Department of Defense Directed Energy
September 28, 2021
Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress Kelley M. Sayler,
Directed energy (DE) weapons use concentrated electromagnetic energy, rather than kinetic
Coordinator
energy, to combat enemy forces. Although the United States has been researching directed
Analyst in Advanced
energy since the 1960s, some experts have observed that the Department of Defense (DOD) has
Technology and Global
invested billions of dollars in DE programs that failed to reach maturity and were ultimately
Security
cancelled. In recent years, however, DOD has made progress on DE weapons development,

deploying the first operational U.S. DE weapon in 2014 aboard the USS Ponce. Since then, DE
Andrew Feickert
weapons development has continued, with DOD issuing a Directed Energy Roadmap to
Specialist in Military
coordinate the department’s efforts. DOD has also introduced a High Energy Laser Scaling
Ground Forces
Initiative, which seeks to strengthen the defense industrial base for DE weapons and improve

laser beam quality and efficiency.
John R. Hoehn
This report provides background information and issues for Congress on DE weapons, including
Analyst in Military
Capabilities and Programs
high-energy lasers (HELs) and high-powered microwave (HPM) weapons, and outlines selected

unclassified DOD, Air Force, Army, and Navy DE programs. If successfully fielded, HELs could
be used by ground forces in a range of missions, including short-range air defense (SHORAD);
Ronald O'Rourke
counter-unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS); and counter-rocket, artillery, and mortar (C-RAM)
Specialist in Naval Affairs
missions. HPM weapons could provide a nonkinetic means of disabling adversary electronics and

communications systems. Compared with traditional munitions, DE weapons could offer lower
logistical requirements, lower costs per shot, and—assuming access to a sufficient power

supply—deeper magazines. These weapons could, however, face a number of limitations not
faced by their kinetic counterparts. For example, atmospheric conditions (e.g., rain, fog, obscurants) could potentially limit
the range and beam quality of DE weapons, in turn reducing their effectiveness.
As DOD continues to invest in DE weapons, Congress may consider the weapons’ technological maturity, lifecycle cost,
characteristics, mission utility, industrial base, intelligence requirements, and oversight structure. Congress may also consider
the implications of DE weapons for future arms control agreements.

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Department of Defense Directed Energy Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress

Introduction
This report provides background information and issues for Congress on Department of Defense
(DOD) efforts to develop and procure directed energy (DE) weapons. The report provides an
overview of certain DOD, Air Force, Army, and Navy DE programs. Two other CRS reports
provide additional discussion of Army and Navy DE programs.1 Some types of DE weapons, such
as particle-beam weapons, are outside the scope of this report.
DOD’s efforts on DE weapons pose a number of potential issues for Congress. Decisions that
Congress makes on these issues could have substantial implications for future DOD capabilities
and funding requirements and the U.S. defense industrial base.
Overview of Directed Energy Weapons2
DOD defines directed energy weapons as those using concentrated electromagnetic energy, rather
than kinetic energy, to “incapacitate, damage, disable, or destroy enemy equipment, facilities,
and/or personnel.”3 DE weapons include high-energy laser (HEL) and high-powered microwave
(HPM) weapons.
HEL weapons might be used by ground forces in various missions, including short-range air
defense (SHORAD); counter-unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS); and counter-rocket, artil ery,
and mortar (C-RAM) missions.4 The weapons might be used to “dazzle” (i.e., temporarily
disable) or damage satel ites and sensors. This could in turn interfere with intel igence-gathering
operations; military communications; and positioning, navigation, and timing systems used for
weapons targeting. In addition, HEL weapons could theoretical y provide options for boost-phase
missile intercept, given their speed-of-light travel time; however, experts disagree on the
affordability, technological feasibility, and utility of this application.5
In general, HEL weapons might offer lower logistical requirements, lower costs per shot, and—
assuming access to a sufficient power supply—deeper magazines compared with traditional
munitions. (Although a number of different types of HELs exist, many of the United States’
current programs are solid state lasers, which are fueled by electrical power. As a result, the cost
per shot would be equivalent to the cost of the electrical power required to fire the shot.)6 This

1 See CRS Report R45098, U.S. Army Weapons-Related Directed Energy (DE) Programs: Background and Potential
Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert ; and CRS Report R44175, Navy Lasers, Railgun, and Gun-Launched Guided
Projectile: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
2 T his section was written by Kelley M. Sayler, CRS Analyst in Advanced T echnology and Global Security. For more
information—including information about DE weapons programs in China and Russia—see CRS Report R46458,
Em erging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress, by Kelley M. Sayler.
3 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations, Joint Publication 3 -85, May 22, 2020, p. GL-6.
4 For more information about the role of DE weapons in C-UAS missions, see CRS In Focus IF11426, Department of
Defense Counter-Unm anned Aircraft System s, by John R. Hoehn and Kelley M. Sayler.
5 See, for example, James N. Miller and Frank A. Rose, “ Bad Idea: Space-Based Interceptors and Space-Based
Directed Energy Systems,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 13, 2018, at
https://defense360.csis.org/bad-idea-space-based-interceptors-and-space-based-directed energy-systems/; and Justin
Doubleday, “ Pentagon punts MDA’s laser ambitions, shifts funding toward OSD-led ‘laser scaling,’” Inside Defense,
February 19, 2020, at https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/pentagon-punts-mdas-laser-ambitions-shifts-funding-
toward-osd-led-laser-scaling.
6 Ariel Robinson, “ Directed Energy Weapons: Will T hey Ever Be Ready?,” National Defense, July 1, 2015, at
https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2015/7/1/2015july-directed energy-weapons-will-they-ever-be-
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could in turn produce a favorable cost-exchange ratio for the defender, whose marginal costs
would be significantly lower than those of the aggressor.
Similarly, HPM weapons could provide a nonkinetic means of disabling adversary electronics and
communications systems. These weapons could potential y generate effects over wider areas—
disabling any electronics within their electromagnetic cone—than HEL weapons, which emit a
narrower beam of energy (see Figure 1). Some analysts have noted that HPM weapons might
provide more effective area defense against missile salvos and swarms of unmanned aircraft
systems. HPM weapons in an anti-personnel configuration might provide a means of nonlethal
crowd control, perimeter defense, or patrol or convoy protection.7 Potential advantages and
limitations of both HEL and HPM weapons are discussed in greater detail in Appendix A.
Figure 1. Illustrative Effects of HELs vs HPM Weapons

Source: CRS image based on an image in Mark Gunzinger and Chris Dougherty, Changing the Game: The Promise
of Directed-Energy Weapons, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, April 19, 2021, p. 40, at
https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/CSBA_ChangingTheGame_ereader.pdf.
Note: Units of measurement are il ustrative.
Selected Defense-Wide Directed Energy Programs8
DOD directed energy programs are coordinated by the Principal Director for Directed Energy
within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
(OUSD[R&E]). The Principal Director for Directed Energy is additional y responsible for
development and oversight of the Directed Energy Roadmap, which articulates DOD’s objective
of “[achieving] dominance in DE military applications in every mission and domain where they
give advantage.”9 The roadmap outlines DOD’s plan to increase power levels of HEL weapons
from around 150 kilowatt (kW), as is currently feasible, to around 300 kW by FY2022, 500 kW
by FY2024, and 1 megawatt (MW) by FY2030.10 For reference, although no consensus exists

ready.
7 See, for example, Joint Intermediate Force Capabilities Office, “Active Denial System FAQs,”
https://jnlwp.defense.gov/About/Frequently-Asked-Questions/Active-Denial-System-FAQs/.
8 T his section was written by Kelley M. Sayler, CRS Analyst in Advanced T echnology and Global Security.
9 Dr. Jim T rebes, “Advancing High Energy Laser Weapon Capabilities: What is OUSD (R&E) Doing?,” Presentation at
the Institute for Defense and Government Advancement (IDGA), October 21, 2020.
10 Kilowatts and megawatts are units of power. One kilowatt is equal to one thousand watts, while one megawatt is
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regarding the precise power level that would be needed to neutralize different target sets, DOD
briefing documents (see Figure 2) suggest that a laser of approximately 100 kW could engage
UASs, rockets, artil ery, and mortars, whereas a laser of around 300 kW could additional y
engage smal boats and cruise missiles flying in certain profiles (i.e., flying across—rather than
at—the laser).11 Lasers of 1 MW could potential y neutralize bal istic missiles and hypersonic
weapons.12
Figure 2. Summary of DOD Directed Energy Roadmap

