Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer
Programs: Background and Issues for
Congress
Updated September 29, 2021
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
RL32109

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

Summary
The Navy began procuring Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyers, also known as Aegis
destroyers, in FY1985, and a total of 87 have been procured through FY2021, including two in
FY2021. From FY1989 through FY2005, DDG-51s were procured in annual quantities of two to
five ships per year. Since FY2010, they have been procured in annual quantities of one to three
ships per year.
DDG-51s are being procured in FY2018-FY2022 under a multiyear procurement (MYP) contract
that Congress approved as part of its action on the Navy’s FY2018 budget. DDG-51s procured in
FY2017 and subsequent years are being built to a design cal ed the Flight III design, which
incorporates a new and more capable radar cal ed the SPY-6 radar.
The Navy’s proposed FY2022 budget requests the procurement of one DDG-51 in FY2022,
rather than the two DDG-51s that are cal ed for in FY2022 under the FY2018-FY2022 DDG-51
MYP contract, and that were projected for FY2022 under the Navy’s FY2021 budget submission.
A key issue for Congress for the DDG-51 program in FY2022 is whether to fund the procurement
of one DDG-51, two DDG-51s, or some other number of DDG-51s (such as zero or three).
When procured at a rate of two per year, DDG-51s cost roughly $2.0 bil ion each. Due to the
reduced production economies of scale that would occur at a production rate of one ship per year,
the one DDG-51 requested for procurement in FY2022 has an estimated cost of $2,401.7 mil ion
(i.e., about $2.4 bil ion). Under the Navy’s proposed FY2022 budget, the one requested DDG-51
would receive $384.9 mil ion in prior-year Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) funding—a type of
advance procurement (AP) funding that occurs under an MYP contract. Taking this prior-year
EOQ funding into account, the Navy’s proposed FY2022 budget requests the remaining $2,016.8
mil ion (i.e., about $2.0 bil ion) needed to complete the ship’s estimated procurement cost of
$2,401.7 mil ion. The Navy’s proposed FY2022 budget also requests $45.8 mil ion in cost-to-
complete funding to pay for cost growth on DDG-51s procured in prior years, bringing the total
amount of procurement funding requested for the DDG-51 program to $2,062.5 mil ion (i.e.,
about $2.1 bil ion)
Procuring one DDG-51 rather than two DDG-51s in FY2022 would prevent the Navy from
fulfil ing its obligations in the final year of the FY2018-FY2022 DDG-51 MYP contract. Navy
officials state that as a result, the Navy would need to pay a $33 mil ion penalty to the DDG-51
shipbuilders (unless the Navy and the shipbuilders were to reach an agreement to amend the
terms of the MYP contract).
Navy officials have stated that requesting procurement of one DDG-51 rather than two DDG-51s
was an affordability measure—a means of helping the Navy remain within its budget topline
while meeting funding needs for other Navy programs. Procuring a second DDG-51 in FY2022 is
the number one item on the Navy’s FY2022 Unfunded Priorities List (UPL)—the service’s list of
programs it would prefer to be funded in FY2022, if additional funding were to become available.
The UPL states that procuring two DDG-51s rather than one DDG-51 in FY2022 would require
an additional $1,659.2 mil ion (i.e., about $1.7 bil ion) in shipbuilding funding. That figure is not
the cost of the second DDG-51—the second DDG-51’s procurement cost would be roughly $2.0
bil ion. Adding the second DDG-51, however, would reduce the estimated procurement cost of
the first DDG-51 due to the resulting increased production economies of scale. The figure of
$1,659.2 mil ion is thus the net increase in shipbuilding funding that would be needed to procure
two DDG-51s rather than one DDG-51 in FY2022.
Congressional Research Service

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

Introduction
This report presents background information and potential oversight issues for Congress on the
Navy’s Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) and Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyer programs. The Navy
began procuring DDG-51s, also known as Aegis destroyers, in FY1985, and a total of 87 have
been procured through FY2021, including two in FY2021. The Navy procured three DDG-1000
class destroyers in FY2007-FY2009 and plans no further procurement of DDG-1000s.
The Navy’s proposed FY2022 budget requests the procurement of one DDG-51 in FY2022,
rather than the two DDG-51s that are cal ed for in FY2022 under the FY2018-FY2022 DDG-51
multiyear procurement (MYP) contract, and that were projected for FY2022 under the Navy’s
FY2021 budget submission. Procuring a second DDG-51 in FY2022 is the number one item on
the Navy’s FY2022 Unfunded Priorities List (UPL)—the service’s list of programs it would
prefer to be funded in FY2022, if additional funding were to become available. A key issue for
Congress for the DDG-51 program in FY2022 is whether to fund the procurement of one DDG-
51, two DDG-51s, or some other number of DDG-51s (such as zero or three).
Other issues for Congress concern the Navy’s future force-level goal for large surface combatants
(or LSCs, meaning cruisers and destroyers) and how the Navy proposes to transition several years
from now from procurement of DDG-51s to procurement of a successor destroyer design now in
development cal ed the DDG(X). Decisions that Congress makes on these issues could
substantial y affect Navy capabilities and funding requirements, and the U.S. shipbuilding
industrial base.
For more on the DDG(X) program, see CRS In Focus IF11679, Navy DDG(X) Next-Generation
Destroyer Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
Background
Navy’s Force of Large Surface Combatants (LSCs)
LSC Definition
Decades ago, the Navy’s cruisers were considerably larger and more capable than its destroyers.
In the years after World War II, however, the Navy’s cruiser designs in general became smal er
while its destroyer designs in general became larger. As a result, since the 1980s there has been
substantial overlap in size and capability of Navy cruisers and destroyers. (The Navy’s new
Zumwalt [DDG-1000] class destroyers, in fact, are considerably larger than the Navy’s cruisers.)
In part for this reason, the Navy now refers to its cruisers and destroyers collectively as large
surface combatants (LSCs), and distinguishes these ships from the Navy’s small surface
combatants (SSCs), the term the Navy now uses to refer collectively to its frigates, Littoral
Combat Ships (LCSs), mine warfare ships, and patrol craft. The Navy’s annual 30-year
shipbuilding plan, for example, groups the Navy’s surface combatants into LSCs and SSCs.1

1 T he Navy sometimes also uses the term Cru-Des (an abbreviation of cruiser-destroyer, pronounced “crew-dez”) to
refer collectively to its cruisers and destroyers.
Congressional Research Service

1

link to page 7 Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

LSC Force Level as of End of FY2020
As of the end of FY2020, the Navy’s LSC force included 91 ships, including 22 Ticonderoga
(CG-47) class cruisers,2 68 DDG-51s, and one Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyer.
Current and Potential Future LSC Force-Level Goal
Current LSC Force-Level Goal Within 355-Ship Plan of December 2016
The Navy’s current force-level goal, released in December 2016, cal s for achieving and
maintaining a fleet of 355 ships, including 104 LSCs. The Navy and the Department of Defense
(DOD) have been working since 2019 to develop a successor for the 355-ship force-level goal.
December 9, 2020, Document Presented Potential New LSC Force-Level Goal
On December 9, 2020, the Trump Administration released a long-range Navy shipbuilding
document that cal ed for a Navy with a more distributed fleet architecture, including 382 to 446
manned ships and 143 to 242 large surface and underwater unmanned vehicles (UVs). Within the
total of 382 to 446 manned ships, the document cal ed for a total of 78 to 83 LSCs.
June 17, 2021, Document Presents Potential New LSC Force-Level Goal
On June 17, 2021, the Biden Administration released a long-range Navy shipbuilding document
that cal s for a Navy with a more distributed fleet architecture, including 321 to 372 manned ships
and 77 to 140 large surface and underwater UVs. Within the total of 321 to 372 manned ships, the
document cal s for a total of 63 to 65 LSCs.3
Comparison of Surface Combatant Force-Level Goals
Table 1 compares the current force-level goals for surface combatants (i.e., LSCs, SSCs, and
large and medium unmanned surface vehicles [LUSVs] and [MUSVs]) within the 355-ship plan
to the potential force-level goals for surface combatants in the June 17, 2021, and December 9,
2020, long-range Navy shipbuilding documents.4

2 A total of 27 CG-47s (CGs 47 through 73) were procured for the Navy between FY1978 and FY19 88; the ships
entered service between 1983 and 1994. T he first five ships in the class (CGs 47 through 51), which were built to an
earlier technical standard in certain respects, were judged by the Navy to be too expensive to modernize and were
removed from service in 2004-2005, leaving 22 ships in operation (CGs 52 through 73).
3 For more on the 355-ship force-level goal and the December 9, 2020, and June 17, 2021, long-range Navy
shipbuilding documents, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and
Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
4 For more on the Navy’s SSC programs, see CRS Report R44972, Navy Constellation (FFG-62) Class Frigate
Program : Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke; and CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral
Com bat Ship (LCS) Program : Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. For more on the LUSV and
MUSV programs, see CRS Report R45757, Navy Large Unm anned Surface and Undersea Vehicles: Background and
Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
Congressional Research Service

2

link to page 8 Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

Table 1. Current and Potential Surface Combatant Force-Level Goals
Current force-
December 9,
June 17, 2021,
level goal within
2020, shipbuilding
shipbuilding

355-ship plan
document
document
Large surface combatants (LSCs—cruisers
104
73 to 88
63 to 65
and destroyers)
Smal surface combatants (SSCs—frigates and
52
60 to 67
40 to 45
Littoral Combat Ships)
Subtotal: LSCs and SSCs
156
133 to 155
103 to 110
Large and Medium Unmanned Surface Vehicles
0
119 to 166
59 to 89
(LUSVs and MUSVs)
Source: Table prepared by CRS based on U.S. Navy data.
DDG-51 Program
Overview
The DDG-51 program was initiated in the late 1970s.5 The first DDG-51 was procured in FY1985
and entered service in 1991. A total of 87 have been procured through FY2021. From FY1989
through FY2005, DDG-51s were procured at rates of two to five ships per year. Since FY2010,
they have been procured at rates of one to three ships per year. (The Navy did not procure any
DDG-51s during the period FY2006-FY2009. Instead, the Navy in FY2007-FY2009 procured
three Zumwalt [DDG-1000] class destroyers, which are discussed later in this report.) The DDG-
51 program is one of the longest-running shipbuilding programs in Navy history, and the DDG-51
class is one of the Navy’s numerical y largest classes of ships since World War II.
DDG-51s (Figure 1) are multi-mission destroyers with an emphasis on air defense (which the
Navy refers to as anti-air warfare, or AAW) and blue-water (mid-ocean) operations. DDG-51s,
like the Navy’s 22 Ticonderoga (CG-47) class cruisers, are equipped with the Aegis combat
system, an integrated ship combat system named for the mythological shield that defended Zeus.
CG-47s and DDG-51s consequently are often referred to as Aegis cruisers and Aegis destroyers,
respectively, or collectively as Aegis ships. The Aegis system has been updated several times over
the years. Many DDG-51s (and also some CG-47s) have a capability for conducting bal istic
missile defense (BMD) operations.6
Design Changes
The DDG-51 design has been modified and updated periodical y over the years. The first 28
DDG-51s (DDGs 51 through 78) are cal ed Flight I/II DDG-51s. In FY1994, the Navy shifted
DDG-51 procurement to the Flight IIA DDG-51 design, which incorporated certain changes,
including the addition of a helicopter hangar. A total of 47 Flight IIA DDG-51s (DDGs 79
through 124 and DDG-127) were procured in FY1994-FY2016. In FY2017, the Navy shifted
DDG-51 procurement to the Flight III DDG-51 design, which incorporates a new and more

