Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations
September 30, 2021
Historically, Egypt has been an important country for U.S. national security interests based on its
geography, demography, and diplomatic posture. Egypt controls the Suez Canal, which is one of
Jeremy M. Sharp
the world’s most well-known maritime chokepoints, linking the Mediterranean and Red Seas.
Specialist in Middle
Egypt’s population of more than 100 million people makes it by far the most populous Arabic-
Eastern Affairs
speaking country. Although today it may not play the same type of leading political or military

role in the Arab world as it has in the past, Egypt may retain some “soft power” by virtue of its
history, media, and culture. Cairo hosts both the 22-member Arab League and Al Azhar

University, which claims to be the oldest continuously operating university in the world and has
symbolic importance as a leading source of Islamic scholarship.
Additionally, Egypt’s 1979 peace treaty with Israel remains one of the most significant diplomatic achievements for the
promotion of Arab-Israeli peace. While people-to-people relations remain cold, the Israeli and Egyptian governments have
increased their cooperation against Islamist militants and instability in the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip.
Since taking office, President Biden has balanced some considerations in his approach to U.S.-Egyptian relations, praising
Egyptian diplomacy while signaling U.S. displeasure for President Sisi’s continued domestic crackdown. In the year after the
United States started facilitating the historic Abraham Accords between Israel and various Arab states, Egypt, which ha s
maintained its peace treaty with Israel since 1979, has earned praise from U.S. officials by increasing its diplomatic outrea ch
to Israel.
Since 1946, the United States has provided Egypt with over $84 billion in bilateral foreign aid (calculated in hist orical
dollars—not adjusted for inflation), with military and economic assistance increasing significantly after 1979. Annual
appropriations legislation includes several conditions governing the release of these funds. Successive U.S. Administrations
have justified aid to Egypt as an investment in regional stability, built primarily on long -running cooperation with the
Egyptian military and on sustaining the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. All U.S. military aid to Egypt finances the
procurement of weapons systems and services from U.S. defense contractors.
For FY2022, the Biden Administration has requested $1.4 billion in bilateral assistance for Egypt, the same amount Congress
appropriated the previous year. Nearly all of the U.S. funds for Egypt come from the Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
account. All U.S. military aid to Egypt finances the procurement of weapons systems and services from U.S. defense
contractors.
As of September 20, 2021, the World Health Organization reports that since January 3, 2020, there have been 295,745
confirmed cases of COVID-19, with 16,938 deaths in Egypt. As of September 14, 2021, a total of 12,194,537 vaccine doses
have been administered. As of September 15, the COVAX facility has delivered 2.9 million doses of the Oxford/AstraZeneca
vaccine to Egypt.
Beyond the United States, President Sisi has improved or expanded Egypt’s ties with several key partners, including the Arab
Gulf states, Israel, Russia, China, France, and Italy.
In April 2019, Egyptian voters approved constitutional amendments that extend Sisi’s current term until 2024 and permit him
to run for a third term, potentially keeping him in office until 2030.

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Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations

Overview
As of fal 2021, Egypt, the Arab world’s most populous country of more than 100 mil ion
people,1 is attempting to modernize and reassert itself on the regional stage. Led by President
Abdel Fattah al Sisi (hereinafter referred to as President Sisi), a former military officer who took
power in a 2013 coup, Egypt is undergoing significant infrastructure development, exemplified
by the construction of a new capital city. Military modernization also is ongoing, as Egypt has
become the world’s third-largest importer of weapons, acquiring fighter planes and warships from
Russian and European suppliers. Diplomatical y, President Sisi has mediated a crisis in Gaza and
expanded ties to Libya, Lebanon, and Iraq. Egypt’s renewed regional assertiveness and domestic
activity follows a period of political unrest that had paralyzed the country in the previous decade.
Egypt’s renewed confidence, however, may mask systemic underlying chal enges that could limit
the extent of its regional influence. Economical y, while Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has
grown, even throughout the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, poverty is
pervasive—with the national rate at 29.7% (as of December 2020). Egypt’s national debt
constitutes 92% of GDP (as of September 2021), and servicing it takes up nearly 36% of the
national budget,2 limiting the state’s ability to invest in its citizenry’s wel -being.
As of September 20, 2021, the World Health Organization reports that since January 3, 2020,
there have been 295,745 confirmed cases of COVID-19, with 16,938 deaths in Egypt.3 As of
September 14, 2021, a total of 12,194,537 vaccine doses have been administered. As of
September 15, the COVAX facility has delivered 2.9 mil ion doses of the Oxford/AstraZeneca
vaccine to Egypt.4 In late September 2021, the United States provided Egypt with 1.6 mil ion
doses of the Pfizer vaccine.
President Sisi has used emergency powers and broad legal authority granted to the executive by
parliament to suppress opposition and perceived criticism, both before and during the pandemic.
Authorities have used media laws to arrest journalists who questioned government caseload
statistics on charges of spreading “false news.”5 The Egyptian parliament also has amended and
extended the nationwide state of emergency, which has been in place since April 2017, most
recently in July 2021.
Since taking office, President Biden has attempted to take a balanced approach to U.S.-Egyptian
relations, praising Egyptian diplomacy while signaling U.S. displeasure for President Sisi’s
continued domestic crackdown. In the year after the United States started facilitating the historic
Abraham Accords between Israel and various Arab states, Egypt, which has maintained its peace

1 Beyond the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, Egypt has long struggled with scarce domestic
resources due to population pressures. Egypt’s population surpassed 100 million in 2020 and is predicted to rise as high
as 160 million by 2050 (United Nations–World Population Prospects–2019). Population size, particularly in the Cairo
metropolis, has contributed to overcrowded classrooms, unemployment, and crippling traffic. See “ As Egypt’s
Population Hits 100 Million, Celebration is Muted,” Fanack.com , December 19, 2019. T he Egyptian government has
launched family planning initiatives, which is a challenge in more rural areas. See “ ‘T wo is Enough,’ Egypt T ells Poor
Families as Population Booms,” Reuters, February 20, 2019.
2 Mirette Magdy and T arek El-T ablawy, “Egypt Keeps Interest Rate on Hold with an Eye on Fed T apering,”
Bloom berg, September 16, 2021.
3 See the World Health Organization’s Egypt Dashboard at https://covid19.who.int/region/emro/country/eg.
4 “FACT BOX-Vaccines Delivered under COVAX Sharing Scheme for Poorer Countries,” Reuters, September 15,
2021.
5 Amnesty International, “Egypt: Prisons are Now Journalists’ Newsrooms,” Public Statement, May 3, 2020.
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treaty with Israel since 1979, has earned praise from U.S. officials by increasing its diplomatic
outreach to Israel.6
Figure 1. Map of Egypt

Source: Map Resources, adapted by CRS.
Historical Background
Since 1952, when a cabal of Egyptian Army officers, known as the Free Officers Movement,
ousted the British-backed king, Egypt’s military has produced four presidents: Gamal Abdel
Nasser (1954-1970), Anwar Sadat (1970-1981), Hosni Mubarak (1981-2011), and Abdel Fattah al
Sisi (2013-present). These four men have ruled Egypt with strong backing from the country’s
security establishment almost continual y. The one exception has been the brief period of rule by
Muhammad Morsi, who was affiliated with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (see below). That
organization has opposed single party military-backed rule and advocated for a state governed by
a vaguely articulated combination of civil and Shariah (Islamic) law. For the most part, the
Muslim Brotherhood has been the only significant and abiding opposition during the decades of
military-backed rule.
The one departure from Egypt’s decades of military rule, the brief period in which Morsi ruled,
took place between 2011 and 2013, after popular demonstrations dubbed the “Arab Spring,”

6 U.S. State Department, Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State, At the One Year Anniversary of the Abraham Accords:
Normalization Agreements in Action, September 17, 2021.
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which had started in neighboring Tunisia, compel ed the military to force the resignation of
former President Hosni Mubarak in February 2011. During this period, Egypt experienced
tremendous political tumult, culminating in Morsi’s one-year presidency. When Morsi took office
on June 30, 2012, after winning Egypt’s first truly competitive presidential election, his ascension
to the presidency was expected to mark the end of a rocky 16-month transition period.7 Proposed
timelines for elections, the constitutional drafting process, and the military’s relinquishing of
power to a civilian government had been constantly changed, contested, and sometimes even
overruled by the courts. Instead of consolidating democratic or civilian rule, Morsi’s rule exposed
the deep divisions in Egyptian politics, pitting a broad cross-section of Egypt’s public and private
sectors, the Coptic Church, and the military against the Brotherhood and its Islamist supporters.
The atmosphere of mutual distrust, political gridlock, and public dissatisfaction that permeated
Morsi’s presidency provided Egypt’s military, led by then-Defense Minister Sisi, with an
opportunity to reassert political control. On July 3, 2013, following several days of mass public
demonstrations against Morsi’s rule, the military unilateral y dissolved Morsi’s government,
suspended the constitution that had been passed during his rule, and instal ed Sisi as interim
president. The Muslim Brotherhood and its supporters declared the military’s actions a coup
d’etat and protested in the streets. Weeks later, Egypt’s military and national police launched a
violent crackdown against the Muslim Brotherhood, resulting in police and army soldiers firing
live ammunition against demonstrators encamped in several public squares and the kil ing of at
least 1,150 demonstrators. The Egyptian military justified these actions by decrying the
encampments as a threat to national security.8
Issues for Congress
Egyptian Cooperation with Israel
Following 30 years of intermittent war and enduring confrontation, Egypt’s 1979 peace treaty
with Israel remains one of the single most significant diplomatic achievements for the promotion
of Arab-Israeli peace. Congress has long been concerned with the preservation of the peace treaty
and has appropriated foreign assistance and exercised oversight to help both parties maintain it.
Since 2012, congressional appropriators have included a requirement in foreign operations
appropriations legislation that before foreign aid funds can be provided to Egypt, the Secretary of
State must certify that Egypt is meeting its obligations under the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty.9
While people-to-people relations remain limited, Egypt and Israel have continued to find specific
areas in which they can cooperate, such as containing the Palestinian group Hamas (a U.S.-
designated terrorist organization) in the Gaza Strip, countering terrorism, and developing natural
gas in the Eastern Mediterranean (see sections below).

7 David Kirkpatrick, “ Named Egypt’s Winner, Islamist Makes History,” New York Times, June 24, 2012.
8 “Egyptian Cabinet Vows to Disperse Pro-Morsi Protest Camps,” The Guardian (UK), July 31, 2013.
9 See Section 7041(a)(1) of P.L. 116-260, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021. In addition to sustaining the
treaty, the certification also requires Egypt to sustain its “ strategic relationship with the United States.”
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Since 2020, when Israel reached various
agreements to normalize or improve relations
Figure 2. Bennett-Sisi Meeting
with the United Arab Emirates (UAE),
September 2021 in Egypt
Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco (known as the
“Abraham Accords”), there has been a
noticeable increase in Israeli-Egyptian
bilateral contacts. In February 2021, Egyptian
Minister of Energy Tarek al Molla visited
Israel to discuss cooperation on natural gas
projects. Before this visit, no Egyptian
cabinet officials other than foreign ministers
or intel igence chiefs had visited Israel in the
past 15 years. In May 2021, Israel’s then-
Foreign Minister Gabi Ashkenazi visited
Cairo for meetings with Foreign Minister
Sameh Shoukry, marking the first time in 13

years that an Israeli foreign minister had
Source: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs
official y visited Egypt. In August 2021,
Abbas Kamel, the chief of Egypt’s General Intel igence Directorate, visited Israel to discuss the
security situation in Gaza, where Egypt helped negotiate an end to Israel-Hamas hostilities earlier
in the year (see below).
Bilateral engagement increased in September 2021, when Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennet
traveled to the resort town of Sharm al Sheikh in southern Sinai for a meeting with President Sisi.
Former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu last made an official visit to Egypt in 2011
(and an unofficial visit in 2018). Shortly after the Bennett-Sisi summit, EgyptAir, the national
airline of Egypt, announced that it would offer direct flights between Cairo and Tel Aviv starting
in October 2021. Previously, air travel between Egypt and Israel had been discreet, limited to
unmarked planes run by a subsidiary of EgyptAir.
Egypt, Israel, and the Palestinians
Egypt’s triangular relationship with Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip is complex. On the one
hand, Israel and Egypt cooperate against Hamas in the Gaza Strip, as they have since Sisi’s rise to
power in 2013. In general, the Egyptian government is opposed to Islamist groups wielding
political power across the Middle East, and opposes Turkish and Qatari support for Hamas.10 On
the Egyptian-Gaza border, Egypt has tried to thwart arms tunnel smuggling into Gaza11 and has
accused Palestinian militants in Gaza of aiding terrorist groups in the Sinai. On the other hand, in
an acknowledgement of Hamas’ entrenched rule in Gaza since 2007, Egypt couples its policy of
containment with ongoing dialogue. Maintaining a relationship with Hamas has provided the
Egyptian security and intel igence services an opportunity to mediate between Hamas and Israel

10 “How Israel and Egypt are Coordinating on Gaza,” Al Monitor, July 12, 2018.
11 T he Egyptian military has taken a number of steps to stop smuggling tunnel construction beneath the Egyptian -Gaza
border. T o date, it has destroyed numerous tunnels and created a “buffer zone” along the Gaza border by demolishing
parts of Rafah city and flooding trenches in the area with seawater from the Mediterranean. T he military also has
erected concrete walls and barbed wire fencing along the buffer zone to protect against attacks from the Islamic State -
Sinai Province. According to Human Rights Watch, which has criticized the military’s actions, since 2013, a little less
than one-quarter of all northern Sinai residents have been displaced or otherwise left the region as a result of the home
demolitions and intensifying military hostilities. See, Human Rights Watch, “ Egypt: Massive Sinai Demolitions Likely
War Crimes,” March 17, 2021.
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and between Hamas and its rival Palestinian faction Fatah (led by Palestinian Authority President
Mahmoud Abbas). Egypt, at times, has attempted to broker a long-term Israel-Hamas truce.12 In a
September 2021 speech, Israeli Foreign Minister Yair Lapid set forth Israeli conditions for a
possible truce with Hamas, and said, “It’s worth emphasizing the critical importance of Egypt in
this whole process. It won't happen without the support and involvement of our Egyptian partners
and without their ability to talk to everyone involved.”13
Egypt controls the Rafah border crossing into Gaza, making Rafah the only non-Israeli-controlled
passenger entryway into the Strip, which Egypt periodical y closes for security reasons. Control
over the Rafah border crossing provides Egypt with some leverage over Hamas, though Egyptian
authorities appear to use it carefully to avoid sparking a humanitarian crisis on their border.14
Egypt also controls the Salah al Din Gate, a previously used crossing north of Rafah that opened
for commercial use in 2018. According to one report, both Hamas and Egypt tax imported goods
moving into Gaza through the gate, earning Hamas tens of mil ions of dollars per year in
revenue.15
The May 2021 Israel-Hamas Conflict and Egyptian Mediation
In May 2021, a conflict took place between Israel and Hamas in which Palestinian militants fired
rockets at Israeli populated areas, while Israeli forces targeted Hamas and other militants in the
densely populated urban areas of Gaza. After 11 days of fighting that resulted in over 250
Palestinians kil ed and 12 deaths inside Israel, Egypt helped mediate a cease-fire. President Sisi
also provided Gaza with humanitarian aid and pledged $500 mil ion for reconstruction (Qatar
also pledged $500 mil ion). On May 20, President Biden extended “my sincere gratitude to
President Al Sisi and the senior Egyptian officials who played a critical role in this diplomacy. ”16
Days later, Secretary of State Antony Blinken arrived in Cairo for a meeting with President Sisi in
which he conveyed “President Biden’s appreciation to President Sisi for Egypt’s critical
mediation efforts in support of a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas and other groups in Gaza
and for Egypt’s help in evacuating American citizens to safety.”17 Since then, Egypt has kept open
(with some exceptions) its Rafah border crossing to al ow for wounded Gazans to be evacuated
and the import of reconstruction materials. According to one account, “Al of this is helpful for
Palestinians—but it is more helpful stil for Mr. Sisi’s reputation.”18
As of September 2021, Egypt has continued to serve as a mediator between Israel and Hamas as
both sides negotiate over the infusion of additional reconstruction aid for Gaza and the return of
Israeli civilians held in Gaza.19 As in the aftermath of the three previous major Israel-Hamas
conflicts (in 2008-2009, 2012, and 2014), Egypt, Israel, and other international actors face
chal enges in balancing Gaza’s humanitarian and economic needs with concerns that Hamas
could divert money and supplies brought into Gaza for military purposes.