Source: Dr. Jim Trebes, “Advancing High Energy Laser Weapon Capabilities: What is OUSD (R&E) Doing?,”
presentation at the Institute for Defense and Government Advancement (IDGA), October 21, 2020.
In addition to the DE roadmap, OUSD(R&E) manages the High Energy Laser Scaling Initiative
(HELSI), which seeks “to demonstrate laser output power scaling while maintaining or improving
beam quality and efficiency.”13 HELSI is intended to strengthen the defense industrial base for
potential future DE weapons by providing near-term prototyping opportunities for industry
partners.14 OUSD(R&E) has completed a DOD-wide Laser Lethality Analysis Process Review to
identify future needs for the department and best practices for DE development and use. In
addition, OUSD(R&E) is establishing a Directed Energy Lethality Database, a searchable
repository for DOD’s DE analyses.15

equal to one million watts.
11 Dr. Jim T rebes, “Advancing High Energy Laser Weapon Capabilities: What is OUSD (R&E) Doing?,” Presentation
at IDGA, October 21, 2020; and CRS conversation with Principal Director for Directed Energy Modernization Dr. Jim
T rebes, November 17, 2020. Required power levels could be impacted by addit ional factors such as adversary
countermeasures and atmospheric conditions and effects.
12 Dr. Jim T rebes, “Advancing High Energy Laser Weapon Capabilities: What is OUSD (R&E) Doing?,” Presentation
at IDGA, October 21, 2020.
13 Dr. Jim T rebes, “Advancing High Energy Laser Weapon Capabilities: What is OUSD (R&E) Doing?,” Presentation
at IDGA, October 21, 2020.
14 Industry participants in HELSI include nLight -Nutronics (sponsored by the Navy), Lockheed Martin (sponsored by
the Army), and General Atomics (sponsored by the Air Force). See Nancy Jones-Bonbrest, “ Scaling Up: Army
Advances 300kW-class Laser Prototype,” Army Rapid Capabilities and Critical T echnologies Office, March 3, 2020, at
https://www.army.mil/article/233346/scaling_up_army_advances_300kw_class_laser_prototype.
15 OUSD(R&E) plans to have the database available for data incorporation and use by early 2022. CRS correspondence
with Distinguished Scientist for Laser Weapon Systems Lethality Dr. Christopher Lloyd, January 11, 2021.
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In support of these initiatives, DOD maintains a number of Defense-wide research programs,
including programs at the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD), and the Defense Advanced Projects Research Agency (DARPA). For example, MDA’s
Directed Energy Demonstrator Development program “addresses technology risk reduction and
maturation for high powered strategic lasers, beam control, lethality, and related technologies” in
support of OUSD(R&E)’s Directed Energy Roadmap.16 The program received $42 mil ion in
FY2021. MDA did not request funding for the program in FY2022 “due to a shift in Department
of Defense priorities”; however, program tests are scheduled to continue through 2022.17
In FY2022, OSD requested $15 mil ion for High Energy Laser Research Initiatives, including
basic research and educational grants, and $46 mil ion for High Energy Laser Development,
which funds applied research.18 OSD additional y requested $107 mil ion in FY2022 for High
Energy Laser Advanced Development, which is focused on “scaling the output power of DE
systems to reach operational y effective power levels applicable to broad mission areas across the
DOD.”19 OSD requested $11 mil ion in FY2022 to continue assessments of directed energy
weapons, including assessments of the weapons’ effects, effectiveness, and limitations.20 Final y,
DARPA’s Waveform Agile Radio-frequency Directed Energy (WARDEN) program seeks to
“extend the range and lethality of high power microwave weapons ... [for] counter-unmanned
aerial systems, vehicle and vessel disruption, electronic strike, and guided missile defense.”
DARPA received $6 mil ion for WARDEN in FY2021 and requested $15 mil ion for the program
in FY2022.21
Overal , DOD requested at least $578 mil ion in FY2022 for unclassified DE research,
development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E), and at least $331 mil ion for unclassified DE
weapons procurement.22

16 DOD, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 Budget Estimates, Missile Defense Agency, Defense -Wide
Justification Book Volum e 2a of 5 Research, Developm ent, Test & Evaluation, Defense-Wide, p. 554, at
https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2021/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT _and_E/
RDT E_Vol2_MDA_RDT E_PB21_Justification_Book.pdf .
17 DOD, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Missile Defense Agency, Defense -Wide
Justification Book Volum e 2a of 5 Research, Developm ent, Test & Evaluation, Defense -Wide, pp. 535 and 534, at
https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2022/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT _and_E/
RDT E_Vol2_MDA_RDT E_PB22_Justification_Book.pdf .
18 T hese programs were transferred to OSD from the Air Force to “better align [the] research area to Department of
Defense Science and T echnology strategy and priorities for Directed Energy.” T his transfer could reflect greater
coordination across DOD DE programs. DOD, Departm ent of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estim ates, Office
of the Secretary of Defense, Defense-Wide Justification Book Volum e 3 of 5 Research, Developm ent, Test &
Evaluation, pp. 1 and 79, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2022/
budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT _and_E/RDT E_Vol3_OSD_RDT E_PB22_Justification_Book.pdf .
19 DOD, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Defense-
Wide Justification Book Volum e 3 of 5 Research, Developm ent, Test & Evaluation , p. 335, at
https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2022/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT _and_E/
RDT E_Vol3_OSD_RDT E_PB22_Justification_Book.pdf .
20 DOD, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Defense -
Wide Justification Book Volum e 3 of 5 Research, Developm ent, Test & Evaluation , p. 357, at
https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2022/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT _and_E/
RDT E_Vol3_OSD_RDT E_PB22_Justification_Book.pdf.
21 DOD, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency, Defense-Wide Justification Book Volum e 1 of 5 Research, Developm ent, Test & Evaluation , p. 141, at
https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2022/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT _and_E/
RDT E_Vol1_DARPA_MasterJustificationBook_PB_2022.pdf .
22 T hese figures include funding for DOD-wide programs as well as programs managed by the Air Force, Army, and
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Selected Air Force Directed Energy
Weapons Programs23
The Air Force is developing and testing a number of DE technologies through the Directed
Energy Directorate of the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL). The following section provides
a brief description of selected unclassified efforts.
Tactical High-Power Operational Responder (THOR)
The Tactical High-Power Microwave Operational Responder (THOR) technology demonstrator
(see Figure 3), designed by AFRL in collaboration with industry partners, is intended to provide a
viable DE C-UAS weapon system focused on short-range air base defense.24 THOR is housed in
a standardized 20-foot transport container that enables it to fit inside a C-130 transport aircraft.
Users reportedly can deploy the system in three hours and operate its user interface with only
rudimentary training.25 According to Air Force press releases, THOR has successfully completed
a two-year test period and is to inform follow-on prototype efforts.26
Figure 3. THOR Demonstrator

Source: U.S. Air Force, AFRL Directed Energy Directorate, press release, September 24, 2019.
Phaser High-Powered Microwave
The Phaser High-Powered Microwave system (see Figure 4), developed by Raytheon, is intended
to provide a short-range C-UAS capability similar to that of THOR. The Air Force reportedly

Navy. CRS analysis of FY2022 budget documents; see Appe ndix B and Appe ndix C for additional information.
23 T his section was written by former CRS Research Assistant Samuel D. Ryder and updated by John R. Hoehn, CRS
Analyst in Military Capabilities and Programs.
24 Industry partners include BAE Systems, Leidos, and Verus Research. T HOR also features a proprietary radar system
developed by Black Sage.
25 Bryan Ripple, “Enemy drone operators may soon face the power of T HOR,” 88th Air Base Wing Public Affairs,
September 24, 2019, at https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1836495/air-force-research-laboratory-
completes-successful-shoot -down-of-air-launched-m/.
26 1st Lt. James Wymer, “AFRL’s drone killer, T HOR will welcome new drone ‘hammer,’” U.S. Air Force, August 2,
2021, at https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2713908/afrls-drone-killer-thor-will-welcome-new-drone-
hammer/.
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procured a $16.3 mil ion prototype Phaser for testing and overseas field assessments; however, it
is unclear whether the system has been deployed outside the United States.27
Figure 4. Phaser Demonstrator

Source: Raytheon Missiles and Defense, Phaser product page, February 2020.
Counter-Electronic High Power Microwave Extended Range Air
Base Defense (CHIMERA)
AFRL awarded Raytheon Missiles and Defense a contract for testing of the Counter-Electronic
High Power Microwave Extended Range Air Base Defense (CHIMERA) system in October 2020.
In contrast to THOR and Phaser, which are designed for a short-range C-UAS mission, the
CHIMERA system is intended to be able to engage UAS at greater distances.28 Unclassified
information about the CHIMERA system is limited.
High-Energy Laser Weapon System (HELWS)
The High-Energy Laser Weapon System (HELWS) is to serve as a mobile C-UAS capability for
air base defense (see Figure 5). The system comprises a laser weapon and multispectral targeting
system mounted on the back of a Polaris MRZR al -terrain vehicle and can reportedly operate at
distances of up to 3 km.29 HELWS developer Raytheon claims the laser can fire dozens of shots
using a single charge from a standard 220-volt outlet, and an indefinite number of shots if
connected to an external power source such as a generator.30 The Air Force acquired the first

27 Joe Pappalardo, “T he Air Force Is Deploying Its First Drone-Killing Microwave Weapon,” Popular Mechanics,
September 24, 2019, at https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a29198555/phaser-weapon-air-force/;
and T heresa Hitchens, “ AF Says Lasers Are Being Field T ested, but NOT T HOR or Other Microwave Weapons,”
Breaking Defense, December 22, 2020, at https://breakingdefense.com/2020/12/af-says-lasers-are-being-field-tested-
but-not-thor-or-other-microwave-weapon/.
28 Sara Sirota, “AFRL to award Raytheon sole-sourced contract for directed energy weapon,” Inside Defense, October
29, 2020, at https://insidedefense.com/insider/afrl-award-raytheon-sole-sourced-contract-directed-energy-weapon.
29 Raytheon, “ Raytheon Intelligence & Space delivers another Air Force laser system ready for op erational use,”
September 14, 2020, https://www.raytheonintelligenceandspace.com/news/advisories/raytheon-intelligence-space-
delivers-another-air-force-laser-system-ready; and Nathan Strout, “ Raytheon awarded $15.5 million to upgrade laser
weapon,” C4ISRNET, April 7, 2021, at https://www.c4isrnet.com/unmanned/2021/04/07/raytheon-awarded-155-to-
upgrade-laser-weapon/.
30 Kyle Mizokami, “ T he Air Force Mobilizes Its Laser and Microwave Weapons Abroad,” Popular Mechanics, April 9,
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HELWS in October 2019 and reportedly deployed HELWS overseas for field assessments in
April 2020.31 The Air Force additional y awarded Raytheon a $15.5 mil ion contract for an
upgraded version of HELWS in April 2021.32 This version is to be “delivered unmounted on
pal ets for potential use with different platforms.”33
Figure 5. HELWS Prototype

