Central Asia: Background and U.S. Relations
September 24, 2021
Central Asia is a landlocked region that borders the Caspian Sea to the West, Russia to the north,
China to the east, and Afghanistan and Iran to the south. The five Central Asian countries—
Maria A. Blackwood
Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—collectively cover
Analyst in Asian Policy
an area approximately 40% that of the United States. The region’s overall population of about 73

million is ethnically diverse and predominantly under 30; the majority religion in Central Asia is
Sunni Islam, and the region is also home to religious minority groups including Shia Muslims

and various Christian denominations, primarily Russian Orthodox. In addition to the local Turkic
and Persian languages, Russian remains spoken throughout the region to varying degrees.
Outside observers classify the governments of Central Asia as authoritarian to varying degrees; all five countries rank low on
international democracy and human rights indexes. Central Asia has been described as a challenging environment for efforts
to promote democracy, and observers have expressed concerns that democratic progress in the region has been uneven or
lacking. Members of Congress have drawn attention to human rights issues in Central Asia, including the lack of press
freedom and the detention of political prisoners. Although Central Asian governments have implemented varying degrees of
market reforms, political elites maintain significant control over the region’s economies, and corruption remains prevalent.
Central Asia remains one of the least economically integrated regions in the world. Fostering regional connectivity has long
been a major U.S. priority in Central Asia. Intra-regional relations have improved markedly since 2016, when Uzbekistan, the
region’s most populous country, embarked on a policy of reengaging with its neighbors. This has led to progress on issues
such as border demarcation and water disputes. Periodic border clashes have continued between some countries, and analysts
assess that water resources remain a potential source of conflict in the region. Much of Central Asia’s hydropower potential
remains unrealized. Some Central Asian governments are pursuing , with uneven progress, projects to develop solar and wind
power in their countries. Despite these and other efforts toward diversification, economies such as Kazakhstan’s and
Turkmenistan’s remain heavily dependent on hydrocarbon exports.
The United States was among the first countries to recognize the five Central Asian countries when they became independent
amid the 1991 dissolution of the Soviet Union. Since that time, the United States has emphasized support for the five
countries’ independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. The U.S. Strategy for Central Asia defines the primary U.S.
strategic interest in the region as building a “more stable and prosperous Central Asia that is free to pursue political,
economic, and security interests with a variety of partners on its own terms; is connected to global markets and open to
international investment; and has strong, democratic institutions, rule of law, and respect for human rights.” The United
States has provided over $9 billion in direct assistance to the countries of Central Asia in the past three decades to s upport
security, democratic reform, and economic growth, and to meet humanitarian needs. Russia maintains strong political,
economic, and military ties with the region, and is the primary destination for labor migrants from Central Asia. China’s
economic presence in Central Asia has grown significantly in recent years and is accompanied by an expanding security
footprint. Many in Central Asia remain wary of China, however, due in part to fears of potential Chinese territorial
encroachment and anger at China’s repression of Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim minorities in China’s Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region, including ethnic Kazakhs and Kyrgyz.
Following the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, many analysts assess that the primary concerns of Central Asian
governments are maintaining stability and ensuring their own countries’ security. The governments of Central Asia have
generally adopted a pragmatic approach toward the Taliban, particularly Afghanistan’s immediate neighbors Uzbekistan and
Turkmenistan. The government of Tajikistan, which also shares a bord er with Afghanistan, has by contrast expressed strong
opposition to a Taliban-led government in Afghanistan. All five countries previously provided logistical assistance at various
times to U.S. military efforts in Afghanistan, ranging from overflight righ ts to hosting U.S. forces. The Kyrgyz Republic and
Uzbekistan leased bases to the United States from 2001 to 2014 and from 2001 to 2005, respectively. Given Central Asian
countries’ proximity to Afghanistan and interest in contributing to regional stability, security cooperation between the United
States and Central Asian countries may evolve in light of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan.

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Overview
Central Asia is a region rich in mineral resources that borders Russia, China, Afghanistan, and
Iran (see Figure 1). The United States was among the first countries to recognize the newly
independent Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic (commonly known as
Kyrgyzstan), Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan following the dissolution of the Soviet
Union in 1991. Since that time, the United States has repeatedly expressed support for the
independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the five Central Asian countries, and has
implemented programs to support democracy, good governance, and economic reforms in the
region. Some observers contend that Central Asia’s importance to the United States has
historical y been “derivative of interests that were not indigenous to Central Asia itself, but rather
were functions of U.S. policies, priorities, and relationships with countries around the region. ”1
Since 2001, U.S. engagement with Central Asia has largely focused on security cooperation,
particularly in relation to the conflict in Afghanistan. Russia maintains strong political and
military ties with the region, and China’s significant economic presence is accompanied by an
expanding security footprint. Central Asia’s combined population of approximately 73 mil ion is
ethnical y diverse, and the median age across al five countries is about 28. In addition to Turkic
(Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Turkmen, and Uzbek, among others) and Persian (Tajik) languages, Russian
remains spoken throughout the region. Outside nongovernmental observers characterize Central
Asian governments as authoritarian and repressive to varying degrees (see Appendix). The five
countries’ heads of state did not change between 1992 and 2005, and political elites maintain
significant influence over Central Asia’s economies.
Figure 1. Map of Central Asia

Source: Graphic created by CRS.