12 “Egypt T rying to Broker Broad Israel-Hamas T ruce, Hamas Says,” Associated Press, August 2, 2018.
13 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, FM Lapid addresses World Summit on Counter T errorism, September 12, 2021.
14 “For Hamas, Reconciliation with Egypt Worth More than Qatari Cash,” Al Monitor, January 31, 2019.
15 “New Gaza Crossing Raises Questions about Blockade Policies,” PolicyWatch, number 3205, T he Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, October 23, 2019.
16 T he White House, Remarks by President Biden on the Middle East, May 20, 2021.
17 U.S. State Department, Secretary Blinken’s Meeting with Egyptian President Al Sisi, May 26, 2021.
18 “Sisi Sees an Opportunity,” The Economist, Middle East & Africa, July 3, 2021 edition.
19 Hamas is holding two Israelis captive, Hisham al Sayed and Avera Mengistu. Israel is demanding their return and the
return of the remains of two soldiers killed in Gaza during the 2014 war.
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Sinai Peninsula
Several terrorist groups based in the Sinai Peninsula (the Sinai) have been waging an insurgency
against the Egyptian government since 2011. The Islamic State’s Sinai Province affiliate (IS-SP)
is the most lethal terrorist organization in the peninsula.20 Since its inception in 2014, IS-SP has
attacked the Egyptian military continual y, targeted Coptic Christian individuals and places of
worship,21 and occasional y fired rockets into Israel.
To counter IS-SP in northern Sinai, the Egyptian armed forces and police have declared a state of
emergency, imposed curfews and travel restrictions, and erected police checkpoints along main
roads. Egyptian counterterrorism efforts in the Sinai appear to have reduced the frequency of
terrorist attacks somewhat. According to one analyst, as of late 2020, militant attacks had fal en to
15 a month from 40 in late 2017.22 However, though the pace of IS-SP attacks have dropped,
other experts believe that IS-SP is a significant security threat, especial y when pitted against
poorly trained Egyptian conscript soldiers serving in the Sinai. According to one report from IHS
Markit, “Although militant capabilities have not returned to the levels of sophistication seen from
2014-16, the group has shown it stil retains high level capabilities.”23
The 1979 Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty limits the number of soldiers that Egypt can deploy in the
Sinai, subject to the parties’ negotiation of changes to address particular circumstances. Egypt and
Israel agree upon any short-term increase of Egypt’s military presence in the Sinai and to the
construction of military and/or dual-use infrastructure. Since Israel returned control over the Sinai
to Egypt in 1982, the area has been partial y demilitarized, and the Sinai has served as an
effective buffer zone between the two countries. The Multinational Force and Observers, or MFO,
which are partial y funded by the United States, are deployed in the Sinai to monitor the terms of
the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty (see Figure 3).

20 T his group was formerly known as Ansar Bayt al Maqdis (Supporters of the Holy House or Partisans of Jerusalem).
It emerged after the Egyptian revolution of 2011 and affiliated with the Islamic State in 2014. Estimates of its
numerical composition range from 500 t o 1,000. In Arabic, it is known as Wilayat Sinai (Sinai Province). Also referred
to as ISIS-Sinai, ISIS-Egypt, and the Islamic State in the Sinai.
21 In November 2018, IS-SP claimed responsibility for an attack against Coptic Christian pilgrims traveling t o the
monastery of Saint Samuel the Confessor 85 miles south of Cairo in the western desert.
22 “Shifting Militant T actics Curb Development in Egypt ’s North Sinai,” Reuters, November 9, 2020.
23 Jack Kennedy, “ T errorism in Egypt: Examining the Data and What to Expect in 2021,” IHS Markit, December 18,
2020.
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At times, Egypt and Israel have cooperated
to counter terrorism in the Sinai. In a
Figure 3. The Sinai Peninsula
televised interview in 2019, President Sisi
responded to a question on whether
Egyptian-Israeli military cooperation was
the closest it has ever been, saying “That is
correct. The [Egyptian] Air Force sometimes
needs to cross to the Israeli side. And that’s
why we have a wide range of coordination
with the Israelis.”24 One news account
suggested that, as of February 2018, Israel,
with Egypt’s approval, had used its own
drones, helicopters, and aircraft to carry out
more than 100 covert airstrikes inside Egypt
against militant targets.25
Natural Gas
Israeli-Egyptian energy cooperation has
significantly expanded since 2018. For
Egypt, cooperation with Israel is a key
component of its broader regional strategy to
become a major player in the development

of undersea natural gas in the Eastern
Mediterranean. Egypt is attempting to
Source: http://www.mfo.org
position itself as a regional gas hub, whereby its own gas fields meet domestic demand while
imported gas from Israel and Cyprus can be liquefied in Egypt and reexported.26 Egypt has the
Eastern Mediterranean’s only two large-scale liquefied natural gas terminals (located at Idku and
Damietta), operating as partnerships between the state and foreign companies such as Italy’s ENI
and Royal Dutch Shel .
In 2018, Israeli and Egyptian companies entered into a decade-long agreement worth an estimated
$15 bil ion, according to which Israeli off-shore natural gas is exported to Egypt for either
domestic use or liquefaction and reexport. In August 2021, Israeli and Egyptian officials
discussed possible plans to liquefy Israeli gas for reexport at the Egyptian terminals mentioned
above.
Israeli and Egyptian companies bought significant shares of an unused undersea pipeline (the
EMG pipeline) connecting Israel to the northern Sinai Peninsula. The pipeline is now used to
transport natural gas from Israel to Egypt as part of the previously mentioned gas deal.
As energy ties bind Israel and Egypt closer together, they have also made both parties wary of
competitors such as Turkey. In January 2019, Egypt convened the first ever Eastern
Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), a regional consortium consisting of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, the
Palestinian Authority, Cyprus, Greece, and Italy, intended to consolidate regional energy policies

24 “Egypt’s President El-Sisi Denies Ordering Massacre in Interview his Government Later T ried to Block,” 60
Minutes, January 6, 2019.
25 “Secret Alliance: Israel Carries Out Airstrikes in Egypt, with Cairo’s O.K,” New York Times, February 3, 2018.
26 “Egypt Says U.S. Oil Firms Showing Appetite for Offshore P rojects,” Reuters, November 24, 2018.
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and reduce costs.27 In September 2020, the EMGF became an official intergovernmental
organization based in Cairo. Turkey, which has longstanding disputes with Greece and Cyprus
that have shaped Eastern Mediterranean energy debates, is considered a rival of the EMGF
countries.28 As Turkey expanded its role in Libya, Libya’s then-Government of National Accord
(GNA) signed a maritime boundary agreement with it in late 2019.29 Egypt cal ed the deal “il egal
and not binding”; Israel said the deal could “jeopardize peace and stability in the area.”30 In 2020,
Egypt and Greece signed an exclusive economic zone agreement—general y seen in part as a
response to the Turkey-Libya deal—in an area of the Mediterranean containing oil and gas
reserves. Turkey claims that this zone fal s in the area of its continental shelf.31
Possible Egyptian Purchase of Russian Advanced Fighter Aircraft
Since 2018, there have been periodic reports of Egyptian plans to purchase Russian Sukhoi Su-35
Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft, a move that could potential y trigger U.S. sanctions under
Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (CRIEEA; P.L. 115-44/H.R.
3364, Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act [CAATSA], Title II—hereinafter
referred to as CAATSA).32 In May 2020, TASS Russian News Agency reported that the Gagarin
Aircraft Manufacturing Association in Komsomolsk-on-Amur had started production of the
aircraft under a contract signed in 2018.33 As of September 2021, U.S. officials have not publicly
confirmed that Egypt and Russia are moving ahead with the deal. The Su-35 is Russia’s most
advanced fighter aircraft. In May 2021, a report suggested that Russia had delivered five Su-35s
to Egypt.34 A month later, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov said that 11 Su-35 aircraft
wil be delivered to Egypt this year.35 Several months earlier, in a phone cal with the Egyptian
foreign minister, Secretary of State Antony Blinken “raised concerns over human rights, which he
emphasized would be central to the U.S.-Egypt bilateral relationship, and Egypt’s potential
procurement of Su-35 fighter aircraft from Russia.”36
Section 231 of CAATSA requires that the President impose a number of sanctions on a person or
entity who knowingly engages in a significant transaction with anyone who is part of, or operates
for or on behalf of, the defense or intel igence sectors of the Government of the Russian
Federation. The Secretary of State has determined that the manufacturer of the Su-35,
Komsomolsk-on-Amur Aviation Production Organization (KNAAPO) is a part of, or operates on

27 “Natural Gas Fields Give Israel a Regional P olitical Boost,” Associated Press, January 23, 2019.
28 CRS Report R44000, Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton T homas.
29 Selcan Hacaoglu and Firat Kozok, “T urkish Offshore Gas Deal with Libya Upsets Mediterranean Boundaries,”
Bloom berg, December 6, 2019.
30 “T urkey-Libya Maritime Deal Rattles East Mediterranean,” Reuters, December 25, 2019.
31 “Egypt and Greece Sign Agreement on Exclusive Economic Zone,” Reuters, August 6, 2020.
32 Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 , title II, Countering America’s Adversaries
T hrough Sanctions Act (CAAT SA; P.L. 115-44). For additional background, see CRS Report R45415, U.S. Sanctions
on Russia, coordinated by Cory Welt .
33 Derek Bisaccio, “Su-35 Production for Egypt Begins,” Defense and Security Monitor, May 18, 2020.
34 Dan Arkin, “Egyptian Air Force Starts to Receive Su-35 Fighter,” Israel Defense, May 7, 2021.
35 Jeremy Binnie, “Russian Official Indicates Egypt Will Receive 11 Su-35s this Year,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, June
23, 2021.
36 U.S. State Department, Secretary Blinken’s Call with Egyptian Foreign Minister Shoukry, February 23, 2021.
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behalf of, Russia’s defense and intel igence sectors for the purpose of meeting the definitional
requirements of CAATSA Section 231.37
While Egypt’s procurement of Russian (and French) fighter aircraft has drawn media attention,
U.S.-origin aircraft compose the largest component of Egypt’s fixed-wing inventory, including
around 200 F-16 variant combat aircraft. Egypt’s diversification strategy is particularly
chal enging for its air force, which must balance different training and maintenance procedures
for European, Russian, and U.S. platforms.
Democracy, Human Rights, and Religious Freedom
Egypt’s record on human rights and democratization has sparked regular criticism from U.S.
officials and some Members of Congress. The Egyptian government rejects foreign criticism of
its human rights practices as il egitimate interference in Egypt’s domestic affairs.38 Certain
practices of President Sisi’s government, the parliament, and the security apparatus have been the
subjects of U.S criticism. According to the U.S. State Department’s report on human rights
conditions in Egypt in 2020:
Significant human rights issues included: unlawful or arbitrary killings, including
extrajudicial killings by the government or its agents and terrorist groups; forced
disappearance; torture and cases of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment
by the government; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary detention;
political prisoners or detainees; politically motivated reprisal against individuals located
outside the country; arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy; serious restrictions on
free expression, the press, and the internet, including arrests or prosecutions of journalists,
censorship, site blocking, and the existence of criminal libel laws, which were not enforced;
substantial interference with the rights of peaceful assembly and freedom of association,
such as overly restrictive laws governing civil society organizations; restrictions on
political participation; violence targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex
persons and use of the law to arrest and prosecute arbitrarily such persons; and forced or
compulsory child labor, including its worst forms.39
Egyptian authorities employ a host of legal authorities to suppress peaceful political opposition
and civil society, including the folowing:
 Emergency Law. As previously mentioned, Egypt has been in a near continuous state of
emergency since 2017.40 The 2014 constitution, as amended, limited the president’s
ability to declare an indefinite state of emergency, though the pro-government parliament
has continuously approved three-month extensions of the President’s emergency
declarations (most recently in July 2021). Emergency powers, which were in effect for
decades under the rule of the late Hosni Mubarak, enable the state to refer civilians to
State Security Emergency Courts rather than civilian courts for various infractions.
 Anti-terrorism law. Egypt’s 2015 anti-terrorism law has been widely criticized by
human rights groups for creating a broad definition of terrorism that can be used by
authorities to crack down against peaceful political opposition. According to one critique,
“By writing into law a broad definition for terrorism and creating new prosecutorial and

37 See U.S. State Department, Section 231 of CAAT SA, at https://www.state.gov/t/isn/caatsa/.
38 “Egypt calls on US not to interfere in its Affairs,” The Middle East Monitor, March 15, 2019.
39 U.S. State Department , 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Egypt, March 30, 2021.
40 For an overview of the Egypt’s emergency law, see “Egypt’s Emergency Law Explained,” Al Jazeera, April 11,
2017.
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judicial mechanisms, the Counter-terrorism Law expands the scope of acts that can be
tried as terrorism; subjects even nonviolent, constitutional y protected actions of
everyday citizens, journalists, and rights defenders to possible prosecution under
terrorism legislation; and contributes to a culture in which national security concerns
automatical y trump human rights and legal obligations.”41
 NGO Law. For years, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operating in Egypt have
charged that the government has used the legal system to restrict civil organizations from
conducting lawful activities without government interference. Egypt’s Law #149 of 2019
on activities of nongovernmental organizations prohibits domestic and foreign NGOs
from pursuing activities that violate “national security,” “public order,” “public morals,”
and “national unity” without defining any of these terms.42
Authorities also restrict access to the internet, censor online content, and monitor private online
communications.43 In 2018, parliament passed amendments to the Media and Press Law that,
among other changes, grant the regulatory body known as the Supreme Media Council “the
authority to suspend a social media account that has 5,000 followers or more if it posts false
news, promotes violence, or spreads hateful views.”44 The Egyptian government also has
attempted to require that technology companies share their user data with authorities.45 In October
2019, the Egyptian cabinet issued a resolution mandating, among other things, that ride-sharing
companies such as Uber submit to the Ministry of Transportation six months’ worth of customers’
data from al rides.46
Select international human rights, democracy, and development monitoring organizations provide
the following global rankings for Egypt.
Table 1. Democracy, Human Rights, and Development Indicators
Issue
Index
Ranking
Democracy
Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2021
“Not Free”
Press Freedom
Reporters Without Borders, World Press
166/180 Countries
Freedom Index 2021
Corruption
Transparency International, Corruption
117/180 Countries
Perceptions Index 2020
Human
United Nations Human Development
116/189 Countries
Development
Programme, Human Development Index 2020
Sources: Freedom House, Reporters Without Borders, Transparency International, and United Nations Human
Development Programme.

