” Financial Times (UK), April 3, 2017; Simeon
Kerr and Ahmed Al Omran, “ Saudi Aramco IPO sparks fears of loss of cash cow,” Financial Tim es (UK), May 10,
2017; and Simeon Kerr, Anjli Raval, and Arash Massoudi, “ Saudi Aramco pares back IPO on weak foreign demand,”
Financial Tim es (UK), November 17, 2019.
157 Katie McQue, “ FEAT URE: Plans for second Aramco share sale increase oil price pressure on Saudi Arabia,” S&P
Global Platts, February 16, 2021.
158 Dinesh Nair, Matthew Martin, and Javier Blas, “Aramco IPO Hangs on Same Old Question: Is It Worth $2
T rillion?” Bloomberg News, October 18, 2019.
159 Summer Said and Stephen Kalin, “ Saudi Aramco Borrows Again to Fund Dividend Pledge Despite Oil Recovery ,”
Wall Street Journal, June 11, 2021.
160 See Box 4 in IMF Country Report No. 21/149, July 8, 2021, p. 25.
161 ClimateWatch, Historical GHG Emissions, available at: https://www.climatewatchdata.org/ghg-
emissions?calculation=PER_CAPIT A&end_year=2018&regions=SAU%2CUSA&sectors=total -including-
lucf&start_year=1990.
162 Leo Hickman, “T he Carbon Brief Interview: Saudi Arabia’s Ayman Shasly,” CarbonBrief, December 12, 2018.
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In June 2021, U.S. Climate Envoy John Kerry visited Saudi Arabia and met with Crown Prince
Mohammed bin Salman to discuss climate change and related issues. The meeting marked the
first senior Biden Administration official meeting with the Crown Prince. A joint statement
following the visit said both countries “affirm the importance of reducing greenhouse gas
emissions and taking adaptation actions during the 2020s to avoid the worst consequences of
climate change.”163 Saudi officials highlighted the kingdom’s plans under the Saudi Green
Initiative to generate half of national energy needs from renewable sources by 2030 and to invest
in so-cal ed clean hydrocarbon technologies.164 Stil , Saudi Arabia’s influence on GHG is largely
by producing and exporting petroleum to be combusted elsewhere, and not its emissions within
its borders. The kingdom used its presidency of the G20 during 2020 to promote the concept of a
circular carbon economy where carbon dioxide reductions, reuse, recycling, and removal would
be pursued.165
A rapid global transition away from use of petroleum-derived fuels would likely directly
chal enge the kingdom’s fiscal stability and disrupt its society and political economy. Current
Saudi officials view this prospect as highly unlikely and have signaled the kingdom also wil
continue to invest in its oil and gas production infrastructure to meet expected global demand
over coming decades.166
Potential U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Cooperation
Saudi Nuclear Plans
In July 2017, the Saudi cabinet approved a National Project for Atomic Energy, including plans to
build large and smal nuclear reactors for electricity production and seawater desalination. The
decision comes amid a larger effort to diversify the economy and expand renewable energy use.
Original y, Saudi officials at the King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy (KA
CARE) stated that the kingdom might seek to develop as many as 16 nuclear power reactors by
2040 in order to reduce the domestic consumption of oil and natural gas for electricity
production.167 The Saudi Ministry of Energy, Industry, and Mineral Resources and KA CARE
envisioned these reactors generating up to 17.6 GW of nuclear energy, which would have
provided 15-20% of Saudi Arabia’s projected electricity needs.
Those plans were subsequently scaled back, and Saudi leaders are now considering plans for the
construction of two nuclear power reactors, for a total capacity between 2 GW and 3.2 GW.
Original plans cal ed for contracts to be signed for reactor construction in 2018, for delivery by
2027.168 This schedule was then delayed to 2020, with no decisions announced to date. Firms in
Russia, the United States, France, China, and South Korea reportedly remain under consideration
for the construction partnership. Project management, financial advisory services, and site survey
and safety contracts have been issued, with a site south of the Saudi-Qatari border selected as the

163 Office of the U.S. State Department Spokesperson, U.S.-Saudi Arabia Joint Statement Addressing the Climate
Challenge, June 16, 2021.
164 See https://www.saudigreeninitiative.org/.
165 See G20 Energy Ministerial Meeting Communique, September 28, 2020; and, https://www.cceguide.org/guide/.
166 Sam Meredith, “Russia and Saudi Arabia reject calls to end oil and gas spending, call IEA’s net -zero plan
‘unrealistic’,” CNBC, June 4 2021.
167 KA CARE 2011 statement cited in World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Power in Saudi Arabia,” October 2017.
168 Reuters, “Saudi Arabia aims to prequalify firms by April or May for first nuclear plant,” January 15, 2018.
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proposed location for the kingdom’s first reactor.169 A separate process with South Korean
partners to study the use of relatively smal SMART reactors to generate electricity in remote
areas also is underway.
Saudi Arabia has entered into a range of agreements since 2015 concerning possible civil nuclear
cooperation with several countries (Table 2).
Saudi nuclear facilities would be subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
safeguards under the terms of the country’s comprehensive safeguards agreement, which has been
in force since 2009. Such safeguards present a significant hurdle to the development of nuclear
weapons. The IAEA completed an Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review (INIR) in Saudi
Arabia at the kingdom’s invitation in July 2018.170 Saudi Arabia has not agreed to an Additional
Protocol to its safeguards agreement. The country has a Smal Quantities Protocol (SQP) to its
safeguards agreement, which suspends certain verification provisions for states with
comprehensive safeguards agreements and smal quantities of nuclear materials. The agency’s
Board of Governors in 2005 approved changes to the SQP designed to increase verification
obligations and Saudi Arabia has not accepted the modified text. Saudi Arabia would need to
rescind its SQP to build nuclear reactors.
Table 2. Select Nuclear Cooperation Developments Involving Saudi Arabia
March 2015
Argentine-Saudi joint nuclear R&D venture agreed.
Saudi-South Korean mutual nuclear cooperation agreements signed, including an MOU on building
two smal reactors for Saudi water desalination.
June 2015
KA CARE officials sign a nuclear energy cooperation agreement with Russia’s Rosatom.
Agreements signed with France on cooperation, including EPR reactor feasibility studies.
January
Saudi Arabia and China memorandum of understanding signed regarding cooperation in the
2016
possible future construction of a high-temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) in the kingdom.
October
Saudi Arabia and Kazakhstan sign a nuclear cooperation agreement focused on nuclear fuel.
2016
March 2017
Agreement signed for Chinese-Saudi feasibility study of HTGR construction in Saudi Arabia.
March-
KA CARE officials visit China to begin HTGR study implementation planning. China National
August 2017 Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) and the Saudi Geological Survey sign agreements on uranium
exploration cooperation.
December
Russia’s Rosatom and KA CARE sign implementing agreement related to smal and medium
2017
reactors, personnel and fuel management.
March 2019
Saudi trainees begin uranium exploration and mining training in Jordan.
September
KA CARE and South Korean officials sign MoU on comprehensive cooperation in nuclear research
2019
and development, with emphasis on SMART Reactor design and construction.
Source: Official statements and media reports.
U.S. Civil Nuclear Cooperation with Saudi Arabia
In 2008, the United States under the George W. Bush Administration and Saudi Arabia signed a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which stated the intention to cooperate on a variety of
nuclear activities in the fields of medicine, industry, and electricity production. Previous U.S.

169 Informa PLC (UK), “Saudi Arabia receives bids for nuclear power project advisory role,” July 28, 2021.
170 IAEA, “IAEA Reviews Saudi Arabia’s Nuclear Power Infrastructure Development,” 35/2018, July 31, 2018.
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Administrations had explored a civil nuclear energy agreement with Saudi Arabia but had not
finalized an agreement.
In 2017, the Trump Administration expedited consideration of required regulatory approvals for
U.S. firms to provide marketing information to Saudi officials, and U.S. companies have provided
proposals to Saudi authorities in relation to the planned tender for nuclear reactor construction. In
September 2018, Secretary of Energy Rick Perry and Minister of Energy, Industry, and Mineral
Resources Khalid al Falih met in Washington, DC, and discussed, inter alia, “the potential for
U.S.-Saudi civil nuclear engagement and new technologies such as Smal Modular Reactors.”171
In September 2019, Secretary Perry wrote to then-Minister Al Falih addressing requirements for a
nuclear cooperation agreements under Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended (AEA, 22 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.), and stating that, “The terms of the 123 Agreement must
also contain a commitment by the kingdom to forgo any enrichment and reprocessing for the term
of the agreement.”172 So-cal ed 123 Agreements are required for significant nuclear cooperation,
such as the transfer of certain U.S.-origin nuclear material subject to licensing for commercial,
medical, and industrial purposes; the export of reactors and critical reactor components; and the
export of other commodities under Nuclear Regulatory Commission export licensing authority. A
“123 agreement” is required for any covered nuclear exports but appears to be unnecessary for
U.S. companies to conclude contracts for nuclear reactors. In September 2019, Deputy Secretary
of Energy Dan Brouil ette said, “we’re going to pursue a 123 agreement” with Saudi Arabia.
An April 2020 Government Accountability Office investigation concluded that U.S.-Saudi
negotiations were “stal ed over nonproliferation conditions” and recommended that the State
Department and Energy Department “commit to regularly scheduled, substantive briefings for the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on al
initiatives and negotiations related to nuclear cooperation in order to enhance transparency and
establish greater confidence with Congress on nuclear cooperation matters.”173 As of July 2021,
the recommendation remained open, pending input from the new Administration.
The Biden Administration has not announced any change to U.S. views on the requirements for
U.S.-Saudi nuclear cooperation under a 123 agreement. In January 2021, Secretary of State
Antony Blinken said in his confirmation hearing that “We want to make sure that to the best of
our ability al of our partners and al ies are living up to their obligations under various
nonproliferation and arms control agreements and, certainly, in the case of Saudi Arabia that is
something we wil want to look at.”174