1 Eugene Rumer, Richard Sokolsky, and Paul Stronski, U.S. Policy Toward Central Asia 3.0, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, January 2016, pp. 3 -4.
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Notes: Abbreviations: GEO—Georgia; ARM—Armenia; AZE—Azerbaijan; IND—India.
History
Historical y inhabited by a combination of nomadic pastoralist and settled agrarian societies, the
territories that now make up the five Central Asian states were incorporated into the Russian
empire over the course of the 18th and 19th centuries through a combination of military conquests
and political settlements. They became part of the Soviet Union after a period of armed struggle
following the 1917 Russian Revolution. In 1924, Soviet authorities established the boundaries
that served as the basis for Central Asia’s modern borders. Soviet settlement policies and Stalin-
era internal deportations of certain ethnic groups brought new populations to the region. While
the name of each Central Asian republic derives from the local y predominant group, the region
has historical y been ethnical y diverse (see Figure 2). Soviet policies granted local languages
certain protections, but Russian functioned as a lingua franca and was privileged and promoted
for most of the 20th century. The Soviet legacy in Central Asia is complex, encompassing
universal literacy and economic development on the one hand, and brutal repression and
environmental degradation on the other. Central Asians’ contributions to the Soviet war effort
against Nazi Germany continue to find broad resonance and are official y commemorated in al
five countries.
The states of Central Asia became independent with the 1991 dissolution of the Soviet Union. In
the assessment of one scholar, independence brought “massive transformations [that] coexist with
significant continuities with the Soviet past.”2 Following independence, many of the region’s
ethnic Russians moved to Russia, the ethnic German minority mostly left for Germany, and
almost al of Central Asia’s Jewish population emigrated. Nevertheless, the Central Asian
countries maintain varying levels of ethnic diversity, even as they have embarked on the process
of forging new identities as independent nation-states. The Islamic religious heritage of the
region’s traditional y Sunni Muslim majority is one factor that informs contemporary national
identities in Central Asia.3 Soviet ideology was hostile to religion, and Soviet anti-religion
policies in Central Asia led to the elimination of Islam from public life.4 Experts and stakeholders
assert that Islamic civil society is now growing in importance in the region.5 At the same time,
Central Asian governments general y exert strict control over religious activity.6

2 Adeeb Khalid, Central Asia: A New History from the Imperial Conquests to the Present (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2021), p. 442.
3 Adeeb Khalid, Islam After Communism: Religion and Politics in Central Asia (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 2014), pp. 117-119, 125-126, 132-133.
4 Khalid, Central Asia, pp. 218-220, 351-352; Khalid, Islam After Communism , pp. 82-83.
5 Edward Lemon, Samuel Doveri Vesterbye, and Bradley Jardine, Emerging Forms of Islamic Civil Society in Central
Asia, T he Hollings Center for International Dialogue, May 2021.
6 See, for example, U.S. Department of State, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom , May 12, 2021.
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Figure 2. Major Ethnic Groups in Central Asia, 1992

Source: U.S. Central Intel igence Agency, available at https://www.loc.gov/item/92685272.
CRS-3

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Country Backgrounds
Kazakhstan
Endowed with significant hydrocarbon and mineral resources, Kazakhstan is the most developed
country in Central Asia.7 Kazakhstan shares lengthy borders with Russia to the north and China to
the east, and also borders Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan (see Figure 3); it is the
world’s ninth largest country by land area (about four times the size of Texas). The ethnical y
diverse population of approximately 19 mil ion is predominantly Kazakh (69%), with minority
groups including Russians (18.4%), Uzbeks (3.2%), Ukrainians (1.4%), Uyghurs (1.4%), and
Tatars (1%), among others.8 About 70% of the population is Muslim, mostly Sunni, and
approximately a quarter is Christian, primarily Russian Orthodox. Since independence,
Kazakhstan’s authoritarian government has introduced market reforms, developed the energy
sector, and moved to diversify its economy. Kazakhstan pursues a “multi-vector” foreign policy,
seeking to balance its relations with major powers while actively participating in international
organizations.9
Figure 3. Map of Kazakhstan

Source: Graphic created by CRS.
Notes: Abbreviations: GEO—Georgia; AZE—Azerbaijan; MNG—Mongolia.

7 Kazakhstan ranks 51st in the U.N.’s 2020 Human Development Index, ahead of Kyrgyzstan (120th), T ajikistan (125th),
T urkmenistan (111th), and Uzbekistan (106th). Rankings available at https://hdr.undp.org/.
8 Agency for Strategic Planning and Reforms of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2021 zhyl basyna Qazaqstan
Respublikasy khalqynyng zhekelgen etnostary boiynsha sany [Population of the Republic of Kazakhstan by individual
ethnic groups at the beginning of 2021], available at https://stat.gov.kz/api/getFile/?docId=EST AT 414397.
9 “Mukhtar T ileuberdi: ‘Despite the Pandemic, the Foundations of Kazakhstan’s Foreign Policy Remain Unchanged,’”
The Astana Tim es, January 7, 2021.
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Political Background
Since independence, Kazakhstan’s political system has been dominated by Nursultan Nazarbayev,
a former high-level Soviet official who became the country’s first president in 1991 and remained
in that office until 2019. He won reelection four times, most recently in 2015, although observers
from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) report that elections in
Kazakhstan consistently do not meet international standards of impartiality, integrity, and
transparency.10 While Nazarbayev’s authoritarian government faced international criticism for
human rights violations and suppression of political dissent, he enjoyed strong domestic
popularity for much of his presidency due to his largely successful efforts to promote stability and
economic development.11 Nazarbayev resigned from the presidency in March 2019, but he
maintains his position as Chairman of Kazakhstan’s Security Council, an influential post to which
he is legal y entitled for life, and as leader of the ruling Nur Otan (Radiant Fatherland) party. The
day after Nazarbayev’s resignation, Kazakhstan’s capital, formerly Astana, was renamed Nur-
Sultan in his honor. As First President and Elbasy (Leader of the Nation), Nazarbayev enjoys
constitutional y protected status, including lifelong immunity from prosecution as wel as special
protections for property belonging to him and certain family members.12
Nazarbayev was succeeded by Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, an experienced politician and diplomat
who previously served as Kazakhstan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and Director-General of the
United Nations Office at Geneva. Tokayev became acting president upon Nazarbayev’s
resignation and subsequently won a snap presidential election in June 2019 with 71% of the vote,
although independent observers questioned the integrity of this result.13 Tokayev is widely seen as
a Nazarbayev loyalist, and his stated motivation for running was to maintain Nazarbayev’s
“strategic course” and “ensur[e] the continuity of our Leader’s policies.”14 Tokayev has coupled
his emphasis on continuity with promises of systemic reforms aimed at modernizing
Kazakhstan’s political system and improving government openness and accountability.15
Some analysts contend that major changes are unlikely as long as Nazarbayev remains entrenched
in the political system, questioning the extent to which President Tokayev can act independently
of his predecessor.16 In October 2019, Tokayev signed a decree further enhancing Nazarbayev’s