5 T he program was initiated with the aim of developing a surface combatant to replace older destroyers and cruisers
that were projected to retire in the 1990s. T he DDG-51 was conceived as an affordable complement to the Navy’s
T iconderoga (CG-47) class Aegis cruisers. For an early discussion of the DDG-51 program, see Alva M. Bowen and
Ronald O’Rourke, “DDG-51 and the Future Surface Navy,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1985: 176-189.
6 For more on Navy BMD programs, see CRS Report RL33745, Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
Congressional Research Service

3

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

capable radar cal ed the SPY-6 radar or the Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR), as wel as
associated changes to the ship’s electrical power and cooling systems. DDGs 125 and higher,
except for DDG-127 as noted above, are to be Flight III DDG-51s.
Figure 1. DDG-51 Class Destroyer

Source: U.S. Navy file photograph.
Multiyear Procurement (MYP)
As part of its action on the Navy’s FY2018 budget, Congress granted the Navy authority to use a
multiyear procurement (MYP) contract for DDG-51s planned for procurement in FY2018-
FY2022. This is the fourth DDG-51 MYP contract—previous DDG-51 MYP contracts covered
DDG-51s procured in FY2013-FY2017, FY2002-FY2005, and FY1998-FY2001.
Shipbuilders, Combat System Lead, and Radar Makers
DDG-51s are built by General Dynamics/Bath Iron Works (GD/BIW) of Bath, ME, and
Huntington Ingal s Industries/Ingal s Shipbuilding (HII/Ingal s) of Pascagoula, MS. Lockheed is
the lead contractor for the Aegis system instal ed on al DDG-51s. The SPY-6—the primary radar
for the Aegis system on Flight III DDG-51s—is made by Raytheon.
Modernization of In-Service Ships
The Navy is modernizing existing DDG-51s (and some CG-47s) so as to maintain their mission
and cost-effectiveness out to the end of their projected service lives. Older CRS reports provide
additional historical and background information on the DDG-51 program.7

7 See CRS Report 94-343, Navy DDG-51 Destroyer Procurement Rate: Issues and Options for Congress, by Ronald
Congressional Research Service

4

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

FY2022 Procurement Funding Request
The Navy’s proposed FY2022 budget requests the procurement of one DDG-51 in FY2022,
rather than the two DDG-51s that are cal ed for in FY2022 under the FY2018-FY2022 DDG-51
MYP contract, and that were projected for FY2022 under the Navy’s FY2021 budget submission.
When procured at a rate of two per year, DDG-51s cost roughly $2.0 bil ion each. Due to the
reduced production economies of scale that would occur at a production rate of one ship per year,
the one DDG-51 requested for procurement in FY2022 has an estimated cost of $2,401.7 mil ion
(i.e., about $2.4 bil ion).
Under the Navy’s proposed FY2022 budget, the one requested DDG-51 would receive $384.9
mil ion in prior-year Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) funding—a type of advance procurement
(AP) funding that occurs under an MYP contract.8 Taking this prior-year EOQ funding into
account, the Navy’s proposed FY2022 budget requests the remaining $2,016.8 mil ion (i.e., about
$2.0 bil ion) needed to complete the ship’s estimated procurement cost of $2,401.7 mil ion. The
Navy’s proposed FY2022 budget also requests $45.8 mil ion in cost-to-complete funding to pay
for cost growth on DDG-51s procured in prior years, bringing the total amount of procurement
funding requested for the DDG-51 program to $2,062.5 mil ion (i.e., about $2.1 bil ion)
Procuring one DDG-51 rather than two DDG-51s in FY2022 would prevent the Navy from
fulfil ing its obligations in the final year of the FY2018-FY2022 DDG-51 MYP contract. Navy
officials state that as a result, the Navy would need to pay a $33 mil ion penalty to the DDG-51
shipbuilders9 (unless the Navy and the shipbuilders were to reach an agreement to amend the
terms of the MYP contract).
Navy officials have stated that requesting procurement of one DDG-51 rather than two DDG-51s
was an affordability measure—a means of helping the Navy remain within its budget topline
while meeting funding needs for other Navy programs. Procuring a second DDG-51 in FY2022 is
the number one item on the Navy’s FY2022 Unfunded Priorities List (UPL)—the service’s list of
programs it would prefer to be funded in FY2022, if additional funding were to become available.
The UPL states that procuring two DDG-51s rather than one DDG-51 in FY2022 would require
an additional $1,659.2 mil ion (i.e., about $1.7 bil ion) in shipbuilding funding. That figure is not
the cost of the second DDG-51—the second DDG-51’s procurement cost would be roughly $2.0
bil ion. Adding the second DDG-51, however, would reduce the estimated procurement cost of
the first DDG-51 due to the resulting increased production economies of scale. The figure of
$1,659.2 mil ion is thus the net increase in shipbuilding funding that would be needed to procure
two DDG-51s rather than one DDG-51 in FY2022.

O’Rourke (April 25, 1994; out of print and available to congressional clients directly from the author), and CRS Report
80-205, The Navy’s Proposed Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) Class Guided Missile Destroyer Program : A Com parison With
An Equal-Cost Force Of Ticonderoga (CG-47) Class Guided Missile Destroyers, by Ronald O’Rourke (November 21,
1984; out of print and available to congressional clients directly from the author).
8 For more on EOQ funding with MYP contracts, see CRS Report R41909, Multiyear Procurement (MYP) and Block
Buy Contracting in Defense Acquisition: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
9 See, for example, Christopher P. Cavas, “ Updated: Fleet Growth Stymied by Navy Budget Request,” USNI News,
May 28 (updated May 30), 2021.
Congressional Research Service

5

link to page 25 Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

DDG-1000 Program
As noted earlier, in FY2007-FY2009, during the time when the Navy was not procuring DDG-
51s, the Navy instead procured three Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyers. The Navy plans no
further procurement of DDG-1000s.
DDG-1000s are multi-mission destroyers with an original y intended emphasis on naval surface
fire support (NSFS)10 and operations in littoral (i.e., near-shore) waters. Consistent with that
mission orientation, the ship was designed with two new-design 155mm guns cal ed Advanced
Gun Systems (AGSs). The AGSs were to fire a new 155mm, gun-launched, rocket-assisted
guided projectile cal ed the Long-Range Land-Attack Projectile (LRLAP, pronounced LUR-lap).
In November 2016, however, it was reported that the Navy had decided to stop procuring LRLAP
projectiles because the projected unit cost of each projectile had risen to at least $800,000.11
In December 2017, it was reported that, due to shifts in the international security environment and
resulting shifts in Navy mission needs, the mission orientation of the DDG-1000s wil be shifted
from an emphasis on NSFS to an emphasis on surface strike, meaning the use of missiles to attack
surface ships and perhaps also land targets.12
In April and May 2021, it was reported that the Navy plans to remove the AGSs on the three ships
and replace them with vertical launch tubes for the Navy’s new hypersonic Conventional Prompt
Strike (CPS) missile, with a goal of fielding CPSs on a DDG-1000 class ship by 2025.13
For additional background information on the DDG-1000 program, see the Appendix.
Surface Combatant Construction Industrial Base
Al cruisers and destroyers procured since FY1985 have been built at GD/BIW and HII/Ingal s.
Both of these shipyards have long histories of building larger surface combatants. Construction of
Navy surface combatants in recent years has accounted for virtual y al of GD/BIW’s ship-
construction work and for a significant share of HII/Ingal s’ ship-construction work. (HII/Ingal s
also builds amphibious ships for the Navy and cutters for the Coast Guard.) Navy surface

10 NSFS is the use of naval guns to provide fire support for friendly forces operating ashore.
11 Christopher P. Cavas, “New Warship’s Big Guns Have No Bullets,” Defense News, November 6, 2016; Sam
LaGrone, “ Navy Planning on Not Buying More LRLAP Rounds for Zumwalt Class,” USNI News, November 7, 2016;
Ben Guarino, “T he Navy Called USS Zumwalt A Warship Batman Would Drive. But at $800,000 Per Round, Its
Ammo Is T oo Pricey to Fire,” Washington Post, November 8, 2016.
12 Megan Eckstein, “New Requirements for DDG-1000 Focus on Surface Strike,” USNI News, December 4, 2017. See
also Richard Abott, “Navy Will Focus Zumwalt On Offensive Surface Strike,” Defense Daily, December 5, 2017;
David B. Larter, “T he Navy’s Stealth Destroyers to Get New Weapons and a New Mission: Killing Ships,” Defense
News, February 15, 2018.
13 See, for example, Rich Abott, “ Navy Plans to Field 12 Hypersonic Missiles on Each Zumwalt Destroyer, Replacing
Gun,” Defense Daily, June 8, 2021; Jason Sherman, “ Navy Plans to Pack Each DDG-1000 with 12 Long-Range
Hypersonic Strike Missiles,” Inside Defense, June 8, 2021; Sam LaGrone, “ CNO: Hypersonic Weapons at Sea to
Premiere on Zumwalt Destroyers in 2025 ,” USNI News, April 28, 2021; Jason Sherman, “ Navy to Rip Out DDG-1000
Advanced Gun System Mounts to Make Room for Hypersonic Weapons,” Inside Defense, May 26, 2021. See also Paul
McLeary, “ Exclusive[:] Eying China, CNO Plans Hypersonics & Lasers On Zumwalt Destroyers,” Breaking Defense,
February 26, 2021; Joseph T revithick, “ Navy Wants T riple-Packed Hypersonic Missile Modules On Its Stealthy
Zumwalt Destroyers,” The Drive, March 19, 2021; David B. Larter, “ What Should Become of the Zumwalt Class? T he
US Navy Has Some Big Ideas,” Defense News, March 25, 2021.
For more on the CPS program, see CRS Report R41464, Conventional Prom pt Global Strike and Long -Range Ballistic
Missiles: Background and Issues, by Amy F. Woolf.
Congressional Research Service