41 T he T ahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, “T IMEP Brief: Counter-T errorism Law,” August 15, 2018.
42 George Sadek, “Egypt: New Law Enacted Regulating Activities of Nongovernmental Organizations,” Global Legal
Monitor, T he Law Library, Library of Congress, September 11, 2019.
43 See “T he Eye on the Nile,” Check Point Research, October 3, 2019.
44 “Egypt: Parliament Passes Amendments to Media and Press Law,” Global Legal Monitor, T he Law Library, Library
of Congress, August 6, 2018.
45 “Dilemma for Uber and Rival: Egypt’s Demand for Data on Riders,” New York Times, June 10, 2017.
46 “Egypt: Ministerial Resolution Issued to Regulate Activities of Ride-Sharing Companies,” Global Legal Monitor,
T he Law Library, Library of Congress, October 22, 2019.
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Gender Equality
Despite a constitutional provision affirming gender equality, Egyptian women do not enjoy the
same legal rights and opportunities as men and experience widespread discrimination.47 The
World Economic Forum ranks Egypt 129th of 156 countries on the Global Gender Gap index, and
4th within the MENA region; the country performs in the bottom 10 countries on the measure of
women’s economic participation and opportunity. Men participate in the labor force at more than
three times the rate of women in Egypt (75.2% compared with 20% for women), and less than
10% of firms have women in top management positions.48 Egypt performs lower than the regional
MENA average on the Women, Business, and the Law index, an annual study by the World Bank
that measures the laws and regulations that affect women’s economic opportunity in 190
economies. The World Bank has found that “constraints on freedom of movement, laws affecting
women’s decisions to work, laws affecting women’s pay, constraints related to marriage, laws
affecting women’s work after having children, constraints on women’s starting and running a
business, and gender differences in property and inheritance” contribute to Egypt’s score of 45
out of 100.49
Violence against women and rampant sexual harassment remain problems in Egypt, due in part to
the lack of a comprehensive law criminalizing al forms of violence against girls and women.50
Child marriage and female genital mutilation or cutting (FGM/C) are both practiced to some
extent, despite laws against them. The State Department reports the government “did not
effectively enforce the FGM/C law” and that FGM/C remains a “serious problem.”51 Egyptian
law does not prohibit domestic violence or spousal abuse. The government has recently increased
the punishment for sexual harassment and claims to be prioritizing efforts to address it, perhaps in
response to the 2020 social media movement about sexual assault that some dubbed Egypt’s
#MeToo moment.52
Coptic Christians
Most Egyptians are Sunni Muslims, but a relatively smal percentage (perhaps 5% or less) are
Coptic Christians, and this minority has faced discrimination and persecution, from the
government as wel as from other citizens and terrorist groups. Congress has at times urged the
government of Egypt to protect this community. For example, in the 117th Congress, H.Res. 117,
among other provisions, urges the Government of Egypt to enact “serious and legitimate reforms
in the public sector, athletics, and society to ensure Coptic Christians are given the same rights
and opportunities as al other Egyptian citizens.”
For years, the Coptic Christian community in Egypt has cal ed for equal treatment under the
law.53 Since taking office, President Sisi has publicly cal ed for greater Muslim-Christian

47 Op.cit., U.S. State Department, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Egypt, March 30, 2021.
48 World Economic Forum, Global Gender Gap Report 2021, March 2021.
49 World Bank, Women, Business, and the Law 2021, data as of October 1, 2020.
50 Statement by Michelle Bachelet, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Efforts to Combat Violence against
Women in Egypt: Milestones, Challenges, and Recommendations,” UN Human Rights Council, June 8, 2021.
51 Op.cit., U.S. Department of State, 2020 Country Reports on Hum an Rights Practices: Egypt, March 30, 2021.
52 “Egypt tightens punishment for sexual harassment ,” Reuters, July 12, 2021; Declan Walsh, “ T he 22-Year-Old Force
Behind Egypt’s Growing #MeT oo Movement,” The New York Times, October 2, 2020.
53 In late 2019, an Egyptian Coptic woman won a landmark inheritance case before the Cairo Court of Appeal. T he
court granted the plaintiff, a Coptic Christian woman, a share of her late father’s inheritance equal to that of her two
male brothers by applying Christian Orthodox Personal Status Bylaws rather than Islamic law (which grants sons twice
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coexistence and national unity. In January 2019, he inaugurated Egypt’s Coptic Cathedral of
Nativity in the new administrative capital east of Cairo saying, “This is an important moment in
our history.... We are one and we wil remain one.”54
Despite these public cal s for improved interfaith relations in Egypt, the minority Coptic Christian
community continues to face professional and social discrimination, along with occasional
sectarian attacks. According to the 2021 U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom
report, “religious discrimination [in Egypt] remained pervasive, including a disparity in policies
regarding places of worship, a lack of opportunities for non-Muslims to work in key areas of
government service, state security harassment of former Muslims, and recurring incidents of anti-
Christian mob violence, particularly in rural areas.”55
Major terrorist attacks against Christian places of worship also continue to threaten the Coptic
community. Suicide bomber attacks against Coptic cathedrals in 2011, 2016, and 2017
collectively kil ed over 95 people and injured hundreds of others. In April 2021, IS-SP posted a
video depicting the group’s murder of a 62-year-old Copt from Bir al Abd in North Sinai.
Coptic Christians also have long voiced concern about state regulation of church construction.
They have demanded that the government reform long-standing laws (some dating back to the
nineteenth century) on building codes for Christian places of worship. Article 235 of Egypt’s
2014 constitution mandates that parliament reform these building code regulations. In 2016,
parliament approved a church construction law (Law 80 of 2016) that expedited the government
approval process for the construction and restoration of Coptic churches, among other structures.
Although Coptic Pope Tawadros II welcomed the law,56 critics claimed that it continues to al ow
for discrimination. According to Human Rights Watch, “the new law al ows governors to deny
church-building permits with no stated way to appeal, requires that churches be built
‘commensurate with’ the number of Christians in the area, and contains security provisions that
risk subjecting decisions on whether to al ow church construction to the whims of violent
mobs.”57
Domestic Developments
Domestic Politics
President Abdel Fattah al Sisi’s tenure appears to have been predicated on the idea that a
sufficient segment of the public, exhausted after several years of unrest and distrustful of Islamist
rule, remains wil ing to forgo democratic liberties in exchange for the rule of a strongman hailing
from the military. The extent to which Egyptians political quiescence reflects endorsement of
military rule or strategic silence in the face of suppression is impossible to quantify, given the
closed political environment enforced by the current government. The authorities have limited
dissent by maintaining a constant crackdown, which initial y was aimed at the Muslim

the share of daughters). T he plaintiff had argued that, per the Egyptian Constitution of 2014, she should not be subject
to Islamic law in matters related to family law. See George Sadek, “ Egypt: Court Grants Christian Woman Share of
Father’s Estate Equal to Share of Her T wo Brothers,” T he Law Library, Library of Congress, Global Legal Monitor,
January 9, 2020.
54 “Egypt’s Sisi Opens Mega-Mosque and Middle East’s Largest Cathedral in New Capital,” Reuters, January 6, 2019.
55 Annual Report of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, April 2021.
56 “HH Pope T awadros II: Church Construction Law Corrected an Error and Bandaged Wounds,” Coptic Orthodox
Cultural Center, September 1, 2016.
57 “Egypt: New Church Law Discriminates Against Christians,” Human Rights Watch, September 15, 2016.
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Brotherhood, but has evolved to cover a broader range of political speech, encompassing anyone
criticizing the government.
While successive Egyptian presidents since 1952 were effective at centralizing power, both
within the ruling system and outside it, certain institutions (judiciary, military) and individuals
enjoyed a considerable degree of independence from the executive. However, under President
Sisi, there has been arguably an unprecedented attempt to consolidate control over al branches of
government while stymying opposition to his rule. In April 2019, voters approved amendments to
the constitution that extend President Sisi’s current term until 2024 and permit him to run for a
third term, potential y keeping him in office until 2030. The amendments also granted the
president the authority to appoint al chief justices of Egyptian judicial bodies and the public
prosecutor. During summer 2019, President Sisi made those judicial appointments, leading one
anonymous Egyptian judge to question this authority, saying that “The role of the judge is to be at
arm’s length from the executive, but this is inconsistent now with the fact the president of the
republic is involved with a judge’s transfer, promotion and accountability.”58 President Sisi also
placed his older brother and oldest son in key security and intel igence positions, although his son
is no longer in that role.59
Egypt’s bicameral parliament consists of a
596-member House of Representatives (568
Figure 4. President Abdel Fattah al Sisi
elected and 28 appointed by the president)
and a 300-member Senate (200 of whom are
elected, and 100 appointed by the president).
According to Egypt’s Political Rights Law, at
least 25% of the elected seats in the House of
Representatives are set aside for female
candidates; 10% of al Senate seats are
designated for women. 60 Women’s right to
vote was recognized in 1956, and women
currently constitute 27.7% of representatives

in the lower parliament and 13% of seats in
Source: Egyptian State Information Service.
the upper house.61
Parliamentary elections took place in late 2020 amidst a turnout estimated at less than 30%.
Mostaqbal Watan (translated as either Future of the Homeland or Nation’s Future)62 emerged as
the leading pro-Sisi party, with 316 seats in the House. When parliament began its work in early
2021, it featured the most women legislators in Egypt’s history. Egyptian lawmakers
overwhelmingly support the president’s legislative agenda, as Mostaqbal Watan has become the

58 “Fears Over Egypt’s Judiciary Abound after Sisi Appointments,” Agence France Presse, August 21, 2019.
59 Reportedly, President Sisi has since removed his son Mahmoud from the deputy head of the GIS. According to one
controversial report in the Egyptian publication Mada Masr, Mahmoud Sisi lost his position in the GIS after the
president’s inner circle concluded that his reputation was harmful to the Sisi regime. See “President’s Eldest Son,
Mahmoud al-Sisi, Sidelined from Powerful Intelligence Position to Diplomatic Mission in Russia,” Mada Masr,
November 20, 2019. After Mada Masr published this account, security services temporarily detained an editor and two
journalists and had their personal electronics confiscated. See “ Egypt News Outlet Raided after Report on Sisi’s Son,”
Financial Tim es, November 24, 2019.
60 See, Genders Quota Database, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) ,
Stockholm, Sweden.
61 Inter-Parliamentary Union, Monthly Ranking of Women in National Parliaments, accessed September 9, 2021.
62 T he party’s website is available in English at https://mostaqbal-watan.org/en/.
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successor to the now-defunct National Democratic Party (NDP), the former pro-government party
of the late Hosni Mubarak. According to one observer, “Sisi’s circle is presenting a democratic,
pluralistic picture of this outcome, but in truth the legislature wil be dominated by one major
party surrounded by smal parties that serve as window dressing, thereby mimicking an
opposition just enough to occasional y channel the public’s frustration at socioeconomic
conditions. This is straight from the Mubarak playbook.”63 The next parliamentary elections are
expected to take place in 2025.
The Economy
As an emerging market, Egypt has weathered the COVID-19 pandemic and has witnessed
positive GDP growth both in 2020 (3.6%) and 2021 (2.8% estimated). In the face of the
pandemic’s disruption to global tourism (tourism in Egypt accounts for 9.5% of al employment),
the Egyptian government has enacted various fiscal stimulus measures while receiving various
low-interest loans from international financial institutions, such as the IMF. According to a July
2021 IMF analysis,
over the past 12 months, the [Egyptian] authorities’ commitment to prudent policies and
their strong performance under the IMF program have helped mitigate the health and social
impact of the pandemic while safeguarding economic stability, debt sustainability, and
investor confidence. Growth is expected to rebound strongly in FY2021/22 to 5.2 percent,
but the outlook is still clouded by uncertainty related to the pandemic, including regarding
the full recovery of tourism.64
Egypt Constructs a New Capital City
Since 2015, Egypt has been constructing a yet unnamed new capital city (temporarily referred to as the New
Administrative Capital, or NAC) 28 miles east of Cairo. The new city is planned to house 6.5 mil ion people and is
to feature new headquarters for most government agencies and a new financial center. The city is designed to be a
“smart” city, in which residents may use smartphone applications to access basic services. The city is to feature an
extensive surveil ance network of cameras to “monitor crowds and traffic congestion, detect incidents of theft,
observe suspicious people or objects, and trigger automated alarms in emergency situations,” according to
Honeywel , the contractor building the network.65 The German company Siemens Mobility is partnering with local
Egyptian companies to construct a high-speed rail line linking Cairo to the NAC and Red Sea coastal cities to ports
on the Mediterranean.
The construction of the NAC is the biggest “mega project” inaugurated by President Sisi. Since his ascension to
power, Egypt has widened the Suez Canal, expanded the network of tunnels and bridges connecting the Sinai
Peninsula to the mainland, and constructed several new military bases. Some observers, however, have questioned
the economic and environmental viability of building a city of 6 mil ion in an undeveloped desert area. According
to The Economist, “There are myriad questions about the city’s viability. Water is scarce; property prices are too
high for most Egyptians. Critics say the money would be better spent fixing the poor infrastructure in ‘old’
Cairo.”66
While Egypt has been able to access global capital to finance its infrastructure expansion, demand
for its debt could shift if interest rates rise elsewhere. Egypt’s Central Bank offers one of the
highest bond interest rates (8.25%) among emerging market economies, making the country’s
debt attractive to foreign investors. Overseas investors hold around $33 bil ion of Egypt’s

63 Haisam Hassanein, “Egypt’s New Parliament: Reopening Political Life, But Only So Far,” Policy Analysis, T he
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 26, 2021.
64 T he International Monetary Fund, “Egypt: Overcoming the COVID Shock and Maintaining Growth,” July 14, 2021.
65 “From Creaking Cairo, Egypt Plans High-T ech Leap with new Capital,” Reuters, September 2, 2021.
66 “Egypt: Always Going Big,” The Economist, April 3, 2021.
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Treasury bil s and bonds.67 International financial institutions now hold about half of Egypt’s
external debt. However, some economists are concerned that any increase in U.S. and European
interest rates may lead investors to sel Egyptian debt and move their money into safer markets.
Relatively low borrowing costs have enabled Egypt to finance public works projects and other
deficit spending initiatives. According to S&P Global Ratings, Egypt’s has one of the highest
debt-service burdens among al sovereigns, and the government requires funding from equity
sources in order to cope with possible increases in global interest rates.68
Some economists argue that Egypt relies too heavily on a few key economic sectors, such as
energy and tourism, while the rest of the private sector remains underdeveloped and poverty rates
remain high. According to the Economist, “The purchasing managers’ index, a measure of
private-sector activity, has spent most of the past five years contracting. As many as 30% of
Egyptians fel below the official poverty line of 857 pounds ($55) a month at the end of 2020.”69
For decades, Egypt’s military has played a key role in the nation’s economy as a food producer
and low-cost domestic manufacturer of consumable products; however, due to political
sensitivities, the extent of its economic power is rarely quantified. Egypt’s military is believed to
be largely economical y self-sufficient. It produces what it consumes (food and clothes) and then
sel s surplus goods for additional revenue.
Under President Sisi, who has commissioned massive infrastructure projects, Egyptian military
companies have been the main beneficiaries of government contracts.70 Military-owned
manufacturing companies have expanded into new markets, producing goods that are cheaper
than either foreign imports or domestical y produced goods made by the private sector (including
appliances, cement, fertilizer, solar panels, some electronics, and some medical equipment).
Proponents of the military’s expanded role argue that its companies can move goods to market
more quickly and sel them to consumers at prices below those charged by private corporations.
Critics argue that the military is distorting the economic system and benefitting from a legal
system that gives the military unfair advantages. Reportedly, the military does not pay corporate
income taxes and employs low-wage conscript labor to keep overhead costs at a minimum.71
Egypt’s Foreign Policy
Under President Sisi, Egypt’s foreign policy has been more active after a period of dormancy
during the latter years of the late President Hosni Mubarak and the tumultuous two-and-a-half-
year transition that followed Mubarak’s resignation.72 While President Sisi has continued Egypt’s