10 See OSCE Office for Democracy and Human Rights (ODIHR) reports on elections in Kazakhstan, available at
https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/kazakhstan.
11 Annette Bohr et al., Kazakhstan: Tested By Transition, Chatham House, November 2019, p. 16.
12 Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan of July 5, 2018, No. 178-VI, “On the Security Council of the Republic of
Kazakhstan,” available at https://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=38039248#pos=4;-104; Constitutional Law of the
Republic of Kazakhstan of July 20, 2000, No. 83 -II, “ On the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan —T he
Leader of the Nation,” available at http://www.akorda.kz/ru/official_documents/constitutional_laws/o-pervom-
prezidente-respubliki-kazahstan-lidere-nacii.
13 OSCE ODIHR, Republic of Kazakhstan Early Presidential Election, 9 June 2019: ODIHR Election Observation
Mission Final Report, October 4, 2019; Bohr et al., Kazakhstan, p. 40; Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2020:
Kazakhstan.
14 “Nazarbaev reshil vydvinut’ T okaeva v prezidenty Kazakhstana” [Nazarbayev has decided to nominate T okayev for
the presidency of Kazakhstan], BBC News Russian, April 23, 2019.
15 President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart T okayev’s State of the Nation Address, September 2, 2019 , available at
https://www.akorda.kz/en/addresses/addresses_of_president/president -of-kazakhstan-kassym-jomart-tokayevs-state-of-
the-nation-address-september-2-2019; Ann M. Simmons, “ Kazakhstan’s Newly Elected Leader Calls Himself a
‘Reformer,’” Wall Street Journal, June 13, 2019; S. Frederick Starr, “First Glimpses of T okayev’s Kazakhstan: T he
Listening State?” Atlantic Council, September 17, 2019.
16 See, for example, Paolo Sorbello, “ T he Illusions of Post-Nazarbayev Kazakhstan,” The Diplomat, February 1, 2021;
Nurseit Niyazbekov, “ Democracy, the T okayev Way,” The Diplom at, March 3, 2020; Bohr et al., Kazakhstan, pp. v,
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powers as Chairman of the National Security Council, requiring that most senior government
appointments be approved by Nazarbayev.17 Moreover, Kazakhstan’s parliament is dominated by
Nazarbayev’s Nur Otan party. Legislation passed in 2020 formalized the concept of a
parliamentary opposition, but critics contend that real opposition groups have no chance of
entering parliament.18 The most recent parliamentary elections, held in January 2021, reaffirmed
Nur Otan’s commanding majority (the party currently holds 76 of 98 elected seats).19
Table 1. Kazakhstan: Selected Democracy and Human Rights Indexes
Issue
Index
2016 Status/Rank
2020/2021 Status/Rank
Democracy
Freedom House, Freedom in
Not Free (Score: 24/100)
Not Free (Score: 23/100)
the World
Press Freedom
Reporters Without Borders,
160th of 180 Countries
155th of 180 Countries
World Press Freedom Index
Economic Freedom
Heritage Foundation, Index of
Moderately Free (68th of
Mostly Free (34th of 178
Economic Freedom
178 Countries)
Countries)
Perceptions of
Transparency International,
131st of 168 Countries
94th of 179 Countries
Corruption
Corruption Perceptions Index
Rule of Law
World Justice Project, Rule of
73rd of 128 Countries and
62nd of 128 Countries and
Law Index
Jurisdictions
Jurisdictions
Source: Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2016 and Freedom in the World 2021; Reporters Without
Borders, 2016 World Press Freedom Index and 2021 World Press Freedom Index; The Heritage Foundation, 2016
Index of Economic Freedom and 2021Index of Economic Freedom; Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions
Index 2016 and Corruption Perceptions Index 2021; World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index 2016 and Rule of Law
Index 2020.
Human Rights
According to the U.S. State Department, significant human rights issues in Kazakhstan include
restrictions on freedoms of expression, assembly, and association; restrictions on political
participation; the absence of an independent judiciary and due process; corruption; unlawful or
arbitrary kil ing by or on behalf of the government; and torture by police and prison officials.20
The State Department notes severe limitations on media independence in Kazakhstan as wel as
widespread government surveil ance of the internet.21 Reporters Without Borders ranks
Kazakhstan 155th out of 180 countries in its 2021 World Press Freedom Index (see Table 1).
Human Rights Watch assesses that Kazakhstan’s government actively persecutes real or
perceived political opponents, especial y those associated with Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan,
an opposition movement banned as “extremist” since 2018.22