6

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

combatants are overhauled, repaired, and modernized at GD/BIW, HII/Ingal s, and other U.S.
shipyards.
Lockheed Martin and Raytheon are general y considered the two leading Navy surface combatant
radar makers and combat system integrators. Lockheed is the lead contractor for the DDG-51
combat system (the Aegis system), while Raytheon is the lead contractor for the DDG-1000
combat system, the core of which is cal ed the Total Ship Computing Environment Infrastructure
(TSCE-I). Lockheed has a share of the DDG-1000 combat system, and Raytheon has a share of
the DDG-51 combat system. Lockheed, Raytheon, and Northrop competed to be the maker of the
AMDR to be carried by the Flight III DDG-51. On October 10, 2013, the Navy announced that it
had selected Raytheon to be the maker of the AMDR, now cal ed the SPY-6 radar.
The surface combatant construction industrial base also includes hundreds of additional firms that
supply materials and components. The financial health of Navy shipbuilding supplier firms has
been a matter of concern in recent years, particularly since some of them are the sole sources for
what they make for Navy surface combatants. Several Navy-operated laboratories and other
facilities support the Aegis system and other aspects of the DDG-51 and DDG-1000 programs.
Issues for Congress
Number of DDG-51s to Procure in FY2022
A key issue for Congress for the DDG-51 program in FY2022 is whether to fund the procurement
of one DDG-51, two DDG-51s, or some other number of DDG-51s (such as zero or three).
Supporters of procuring one DDG-51 might argue that in a situation of finite defense resources,
funding the procurement of a second DDG-51 could require reducing funding for other Navy or
DOD programs by about $1.7 bil ion, which could reduce Navy or DOD capabilities in other
ways; that the Navy’s new fleet architecture may result in a reduction in the force-level goal for
large surface combatants (as shown in Table 1), which would reduce the need for procuring a
second DDG-51 in FY2022; that the DDG-51 industrial base (both shipyards and supplier firms)
wil be adequately supported by their existing backlog of DDG-51s and other Navy shipbuilding
work; and that a second DDG-51 can be procured in FY2023 (a year in which the Navy’s
FY2021 budget submission had cal ed for procuring one DDG-51), which would preserve the
procurement of a total of three DDG-51s across the two-year period FY2022-FY2023.
Supporters of procuring two DDG-51s might argue that it would help accelerate the introduction
of Flight III DDG-51s, with their SPY-6 radars, into the fleet; that it would improve production
economies of scale in the DDG-51 program, avoiding a roughly $400 mil ion increase in the
procurement cost of the single DDG-51 requested for procurement in FY2021; that it would more
strongly support the DDG-51 industrial base; that the second DDG-51’s position at the top of the
Navy’s FY2022 UPL shows that the second ship is a high-priority item for the Navy to fund with
offsetting reductions that Congress might be able to identify in reviewing and marking up DOD’s
proposed FY2022 budget; and that it would permit the Navy to fulfil its obligations under the
DDG-51 MYP contract, which would avoid the $33 mil ion penalty payment to the shipbuilders
and avoid setting a precedent of the Navy not fully implementing a shipbuilding MYP contract—
a precedent that could impact defense contractor confidence about the likelihood that the Navy
(or other parts of DOD) wil fully implement future MYP contracts.14

14 See also Richard R. Burgess, “ Senators Hammer $1 Billion Loss, Industrial Instability with Navy’s Planned 2022
Congressional Research Service

7

link to page 7 Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

Future LSC Force-Level Goal
Another issue for Congress concerns the future LSC force-level goal. In connection with this
issue, it can be noted that the December 9, 2020, and June 17, 2021, long-range Navy
shipbuilding documents reflect a Navy desire to shift to a more distributed force architecture that
would feature
 a smal er proportion of larger ships (such as large-deck aircraft carriers, cruisers,
destroyers, large amphibious ships, and large resupply ships);
 a larger proportion of smal er ships (such as frigates, corvettes, smal er
amphibious ships, smal er resupply ships, and perhaps smal er aircraft carriers);
and
 a new third tier of large unmanned surface and underwater unmanned vehicles
(UVs).
Navy and DOD leaders believe that shifting to a more distributed fleet arc hitecture is
 operationally necessary, to respond effectively to the improving maritime anti-
access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities of other countries, particularly China;
 technically feasible as a result of advances in technologies for unmanned
vehicles (UVs) and for networking widely distributed maritime forces that
include significant numbers of UVs; and
 affordable—no more expensive, and possibly less expensive, than the current
fleet architecture, for a given aggregate level of Navy capability.15
One potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the difference between the emerging Navy
force-level goals for LSCs and other surface combatants in the Biden Administration’s June 17,
2021, long-range Navy shipbuilding document and the emerging force-level goals for LSCs and
other surface combatants in the Trump Administration’s December 9, 2020, long-range Navy
shipbuilding document. Using the figures shown in Table 1, the Trump Administration’s
emerging force-levels goals for surface combatants include about 22%-35% more large surface
combatants, about 49%-50% more smal surface combatants, about 29%-41% more large and
smal surface combatants combined, and about 87%-102% more unmanned surface vehicles than
the Biden Administration’s emerging force-level goals for surface combatants. A potential
oversight question is to what degree these differences between the two sets of emerging force-
level goals for surface combatants are due to differences between the two Administrations
regarding one or more of the following factors:
 U.S. national security strategy and U.S. national defense strategy;
 projections of future capabilities of potential adversaries such as China and
Russia;
 consequent requirements, from the two factors above, for day-to-day forward-
deployed Navy capacity and capability and Navy warfighting capacity and
capability;

Shipbuilding,” Seapower, June 22, 2021; Kathleen O’Brien, “ Rep. Jared Golden: Warship Cut from Biden’s Budget
Could Mean Shipyard Layoffs,” Tim es Record (ME), June 21, 2021 (updated June 23, 2021).
15 For additional discussion about shifting the Navy to a more distributed architecture, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy
Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
Congressional Research Service

8

link to page 7 link to page 7 Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

 assumptions about the capabilities of future U.S. Navy manned and unmanned
ships;
 Navy homeporting arrangements and operational cycles;
 projections about future Navy budgets, including future Navy shipbuilding
budgets; and
 the degree of operational risk deemed acceptable regarding the ability of the
Navy to successfully perform its various day-to-day and warfighting missions.
Reducing the LSC force-level goal from 104 manned ships to a smal er number (such as those
shown in Table 1 for the December 9, 2020, and June 17, 2021, long-range Navy shipbuilding
documents) could affect issues such as when to retire older LSCs and how many new LSCs to
procure each year. A June 23, 2021, press article that presents one observer’s perspective
regarding the figures in Table 1 states that the June 17, 2021, long-range Navy shipbuilding
document
telegraphs enormous cuts to America’s large surface combatant fleet of cruisers and
destroyers. The mild verbiage from the report, saying “that growing the small surface
combatant force enables reductions in the quantity of large surface combatants while
yielding a more distributed and lethal force,” masks a likely brutal downsizing.
The cuts will be deep and potentially rapid. Today, 92 large combatants are in the fleet, but
the Navy’s longer-term plans suggest the legacy large surface combatant fleet of
Ticonderoga Class (CG 47) cruisers, Zumwalt Class (DDG 1000) destroyers and Arleigh
Burke Class (DDG 51) destroyers will shrink to a fleet of 63 to 65 large surface vessels
over the next 30 years. Amphibious assault vessels (LHA/LHDs and LPDs) and command,
support and fast transport ships will be cut as well, and the future small surface combatant
fleet of littoral combat ships and frigates is only projected to grow to between 40 and 45
ships from a current fleet of 35.
The cuts are widespread, but one place the axe falls hardest is upon the Navy’s large surface
combatant fleet. First, the Department of Defense will force the Navy to eliminate the entire
22-hull Ticonderoga Class cruiser fleet. But even that drastic cut is not enough for the Navy
to get to the Department of Defense’s current projection of 63 to 65 ships. With 88 Arleigh
Burkes in service, under construction or already authorized, Arleigh Burke destroyer
procurement will likely cease and 27 older Flight I, Flight IA and Flight II Burkes will be
ushered out of the fleet.
The only question is just how fast the cuts to the large surface combatants will happen.
If left to normal attrition, most of the 27 older Arleigh Burke Class destroyers, deprived of
a few hundred million dollar service-life extension six years ago, will simply age out over
the next 30 years. Commissioned between 1991 and 1999, early-Flight Burkes were built
with a service life expectation of about 35 years and, since the Navy has been unable to
find money to systematically modernize and extend the life of the aging ships, most of the
older Arleigh Burke destroyers are set to start decommissioning sometime after 2026.
That would be relatively normal practice. But, in a rush to claw back additional money,
lock in savings, and make the proposed cuts permanent, aged Ticonderoga cruisers and
older Burkes may well be pulled from service quite quickly—far faster than anyone outside
of the Pentagon expects.
What should scare surface warriors is that the administration’s proposed 30-year goal of
63 to 65 large combatants can be achieved without procuring a single new hull. And while
one of America’s two remaining large surface combatant yards may help build
Constellation Class (FFG-62) guided missile frigates in the coming years, the Navy’s
surface combatant industrial base will fall under serious strain without some modest level
of large surface combatant procurement.
Congressional Research Service

9

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

The end of the Burke production line is in sight. The newer, Flight IIA Burkes were built
to have a 40-year service life, and, even with no additional vessel procurements beyond the
authorized-but-unnamed “DDG 139,” the Navy would only need to give six Burkes, DDGs
79 through 84, a 10-year service life extension to meet the current fleet-size goal.
Those handful of refits would let the Navy show up in in 2051 with about 60 Arleigh
Burkes and three DDG 1000s in service, clocking in right at the low end of the Navy’s 30-
year estimate….
A large surface combatant procurement pause may be inevitable.16
Section 121 of the FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 6395/P.L. 116-283 of
January 1, 2021) states
SEC. 121. LIMITATION ON ALTERATION OF THE NAVY FLEET MIX.
(a) LIMITATION.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of the Navy may not deviate from the large surface
combatant requirements included in the 2016 Navy Force Structure Assessment until the
date on which the Secretary submits to the congressional defense committees the
certification under paragraph (2) and the report under subsection (b).
(2) CERTIFICATION.—The certification referred to in paragraph (1) is a certification, in
writing, that the Navy can mitigate the reduction in multi-mission large surface combatant
requirements, including anti-air and ballistic missile defense capabilities, due to having a
reduced number of DDG–51 Destroyers with the advanced AN/SPY–6 radar in the next
three decades.
(b) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Secretary of the Navy shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report that
includes—
(1) a description of likely detrimental impacts to the large surface combatant industrial
base, and a plan to mitigate such impacts, if the fiscal year 2021 future-years defense
program is implemented as proposed;
(2) a review of the benefits to the Navy fleet of the new AN/SPY–6 radar to be deployed
aboard Flight III variant DDG–51 Destroyers, which are currently under construction, as
well as an analysis of impacts to the warfighting capabilities of the fleet s hould the number
of such destroyers be reduced; and
(3) a plan to fully implement section 131 of the National Defense Authorization for Fiscal
Year 2020 (Public Law 116–92; 133 Stat. 1237), including subsystem prototyping efforts
and funding by fiscal year.
Transition of Procurement from DDG-51s to DDG(X)s
Another issue for Congress concerns how the Navy proposes to transition several years from now
from procurement of DDG-51s to procurement of a successor destroyer design now in
development cal ed the DDG(X). Navy plans for transitioning from procurement of DDG-51s to
procurement of DDG(X)s were an oversight focus for the defense committees in their reviews
and markups of the Navy’s proposed FY2020 and FY2021 budgets. Decisions regarding the
transition to DDG(X) procurement wil affect Navy capabilities and funding requirements and the
U.S. shipbuilding industrial base. Recent Navy documents have shown the following:

16 Craig Hooper, “ Pentagon Plan Sets Navy Up to Quickly Shed 30% of Cruiser and Destroyer Fleet ,” Forbes, June 23,
2021.
Congressional Research Service