67 Mirette Magdy and T arek El-T ablawy, “Egypt Keeps Interest Rate on Hold with an Eye on Fed T apering,”
Bloom berg, September 16, 2021.
68 Op.cit., Mirette Magdy and Manus Cranny, “Egypt Has Crisis Experience to Handle a Fed T aper, Minister Says,”
Bloom berg, September 8, 2021.
69 “Egypt is again under Military Rule, but Sisi Lacks Nasser’s Appeal,” The Economist, August 28, 2021 edition.
70 “Egypt’s Economy Falls to the Military,” Wall Street Journal, May 22, 2018.
71 “Army’s Economic Role Fuels Debate in Egypt,” Middle East Online, April 3, 2018.
72 From about 2000 to 2013, Egypt had turned inward, unable to either lend its support or unilaterally advance major
U.S. initiatives in the region, such as the war in Iraq or the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Moreover, the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, profoundly and negatively impacted how some U.S. policymakers viewed Egypt.
Whereas the bilateral relationship had previously focused on promoting regional peace and stability, the 9/11 attacks
reoriented U.S. policy during the George W. Bush Administration, as Americans considered the possibility that popular
disillusionment from authoritarianism might contribute to terrorism. Egypt has been a key element of this reorient ation,
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longtime policy of playing an intermediary role between Israel and the Palestinians, Egypt under
President Sisi has attempted to play a bigger role in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea.
Since 2014, as Egypt has developed off-shore natural gas in the eastern Mediterranean, President
Sisi has modernized the Egyptian Navy and improved economic ties with Israel, Italy, and Cyprus
while also looking to deter regional rivals, such as Turkey. In January 2020, Egypt inaugurated a
new base (Berenice) on the Red Sea which, according to one account, wil al ow Egypt to
“project military power into the southern Red Sea.”73
As part of President Sisi’s strategy to revitalize Egyptian power in its immediate vicinity, it has
maintained longstanding U.S.-Egyptian security ties while strengthening defense relationships
with other actors.74 During Sisi’s presidency, Egypt has diversified its military-to-military and
trade relationships away from the United States to include closer relations with Russia, China,
and European nations such as France, Italy,75 and Germany.76 Between 2016 and 2020, Egypt was
the third-largest arms importer global y (after Saudi Arabia and India) with France, Russia, and
the United States being Egypt’s principal suppliers.77
In 2021, Egypt also has been more active in the Middle East, specifical y in Lebanon and Iraq,
two countries where Iran exerts influence over some of the Shia Arab population. In Lebanon,
which remains in the throes of a crippling economic and energy crisis, Egypt is planning to ship
natural gas through Jordan and Syria to the Deir Ammar power plant in Lebanon.78 Egypt may
need to receive a waiver from the United States in order to comply with the Caesar Syria Civilian
Protection Act of 2019 (P.L. 116-92, Title LXXIV). According to Barbara Leaf, the President’s
nominee for Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, “This is a project that, as I
understand, it is endorsed by the World Bank, so that a State Department is looking at it carefully
within the framework of US law and sanctions policy. But it shows some promise on the face of
it. And of course, the department wil consult thoroughly with Treasury on the way forward.”79 In
Iraq in 2021, President Sisi became the first Egyptian president to visit Baghdad in 30 years.

as several Egyptian terrorists helped form the original core of Al Qaeda. For example, see Nabil Fahmy, “ Egypt in the
World,” The Cairo Review of Global Affairs, Summer 2012.
73 Jeremy Binnie, “Egypt Inaugurates Major Red Sea Base Complex,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 16, 2020.
74 T he United States continues to fund the procurement of major defense systems, as the Defense Security Cooperation
Agency (DSCA) has notified Congress of potential defense sales to Egypt worth an estimated $4.9 billion since 2018.
For a list of major arms sales notifications to Egypt, see https://www.dsca.mil/tags/Egypt .
75 Italy has supplied the Egyptian Navy with two FREMM Frigates from the Italian defense contractor Fincantieri for
an estimated $1.4 billion. Egypt has also armed its Italian frigates with Aster-15 medium-range surface-to-air missiles.
See, “Italy Advances Arms Deals with Egypt Despite Opposition,” Al Monitor, March 27, 2021. A year earlier, Egypt
purchased 24 AW149 and eight AW189 helicopters from Italian defense contractor Leonardo for $957 million . See
Gareth Jennings, “Italy Reveals Leonardo Helo Sales to Egypt,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, May 21, 2020.
76 T hyssenKrupp Marine Systems (T KMS) is supplying the Egyptian Navy with four T ype 209/1400mod submarines
(for $1.7 billion). T he same German company also is providing the navy with MEKO A‑200 frigates. Egypt is
procuring VL MICA NG surface-to-air missiles from MBDA to protect these new frigates.
77 “T rends in International Arms T ransfers, 2020,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute ( SIPRI), March
2021.
“Egypt looks beyond the US to meet Defence Needs,” Economist Intelligence Unit, April 15, 2019. Report used data
from the Stockholm International P eace Research Institute’s database on arms transfers.
78 “Lebanon to get Egyptian Gas via Syria in Plan to Ease Crisis,” Reuters, September 8, 2021.
79 “Senate Foreign Relations Committee Holds Hearing on Pending Nominations,” Congressional Quarterly,
Congressional T ranscripts, September 15, 2021.
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Egypt, Iraq, and Jordan have agreed to expand various energy and military cooperation, as wel as
trilateral trade and investment.80
Russia
Egypt and Russia, close partners in the early years of the Cold War, have again strengthened
bilateral ties under President Sisi, who has promised to restore Egyptian stability and international
prestige. His relationship with Russian President Putin, in the words of one observer, has
benefitted from “a romanticized memory of relations with Russia during the Nasser era.”81
President Sisi turned to Russia during the Obama Administration, when the U.S.-Egyptian
relationship became more strained (see the Appendix).82
Since 2014, Egypt and Russia have strengthened their ties in a number of ways, including through
arms deals and joint military exercises. Reportedly, Egypt is upgrading its aging fleet of legacy
Soviet MiG-21 aircraft to a fourth generation MiG-29M variant.83 Egypt also has purchased 46
standard Ka-52 Russian attack helicopters for its air force, along with the naval version of the Ka-
52 for use on Egypt’s two French-procured Mistral-class helicopter dock vessels, and the S-
300VM surface-to-air missile defense system from Russia.84 In June 2020, Egyptian media
reported that the Egyptian Army had agreed to purchase 500 Russian T-90 Main Battle Tanks
from Uralvagonzavod, though reportedly both sides are stil negotiating whether the tanks can be
assembled in Egypt (M1A1 tanks have been assembled in Egypt).85
Additional y, Egypt and Russia reportedly have expanded their cooperation on nuclear energy. In
2015, Egypt reached a deal with Russian state energy firm Rosatom to construct a 4,800-
megawatt nuclear power plant in the Egyptian Mediterranean coastal town of Daba’a, 80 miles
northwest of Cairo. Russia is lending Egypt $25 bil ion over 35 years to finance the construction
and operation of the nuclear power plant (this loan is to cover 85% of the project’s total costs).
The contract also commits Russia to supply the plant’s nuclear fuel for 60 years and to transfer
and store depleted nuclear fuel from the reactors. Rosatom anticipates that construction wil begin
in 2022 and that the plant wil be operational in 2028.86
Egyptian-Russian ties are not without complications. In the aftermath of a 2015 terrorist attack
against a Russian passenger jet departing from Sharm El Sheikh, visits to Egypt by Russian
tourists, previously the country’s largest source of tourists, dropped.87 Russian commercial
aircraft have resumed direct flights to Cairo and, after six years, to Sharm El Sheikh. Egypt and
Russia also engaged in a trade dispute in 2016 over Russian wheat imports. Egypt is the largest
global importer of wheat, and the largest export market for Russian wheat.
Several possible reasons could explain why Egyptian-Russian relations have improved under
President Sisi, none of which are mutual y exclusive. For one, President Sisi has most likely made
the determination that Egypt’s national security interests are best served by having global powers

80 “Is Egypt Back as a Power Player in the MENA Region?” Fanack.com , August 30, 2021.
81 “T he United States and the Future of Egyptian-Russian Relations,” The Caravan, Hoover Institution, March 9, 2017.
82 “Analysis: Egyptian Air Force Modernization,” Jane’s International Defence Review, November 10, 2016.
83 See Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, Air Force- Egypt, August 7, 2018.
84 “Egyptian S-300VM SAM Delivery Confirmed,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, June 6, 2017.
85 See, Jane’s World Armies, Egypt, March 17, 2021.
86 “Egypt’s Nuclear Power Plans Back on T rack,” Economist Intelligence Unit, August 4, 2021.
87 Before 2015, Russian visitors accounted for 20%-30% of Egypt’s tourist arrivals. “Russian T ourist Numbers Set to
Recover Slowly,” Economist Intelligence Unit, May 4, 2018.
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compete for Egypt’s favor. As a lower-middle-income country with relatively high poverty
(29.7%) and a military that relies on the appearance of strength for deterrence, Egypt seeks cost
efficiencies for its military acquisitions. Part of Egypt’s rebalancing of its foreign policy may be
seen as a quest to secure the most advanced hardware on the most generous financing terms
available. With U.S. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants relatively unchanged since 1987
(Congress has appropriated $1.3 bil ion a year since then), the purchasing power of U.S. military
aid has decreased substantial y given the rising costs of major defense systems. Moreover, U.S.
defense technology, particularly fighter aircraft, has evolved to the point where Egypt either
cannot afford the latest generation of U.S. fighters (such as the F-35), lacks the technical know-
how to maintain them, or may be prohibited from purchasing certain items if they negate Israel’s
Qualitative Military Edge (QME).88 Egypt has turned to Russia and France in recent years to
source naval and air force acquisitions (fourth-generation fighters, such as the Su-35 from Russia
and the Rafale from France) while using U.S. assistance to maintain its existing stocks of U.S.
materiel. According to SIPRI, from 2000 to 2009, Egypt’s major arms supplier was the United
States, accounting for 75% of Egypt’s total arms imports; however, from 2010 to 2019, U.S. arms
imports accounted for 23% of Egypt’s total arms imports.89
Since the Egyptian military ousted former President Morsi in 2013, the Egyptian government
under President Sisi has rejected international criticism of its human rights record90 and has
sought out foreign partners that do not condition support based on Egyptian domestic policies.91
In 2014, while U.S. assistance to Egypt was under review (see the Appendix), then-Defense
Minister Sisi and Russian President Vladmir Putin held a series of meetings in which President
Putin endorsed Sisi for president, and the two leaders signed several unnamed military deals
possibly financed by Gulf Arab states.92 Russia and Egypt issued a joint communique at the time
that “condemned foreign interference in domestic affairs of any country and cal ed for solving al
existing problems and crises exclusively by peaceful means and broad al -inclusive dialogue.”93
France
Like Russia, France stands out as a country with which President Sisi has sought to build a
diplomatic and military procurement relationship. In late 2020, President Sisi visited France, and
French President Emmanuel Macron stated during a joint press conference that “I wil not
condition matters of defence [sic] and economic cooperation on these disagreements [over human
rights].... It is more effective to have a policy of demanding dialogue than a boycott which would
only reduce the effectiveness of one of our partners in the fight against terrorism.”94 Egypt has
purchased major air and naval defense systems from French defense contractors, including the
following:
 54 Rafale multirole fighters (produced by Dassault Aviation). In 2015, Egypt
became the first foreign buyer of the Rafale when it ordered 24 fighter jets. In
2018, French officials said that the United States would not permit France to

88 See CRS Report R46580, Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge and Possible U.S. Arms Sales to the United Arab
Em irates, coordinated by Jeremy M. Sharp and Jim Zanotti.
89 Alexandra Kuimova, “Understanding Egyptian Military Expenditure,” SIPRI Background Paper, October 2020.
90 “Egypt Rejects Western Countries’ Criticism at UN Human Rights Council,” Al Ahram, March 12, 2021.
91 “Macron avoids ‘lecturing’ Egypt on rights, Sisi defends his record,” Reuters, October 24, 2017.
92 See, Molly Hunter, “From Russia with Love: Vladimir Putin Gives Sissi AK-47,” ABC News, February 10, 2015.
93 “Vladimir Putin pre-empts presidency bid by Egypt’s military chief,” Associated Press, February 13, 2014.
94 “Macron says French arms sales to Egypt will not be conditional on human r ights,” France 24, December 7, 2020.
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export the U.S.-made SCALP air-launched land-attack cruise missile used on the
Rafale to Egypt under the International Trade in Arms Regulation (ITAR)
agreement.95 The United States may have been concerned over the transfer of
sensitive technology to Egypt. In 2021, Egypt purchased an additional 30 Rafale
fighters in a $4.5 bil ion deal financed by a French sovereign loan guarantee on
85% of the total amount borrowed from various French commercial banks (BNP
Paribas, Crédit Agricole, Société Générale and CIC).96 France also provided a
sovereign loan guarantee on 65% of the financing for Egypt’s initial purchase of
24 jets.97
 Four Gowind Corvettes (produced by Naval Group). This deal was signed in July
2014. As part of the French-Egyptian arrangement, some of the Corvette
construction has taken place at the Alexandria Shipyard in Egypt.98
 One FREMM multi-mission Frigate (produced by Naval Group). Named the
Tahya Misr (Long Live Egypt), this vessel was delivered to Egypt in 2015. This
ship has participated in an annual joint French-Egyptian naval exercise, known as
Cleopatra.
 Two Mistral-class Helicopter Carriers (produced by Naval Group). In fal 2015,
France announced that it would sel Egypt two Mistral-class Landing Helicopter
Dock (LHD) vessels (each carrier can carry 16 helicopters, 4 landing craft, and
13 tanks) for $1 bil ion. The LHDs were delivered in 2016. In 2017, Egypt
announced that it would purchase Russian 46 Ka-52 Al igator helicopters, which
can operate on the LHDs.99
China
Unlike Russia, France, and the United States, China has not been a key military partner of the
Egyptian Armed Forces, with the exception of its exports of armed drones to the Egyptian Air
Force.100 Moreover, although China has received some media attention for its investment in
projects relating to Egypt’s construction of its new capital,101 Chinese-Egyptian trade remains

95 “France Could Replace US Parts in SCALP Missile to Circumvent IT AR Restrictions for Egypt, But at Some
Delay,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, August 2, 2018.
96 Although unconfirmed, the French newspaper La Tribune also reported that Egypt intends to buy two Airbus MRT T
refueling tankers, four T hales Ground Master 400 long-range air surveillance radars, and one Airbus observation
satellite. See Michel Cabirol, “ Egypt: a Contract (Rafale) May Hide Other Orders (Spy Satellite, MRT T ),” La Tribune
(France), May 6, 2021.
97 “Egypt Buys French Fighter Jets,” Economist Intelligence Unit, May 5, 2021.
98 In fall 2018, it was reported that the German manufacturer T hyssenKrupp Marine Systems is competing with the
French company Naval Group for a possible new Egyptian Navy purchase of corvettes.
99 According to one report, the effectiveness of the Mistral as a helicopter carrier depends on whether the helicopters on
board have foldable rotors. If they don’t, it “ reduces the size of their air wings from 16 helicopters to the six that can be
carried on deck.” See Jeremy Binnie, “ Egypt Deploys Ka-52s on Mistral LHD,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 7,
2020.
100 “T he Aisheng ASN-209 was a Joint-Development of a MAME UAV System between China and Egypt,”
militaryfactory.com, April 27, 2020.
101 T he Chinese State Construction and Engineering Company (CSCEC) has secured a contract to build the business
district of Egypt’s New Administrative Capital. In the Suez Canal industrial zone, Chinese state-owned conglomerate
T EDA operates an industrial park with 85 companies and more than 4,000 employees. See “ T he Competition for
Egypt: China, the West, and Megaprojects,” Al Jazeera, March 15, 2021.
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relatively modest. According to one report, Egypt represents less than 5% of China’s trade with
Middle Eastern and North African countries.102
Though Chinese-Egyptian trade and investment does not match China’s presence in other parts of
the region, the United States has warned Egypt over accepting Chinese investment in critical
technological infrastructure, such as 5G networks. According to one report, during the Trump
Administration, U.S. officials warned Egypt not to al ow Chinese companies, such as Huawei, to
build critical data networks in Egypt due to their inability to protect user data.103
The Nile Basin Countries
Egypt relies on the Nile River104 for
hydroelectricity, agriculture, and most of its
Figure 5. GERD Talks in Washington, DC
domestic water needs, and thus treats
restrictions to the flow of the Nile from
upstream countries as an existential issue.
According to the United Nations, “Egypt’s
dependency ratio is one of the world’s highest
with 96.9 percent of the total renewable water
resources flowing into the country from
neighboring countries. The total renewable
water resources per capita stands at 700
m3/year/capita in 2014, but considering

population growth is expected to drop below
the 500 m3 threshold of absolute water
Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury.
scarcity by 2030.”105 Experts expect climate change to increase the frequency of hot and dry years
for farmers along the Nile.106
The government has been at odds with Nile Basin countries to Egypt’s south that seek to revisit
colonial-era treaties governing the Nile waters. Tensions are particularly strong with Ethiopia
(population 110 mil ion), which is nearing completion of the $4.2 bil ion Grand Ethiopian
Renaissance Dam (GERD), a major hydroelectric project on the Blue Nile, which starts in
Ethiopia. Egypt argues that the dam, once fil ed, wil limit the flow of the Nile below Egypt’s
share,107 as agreed upon in a 1959 deal with Sudan (of which Ethiopia was not part).108 Ethiopia