10-15, 19-22.
17 Joanna Lillis, “Kazakhstan: Nazarbayev T akes Back Control,” Eurasianet, October 21, 2019.
18 Zulfiya Raissova, “Why Does Kazakhstan Have Parliamentary Opposition?” Central Asian Bureau for Analytical
Reporting, July 2, 2020; Almaz Kumenov, “ Kazakhstan: Would-Be Opposition Political Parties to Get Leg Up,”
Eurasianet, May 7, 2020.
19 Another nine deputies are appointed by the Assembly of t he People of Kazakhstan, a constitutional body chaired by
the president.
20 U.S. Department of State, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Kazakhstan, March 30, 2021.
21 Ibid.
22 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2020, pp. 323-325; Human Rights Watch, World Report 2021, p. 385.
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Although Kazakhstan’s constitution guarantees freedom of assembly, restrictive legislation on
public demonstrations makes it difficult to exercise in practice. President Tokayev signed a new
law on the organization and conduct of demonstrations in May 2020, and the government of
Kazakhstan touts the legislation as a positive reform.23 Domestic and international human rights
organizations have criticized the law for failing to meet international human rights standards,
however. According to Human Rights Watch, onerous restrictions and bureaucratic requirements
mean that the ability to protest remains “more a privilege than a right.”24 Local activists and
international human rights experts also expressed concerns that parliament considered the law
while the country was under lockdown due to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)
pandemic, impeding public debate and blocking potential protests of the bil .25
In the past decade, economic inequality and a perceived lack of government accountability have
fueled discontent that has sometimes manifested in demonstrations despite Kazakhstan’s
restrictive protest rules. For example, in 2011, protests by oil workers in the western town of
Zhanaozen turned violent, leaving at least 15 demonstrators dead and dozens injured after police
opened fire.26 In 2016, large-scale protests took place against proposed changes to the country’s
land code, which critics feared would lead to a Chinese takeover of Kazakhstan’s agricultural
land.27 Since 2018, women have protested a perceived lack of support from the state for single
mothers and families with many children.28 Nazarbayev’s resignation and the June 2019
presidential election catalyzed further protests and cal s for broader political change, including
transition to a parliamentary system.29

Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan is led by Mukhtar Ablyazov, a fugitive businessman and former government official
accused of embezzling some $6 billion while serving as chairman of BT A Bank, a m ajor Kazakhstani financial
institution. A vocal Nazarbayev critic, Ablyazov maintains that the charges against him are politically motivated. He
received political asylum in France but lost court cases brought against him in the United States, the United K ingdom,
and other jurisdictions. He was sentenced in absentia on criminal charges in both Kazakhstan and Russia. Kazakhstan’s
government has been accused of abusing the INT ERPOL Red Notice system and other international law enforcement
mechanisms in its efforts to go after Ablyazov and his associates. See U.S. Department of State, 2020 Country Reports
on Hum an Rights Practices: Kazakhstan, March 30, 2021; Alexander Cooley and John Heathershaw, Dictators Without
Borders: Power and Money in Central Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2019), pp. 71 -73; Serge Enderlin, “ La
France accorde l’asile politique au principal opposant kazakh” [France grants political asylum to primary Kazakh
opposition figure], Le Monde, October 5, 2020; “ Russia Sentences Fugitive Kazakh Banker Ablyazov in Absentia to 15
Years,” RFE/RL, December 29, 2020.
23 Assel Satubaldina, “Freedom of Expression Is the Constitutional Right of Every Citizen, Says T okayev,” Astana
Tim es, February 17, 2021; Almaz Kumenov, “ Kazakhstan: President Signs off on Contentious Rally Law,” Eurasianet,
May 26, 2020.
24 Mihra Rittman, “Kazakhstan’s ‘Reformed’ Protest Law Hardly an Improvement: Serious Restrictions on Right to
Free Assembly Remain,” Human Rights Watch, May 28, 2020.
25 Sarah H. Cleveland, “Joint Opinion on Compliance of the Draft Law on the Procedure for Organising and Holding
Peaceful Assemblies with the Republic of Kazakhstan’s Human Rights Obligations,” International Bar Associatio n’s
Human Rights Institute, T he International Commission of Jurists, and the Centre for Civil and Political Rights, May 1,
2020; Laura Mills, “ Kazakhstan Draft Law Would Undermine Freedom of Assembly ,” Human Rights Watch, March
31, 2020.
26 Bohr et al., Kazakhstan, pp. 48-49.
27 Abdujalil Abdurasulov, “Kazakhstan’s Land Reform Protests Explained,” BBC, April 28, 2016.
28Catherine Putz, “ Social Benefits Remain at the Heart of Ongoing Kazakh Frustration ,” The Diplomat, January 13,
2020.
29 See CRS Insight IN11113, Kazakhstan’s Snap Presidential Election Met with Protests, by Maria A. Blackwood.
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Economy
Kazakhstan is Central Asia’s most economical y developed country, with an export-oriented
economy highly dependent on hydrocarbons.30 Major exports by value include oil, copper,
ferroal oys, uranium, and wheat. Dependence on oil exports renders Kazakhstan vulnerable to
external shocks. During a period of fal ing oil prices and currency devaluation tied to
international sanctions on Russia (Kazakhstan’s largest trading partner), Kazakhstan’s real gross
domestic product (GDP) growth slowed to an annual average of slightly above 1% percent in
2015-2016, later accelerating to over 4% in 2017-2019. The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and
the related fal in oil prices have caused significant economic pressure.31 The World Bank
estimates that Kazakhstan’s economy contracted by 2.5% in 2020 as a result of the pandemic; the
country last experienced negative economic growth in the late 1990s. Projections indicate a
recovery of 2.5% GDP growth in 2021.32
Energy
Kazakhstan is a major energy exporter, producing significant volumes of crude oil, natural gas,
and coal. The country is estimated to have the 12th-largest reserves of oil and 16th-largest reserves
of natural gas in the world.33 Kazakhstan’s oil and gas resources attract significant investment
from U.S., European, Russian, and Chinese firms (see also “Oil and Gas,” below). According to
the U.N. Trade Statistics Database, crude oil accounted for about 58% of Kazakhstan’s exports by
value in 2019.
Kazakhstan holds 12% of the world’s uranium resources and has led world uranium production
since 2009. According to the World Nuclear Association, the country accounted for 43% of world
uranium production in 2019.34 In 2015, Kazakhstan’s state-owned nuclear energy company
Kazatomprom and China General Nuclear Power Corporation agreed to a joint venture to build a
fuel fabrication plant, with production slated to begin in 2021.35 Kazakhstan also hosts a low-
enriched uranium (LEU) bank owned and operated by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
The LEU bank is intended to decrease the global risk of nuclear weapons proliferation by
guaranteeing countries that lack enrichment capabilities access to fuel for peaceful purposes in
the event of supply disruptions on the commercial market. It is the only facility of its kind that is
not controlled by any individual country.36