10

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

 The Navy’s FY2020 budget submission and FY2020 30-year shipbuilding plan
projected DDG-51s being procured during the period FY2022-FY2025 in annual
quantities of 2-3-3-2, with FY2025 being the final year of DDG-51 procurement
and the year that the first DDG(X) would be procured.
 The Navy’s FY2021 budget submission projected DDG-51s being procured
during the period FY2022-FY2025 in annual quantities of 2-1-2-1, and for DDG-
51 procurement to end with the procurement of two final ships that would be
procured in either FY2026 (both ships) or FY2026 and FY2027 (one ship each
year). Under this budget submission, DDG(X) procurement might begin around
FY2028.
 The December 9, 2020, long-range Navy shipbuilding document projected DDG-
51s being procured during the period FY2022-FY2026 in annual quantities of 2-
2-2-2-2. The document did not specify the final year of DDG-51 procurement,
but press reports have suggested that the Navy wants to procure the first DDG(X)
around FY2028.
At a June 24, 2021, hearing on the Department of the Navy’s proposed FY2022 budget before the
Defense subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, Acting Secretary of the Navy
Thomas Harker stated that “multiyear contracts are very important to us. We do intend to sign
another multiyear [contract] for DDGs starting in [FY]’23 [and continuing] through [FY]’27 and
continue that procurement into the foreseeable future.” He also stated, “We are committed to
multiyears [i.e., multiyear procurement contracts] for our submarines and for DDGs.”17
For more on the DDG(X) program, see CRS In Focus IF11679, Navy DDG(X) Next-Generation
Destroyer Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
Potential Impact of COVID-19 Pandemic
Another issue for Congress concerns the potential impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the
execution of U.S. military shipbuilding programs, including the DDG-51 program. For additional
discussion of this issue, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
Cost, Technical, and Schedule Risk in Flight III DDG-51 Effort
Another issue for Congress concerns cost, technical, and schedule risk for the Flight III DDG-51.
A June 2021 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report assessing selected DOD
acquisition programs stated the following in its assessment of the Flight III DDG-51:
Current Status
Flight III ships include design changes to incorporate the AN/SPY-6(V)1 radar and an
upgraded Aegis combat system, both of which the Navy plans to be integrated and tested
at a land-based site prior to on-board activation in 2022. Program officials stated that
integration and testing with AN/SPY-6(V)1 and Aegis is underway and is expected to be
complete prior to Aegis combat system activation on DDG 125 in 2022. However, Aegis
and AN/SPY-6(V)1 will be installed on DDG 125 before land-based testing is complete.
This limits opportunities to address any issues prior to Aegis activation in 2022.

17 T ranscript of hearing as posted at CQ.com. See also Mallory Shelbourne, “Harker: Navy Planning New Multi-Year
Destroyer Buy,” USNI News, June 24, 2021.
Congressional Research Service

11

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

The program office, in coordination with the Aegis and AMDR programs, is developing
an integrated test and evaluation master plan for the ship, AMDR, and Aegis, but the plan
has yet to be approved.
Both shipbuilders—new to building Flight III—may face cost and schedule challenges
often associated with lead ships, potentially exacerbated by a labor inefficiencies due to
COVID-19. DDG 125 is 43 percent complete, as of October 2020, and has experienced
some cost growth, but is expected to deliver on schedule in fiscal year 2023, according to
officials. However, this schedule leaves limited time for sea trials and operational testing
based on a planned August 2024 initial operational capability. Any issues during sea trials
and testing would likely delay DDG 125’s operational availability. Construction on the
second Flight III ship—DDG 126—began in March 2020. The program reported that a
recent labor strike could also affect DDG 126 construction efficiency. Since last year, the
program reduced its planned Flight III procurement from 22 to 18 sh ips to align with the
Navy’s future large surface combatant ships plan.
Program Office Comments
We provided a draft of this assessment to the program office for review and comment. The
program office provided technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate.
The program office reports that the DDG 51 program has delivered 68 ships, with another
21 ships under contract, and that both shipyards are in serial production and constructing
the initial Flight III ships. It stated the Navy is executing a test program to demonstrate
Flight III upgrades prior to shipboard activation. The program anticipates that the first
Flight III ship is on track for delivery in fiscal year 2023, and will reach initial operational
capability in fiscal year 2024.18
Regarding the AMDR specifical y, the report stated the following:
Technology Maturity, Design Stability, and Production Readiness
AMDR will not demonstrate its critical technologies in a realistic environment until after
the Navy integrates AMDR and Aegis on the lead DDG 51 Flight III ship during activation
of the Aegis combat system in 2022. Until this occurs, we will continue to disagree that the
program’s critical technologies are fully mature, despite the program reporting them
mature since 2017. The Navy will then test AMDR and Aegis in a realistic, at-sea
environment on the lead DDG 51 Flight III ship in 2023. The design remains at risk for
further disruption until the Navy completes operational testing in fiscal year 2024. Any
deficiencies the Navy discovers during testing could require revisions to existing design
drawings or retrofitting to already-built radars, likely increasing costs, delaying future radar
deliveries, or both.
While AMDR’s overall design is currently stable, according to officials, the program
redesigned the Digital Receiver Exciter (DREX)—a critical technology component—in
2020 because it did not meet vibration specifications, leading to cost increases. Program
officials said the new design met all qualification testing specifications and is easier to
manufacture. However, the fourth radar array—which completes the first AMDR unit—
was delivered to the shipyard in October 2020, 2 months later than planned due in part to
the redesign. To maintain the delivery schedule and offset further dela ys due to the
component redesign, the program delivered the first radar to the lead DDG 51 Flight III
ship without the complete set of DREX components installed. Officials said the remaining
components will be installed in the radar once it is installed on the ship prior to shipyard
testing and activation of the Aegis combat system in 2022.
AMDR has yet to demonstrate statistical control of its critical manufacturing processes
despite initiating production in May 2017, an approach inconsistent with leading practices.

18 Government Accountability Office, Weapon Systems Annual Assessment[:] Updated Program Oversight Approach
Needed, GAO-21-222, p. 192.
Congressional Research Service

12

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

In 2020, the program experienced a manufacturing issue with a Transmit/Receive
Integrated Microwave Module (TRIMM) component—another critical technology—that
caused cost increases and rework. A TRIMM component’s incorrect adhesive application
caused unexpected heat exposure, which could result in premature component failure,
demonstrating the risks of these immature manufacturing processes. Officials said the
contractor fixed the issue for future deliveries. They added that samples of the weakened
TRIMM components were re-tested for confidence that they will not prematurely fail and
do not present a significant reduction in operational capability for AMDR on the lead DDG
51 Flight III ship.
Software and Cybersecurity
AMDR has used Agile development to complete eight software deliveries that support core
radar capabilities. In 2020, the AMDR program tested new Aegis software at the Pacific
Missile Range Facility (PMRF), where the Aegis combat system and an AMDR radar array
interfaced and tracked an aircraft, according to officials. The program delivered a radar
array to the combat system land-based test site and started integration and testing of AMDR
and Aegis at the land-based test site in October 2020. These tests will inform software
development and integration of AMDR and Aegis, in development concurrently, in
preparation for Aegis combat system activation, planned in January 2022.
In the future, the program plans to integrate an Advanced Distributed Radar (ADR)
capability through AMDR and Aegis software upgrades. ADR is expected to add radar
enhancements and address future threats to the current system. Officials expect to finalize
ADR requirements in fiscal year 2021 and begin software development in 2022, with the
plan to deliver a capability after 2024. Program officials reported that software
development costs increased due to unanticipated complexity and new system
requirements such as ADR, among other things.
Officials said that AMDR cybersecurity is addressed within the Aegis combat system. The
Aegis program plans to conduct three cyber exercises in 2021, but complete cybersecurity
testing will not occur until at least 2023.
Other Program Issues
Since last year, the Navy reduced the number of radar units from 22 to 20—lowering
procurement costs—to better align with the number of DDG 51 Flight III ships planned
through 2025.
Program Office Comments
We provided a draft of this assessment to the program office for review and comment. The
program office provided technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate.
The program office stated that the first AMDR was delivered in October 2020, this delivery
supported DDG 51 Flight III construction schedule, and AMDR performance exceeded
thresholds during testing in a maritime environment at PMRF. The program also stated that
while radar testing with Aegis and other components at the combat system land -based test
site and PMRF will help decrease risk, complete AMDR testing with the ship is necessary
to fully retire risk. Additionally, the program noted that the new DREX component is in
production and will be installed in all future arrays. According to the program, the use of
an FPI firm target production contract for AMDR procurement minimizes the impact of
component price variances.19

19 Government Accountability Office, Weapon Systems Annual Assessment[:] Updated Program Oversight Approach
Needed, GAO-21-222, p. 165.
Congressional Research Service

13

link to page 18 link to page 18 Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

Legislative Activity for FY2022
Summary of Congressional Action on FY2022 Funding Request
Table 2 summarizes congressional action on the Navy’s FY2022 procurement funding requests
for the DDG-51 and DDG-1000 programs.
Table 2. Congressional Action on FY2022 Funding Request
Mil ions of dol ars, rounded to nearest tenth
Authorization
Appropriation

Request
HASC
SASC
Conf.
HAC
SAC
Conf.
DDG-51 procurement
2,016.8
5,058.4*
3,675.8

3,334.8

Quantity
(1)
(3)
(2)

(2)

DDG-51 advance procurement (AP)
0.0
0*
175.0

0

DDG-51 cost to complete
45.8
45.8
45.8

45.8

DDG-1000 procurement
56.6
56.6
71.6

56.6

Source: Table prepared by CRS based on Navy’s FY2022 budget submission, committee and conference
reports, and explanatory statements on FY2022 National Defense Authorization Act and FY2022 DOD
Appropriations Act.
Notes: HASC is House Armed Services Committee; SASC is Senate armed Services Committee; HAC is
House Appropriations Committee; SAC is Senate Appropriations Committee; Conf. is conference agreement.
The asterisk (*) marks in the HASC column indicate that the figure of $5,058.4 mil ion in procurement funding is
noted in the HASC report as including $130.0 mil ion in advance procurement (AP) funding for a third DDG-51
to be procured in FY2023.
FY2022 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4350/S. 2792)
House
The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 117-118 of September 10, 2021) on
H.R. 4350, recommended the funding levels shown in the HASC column of Table 2. The net
increase of $3,041.637 mil ion in procurement funding includes an increase of $3,059.9 mil ion
for “One additional ship” (sic: two additional ships), an increase of $130.0 mil ion for “AP
[advance procurement funding] for a third ship in FY 2023,” (this funding is shown as included in
the DDG-51 procurement funding line rather than in the DDG-51 advance procurement [AP]
funding line), and decreases of $12.3 mil ion for “Change order excessive cost growth,” $35.5
mil ion for “Electronics excessive cost growth,” $47.0 mil ion for “Plans cost excessive cost
growth,” $20.463 mil ion for “Program decrease,” and $33.0 mil ion for “[MYP contract]
Termination liability not required.” (Pages 373-374)
Section 123 of H.R. 4350 as reported by the committee states:
SEC. 123. MULTIYEAR PROCUREMENT AUTHORITY FOR ARLEIGH BURKE
CLASS DESTROYERS.
(a) AUTHORITY FOR MULTIYEAR PROCUREMENT.—Subject to section 2306b of
title 10, United States Code, the Secretary of the Navy may enter into one or more multiyear
contracts for the procurement of up to 15 Arleigh Burke class Flight III guided missile
destroyers.
Congressional Research Service