102 Mohamed El Dahshan, “Egyptian Exceptionalism in a Chinese-led World,” Chatham House, February 10, 2021.
103 Khalid Hassan, “US Warns Egypt to Avoid Chinese Companies on 5G Connections,” Al Monitor, November 3,
2020.
104 T he Nile is the longest river in the world (4,184), stretching from Kenya’s Lake Victoria to the Mediterranean Sea.
T he Blue Nile and White Nile merge in Sudan before flowing into Egypt.
105 FAO. 2016. AQUAST AT Country Profile—Egypt. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
(FAO). Rome, Italy.
106 Declan Walsh and Somini Sengupta, “For T housands of Years, Egypt Controlled the Nile. A New Dam T hreatens
T hat,” New York Times, February 9, 2020.
107 “Egypt Denounces Ethiopia for Moving Ahead with Nile Dam Amid Water: Shortage Fears,” Reuters, October 3,
2019.
108 International agreements on apportioning the flow of the Nile River date back to the British colonial period when
some Nile riparian countries were not parties themselves to the agreemen ts. T he last major agreement, the 1959 Nile
Waters Agreement between Egypt and Sudan, divided the entire average annual flow of the Nile between Egypt and
Sudan. Ethiopia was not part of this agreement. T he 1959 agreement revised Egypt’s share of the Nile waters upward
from a previous arrangement reached between Egypt and the British colonial authorities in Sudan , which also excluded
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claims that the dam, which would double its electricity generating capacity, is critical to its efforts
to eradicate poverty. Sudan, which sits in the middle of the dispute, stands to benefit from
Ethiopia’s prospective electricity exports and the regulated water flow, which would curtail
flooding and improve its agricultural potential.109
After years of failed talks, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan continue to disagree over how long
Ethiopia should take to fil the dam, as wel as how much water should be released from the
GERD on an annual basis, particularly during prolonged droughts.110 Reduced Nile flow through
Sudan into Egypt may exacerbate existing water shortages in both countries and cause short-term
political problems for the Egyptian government, given its extensive unmet domestic water needs.
Rising Sea Levels and the Nile Delta
Low-lying deltas like Egypt’s Nile Delta and other parts of Egypt’s coast are susceptible to sea-level rise. Higher
sea levels can result in more frequent flooding from high tides and extreme rainfal , greater impacts from coastal
storms, damage to coastal fresh groundwater, changes to coastal habitats for fish and other species, and land lost
to coastal erosion and inundation.111 The Nile Delta is Egypt’s most important agricultural region and home to
significant population and economic centers, such as Alexandria and Port Said. Scientists have warned that the Nile
Delta’s flood risk may increase in the years ahead due to a combination of factors.112 These include rising sea
levels, which general y are anticipated to increase in the coming decades with warming temperatures, and local
conditions contributing to land subsidence and loss, such as upstream dams capturing sediments needed for
maintaining the delta and land subsidence from groundwater, oil, and gas extraction.113 According to the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), “The low-lying northern coast and Nile Delta region are a
high priority for adaptation to climate change.”114
The Egyptian government is taking some steps to address climate change. With support from the International
Finance Corporation, it has built one of the world’s largest solar parks at Benban in Aswan and aims to
dramatical y increase its national reliance on solar power. It also has built storm barriers along Alexandria’s shore
to stave off flooding, and has received funding from the United Nations Development Program to protect dams
along the Nile. In order to cope with anticipated freshwater shortages, Egypt is building two large wastewater
treatment plants, limiting cultivation of water-intensive crops such as bananas and rice, and planning to construct
desalination plants. 115
To break the deadlock over Nile water-sharing, Egypt has repeatedly sought third-party
mediation, particularly from the United States,116 the United Nations, and the Africa Union.

Ethiopia.
109 See International Crisis Group, “Bridging the Gap in the Nile Waters Dispute,” March 20, 2019.
110 See International Crisis Group, “Calming the Choppy Nile Dam T alks,” October 23, 2019.
111 For more information on how sea levels may effect coasts, see CRS Report R44632, Sea-Level Rise and U.S.
Coasts: Science and Policy Considerations, by Peter Folger and Nicole T . Carter. Higher sea levels can impair drainage
of runoff from rainfall events.
112 Mohamed Shaltout, Kareem T onbol, and Anders Omstedt, “Sea-Level Change and Projected Future Flooding Along
the Egyptian Mediterranean Coast,” Oceanologia, vol. 57, no. 4 (2015); IPCC, IPCC Special Report on the Ocean and
Cryosphere in a Changing Clim ate, in press, September 24, 2019, p. 4-61.
113 Esayas Gebremichael et al., “Assessing Land Deformation and Sea Encroachment in the Nile Delta: A Radar
Interferometric and Inundation Modeling Approach,” JGR Solid Earth, vol. 123, no. 4 (April 2, 2018).
114 IPCC, IPCC Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate, in press, September 24, 2019,
p. 4-61.
115 “Egypt Seeks to Diversify its Water Supply Sources,” Economist Intelligence Unit, May 4, 2021.
116 During a June 2021 hearing before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Ambassador Robert F. Godec, Acting
Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of African Affairs, stated, “ What I would emphasize is that there are solutions—
technical solutions that address the concerns of all of the parties, that allow Ethiopia to build the dam and have
electricity, that allows Egypt to have water, that allows Sudan to have water, and meets the needs of all of the people of
the region. T he issue is really a question of political will. T he leaders in these countrie s have to come to an agreement.”
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However, as of September 2021, Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia continue to be at an impasse in
reaching a trilateral agreement governing Ethiopia’s usage of the GERD to manage the flow of
the Nile River. International mediation efforts by the United States and the Africa Union (AU),
among others, have to date not resolved the dispute.117 After numerous rounds of unsuccessful
talks, Egypt’s negotiating position remains focused on securing a long term, international y
legal y binding agreement limiting Ethiopia’s dam-fil ing in drought years. Ethiopia, which
perceives its control over the dam as a matter of national pride and sovereignty, has sought to
retain the flexibility to release waters from the dam’s reservoir. In July 2021, Ethiopia fil ed the
dam’s reservoir for the second time, potential y fil ing it enough to begin producing
hydroelectricity for the first time.
Egypt, with support from the Arab League,
also has continued to press the issue at the
Figure 6. The Nile River
United Nations Security Council (UNSC). In
July 2021, the UNSC held a meeting on the
GERD, in which Egypt presented draft text
for a UNSC resolution cal ing for a binding
agreement within six months; for the rejection
of unilateral actions, including the fil ing of
the dam; and for world powers to play a more
active role in mediation.118 In September
2021, the Security Council adopted a
presidential statement cal ing for a
resumption of African Union-led negotiations
in order to reach a “binding agreement on the
fil ing and operation of the GERD.”119
However, Egypt’s entreaties to the
international community have not born fruit.
According to one analyst, “From a
psychological point of view, Egypt is for the
first time dependent on a major country of a
size that is comparable to Egypt, of an
economic power that is quickly catching up
with Egypt.”

120
Source: CRS Graphics.
Libya
Since the 2011 uprising that toppled long-time authoritarian leader Muammar al Qadhafi,
Egyptian policy in Libya has focused on securing its western border, protecting its citizens
working in Libya, and supporting eastern Libyan political and military forces. During Libya’s
recent period of internal conflict (2014-2020), Egypt intervened militarily to strike armed Islamist

See House Foreign Affairs Committee, Hearing entitled, T he Conflict in Ethiopia, June 29, 2021.
117 A mediation effort by the T rump Administration stalled in 2020 after Ethiopia rejected a draft agreement put forth
by then-T reasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin and accused the United States of bias toward Egypt.
118 United Nations, “ Meeting on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and Regional Relations,” What’s in Blue, July
7, 2021.
119 “Security Council Presidential Statement on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD),” What’s in Blue,
September 15, 2021.
120 Max Bearak and Sudarsan Raghavan, “Africa’s Largest Dam Powers Dreams of Prosperity in Ethiopia —and Fears
of Hunger in Egypt,” Washington Post, October 15, 2020.
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groups in eastern Libya and provided diplomatic and material support to Field Marshal Khalifa
Haftar and the Libyan National Army (LNA) movement. The LNA stil controls most of eastern
Libya despite its unsuccessful attempt to seize al of Libya between 2019 and 2020. Although
Egypt’s support to Haftar and the LNA has been limited, Haftar’s priorities align with President
Sisi’s to a certain extent, as both men hail from the military and broadly oppose Islamist political
forces.
Beyond its immediate borders and from a broader geo-political perspective, Egypt seeks to limit
Turkish influence in Libya, which it sees as destabilizing. Turkey’s support for Islamist
movements, including the Egyptian-outlawed Muslim Brotherhood, has long been a strain in their
bilateral relationship, particularly since the ouster of former president Muhammad Morsi in 2013.
Support for opposing factions in Libya further exacerbated tensions.
Since a cease-fire among Libyans went into effect in October 2020, Egypt has engaged
diplomatical y with Libyan military leaders and the interim Government of National Unity
(GNU). In 2021, President Sisi has met several times with GNU interim Prime Minister Abdul
Hamid Dabaiba. Egypt has pledged to reopen its embassy in Tripoli (which has been closed since
2014) and consulate in Benghazi. At the same time, Egypt has engaged Turkey in a series of
bilateral talks (the first since 2013) aimed at reaching mutual understandings in Libya and the
eastern Mediterranean. Despite improved ties, Cairo may stil be suspicious of Turkish long-term
intentions in Libya. According to Egypt’s Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry, progress in Libya
depends on “real change in Turkish policy,” and “words are not enough, they must be matched by
deeds.”121 According to one analyst, “Egypt fears that Ankara’s military patronage of Tripoli
combined with the long-lasting Turkish support for the Muslim Brotherhood could create an
Islamic-oriented government in Tripoli. This is a risk that Egyptian President Sisi does not want
to run.”122
U.S.-Egyptian Relations
Key Components
At a broad level, the United States views the stability of Egypt, the most populous country in the
Middle East, as key to regional stability, and therefore maintains a decades-long security
partnership to strengthen Egypt’s armed forces and its ability to combat terrorism.123 In April
2021, Egypt joined the U.S. Naval Forces Central Command’s Combined Maritime Forces,124 a
34-nation naval partnership to combat terrorism, prevent piracy, and encourage regional
cooperation. In September 2021, 600 U.S. service personnel from the U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM) participated in Operation Bright Star,125 a biennial multinational military training

121 Lazar Berman, “Egypt Uses Military to Send Firm Message to Newly Conciliatory T urkey, Times of Israel, July 7,
2021.
122 Alessia Melcangi, “Egypt recalibrated its strategy in Libya because of T urkey,” MENASource, Atlantic Council,
June 1, 2021.
123 T he White House, President Donald J. T rump Remains Committed to Egypt and Middle East Stability, April 9,
2019.
124 See https://www.cusnc.navy.mil/Combined-Maritime-Forces/.
125 Since 1980, shortly after the signing of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, the United States and Egypt have
conducted large-scale joint military exercises known as “ Bright Star.” In 1980, both countries conducted annual single
service bilateral ground maneuver events. However, starting in the mid-1980s, Bright Star became a biennial
multinational military training exercise. For the first 25 years of its existence, Bright Star was one of the largest
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exercise cohosted by the United States and Egypt that, since the early 1980s, has helped foster the
interoperability of U.S. and Egyptian forces.126
Another key U.S. component of U.S.-Egyptian military cooperation has been expedited naval
access through the Suez Canal. The Egyptian government has long provided U.S. warships with
the courtesy of front-of-the-line access to the Canal for expedited passage.127 After the March
2021 temporary blockage of the canal by a stranded container ship, U.S. officials have reiterated
the importance of open access to the canal for commercial trade and military operations.128
Successive Administrations also have expressed admiration for Egypt’s role in Middle East
peacemaking (see the “Egypt, Israel, and the Palestinians” section above). According to U.S.
Ambassador to Egypt Jonathan Cohen, “The U.S.-Egypt strategic partnership is vital to both
nations and spans decades. We have cooperated with one another every day, across the
administrations of eight U.S. presidents on a wide agenda which began with Egypt’s pioneering
role in promoting Middle East peace.”129 Since 1982, the United States has continued to
participate in the Sinai Peninsula peacekeeping and monitoring mission, know n as the
Multinational Force and Observers (MFO).130
Though military-to-military relations remain the backbone of the bilateral relationship, the United
States and Egypt seek opportunities to expand trade and investment deemed mutual y beneficial.
Despite having the largest population in the Middle East, Egypt ranks as the region’s fifth-largest
economy by GDP (behind Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Israel). By total 2020 volume of
trade, Egypt ranks as the 50th-largest U.S. trading partner, at $6.8 bil ion (a 20% drop from 2019
due to the pandemic).131 The United States has a trade surplus with Egypt and exports wheat and