171 U.S. Department of Energy, “Secretary Perry Meets with Khalid Al-Falih, Minister of Energy, Industry and Mineral
Resources of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,” September 10, 2018.
172Ari Natter, “U.S. Says Saudis Must Forgo Enrichment for Nuclear Sharing Deal,” Bloomberg, September 18, 2019.
T rump Administration officials had previous indicated they were seeking such commitments in discussions with Saudi
authorities. In May 2018, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said in Senate testimony, “ we want a gold-standard Section
123 Agreement from them, which would not permit them to enrich.” Secretary of Energy Rick Perry also told a House
committee that if Saudi Arabia does not reach an agreement with the United States, “ the message will be clear to the
rest of the world that the kingdom is not as concerned about being leaders when it comes to nonproliferation in the
Middle East.”
173 U.S. Government Accountability Office, U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Cooperation: Progress Is Stalled over
Nonproliferation Conditions and Agency Managem ent of Negotiations Is Unclear, GAO-20-343, April 3, 2020.
174 Antony Blinken, Secretary of State-designate, T estimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January
19, 2021.
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Congressional Views, Legislation, and Administration Perspectives
It remains to be seen whether terms requiring Saudi Arabia to forgo fuel cycle technologies wil
be acceptable to the kingdom. Congress could debate a U.S.-Saudi 123 agreement within
prescribed timelines or enact legislation to approve an agreement notwithstanding the AEA
congressional review requirements.175 An agreement meeting AEA requirements would take
effect after the congressional review period unless a resolution blocking it were enacted.
Some Members of Congress have criticized the potential for U.S.-Saudi nuclear cooperation in
the absence of a firm Saudi commitment to forgo uranium enrichment and fuel reprocessing
technologies. Members considered resolutions and bil s in the 115th Congress that would have
addressed potential Saudi enrichment and reprocessing or have amended the procedures for
consideration of 123 agreements to require congressional approval of any agreement not
containing, inter alia, commitments by cooperating countries to forgo enrichment and
reprocessing (H.R. 5357 and S.Res. 541).
In the 116th Congress, Members proposed several bil s and resolutions to address the subject of
possible U.S.-Saudi nuclear cooperation, Saudi Arabia’s nuclear energy program, and related
proliferations concerns (e.g., S. 612, S. 2338, S.Con.Res. 2, H.Con.Res. 23, H.R. 1471, and, H.R.
1541). As noted above, the FY2020 and FY2021 foreign operations appropriations acts placed
restrictions on the use of export promotion funds related to nuclear cooperation with Saudi Arabia
(see “U.S. Foreign Assistance to Saudi Arabia” above).
Some Trump Administration officials and nuclear industry advocates have warned that Saudi
Arabia may pursue nuclear cooperation with other countries, including Russia or China, if the
United States insists on including enrichment and reprocessing commitments in a bilateral
agreement.176
Saudi Views on Fuel Cycle Technologies
Analysts have examined Saudi nuclear plans and proposals for decades in light of the kingdom’s
economic profile, energy resources, and security dilemmas. Saudi state policy maintains that the
kingdom’s nuclear energy pursuits are limited to peaceful purposes, but senior officials, including
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, also have stated that if Iran pursues or obtains a nuclear
weapon, then the kingdom also would work to do so. In March 2018, Crown Prince Mohammed
bin Salman said, “Saudi Arabia does not want to acquire any nuclear bomb, but without a doubt if
Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we wil follow suit as soon as possible.”177
The 2008 U.S.-Saudi MOU on nuclear cooperation, which is a statement of intent and is not
legal y binding, described the Saudi government’s intent “to rely on existing international
markets for nuclear fuel services as an alternative to the pursuit of enrichment and reprocessing.”
Saudi Arabian officials have not publicly stated that they wil reject prohibitions on uranium
enrichment and fuel reprocessing if such prohibitions are required to enter into a bilateral nuclear
cooperation agreement with the United States. However, Saudi officials also have not forsworn

175 Such legislation has been proposed in the past ; bills introduced in the House and Senate in 2010 would have
approved the 123 agreement between the United States and Australia. See CRS Report R41312, U.S.-Australia Civilian
Nuclear Cooperation: Issues for Congress, by Mary Beth D. Nikitin and Bruce Vaughn .
176 Jennifer A. Dlouhy, Ari Natter, and Jennifer Jacobs, “CEOs Ask T rump to Help T hem Sell Nuclear Power Plants
Abroad,” Bloomberg News, February 12, 2019; and, T estimony of Secretary of Energy Rick Perry before the Senate
Committee on Armed Services, March 28, 2019.
177 Reuters, “ Saudi crown prince says will develop nuclear bomb if Iran does: CBS T V,” March 15, 2018.
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enrichment or reprocessing and have stated their intent to use and develop domestic resources and
capabilities to support their nuclear program.
Saudi official statements since late 2017 have implied that the country seeks, at a minimum, to
preserve the option to pursue uranium enrichment. KA CARE officials have said that the Saudi
program may use indigenous uranium resources for fuel,178 and, in December 2017, then-Energy
Minister Khalid al Falih said, “We intend to localize the entire value chain with nuclear energy....
Whatever we do is going to be under strict compliance with international agreements. But we wil
not deprive ourselves of accessing our natural resources and localizing an industry that we intend
to be with us for the long term.”179 In February 2018, Saudi Foreign Minister Adel Al Jubeir said,
“we want to have the same rights as other countries.”180
Energy Minister Prince Abd al Aziz bin Salman, the king’s son, said in September 2019 that the
kingdom is proceeding with plans to pursue nuclear fuel cycle technology “cautiously.”181 Prince
Abd al Aziz further said, “We want to make sure that even if we scale up [nuclear power], we
scale up to the notion that we want to go to the full cycle, to producing the uranium, enriching the
uranium, using the uranium.”182
In August 2020, Saudi authorities denied press reports citing unnamed Western officials that
claimed Saudi Arabia with China’s help built a facility for mil ing uranium oxide ore.183 Such a
facility would not violate Saudi Arabia’s nonproliferation commitments but would require
declaration. Chinese state entities have assisted in surveys of uranium deposits in Saudi Arabia.184
Other press reporting described a separate possible undeclared site.185
Saudi Foreign Policy
King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman have actively pursued Saudi interests
across the Middle East since 2015, chal enging Iran, reopening dialogue with Iraq, seeking to
isolate Qatar, and fighting an ongoing war in Yemen. This Saudi activism in regional affairs has
created new questions for successive Administrations and Congress to consider, including with
regard to defense cooperation, U.S. security commitments, and the U.S. military presence in the
Middle East. Close U.S.-Saudi security cooperation continues in paral el with efforts to overcome
U.S.-Saudi differences of opinion on some regional security threats. The Biden Administration
has welcomed Saudi decisions to reengage with neighboring Qatar and Iraq and to engage in

178 Ibid.
179 Rania El Gamal and Katie Paul, “Saudi Arabia hopes to start nuclear pact talks with U.S. in weeks – minister,”
Reuters, December 20, 2017.
180 CNBC, Interview with Saudi Foreign Minister Adel Al Jubeir, Munich, Germany, February 19, 2018.
181 Rania El Gamal and Alexander Cornwell, “Saudi Arabia flags plan to enrich uranium as U.S. seeks nuclear pact,”
Reuters, September 9, 2019.
182 Herman Wang and Andrea Jennetta, “ Saudi Arabia wants option to enrich uranium, says new energy minister,”
Platts Nucleonics Week, September 12, 2019.
183 Warren P. Stroebel, Michael R. Gordon, and Felicia Schwartz, “ Saudi Arabia, With China’s Help, Expands Its
Nuclear Program,” Wall Street Journal, August 4, 2020.
184 China National Nuclear Corporation, “ CNNC and Saudi Arabia expedite uranium and thorium collaborations,”
September 1, 2017; Suzan Katamoura et al, “Uranium/T horium Resource Assessment in Saudi Arabia,” International
Symposium on Uranium Raw Material for the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Exploration, Mining, Production, Supply and
Demand, Economics and Environmental Issues, June 27, 2018.
185 Mark Mazzetti, David E. Sanger, and William J. Broad, “U.S. Examines Whether Saudi Nuclear Program Could
Lead to Bomb Effort ,” New York Tim es, August 5, 2020.
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dialogue with Iran and parties to the Yemen conflict in pursuit of a diplomatic solution to the
conflict there.
Iran, Iraq, and the Levant
Iran
Saudi policies toward Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon continue to reflect the kingdom’s overarching
concerns about Iran and Iran’s ties to state and non-state actors in these countries. Statements by
Saudi leaders suggest that they see Iran’s policies as part of an expansionist, sectarian agenda
aimed at empowering Shia Muslims in the Middle East at the expense of Sunnis.186 Iranian
leaders attribute similarly sectarian motives to their Saudi counterparts and remain critical of
Saudi cooperation with the United States.187 Saudi Arabia severed diplomatic ties to Iran in 2016
following attacks on a Saudi diplomatic facility in Iran that occurred in the wake of the
kingdom’s execution of a Shia cleric convicted of treason.188
The Saudi government has engaged Iranian counterparts in four rounds “exploratory talks” during
2021 about better managing their disagreements, but officials from the two countries have not
announced any formal results or new accords.189 In August 2021, Foreign Minister Prince Faisal
bin Farhan Al Saud described Iran as “emboldened” and criticized continuing Iranian support to
armed groups and attacks on regional shipping.190 In September, he said, “We hope these talks
wil resolve the issues stuck between the two countries and we are seeking to attain it.”191
Reflecting continuing Saudi concerns about Iran’s nuclear activities, the Foreign Minister has
said, “We certainly support a deal with Iran, as long as that deal ensures that Iran wil not now or
ever gain access to nuclear weapons technology.” Summarizing Saudi Arabia’s current approach,
he stated:
It’s not that we think Iran should forever be a pariah. ... We would very much welcome
Iran as a productive part of the region; it could actually be a significant contributor to
regional stability and economic prosperity. But that would require engaging in the region
as a state actor in a normal way … not supporting militias, not sending weapons to armed
groups and, most importantly, giving up a nuclear program which might be used … to
develop nuclear weapons.192
Previously, the kingdom scrutinized but then accepted the 2015 Iran-P5+1 Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action (JCPOA), later cal ing for its rigorous enforcement and reconsideration. In May
2018, the kingdom welcomed President Trump’s decision to withdraw the United States from the