14

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

(b) AUTHORITY FOR ADVANCE PROCUREMENT.—The Secretary of the Navy may
enter into one or more contracts, beginning in fiscal year 2023, for advance procurement
associated with the destroyers for which authorization to enter into a multiyear
procurement contract is provided under subsection (a), and for systems and subsystems
associated with such destroyers in economic order quantities when cost savings are
achievable.
(c) CONDITION FOR OUT-YEAR CONTRACT PAYMENTS.—A contract entered into
under subsection (a) shall provide that any obligation of the United States to make a
payment under the contract for a fiscal year after fiscal year 2023 is subject to the
availability of appropriations or funds for that purpose for such later fiscal year.
(d) LIMITATION.—The Secretary of the Navy may not modify a contract entered into
under subsection (a) if the modification would increase the target price of the destroyer by
more than 10 percent above the target price specified in the original contract awarded for
the destroyer under subsection (a).
Regarding Section 123, H.Rept. 117-118 states:
DDG–51 multiyear procurement
The committee remains concerned that the Navy is not adequately planning for the
DDG(X) procurement. The current DDG–51 multiyear procurement contract ends in fiscal
year 2022, and the Navy has yet to produce program milestones or an acquisition strategy
for the next large surface combatant, known as DDG(X). The lack of an adequate plan is
even more troubling given the Navy’s most recent shipbuilding proposal that reduces a
destroyer in fiscal year 2022 and violated the current multiyear procurement contract. This
will incur a penalty of over $33.0 million. The reduction will delay the force level goal for
large surface combatants during a period of increasing demand, particularly in countering
threats from China and Russia. Therefore, in order to mitigate this risk and ensure a smooth
shipbuilding manufacturing and design industrial base transition from DDG–51 to
DDG(X), elsewhere in this Act, the committee authorizes a multi-year procurement for up
to 15 Flight III DDGs beginning in fiscal year 2023. (Pages 18-19)
Section 124 of H.R. 4350 as reported by the committee states (emphasis added):
SEC. 124. INCORPORATION OF ADVANCED DEGAUSSING SYSTEMS INTO
DDG–51 CLASS DESTROYERS.
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of the Navy shall ensure that an advanced degaussing
system is incorporated into any DDG–51 class destroyer procured pursuant to a covered
contract.
(b) COVERED CONTRACT DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘covered contract’’
means a multiyear contract for the procurement of a DDG–51 destroyer that is entered
into by the Secretary of the Navy on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.
H.Rept. 117-118 states:
Aegis radar
The committee recognizes that the rapid deployment of next-generation maritime radar
systems is required to address existing and emerging gaps in integrated air and missile
defenses, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region. However, the committee is concerned by
the apparent lack of alignment and congruent planning between three concurrent Aegis
Baseline radars funded at various stages of development or production across the Navy and
Missile Defense Agency. Specifically, the Navy budget includes funding for the backfit of
AN/SPY–6(V), which began low-rate production in 2016 and will enter full-rate
production upon the award of a hardware production and sustainment contract anticipated
by the end of fiscal year 2021. The Navy budget also includes funding for the development
Congressional Research Service

15

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

of a digital low noise amplifier modification to the existing AN/SPY–1 radar. At the same
time, the Missile Defense Agency budget includes funding for the development of a variant
of the Long Range Discrimination Radar for use in Aegis Ashore applications.
The committee believes there are opportunities to better leverage common, mature radar
technology in modernizing all Aegis -based platforms, including through U.S. Navy
weapon systems applications aboard existing surface ships, Homeland Defense Guam,
and/or defense of the continental United States from cruise missiles or air and missile
defense threats. Leveraging such commonality across platforms would serve as a means to
achieve critical distributed maritime operations objectives by expanding the number of
deployed netted sensors while also proliferating the number of sensors capable of
simultaneously defending against advanced air and missile defense threats. Moreover, the
committee believes that better aligning Aegis Baseline radar investments would also serve
to reduce risk and lower acquisition, lifecycle, and sustainment costs.
Therefore, the committee directs the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation
to conduct a review of the three Aegis Baseline radars included in the budget request for
fiscal year 2022 and to submit a report to the congressional defense committees not later
than December 1, 2021, outlining the results of this review and making recommendations
for achieving greater affordability, commonality, and sustainability through improved
alignment of radar modernization investments. (Page 16)
H.Rept. 117-118 also states:
Report on large surface combatant production transition
The committee recognizes the Navy’s successful transition from the Los Angeles-class
submarine to the Seawolf and Virginia submarine classes and the importance of
shipbuilding schedule overlap within that transition. The committee believes that new
programs such as the DDG(X) should also implement some type of overlap shipbuilding
schedule, which would mitigate shipbuilding issues related to stops in lead ship build
design and construction. The committee notes that absence of a proper overlap plan may
adversely impact both the Navy’s overall shipbuilding numbers and the associated
shipyard’s ability to adjust their production line accordingly.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to submit a report to the
congressional defense committees not later than December 30, 2021, that details what the
proper transition between the two platforms should include. The report should be informed
by early collaboration with the two current shipbuilders to maximize design and cost
efficiencies and emphasize the needs of the industrial base regarding both design and
construction capacity.
This report shall include at a minimum:
(1) a review of the Los Angeles submarine class transition to the Seawolf and Virginia
submarine classes, including shipyard schedules and operational impacts; shipyard cost
impacts; effects on associated shipyard manpower and skill; impact on planned versus
actual fiscal year shipbuilding numbers; and lessons learned;
(2) a review of the DDG–51 class transition to the Zumwalt DDG–1000 program, including
shipyard schedules and operational impacts; shipyard cost impacts; effects on associated
shipyard manpower and skill; impact on planned versus actual fiscal year shipbuilding
numbers; and lessons learned;
(3) a review of the Nimitz-class carrier transition to the Ford-class carrier program,
including shipyard schedules and operational impacts; shipyard cost impacts; effects on
associated shipyard manpower and skill; impact on planned versus actual fiscal year
shipbuilding numbers; and lessons learned;
Congressional Research Service

16

link to page 18 Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

(4) recommendations on the amount of time for a successful overlap transition period
before a shipyard shifts to full-rate production of the next-generation ship; and
(5) recommendations on requirements for an ideal large surface combatant shipyard
transition and next-generation shipbuilding production. (Page 20)
H.Rept. 117-118 also states:
SPY–1D capability improvements
The committee recognizes the urgent need to deliver increased warfighting capability
through combat systems modernization to the destroyers comprising flight I, II, and certain
IIA ships, and further understands that advances in digital technology, solid-state upgrades,
and other innovations can be leveraged in existing mature systems to keep Aegis destroyers
threat-relevant to the end of their service lives. The committee encourages the Secretary of
the Navy to consider specific initiatives that could rapidly incorporate digital technology
into the receive chain of the SPY–1D radar in order to improve readiness, lethality,
survivability, and operational availability. (Page 21)
H.Rept. 117-118 also states:
Shipboard High Energy Laser
The committee is encouraged by the Navy’s continued progress in testing and deploying
High Energy Laser Systems (HELS). The integration of the 150kW class Solid State Laser
Technology Maturation on the USS Portland (Landing Platform/Dock–27) in 2019 is a
significant improvement in lethality over the Laser Weapons System and will provide a
valuable capability to counter unmanned aerial systems and fast inshore attack craft, as
well as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities on its upcoming
deployment. The committee is also encouraged by the planned integration of the 60kW
HELIOS and 30 kW Optical Dazzler Interdictor Navy on identified Arleigh Burke-class
destroyer ships beginning in 2021. The committee is eager to facilitate the widespread
adoption of this necessary capability, but is concerned about inadequate Space, Weight,
Power and Cooling, Service Life Allowances in currently deployed ships and a robust
industrial base. Lastly, the committee would like to avoid backfitting costs by ensuring
future ship design plans include HELS.
The committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to provide a briefing to the House
Committee on Armed Services by December 1, 2021, on a plan describing a path forward
for integration of HEL Systems with more than 150kW of power on the DDG(X) ship class,
and address installation plans on other surface combatants Arleigh Burke-class destroyers.
(Page 53)
Senate
The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 117-39 of September 22 [legislative
day, September 21], 2021) on S. 2792, recommended the funding levels shown in the SASC
column of Table 2. The recommended increase of $1,659.0 mil ion for DDG-51 procurement is
for “Navy UFR [unfunded requirement]—Arleigh Burke-class destroyer DDG–51.” The
recommended increase of $175.0 mil ion for DDG-51 advance procurement (AP) is for “FY23
3rd DDG LLTM [long leadtime materials]” ($125.0 mil ion) and “Surface combatant supplier
base” ($50.0 mil ion). The recommended increase of $15.0 mil ion for DDG-1000 procurement is
for “Navy UFR—DDG–1001 combat system activation.” (Page 403)
Section 820 of S. 2792 as reported by the committee states:
SEC. 820. MULTIYEAR CONTRACT AUTHORITY FOR DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS
SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZED BY LAW.
Congressional Research Service

17

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

Section 2306b(i)(3) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the
following new subparagraph:
‘‘(H) The quantity of end items that would be procured with such contract in each fiscal
year of the future years defense program at the time of contract award will not decrease
during the contract period of performance without prior approval from the congressional
defense committees.’’.
Regarding Section 820, S.Rept. 117-39 states:
Multiyear contract authority for defense acquisitions specifically authorized by law
(sec. 820)
The committee recommends a provision that would add an additional criterion to the
certifications required for approving a multiyear procurement contract.
The committee notes the budget request would breach a multiyear contract for Arleigh
Burke-class destroyers entered into under authority provided in section 2306b of title 10,
United States Code. The committee believes such an action would set an unacceptable
precedent and undermine future confidence in entering into these highly cost effective and
stabilizing contractual agreements.
Accordingly, this provision would require the Secretary of Defense to certify, as part of an
existing certification required under section 2306b of title 10, United States Code, that the
Department of Defense will not reduce the quantity of end items that would be procured
with a multiyear contract in each fiscal year of the future years defense program planned
at the time of contract award without prior approval from the congressional defense
committees. (Page 208)
S.Rept. 117-39 states:
Arleigh Burke-class destroyers
The budget request included $2.0 billion in line number 10 of Shipbuilding and
Conversion, Navy (SCN) for procurement of Arleigh Burke-class destroyers.
The committee notes that funding a second Arleigh Burke-class destroyer in fiscal year
2022 is the Chief of Naval Operations’ top unfunded priority, supports completing a multi-
ship procurement contract, and increases Flight III destroyer multi-mission capability and
capacity in the most demanding warfighting scenario.
Therefore, the committee recommends an increase of $1.7 billion for an additional Arleigh
Burke-class destroyer in line number 10 of SCN.
Arleigh Burke-class advance procurement
The budget request did not include funding in line number 11 of Shipbuilding and
Conversion, Navy (SCN) for advance procurement of Arleigh Burke-class destroyers.
The committee notes the Navy intends to negotiate another Arleigh Burke-class multiyear
procurement contract that would support Arleigh Burke-class procurement in future years.
The committee believes procuring a third Arleigh Burke-class destroyer in fiscal year 2023
would provide additional warfighting capacity as well as greater stability in the
shipbuilding industrial base. Therefore, the committee recommends an increase of $125.0
million in line number 11 of SCN for advance procurement of Arleigh Burke -class
destroyers.
Surface combatant supplier development
The budget request did not include funding in line number 11 of Shipbuilding and
Conversion, Navy (SCN) for advance procurement for the DDG–51 destroyer program.
Congressional Research Service