coalition military exercise conducted by CENT COM. It included the ground, naval, and air forces of both the United
States and Egypt, along with troops from France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Greece,
Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the UAE, T urkey, Pakistan, and Kuwait. During the 1999/2000 eve nt, 11 nations contributed
over 70,000 troops to the exercise. At times, regional conflict or tensions in the U.S. -Egyptian relationship have led to
the cancellation of Bright Star. Due to the wars in Iraq, Bright Star was cancelled in 1991 and 2003. Due t o political
unrest in Egypt, the Egyptian armed forces cancelled Bright Star in 2011. In 2013, President Obama suspended U.S.
participation in Bright Star due to U.S. concerns over the military’s ousting of Egypt’s civilian -led government. T hus,
Bright Star did not take place from 2010 to 2016. It resumed in September 2017, when an estimated 200 U.S. soldiers
participated in the exercise at Mohamed Naguib Military Base in Egypt, where U.S. and Egyptian forces conducted
battle simulations involving U.S.-origin major defense equipment, such as Egyptian F-16s and M1A1 Egyptian tanks.
In August 2018, approximately 800 U.S. troops participated in Operation Bright Star 18. T hat event featured Egyptian
special operations forces conducting counterterrorism and irregular warfare training operations, working in close
collaboration with US special operators. In 2020, the United States and Egypt cancelled Bright Star due to the COVID -
19 pandemic.
126 U.S. Department of Defense, United States Central Command, Readout from Gen. McKenzie’s Visit to Egypt,
September 11, 2021.
127 While the Suez Canal T ransit Authority provides the U.S. Navy with expedited passage, the United States, like other
foreign nations transiting the canal, pays the authority fees for transit, tug boat assistance, late fees, and port dues.
128 See testimony of Amanda Dory, Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Department of Defense, House
Armed Services Committee Hearing entitled “ National Security Challenges and U.S. Military Activities in the Greater
Middle East and Africa,” April 20, 2021. See also John Bowden, “Pentagon: Suez Canal Stoppage may Impact T ransit
of Military Vessels,” The Hill, March 28, 2021.
129 Hany Assai, “INT ERVIEW: US Ambassador to Cairo says Strategic Partnership Vital to both Nations, Spans
Decades,” Ahram online, July 4, 2021.
130 See CRS Insight IN11403, Possible Withdrawal of U.S. Peacekeepers from the Sinai Peninsula , by Jeremy M.
Sharp. P.L. 116-283, the William M. (Mac) T hornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 ,
includes Section 1292, which requires the Secretary of Defense to notif y Congress of any planned withdrawal of U.S.
troops that would bring total U.S. military participation in the MFO below 430 soldiers.
131 T rade statistics generated by T rade Data Monitor, LLC using trade information from Egypt’s Central Agency for
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corn, mineral fuel and oil, machinery, aircraft, and iron and steel products. U.S. imports include
apparel, natural gas and oil, fertilizers, textiles, and agricultural products.132 According to the U.S.
Department of Commerce’s Egypt Country Commercial Guide, U.S. foreign direct investment
(FDI) in Egypt was $1.37 bil ion in 2019 (latest data available), making the United States the
third-largest foreign investor in Egypt, behind the United Kingdom and Belgium. Most FDI from
the United States is concentrated in the oil and natural gas sectors.133
Challenges in the Bilateral Relationship
Various U.S. concerns about Egypt’s internal security, political repression, and social stagnation
complicate longstanding bilateral military and economic cooperative endeavors, but the countries
continue to share security interests. After nearly a decade of terrorist attacks and insurgent
warfare, the Sinai Peninsula continues to be an area of significant concern to U.S. policymakers.
According to the latest U.S. State Department Report on Terrorism, “Nearly al terrorist attacks in
Egypt took place in the Sinai Peninsula and largely targeted security forces, but terrorist attacks
targeting civilians, tourists, and security personnel in mainland Egypt remained a concern.”134
Beyond the spate of violence emanating from the Sinai is concern over Egypt’s dynamism as a
21st-century nation state that meets the growing demands of its educated and interconnected
youth. According to Tamara Cofman Wittes, the President’s nominee for USAID assistant
administrator for Middle East:
Even in the face of a relationship that has today as many differences as areas of agreement,
many parts of the United States government continue to view the nation of Egypt as ‘too
big to fail.’ There is good reason for this view. Egyptians represent a full one-fifth of the
entire Arab world. An economic or political disruption in Egypt would, as it did in 2011,
have profound effects across the region.135
The COVID-19 pandemic has further strained state finances, forcing the government to continue
to rely on foreign creditors to finance its large public debt, which, as of September 2021, was
equal to 92% of Gross Domestic Product. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has repeatedly
lent Egypt funds with the stipulation that it cuts spending on food and fuel subsidies, changes that
successive Egyptian governments have been slow to make because of fear of igniting popular
unrest. Since 2016, the IMF has lent Egypt $20 bil ion; it continues to emphasize that in order for
Egypt to unlock its growth potential, Egypt’s private sector needs to grow and the state needs to
reduce its role in certain sectors while “fostering labor market participation of women and youth,
and encouraging exports.”136 According to one longtime expert on Egypt, Professor Robert
Springborg:
Egypt’s biggest challenge comes down to the state’s money: where does it come from and
where does it go? The al-Sisi regime is based on the proposition that Egypt is too big to

Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS).
132 U.S. State Department, U.S. Relations with Egypt, Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs,
September 20, 2019.
133 U.S. Commerce Department, International T rade Administration, Egypt Country Commer cial Guide, Updated
September 5, 2021.
134 U.S. State Department, Bureau of Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2019: Egypt.
135 T estimony of T amara Wittes, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Middle East, North Africa, and
International T errorism, hearing entitled “ Egypt Politics-Economics-Human Rights,” September 9, 2020.
136 T he International Monetary Fund, IMF Executive Board Completes the Second Review under the Stand-By
Arrangement (SBA) for the Arab Republic of Egypt and Concludes 2 021 Article IV Consultation, June 23, 2021.
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fail and therefore that the world will continue to support it financially. But there are serious
questions regarding regime sustainability in the face of a global financial crisis. Egypt’s
foreign debt position is extremely vulnerable. Foreign direct investment is limited to
hydrocarbons and real estate investment, which create few jobs. As for where the money
goes, it is not being distributed fairly. The regime is not investin g in public services,
education, or health care. Sectors that according to the 2014 constitution are supposed to
receive at minimum between three to four percent of annual GDP do not. Seventy percent
of Egyptians are living on less than five and a half dollars a day.137
Successive U.S. Administrations also have expressed concerns over the Sisi government’s
continued crackdown against political dissent and nonviolent opposition. Biden Administration
officials have reiterated this concern while attempting to maintain the uneasy balance of U.S.
longstanding concern for human rights in Egypt with close ties to the military. During a 2021
State Department press conference, State Department Spokesperson Ned Price remarked:
When it comes to Egypt, it is true that Egypt plays an important role in promoting some of
our key interests in the region: regional security and stability through the guardianship of
the Suez Canal; counterterrorism cooperation; and its leadership in promoting Middle East
peace. Secretary Blinken has had an opportunity to discuss some of these issues with his
counterpart, Foreign Minister Shoukry, just as we raise human rights, just as we raise our
values. These two things, they’re not separate. They’re inextricably linked. If we don’t
stick up for our values, if we don’t stick up for human rights, we’re not sticking up for our
interests. We recognize that, and we can do both. We have deep concerns, as we have said,
about the human rights situation in Egypt, including undue res trictions on civil society,
undue restrictions on freedom of expression, some of the detentions you have mentioned.
There is repression of civil society and human rights abuses. They undercut Egypt’s own
dynamism and stability as a partner of ours. We will consistently raise these issues. We
will not shy away from them. We’ll do that both publicly, as we have, and we’ll do it
privately, too. We’ll also work and seek to find a partner in Congress to champion these
same issues.138
Recent Action on U.S. Foreign Aid to Egypt
Egypt’s record on human rights and democratization has sparked regular criticism from U.S.
officials and some Members of Congress. Since FY2012, Congress has passed appropriations
legislation that withholds the obligation of FMF to Egypt until the Secretary of State certifies that
Egypt is taking various steps toward supporting democracy and human rights. With the exception
of FY2014, lawmakers have included a national security waiver to al ow the Administration to
waive these congressional y mandated certification requirements under certain conditions. When
Congress appropriates FMF to Egypt, it typical y makes funds available for two years only.

137 Clare Ulmer, “T en Years after Mubarak’s Fall, What is Egypt’s Biggest Challenge?” Project on Middle East
Democracy, February 22, 2021.
138 https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-march-11-2021/#post-225613-EGYPT 1.
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Figure 7. Egypt: Withholding Conditions on U.S. Military Assistance Allocations
In mil ions of current dol ars

Sources: Prepared by CRS based on Foreign Military Financing (FMF) al ocations and terms from annual SFOPS
appropriations acts, FY2011-FY2021.
Notes: In FY2014, Congress did not provide a waiver for certification requirements but al owed for the
obligation of tranches of aid for defined purposes and at defined rates if the executive branch could not make
certain democracy and human rights-related certifications. For FY2015, Congress again linked aid tranches and
rates to certain democracy and human rights-related certifications, but provided a waiver. From FY2012 through
FY2021, Congress conditioned al U.S. assistance to Egypt by requiring the executive branch to certify that Egypt
was meeting its commitments under the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty and sustaining its strategic relationship
with the United States. From FY2014 onward, Congress did not provide a waiver for these certifications.
FY2020
Section 7041(a)(3) of the FY2020 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 116-94) provided $1.3
bil ion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) “to remain available until September 30, 2021.” The
act also withheld $300 mil ion in FMF unless the Secretary of State could make a certification on
democracy-related conditions in Egypt. Congress also enabled the Secretary to waive the
certification requirement on national security grounds. In October 2020, the State Department
notified Congress of its intent to obligate $1 bil ion in FY2020 FMF. Several lawmakers and
human rights advocates had cal ed on the Administration to not exercise the waiver authority.139
Biden Administration Withholds Some Military Aid
On September 14, 2021, the Administration notified Congress its intent to obligate the remaining
$300 mil ion in FY2020 FMF using the authority in Section 7041(a)(3)(A) of P.L. 116-94, which
exempts FY2020 FMF funds from certification if used for “counterterrorism, border security, and
nonproliferation programs” for Egypt.140 In its communications to Congress, the Administration

139 For example, see Charles Dunne, “It’s T ime for Biden to Get T ough on Sisi,” foreignpolicy.com , July 20, 2021, and
Nahal T oosi, “ In D.C. Visit, Egypt Spy Boss Claims U.S. Agreed—in Writing—to Jail American Activist ,” Politico,
July 12, 2021.
140 T his provision in appropriations for Egypt dates back to P.L. 113-76, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014
(passed January 2014). At the time, President Obama had initiated a review of U.S. military assistance to Egypt. P.L.
113-76 divided annual aid to Egypt into two tranches ($976 million and $576.8 million) and conditioned their
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claimed that it could not certify that Egypt is taking sustained and effective steps related to the
human rights-related conditions. However, because human rights concerns remain, the State
Department has said that it wil not move forward with the application of $130 mil ion in FMF,
the maximum amount it can withhold, and wil not deposit it into Egypt’s Federal Reserve Bank
account unless Egypt affirmatively addresses U.S. concerns.141
The Biden Administration suspension represents the first time any Administration has refused to
waive Egypt democracy and human conditions on national security grounds since Congress
inserted such criteria in FY2012. Though the Administration did not official y use the waiver to
obligate the $300 mil ion withheld FMF, it did use another broad authority Congress has granted
the executive for years in exempting “counterterrorism, border security, and nonproliferation
programs” from certification. Congress has not defined in law which programs qualify as
“counterterrorism, border security, and nonproliferation.”
If the Biden Administration ultimately decides that Egypt cannot meet its human rights criteria,142
then the $130 mil ion in FY2020 FMF would presumably by reprogrammed for other uses, and
would represent the largest amount of FMF ever rescinded (other than by across the board
spending cuts by Congress). President Trump reduced the FY2017 FMF obligation to Egypt by
$65.7 mil ion, citing “Egypt’s ongoing relationship with the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea, lack of progress on the 2013 convictions of U.S. and Egyptian nongovernmental
organization (NGO) workers, and the enactment of a restrictive NGO law that wil likely
complicate ongoing and future U.S. assistance to the country.”143
A coalition of 19 human rights group cal ed the Biden Administration’s obligation of the $300
mil ion in FMF a “terrible blow to its stated commitment to human rights and to the rule of
law.”144 There has been no official response from the Egyptian government, though the state did
release a “National Strategy for Human Rights” the same week that Biden obligated the
remaining FY2020 FMF aid. Former Egyptian foreign minister Nabil Fahmy remarked that
“constructive engagement is a better approach than attempting to use assistance as a weapon or
the withholding of access to facilities.”145

obligation without providing a national security waiver. T hus, this provision may have been inserted to allow for
greater flexibility in providing certain types of military aid to Egypt.
141 U.S. State Department, Press Briefing, September 15, 2021.
142 According to one unnamed U.S. official, the Biden Administration will provide the $130 million on the condition
that “ Egypt ends protracted prosecutions against rights and civil society organizations known as Case 173, and drops
charges against or releases 16 individuals the United States has identified and raised with Cairo since June.” See, John
Hudson and Missy Ryan, “Facing Pressure on Human Rights, Biden Administration Attaches New Conditions to Egypt
Security Aid,” Washington Post, September 14, 2021. In 2013, an Egyptian court convicted and sentenced 43
individuals from the United States, Egypt, and Europe, including the Egypt country directors of the Nati onal
Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI), for spending money from organizations
that were operating in Egypt without a license and for receiving foreign funds (known as Case 173, or the “foreign
funding case”). In 2018, the individuals were acquitted of all charges, but Case 173 has since remained active, as the
judiciary has imposed asset freezes and travel bans on several Egyptian civil society activists. See Hadeer El-Mahdawy,
“What’s Next in Case 173? 4 NGOs, 5 Civil Society Workers in the Clear but Investigations Continue,” Mada Masr,
September 1, 2021.
143 Congressional Notification T ransmittal Sheet, Mary K. Water, Assistant Secretary of Legislative Affairs, January
23, 2018.
144 Biden Decision to Grant Military Aid to Egypt a Betrayal of Human Rights Commitments, Project on Middle East
Democracy, September 14, 2021.
145 “T he T akeaway: Business As Usual: US-Egypt Alliance Finds its Center,” Al Monitor, September 16, 2021.
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In Congress, Republicans largely refrained from commenting on the Administration’s action,
while Democrats were somewhat divided on the issue. Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee Gregory Meeks stated, “I support the Biden administration’s decision to withhold a
portion of security assistance to Egypt contingent on measurable progress on important bipartisan
human rights criteria.... This decision is consistent with the law and our values as a country.”146 In
the Senate, Senator Christopher Murphy stated, “This was a big missed opportunity to stand up
strongly and unequivocal y for human rights. Egypt had almost two years to meet the human
rights improvements required by Congress, but arguably the situation on the ground in Egypt has
gotten worse.”147
Analysis
The Biden Administration’s withholding of some military aid has reignited a longstanding debate
in the broader foreign policy community over the efficacy of using foreign aid as leverage to
promote greater respect for human rights in the Middle East and elsewhere.148 In Egypt’s case,
this debate usual y breaks down between the human rights community, which seeks to either end
U.S. military aid to Egypt or reprogram it as economic and democracy assistance,149 and those
who do not support modifying or conditioning longstanding military-to-military ties seen as
contributing to Egypt’s peaceful relationship with Israel150 and its efforts to counter terrorism in
the Sinai.151 Successive Administrations have often found themselves in the midst of the debate,
attempting to balance the security relationship with congressional prerogatives to consider what
many international monitoring organizations believe is the country’s woeful human rights record
(see Table 1).
As mentioned above, since 2013, the Obama, Trump, and now Biden Administrations have al
taken various actions (suspended weapons deliveries, ended cash flow financing, reprogrammed
aid and withheld assistance) to limit U.S.-Egyptian military cooperation. In looking back at these
past nine years, proponents of cutting aid argue that the lack of any credible, discernable change
in Egypt’s behavior is because the United States has not used al of its policy levers to pressure
the Sisi government enough.152 Opponents of halting assistance often charge that conditioning aid
wil only further harden Egypt’s resolve to resist U.S. pressure and push Egypt to develop deeper
ties with countries less concerned about its human rights record. Others have argued that U.S.-
Egyptian relations have atrophied since the arguable high point in the 1980s to the point in which
U.S. leverage is overestimated by participants in this debate.153 According to David Schenker, a

146 Meeks Issues Statement on Admin Placing Human Rights Conditions on Part of Egypt’s Security Aid, House
Foreign Affairs Committee, September 14, 2021.
147 Senator Chris Murphy, Murphy on Administration’s Decision to Send Aid to Egypt Despite Human Rights
Concerns, September 13, 2021.
148 In 2021, the journal Democracy in Exile, published by the human rights organization known as Dawn (Democracy
for the Arab World Now), published a series of articles on foreign aid conditionality in the Middle East. See
https://dawnmena.org/dawns-advocacy/aid-conditionality/.
149 T estimony of Michele Dunne, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Middle East, North Africa, and
International T errorism, hearing entitled “ Egypt Politics-Economics-Human Rights,” September 9, 2020.
150 Jacob Magid, “Israeli Officials Cautioned Biden against Heavy Criticism of Egypt, Saudi Arabia,” Times of Israel,
September 2, 2021.
151 Rachel Oswald, “Military Aid to Egypt Shapes Up as Human Rights T est for Biden,” Congressional Quarterly,
August 16, 2021.
152 Charles Dunne, “It’s T ime for Biden to Get T ough on Sisi,” ForeignPolicy.com , July 20, 2021.
153 Senator Murphy, Congressional Record, Senate Procedural Matters, p. S5129, July 28, 2021.
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former Assistant Secretary for Near East Affairs at the State Department, the value of U.S.
military aid to Egypt has declined over time and aid cuts or even sanctions would not effectively
change Egypt’s behavior.154 Schenker argues that the U.S.-Egyptian bilateral relationship may
need to be recalculated and reducing some aid to Egypt would al ow the United States to send a
signal to Cairo of its displeasure with its policies without causing a permanent diplomatic
rupture.155
FY2021
For FY2021, the Trump Administration requested a total of $1.4 bil ion in bilateral assistance for
Egypt, the same amount Congress appropriated in FY2020. Nearly al of the U.S. funds for Egypt
come from the FMF account and are in turn used to purchase U.S.-origin military equipment,
spare parts, training, and maintenance from U.S. firms.
The Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2021 (P.L. 116-260) withholds $225 mil ion in FMF
from obligation until the Secretary of State makes democracy-related certifications and provides
waiver authority on national security grounds. The act also includes a condition that withholds
$75 mil ion in FMF until the Secretary of State determines that the Government of Egypt is
making clear and consistent progress in releasing political prisoners and providing detainees with
due process of law. This condition is new in the FY2021 act and affords no national security
waiver. Because the act made the funds available for two years, obligation decisions about
FY2021 assistance for Egypt may not occur until calendar year 2022.
Table 2.Bilateral Aid to Egypt
current U.S. dol ars in mil ions
FY2017
FY2018
FY2019
FY2020
FY2021
FY2022
actual
actual
actual
actual
allocated
request