186 “Saudi FM to Asharq Al-Awsat: We Reject Iran’s Sectarian Strife, Support for T errorism,” July 11, 2018.
187 Reuters, “Iran’s leader accuses Saudis of ‘treason’ against Muslims,” January 16, 2018.
188 Ben Hubbard, “ Saudi Arabia Cuts T ies With Iran Amid Fallout From Cleric’s Execution ,” New York T imes,
January 3, 2016.
189 Ghaida Ghantous, “Saudi Arabia wants to see “verifiable deeds” from talks with Iran, says official,” Reuters, May 7,
2021; AFP, “ Saudi foreign minister ‘hopeful’ over exploratory Iran talks,” May 19, 2021; and, Reema Alothman and
Matthew Martin “Saudi Arabia Says T alks With Iran Are at ‘Exploratory Stage’” Bloomberg News, October 3, 2021.
190 Arab News, “ ‘Emboldened’ Iran ‘extremely active’ in region, says Saudi foreign minister,” August 4, 2021.
191 Reema Alothman and Matthew Martin “Saudi Arabia Says T alks With Iran Are at ‘Exploratory Stage’” Bloomberg
News, October 3, 2021.
192 Arab News, “ ‘Emboldened’ Iran ‘extremely active’ in region, says Saudi foreign minister,” August 4, 2021.
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JCPOA and announced its support for the re-imposition of economic sanctions on Iran and efforts
to curtail Iranian support to the Syrian government and various non-state actors in the region.193
Saudi officials have not expressed opposition to renewed U.S. talks with Iran over Iran’s nuclear
program, but stated that they “want to make sure at a minimum that any financial resources made
available to Iran via the nuclear deal are not used ... to destabilize the region.”194 Saudi Arabia
seeks follow-on negotiations aimed at Iranian missile programs and Iran’s support for regional
armed groups.
Iraq
In December 2015, Saudi officials reopened the kingdom’s diplomatic offices in Iraq after a 25-
year absence that began after Saddam Hussein’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait. The reopening marked
a milestone in a relative normalization of Saudi-Iraqi relations that occurred after the 2014 change
in Iraqi leadership from the government of former prime minister Nouri al Maliki (who had close
ties to Iran) to that of Hayder al Abadi (who positioned Iraq more neutral y among its neighbors).
Successive U.S. Administrations have praised exchanges of official visits between senior Saudis
and Iraqis as important in strengthening Saudi and Gulf Arab ties with Iraq’s government.
High-level Saudi-Iraqi contacts continued under the government of Iraqi Prime Minister Adel
Abd al Mahdi, including in the wake of 2019 attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure that reportedly
were carried out from Iraqi territory. Exchanges have continued under the government of Iraqi
Prime Minister Mustafa al Kadhimi, who visited the kingdom in March 2021 to sign a series of
bilateral agreements and receive Saudi investment pledges. According to U.S. officials, Prime
Minister al Kadhimi “has helped facilitate direct talks between Saudi Arabia and Iran in
Baghdad,”195 and in August 2021, he hosted Saudi, Iranian, and regional leaders at a summit in
Baghdad.
Syria and Lebanon
Saudi authorities back the U.N. Security Council’s cal for a negotiated settlement to the conflict
in Syria in accordance with Resolution 2254.196 In June 2021, the kingdom reiterated its support
for a peaceful solution and cal ed for an end to “Iranian interference” in Syria. According to a
news report citing an unnamed Saudi official, a Saudi delegation travel ed to Syria in May 2021
to discuss reopening the Saudi embassy there.197 Saudi Arabia has made efforts in recent years to
consolidate and align the views of Syrian opposition actors and armed groups, and made some
financial contributions to U.S.-implemented stabilization programs following the Trump
Administration’s 2018 decision to reduce some U.S. spending on stabilization efforts in areas of
Syria liberated from the Islamic State.

193 Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Washington, DC, Statement on the Un ited States Withdrawal from the
JCPOA, May 8, 2018.
194 Ghaida Ghantous, “Saudi official: Expanded talks should follow any Iran nuclear deal,” Reuters, April 14, 2021.
195 U.S. Department of State, “Background Press Call by a Senior Administration Official Previewing the Visit of
Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi of the Republic of Iraq,” July 26, 2021.
196 U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2254, adopted in 2015, endorsed a “road map” for a political settlement
in Syria, including the drafting of a new constitution and the administration of U.N.-supervised elections.
197 Martin Chulov, “ Meeting between Saudi and Syrian intelligence chiefs hints at détente,” Guardian (UK), May 4,
2021.
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Saudi Arabia hosted U.S. and French officials in July 2021 to discuss common approaches to
assisting Lebanon in overcoming its overlapping financial and political crises. Saudi Arabia
historical y has acted as a patron of Lebanese Sunni parties and leaders, and has opposed the
influence of Iran-backed groups in Lebanon. Ties between the kingdom and some Lebanese
figures appear to have become strained in recent years, a trend reflected in then-Prime Minister
Saad Hariri’s 2017 forced resignation in Riyadh and subsequent decisions that have limited
formerly robust Saudi economic engagement in Lebanon.198
Conflict in Yemen199
Conflict Status
In general, Saudi officials have approached the Houthis (see textbox below) as a hostile minority
movement that many other Yemenis oppose and that continues to benefit from Iranian support to
the detriment of the kingdom’s security.200 Nevertheless, the Houthis dominate many areas of
northern Yemen and control the capital, Sana’a. At present, prospects for a military reversal of
their control over northern Yemen appear limited. In August 2021, Hans Grundberg of Sweden
succeeded Martin Griffiths of the United Kingdom as the U.N. Secretary-General’s Special
Envoy for Yemen. President Biden has said that the conflict in Yemen “has to end” and in
February 2021 appointed Ambassador Timothy Lenderking as U.S. Special Envoy to Yemen, who
continues to support U.N.-led peace-making efforts through shuttle diplomacy.
With U.S. support, in late March 2021, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan proposed
a new peace initiative aimed at ending Saudi involvement in the Yemen conflict. The Saudi
Foreign Minister proposed that, if the Houthis agree to a nationwide ceasefire under U.N.
supervision, Saudi Arabia would: (1) adhere to a U.N.-supervised ceasefire, (2) reopen Sana’a
International Airport to direct flights, (3) al ow fuel into Hudaydah port with revenues deposited
in a joint Houthi-ROYG bank account, and (4) restart political negotiations for a permanent
settlement to the conflict. The Houthis almost immediately dismissed the Saudi proposal as
“nothing new” and reiterated their demands for the Saudis unilateral y to lift their blockade of
Sana’a airport and Hudaydah port.201 They continue to demand that the coalition agree to lift
restrictions on access to airports and ports in northern Yemen prior to any ceasefire agreement.202
Without regard for U.S. and international efforts to advance ceasefire talks, Houthi fighters also
are attempting to seize Marib, the last city in northern Yemen held by Hadi government-aligned
forces.203 The Saudi-led coalition is assisting Yemeni partner forces in resisting the Houthi

198 See Anne Barnard and Maria Abi-Habib, “Why Saad Hariri Had T hat Strange Sojourn in Saudi Arabia,” New York
Tim es, December 24, 2017; David Kenner, “ Why Saudi Arabia can’t win in Lebanon,” Institute of Current World
Affairs, June 16, 2020; and, Julie Kebbi, “Lebanon–Saudi Arabia: T he story of a family rupture,” L'Orient-Le Jour
(Lebanon), May 17, 2021.
199 For more information, see CRS Report R43960, Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention, by Jeremy M. Sharp.
200 Minister of Foreign Affairs Adel Al Jubeir, Remarks at Council on Foreign Relations, September 26, 2018; and,
Arab News, “ ‘Emboldened’ Iran ‘extremely active’ in region, says Saudi foreign minister,” August 4, 2021.
201 Reuters, “ Houthis say nothing new in Saudi peace offer, will keep talking,” March 22, 2021.
202 On August 8, Oman-based Houthi negotiator Mohammed Abdulsalam said via T witter, “ T here is no use in having
any dialogue before airports and ports are opened as a humanitarian necessity and priority ." Reuters, “ T op Houthi
negotiator says no point in meeting new U.N. envoy now,” August 8, 2021.
203 Siobhán O'Grady and Ali Al-Mujahed, “Battle for the badlands,” Washington Post, October 1, 2021; and, Agence
France Presse, “ Key to conflict: How battle for Marib is crucial to Yemen war,” September 28, 2021.
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offensive against Marib. In some other areas of Yemen, anti-Houthi forces have made some gains
in 2021.
U.S. officials have cal ed for restrictions on fuel imports through Hudaydah port to be “lifted
immediately” and for Sanaa airport to be “opened and operational.”204 In August 2021, Special
Envoy Lenderking stated the Biden Administration’s view that “there should be no preconditions
to dialogue on peace. Such preconditions only prolong war and suffering and obstruct the kind of
durable peace agreement that wil bring true relief to Yemenis. The Houthis’ single-minded focus
on the offensive in Marib has undermined UN efforts to reach a comprehensive ceasefire.”205
Yemen’s Houthi Movement and Saudi Arabia
The Ansaral ah/Houthi movement is a predominantly Zaydi Shia revivalist political and insurgent movement that
formed in the northern province of Sa’da in 2004 under the leadership of members of the Al Houthi family. It
original y sought an end to what it viewed as efforts to marginalize Zaydi Shia communities and beliefs, but its goals
grew in scope and ambition as it embraced a populist, antiestablishment message fol owing the 2011 uprising in
Yemen. Members of its Zaydi Shia base of support are closer in their beliefs to Sunni Mu slims than most other
Shia, and some Yemeni observers argue that the motives of the Houthi movement are evolving to include new
political and social goals that cannot be explained strictly in sectarian terms. Skeptics highlight the movement’s
ideological roots, its al eged cooperation with Iran, and the slogans prominently displayed on its banners: “God is
Great! Death to America! Death to Israel! Curse the Jews! Victory to Islam!”
Saudi air, ground, and border forces fought Houthi militia members in 2009 in a campaign that ejected Houthi
fighters who had crossed the Saudi border, but Saudi Arabia failed to defeat the movement or end the potential
threat it posed to southern Saudi Arabia and Saudi interests in Yemen. Saudi officials expressed increasing con cern
about developments in Yemen over the course of 2014, as the Saudi- and GCC-backed transition process there
stal ed. An al iance between the Houthis and forces loyal to the now deceased former president Ali Abdul ah Saleh
took control of the Yemeni capital, Sana’a, and, in September 2014, they continued military operations in
contravention of an agreed power-sharing arrangement with the interim government led by President Abdu Rabbu
Mansour Hadi. Houthi forces’ unwil ingness to withdraw from the capital and unilateral moves by Houthi leaders
and Saleh supporters to circumvent Hadi’s authority precipitated a crisis that culminated in the outbreak of
renewed conflict and Hadi’s resignation and de facto house arrest in January 2015. Houthi leaders announced a
new governance plan in February 2015 and in March launched an offensive against pro-Hadi forces in central and
southern Yemen.
In response, the Saudi Foreign Minister decried what the kingdom considered a “serious escalation… carried out
by an Al Houthi militia coup against constitutional legitimacy.”206 Days later, as Houthi forces advanced on the
southern city of Aden, Saudi Arabia and members of a coalition launched air strikes in response to a specific
request from President Hadi.207 Saudi Arabia has led a military coalition of mostly Arab states since March 2015 in
efforts to reinstate the Hadi government.208
The development and increased sophistication of Houthi military capabilities since 2014 is a source of significant
concern to Saudi Arabia, especial y the group’s demonstrated ability to conduct cross-border missile attacks
against targets inside the kingdom.209 U.S. officials express concern not only about Houthi threats to Saudi Arabia,
but also about the potential for ties between the Houthi movement, Iran, and Iranian-supported groups such as
Hezbol ah to develop to an extent that Houthi forces could pose a durable, Iranian -linked threat in the southern
Arabian Peninsula and Red Sea region.