Source: Raytheon Missiles and Defense, HELWS product page, April 2020.
Self-Protect High-Energy Laser Demonstrator (SHiELD)
The Self-Protect High-Energy Laser Demonstrator (SHiELD) is a prototype system in
development by AFRL, Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Northrop Grumman (see Figure 6). It is
intended to mount as an external pod on Air Force aircraft—from fourth-generation F-15 fighters
to sixth-generation aircraft currently in development—and target incoming air-to-air and surface-
to-air missiles.34 The Air Force conducted a series of tests of the Demonstrator Laser Weapon
System, a ground-based test surrogate for SHiELD, in April 2019. The demonstrator successfully
engaged incoming missiles and helped validate SHiELD’s technology; however, technical
chal enges and chal enges related to the COVID-19 pandemic have reportedly pushed SHiELD’s
first flight demonstration from FY2021 to FY2024.35 Furthermore, at a June 2020 Mitchel

2020, at https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a32083799/laser-microwave-weapons/; and Raytheon,
“Raytheon Intelligence & Space delivers another Air Force laser system ready for operational use,” September 14,
2020, at https://www.raytheonintelligenceandspace.com/news/advisories/raytheon-intelligence-space-delivers-another-
air-force-laser-system-ready.
31 Raytheon, “Raytheon Delivers First Laser Counter-UAS System to U.S. Air Force,” October 22, 2019, at
https://raytheon.mediaroom.com/2019-10-22-Raytheon-delivers-first-laser-counter-UAS-System-to-U-S-Air-
Force#:~:text=Laser%20dune%20buggy%20set%20for,Air%20Force%20earlier%20this%20month ; and 88th Air Base
Wing Public Affairs, “ AFRL gives warfighters new weapons system,” April 6, 2020, at https://www.whs.mil/News/
News-Display/Article/2138161/afrl-gives-warfighters-new-weapons-system/.
32 Nathan Strout, “ Raytheon awarded $15.5 million to upgrade laser weapon,” C4ISRNET, April 7, 2021, at
https://www.c4isrnet.com/unmanned/2021/04/07/raytheon-awarded-155-to-upgrade-laser-weapon/.
33 Ibid.
34 See Joanne Perkins, “ AFRL’s SHiELD set to receive critical assembly,” Air Force Research Laboratory, February
23, 2021, at https://www.afrl.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2511692/afrls-shield-set-to-receive-critical-
assembly/.
35 “Air Force Research Laboratory completes successful shoot down of air-launched missiles,” 88th Air Base Wing
Public Affairs, May 3, 2019, at https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1836495/air-force-research-
laboratory-completes-successful-shoot -down-of-air-launched-m/; Valerie Insinna, “ US Air Force delays timeline for
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Institute event, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force Wil Roper stated that the Air Force is
reassessing the technological maturity of and use cases for SHiELD, as wel as its potential role
in missile defense missions.36 Former Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
Mike Griffin has noted that he is “extremely skeptical that we can put a large laser on an aircraft
and use it to shoot down an adversary missile, even from fairly close.”37
Figure 6. SHiELD Prototype Rendering

Source: Lockheed Martin, Tactical Airborne Laser Weapon System, September 14, 2020 .
Selected Army-Directed Energy Weapons Programs38
In support of its directed energy strategy, the Army is developing both HEL and HPM weapons
with the intent of “field[ing] prototypes to operational units starting in Fiscal Year (FY) 2022.”39
Multi-Mission HEL (MMHEL) and Directed Energy Maneuver-
Short-Range Air Defense (DE M-SHORAD)
MMHEL (see Figure 7) seeks to integrate a 50 kW-class laser on a Stryker combat vehicle to
provide SHORAD support to the Army’s maneuver brigades. The Army has stated that “the
[system’s] average cost per kil is approximately $30.”40 The Army expects to conduct

testing a laser on a fighter jet,” Defense News, June 30, 2020, at https://www.defensenews.com/air/2020/06/30/us-air-
force-delays-timeline-for-testing-a-laser-on-a-fighter-jet/; and Nathan Strout, “ Air Force to begin assembly of airborne
laser,” C4ISRNET, February 23, 2021, at https://www.c4isrnet.com/battlefield-tech/2021/02/23/air-force-to-begin-
assembly-of-airborne-laser/.
36 Valerie Insinna, “US Air Force delays timeline for testing a laser on a fighter jet,” Defense News, June 30, 2020, at
https://www.defensenews.com/air/2020/06/30/us-air-force-delays-timeline-for-testing-a-laser-on-a-fighter-jet/.
37 Aaron Mehta, “ Griffin ‘extremely skeptical’ of airborne lasers for missile defense,” Defense News, May 20, 2020, at
https://www.defensenews.com/2020/05/20/griffin-extremely-skeptical-of-airborne-lasers-for-missile-defense/.
38 T his section was written by Andrew Feickert, CRS Specialist in Military Ground Forces. For more information about
U.S. Army DE programs, including information about the Army’s past DE development programs, see CRS Report
R45098, U.S. Arm y Weapons-Related Directed Energy (DE) Program s: Background and Potential Issues for
Congress, by Andrew Feickert .
39 “Army Directed Energy Strategy,” Army Rapid Capabilities and Critical T echnologies Office, August 20, 2021.
40 Richard Sisk, “Army Works to Slim Down Powerful New Laser Defense System ,” Military.com, May 2, 2019, at
https://www.military.com/daily-news/2019/05/01/army-works-slim-down-powerful-new-laser-defense-system.html.
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demonstrations in FY2021 to engage a variety of targets to lead to a technology readiness level
(TRL) of 7.41 MMHEL is intended to inform requirements and reduce risk for the Army’s DE M-
SHORAD program, which is to deliver four prototype systems in FY2022.42
Figure 7. Prototype Multi-Mission High-Energy Laser (MMHEL)

Source: U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, HEL Configurations Summary, May 24, 2017 .
High Energy Laser Tactical Vehicle Demonstrator (HEL TVD) and
Indirect Fire Protection Capability-High Energy Laser (IFPC-HEL)
The HEL TVD program involves the development of a 100 kW-class laser to be mounted on an
existing Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV) truck to provide a counter rocket, artil ery,
and mortar (C-RAM) capability to protect fixed sites, as wel as to provide limited protection in a
mobile mode (see Figure 8). In addition, the HEL TVD could be adapted in a short-range air
defense (SHORAD) role to protect against UAVs and, if successfully scaled to higher power
levels, cruise missiles. In March 2019, the Army announced that Dynetics and Lockheed Martin
were awarded a $130 mil ion contract to develop the HEL TVD.43 The Army seeks to increase the
power output of HEL TVD to 300 kW and leverage the technology within the IFPC-HEL
program.44 IFPC-HEL is scheduled to complete initial demonstrations in FY2022, to deliver four
prototypes in FY2024,45 and to transition to a program of record in FY2025.46

41 T echnology Readiness Levels range from 1 to 9, where 1 signifies that a technology is potentially possible and 9
signifies that a system is in operational use. DOD defines T RL 7 as a prototype near or at the status of an operational
system requiring a demonstration. DOD, Departm ent of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estim ates, Arm y
Justification Book Volum e 2a of 2 Research, Developm ent, Test & Evaluation - Volum e II Budget Activity 4, p. 502, at
https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Documents/BudgetMaterial/2022/Base%20Budget/rdte/
RDT E_BA_4_FY_2022_PB.pdf.
42 Devon L. Suits, “ Army to field laser-equipped Stryker prototypes in FY 2022,” U.S. Army, August 20, 2021, at
https://www.army.mil/article/249549/army_to_field_laser_equipped_stryker_prototypes_in_fy_2022 .
43 Jen Judson, “Dynetics-Lockheed team beats out Raytheon to build 100-kilowatt laser weapon,” Defense News, May
15, 2019, at https://www.defensenews.com/land/2019/05/16/dynetics-lockheed-team-beats-out-raytheon-to-build-100-
kilowatt -laser-weapon/.
44 IFPC-HEL is intended to complement the kinetic interception capability of IFPC.
45 Jared Keller, “T he Army is tripling the power of one of its vehicle-mounted laser systems,” Task and Purpose, May
8, 2020, at https://taskandpurpose.com/news/army-laser-weapon-power/; and Nancy Jones-Bonbrest, “ Scaling Up:
Army Advances 300kW-class Laser Prototype,” Army Rapid Capabilities and Critical T echnologies Office, March 3,
2020, at https://www.army.mil/article/233346/scaling_up_army_advances_300kw_class_laser_prototype.
46 DOD, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Army Justifica tion Book Volume 2a of 2
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Figure 8. Prototype High Energy Laser Tactical Vehicle Demonstrator (HEL TVD)

Source: U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, HEL Configurations Summary, May 24, 2017.
IFPC-High Power Microwave (HPM)
The Army is developing IFPC-HPM to counter groups or swarms of UAS. IFPC-HPM is to be
“paired with IFPC-HEL as part of a layered defense to protect fixed and semi-fixed sites.”47 In
support of this program, the Army is to begin investing in FY2022 as a partner in the Air Force’s
THOR program, as wel as in other Air Force demonstrators.48 The Army’s “THOR prototype
wil undergo a series of risk reduction and system characterization efforts” before its intended
field testing in FY2024.49 IFPC-HPM is scheduled to transition to a program of record in
FY2025.50
Lasers on Next-Generation Army Combat Vehicles?
Army officials suggest that next-generation combat vehicles could feature an active protection
system employing directed energy to protect the vehicle and to replace traditional mounted
weapons.51 The Army asserts that active protection systems featuring lasers could provide 360-
degree protection from incoming rounds or UAVs, and that laser weapons might also be used to
disable or possibly destroy enemy vehicles. Officials note that to begin fielding Army units with a
next-generation combat vehicle in 2035, major decisions would need to be made by 2025. This
time frame suggests that the Army has less than four years to advance laser weapons technology
to a point where it can be considered a viable option, if it is to be incorporated into next-
generation combat vehicles.52