18

link to page 18 Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

The committee notes that elements of the surface combatant industrial base continue to
struggle to support the demands of the Navy’s future s hipbuilding plan.
Therefore, the committee recommends an increase of $50.0 million in line number 11 of
SCN for surface combatant supplier development efforts. (Pages 15-16)
S.Rept. 117-39 also states:
DDG–51 destroyer multi-year procurement
The committee continues to support the national policy of achieving at least a 355-ship
fleet, as codified in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (Public
Law 115–91), which is integral to the National Defense Strategy and its emphasis on near-
peer competition with Russia and China.
The committee views DDG–51 destroyers as the backbone of the surface fleet, providing
multi-mission flexibility and increasing capability with introduction of Flight III and the
AN/SPY–6 radar. With plans for construction of a new class of Large Surface Combatants
(LSCs) toward the end of this decade and the current multi-year procurement of DDG–51s
ending in fiscal year 2022, the committee believes that it is imperative that the Navy award
another DDG–51 multi-year contract beginning in fiscal year 2023. This contract is critical
to ensuring that Flight III capability continues to be delivered to the fleet and the industrial
base is maintained to support the LSC acquisition strategy.
Accordingly, the committee urges the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Navy
to make all necessary plans to award another multi-year contract for DDG–51 Flight III
destroyers in fiscal year 2023 and include the optimal associated funding profile for
economic order quantity material, long lead time material, and full funding in the
Department of Defense’s fiscal year 2023 budget request. (Page 29)
FY2022 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 4432)
House
The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 117-88 of July 15, 2021) on H.R.
4432, recommended the funding levels shown in the HAC column of Table 2. The recommended
net increase of $1,318.0 mil ion for DDG-51 procurement includes an increase of $1,500.0
mil ion for “Program increase—one additional DDG-51,” and decreases for “Plans excess costs”
($47.352 mil ion), “Change orders excess costs” ($11.651 mil ion), “Electronics excess costs”
($60,446 mil ion), “Ordnance excess costs” ($25.190 mil ion), and “Other costs excess” ($37.323
mil ion). (Page 185)
H.Rept. 117-88 states:
DDG–51 FLIGHT III DESTROYER
The Committee is dismayed by the Navy’s decision to remove one DDG–51 Flight III
Destroyer from the planned fiscal year 2022 budget request. For the second consecutive
fiscal year, the Navy has chosen to remove a major ship procurement from the budget
request rather than make difficult funding decisions in a fiscally constrained environment.
This represents a troubling trend of underfunding ship acquisition programs and then
requesting the removed ship as the highest priority on the u nfunded priority list.
Furthermore, removing the ship from the budget request breaks the program’s multi-year
procurement contract, which adversely impacts the already fragile domestic shipbuilding
industrial base. Therefore, the Committee recommendation reduces multiple Navy
programs to include an additional $1,500,000,000 for a second DDG–51 Destroyer.
Congressional Research Service

19

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

Further, the Committee notes that the current multi-year procurement contract for the
DDG–51 Flight III destroyer ends in fiscal year 2022 and that the Navy has already delayed
the detail design and construction schedule of the planned follow-on program until no
earlier than fiscal year 2026. The Committee believes that a follow-on multi-year
procurement contract beginning in fiscal year 2023 may be a pruden t plan to ensure a
smooth shipbuilding manufacturing and design industrial base transition from the DDG–
51 to the follow-on large surface combatant. (Page 186)

Congressional Research Service

20

link to page 25

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

Appendix. Additional Background Information on
DDG-1000 Program
This appendix presents additional background information on the DDG-1000 program.
Overview
The DDG-1000 program was initiated in the early 1990s.20 DDG-1000s (Figure A-1) are multi-
mission destroyers with an original y intended emphasis on naval surface fire support (NSFS) and
operations in littoral (i.e., near-shore) waters. (NSFS is the use of naval guns to provide fire
support for friendly forces operating ashore.)
Figure A-1. DDG-1000 Class Destroyer

Source: U.S. Navy photo 151207-N-ZZ999-435, posted December 8, 2015, with a caption that reads in part:
“The future USS Zumwalt (DDG 1000) is underway for the first time conducting at-sea tests and trials in the
Atlantic Ocean Dec. 7, 2015.”
DDG-1000s were original y intended to replace, in a technological y more modern form, the
large-caliber naval gun fire capability that the Navy lost when it retired its Iowa-class battleships
in the early 1990s,21 to improve the Navy’s general capabilities for operating in defended littoral

20 T he program was originally designated DD-21, which meant destroyer for the 21st century. In November 2001, the
program was restructured and renamed DD(X), meaning a destroyer wh ose design was in development. In April 2006,
the program’s name was changed again, to DDG-1000, meaning a guided missile destroyer with the hull number 1000.
21 T he Navy in the 1980s reactivated and modernized four Iowa (BB-61) class battleships that were originally built
during World War II. T he ships reentered service between 1982 and 1988 and were removed from service between
1990 and 1992.
Congressional Research Service

21

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

waters, and to introduce several new technologies that would be available for use on future Navy
ships. The DDG-1000 was also intended to serve as the basis for a planned cruiser cal ed CG(X)
that was subsequently canceled.22
DDG-1000s are to have reduced-size crews of 175 sailors (147 to operate the ship, plus a 28-
person aviation detachment), compared to roughly 300 on the Navy’s Aegis destroyers and
cruisers, so as to reduce its operating and support (O&S) costs. The DDG-1000 design
incorporates a significant number of new technologies, including an integrated electric -drive
propulsion system23 and automation technologies enabling its reduced-sized crew.
With an estimated full load displacement of 15,656 tons, the DDG-1000 design is substantial y
larger than the Navy’s Aegis cruisers and destroyers, which have displacements of up to about
9,700 tons, and are larger than any Navy destroyer or cruiser since the nuclear-powered cruiser
Long Beach (CGN-9), which was procured in FY1957.
The first two DDG-1000s were procured in FY2007 and split-funded (i.e., funded with two-year
incremental funding) in FY2007-FY2008; the Navy’s FY2021 budget submission estimates their
combined procurement cost at $9,450.8 mil ion. The third DDG-1000 was procured in FY2009
and split-funded in FY2009-FY2010; the Navy’s FY2021 budget submission estimates its
procurement cost at $3,855.1 mil ion.
The first DDG-1000 was commissioned into service on September 7, 2016. Its delivery date was
revised multiple times. In the Navy’s FY2021 budget submission, the ship’s delivery date was
revised to March 2020. The ship’s actual delivery date reportedly was April 2020.24 This created
an unusual situation in which a ship was commissioned into service more than three years prior to
its delivery date. The delivery dates for the second and third ships have also been revised multiple
times.25 In the Navy’s FY2022 budget submission, the delivery dates for the two ships were
revised to March 2022 and April 2024, respectively.
Program Origin
The program known today as the DDG-1000 program was announced on November 1, 2001,
when the Navy stated that it was replacing a destroyer-development effort cal ed the DD-21
program, which the Navy had initiated in the mid-1990s, with a new Future Surface Combatant
Program aimed at developing and acquiring a family of three new classes of surface
combatants:26

22 For more on the CG(X) program, see CRS Report RL34179, Navy CG(X) Cruiser Program: Background for
Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
23 For more on integrated electric-drive technology, see CRS Report RL30622, Electric-Drive Propulsion for U.S. Navy
Ships: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
24 See Aidan Quigley, “Final Delivery of Zumwalt-class Destroyer Monsoor Delayed,” Inside Defense, January 21,
2021.
25 T he revised delivery dates for the three ships reflect Section 121 of the FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act
(S. 2943/P.L. 114-328 of December 23, 2016), a provision that establishes standards for determining vessel delivery
dates and which also required the Secretary of the Navy to certify that the delivery dates for certain ships, including the
three DDG-1000s, had been adjusted in accordance with the provision. T he Navy’s original plan for the DDG-1000
program was to install certain elements of each DDG-1000’s combat system after delivering the ship and
commissioning it into service. Section 121 of P.L. 114-328 in effect requires the Navy to defer the delivery date of a
DDG-1000 until those elements of the combat system are installed. By the time P.L. 114-328 was enacted, DDG-1000,
per the Navy’s original plan, had already been commissioned into service without those elements of its combat system.
26 T he DD-21 program was part of a Navy surface combatant acquisition effort begun in the mid-1990s and called the
SC-21 (Surface Combatant for the 21st Century) program. T he SC-21 program envisaged a new destroyer called DD-21
Congressional Research Service

22

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

 a destroyer called DD(X) for the precision long-range strike and naval gunfire
mission;
 a cruiser called CG(X) for the air defense and bal istic missile mission; and
 a smaller combatant called the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) to counter
submarines, smal surface attack craft (also cal ed “swarm boats”), and mines in
heavily contested littoral (near-shore) areas.27
On April 7, 2006, the Navy announced that it had redesignated the DD(X) program as the DDG-
1000 program. The Navy also confirmed in that announcement that the first ship in the class,
DDG-1000, would be named Zumwalt, in honor of Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, the Chief of Naval
operations from 1970 to 1974. The decision to name the first ship after Zumwalt was made by the
Clinton Administration in July 2000, when the program was stil cal ed the DD-21 program.28
New Technologies
The DDG-1000 incorporates a significant number of new technologies, including a wave-
piercing, tumblehome hull design for reduced detectability,29 a superstructure on the first two
ships, but not the third that is made partly of large sections of composite (i.e., fiberglass-like)
materials rather than steel or aluminum, an integrated electric-drive propulsion system,30 a total-
ship computing system for moving information about the ship, automation technologies enabling
its reduced-sized crew, a dual-band radar (that was later changed to a single-band radar), a new
kind of vertical launch system (VLS) for storing and firing missiles, and two copies of a new
155mm gun cal ed the Advanced Gun System (AGS).
Shipbuilders and Combat System Prime Contractor
GD/BIW is the builder for al three DDG-1000s, with some portions of each ship being built by
HII/Ingal s for delivery to GD/BIW. Raytheon is the prime contractor for the DDG-1000’s
combat system (its collection of sensors, computers, related software, displays, and weapon
launchers).
Under a DDG-1000 acquisition strategy approved by the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD AT&L) on February 24, 2004, the first DDG-1000
was to have been built by HII/Ingal s, the second ship was to have been built by GD/BIW, and

and a new cruiser called CG-21. When the Navy announced the Future Surface Combatant Program in 2001,
development work on the DD-21 had been underway for several years, while the start of development work on the CG-
21 was still years in the future. T he current DDG-1000 destroyer CG(X) cruiser programs can be viewed as the
descendants, respectively, of the DD-21 and CG-21. T he acronym SC-21 is still used in the Navy’s research and
development account to designate the line item (i.e., program element) that funds development work on both the DDG-
1000 and CG(X).
27 For more on the LCS program, see CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background
and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
28 For more on Navy ship names, see CRS Report RS22478, Navy Ship Names: Background for Congress, by Ronald
O'Rourke.
29 A tumblehome hull slopes inward, toward the ship’s centerline, as it rises up from the waterline, in contrast to a
conventional flared hull, which slopes outward as it rises up from the waterline.
30 For more on integrated electric-drive technology, see CRS Report RL30622, Electric-Drive Propulsion for U.S. Navy
Ships: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
Congressional Research Service