204 U.S. Department of State, Briefing on Yemen with T imothy Lenderking, U.S. Special Envoy for Yemen; and Sarah
Charles, USAID Assistant Administrator for Humanitarian Assistance, August 9, 2021.
205 Ibid.
206 Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Foreign Affairs Stresses Depth of Historical and Strong Relations
Between Saudi Arabia and Britain, March 24, 2015.
207 T ext of Hadi request letter in “GCC statement: Gulf countries respond to Yemen developments,” The National
(UAE), March 26, 2015.
208 See CRS Report R43960, Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention, by Jeremy M. Sharp.
209 For a detailed discussion, see Michael Knights, “T he Houthi War Machine: From Guerrilla War to State Capture,”
U.S. Military Academy Combat ting T errorism Center, Sentinel, Volume 11, Issue 8, September 2018.
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Civilian Casualties, Houthi Cross-border Attacks, and Humanitarian Concerns
As the conflict and Saudi-led coalition’s military campaign have unfolded, reports of civilian
casualties and displacement; food, medicine, and water shortages; advances by AQAP forces;
Islamic State attacks; and persistence by the Houthis and their al ies fueled international criticism
of Saudi policy. Civilian casualties were highest in 2015, but continue to occur in connection with
coalition airstrikes and indiscriminate fire by Houthi forces. Saudi officials have acknowledged
some shortcomings in their operations, while placing most of the blame for reported civilian
deaths and for difficult humanitarian conditions on the activities of and threats posed by their
adversaries. Independent observers cite public reporting to attribute most civilian casualties to
coalition airstrikes, particularly strikes that occurred in 2015.210
The difficulty of accessing certain areas of Yemen has made it hard for governments and aid
agencies to count the war’s casualties. As of June 2020, the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights had documented at least 7,825 civilians kil ed and 12,416
civilians injured as a direct result of armed conflict since March 2015.211 Reports issued by the
U.N. Human Rights Council-organized Group of International and Regional Eminent Experts on
Yemen have described potential violations of international law by Houthi forces, their al ies, and
the Saudi-led coalition.212
In August 2021, USAID Assistant Administrator for Humanitarian Assistance Sarah Charles
described the situation in Yemen as “one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world” adding
that, “Two-thirds of the country needs humanitarian assistance. That’s more than 20 mil ion
Yemenis who struggle every day to survive without basic necessities including more than 2
mil ion young children facing deadly malnutrition this year alone.”213 U.N. and U.S. officials
describe steps taken both by the Houthis and by the Yemeni government and its coalition partners
that cause humanitarian harm and impede flows of commercial and humanitarian goods.214 In
September 2021, Acting U.S. Representative to the United Nations Ambassador Richard Mil s
said, “the violence in Yemen must stop. A broad and inclusive political process must resume, and
we need to al eviate the humanitarian crisis.” 215
The United Nations 2021 humanitarian appeal for Yemen seeks more than $3.85 bil ion in
international donor support. U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres cal ed the outcome of a

210 Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), “Over 100,000 Reported Killed in Yemen War,” October
31, 2019. Data collected by the U.S. and European-funded ACLED estimates that targeted airstrikes and drone attacks
reportedly killed 8,478 civilians in Yemen from March 2015 to September 10, 2021, out of more than 14,280 civilians
reported killed overall. Data available at: https://www.acleddata.com.
211 U.N. Document A/HRC/45/6, Situation of human rights in Yemen, including violations and abuses since September
2014, September 28, 2020. According to the U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), as of
June 2018, coalition airstrikes had killed at least 4,300 civilians. See Annex 4, U.N. Document A/HRC/39/43, Report
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights containing the findings of the Group of Independent
Eminent International and Regional Experts, August 17, 2018.
212 U.N. Document A/HRC/45/6, Situation of human rights in Yemen, including violations and abuses since September
2014, September 28, 2020; and U.N. Document A/HRC/48/20, Situation of human rights in Yemen, including
violations and abuses since September 2014, September 13, 2021.
213 U.S. Department of State, Briefing on Yemen with T imothy Lenderking, U.S. Special Envoy for Yemen; and Sarah
Charles, USAID Assistant Administrator for Humanitarian Assistance, August 9, 2021.
214 Briefing by U.N. Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Mark
Lowcock to the U.N. Security Council, June 15, 2021; and, U.S. Department of State, Briefing on Yemen with T imothy
Lenderking, U.S. Special Envoy for Yemen; and Sarah Charles, USAID Assistant Administrator for Humanitarian
Assistance, August 9, 2021.
215 U.N. Document S/PV.8854, U.N. Security Council Meeting, September 10, 2021.
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March 2021 pledging conference for Yemen “disappointing” after donors pledged $1.7 bil ion.
Saudi Arabia pledged $430 mil ion.
Successive U.S. Administrations have expressed varying degrees of criticism of some coalition
and Houthi actions while emphasizing a consistent view that strictly military solutions to the
Yemen conflict are not possible. Over time, Saudi and coalition officials have taken some steps to
improve humanitarian access and implement more effective military targeting, amid rising
concern among some Members of Congress and consideration of several legislative proposals to
condition, reduce, or eliminate related U.S. assistance.216 Humanitarian actors continue to cal for
additional aid and fewer restrictions on their operations by al parties, citing the needs of Yemeni
civilians.
Qatar and Intra-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Tensions
Saudi-Qatari disputes have flared periodical y over the last 20-plus years and soured significantly
in 2017.217 Saudi Arabia has taken issue with the independent foreign policies pursued by Qatar’s
leaders, which the kingdom views as pro-Islamist, and has opposed Qatar’s ties to Iran, with
which Qatar shares lucrative natural gas reserves. Saudi Arabia and Qatar have both sought to
shape the outcome of regional uprisings and conflicts since 2011, in some cases using their own
military forces, such as in Libya and Yemen, and, in other cases, such as Syria, supporting
different non-state armed groups.
In January 2021, Saudi Arabia lifted closures of its land and sea borders and airspace with Qatar
along with diplomatic isolation measures that it had imposed in 2017.218 Mirroring the resolution
of a previous confrontation in 2014,219 an agreement reached between the parties provides for an
end to the isolation measures in exchange for an end to Qatar’s pursuit of legal damages and new
understandings about state-backed media coverage. Saudi and Qatari leaders have met since
reaching the agreement, but deeper differences have not been fully resolved.220
At the height of the dispute, Saudi Arabia accused Qatar’s government of supporting terrorism,
interfering in the internal affairs of fel ow Arab states, and facilitating Iranian efforts to
destabilize Saudi Arabia and its neighbors.221 Qatar rejected the charges and described Saudi
Arabia as seeking to violate Qatari sovereignty and impose its wil on the country’s leaders and