Research, Developm ent, Test & Evaluation - Volum e II Budget Activity 4, p. 395, at https://www.asafm.army.mil/
Portals/72/Documents/BudgetMaterial/2022/Base%20Budget/rdte/RDT E_BA_4_FY_2022_PB.pdf.
47 “Army Directed Energy Strategy,” Army Rapid Capabilities and Critical T echnologies Office, August 20, 2021.
48 See Ashley Roque, “ US Army eyes T HOR fielding by 2024,” Jane’s (subscription required), February 23, 2021, at
https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/us-army-eyes-thor-fielding-by-2024; and “ US Army to test new
microwave weapon for defeating drones,” Associated Press, February 24, 2021.
49 Ashley Roque, “ US Army eyes T HOR fielding by 2024,” Jane’s (subscription required), February 23, 2021, at
https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/us-army-eyes-thor-fielding-by-2024.
50 DOD, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Army Justification Book Volume 2a of 2
Research, Developm ent, Test & Evaluation - Volum e II Budget Activity 4, pp. 402-403, at https://www.asafm.army.mil/
Portals/72/Documents/BudgetMaterial/2022/Base%20Budget/rdte/RDT E_BA_4_FY_2022_PB.pdf.
51 CRS Report R44598, Army and Marine Corps Active Protection System (APS) Efforts, by Andrew Feickert.
52 See Gary Sheftick, “T he Next -Generation Combat Vehicle Could Have Lasers, Run on Hybrid Power,” Army News
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Selected Navy Directed Energy Programs53
The Navy is currently developing lasers with improved capability for countering surface craft and
UAVs, and eventual y a capability for countering anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs). The Navy’s
development roadmap is il ustrated in Figure 9. Navy efforts to develop these more capable
lasers include the Navy Laser Family of Systems (NLFoS):
 the Solid State Laser Technology Maturation (SSL-TM) effort;
 the Optical Dazzling Interdictor, Navy (ODIN);
 the Surface Navy Laser Weapon System (SNLWS) Increment 1, also known as
the High-Energy Laser with Integrated Optical-dazzler and Surveil ance
(HELIOS); and
 the completed Ruggedized High Energy Laser (RHEL).
The Navy is also developing the High Energy Laser Counter-ASCM Program (HELCAP).
NLFoS, HELCAP, and other DOD technologies are to support the development of future, more
capable lasers referred to as SNLWS Increment 2 and SNLWS Increment 3.
Figure 9. Navy Laser Weapon Development Approach

Source: Navy briefing slide provided by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs to CRS on May 6, 2019.

Service, November 3, 2016, and Hope Hodge Seck, “ Next Army Combat Vehicle May Feature Active Protection, Laser
Weapons,” Defense Tech, October 30, 2017.
53 T his section was written by Ronald O’Rourke, CRS Specialist in Naval Affairs. For more information about U.S.
Navy DE programs, including information about the Navy’s past DE development programs, see CRS Report R44175,
Navy Lasers, Railgun, and Gun-Launched Guided Projectile: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald
O'Rourke.
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SSL-TM
The Navy’s FY2021 budget submission states that the SSL Technology Maturation (SSL-TM; see
Figure 10) program
is developing an integrated Laser Weapons System Demonstrator (LWSD) that will be
installed on [the amphibious ship] USS Portland (LPD-27) during FY 2019…. SSL-TM
will provide a new capability to the Fleet to address known capability gaps against
asymmetric threats (UAS, small boats, and ISR sensors) and will inform future acquisition
strategies, system designs, integration architectures, and fielding plans for laser weapon
systems.54
The Navy announced in January 2018 that it intended to instal LWSD on the USS Portland.55
According to the Navy’s FY2021 budget submission, the demonstration on Portland is to
continue through FY2022, and the system is to be removed in early FY2023.56
Figure 10. Navy Graphic of SSL-TM Laser System

Source: Navy briefing slide accompanying Tyler Rogoway, “Mysterious Object Northrop Is Barging From
Redondo Beach Is A High-Power Naval Laser,” The Drive, October 18, 2019. The blog post credits the slide to
the Navy and describes it as a “recent slide.”

54 DOD, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 Budget Estimates, Navy, Justification Book Volume 2 of 5,
Research, Developm ent, Test & Evaluation, Navy, February 2020, p. 188. For additional discussion of SSL-T M, see
U.S. Navy, U.S. Navy Program Guide 2017, pp. 180-181.
55 Megan Eckstein, “LPD Portland Will Host ONR Laser Weapon Demonstrator, Serve as RIMPAC 2018 Flagship,”
USNI News, January 10, 2018; Richard Abott, “ Next Navy Amphib Will Feature Laser Weapon Demo, Chosen As
Flagship For RIMPAC 2018,” Defense Daily, January 11, 2018.
56 DOD, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 Budget Estimates, Navy, Justification Book Volume 2 of 5,
Research, Developm ent, Test & Evaluation, Navy, February 2020 , p. 191.
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On May 22, 2020, the Navy announced that the USS Portland had used its LWSD to successfully
disable a UAV in an at-sea test that was conducted on May 16, 2020.57
Optical Dazzling Interceptor, Navy (ODIN)
According to the Navy’s FY2021 budget submission, the Optical Dazzling Interceptor, Navy
(ODIN) effort is designed to provide “near-term, directed energy, shipboard Counter-Intel igence,
Surveil ance, and Reconnaissance (C-ISR) capabilities to dazzle Unmanned Aerial Systems
(UASs) and other platforms that address urgent operational needs of the Fleet.” 58 The Navy plans
to procure ODIN to deploy on Arleigh Burke Flight IIA destroyers. FY2021 funding for ODIN
would complete the procurement, assembly, checkout, integration, test and evaluation, and
instal ation of ODIN units 4 and 5; continue the procurement, assembly, checkout, integration,
test and evaluation of units 6, 7, and 8; and provide for the operation and sustainment of units 1
through 5.59
ODIN is reportedly the successor to the 30 kW HEL program60 and instal ed aboard the USS
Portland and the USS Dewey.61 The press has reported that the ODIN system has been identified
to fil an urgent need for Pacific Fleet.62
SNLWS Increment 1 (HELIOS)
SNLWS Increment 1 is the High-Energy Laser with Integrated Optical-dazzler and Surveil ance
(HELIOS). The HELIOS effort is focused on rapid development and rapid fielding of a 60 kW-
class high-energy laser (with growth potential to 150 kW) and dazzler in an integrated weapon
system, for use in countering UAS, smal boats, and ISR sensors, and for combat identification
and battle damage assessment.63 HELIOS is currently in land-based testing and is to be instal ed

57 Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet Public Affairs, “ USS Portland Conducts Laser Weapon System Demonstrator T est,”
Navy News Service, May 22, 2020. See also Megan Eckstein, “ VIDEO: USS Portland Fires Laser Weapon, Downs
Drone in First At -Sea T est ,” USNI News, May 22, 2020; Paul McLeary, “ US Warship Fries Drone With Powerful New
Laser,” Breaking Defense, May 22, 2020; Geoff Ziezulewicz, “ Watch T his Ship-mounted Navy Laser Shoot Down a
Drone,” Navy Tim es, May 26, 2020.
58 DOD, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 Budget Estimates, Navy, Justification Book Volume 2 of 5,
Research, Developm ent, Test & Evaluation, Navy, February 2020 , pp. 1031, 1032.
59 DOD, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 Budget Estimates, Navy, Justification Book Volume 2 of 5,
Research, Developm ent, Test & Evaluation, Navy, February 2020 , p. 1031. See also Joseph T revithick, “ Navy T o Add
Laser Weapons T o At Least Seven More Ships In T he Next T hree Years,” The Drive, July 8, 2020.
60 Hope Hodge Seck, “ T he Navy Has Installed the First Drone-Stopping Laser on a Destroyer,” Military.com, February
21, 2020. See also Justin Katz, “Navy Installs Laser on Destroyer to Counter Unmanned Intelligence Drones,” Inside
Defense, February 21, 2020.
61 Christopher P. Cavas, “Lasers Sprout in San Diego,” Defense & Aerospace Report, March 1, 2020. See also Kris
Osborn, “New Destroyer-Fired Laser Weapons Might Stop Hypersonic Missile Attacks,” Warrior Maven, March 1,
2020, which was republished as Kris Osborn, “ Could Naval Lasers Be T he Solution T o China’s Hypersonic Missile
T hreat?” National Interest, March 7, 2020.
62 Daniel P. T aylor, “ The ODIN Shipboard Laser: Science Fiction No More,” Seapower, May 26, 2020.
63 DOD, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 Budget Estimates, Navy, Justification Book Volume 2 of 5,
Research, Developm ent, Test & Evaluation, Navy, February 2020 , p. 1021.
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on a Navy Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, the USS Preble, in December 2021.64 The system is to
remain on the ship for fleet testing and sustainment through at least the end of FY2025.65
Following a full and open competition based on a request for proposals (RFP) released on June
18, 2017, the Navy on January 26, 2018, awarded Lockheed Martin a $150 mil ion contract for
the development, manufacture, and delivery of two HELIOS systems—one for instal ation on a
DDG-51 class Aegis destroyer, the other for land-based testing—by FY2020.66 The contract
includes options for up to 14 additional HELIOS systems that if exercised could increase the total
value of the contract to $942.8 mil ion.67
A March 21, 2019, press report states that Lockheed Martin was developing a 60-150 kW single
laser beam (presumably HELIOS) designed to engage unmanned aircraft systems and smal
boats. 68 The report states that the weapon is designed to provide ISR data into the ship’s combat
system in order to perform sensor dazzling at lower power levels.69 Then-Rear Admiral Boxal ,
the direct of Navy Surface Warfare, described the primary chal enges with the HELIOS program
as being the integration of the weapon system with the command and control systems currently
instal ed and the amount of available power due to increased power consumption of current
systems and sensors, particularly the upgraded SPY-6 radar.70 In addition to instal ing HELIOS on
current destroyers, the Navy plans to instal the system on the USS Little Rock, a Littoral Combat
Ship.71 A contract was awarded to Lockheed Martin on March 9, 2020 to instal the system.72