30 U.S. Department of Commerce, International T rade Administration, “Kazakhstan—Market Overview,” January 19,
2021, at https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/kazakhstan-market-overview.
31 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), COVID-19 Crisis Response in Central Asia,
November 16, 2020, p. 18.
32 World Bank, Global Economic Prospects, January 2021, p. 79.
33 BP, Statistical Review of World Energy 2021, July 2021, pp. 16, 34.
34 World Nuclear Association, “Uranium and Nuclear Power in Kazakhstan,” September 2020.
35 Kazatomprom National Atomic Company, “Kazatomprom and Chinese Companies Sign an Agreement on Nuclear
Cooperation,” December 15, 2015; Mattia Baldoni and Kamen Kraev, “ Kazatomprom-CGN Joint Venture to Supply
Framatome Assemblies t o China,” NucNet, March 5, 2020.
36 IAEA, “IAEA Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) Bank,” at https://www.iaea.org/topics/iaea-low-enriched-uranium-
bank; Nuclear T hreat Initiative, “ IAEA Low Enriched Uranium Bank Launches in Kazakhstan, Significant Milestone
for NT I-Backed Nuclear Security Initiative,” August 28, 2017.
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Diversification
Kazakhstan’s government seeks to promote non-oil exports through ongoing structural and
institutional reforms. The Kazakhstan 2050 Strategy, promulgated by Nazarbayev in 2012, aims
to position Kazakhstan as one of the world’s top 30 most-developed economies by 2050.37 As part
of this framework, officials are prioritizing transport and logistics development and
modernization projects, largely aligned with China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Kazakhstan’s
government also seeks to turn the country into a regional financial hub, in part through the Astana
International Financial Centre. This special economic zone, opened in 2018, is backed by Chinese
investment and is modeled on the Dubai International Financial Centre.38 As part of its economic
diversification efforts, Kazakhstan’s government has announced that the country aims to produce
50% of its power from alternative energy sources by 2050. The U.S. Department of Commerce
has identified the agricultural sector as an area of opportunity for U.S. firms as Kazakhstan seeks
to reduce its dependence on extractive industries.39
U.S.-Kazakhstan Bilateral Relations
The United States was the first country to recognize Kazakhstan’s independence following the
dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. The two countries have developed a strong and wide-
ranging bilateral relationship, even as Kazakhstan has sought to avoid alignment with any one
power. In February 2019 Senate testimony, General Joseph L. Votel, then-Commander of U.S.
Central Command, described U.S. relations with Kazakhstan as “the most mature and forward-
thinking in Central Asia.”40
Nuclear threat reduction has been an area of close cooperation between the United States and
Kazakhstan from the inception of the bilateral relationship. Kazakhstan was home to the Soviet
Union’s primary nuclear test site, a 6,950-square-mile zone situated near the city of
Semipalatinsk (renamed Semey in 2007) in Kazakhstan’s northeast. Over 450 nuclear tests were
conducted at the Semipalatinsk Test Site between 1949 and 1989.41 The dissolution of the Soviet
Union left Kazakhstan with one of the world’s largest nuclear arsenals, including some 1,400
nuclear warheads and more than 100 intercontinental bal istic missiles. Kazakhstan denuclearized
and relinquished the Soviet warheads that remained on its territory, the last of which were
transferred to Russia in 1995.42 Kazakhstan cooperated closely with the United States to secure
nuclear materials and dismantle associated infrastructure as part of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative
Threat Reduction program, through which the United States has provided over $275 mil ion in
assistance to Kazakhstan’s efforts to eliminate weapons of mass destruction and related