216 See also CRS Report R45046, Congress and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2020, by Jeremy
M. Sharp, Christopher M. Blanchard, and Sarah R. Collins.
217 For background, see Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, “Qatar: T he Gulf’s Problem Child,” Atlantic Monthly, June 5, 2017,
and, CRS Report R44533, Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.
218 On June 5, 2017, Saudi Arabia abruptly severed diplomatic relations with Qatar, closed the land border between the
two countries, closed its air space and waters to Qatari vessels, prohibited Saudi nationals from visiting or transiting
Qatar, and gave Qatari nationals 14 days to leave the kingdom. T he moves followed a period of escalation in official
Saudi-Qatari confrontation marked by mut ual recriminations and accusations. A long period of diplomatic and
commercial isolation followed.
219 In March 2014, Saudi-Qatari differences—including over the 2013 military overthrow of an elected Muslim
Brotherhood-linked president of Egypt —widened to the point where Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain withdrew their
ambassadors from Doha. T he ambassadors returned in November 2014 in exchange for mutual pledges not to interfere
in each other’s affairs.
220 See Jon Alterman, GCC Rift over Qatar Comes to an End, January 5, 2021.
221 Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement, June 5, 2017.
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population.222 Qatar rejected some demands presented by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates,
Egypt, and Bahrain, but sought to resolve the confrontation through negotiation.
Both sides of the dispute sought to influence the United States to support their position. The
United States maintains close defense cooperation, including arms sales, with both Saudi Arabia
and Qatar and continues to operate from military bases in both countries. U.S. officials cal ed for
reconciliation and offered to facilitate dialogue among the parties, and continue to support
dialogue aimed at improving ties among U.S. partners in the Gulf.
Israeli-Palestinian Affairs
For decades, official Saudi statements have been routinely critical of Israeli policies, and some
Saudi clerics, including leading official clerics, for years appeared implacably hostile to Israel.
Nevertheless, Saudi leaders have outlined parameters of an Israeli-Arab agreement on the
Palestinian question that they would accept, and speculation has increased about potential
warming in Israeli-Saudi relations based on shared antipathy to the Iranian government’s policies,
paral el cooperation with the United States, and shared terrorism concerns.223 This speculation has
been amplified by some new, overt contacts that have occurred between Saudis and Israeli
government officials, and ecumenical statements from some Saudi officials and state-affiliated
Saudi clerics about relations between Muslims, Christians, and Jews.224
Apart from any potential alignment of views or interests with Israel on some regional threats,
Saudi leaders and government officials have historical y been vocal advocates for the Palestinians
in the context of Israeli-Arab disputes. Saudi Arabia supports the international recognition of a
Palestinian state and full Palestinian membership at the United Nations. King Salman has
remained committed to the terms of the peace initiative his predecessor (the late King Abdullah)
put forward under the auspices of the Arab League in 2002. The initiative cal s for normalization
of Arab relations with Israel if Israel were to
1. withdraw fully from the territories it occupied in 1967,
2. agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state with a capital in East Jerusalem,
and
3. provide for the “[a]chievement of a just solution to the Palestinian Refugee
problem in accordance with U.N. General Assembly Resolution 194.”225

222 Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement, June 5, 2017.
223 Jonathan Marcus, “Israel and Saudi Arabia: T he relationship emerging into the open,” BBC News, April 3, 2018;
Yoel Guzansky and Daniel B. Shapiro, “Friends With Caveats: Will Israel and the Gulf States Form a United Front
Against Iran?” Foreign Affairs, August 5, 2019. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu speculated in January
2016 that “ Saudi Arabia recognizes that Israel is an ally rather than an enemy because of the two [principal] threats that
threaten them, Iran and Daesh [the Arabic acronym for the Islamic State].” i24 News, “ Netanyahu urges EU to adop t
policy of moderate Arab states on Israel,” January 22, 2016.
224 Raphael Ahren, “US-Israeli Christian leader discusses peace process with Saudi crown prince,” Times of Israel,
September 11, 2019; “In first, Saudi envoy in Washington sends Rosh Hashanah greeting to US Jews,” Times of Israel,
October 2, 2019.
225 Adopted in December 1948, General Assembly Resolution 194 states that “the refugees wishing to return to their
homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that
compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property
which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities
responsible.” T his resolution is often cited by advocates for the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their former
homes in what is now Israel. In April 2013, representatives of the Arab League agreed that land swaps could be an
element of a conflict-ending agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. In September 2015, King Salman and
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In January 2018, King Salman reiterated the kingdom’s “firm position on the Palestinian cause
and the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people to establish their independent state with
Jerusalem as its capital and on continuing efforts to find a just and lasting solution to the
Palestinian cause in accordance with relevant international resolutions.”226 In April 2018, Crown
Prince Mohammed bin Salman said, “I believe that each people, anywhere, has a right to live in
their peaceful nation. I believe the Palestinians and the Israelis have the right to have their own
land. But we have to have a peace agreement to assure the stability for everyone and to have
normal relations.”227
In September 2019, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Adel al Jubeir argued that the United
States’ and Saudi Arabia’s views of the conflict are aligned, “in the sense of wanting to bring an
end to this conflict that is just, that leads to a two-state solution, that leads to ’67 borders, with
minor agreed-to adjustments, that basical y reflects the Arab peace initiative.”228 Saudi leaders
welcomed the Trump Administration’s efforts in developing its “Peace to Prosperity” plan, and
encouraged the start of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations to resolve differences.229
Saudi authorities did not reach an agreement for formal recognition of Israel as part of the Trump
Administration’s Abraham Accords initiative. Rather, Saudi officials continue to condition Saudi
normalization with Israel on terms outlined in the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative. Formal recognition
of Israel by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain in late 2020 fueled some speculation
that some Saudi officials welcomed the UAE and Bahraini moves—given Saudi ties with those
countries—as a means of evaluating future Saudi diplomatic options.230
Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud said in December 2020 that Saudi
Arabia is “completely open to full normalization with Israel. ... But in order for that to happen
and for that to be sustainable, we do need the Palestinians to get their state and we do need to
settle that situation.” In late 2020, Saudi Arabia granted Israel flyover rights within its airspace to
facilitate direct Israeli airline travel to the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain.
In a May 2021 phone cal with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, King Salman
reportedly condemned what he characterized as “Israeli attacks and measures” in Jerusalem and
“Israeli aggression in the Gaza Strip.” The Saudi Foreign Minister later pledged “the continuation

President Obama “ underscored the enduring importance of the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, and underlined the necessity
of reaching a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement to the conflict based on two states living side-by-side in peace
and security.” Joint Statement on the Meeting between President Barack Obama and King Salman bin Abd al Aziz Al
Saud, September 4, 2015.
226 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement on Phone Conversation between King Salman and Palestinian Authority
President Mahmoud Abbas, January 9, 2018.
227 Jeffrey Goldberg, “Saudi Crown Prince: Iran’s Supreme Leader ‘Makes Hitler Look Good’” The Atlantic, April 2,
2018.
228 Remarks of Saudi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Adel al Jubeir, Council on Foreign Relations, New York,
NY, September 24, 2019.
229 After the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) rejected the U.S. plan, the Saudi cabinet
“emphasized the centrality of the Palestinian cause to the Arab and Islamic nation” and stated “the need to adhere to the
peace process as a strategic option for the conflict, based on the two -state solution, in accordance with legitimate
international resolutions, the Arab Peace Initiativ e and adopted international references.”
230 See, e.g., “ After UAE and Bahrain deals, is Saudi Arabia softening its stance on Israel?” Reuters, September 15,
2020. In November 2020, some media reports claimed that Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu met secretl y with Saudi
Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman in the northwest corner of Saudi Arabia. Felicia Schwartz and Summer Said,
“Israel’s Netanyahu, Saudi Crown Prince Hold First Known Meeting,” Wall Street Journal, November 23, 2020.
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of our endeavors to fulfil the aspirations of the Palestinian people to establish their independent
state.”231
Saudi Arabia long provided regular financial support to the Palestinian Authority’s budget, and
increased its contributions through 2019 as U.S. assistance and Israeli transfers declined.232
Palestinian Authority data suggests Saudi contributions declined significantly in 2020.233 Saudi
Arabia also provides support to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)—which has fluctuated in recent years as UNRWA lost and
regained U.S. financial support—and other U.N. entities working with Palestinians.
Saudi relations with Hamas have evolved over time and have grown strained since 2017, amid the
deteriorating relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia and Saudi confrontation with Qatar. In
June 2017, Foreign Minister Al Jubeir cal ed on Qatar to end its support to groups like Hamas.234
In September 2019, Hamas figures complained that Saudi Arabia had arrested its senior
representative and a network of more than 60 of its supporters in the kingdom.235 A Hamas figure
was quoted as saying, “The arrests were carried out under American pressure. Saudi Arabia is
trying to force Hamas to abandon its resistance against the Israeli occupation.”236 Saudi courts
sentenced many of those arrested to varying prison terms in August 2021, with some being
acquitted.237
Outlook
With Saudi leadership in transition, and the Middle East region beset by turbulence and conflict,
the Biden Administration and some Members of Congress may continue to debate how best to
navigate this contentious period in U.S.-Saudi relations. Saudi decision makers have changed
tactics with regard to some issues of concern to the United States—releasing some human rights
advocates, reiterating their peace parameters for Yemen, and quietly engaging Iran—but their
decisions may reflect an acceptance of setbacks and limits and a reconsideration of self-interest as
much as any embrace of U.S. priorities or values. If past patterns in the bilateral relationship
prevail, leaders on both sides may seek to maintain U.S.-Saudi solidarity, while managing points
of friction and resisting cal s from some parties on both sides for a more fundamental
reevaluation of a productive, if imperfect, partnership.
In recent years, U.S. policymakers have engaged with an emerging class of Saudi leaders during a
particularly chal enging and tumultuous period for the kingdom and its neighbors. Islamic State
attacks, leadership transition and consolidation in the kingdom, the collapse of the Saudi-backed
transitional government in neighboring Yemen, oil market volatility, Russian military intervention
in Syria, and Iranian nuclear policy and regional activism al have created pressure on Saudi
leaders and have tested U.S.-Saudi relations. Human rights concerns, especial y the murder of