64 Megan Eckstein, “ Navy Installing More Directed Energy Weapons on DDGs, Conducting Land-Based Laser T esting
T his Year,” USNI News, April 7, 2021.
65 Ibid., p. 1030.
66 See DOD contract awards for January 26, 2018 (Release No: CR-017-18, January 26, 2018); “ Lockheed Gets $150m
Contract to Install High Energy Laser on a Flight IIA DDG-51 destroyer,” NavalToday.com , January 29, 2018;
Kimberly Underwood, “ Navy Selects Lockheed Martin to Deliver Laser Energy Weapon ,” Signal, January 30, 2018;
Richard Scott, “ Lockheed Martin to Develop HELIOS Laser Weapon for DDG 51 Flight IIA Destroyer,” Jane’s Navy
International, January 30, 2018; “ Lockheed Martin Receives $150 Million Contract to Deliver Integrated High Energy
Laser Weapon Systems to U.S. Navy,” Lockheed Martin, March 1, 2018; Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “ First Combat Laser
For Navy Warship: Lockheed HELIOS,” Breaking Defense, March 1, 2018; Jeff Hecht, “ Lockheed Martin to Develop
Laser Weapons for U.S. Navy Destroyers,” IEEE Spectrum , March 2, 2018; Justin Bachman, “ T he Navy Wants a Laser
to Blow Drones Out of the Sky,” March 2, 2018.
67 Richard Abott, “HELIOS Laser T o Be First Fully Integrated On U.S. Ship,” Defense Daily, March 5, 2018: 10-12.
68 Rich Abott, “Navy T o ‘Burn T he Boats’ With Laser For Destroyer In 2021, Needs Bugger LSC For Lasers,” Defense
Daily, March 21, 2019. See also Sam LaGrone, “ Navy Ready to ‘Burn the Boats’ with 2021 Laser Installation on a
Destroyer,” USNI News, March 20, 2019; Kyle Mizokami, “T he Navy Plans to Put HELIOS Laser Weapon on
Destroyer by 2021,” Popular Mechanics, March 21, 2019; Justin Katz, “HELIOS Set for Critical Design Review in
2020, Delivery in May 2021,” Inside Defense, May 2, 2019; Marc Selinger, “US Navy T weaks Destroyer-Based Laser
Effort,” Shephard Media, May 8, 2019.
69 T he article does not describe what power levels would be required to dazzle ISR sensors. Specifics for this capability
are most likely classified.
70 Rich Abott, “Navy T o ‘Burn T he Boats’ With Laser For Destroyer In 2021, Needs Bugger LSC For Lasers,” Defense
Daily, March 21, 2019. See also Sam LaGrone, “ Navy Ready to ‘Burn the Boats’ with 2021 Laser Installation on a
Destroyer,” USNI News, March 20, 2019; Kyle Mizokami, “T he Navy Plans to Put HELIOS Laser Weapon on
Destroyer by 2021,” Popular Mechanics, March 21, 2019; Justin Katz, “HELIOS Set for Critical Design Review in
2020, Delivery in May 2021,” Inside Defense, May 2, 2019; Marc Selinger, “US Navy T weaks Destroyer-Based Laser
Effort,” Shephard Media, May 8, 2019.
71 Megan Eckstein, “ Littoral Combat Ship Will Field Laser Weapon as Part of Lockheed Martin, Navy T est ,” USNI
News, January 13, 2020.
72 Department of Defense, “Contracts for March 9, 2020.” See also Rich Abott, “ Lockheed Martin Nabs $22 Million
Contract For Layered Laser Defense Prototype On LCS,” Defense Daily, March 16, 2020.
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HELCAP
The Navy’s FY2021 budget submission states that the HELCAP effort
will expedite the development, experimentation, integration and demonstration of critical
technologies to defeat crossing Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCM) by addressing the
remaining technical challenges, e.g.: atmospheric turbulence, automatic target
identification and aim point selection, precision target tracking with low jitter in high
clutter conditions, advanced beam control, and higher power HEL development. HELCAP
will assess, develop, experiment, and demonstrate the vario us laser weapon system
technologies and methods of implementation required to defeat ASCMs in a crossing
engagement.73
According to the Navy’s FY2021 budget submission, demonstrations of HELCAP include
“adapting an OSD 300 kW+ laser source for transport and integration with the prototype
system.”74 The Navy plans to demonstrate its ability to detect and defeat ASCMs in the second
through fourth quarters of FY2023.75
Potential Issues and Questions for Congress76
Technological Maturity
Directed energy weapons programs continue to face questions about their technological maturity,
including the ability to improve beam quality and control to militarily useful levels, and to meet
size, weight, and power (SWaP) and cooling requirements for integration into current platforms.77
Some DE systems are smal enough to fit on military vehicles, but many require larger and/or
fixed platforms that could potential y limit deployment options and operational utility. Congress
may consider directing DOD to establish metrics for assessing the pace of technological
advancement. In what ways, if any, are DOD technology maturation efforts reducing the SWaP
and cooling requirements of DE systems?
Cost
Although the United States has been researching directed energy since the 1960s, some experts
have observed that “actual directed-energy programs … have frequently fal en short of
expectations,” with DOD investing bil ions of dollars in programs that failed to reach maturity
and were ultimately cancel ed.78 Directed energy weapons may therefore require greater up-front

73 DOD, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 Budget Estimates, Navy, Justification Book Volume 2 of 5,
Research, Developm ent, Test & Evaluation, Navy, February 2020 , pp. 1011-1012. See also Departm ent of Defense
Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 Budget Estim ates, Navy, Justification Book Volum e 1 of 5, Research, Developm ent, Test &
Evaluation, Navy, February 2020, p. 415.
74 DOD, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 Budget Estimates, Navy, Justification Book Volume 2 of 5,
Research, Developm ent, Test & Evaluation, Navy, February 2020 , p. 1012.
75 Ibid., p. 1020.
76 T his section was written by Kelley M. Sayler, CRS Analyst in Advanced T echnology and Global Security, and John
R. Hoehn, CRS Analyst in Military Capabilities and P rograms.
77 Ariel Robinson, “ Directed Energy Weapons: Will T hey Ever Be Ready?,” National Defense, July 1, 2015, at
https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2015/7/1/2015july-directed-energy-weapons-will-they-ever-be-
ready.
78 Paul Scharre, Directed-Energy Weapons: Promise and Prospects, Center for a New American Security, April 2015,
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investment than traditional kinetic weapons in order to field a successful weapons system.
Congress may consider requesting an independent assessment of the technological maturity and
life cycle cost estimates for various DE weapons as wel as a comparative assessment of costs of
DE weapons versus comparable kinetic weapons. How do estimates of the total lifecycle costs of
DE weapons compare with those of their kinetic counterparts? Does the technological maturity of
DE weapons warrant current funding levels?
Weapons Characteristics
Although DE weapons may offer a lower cost per shot than traditional weapons such as missiles,
DE weapons are subject to a number of limitations. For example, atmospheric conditions (e.g.,
rain, fog, obscurants) and SWaP and cooling requirements can limit the range and beam quality of
DE weapons, in turn reducing their effectiveness. Traditional weapons, in contrast, are less
affected by these factors.79 How, if at al , might the limitations of DE weapons be mitigated by
technological developments such as adaptive optics, concepts of operation, or other methods?
What impact might a failure to mitigate these limitations have on future military operations?
Mission Utility
Given the strengths and weaknesses of DE weapons, DOD is conducting multiple utility studies
to analyze potential concepts of operation for DE weapons and to assess the scenarios in which
they might be militarily useful.80 How might Congress draw upon the conclusions of these
analyses as it conducts oversight of DE weapons programs? What is the appropriate balance
between DE weapons and traditional munitions within the military’s portfolio of capabilities?
Defense Industrial Base
Some analysts have expressed concerns that, in the past, DOD did not provide stable funding for
DE weapons programs or sufficient opportunities for the DE workforce. Acknowledging these
concerns, DOD’s Principal Director for Directed Energy, Dr. Jim Trebes, has stated that, although
he believes the DE industrial base is currently healthy, its capacity could be strained in the future
if DOD begins to buy larger numbers of DE systems. Dr. Trebes has additional y noted that, while
today’s DE workforce is sufficient to need, it may face a demographic problem in the future due
to retirement.81 According to OUSD(R&E), HELSI is intended to address such concerns about the
future of the DE industrial base by providing industry with assured prototyping opportunities. In
what ways, if any, has HELSI strengthened the defense industrial base for DE weapons? What, if
any, chal enges does the base continue to face, and how might they be mitigated?