37 “Address by the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Leader of the Nation, N.A. Nazarbayev, Strategy
Kazakhstan 2050: New Political Course of the Established State,” December 14, 2012, available at
https://strategy2050.kz/en/page/multilanguage/.
38 “Seeking Belt Buckle Role, Kazakhstan Launches China-Backed Financial Hub,” Reuters, July 5, 2018.
39 U.S. Department of Commerce, International T rade Administration, “Kazakhstan—Market Overview,” January 19,
2021, at https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/kazakhstan-market-overview.
40 Senate Armed Services Committee, Statement of General Joseph L. Votel, Commander, U.S. Central Command,
Before the Senate Arm ed Services Com m ittee on the Posture of U.S. Central Com m and , February 5, 2019.
41 Radiological Conditions at the Semipalatinsk Test Site, Kazakhstan: Preliminary Assessment and Recommendations
for Further Study (Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 1998), pp. 3-7; Joanna Lillis, Dark Shadows: Inside
the Secret World of Kazakhstan (New York: I.B. T auris, 2019), pp. 234-243.
42 Federation of American Scientists, “Kazakhstan Special Weapons,” at https://fas.org/nuke/guide/kazakhstan/
index.html; Nuclear T hreat Initiative, “ Nuclear Disarmament Kazakhstan,” January 2, 2019, at https://www.nti.org/
analysis/articles/kazakhstan-nuclear-disarmament .
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infrastructure since 1991.43 Kazakhstan also cooperates with the U.S. Department of Energy on
nuclear security and nuclear energy through the U.S.-Kazakhstan Energy Partnership, formalized
in 2001.44
Military-to-military contacts constitute a significant aspect of the U.S.-Kazakhstan bilateral
relationship. Since 2003, Kazakhstan has hosted Exercise Steppe Eagle, a multilateral military
exercise that focuses on peacekeeping capabilities. In its most recent iteration, conducted in
southeastern Kazakhstan in June 2019, Exercise Steppe Eagle included participants from the U.S.
Army and the Arizona Army National Guard, as wel as forces from the United Kingdom,
Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, with observers from India, Turkey, and Uzbekistan.
Counternarcotics is an active area of cooperation between the two countries. Kazakhstan is a
transit country for heroin and other opiates from Afghanistan to Russia and Europe, and the
United States seeks to improve Kazakhstan’s capacity to combat drug trafficking and related
criminal activity. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration maintains a regional office in
Almaty, Kazakhstan’s largest city. The State Department has characterized U.S.-Kazakhstan law
enforcement and military ties as “strong and growing.”45
U.S. assistance to Kazakhstan aims to advance human rights and democratic values by supporting
the rule of law, fostering local media development, and building the capacity of civil society
organizations. Additional y, U.S. programs seek to support economic reform and promote
renewable energy and improved energy efficiency.46 Another focus of U.S. assistance to
Kazakhstan is security cooperation, particularly strengthening military partnerships, fighting
transnational crime, and combatting weapons of mass destruction.47 The State Department
requests $10.7 mil ion in appropriations for aid to Kazakhstan for FY2022, as compared to $12.1
mil ion al ocated for FY2020.48
The Kyrgyz Republic
The Kyrgyz Republic (commonly known as Kyrgyzstan) is a mountainous country slightly
smal er than South Dakota. Kyrgyzstan borders China in addition to three other Central Asian
states (see Figure 4) and maintains close ties with Russia. The population of approximately 6.6
mil ion is predominantly Kyrgyz (73.8%) with minority groups including Uzbeks (14.8%),
Russians (5.1%), Dungans (1.1%), and Uyghurs (0.9%), among others.49 Approximately 90% of
the population is Muslim, primarily Sunni; a plurality of the Christian minority, which accounts
for about 7% of the population, is Russian Orthodox.50 For most of the 30 years since
independence, Kyrgyzstan has been considered by scholars and nongovernmental organizations

43 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Relations with Kazakhstan: Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet,” January 20, 2021.
44 Kazakhstan is seeking to produce 50% of its power from alternative energy sources by 2050. As such, the
Partnership has most recently focused on clean energy deployment and improving the efficiency of Ka zakhstan’s
electricity markets. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of International Affairs, “ U.S.-Kazakhstan Energy Partnership,”
at https://www.energy.gov/ia/international-affairs-initiatives/us-kazakhstan-energy-partnership.
45 U.S. Department of State, Integrated Country Strategy: Kazakhstan, August 3, 2018, p. 2.
46 U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2022, Appendix 2, p.
287.
47 Ibid., pp. 309, 380-381.
48 Ibid., p. 576.
49 National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic, “Natsional’nyi sostav naseleniia” [Ethnic composition of the
population], available at http://www.stat.kg/ru/opendata/category/312/.
50 U.S. Department of State, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Kyrgyz Republic, May 12, 2021.
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(NGOs) as the most democratic country in Central Asia, with a vibrant civil society and a higher
degree of press freedom than is found elsewhere in the region (see Table 2).51 Supporting a more
inclusive and accountable democracy is a stated U.S. goal in Kyrgyzstan.52 The country is one of
21 states worldwide that participate in the House Democracy Partnership.53 In light of recent
political developments (see “Political Background,” below), in 2021 the NGO Freedom House
classified Kyrgyzstan as “not free” for the first time in 11 years. U.S. officials and others have
voiced concern about the influence of organized crime in Kyrgyz politics.54 Some Members of
Congress have expressed concerns about government pressure on independent media outlets,
including the congressional y funded Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL).55 The ongoing
COVID-19 pandemic has caused significant economic strain in Kyrgyzstan, which is an
impoverished country that relies heavily on foreign remittances.