ESF
112.50
106.87
112.50
125.00
125.00
125.00
FMF
1,234.30
1,300.00
1,300.00
1,300.00
1,300.00
1,300.00
IMET
1.74
1.80
1.80
0.00
1.80
1.80
INCLE
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
0.35
0.00
NADR
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.50
3.00
3.50
Total
1,353.54
1,413.67
1,419.30
1,430.50
1,430.15
1,430.30
Source: Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Congressional Budget Justifications
(FY2019-FY2022), Department of State, FY2021 Section 653(a) Al ocation Report, and CRS calculations.
Note: Economic Support Fund (ESF), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and
Training (IMET), International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE), and Nonproliferation, Anti-
Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR).
FY2022
For FY2022, the Biden Administration has requested $1.4 bil ion in bilateral assistance for Egypt,
the same amount Congress appropriated the previous year. H.R. 4373, the House-passed version

154 David Schenker, “Getting T ough with Egypt Won’t Work,” Policy Analysis, PolicyWatch 3459, T he Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, March 25, 2021.
155 Op.cit, Schenker, “Getting T ough wit h Egypt Won’t Work.”
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of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2022,
would:
 Provide not less than $125 mil ion in ESF, of which not less than $40 mil ion
should be made available for higher education programs, including not less than
$15 mil ion for scholarships.
 Provide $1.3 bil ion in FMF, provided that $150 mil ion of FMF funds shal be
withheld from obligation until the Secretary of State certifies that the
Government of Egypt is taking sustained and effective steps to, among other
things, strengthen the rule of law, democratic institutions and, human rights in
Egypt, implement reforms to protect civil liberties, hold Egyptian security forces
accountable, investigate and prosecute cases of extrajudicial kil ing and forced
disappearances, provide access for U.S. officials to monitor such assistance, and
prevent the intimidation and harassment of American citizens. This certification
shal not apply to funds appropriated for counterterrorism, border security, and
nonproliferation programs, and may be waived if the Secretary determines that it
is in the national security interest of the United States. An additional $135 mil ion
in FMF, not subject to a waiver, would be withheld until the Secretary of State
determines and reports that the Government of Egypt is making progress in
releasing political prisoners. An additional $15 mil ion in FMF, not subject to a
waiver, would be withheld until the Secretary of State determines and reports that
the Government of Egypt has provided American citizens with fair and
commensurate compensation for injuries suffered as a result of an attack against
a tour group by the Egyptian military.
 Reauthorize ESF for loan guarantees.
The Biden Administration has indicated that it would oppose certain FMF conditions contained in
H.R. 4373. According to the Office of Management and Budget, “The administration strongly
opposes section 7041(a) of the bil , which would reduce the administration’s flexibility in regards
to FMF [Foreign Military Financing] to Egypt undermining its leverage as it operationalizes its
commitment to a constructive human rights dialogue with Egypt.”156

156 Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, Statement of Administration Policy, H.R.
4373—Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2022, July 27, 2021.
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Appendix. Background on U.S. Foreign Assistance
to Egypt
Overview
Between 1946 and 2019, the United States provided Egypt with $81.4 bil ion in bilateral foreign
aid (calculated in historical dollars—not adjusted for inflation).157 The 1979 Peace Treaty
between Israel and Egypt ushered in the current era of U.S. financial support for peace between
Israel and its Arab neighbors. In two separate memoranda accompanying the treaty, the United
States outlined commitments to Israel and Egypt, respectively. In its letter to Israel, the Carter
Administration pledged that it would “endeavor to take into account and wil endeavor to be
responsive to military and economic assistance requirements of Israel.” In his letter to Egypt,
former U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown wrote the following:
In the context of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, the United States is prepared
to enter into an expanded security relationship with Egypt with regard to the sales of
military equipment and services and the financing of, at least a portion of those sales,
subject to such Congressional review and approvals as may be required.158
Al U.S. foreign aid to Egypt (or any country) is appropriated and authorized by Congress. The
1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty is a bilateral peace agreement between Egypt and Israel, and the
United States is not a legal party to the treaty. The treaty itself does not include any U.S. aid
obligations, and any assistance commitments to Israel and Egypt that could be potential y
construed in conjunction with the treaty were through ancil ary documents or other
communications and were—by their terms—subject to congressional approval (see above).
However, as the peace broker between Israel and Egypt, the United States has traditional y
provided foreign aid to both countries to ensure a regional balance of power and sustain security
cooperation with both countries.
In some cases, an Administration may sign a bilateral “Memorandum of Understanding” (MOU)
with a foreign country pledging a specific amount of foreign aid to be provided over a selected
time period subject to the approval of Congress. In the Middle East, the United States has signed
foreign assistance MOUs with Israel and Jordan, but not with Egypt.159
Congress typical y specifies a precise al ocation of most foreign assistance for Egypt in the
foreign operations appropriations bil . Egypt receives the bulk of foreign aid funds from three
primary accounts: Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Economic Support Funds (ESF), and

157 U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945 -September 30, 2019.
158 See Letter From the Secretary of Defense (Brown) to-the Egyptian Minister of Defense and War Production (Ali),
March 23, 1979, “United States Sales of Military Equipment and Services to Egypt.” Ultimately, the United States
provided a total of $7.3 billion to both parties in 1979. T he Special International Security Assistance Act of 1979 ( P.L.
96-35) provided both military and economic grants to Israel and Egypt at a ratio of 3 to 2, respectively, though this
ratio was not enshrined in the treaty as Egypt would later claim.
159 In July 2007, the George W. Bush Administration announced, as a part of a larger arms package to the region, that it
would begin discussions with Egypt on a proposed $13 billion military aid agreement over a 10 -year period. Since
Egypt was already receiving approximately $1.3 billion a year in military assistance, the announcement represented no
major change in U.S. aid policy toward Egypt. No such bilateral MOU on U.S. military aid to Egypt has been reached
by the Bush, Obama, T rump, or Biden Administrations with the Egyptian government.
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International Military Education and Training (IMET).160 The United States offers IMET training
to Egyptian officers in order to facilitate U.S.-Egyptian military cooperation over the long term.
Military Aid and Arms Sales
Overview
Since the 1979 Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty, the United States has provided Egypt with large
amounts of military assistance. U.S. policymakers have routinely justified this aid to Egypt as an
investment in regional stability, built primarily on long-running military cooperation and
sustaining the treaty—principles that are supposed to be mutual y reinforcing. Egypt has used
U.S. military aid through the FMF to (among other things) purchase major U.S. defense systems,
such as the F-16 fighter aircraft, the M1A1 Abrams battle tank, and the AH-64 Apache attack
helicopter.
Frequently Asked Question: Is U.S. Military Aid Provided to Egypt
as a Cash Transfer?
No. Al U.S. military aid to Egypt finances the procurement of weapons systems and services from U.S. defense
contractors.161 The United States provides military assistance to U.S. partners and al ies to help them acquire U.S.
military equipment and training. Egypt is one of the main recipients of FMF, a program with a corresponding
appropriations account administered by the Department of State but implemented by the Department of Defense.
FMF is a grant program that enables governments to receive equipment and associated training from the U.S.
government or to access equipment directly through U.S. commercial channels.
Most countries receiving FMF general y purchase goods and services through government-to-government
contracts, also known as Foreign Military Sales (FMS). According to the Government Accountability Office, “under
this procurement channel, the U.S. government buys the desired item on behalf of the foreign country (Egypt),
general y employing the same criteria as if the item were being procured for the U.S. military.” The vast majority
of what Egypt purchases from the United States is conducted through the FMS program funded by FMF. However,
U.S. officials have been encouraging Egypt to use national funds for U.S. military equipment purchases.162
Under Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), Congress must be formal y notified 30 calendar
days before the Administration can take the final steps of a government-to-government foreign military sale of
major U.S.-origin defense equipment valued at $14 mil ion or more, defense articles or services valued at $50
mil ion or more, or design and construction services valued at $200 mil ion or more. In practice pre-notifications
to congressional committees of jurisdiction occur, and proposed arms sales general y do not proceed to the public
official notification stage until issues of potential concern to key committees have been resolved.
Special Military Assistance Benefits for Egypt
In addition to substantial amounts of annual U.S. military assistance, Egypt has benefited from
certain aid provisions that have been available to only a few other countries, listed below.

160 Egypt also receives, though not consistently, relatively small sums from the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism,
Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) account and the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
(INCLE) account. NADR funds support counterterrorism training through the Antiterrorism Assistance Program.
INCLE funds support police training and respect fo r human rights in law enforcement. The Administration typically
requests these funds, but they are not usually specifically earmarked for Egypt (or for most other countries) in
legislation. After the passage of a foreign operations appropriations bill, federal agencies such as the State Department
and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) allocate funds to Egypt from these aid accounts. T hey
then submit a country allocation report (653a Report) to Congress for review.
161 For the relevant legal authorities, see §604 of the Foreign Assistance Act as amended (22 U.S.C. 2354) and §503 of
the Foreign Assistance Act as amended (22 U.S.C. 2311).
162 During a 2021 hearing on security assistance, Dana Stroul, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle
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 Early Disbursal and Interest-Bearing Account: Between FY2001 and FY2011,
Congress granted Egypt early disbursement of FMF funds (within 30 days of the
enactment of appropriations legislation) to an interest-bearing account at the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York.163 Interest accrued from the rapid
disbursement of aid has al owed Egypt to receive additional funding for the
purchase of U.S.-origin equipment. In FY2012, Congress began to condition the
obligation of FMF, requiring the Administration to certify certain conditions had
been met before releasing FMF funds, thereby eliminating their automatic early
disbursal. However, Congress has permitted Egypt to continue to earn interest on
FMF funds already deposited in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
 The Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program provides one means by which the
United States can advance foreign policy objectives—assisting friendly and
al ied nations through provision of equipment in excess of the requirements of its
own defense forces. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) manages
the EDA program, which enables the United States to reduce its inventory of
outdated equipment by providing friendly countries with necessary supplies at
either reduced rates or no charge. As a designated “major non-NATO al y,” Egypt
is eligible to receive EDA under Section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act and
Section 23(a) of the Arms Export Control Act.
Egypt: Aid Conditionality and Human Rights
Historical y, Congress had placed certain conditions on economic aid to Egypt. After Egypt’s
2011 uprising and initial change of government, lawmakers have conditioned, and in some cases
withheld, U.S. military aid to Egypt on executive branch certifications to the Committees on
Appropriations that the Egyptian government is taking steps toward democratic governance and
supporting human rights.

East , remarked, “ In terms of the FMF, it remains an important tool for us to work with Egypt in making sure that they
have U.S.-origin defense articles oriented towards what we assess to be shared security threats, whether it ’s
counterterrorism, maritime security, border security. And I would note here that Egypt is interested in continuing this
relationship with us. T hey recently agreed to upgrade their Apache helicopter fleet by using blended financing, not just
U.S. security assistance but also Egyptian national funds.” See Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senate Foreign
Relations Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central Asia and Counterterorism Hearing on Middle East Security
Assistance, August 10, 2021.
163 By law, Egypt and Israel are permitted to earn interest on congressionally appropriated Foreign Military Financing
(FMF). During the late 1990s, the Clinton Administration (especially the U.S. Defense Department) and the Egyptian
government sought to increase U.S. military aid to Egypt. One proposal had been to grant Egypt a benefit already
enjoyed by Israel—the use of an interest -bearing account in which unspent FMF funds can accumulate interest to be
used for future purchases. During Senate consideration of legislation to provide E gypt access to an interest -bearing
account, Sen. Mitch McConnell remarked that “In the State Department briefing justifying the request, U.S. officials
urged our support because of Mubarak’s need to address the requirements of ‘his key constituents, the military.’
Frankly, I think Mr. Mubarak needs to worry less about satisfying the military and spend more time and effort shoring
up democratic institutions and civic society.” See Congressional Record-Senate, S5508, June 21, 2000. In October
2000, Congress passed P.L. 106-280, the Security Assistance Act of 2000, which authorized FY2001 FMF funds for
Egypt to be disbursed to an interest -bearing account in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. T he law required that
none of the interest accrued by such account should be obligated unless first notified to relevant congressional
appropriations and oversight committees. In November 2000, Congress passed P.L. 106-429, the FY2001 Foreign
Operations Appropriations Act, which included an interest-bearing account for Egypt in appropriations legislation.
Since then, this provision has remained in annual appropriations legislation, most recently in P.L. 114-113, the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016.
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Figure A-1. The Military Aid “Pipeline”

Source: Information from Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Graphic created by CRS.
In response to political changes in Egypt from 2011 through 2016, the Obama Administration and
Congress altered U.S. foreign aid to Egypt, and strains increased in U.S.-Egyptian relations. In
FY2012, Congress enacted new restrictions on aid to Egypt that have carried forward to today.
The FY2012 Consolidated Appropriations Act (Section 7041 of Division I, P.L. 112-74) specified
that no funds could be made available to Egypt until the Secretary of State certified that Egypt
was meeting its obligations under the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty (due to concerns that a
future democratical y elected Egyptian government might abrogate the treaty).
It further specified that no military funds could be provided until the Administration certified that
the government of Egypt was supporting a transition to civilian rule, including by holding free
and fair elections and by implementing policies to protect freedom of expression, association, and
religion, and due process of law. It permitted the Secretary of State to waive these requirements
by reporting to Congress with a “detailed justification” that doing so was “in the national security
interest of the United States.”
On July 3, 2013, the Egyptian military suspended the constitution and ousted former President
Mohamed Morsi. Subsequently, the Obama Administration took several steps to express U.S.
displeasure with Morsi’s ouster. In 2013, President Obama announced a comprehensive review of
U.S. foreign assistance policy toward Egypt, canceled a joint U.S.-Egypt military exercise
(Operation Bright Star), suspended the deliveries of certain military items to Egypt (such as F-
16s, along with Apache helicopters, Harpoon missiles, and M1A1 tanks) pending progress toward
democracy, and cancel ed planned cash transfers of economic aid.164 Ultimately, the Obama
Administration accepted the Egyptian military’s overthrow of a democratical y elected president