p. 4.
79 Ariel Robinson, “ Directed Energy Weapons: Will T hey Ever Be Ready?,” National Defense, July 1, 2015, at
https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2015/7/1/2015july-directed-energy-weapons-will-they-ever-be-
ready; and David Vergun, “ Army developing lasers that pierce fog, dust to destroy targets,” Arm y News Service,
October 23, 2017, at https://www.army.mil/article/195650/
army_developing_lasers_that_pierce_fog_dust_to_destroy_targets.
80 Dr. Jim T rebes, “Advancing High Energy Laser Weapon Capabilities: What is OUSD (R&E) Doing?, ” Presentation
at IDGA, October 21, 2020.
81 CRS conversation with Principal Director for Directed Energy Dr. Jim T rebes, November 17, 2020. See also Dr. Jim
T rebes, “Advancing High Energy Laser Weapon Capabilities: What is OUSD (R&E) Doing?,” Presentation at IDGA,
October 21, 2020.
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Intelligence Requirements
Some analysts have questioned whether DOD has sufficient knowledge of adversary DE weapons
systems and materials to develop its own weapons requirements. DOD is currently attempting to
further define its DE collection requirements for the intel igence community (IC) through the
Directed Energy Lethality Intel igence initiative.82 To what extent, if at al , is this initiative
improving connectivity between DOD’s DE community and the IC? What collection
requirements, if any, remain?
Coordination within DOD
Pursuant to Section 219 of the FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) (P.L. 114-
328), OUSD(R&E)’s Principal Director for Directed Energy is tasked with coordinating DE
efforts across DOD and with developing DOD’s Directed Energy Roadmap, which is to guide
development efforts. Section 215 of the FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) additional y established a
Directed Energy Working Group to “analyze and evaluate the current and planned directed energy
programs of each of the military departments ... [and] make recommendations to the Secretary of
Defense.” These recommendations are intended to improve DOD DE coordination activities and
accelerate the fielding of DE capabilities. To what extent are the military departments and defense
agencies adhering to OUSD(R&E)’s roadmap? What, if any, additional authorities or structural
changes would be required to ensure proper implementation of the roadmap and execution of the
working group’s recommendations?
Arms Control
DE weapons “are not authoritatively defined under international law, nor are they currently on the
agenda of any existing multilateral mechanism.”83 However, some applications of DE weapons
are prohibited. Article 1 of the Protocol on Blinding Lasers prohibits the employment of “laser
weapons specifical y designed, as their sole combat function or as one of their combat functions,
to cause permanent blindness to unenhanced vision.”84
Some analysts have suggested that additional multilateral agreements should be considered. For
example, Congress may consider prohibitions on nonlethal anti-personnel uses of DE weapons—
such as “heat rays”85 or lasers intended to cause temporary visual impairment—or on certain
military applications of DE weapons—such as aircraft interference—in peacetime.86 Other

82 Dr. Jim T rebes, “Advancing High Energy Laser Weapon Capabilities: What is OUSD (R&E) Doing?,” Presentation
at IDGA, October 21, 2020.
83 “Directed Energy Weapons: Discussion paper for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW),”
Article 36, November 2017.
84 T he protocol does not cover the development, procurement, or possession of such weapons, nor does it prohibit the
employment of laser weapons that may cause blindness “ as an incidental or collateral effect .” Additional Protocol to
the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deem ed to
Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscrim inate Effects, Vienna, October 13, 1995, United Nations, T reaty Series,
vol. 1380, p. 370, at https://treaties.un.org/doc/T reaties/1995/10/19951013%2001-30%20AM/Ch_XXVI_02_ap.pdf.
For additional information about the protocol and its relationship to DE weapons programs, see Appendix I of CRS
Report R41526, Navy Shipboard Lasers for Surface, Air, and Missile Defense: Background and Issues for Congress, by
Ronald O'Rourke.
85 See “Active Denial T echnology: Fact Sheet,” Joint Intermediate Force Capabilities Office, May 11, 2020, at
https://jnlwp.defense.gov/Press-Room/Fact -Sheets/Article-View-Fact-sheets/Article/577989/active-denial-technology/.
86 Patrick M. Cronin and Ryan D. Neuhard, “Countering China’s Laser Offensive,” The Diplomat, April 2, 2020, at
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analysts have argued that DE weapons could be considered more humane than conventional
weapons because their accuracy could potential y reduce collateral damage and because they
could provide a nonlethal anti-personnel capability in circumstances in which lethal force might
otherwise be used.87 In what circumstances and for what purposes should the U.S. military’s use
of DE weapons be permissible? What, if any, regulations, treaties, or other measures should the
United States consider with regard to the use of DE weapons in both war and peacetime?

https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/countering-chinas-laser-offensive/.
87 See, for example, Mark Gunzinger and Chris Dougherty, Changing the Game: The Promise of Directed-Energy
Weapons, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, April 19, 2021, at https://csbaonline.org/uploads/
documents/CSBA_ChangingT heGame_ereader.pdf.
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Appendix A. Potential Advantages and Limitations
of Directed Energy Weapons88
This appendix provides additional information on potential advantages and limitations of High-
Energy Laser (HEL) and High-Powered Microwave (HPM) weapons. The advantages and
limitations of any HEL or HPM weapons would be specific to the system; as such, al advantages
and limitations might not equal y apply to each system.
Potential Advantages of HEL Weapons
In addition to deeper magazines, lower logistics requirements, and lower costs per shot, potential
advantages of HEL weapons include the following:
 Fast engagement times. Light from a laser beam can reach a target almost
instantly, thereby eliminating the need to calculate an intercept course, as
interceptor missiles must do. By remaining focused on a particular spot on the
target, a laser can cause disabling damage to the target within seconds, depending
on the laser power. After disabling one target, a laser can be redirected to another
target in several seconds.
 Ability to counter radically maneuvering missiles. HEL weapons can follow
and maintain their beam on radical y maneuvering missiles that might stress the
maneuvering capabilities of kinetic interceptors.
 Precision engagements. HEL weapons are precision-engagement weapons—the
area irradiated by the laser, which might be several mil imeters to several inches
in diameter, affects what it hits, while general y not affecting (at least not
directly) separate nearby objects.
 Graduated responses. HEL weapons can perform functions other than
destroying targets, including detecting and monitoring targets and producing
nonlethal effects, including reversible jamming of electro-optic (EO) sensors.
HELs offer the potential for graduated responses that range from warning targets
to reversibly jamming their systems, to causing limited but not disabling damage
(as a further warning), and then final y causing disabling damage.
Potential Limitations of HEL Weapons
Potential limitations of HEL weapons include the following:
 Line of sight. Since laser light passes through the atmosphere on an essential y
straight path, HEL weapons would be limited to line-of-sight engagements, and
consequently could not counter over-the-horizon targets or targets obscured by
intervening objects. As a result, potential engagement ranges against certain
targets (e.g., low-flying targets) would be limited.
 Atmospheric absorption, scattering, and turbulence. Substances in the
atmosphere—particularly water vapor, but also sand, dust, salt particles, smoke,
and other air pollution—absorb and scatter light and atmospheric turbulence can
defocus a laser beam. These effects can reduce the effective range of the HEL

88 T his appendix was written by Ronald O’Rourke (HEL weapons) and Andrew Feickert (HPM weapons), CRS
Specialist in Naval Affairs and CRS Specialist in Military Ground Forces, respectively.
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weapon. Absorption by water vapor is a particular consideration for shipboard
lasers because marine environments feature substantial amounts of water vapor in
the air. There are certain wavelengths of light (i.e., “sweet spots” in the
electromagnetic spectrum) where atmospheric absorption by water vapor is
markedly reduced. Lasers can be designed to emit light at or near those sweet
spots, so as to maximize their potential effectiveness. Absorption general y grows
with distance to target, making it in general less of a potential problem for short-
range operations than for longer-range operations. Adaptive optics, which make
rapid, fine adjustments to a laser beam on a continuous basis in response to
observed turbulence, can counteract the effects of atmospheric turbulence. Even
so, lasers might not work wel , or at al , in rain or fog, preventing lasers from
being an al -weather solution.
 Thermal blooming. A laser that continues firing in the same exact direction for a
certain amount of time can heat up the air it is passing through, which in turn can
defocus the laser beam, reducing its ability to disable the intended target. This
effect, cal ed thermal blooming, can make lasers less effective for countering
targets that are coming straight at them, on a constant bearing (i.e., “down-the-
throat” shots). Most tests of laser systems have been against crossing targets
rather than “down-the-throat” shots. In general, thermal blooming becomes more
of a concern as the power of the laser beam increases.
 Saturation attacks. Since a HEL weapon can attack only one target at a time,
require several seconds to disable the target, and require several more to be
redirected to the next one, a HEL weapon can disable only so many targets within
a given period of time. This places an upper limit on the ability of an individual
laser to deal with saturation attacks—attacks by multiple weapons that approach
the platform simultaneously or within a few seconds of one another. This
limitation can be mitigated by instal ing more than one laser on the platform, up
to space and energy availability.
 Hardened targets and countermeasures. Less powerful lasers—that is, lasers
with beam powers measured in kilowatts (kW) rather than megawatts (MW)—
can have less effectiveness against targets that incorporate shielding, ablative
material, or highly reflective surfaces, or that tumble or rotate rapidly (so that the
laser spot does not remain continuously on a single location on the target’s
surface). Smoke or other obscurants can reduce the susceptibility of a target
platform to laser attack. Such measures, however, can increase the cost and/or
weight of the target platform.
Potential Advantages of HPM Weapons
In addition to deep magazines, low costs per shot, fast engagement times, and graduated
responses, potential advantages of HPM weapons include the following:
 Temporary or system-specific effects. HPM weapons can generate waves at
different frequencies and power levels to temporarily or permanently disrupt
targeted electronic systems while leaving others unaffected.
 Broad effects. HPM weapons can destroy a wide array of unshielded electronic
systems, including both military and commercial systems. In addition, they are
capable of disabling any unshielded electronic system within their
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electromagnetic cone (i.e., they can disable numerous systems, including swarms
of UAS, at once).
 Nonlethal applications. Certain HPM weapons, such as “heat rays,” could
provide a nonlethal anti-personnel capability in circumstances in which lethal
force might otherwise be used.
 Limitation of collateral damage. HPM weapons would generate little to no
collateral damage of physical structures.89 This feature could make them
attractive weapons in urban areas or in situations “short of war.”
Potential Limitations of HPM Weapons
Potential limitations of HPM weapons include the following:
 Range constraints. Because HPM beams are more diffuse than lasers and cannot
be as tightly focused, the “energy per unit area in HPM beams decreases
significantly over distance.”90 This could limit the range at which HPM weapons
are operational y effective.
 Potential for fratricide. Because HPM weapons could affect al unshielded
electronic systems within range, measures must be taken to ensure that friendly
systems are properly shielded or kept outside of the weapon’s range when the
weapon is in use.
 Effectiveness of countermeasures. Because electromagnetic radiation can be
absorbed by shielding, HPM weapons may not be effective against shielded
targets.