231 Ismaeel Naar, “King Salman assures Palestinian President Abbas of Saudi Arabia’s support ,” Al Arabiya English,
May 21, 2021.
232 Rami Ayyub, “As T rump team prepares Mideast plan, Palestinians face financial crisis,” Reuters, May 1, 2019.
233 Adnan Abu Amer, “Why has Gulf aid to PA declined in recent years?” Al Monitor, March 11, 2021.
234 John Irish, “Saudi minister says Qatar must end support for Hamas, Muslim Brotherhood,” Reuters, June 6, 2017.
235 Khaled Abu T oameh, “Hamas: Saudi Arabia arresting our men under U.S. pressure,” Jerusalem Post, September 12,
2019.
236 Ibid. Comment attributed to Wasfi Qabaha, reportedly “a senior Hamas representative in the West Bank.”
237 Al Jazeera, “ Saudi Arabia sentences dozens of Palestinians, Jordanians,” August 9, 2021. A Hamas representative
statement said “ We were shocked … by the rulings issued by the Saudi judiciary against a large number of Palestinians
and Jordanians residing in the kingdom.”
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Jamal Khashoggi, similarly strained bilateral ties. Saudi Arabia’s pursuit of an independent and
assertive course on regional security issues and its leaders’ ambitious plans to transform the
kingdom’s economy and fiscal base offer new opportunities for U.S.-Saudi partnership and
shared risks.
As described above, Saudi Arabia has close defense and security ties with the United States
anchored for decades by long-standing military training programs and supplemented by high-
value weapons sales, critical infrastructure security cooperation, and counterterrorism initiatives.
While Saudi and U.S. officials have taken steps to maintain and deepen security ties, differences
in preferred tactics and methods may continue to complicate bilateral coordination on regional
security issues, including on Iran and Yemen. The redeployment of U.S. military personnel,
aircraft, and air defense systems to the kingdom since 2019 may suggest a deepening of those ties
in the immediate term, even if fundamental questions about the future of the security partnership
continue to be debated.
Continued U.S. wil ingness to arm and train Saudi security forces may reduce potential burdens
on U.S. forces if they enable Saudi Arabia to provide for its own defense, but may also more
deeply entangle the United States in dilemmas or disputes in cases where U.S.-equipped or -
trained Saudi forces are deployed. The deployment and use of U.S. military forces to protect
Saudi Arabia may better deter common adversaries and enhance the security of the kingdom, its
people, and global y significant infrastructure, but may more directly involve U.S. personnel and
assets, increasing potential direct threats to both. An enduring U.S. military presence in Saudi
Arabia also may rekindle religious and nationalist opposition inside the kingdom and beyond.
Over time, Saudi and U.S. officials have periodical y attempted to articulate a shared “strategic
vision” that includes, but extends beyond, defense and counterterrorism partnership. In 2004, the
bipartisan National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (aka “The 9/11
Commission”) chal enged both governments to confront problems in the bilateral relationship
openly and urged them to “build a relationship that political leaders on both sides are prepared to
publicly defend.” In that era, problems identified in the relationship centered on U.S. concerns
about Saudi ties to extremism and financial support for armed extremist groups. Deeper
counterterrorism partnership and a range of Saudi efforts to combat extremism have contributed
to closer ties in the years since.
Today, principal questions in the relationship relate to whether or not leaders and citizens in both
countries are wil ing to maintain strategic defense ties while more fully embracing economic and
cultural partnership at a time when a new generation of Saudi leaders are seeking to transform the
kingdom. More specifical y, parties on both sides are considering whether differences over human
rights, foreign and defense policy, and energy issues wil limit the potential for deeper ties. U.S.
officials and observers have noted recent liberalization of some Saudi policies that limit women’s
rights, along with ongoing legal restrictions on the public activities of women’s rights advocates.
U.S. programs continue to promote increased engagement by U.S. commercial and cultural
entities with Saudi counterparts, including Saudi women.
Changes to succession arrangements have elevated Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and
raise the prospect that, while stil in his 30s, he could succeed his father and potential y remain as
monarch for decades. That outcome might eliminate some uncertainty about the consolidation of
power among the next generation of Saudi leaders, but consolidated control also could alter the
dynamics of U.S.-Saudi cooperation, particularly with regard to Saudi purchases of military
equipment and the opportunities available to U.S. defense firms and in other sectors. Saudi Arabia
maintains diverse defense supply relationships, and has acquired systems such as armed
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unmanned aircraft238 and, reportedly, new bal istic missiles systems from China.239 In August
2021, Saudi Arabia and Russia signed a defense cooperation agreement “aimed at developing
joint military cooperation between the two countries.”240 As the kingdom repositions itself as a
hub for global investment and pursues increased military self-sufficiency and diversified
acquisition, U.S. firms may not enjoy the privileged role they once held in an increasingly open
Saudi market.
U.S. leaders also may seek to rearticulate and define U.S. interests with regard to Saudi Arabia
and determine whether U.S. policy approaches afford the United States sufficient input in and
leverage over outcomes in issues involving the kingdom. U.S. ties to the kingdom are uniquely
close from Saudi Arabia’s perspective and domestical y sensitive. No other state enjoys
comparably cooperative relations with the Saudi security establishment, and decades of close
security, diplomatic, and commercial contacts afford the United States a broad network of
interlocutors and a deep wel of experience. Nevertheless, it is not certain that the United States
can easily use its partnerships with the kingdom and its relationships with individual Saudis to
predict or shape developments in Saudi foreign and domestic policy. Past and recent instances of
congressional scrutiny or rejection of arms sales have achieved discrete objectives (e.g.,
conditioning the location of deployment or sensitivity of transferred U.S. defense systems and
delaying transfers of precision guided munitions), but there is little evidence that U.S. pressure
has fundamental y altered core Saudi domestic or foreign policy approaches.
Overal , long-term U.S. concerns about avoiding instability in the Gulf region and denying
influence to geopolitical rivals may remain in tension with U.S. desires to convince or compel the
kingdom’s evolving leadership to change or act in accordance with U.S. preferences. U.S.
decision-makers may applaud steps taken by Saudi leaders to change longstanding practices and
policies, but they continue to face uncertainty about the strength and limits of U.S. influence, and
about the kingdom’s stability and trajectory. Critics of Saudi leadership argue that the United
States cannot afford to embrace top-down rule that stifles al dissent both for strategic and moral
reasons.241 Advocates for continued partnership cite the kingdom’s potential, its influence, and its
recent social and fiscal reforms to argue for a principled, but non-confrontational approach.
Congress may continue to shape bilateral relations through its oversight of U.S.-Saudi security
cooperation and its engagement on regional economic and diplomatic policy issues. Lawmakers
and officials also may seek to explore alternative policy approaches or better understand the
sources of Saudi government behavior, the potential for changes in Saudi ties with U.S. rivals like
Russia and China, and the views of Saudi leaders and citizens about their country’s future and its
ties with the United States.

238 U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Development s Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2019.
239 Phil Mattingly, Zachary Cohen and Jeremy Herb, “U.S. intel shows Saudi Arabia escalated its missile program with
help from China,” CNN, June 5, 2019.
240 Deputy Minister of Defense Prince Khalid bin Salman Al Saud (@kbsalsaud), T witter, 5:56 PM, August 23, 2021.
241 For an overview of this debate, see Uri Friedman and Yara Bayoumy, “T he U.S. -Saudi Alliance Is on the Brink,”
The Atlantic, July 1, 2019.
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Appendix A. Historical Background and Leadership
Overview
The modern kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the third state established in the Arabian Peninsula since
the end of the 18th century based on the hereditary rule of members of the Al Saud family. In the
mid-18th century, a local al iance developed between the Al Saud and the members of a
puritanical Sunni Islamic religious movement led by a cleric named Mohammed ibn Abd Al
Wahhab. Al iances between the Al Saud family and supporters of Abd Al Wahhab (referred to by
some as Wahhabis) built two states in the Arabian Peninsula during the next century. Each
eventual y collapsed under pressure from outside powers and inter- and intra-family rivalries.
During the first quarter of the 20th century, an Al Saud chieftain named Abd al Aziz ibn Abd al
Rahman Al Saud (commonly referred to as Ibn Saud) used force to unify much of the Arabian
Peninsula under a restored Al Saud state. Ibn Saud’s forces overcame numerous tribal rivals with
the support of an armed Wahhabi contingent known as the Ikhwan (or brotherhood), and, at times,
with the financial and military backing of the British government. By 1932, King Abd al Aziz and
his armies had crushed an Ikhwan revolt, consolidated control over most of the Arabian
Peninsula, and declared the establishment of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
Six of Ibn Saud’s sons—Kings Saud, Faisal, Khaled, Fahd, Abdullah, and Salman—have
succeeded him as rulers of the Saudi kingdom during the subsequent eight decades. This era has
been dominated by the development and export of the kingdom’s massive oil resources, the
resulting socioeconomic transformation of the country, and accompanying religious and cultural
debates spurred by rapid change. During this period, Al Saud rulers have managed a complex
consensus-based system of governance, balancing the various interests of tribal, religious,
regional, political, and economic constituencies.
A series of agreements, statements by successive U.S. Administrations, arms sales, military
training arrangements, and military deployments have demonstrated a strong U.S. security
commitment to the Saudi monarchy since the 1940s. That security commitment was built on
shared economic interests and antipathy to Communism and was tested by regional conflict
during the Cold War. It has survived the terrorism-induced strains of the post-Cold War era
relatively intact, and has continued as new arms sales to Saudi Arabia—the largest in U.S.
history—are implemented. Transition to a new generation of leadership in the Al Saud family,
evolution in the Saudi economy, and instability in the regional security environment may continue
to create chal enges and opportunities for the U.S.-Saudi relationship.
Leadership and Succession
King Salman and other Saudi leaders are likely to continue to face complex questions about
political consent, economic performance, and social reform as they push ahead with ambitious
economic and social initiatives, and as power is transferred from the sons of the kingdom’s
founder, King Abd al Aziz bin Abd al Rahman al Saud (aka Ibn Saud), to his grandsons. The
wil ingness and ability of the monarchy’s leaders to successfully manage their relationships with
each other and with competing domestic interest groups is among the factors that wil determine
the country’s future stability. Succession questions and intra-family politics may have direct
implications for regional stability and for U.S. national security interests.
Most sources suggest that the Al Saud family has managed a recent series of leadership transition
decisions without a paralyzing degree of disruptive internal dissent. Formal announcements of
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major changes in succession have stated that a preponderance of members of an Al egiance
Council made up of senior family members has considered and endorsed transition decisions
taken since its establishment during the late King Abdullah’s reign. This includes decisions made
prior to and in the wake of King Abdullah’s death in January 2015, and in conjunction with
succession changes announced in April 2015 and June 2017 (see Figure A-1 and Figure A-2
below).
King Salman first placed two members of the next generation of the Al Saud family in line to
rule. This generation—grandsons of the kingdom’s founder—is more numerous and has more
complex intra-family ties than those of its predecessors, making answers to current and future
questions of governance and succession less certain. There exists potential for competition among
members of this generation, as positions of influence in government have been distributed and
redistributed among them.
Changes undertaken in 2015 (Figure A-1) elevated Prince Mohammed bin Nayef and the king’s
son, Prince Mohammed bin Salman, to the line of succession at the expense of senior members of
their fathers’ generation. Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, who became Crown Prince, retained his
duties as Minister of Interior and assumed leadership of a newly created Council for Political and
Security Affairs. Then-Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman became Defense Minister
and the head of the Council for Economic and Development Affairs.
In June 2017 (Figure A-2), Prince Mohammed bin Nayef was replaced as Crown Prince by
Mohammed bin Salman and relieved of his position as Minister of Interior. Crown Prince
Mohammed bin Salman’s elevation puts him next in line for the throne. Given his age, he could
rule for decades upon succession. In conjunction with the change, which was approved by the
Al egiance Council, the kingdom’s Basic Law was amended to prohibit kings from the generation
of the grandsons of the founder from choosing successors from the same maternal line of the Al
Saud family. This amendment presumably was agreed to in order to assuage concern among
members of the family about the further consolidation of power among the branch of the family
from which King Salman and the new Crown Prince hail.242
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is asserting a public national leadership role on a range of
topics, generating considerable international speculation about the potential for reported rivalry or
competition to harden between him and other family members. Such potential exists, and has
precedent in the family’s recent past, but intra-family dynamics historical y have remained
largely shielded from public view until disputes have deepened to the point that consensus breaks
down.
To date there has been no clear indication to suggest that leading members of the royal family
have reverted to the level of overt tension and public competition that characterized intra-family