23

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

contracts for building the first six were to have been equal y divided between HII/Ingal s31 and
GD/BIW.
In February 2005, Navy officials announced that they would seek approval from USD AT&L to
instead hold a one-time, winner-take-al competition between HII/Ingal s and GD/BIW to build
al DDG-1000s. On April 20, 2005, the USD AT&L issued a decision memorandum deferring this
proposal, stating in part, “at this time, I consider it premature to change the shipbuilder portion of
the acquisition strategy which I approved on February 24, 2004.”
Several Members of Congress also expressed opposition to the Navy’s proposal for a winner-
take-al competition. Congress included a provision (§1019) in the Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act for 2005 (H.R. 1268/P.L. 109-13 of May 11, 2005) prohibiting a winner-take-
al competition. The provision effectively required the participation of at least one additional
shipyard in the program but did not specify the share of the program that is to go to the additional
shipyard.
On May 25, 2005, the Navy announced that, in light of Section 1019 of P.L. 109-13, it wanted to
shift to a “dual-lead-ship” acquisition strategy, under which two DDG-1000s would be procured
in FY2007, with one to be designed and built by HII/Ingal s and the other by GD/BIW.
Section 125 of the FY2006 defense authorization act (H.R. 1815/P.L. 109-163) again prohibited
the Navy from using a winner-take-al acquisition strategy for procuring its next-generation
destroyer. The provision again effectively requires the participation of at least one additional
shipyard in the program but does not specify the share of the program that is to go to the
additional shipyard.
On November 23, 2005, the USD AT&L granted Milestone B approval for the DDG-1000,
permitting the program to enter the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase. As
part of this decision, the USD AT&L approved the Navy’s proposed dual-lead-ship acquisition
strategy and a low rate initial production quantity of eight ships (one more than the Navy
subsequently planned to procure).
On February 14, 2008, the Navy awarded contract modifications to GD/BIW and HII/Ingal s for
the construction of the two lead ships. The awards were modifications to existing contracts that
the Navy has with GD/BIW and HII/Ingal s for detailed design and construction of the two lead
ships. Under the modified contracts, the line item for the construction of the dual lead ships is
treated as a cost plus incentive fee (CPIF) item.
Until July 2007, it was expected that HII/Ingal s would be the final-assembly yard for the first
DDG-1000 and that GD/BIW would be the final-assembly yard for the second. On September 25,
2007, the Navy announced that it had decided to build the first DDG-1000 at GD/BIW, and the
second at HII/Ingal s.
On January 12, 2009, it was reported that the Navy, HII/Ingal s, and GD/BIW in the fal of 2008
began holding discussions on the idea of having GD/BIW build both the first and second DDG-
1000s, in exchange for HII/Ingal s receiving a greater share of the new DDG-51s that would be
procured under the Navy’s July 2008 proposal to stop DDG-1000 procurement and restart DDG-
51 procurement.32
On April 8, 2009, it was reported that the Navy had reached an agreement with HII/Ingal s and
GD/BIW to shift the second DDG-1000 to GD/BIW, and to have GD/BIW build al three ships.

31 At the time of the events described in this section, HII was owned by Northrop Grumman and was called Northrop
Grumman Shipbuilding (NGSB).
32 Christopher P. Cavas, “Will Bath Build Second DDG 1000?” Defense News, January 12, 2009: 1, 6.
Congressional Research Service

24

link to page 30 Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

HII/Iingal s wil continue to make certain parts of the three ships, notably their composite
deckhouses. The agreement to have al three DDG-1000s built at GD/BIW was a condition that
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates set forth in an April 6, 2009, news conference on the FY2010
defense budget for his support for continuing with the construction of al three DDG-1000s
(rather than proposing the cancel ation of the second and third).
Reduction in Procurement to Three Ships
Navy plans for many years cal ed for ending DDG-51 procurement in FY2005, to be followed by
procurement of up to 32 DDG-1000s and some number of CG(X)s. In subsequent years, the
planned total number of DDG-1000s was reduced to 16 to 24, then to 7, and final y to 3.
At the end of July 2008, in a major reversal of its destroyer procurement plans, the Navy
announced that it wanted to end procurement of DDG-1000s and resume procurement of DDG-
51s. In explaining this reversal, which came after two DDG-1000s had been procured, the Navy
stated that it had reevaluated the future operating environment and determined that its destroyer
procurement now needed to emphasize three missions: open-ocean antisubmarine warfare
(ASW), countering anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), and countering bal istic missiles. Although
the DDG-1000 could perform the first two of these missions and could be modified to perform
the third, the Navy concluded that the DDG-51 design could perform these three missions
adequately and would be less expensive to procure than the DDG-1000 design.
The Navy’s proposal to stop procuring DDG-1000s and resume procuring DDG-51s was
presented in the Navy’s proposed FY2010 budget, which was submitted to Congress in 2009.
Congress, in acting on the Navy’s FY2010 budget, approved the idea of ending DDG-1000
procurement and restarting DDG-51 procurement, and procured a third DDG-1000 as the final
ship in the class.
In retrospect, the Navy’s 2008 reversal in its destroyer procurement plans can be viewed as an
early indication of the ending of the post-Cold War era (during which the Navy focused its
planning on operating in littoral waters against the land- and sea-based forces of countries such as
Iran and North Korea) and the shift in the international security environment to renewed great
power competition (during which the Navy is now focusing its planning more on being able to
operate in mid-ocean waters against capable naval forces from near-peer competitors such as
China and Russia).33
Increase in Estimated Procurement Cost
As shown in Table A-1 below, the estimated combined procurement cost for al three DDG-
1000s, as reflected in the Navy’s annual budget submission, has grown by $4,328.8 mil ion, or
48.2%, since the FY2009 budget (i.e., the budget for the fiscal year in which the third DDG-1000
was procured).
Some of the cost growth in the earlier years in the table was caused by the truncation of the DDG-
1000 program from seven ships to three, which caused some class-wide procurement-rated costs
that had been al ocated to the fourth through seventh ships in the program to be real ocated to the
three remaining ships.

33 For additional discussion, see CRS Report R43838, Renewed Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—
Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke, and CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Im plications for
U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
Congressional Research Service

25

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

Table A-1. Estimated Combined Procurement Cost of DDG-1000, DDG-1001, and
DDG-2002
In mil ions, rounded to nearest tenth, as shown in annual Navy budget submissions
Estimated combined
Change from prior
Cumulative change
Budget
procurement cost
year’s budget
from FY2009 budget
submission
(millions of dollars)
submission
submission
FY09
8,977.1
—
—
FY10
9,372.5
+395.4 (+4.4%)
+395.4 (+4.4%)
FY11
9,993.3
+620.8 (+6.6%)
+1,016.2 (+11.3%)
FY12
11,308.8
+1,315.5 (+13.2%)
+2,331.7 (+26.0%)
FY13
11,470.1
+161.3 (+1.4%)
+2,493.0 (+27.8%)
FY14
11,618.4
+148.3 (+1.3%)
+2,641.3 (+29.4%)
FY15
12,069.4
+451.0 (+3.9%)
+3,092.3 (+34.4%)
FY16
12,288.7
+219.3 (+1.8%)
+3,311.6 (+36.9%)
FY17
12,738.2
+449.5 (+3.7%)
+3,761.1 (+41.9%)
FY18
12,882.0
+143.8 (+1.1%)
+3,904.0 (+43.5%)
FY19
13,032.2
+150.2 (+1.2%)
+4,055.1 (+45.1%)
FY20
13,195.5
+163.3 (+1.3%)
+4,218.4 (+47.0%)
FY21
13,275.6
+80.1 (+ 0.6%)
+4,298.5 (+47.9%)
FY22
13,305.9
+30.3 (+0.2+%)
+4,328.8 (+48.2%)
Source: Table prepared by CRS based on data in annual Navy budget submissions.
The Navy states that the cost growth shown through FY2015 in the table reflects, among other
things, a series of incremental, year-by-year movements away from an earlier Navy cost estimate
for the program, and toward a higher estimate developed by the Cost Assessment and Program
Evaluation (CAPE) office within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). As one
consequence of a Nunn-McCurdy cost breach experienced by the DDG-1000 program in 2010
(see discussion below), the Navy was directed to fund the DDG-1000 program to CAPE’s higher
cost estimate for the period FY2011-FY2015, and to the Navy’s cost estimate for FY2016 and
beyond. The Navy states that it implemented this directive in a year-by-year fashion with each
budget submission from FY2010 through FY2015, moving incremental y closer each year
through FY2015 to CAPE’s higher estimate. The Navy stated in 2014 that even with the cost
growth shown in the table, the DDG-1000 program as of the FY2015 budget submission was stil
about 3% below the program’s rebaselined starting point for calculating any new Nunn-McCurdy
cost breach on the program.34
Technical Risk and Test and Evaluation Issues
June 2021 GAO Report
A June 2021 GAO report assessing selected major DOD weapon acquisition programs stated the
following of the DDG-1000 program:

34 Source: Navy briefing for CRS and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) on the DDG-1000 program, April 30,
2014.
Congressional Research Service

26

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

Technology Maturity, Design Stability, and Production Readiness
The DDG 1000 program continues to have several immature technologies as it approaches
the planned conclusion of operational testing in 2021. Four technologies have yet to
demonstrate effectiveness on board the ship—the vertical launch system, infrared
signature, volume search radar, and total ship computing environment. The Navy expects
to mature these technologies as it completes ship construction, certification, and
operational testing over the next 2 years. Maturing these technologies throughout the
construction and testing process will likely lead to additional cost an d schedule delays as
the Navy may need to conduct onboard upgrades to facilitate the systems’ effectiveness.
To begin to enable the new surface strike mission, the Navy also added three additional
immature critical technologies: a communication system, an intelligence system, and an
offensive strike missile with an immature seeker technology. In addition, the Navy received
$15 million in funding to begin initial integration of a prompt strike (hypersonic) weapon.
As of September 2020, the Navy plans to request $169 million to install its four new
systems on at least one or more DDG 1000 ships and would need to request further funding
to complete the remaining ships’ systems. Though the Navy plans to fully mature these
technologies by ship integration, the integration will not occur until several years after the
Navy plans to achieve initial operational capability in December 2021. As a result, the
DDG 1000 class ships will remain incomplete and incapable of performing their planned
mission until at least 2025.
In 2020, the Navy achieved a major milestone with DDG 1000’s final delivery—including
combat systems activation—in April 2020, but cost growth and schedule delays continue
to mount for the third and final ship. Additionally, delivery of DDG 1001 has been delayed
again and is now planned for fiscal year 2022. The Navy now plans delivery of DDG 1002
with its combat systems in January 2024—a 16-month delay compared to last year’s
estimate of September 2022—and further delays are possible given its planned change in
delivery approach. The program manager attributed the current delay to a strike at the
shipyard and COVID-19-related complications.
Software and Cybersecurity
The Navy now plans to complete software development for the class in fiscal year 2022—
a 24-month delay since our 2020 assessment, largely due to overly optimistic development
schedules. Although the lead ship was initially delivered in 2016, the program continues to
deliver software builds only providing a portion of initially planned automation and to
complete programming for the ship’s communication systems, as we reported last year.
Without the originally planned level of capability and automation, the Navy has had to
permanently grow the crew size by 31 sailors, increasing life-cycle costs.
The program expects that a cybersecurity strategy planned for fiscal year 2023 which,
along with the remainder of a 2-year regimen of certifications and testing, should
demonstrate the full functionality of the ships’ systems and their cybersecurity. Our prior
work has shown that not focusing on cybersecurity until late in the development cycle or
after a system has been deployed is more difficult and costly than designing it in from the
beginning. According to the program manager, no cybersecurity issues have been identified
to date.
Other Program Issues
For DDG 1002, the Navy changed its delivery plan over the past year. According to the
program manager, instead of taking custody of the ship from the builder’s yard and
completing the combat system at Naval Base San Diego, the Navy is now planning to
contract with a private shipyard to install the combat system and will not take delivery or
commission DDG 1002 until it is fully complete. The program manager stated that this
new approach may result in additional schedule delays; however, it will free up valuable
Congressional Research Service