89 Anti-personnel HPM weapons could not, however, discriminate between military personnel and civilians and could
therefore impact civilians within the weapon’s electromagnetic cone. Similarly, HPM weapons used against military
electronic equipment could disable unshielded civilian equipment.
90 Mark Gunzinger and Chris Dougherty, Changing the Game: The Promise of Directed-Energy Weapons, Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, April 19, 2021, p. 39, at https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/
CSBA_ChangingT heGame_ereader.pdf.
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Appendix B. Funding for Directed
Energy Programs91
DOD appears to provide some summary funding information for DE programs in budget
documentation. For example, in the FY2020 Defense Budget Overview document, the department
stated it planned to request $235 mil ion for certain offensive and defensive DE capabilities,
including implementing DE applications for base defense, testing and procuring multiple types of
lasers, and researching and developing scalable high-power density applications.92 The document
does not detail which specific programs, projects, and activities are associated with this funding.
It does not appear to include al of the department’s DE programs, projects, and activities.
The following sections provide estimates, based on keyword searches, of how much funding
DOD has requested for DE programs, how much funding Congress has authorized for these DOD
DE programs, and how much funding Congress has appropriated for these DOD DE programs.
CRS is unable to authoritatively identify al DOD funding associated with DE, in part because the
department’s budget documents do not include standard data elements identifying al funding
associated with such work and do not require financial managers to explicitly reference certain
words or terms in program and project descriptions.
Determining Funding Levels for Programs
CRS used the Defense Technical Information Center’s (DTIC’s) DOD Investment Budget Search
tool to identify directed energy research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) and
procurement programs.93 Search terms included “directed energy” and “lasers.”94 These search
terms returned 264 research and development program elements and 90 procurement line items in
FY2020. After assessing each of these programs, CRS identified 13 research and development
program elements and four procurement line items funding directed energy efforts. Using these
results, CRS then traced the funding for these program elements and line items from FY2017 to
FY2022.
To assess whether a program element or line item is developing or procuring DE systems, CRS
analyzed budget documents. If a program element or line item identified more than 50% of its
funding for DE or lasers, it was counted as a DE program listed in Appendix C. This approach
may have certain methodological chal enges. For example, different search terms might include
or exclude certain program elements or line items. Inclusion of a program element or line item
may overstate the amount of funding involved in DE efforts if, for example, the program element

91 T his appendix was written by John R. Hoehn, CRS Analyst in Military Capabilities and Programs.
92 DOD, Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer,
March 2019, Defense Budget Overview, United States Departm ent of Defense Fiscal Year 2020 Budget Request , pp. 1-
9, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2020/
fy2020_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf.
93 DOD’s Defense T echnical Information Center, or DT IC, no longer maintains a publicly accessible website to search
procurement and research and development budget documentation (including R-2 and P-40 exhibits). For more
information, see Jason Sherman, “ DOD moves Google-like tool for searching U.S. military weapon spending behind
firewall,” Inside Defense, November 3, 2020, at https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/dod-moves-google-tool-
searching-us-military-weapon-spending-behind-firewall.
94 Due to database access limitations, CRS was unable to conduct a search for “microwave.”
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or line item supports other purposes. These results therefore should be considered il ustrative and
not comprehensive or exact.
After identifying specific program elements and line items, CRS used the National Defense
Authorization Acts from FY2017 through FY2021 to identify how much each program element or
line item was authorized to receive in a given fiscal year. CRS used two methods to identify
appropriated amounts for each program element or line item. First, DOD typical y reports
appropriated amounts from the two previous fiscal years when it requests funding in budget
justifications. FY2019 through FY2022 budget justification documentation provided
appropriation amounts for FY2017 through FY2020.95 For FY2021 appropriations, CRS analyzed
funding tables in the Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the Department of Defense
Appropriations Acts (P.L. 116-260).96
Analysis
Figure B-1 depicts the differences between the President’s budget request, and congressional
authorizations and appropriations in RDT&E and procurement across five fiscal years. Program
element and line item funding are combined to provide an overview of the appropriation category.
Individual program elements or line items trends may differ from the overview depicted below.
Appendix C provides a detailed list of RDT&E program elements and procurement line items.

95 When available, this report uses the “actual” values reported in the DOD Budget justifications because the data
reported represents both Congressional appropriations and Congressionally -approved reprogramming decisions. T hus
the “actuals” are a more complete representation of Congressional action on an individual program.
96 The Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying P.L. 116-93, Congressional Record, December 17, 2019,
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CREC-2019-12-17/pdf/CREC-2019-12-17-house-bk2.pdf,
beginning on p. H10613; and H.Rept. 116-453.
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Figure B-1. Requested, Authorized, and Appropriated Funding Levels for Selected
DE Programs

Source: CRS analysis of FY2017-FY2022 Army, Air Force, Navy, and Defense-Wide Research, Development,
Test and Evaluation and Procurement Budget Justifications, P.L. 114-328, P.L. 115-91, P.L. 115-232, P.L. 116-92,
P.L. 116-93, P.L. 116-260, and P.L. 116-283.
Note: Funding levels are in current U.S. dol ars.
The military services sometimes change the funding source for programs and activities, including
those related to DE. Two program elements in particular from FY2017 through FY2019 were
significantly restructured: Electronics and Electronic Devices (PE 0602705A) and Weapons and
Munitions Advanced Technology (PE 0603004A). These two program elements funded a number
of DE projects, which were shifted into multiple new program elements to support the Army’s
new modernization strategy. Based on FY2020 budget documents, these projects now primarily
reside in Air and Missile Defense Technology (PE 0602150A) and Air and Missile Defense
Advanced Technology (PE 0603466A). These new program elements fund a number of other
projects, but these alignments appear to provide the best linkage to historical programs.97
Many of the programs identified in this analysis appear to be defensive countermeasures designed
to protect aircraft. The Air Force’s Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures, the Army’s
Common Infrared Countermeasures, and the Navy’s Tactical Air Directed Infrared
Countermeasures are examples of these countermeasures. Other examples of DE programs
include the Army’s Maneuver - Short Range Air Defense (M-SHORAD) and the Air Force’s
Threat Simulator Development.

97 Figures document total funding in a program element or line item. Due to the data fidelity of FY2020 appropriations,
CRS was unable to assess DE funding at the project level.
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Reviewing funding for FY2021, CRS noted several issues related to both procurement and
research and development. Using this methodology, it appears that the Trump Administration
requested approximately $709 mil ion,98 was authorized $718 mil ion, and was appropriated $873
mil ion. The deviation in FY2021 funding between authorization and appropriation levels and the
President’s budget request can largely be attributed to two research and development programs,
which received relatively large increases in appropriations compared with the request: (1) the Air
Force’s Air and Missile Defense Advanced Technology ($125 mil ion) and (2) the Army’s Air and
Missile Defense ($53 mil ion). Other smal er increases and decreases are predominately
offsetting.
Two additional trends occur across the two appropriation categories. First, it appears that DE
research and development programs received additional appropriations compared with both the
requested amount and the authorized amount. Second, programs that were in procurement over
the previous four years seem to have been appropriated less funding than was requested, though
on average it appears that appropriations have been larger than authorizations.

98 T he FY2021 budget request did not provide an estimate for directed energy programs. However, the Administration
stated in its FY2020 budget request that it funded $235 million in DE programs, whereas CRS calculated the
Administration’s request to be $634 million. T he difference between these two funding levels is most likely based on
methodological differences.
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Appendix C. List of Selected Line Items and
Program Elements99
Table C-1. Selected Directed Energy Procurement Line Items
Requested
Authorized Appropriated
Line
($ in
($ in
($ in
Title
Agency
Fiscal Year
Item
thousands)
thousands)
thousands)
Large Aircraft
Air Force
2022
LAIRCM
57,001
—
—
Infrared
Countermeasures
(CM)
Large Aircraft
Air Force
2021
LAIRCM
57,521
57,521
46,321
Infrared CM
Large Aircraft
Air Force
2020
LAIRCM
97,093
53,335
97,093
Infrared CM
Large Aircraft
Air Force
2019
LAIRCM
149,778
149,778
149,778
Infrared CM
Large Aircraft
Air Force
2018
LAIRCM
4,046
4,066
4,066
Infrared CM
Large Aircraft
Air Force
2017
LAIRCM
135,801
135,801
135,801
Infrared CM
Common Infrared
Army
2022
5399AZ3537
240,412
—
—
CM (CIRCM)
CIRCM
Army
2021
5399AZ3537
237,467
237,464
234,117
CIRCM
Army
2020
5399AZ3537
178,094
168,784
178,094
CIRCM
Army
2019
5399AZ3537
60,899
36,839
60,899
CIRCM
Army
2018
AZ3537
49,777
43,440
108,721
CIRCM
Army
2017
AZ3537
108,721
108,721
80,677
Survivability CM
Army
2022
5044AZ3507
5,104
—
—
Survivability CM
Army
2021
5044AZ3507
8,035
8,035
8,035
Survivability CM
Army
2020
5044AZ3507
8,388
8,388
8,388
Survivability CM
Army
2019
5044AZ3507
5,853
5,853
5,853
Survivability CM
Army
2018
AZ3507
5,884
5,884
5,884
Survivability CM
Army
2017
AZ3507
9,565
9,565
9,565
MAGTF EW for
Navy
2022
0587
29,151
—
—
Aviation
MAGTF EW for
Navy
2021
0587
27,794
27,794
26,822
Aviation
MAGTF EW for
Navy
2020
0587
26,536
26,536
26,536
Aviation

99 T his appendix was written by John R. Hoehn, CRS Analyst in Military Capabilities and Programs.
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Requested
Authorized Appropriated
Line
($ in
($ in
($ in
Title
Agency
Fiscal Year
Item
thousands)
thousands)
thousands)
MAGTF EW for
Navy
2019
0587
11,590
11,590
11,590
Aviation
MAGTF EW for
Navy
2018
0587
10,111
10,111
10,111
Aviation
MAGTF EW for
Navy
2017
0588
5,676
5,676
21,968
Aviation
Source: CRS analysis of FY2017-FY2022 Army, Air Force, Navy, and Defense-Wide Research, Development,
Test and Evaluation and Procurement Budget Justifications, P.L. 114-328, P.L. 115-91, P.L. 115-232, P.L. 116-92,
and P.L. 116-93.
Notes: Blank cel s represent data that were not available at the time of publication. MAGTF EW stands for
Marine Air Ground Task Force Electronic Warfare.