242 King Salman and the late Crown Prince Nayef were full bro thers: their sons are full first cousins. T heir “Sudayri”
branch of the Al Saud family is named for their grandmother Hassa bint Ahmad al Sudayri—among the best known of
the late King Abd al Aziz’s late wives and one of three drawn from the Al Sudayri family. She was the mother of the
late King Fahd bin Abd al Aziz, the late Crown Prince Sultan bin Abd al Aziz, the late Crown Prince Nayef bin Abd al
Aziz, King Salman bin Abd al Aziz, Prince Ahmad bin Abd al Aziz, two other senior princes, and four daughters.
Analysts of Saudi affairs have often referred to King Fahd and his younger full brothers as the “Sudayri Seven,”
because of their propensity to support one another. In the future, analysis of relationships and potential competition
within this branch may be of more interest than analysis that presumes Sudayri solidarity in competition with other
wings of the family. For background on Saudi succession issues, see Joseph Kéchichian, Succession in Saudi Arabia,
New York: Palgrave, 2001. For analysis of recen t succession changes and Saudi law, see Chibli Mallat, “ 'Riyadhology’
and Muhammad bin Salman’s T elltale Succession,” Lawfare, June 8, 2018.
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relations in the mid-20th century.243 Private confrontation is strongly implied by some recent
developments, but leading royal family members have not described related disagreements in
detail. In particular, some observers expressed concern and uncertainty about Crown Prince
Mohammed bin Salman’s November 2017 decision to detain and investigate some royal family
members on corruption charges and remove the late King Abdullah’s son, Prince Miteb bin
Abdullah, from his position as Minister of the National Guard.244 Similar concerns have
accompanied reports of the March 2020 detention of former Crown Prince Mohammed bin Nayef
and Prince Ahmed bin Abd al Aziz on sedition charges. These developments appear to signal a
stark end to the consensus-based approach that reportedly had prevailed among senior royal
family members for decades. Taken in conjunction with the Crown Prince’s bold social,
economic, and foreign policy agendas, these steps may meet with different responses from
various family members and components of Saudi society.

243 From 1958 to 1964, supporters of King Saud (the first son to succeed King Abd al Aziz) struggled for influence with
supporters of Saud’s brother Faisal (the following successor). Disputes over Saudi foreign policy and the management
of government finances contributed to the family’s decision to force King Saud from power in favor of Faisal, who
served as king until he was assassinated by his nephew in 1975.
244 See Simon Henderson, “Meet the Next Generation of Saudi Rulers,” Foreign Policy, Nov. 10, 2017; and, Bruce
Riedel, “ Saudi Arabia Shifts Policy From Risk Averse to Downright Dangerous,” YaleGlobal Online, Nov. 28, 2017.
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Figure A-1. Saudi Leadership and Succession Changes, 2015
Changes Ef ective January and April 2015

Source: CRS. Official photos adapted from Saudi Arabian government sources.
Notes: Succession changes in April 2015 reversed a key decision taken by King Abdul ah before his death—King
Abdul ah had named his half-brother Prince Muqrin as Deputy Crown Prince in March 2014, and Prince Muqrin
briefly served as Crown Prince after King Abdul ah’s death. In April 2015, Saudi authorities stated that Prince
Muqrin stepped down as Crown Prince at his own choosing and credited then-new Crown Prince Mohammed
bin Nayef with selecting King Salman’s son Mohammed bin Salman to serve as Deputy Crown Prince, with the
approval of a majority of the Al egiance Council.
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Figure A-2. Saudi Leadership and Succession Changes, 2017
Changes Ef ective June 2017

Source: CRS. Official photos adapted from Saudi Arabian government sources.
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Appendix B. Proposed Major U.S. Foreign Military
Sales to Saudi Arabia
Table B-1. Proposed Major U.S. Foreign Military Sales to Saudi Arabia
January 2009 to December 2020; Possible values in bil ions of dol ars
Formal Notification
Recipient
Date
System
Force
Pos. Value
August 2009
CNS-ATM
RSAF
$1.500
August 2009
TASS
RSAF
$0.530
December 2009
SANG Modernization
SANG
$0.177
September 2010
Blanket Order Training Program
RSAF
$0.350
October 2010
F-15 Sales, Upgrades, Weaponry and Training
RSAF
$29.400
October 2010
APACHE, BLACKHAWK, AH-6i, and MD-530F
SANG
$25.600
Helicopters
October 2010
APACHE Longbow Helicopters
RSLF
$3.300
October 2010
APACHE Longbow Helicopters
RG
$2.200
November 2010
JAVELIN Missiles and Launch Units
—
$0.071
May 2011
Night Vision and Thermal Weapons Sights
RSLF
$0.330
June 2011
CBU-105D/B Sensor Fuzed Weapons
RSAF
$0.355
June 2011
Light Armored Vehicles
—
$0.263
June 2011
Light Armored Vehicles
SANG
$0.350
September 2011
Howitzers, Fire Finder Radar, Ammunition, HMMWVs
—
$0.886
October 2011
Up-Armored HMMWVs
RSLF
$0.033
December 2011
PATRIOT Systems Engineering Services
—
$0.120
August 2012
RSAF Fol ow-on Support
RSAF
$0.850
August 2012
Link-16 Systems and ISR Equipment and Training
RSAF
$0.257
November 2012
C-130J-30 Aircraft and KC-130J Air Refueling Aircraft
RSAF
$6.700
November 2012
RSLF Parts, Equipment, and Support
RSLF
$0.300
November 2012
PATRIOT (PAC-2) Missiles Recertification
RSADF
$0.130
June 2013
SANG Modernization Program Extension
SANG
$4.000
July 2013
Mark V Patrol Boats
RSNF
$1.200
August 2013
RSAF Fol ow-on Support
RSAF
$1.200
U.S. Military Training Mission (USMTM) Program Support
October 2013
Services
MOD
$0.090
October 2013
SLAM-ER, JSOW, Harpoon Block II, GBU-39/B Munitions
RSAF
$6.800
November 2013
C4I System Upgrades and Maintenance
RSNF
$1.100
December 2013
TOW 2A and 2B Missiles
RSLF
$0.170
December 2013
TOW 2A and 2B RF Missiles
SANG
$0.900
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Formal Notification
Recipient
Date
System
Force
Pos. Value
April 2014
Facilities Security Forces- Training and Advisory Group
MOI
$0.080
(FSF-TAG) Support
August 2014
AWACS Modernization
RSAF
$2.000
October 2014
Patriot Air Defense System with PAC-3 enhancement
—
$1.750
May 2015
MH-60R Multi-Mission Helicopters
—
$1.900
July 2015
Ammunition
RSLF
$0.500
July 2015
Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) Missiles
—
$5.400
October 2015
UH-60M Black Hawk Utility Helicopters
RSLFAC
$0.495
October 2015
Multi-Mission Surface Combatant Ships
RSNF
$11.250
November 2015
Air-to-Ground Munitions
RSAF
$1.290
February 2016
MK 15 Phalanx Close-In Weapons System (CIWS) Block
RSNF
$0.154
1B Baseline 2 Kits
USMTM Technical Assistance Field Teams and other
February 2016
Support
—
$0.200
August 2016
M1A2S Tanks and Related Equipment
RSLF
$1.150
December 2016
CH-47F Chinook Cargo Helicopters
RSLFAC
$3.510
January 2017
Persistent Threat Detection System (PTDS) Aerostats
RSLF
$0.525
May 2017
Naval Training Blanket Order
RSNF
$0.250
June 2017
Air Force Training Blanket Order
RSAF
$0.750
June 2017
AN/TPQ 53-V Radar and Support (Counter Indirect Fire)
RSLF
$0.662
October 2017
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
RSADF
$15.000
January 2018
Missile Support Services
—
$0.500
March 2018
TOW 2B (BGM-71F-Series) Missiles
—
$0.670
March 2018
RSLF Ordnance Corps FMS Order II
RSLF
$0.300
March 2018
Maintenance Support Services
RSLFAC
$0.106
April 2018
155mm M109A6 Paladin Howitzer System
RSLF
$1.310
May 2019
Aircraft Fol ow On and Support Services
RSAF
$0.800
May 2019
Continued Tactical Air Surveil ance Support System
RSAF
$0.136
May 2019
Aircraft Fol ow On and Support Services
RSAF
$1.800
December 2020
Security Assistance Office (SAO) Support Services
$0.350
MOD
U.S. Training Mission to Saudi Arabia (USMTM)
December 2020
GBU-39 Smal Diameter Bomb I (SDB I) Munitions
—
$0.290
September 2021
Continuation of Maintenance Support Services
RSLFAC
$0.500
Total Possible Value