164 U.S. State Department, “U.S. Assistance to Egypt,” Press Statement, October 9, 2013.
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as a fait accompli and attempted to redefine certain components of the U.S.-Egyptian
relationship.165
In FY2014, Congress further conditioned the obligation aid for Egypt by applying certification
requirements to distinct tranches of aid; for example, the Secretary of State was required to certify
to the Committees on Appropriations prior to obligation of one tranche that Egypt had held a
constitutional referendum and was taking steps to support a democratic transition. Prior to
obligation of a second tranche, Congress required certification that Egypt had held parliamentary
and presidential elections, and had a new elected government that was taking steps to govern
democratical y.166
By the spring of 2015, as terrorist attacks against Egypt continued amid the global rise of the
Islamic State, some lawmakers cal ed on the Administration to end its weapons export
suspension.167 The Obama Administration responded with a change in U.S. policy. On March 31,
2015, the White House announced it would al ow the deliveries of select weapons systems to
Egypt that had been on hold since October 2013, and pledged to continue seeking $1.3 bil ion in
annual military aid from Congress.
However, the White House simultaneously announced that future military assistance to Egypt
would be largely reformulated by ending cash flow financing.168 Section 23 of the Arms Export
Control Act (AECA, 22 U.S.C. §2763) authorizes the President to finance the “procurement of
defense articles, defense services, and design and construction services by friendly foreign
countries and international organizations, on such terms and conditions as he may determine
consistent with the requirements of this section.” Successive Administrations have used this
authority to permit Israel (and, until 2018, Egypt) to set aside almost al FMF funds for current
year payments only, rather than set aside the amount needed to meet the full cost of multiyear
purchases.
From 2017 through 2020, some bilateral tensions diminished as President Trump sought to
improve ties with President Sisi. President Trump continued to request that Congress appropriate
$1.3 bil ion in military aid to Egypt, but did not restore the Egyptian military’s ability to benefit
from Cash Flow Financing. Moreover, as previously mentioned, President Trump reduced the

165 President Obama said, “Going forward, the United States will maintain a constructive relationship with the Interim
Government that promotes core interests like the Camp David Accords and counterterrorism. We'll continue support in
areas like education that directly benefit the Egyptian people. But we have not proceeded with the delivery of certain
military systems, and our support will depend upon Egypt ’s progress in pursuing a more democratic path.” U.S.
President (Obama), “ Remarks to the United Nations General Assembly in New York City,” Daily Compilation of
Presidential Documents, 2013 DCPD-201300655, September 24, 2013, pp. 6 -7.
166 Congress did not provide a waiver for these conditions, but took steps to allow for the continuation of some aid
under some circumstances. Congress provided that if the certifications could not be made, then FMF obligations were
to “be made available at the minimum rate necessary to continue existing contracts ... except that defense articles and
services from such contracts” were not to be delivered until the certification requirements were met. Congress applied
parallel requirements on any use of prior-year FMF and International Military Education and T raining (IMET ) funds
that remained available. Congress exempted funds that were to be used for counterterrorism, border security, and
nonproliferation programs in Egypt, and for development activities in the Sinai. Congress applied a similar tranche and
minimum rate necessary framework in FY2015, requiring certification of different criteria, and providing a waiver.
167 In February 2015, House State and Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee Chairwoman Kay Granger
wrote t o President Obama stating that “ t hey [the Egyptians] need these planes and other weapons immediately to
continue the fight against ISIL and other terrorists threatening Egypt ’s security, but your Administration has refused to
use the authority Congress provided you in law to provide Egypt these weapons.”
168 For more information, see CRS Report R44060, Ending Cash Flow Financing to Egypt: Issues for Congress, by
Jeremy M. Sharp (out of print but available to congressional requesters from the author).
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FY2017 FMF obligation to Egypt by $65.7 mil ion as a result of Egypt’s relationship with North
Korea and prosecution of U.S. and Egyptian nongovernmental organization (NGO) workers.
Economic Aid
Overview
From the early 1980s until the late 1990s, U.S. economic aid to Egypt helped modernize the
nation’s energy, telecommunications, and waste water infrastructure. Beginning in the mid to late
1990s, as Egypt moved from being an impoverished country to a lower-middle-income
economy,169 the United States and Egypt began to rethink the assistance relationship, emphasizing
“trade not aid.”170 Congress began to scale back economic aid both to Egypt and Israel due to a
10-year agreement reached between the United States and Israel in the late 1990s known as the
“Glide Path Agreement,” which gradual y reduced U.S. economic aid to Egypt to $400 mil ion by
2008.171 Congress also placed conditions on economic assistance in order to encourage Egypt to
modernize its economy and political system. 172 U.S. economic aid to Egypt stood at $200 mil ion
per year by the end of the George W. Bush Administration, whose relations with then-President
Hosni Mubarak suffered173 over the latter’s reaction to the Administration’s democracy agenda in
the Arab world.174
During the Obama Administration, the President and Congress found common support for the use
of enterprise funds, which are U.S. government-funded entities whose purpose is to promote the
development and strengthening of a private sector in a foreign country by directly investing in its
local firms. In May 2011, President Obama laid out his Administration’s initial response to
Middle East uprisings by remarking that U.S. officials were “working with Congress to create
enterprise funds to invest in Tunisia and Egypt. And these wil be modeled on funds that
supported the transitions in Eastern Europe after the fal of the Berlin Wal .”175 In December
2011, Congress drew on a late Cold War precedent to authorize the establishment of enterprise

169 See World Bank historic data at https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-
country-and-lending-groups
170 Ahmed Galal, Robert Z. Lawrence (editors), Building Bridges: An Egypt-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, Brookings
Institution Press, 1998.
171 In January 1998, Israeli officials, sensing that their economic growth had obviated the need for that type of U.S. aid
at a time when Congress sought to reduce foreign assistance expenditures, negotiated with the United States to reduce
economic aid and increase military aid over a 10 -year period. A 3:2 ratio that long prevailed in the overall levels of
U.S. aid to Israel and Egypt was applied to the reduction in economic aid ($60 million reduction for Israel and $40
million reduction for Egypt), but Egypt did not receive an increase in military assistance. T hus, Congress reduced ESF
aid to Egypt from $815 million in FY1998 to $411 million in FY2008.
172 From the late 1990s through FY2005, Congress specified that economic aid (ESF cash transfer) would be provided
“with the understanding that Egypt will undertake significant economic reforms” beyond those previously undertaken.
Beginning in the FY2006 appropriations act (P.L. 109-102), Congress changed the phrasing of this condition to include
“significant economic and political reforms” (emphasis added). Beginning in FY2008 and thereafter through FY2010,
Congress changed the condition phrasing to “significant economic and democratic reforms.” For FY2010, Congress
also allocated “up to” $20 million for democracy, human rights and governance programs, and “not less than” $35
million for education programs. See Division F, T itle III, Econom ic Support Fund, P.L. 111-117.
173 See Helene Cooper, “ With Egypt, Diplomatic Words Often Fail,” New York Times, January 29, 2011.
174 T he George W. Bush Administration requested that Congress cut ESF aid by half in FY2009 to $200 million.
Congress appropriated the President’s request.
175 NARA, Office of the Federal Register, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Barack H. Obama,
2011, Book 1 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2014), Remarks at the Department of State, May 19, 2011, pp. 552 -560.
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funds in Egypt in the FY2012 Consolidated Appropriations Act (Section 7041 of Division I, P.L.
112-74)
The Egyptian-American Enterprise Fund (EAEF) was established by grant agreement with
USAID on March 23, 2013. After eight years in operation, it general y has been considered a
modest success in boosting Egypt’s private sector, particularly in the financial and technology
sectors. According to USAID, the EAEF produced an annual return of 17.5% and has helped
create 5,000 new full-time jobs, attracted several hundred mil ion dollars in foreign direct
investment, and seeded some of the top private equity funds in Egypt.176 Since its inception, the
EAEF has received $300 mil ion in ESF funds. As of May 2021, the EAEF has invested in 94
companies, supported 15,000 jobs and has a market value of over $600 mil ion.177
During the Obama Administration, the Egyptian military pushed back against U.S. support for a
competitive, transparent electoral process.178 After reasserting power in 2013, the military moved
to arrest American employees (as wel as Egyptian and other foreign nationals) of U.S.-based and
foreign democracy promotion organizations.179
In the final years of the Obama Administration, wariness of U.S. democracy promotion assistance
led the Egyptian government to obstruct many U.S.-funded economic assistance programs.180
According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Department of State and the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID) reported hundreds of mil ions of dollars ($460
mil ion as of 2015) in unobligated prior year ESF funding.181 These growing unobligated balances
created pressure on the Obama Administration to reobligate ESF funds for other purposes. In
2016, the Obama Administration notified Congress that it was reprogramming for other purposes
$108 mil ion of ESF that had been appropriated for Egypt in FY2015 but remained unobligated.
The Administration claimed that its actions were due to “continued government of Egypt process
delays that have impeded the effective implementation of several programs.”182 In 2017, the
Trump Administration also reprogrammed FY2016 ESF for Egypt.
During the Trump and Biden Administrations, U.S. economic assistance has averaged $114
mil ion a year in ESF. From 2017 to present, USAID has expanded its role in assisting the
Egyptian government develop the Sinai Peninsula. In north Sinai, the United States has funded

176 USAID, “Activity Fact Sheet: Egyptian-American Enterprise Fund, available at https://www.usaid.gov/egypt/
economic-growth-and-trade/egyptian-american-enterprise-fund.
177 T he Egyptian-American Enterprise Fund, Press Release, “ T he Egyptian-American Enterprise Fund Sells Stake in
Part of Fawry’s $80 Million Secondary Offering,” August 23, 2021.
178 Prior to 2011, U.S. funding for democracy promotion activities and good govern ance had been a source of acrimony
between the United States and Egypt. Using the appropriations process, Congress has mandated that “ democracy and
governance activities shall not be subject to the prior approval by the government of any foreign country. ” Originally
referred to as the Brownback amendment, this legislative language began in reference to Egypt (Division D, T itle II,
Econom ic Support Fund, P.L. 108-447), and was expanded in FY2008 to include “ any foreign country.” (Division J,
Sec. 634(o), P.L. 110-161).
179 See footnote 150 on Case 173. From FY2014 to FY2019, Congress mandated in annual appropriations legislation
that the Secretary of State shall withhold an amount of ESF to Egypt determined to be equivalent to that expended by
the United States Government for bail, and by nongovernmental organizations for legal and court fees, associated with
democracy-related trials in Egypt until the Secretary certifies that Egypt has dismissed the convictions issued by the
Cairo Criminal Court on June 4, 2013.
180 House Foreign Affairs Committee, hearing entitled, “Egypt: Challenges and Opportun ities for U.S. Policy,”
Prepared Statement by Amy Hawthorne, Project on Middle East Democracy, June 15, 2016.
181 EGYPT : U.S. Government Should Examine Options for Using Unobligated Funds and Evaluating Security
Assistance Programs, GAO-15-259: Published: February 11, 2015. Publicly Released: March 12, 2015.
182 “US Shifts Egypt Aid to Other Countries,” Al Monitor, October 16, 2016.
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the Al Arish desalination facility that provides 126,000 residents with potable water.183 USAID
also has delivered commuter buses to isolated communities in central Sinai to improve access to
workplaces, commerce, education, and government services.184
Table A-1. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Egypt: 1946-2020
(calculated in historical dol ars, not adjusted for inflation)
Year
Military
Economic
Annual Total
1946
n/a
$9,600,000
$9,600,000
1948
n/a
$1,400,000
$1,400,000
1951
n/a
$100,000
$100,000
1952
n/a
$1,200,000
$1,200,000
1953
n/a
$12,900,000
$12,900,000
1954
n/a
$4,000,000
$4,000,000
1955
n/a
$66,300,000
$66,300,000
1956
n/a
$33,300,000
$33,300,000
1957
n/a
$1,000,000
$1,000,000
1958
n/a
$601,000
$601,000
1959
n/a
$44,800,000
$44,800,000
1960
n/a
$65,900,000
$65,900,000
1961
n/a
$73,500,000
$73,500,000
1962
n/a
$200,500,000
$200,500,000
1963
n/a
$146,700,000
$146,700,000
1964
n/a
$95,500,000
$95,500,000
1965
n/a
$97,600,000
$97,600,000
1966
n/a
$27,600,000
$27,600,000
1967
n/a
$12,600,000
$12,600,000
1972
n/a
$1,500,000
$1,500,000
1973
n/a
$800,000
$800,000
1974
n/a
$21,300,000
$21,300,000
1975
n/a
$370,100,000
$370,100,000
1976
n/a
$464,300,000
$464,300,000
1976tq
n/a
$552,501,000
$552,501,000
1977
n/a
$907,752,000
$907,752,000
1978
$183,000
$943,029,000
$943,212,000
1979
$1,500,379,000
$1,088,095,000
$2,588,474,000
1980
$848,000
$1,166,423,000
$1,167,271,000

183 U.S. State Department, U.S. Embassy Egypt, U.S. Ambassador Visits North Sinai, June 24, 2021.
184 U.S. State Department, U.S. Embassy Egypt, United States Delivers 20 Brand New Buses to North Sinai
Governorate, August 16, 2021.
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Year
Military
Economic
Annual Total
1981
$550,720,000
$1,130,449,000
$1,681,169,000
1982
$902,315,000
$1,064,936,000
$1,967,251,000
1983
$1,326,778,000
$1,005,064,000
$2,331,842,000
1984
$1,366,458,000
$1,104,137,000
$2,470,595,000
1985
$1,176,398,000
$1,292,008,000
$2,468,406,000
1986
$1,245,741,000
$1,293,293,000
$2,539,034,000
1987
$1,301,696,000
$1,015,179,000
$2,316,875,000
1988
$1,301,477,000
$873,446,000
$2,174,923,000
1989
$1,301,484,000
$968,187,000
$2,269,671,000
1990
$1,295,919,000
$1,093,358,000
$2,389,277,000
1991
$1,301,798,000
$998,011,000
$2,299,809,000
1992
$1,301,518,000
$933,320,000
$2,234,838,000
1993
$1,302,299,892
$753,532,569
$2,055,832,461
1994
$1,329,014,520
$615,278,400
$1,944,292,920
1995
$1,342,039,999
$975,881,584
$2,317,921,583
1996
$1,373,872,023
$824,526,772
$2,198,398,795
1997
$1,304,889,154
$811,229,175
$2,116,118,329
1998
$1,303,343,750
$833,244,554
$2,136,588,304
1999
$1,351,905,310
$862,062,972
$2,213,968,282
2000
$1,333,685,882
$742,458,662
$2,076,144,544
2001
$1,299,709,358
$393,734,896
$1,693,444,254
2002
$1,301,367,000
$1,046,193,772
$2,347,560,772
2003
$1,304,073,715
$646,856,655
$1,950,930,370
2004
$1,318,119,661
$720,241,709
$2,038,361,370
2005
$1,294,700,384
$495,849,544
$1,790,549,928
2006
$1,301,512,728
$351,242,871
$1,652,755,599
2007
$1,305,235,109
$737,348,773
$2,042,583,882
2008
$1,294,902,533
$314,498,954
$1,609,401,487
2009
$1,301,332,000
$688,533,322
$1,989,865,322
2010
$1,301,900,000
$300,943,891
$1,602,843,891
2011
$1,298,779,449
$,242,205,488
$1,540,984,937
2012
$1,302,233,562
$90,260,730
$1,392,494,292
2013
$1,239,659,511
$330,610,024
$1,570,269,534
2014
$274,031
$178,748,169
$179,022,200
2015
$1,345,091,943
$222,864,445
$1,567,956,387
2016
$1,126,658,738
$133,150,380
$1,259,809,118
2017
$201,103,590
$173,179,863
$374,283,453
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2018
$1,002,517,764
$233,703,233
$1,236,220,998
2019
$1,05,992,890
$161,968,390
$1,419,961,281
2020
$1,301,497,657
$126,511,470
$1,428,009,127
Totals
$49,661,424,152
$33,189,150,268
$82,850,574,420
Source: U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945-September 30,
2019, and ForeignAssistance.gov, last updated July 26, 2021 (the year FY2020 is partial y reported).
Note: This chart does not account for the repurposing of assistance funds which had been previously obliga ted
for Egypt. Total numbers may be slightly higher than official sources due to a time delay in government agency
reporting of obligated funds. It is unclear why FY2014 military assistance funds are significantly lower than
previous years.

Author Information

Jeremy M. Sharp

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Disclaimer
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Congressional Research Service
RL33003 · VERSION 113 · UPDATED
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