51 On Kyrgyztan’s “exceptionalism,” see, for example, Eugene Huskey, Encounters at the Edge of the Muslim World: A
Political Mem oir of Kyrgyzstan (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018), pp. 213 -215. See also Johan Engvall,
“Kyrgyzstan and the T rials of Independence,” in Marlene Laruelle and Johan Engvall, eds., Kyrgyzstan Beyond
“Democracy Island” and “Failing State” (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2015), pp. 1-19. Kyrgyzstan is the only
Central Asian country to be characterized as “Partly Free” by Freedom House’s Freedom in the World report after
1993, although it did not consistently maintain that rating (Kyrgyzstan was rated “Partly Free” in 23 o f the 30 years
since the country became independent). In most years since 1991, Freedom House assessed that Kyrgyzstan exhibited a
higher degree of political rights and civil liberties than any other Central Asian country. See Freedom House, “Country
and T erritory Rankings and Statuses, 1973-2021,” available at https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2021-02/
Country_and_T erritory_Ratings_and_Statuses_FIW1973 -2021.xlsx.
52 U.S. Department of State, Integrated Country Strategy: Kyrgyz Republic, November 16, 2018, pp. 5, 10.
53 House Democracy Partnership, “Kyrgyzstan,” available at https://hdp.house.gov/sites/
housedemocracypartnership.house.gov/files/Kyrgyzstan%20One-Pager.pdf/.
54 See, for example, House Foreign Affairs Committee (@HouseForeign), T witter, October 16, 2020, 12:17PM,
available at https://twitter.com/HouseForeign/status/1317137561018601475; U.S. Embassy in the Kyrgyz Republic,
“Statement on T hreats to the Kyrgyz Constitutional Order,” October 13, 2020.
55 See, for example, Senator Bob Menendez (@SenatorMenendez), T witter, December 13, 2019, 12:54PM, available at
https://twitter.com/SenatorMenendez/status/1205546563285798913, and House Foreign Affairs Committee
(@HouseForeign), T witter, December 14, 2019, 12:03AM, available at https://twitter.com/HouseForeign/status/
1205714827706015744.
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Figure 4. Map of the Kyrgyz Republic

Source: Graphic created by CRS.
Political Background
Kyrgyzstan experienced political upheavals that ousted authoritarian-leaning presidents in 2005
and 2010.56 A new constitution adopted in 2010 limited the presidency to one six-year term and
converted the country to a semi-parliamentary system in which the president shared executive
power with the prime minister. Several Members of Congress and other U.S. policymakers voiced
support for Kyrgyzstan’s parliamentary democracy, the only such political system in Central
Asia.57 In light of subsequent political developments, analysts raised concerns about democratic
backsliding in the country.58 According to Freedom House, by 2020, Kyrgyzstan’s legislature had
“de facto surrendered its constitutional y granted power to form and control the executive
branch,” and become a rubber-stamp body “merely paying lip service to the declared goal of
building a parliamentary democracy.”59 Such concerns were heightened following an April 2021
referendum in which voters approved a new constitution. In addition to significantly increasing
presidential power and weakening the legislature, the new constitution also al ows a president to

56 Bruce Pannier, “Rethinking Kyrgyzstan’s T ulip Revolution,” RFE/RL, August 25, 2009; Catherine Putz,
“Remembering Kyrgyzstan’s Revolutions,” The Diplomat, April 9, 2015.
57 See, for example, Sen. T ed Kaufman, “Kyrgyzstan,” remarks in the Senate, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol.
156 (July 15, 2010), p. S5954; Sen. John Kerry, “Kyrgyzstan’s Democratic T ransition,” remarks in the Senate,
Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 157 (June 28, 2011), p. S4149; Rep. Joe Wilso n, “ New Partnership with
Kyrgyzstan,” remarks in the House, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 158 (February 27, 2012), p. H951.
58 See, for example, Paul Stronski and Katherine Quinn-Judge, “Kyrgyzstan at 25: T reading Water,” Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 2016.
59 Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2020: Kyrgyzstan.
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serve two five-year terms. The document has drawn criticism as “undermin[ing] human rights
norms and weaken[ing] checks and balances necessary to prevent abuses of power.”60
The new constitution came after political upheaval in the wake of disputed October 2020
parliamentary elections whose results heavily favored pro-establishment parties. Opposition
parties al eged widespread irregularities, including vote-buying and voter intimidation; these
assertions were deemed credible by international election observers.61 After mass protests broke
out in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan’s capital, the Central Election Commission annulled the election
results.62 Amid the resulting power vacuum, Sadyr Japarov, a former member of parliament who
had been serving a lengthy prison sentence on charges he maintains were political y motivated,
emerged as the leading contender to assume power.63 Within 11 days of the elections, Japarov had
become both prime minister and acting president.64
Upon taking power, Japarov and his al ies began to push for a constitutional referendum to return
Kyrgyzstan to a presidential form of government, arguing that the country is not ready for
parliamentarism. New parliamentary elections were initial y scheduled for December 2020; they
were postponed after the sitting parliament voted to extend its mandate through June 2021.65 The
elections are currently scheduled to take place on November 28, 2021. A snap presidential
election and a referendum on whether or not Kyrgyzstan should adopt a presidential system took
place in January 2021, raising concerns about the state of democracy and rule of law in the
country.66 Japarov was elected president with 79% of the vote amid relatively low turnout. In the
concurrent constitutional referendum, 84% of voters supported reverting to a presidential
system.67