$147.290
Source: U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA).
Notes: Possible values noted in sale proposals may not match actual values of concluded contract sales. Direct
Commercial Sales (DCS) not included. Table includes proposed sales to Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF), Saudi
Arabian National Guard (SANG), Royal Saudi Land Forces (RSLF) and RSLF Aviation Command (RSLFAC), Royal
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Guard (RG), Royal Saudi Air Defense Force (RSADF), Royal Saudi Naval Forces (RSNF), Ministry of Interior
(MOI), and Ministry of Defense (MOD). Dashes indicate unspecified recipient force.
Table B-2. Emergency Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia
As Notified to Congress, May 24, 2019
Possible
Value:
Transmittal
USD,
Other Countries
Number
Item
billions
Involved
Coproduction, manufacture, assembly, development,
integration, instal ation, operation, testing, maintenance,
United Kingdom,
DDTC 17-094 repair, and demilitarization of the Paveway and Enhanced
$1.571
Spain, and Italy
Paveway Weapon System for the Royal Saudi Air Force
F-15, Tornado, and Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft
The manufacture of the Aurora Fuzing System for the
Paveway IV Precision Guided Bomb Program for end use
DDTC 17-112 by the UK Ministry of Defense and the Royal Saudi Air
$0.209
United Kingdom
Force.
To provide technical y qualified personnel to advise and
DDTC 17-128 assist the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) in maintenance
$0.176

and training for the RSAF F-15 fleet of aircraft.
To support the performance of maintenance and repair
DDTC 18-029 services of F 110 engines for the Kingdom of Saudi
$0.549

Arabia Ministry of Defense
Export of 15,000 120mm M933Al 120mm mortar bombs
DDTC 18-050 to the Saudi Arabian Royal Land Forces.
$0.051

DDTC 18-110 KSA Ministry of Defense Transformation Project
$0.071
United Arab Emirates
To support the manufacture, production, test,
South Korea, India,
DDTC 18-109 inspection, modification, enhancement, rework, and
$0.076
repair of F/A-18E/F and derivative series aircraft panels.
Israel
DSCA 18-21
Aircraft Fol ow On and Support Services
$0.800

DSCA 18-31
Continued Tactical Air Surveil ance Support System
$0.136

DSCA 19-01
Aircraft Fol ow On and Support Services
$1.800

Total Possible Value
$5.439

Source: U.S. Department of State and Department of Defense notifications to Congress, May 2019.
Notes: DDTC = U.S. Department of State Directorate of Defense Trade Controls and denotes a Direct
Commercial Sale proposed pursuant to Section 36 (c) or (d) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended (22
U.S.C. 2776). DSCA = U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency and denotes a
Foreign Military Sale proposed pursuant to Section 36 (b) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended (22
U.S.C. 2776).

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Appendix C. Saudi Arabia and Inquiries into the
Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001
The report of the congressional Joint Inquiry into Intel igence Community Activities Before and
After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, released in December 2002, brought attention
to the al eged role of Saudi Arabia in supporting terrorism.245 In the 900-page report, a chapter on
al eged foreign support for the September 11 hijackers was redacted virtual y in its entirety—Part
Four of the report, often referred to as “the 28 pages” (actual y 29)—because executive branch
officials determined at the time that its public release was contrary to U.S. national security
interests.
The congressional Joint Inquiry’s report stated that the committee had “made no final
determinations as to the reliability or sufficiency of the information regarding these issues
[al eged foreign support for the hijackers] that was found contained in FBI and CIA documents. It
was not the task of this Joint Inquiry to conduct the kind of extensive investigation that would be
required to determine the true significance of such al eged support to the hijackers.” U.S. law
enforcement and intel igence agencies subsequently investigated information in the redacted
portion of the report further. Some information reportedly remains under investigation.
In the years since, speculation and periodic media reporting focused on the degree to which the
redacted pages may have addressed the question of whether or not there was some degree of
official Saudi complicity in the September 11 attacks. For years, some people who claimed to
have read the formerly classified sections of the report said it addressed some Saudi nationals’
links with individuals involved in the attacks.246 In 2003, the Saudi government appealed to U.S.
authorities to publish the redacted pages to enable Saudi Arabia to rebut related al egations.247 On
April 19, 2016, President Barack Obama stated that he had asked Director of National
Intel igence James Clapper to review the redacted pages of the congressional Joint Inquiry’s
report for potential release.248
On July 15, 2016, the Senate Select Committee on Intel igence released a declassified version of
Part Four of the congressional Joint Inquiry as wel as two declassified pages from the executive
summary of the September 2005 Joint FBI-CIA Intel igence Report Assessing the Nature and
Extent of Saudi Government Support of Terrorism.249 The latter report focused in part on
investigating information discussed in the 2002 Joint Inquiry and was original y submitted as
required by the classified annex of the Intel igence Authorization Act for FY2004.
The “28 pages” of the congressional Joint Inquiry released in 2016 address a number of reports
that individual Saudi nationals had contact with and may have provided assistance to some of the
September 11, 2001, hijackers. Specifical y, the pages discuss information that suggested
(emphasis added)
while in the United States, some of the September 11 hijackers were in contact with, and
received support or assistance from, individuals who may be connected to the Saudi

245 Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the T errorist Attacks of September 11, 2001,
S.Rept. 107-351/H.Rept. 107-792.
246 CBS News 60 Minutes, “T op secret ‘28 pages’ may hold clues about Saudi support for 9/11 hijackers,” April 8,
2016.
247 Josh Meyer, “Saudis to Seek Release of Classified Parts of 9/11 Rep ort,” Los Angeles Times, July 29, 2003.
248 President Barack Obama interviewed by Charlie Rose, PBS, April 19, 2016.
249 Both documents are available on the website of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.
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Government. There is information, primarily from FBI sources, that at least two of those
individuals were alleged by some to be Saudi intelligence officers. The Joint Inquiry’s
review confirmed that the Intelligence Community also has information, much of it which
has yet be independently verified, indicating that individuals associated with the Saudi
Government in the United States may have other ties to al-Qa'ida and other terrorist groups.
As noted above, the pages of the 2002 report discuss al egations that were then under
consideration and not investigatory conclusions of law enforcement or intel igence officials. The
FBI since has closed some related investigations, and U.S. plaintiffs seeking access to related
information are engaged in ongoing legal proceedings.250
On September 3, 2021, President Joseph Biden directed the U.S. Department of Justice and other
agencies to complete declassification reviews of documents related to FBI investigations into the
September 11, 2011, terrorist attacks, including closed investigations into the involvement of
Saudi nationals in the attacks.251 In a statement, the President said, “the executive order requires
the Attorney General to release the declassified documents publicly over the next six months.”
Documents released in September 2021 described findings of a November 2015 interview
conducted pursuant to FBI investigations into the interactions of some of the September 11
hijackers with some Saudi nationals, including one government employee.252
The declassified pages from the September 2005 FBI-CIA report state that, “There is no evidence
that either the Saudi government or members of the Saudi royal family knowingly provided
support for the attacks of 11 September 2001 or that they had foreknowledge of terrorist
operations in the Kingdom or elsewhere.” The executive summary of the joint FBI-CIA report
further states that “there is evidence that official Saudi entities, [redacted portion], and associated
nongovernmental organizations provide financial and logistical support to individuals in the
United States and around the world, some of whom are associated with terrorism-related activity.
The Saudi Government and many of its agencies have been infiltrated and exploited by
individuals associated with or sympathetic to al-Qa’ida.”
The 2004 final report of the bipartisan National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States (aka “The 9/11 Commission”) states that the commission “found no evidence that
the Saudi government as an institution or senior Saudi officials individual y funded [Al
Qaeda].”253 The report also states that Saudi Arabia “was a place where Al Qaeda raised money

250 T im Golden and Sebastian Rotella, “ T he Saudi Connection: Inside the 9/11 Case T hat Divided the F.B.I.,” New
York T imes Magazine, January 23, 2020; and, Michael Isikoff, “FBI tried to flip Saudi official in 9/11 investigation,”
Yahoo News, July 15, 2021.
251 T he White House, Statement by President Joe Biden on the Executive Order [Executive Order 14040] Directing
Declassification Review of Documents Related to the September 11, 2001 T errorist Attacks, September 3, 2021.
252 See Release of FBI Electronic Communication dated April 4, 2016 Pursuant to Executive Order 14040 § 2(a) (Sept.
3, 2021) in U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 9/11 Material Released in Response to Executive Order 14040 ,
available at: https://vault.fbi.gov/9-11-attacks-investigation-and-related-materials/9-11-material-released-in-response-
to-executive-order-14040/.
253 Final Report of the National Commission on T errorist Attacks Upon the United States, July 22, 2004.
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directly from individuals and through charities,” and indicates that “charities with significant
Saudi government sponsorship” may have diverted funding to Al Qaeda.
In July 2016, Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al Jubeir argued that the 28 pages’ release exonerated
the Saudi government with regard to al egations that it supported or had foreknowledge of the
September 11 attacks, saying that “when the appropriate agencies, the 9/11 Commission and the
FBI and CIA investigated those leads and came out with their conclusions they said that ‘there’s
no there there.’”254 The Saudi Embassy in Washington, DC, has consistently responded to news
reports about the so-cal ed 28 pages’ contents and other al egations of official Saudi involvement
in the attacks by citing some of the findings of later investigations and noting the dismissal of
some lawsuits against the kingdom.255
Following President Biden’s September 2021 executive order directing the declassification of
investigatory materials, the Saudi Embassy in Washington, DC, released a statement cal ing for
“the full declassification of any documents and materials relating to the United States’
investigation of the terrorist attacks.”256

Author Information

Christopher M. Blanchard

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should n ot be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to
copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

254 Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia Information Office, “Saudi Foreign Minister: ‘28 Pages’ Were Misleading,” July
16, 2016.
255 Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia Information Office, “Saudi Arabia Responds to 60 Minutes Report,” April 10,
2016.
256 Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia (@SaudiEmbassyUSA), T witter, 12:38 PM, September 8, 2021.
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