27

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

pier space in Naval Base San Diego and enable the Navy to avoid moving the crew onboard
DDG 1002 until it is ready to operate. The program manager identified the change as a
response to lessons learned from DDG 1000 and 1001—specifically, that completing
combat system activation and final construction is complicated by onboard crew, in part,
because access to spaces is more constrained.
Program Office Comments
We provided a draft of this assessment to the program office for review and comment. The
program office provided technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate.
The program office stated that it continues to make significant progress in the construction,
testing, activation, and sustainment of the Zumwalt class. It added that final delivery of
DDG 1000 marked the transition to the next phase of development and integrated at-sea
testing. According to the program office, DDG 1000 conducted the class’s first live fire
test of the vertical launching system in October 2020, and DDG 1000 will continue lead
ship developmental and integrated at-sea testing in support of achieving initial operational
capability, planned for December 2021. The program office stated that DDG 1001
completed installation of its combat systems in March 2020 and is currently activating its
weapons, sensors, and communications systems. Additionally, it noted that construction of
DDG 1002 is 97 percent complete, and on a path to delivery following activation of its
combat systems.35
Procurement Cost Cap
Section 123 of the FY2006 defense authorization act (H.R. 1815/P.L. 109-163 of January 6, 2006)
limited the procurement cost of the fifth DDG-1000 to $2.3 bil ion, plus adjustments for inflation
and other factors. Given the truncation of the DDG-1000 program to three ships, this unit
procurement cost cap appears moot.
2010 Nunn-McCurdy Breach, Program Restructuring, and
Milestone Recertification
On February 1, 2010, the Navy notified Congress that the DDG-1000 program had experienced a
critical cost breach under the Nunn-McCurdy provision. The Nunn-McCurdy provision (10
U.S.C. 2433a) requires certain actions to be taken if a major defense acquisition program exceeds
(i.e., breaches) certain cost-growth thresholds and is not terminated. Among other things, a
program that experiences a cost breach large enough to qualify under the provision as a critical
cost breach has its previous acquisition system milestone certification revoked. (In the case of the
DDG-1000 program, this was Milestone B.) In addition, for the program to proceed rather than be
terminated, DOD must certify certain things, including that the program is essential to national
security and that there are no alternatives to the program that wil provide acceptable capability to
meet the joint military requirement at less cost.36
The Navy stated in its February 1, 2010, notification letter that the DDG-1000 program’s critical
cost breach was a mathematical consequence of the program’s truncation to three ships.37 Since

35 Government Accountability Office, Weapon Systems Annual Assessment[:] Updated Program Oversight Approach
Needed, GAO-21-222, p. 171.
36 For more on the Nunn-McCurdy provision, see CRS Report R41293, The Nunn-McCurdy Act: Background,
Analysis, and Issues for Congress, by Moshe Schwartz and Charles V. O'Connor.
37 Source: Letter to congressional offices dated February 1, 2010, from Robert O. Work, Acting Secretary of the Navy,
to Representative Ike Skelton, provided to CRS by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs on February 24, 2010.
Congressional Research Service

28

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

the DDG-1000 program has roughly $9.3 bil ion in research and development costs, truncating
the program to three ships increased to roughly $3.1 bil ion the average amount of research and
development costs that are included in the average acquisition cost (i.e., average research and
development cost plus procurement cost) of each DDG-1000. The resulting increase in program
acquisition unit cost (PAUC)—one of two measures used under the Nunn-McCurdy provision for
measuring cost growth38—was enough to cause a Nunn-McCurdy critical cost breach.
In a June 1, 2010, letter (with attachment) to Congress, Ashton Carter, the DOD acquisition
executive (i.e., the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), stated
that he had restructured the DDG-1000 program and that he was issuing the certifications
required under the Nunn-McCurdy provision for the restructured DDG-1000 program to
proceed.39 The letter stated that the restructuring of the DDG-1000 program included the
following:
 A change to the DDG-1000’s design affecting its primary radar.
 A change in the program’s Initial Operational Capability (IOC) from FY2015 to
FY2016.
 A revision to the program’s testing and evaluation requirements.
Regarding the change to the ship’s design affecting its primary radar, the DDG-1000 original y
was to have been equipped with a dual-band radar (DBR) consisting of the Raytheon-built X-
band SPY-3 multifunction radar (MFR) and the Lockheed-built S-band SPY-4 Volume Search
Radar (VSR). (Raytheon is the prime contractor for the overal DBR.) Both parts of the DBR
have been in development for the past several years. An attachment to the June 1, 2010, letter
stated that, as a result of the program’s restructuring, the ship is now to be equipped with “an
upgraded multifunction radar [MFR] and no volume search radar [VSR].” The change eliminates
the Lockheed-built S-band SPY-4 VSR from the ship’s design. The ship might retain a space and
weight reservation that would permit the VSR to be backfitted to the ship at a later point. The
Navy states that
As part of the Nunn-McCurdy certification process, the Volume Search Radar (VSR)
hardware was identified as an acceptable opportunity to reduce cost in the program and
thus was removed from the current baseline design....
Modifications will be made to the SPY-3 Multi-Function Radar (MFR) with the focus of
meeting ship Key Performance Parameters. The MFR modifications will involve software
changes to perform a volume search functionality. Shipboard operators will be able to
optimize the SPY-3 MFR for either horizon search or volume search. While optimized for
volume search, the horizon search capability is limited. Without the VSR, DDG 1000 is
still expected to perform local area air defense....
The removal of the VSR will result in an estimated $300 million net total cost savings for
the three-ship class. These savings will be used to offset the program cost increase as a
result of the truncation of the program to three ships. The estimated cost of the MFR

38 PAUC is the sum of the program’s research and development cost and procurement cost divided by the number of
units in the program. T he other measure used under the Nunn -McCurdy provision to measure cost growth is average
program unit cost (APUC), which is the program’s total procurement cost divided by the number of units in the
program.
39 Letter dated June 1, 2010, from Ashton Carter, Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, T echnology and Logistics)
to the Honorable Ike Skelton, with attachment. The letter and attachment were posted on InsideDefense.com
(subscription required) on June 2, 2010.
Congressional Research Service

29

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

software modification to provide the volume search capability will be significantly less
than the estimated procurement costs for the VSR.40
Regarding the figure of $300 mil ion net total cost savings in the above passage, the Navy during
2011 determined that eliminating the SPY-4 VSR from the DDG-1000 increased by $54 mil ion
the cost to integrate the dual-band radar into the Navy’s new Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) class
aircraft carriers.41 Subtracting this $54 mil ion cost from the above $300 mil ion savings figure
would bring the net total cost savings to about $246 mil ion on a Navy-wide basis.
A July 26, 2010, press report quotes Captain James Syring, the DDG-1000 program manager, as
stating the following: “We don’t need the S-band radar to meet our requirements [for the DDG-
1000],” and “You can meet [the DDG-1000’s operational] requirements with [the] X-band [radar]
with software modifications.”42
An attachment to the June 1, 2010, letter stated that the PAUC for the DDG-1000 program had
increased 86%, triggering the Nunn-McCurdy critical cost breach, and that the truncation of the
program to three ships was responsible for 79 of the 86 percentage points of increase. (The
attachment stated that the other seven percentage points of increase are from increases in
development costs that are primarily due to increased research and development work content for
the program.)
Carter also stated in his June 1, 2010, letter that he had directed that the DDG-1000 program be
funded, for the period FY2011-FY2015, to the cost estimate for the program provided by the Cost
Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) office (which is a part of the Office of the Secretary
of Defense [OSD]), and, for FY2016 and beyond, to the Navy’s cost estimate for the program.
The program was previously funded to the Navy’s cost estimate for al years. Since CAPE’s cost
estimate for the program is higher than the Navy’s cost estimate, funding the program to the
CAPE estimate for the period FY2011-FY2015 wil increase the cost of the program as it appears
in the budget for those years. The letter states that DOD “intends to address the [resulting]
FY2011 [funding] shortfal [for the DDG-1000 program] through reprogramming actions.”
An attachment to the letter stated that the CAPE in May 2010 estimated the PAUC of the DDG-
1000 program (i.e., the sum of the program’s research and development costs and procurement
costs, divided by the three ships in the program) as $7.4 bil ion per ship in then-year dollars
($22.1 bil ion in then-year dollars for al three ships), and the program’s average procurement unit
cost (APUC), which is the program’s total procurement cost divided by the three ships in the
program, as $4.3 bil ion per ship in then-year dollars ($12.8 bil ion in then-year dollars for al
three ships). The attachment stated that these estimates are at a confidence level of about 50%,
meaning that the CAPE believes there is a roughly 50% chance that the program can be
completed at or under these cost estimates, and a roughly 50% chance that the program wil
exceed these cost estimates.
An attachment to the letter directed the Navy to “return for a Defense Acquisition Board (DAB)
review in the fal 2010 timeframe when the program is ready to seek approval of the new

40 Source: Undated Navy information paper on DDG-51 program restructuring provided to CRS and CBO by Navy
Office of Legislative Affairs on July 19, 2010.
41 Source: Undated Navy information paper on CVN-78 cost issues, provided by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs to
CRS on March 19, 2012.
42 Cid Standifer, “Volume Radar Contracted For DDG-1000 Could Be Shifted T o CVN-79,” Inside the Navy, July 26,
2010. See also Joseph T revithick and T yler Rogoway, “ Navy’s T roubled Stealth Destroyers May Have Radars
Replaced Before Ever Sailing On A Mission,” The Drive, October 15, 2020.
Congressional Research Service

30

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

Milestone B and authorization for production of the DDG-1002 [i.e., the third ship in the
program].”
On October 8, 2010, DOD reinstated the DDG-1000 program’s Milestone B certification and
authorized the Navy to continue production of the first and second DDG-1000s and commence
production of the third DDG-1000.43

Author Information

Ronald O'Rourke

Specialist in Naval Affairs

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should n ot be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to
copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

43 Christopher J. Castelli, “Pentagon Approves Key Milestone For Multibillion -Dollar Destroyer,” Inside the Navy,
November 22, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
RL32109 · VERSION 248 · UPDATED
31