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Table C-2. Selected Directed Energy Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
Program Elements
Requested
Authorized
Appropriated
Fiscal
Program
($ in
($ in
($ in
Title
Agency
Year
Element
thousands)
thousands)
thousands)
Directed Energy
Air Force
2022
0604032F
10,820
—
—
Prototyping
Directed Energy
Air Force
2021
0604032F
20,964
20,964
19,464
Prototyping
Directed Energy
Air Force
2020
0604032F
10,000
20,000
42,390
Prototyping
Directed Energy
Air Force
2019
0604032F
—
—-
50,000
Prototyping
Directed Energy
Air Force
2018
0604032F
—
—
—
Prototyping
Directed Energy
Air Force
2017
0604032F
—
—
—
Prototyping
Directed Energy
Air Force
2022
0602605F
121,869
—
—
Technology
Directed Energy
Air Force
2021
0602605F
128,113
128,113
130,613
Technology
Directed Energy
Air Force
2020
0602605F
32,020
124,379
114,279
Technology
Directed Energy
Air Force
2019
0602605F
33,506
141,898
141,800
Technology
Directed Energy
Air Force
2018
0602605F
33,047
141,293
132,993
Technology
Directed Energy
Air Force
2017
0602605F
127,163
127,163
127,365
Technology
High Energy Laser
OSD
2022
0602890D8Z
45,997
—
—
Development
High Energy Laser
Air Force
2022
0602890F
—
—
—
Research
High Energy Laser
Air Force
2021
0602890F
45,088
45,088
29,208
Research
High Energy Laser
Air Force
2020
0602890F
44,221
44,221
47,462
Research
High Energy Laser
Air Force
2019
0602890F
43,359
45,859
43,192
Research
High Energy Laser
Air Force
2018
0602890F
43,049
43,049
43,049
Research
High Energy Laser
Air Force
2017
0602890F
42,300
42,300
39,545
Research
High Energy Laser
OSD
2022
0601108D8Z
15,390
—
—
Research Initiatives
High Energy Laser
Air Force
2022
0601108F
—
—
—
Research Initiatives
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Requested
Authorized
Appropriated
Fiscal
Program
($ in
($ in
($ in
Title
Agency
Year
Element
thousands)
thousands)
thousands)
High Energy Laser
Air Force
2021
0601108F
15,085
15,085
15,085
Research Initiatives
High Energy Laser
Air Force
2020
0601108F
14,795
14,795
13,736
Research Initiatives
High Energy Laser
Air Force
2019
0601108F
14,506
14,506
13,106
Research Initiatives
High Energy Laser
Air Force
2018
0601108F
14,417
14,417
14,417
Research Initiatives
High Energy Laser
Air Force
2017
0601108F
14,168
14,168
13,224
Research Initiatives
Large Aircraft IR
Air Force
2022
0401134F
5,504
—
—
Countermeasures
(LAIRCM)
LAIRCM
Air Force
2021
0401134F
5,507
5,507
5,507
LAIRCM
Air Force
2020
0401134F
5,424
5,424
5,247
LAIRCM
Air Force
2019
0401134F
4,334
4,334
4,334
LAIRCM
Air Force
2018
0401134F
5,283
5,283
5,095
LAIRCM
Air Force
2017
0401134F
5,166
5,166
5,011
Threat Simulator
Air Force
2022
0604256F
41,909
—
—
Development
Threat Simulator
Air Force
2021
0604256F
57,725
57,725
57,725
Development
Threat Simulator
Air Force
2020
0604256F
59,693
59,693
58,906
Development
Threat Simulator
Air Force
2019
0604256F
34,256
34,256
34,206
Development
Threat Simulator
Air Force
2018
0604256F
35,405
35,405
35,405
Development
Threat Simulator
Air Force
2017
0604256F
21,630
21,630
21,377
Development
Air and Missile
Army
2022
0603466A
48,826
—
—
Defense Advanced
Technology
Air and Missile
Army
2021
0603466A
58,130
73,630
182,630
Defense Advanced
Technology
Air and Missile
Army
2020
0603466A
60,613
60,613
79,817
Defense Advanced
Technology
Weapons and
Army
2019
0603004A
102,686
122,686
241,581
Munitions Advanced
Technology
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Requested
Authorized
Appropriated
Fiscal
Program
($ in
($ in
($ in
Title
Agency
Year
Element
thousands)
thousands)
thousands)
Weapons and
Army
2018
0603004A
84,709
84,079
84,079
Munitions Advanced
Technology
Weapons and
Army
2017
0603004A
68,714
68,714
198,245
Munitions Advanced
Technology
Air and Missile
Army
2022
0602150A
19,316
—
—
Defense Technology
Air and Missile
Army
2021
0602150A
56,298
66,298
109,298
Defense Technology
Air and Missile
Army
2020
0602150A
50,771
50,771
19,316
Defense Technology
Common Infrared
Army
2022
0605035A
16,630
—
—
Countermeasures
(CIRCM)
CIRCM
Army
2021
0605035A
23,321
28,321
28,321
CIRCM
Army
2020
0605035A
46,258
11,770
22,226
CIRCM
Army
2019
0605035A
53,848
2,670
33,809
CIRCM
Army
2018
0605035A
127,318
21,540
97,746
CIRCM
Army
2017
0605035A
107,877
10,900
127,318
Electronics and
Army
2019
0602705A
58,283
58,283
96,760
Electronic Devices
Electronics and
Army
2018
0602705A
58,352
60,352
90,613
Electronic Devices
Electronics and
Army
2017
0602705A
56,322
56,322
72,979
Electronic Devices
Maneuver - Short
Army
2022
0604117A
39,376
—
—
Range Air Defense
(M-SHORAD)
M-SHORAD
Army
2021
0604117A
4,995
4,995
4,995
M-SHORAD
Army
2020
0604117A
39,100
29,400
41,690
M-SHORAD
Army
2019
0604117A
118,085
23,000
79,016
M-SHORAD
Army
2018
0604117A
20,000
20,000
19,201
M-SHORAD
Army
2017
0604117A
—
—
95,085
Directed Energy and
Navy
2022
0603925N
71,803
—
—
Electric Weapon
System
Directed Energy and
Navy
2021
0603925N
128,845
128,845
126,895
Electric Weapon
System
Directed Energy and
Navy
2020
0603925N
118,169
118,169
136,535
Electric Weapon
System
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Requested
Authorized
Appropriated
Fiscal
Program
($ in
($ in
($ in
Title
Agency
Year
Element
thousands)
thousands)
thousands)
Directed Energy and
Navy
2019
0603925N
223,344
142,412
142,814
Electric Weapon
System
Directed Energy and
Navy
2018
0603925N
107,310
122,310
92,856
Electric Weapon
System
Directed Energy and
Navy
2017
0603925N
32,700
32,700
34,039
Electric Weapon
System
Tact Air Dir Infrared
Navy
2022
0604272N
33,246
—
—
CM (TADIRCM)
TADIRCM
Navy
2021
0604272N
59,776
52,026
50,281
TADIRCM
Navy
2020
0604272N
68,346
58,449
54,175
TADIRCM
Navy
2019
0604272N
47,278
47,278
47,278
TADIRCM
Navy
2018
0604272N
46,589
46,844
51,311
TADIRCM
Navy
2017
0604272N
72,910
34,920
59,753
High Energy Laser
OSD
2022
0603924D8Z
107,397
—
—
Advanced
Development
High Energy Laser
OSD
2021
0603924D8Z
105,410
92,270
112,910
Advanced
Development
High Energy Laser
OSD
2020
0603924D8Z
85,223
85,223
78,057
Advanced
Development
High Energy Laser
OSD
2019
0603924D8Z
69,533
69,533
74,364
Advanced
Development
High Energy Laser
OSD
2018
0603924D8Z
—
—
—
Advanced
Development
High Energy Laser
OSD
2017
0603924D8Z
—
—
—
Advanced
Development
Source: CRS analysis of FY2017-FY2022 Army, Air Force, Navy, and Defense-Wide Research, Development,
Test and Evaluation and Procurement Budget Justifications, P.L. 114-328, P.L. 115-91, P.L. 115-232, P.L. 116-92,
and P.L. 116-93.
Notes: Blank cel s represent data that were not available at the time of publication. Tact Air Dir Infrared stands
for Tactical Aircraft Directable Infrared.

Congressional Research Service

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Department of Defense Directed Energy Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress

Author Information

Kelley M. Sayler, Coordinator
John R. Hoehn
Analyst in Advanced Technology and Global
Analyst in Military Capabilities and Programs
Security

Andrew Feickert
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Military Ground Forces
Specialist in Naval Affairs

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should n ot be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
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copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

Congressional Research Service
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