60 Human Rights Watch, “ Kyrgyzstan: Withdraw Problematic Draft Constitution,” March 5, 2021.
61 “Kyrgyz Opposition Decries Mass Irregularities in Parliamentary Elections,” RFE/RL, October 4, 2020; OSCE
ODIHR Limited Election Observation Mission, Kyrgyz Republic—Parliamentary Elections, October 4, 2020,
“Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions,” pp. 1-2, 9.
62 Central Commission on Elections and the Conduction of Referendums of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, “T sIK priznala
nedeistvitel’nymi itogi golosovaniia na vyborakh” [CEC has declared election results in valid], October 6, 2020;
Abdujalil Abdurasulov, “Kyrgyzstan Election: Euphoria T urns to Insecurity as Mob Rule Spreads,” BBC News,
October 8, 2020; Catherine Putz, “ Does Kyrgyzstan’s Post -Election Chaos Put It on the Road to Revolution?” The
Diplom at, October 6, 2020.
63T emur Umarov, “ Who’s in Charge Following Revolution in Kyrgyzstan?” Carnegie Moscow Center, October 26,
2020; Bruce Pannier, “ A Hidden Force In Kyrgyzstan Hijacks T he Opposition’s Push for Big Changes,” RFE/RL,
October 13, 2020; “ Sadyr Japarov: Kyrgyzstan Needs to Change ‘Political Culture,’” Al Jazeera, October 20, 2020.
64 “Kyrgyzstan: Japarov’s Nomination as PM Pauses Crisis,” Eurasianet, October 14, 2020; Catherine Putz, “ Kyrgyz
President Jeenbekov Offers Resignation,” The Diplom at, October 15, 2020; Peter Leonard, “ Kyrgyzstan: Japarov
Seizes All Levers of P ower,” Eurasianet, October 16, 2020; “ Kyrgyz Parliament Gives Newly Elected PM Japarov
Presidential Powers,” RFE/RL, October 16, 2020.
65 Catherine Putz, “ Kyrgyzstan Punts on Elections to Pursue Constitutional Reforms,” The Diplomat, October 22, 2020;
Ilgiz Kambarov, “ Upcoming Parliament Elections Present New Opportunities and Challenges for Kyrgyzstan ,” The
Diplom at, August 4, 2021.
66 European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Urgent Amicus Curiae Brief Relating to
the Postponement of Elections Motivated by Constitutional Reform Issued Pursuant to Article 14a of the Venice
Commission’s Rules of Procedure on the Basis of Comments by Mr. Richard Barrett (Member, Ireland), Ms. Marta
Cartabia (Substitute Member, Italy), Ms. Hanna Suchocka (Honorary President, Former Member, Poland) , Opinion No.
1007/2020, November 17, 2020; Human Rights Watch, “ Kyrgyzstan: Bad Faith Efforts to Overhaul Constitution,”
November 21, 2020; U.S. Embassy in the Kyrgyz Republic, “ Statement on Constitutional Referendum in the Kyrgyz
Republic,” November 27, 2020; Ayzyiek Imanaliyeva, “ Kyrgyzstan: Constitutional Chamber Nixes Attempt to Halt
Power Grab,” Eurasianet, December 2, 2020.
67 “Kyrgyzstan: Japarov Secures Commanding Election Victory,” Eurasianet, January 10, 2021; Mariya Omelicheva,
“Why Did Kyrgyz Voters Give Up Parliamentarism?” The Diplomat, January 12, 2021; Ana-Maria Anghelescu,
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Some analysts posit that Kyrgyz voters may be drawn to a strong presidential system due to
longstanding frustrations with corruption and the ineffectiveness of parliament.68 Japarov enjoys
widespread popularity, and many in Kyrgyzstan support his populist platform.69 In a poll
conducted by the International Republican Institute in February and March 2021, 70% of
respondents said the country is heading in the right direction, up from 41% in August 2020.70
Nevertheless, some argue that the new constitution and the process by which it was adopted set
the stage for future political instability.71
As he moved to consolidate power, Japarov announced his intention to combat crime and
corruption. In October 2020, Kyrgyz authorities arrested Raimbek Matraimov, a former high-
level customs official implicated in a large-scale corruption and money-laundering scheme, and
Kamchybek Kolbayev, who is designated by the U.S. Treasury Department as a key member of a
transnational criminal organization.72 In December 2020, Treasury added Matraimov to the
Special y Designated Nationals List under Executive Order 13818, which implements the Global
Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Title XII, Subtitle F of P.L. 114-328), due to his
involvement in corruption. The State Department additional y announced visa sanctions against
Matraimov and his spouse a day later.73 While Kyrgyz authorities have expressed wil ingness to
cooperate with the United States on combatting corruption, some analysts question the sincerity
of Japarov’s anti-corruption efforts and speculate that he has backing from organized crime
leaders.74 The handling of court cases against Matraimov and Kolbayev has raised concerns
among U.S. officials and others in light of their lenient treatment; both men have been released
from custody.75

“Should Europe Worry About Kyrgyzstan?” The Diplomat, January 16, 2021.
68 See, for example, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “ Kyrgyzstan’s Constitutional Referendum: Another
Step Backward?,” event held on April 9, 2021, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tw5jjrXiFH8; Georgy
Mamedov, “‘Japarov Is Our T rump’: Why Kyrgyzstan Is the Future of Global Politics,” Open Democracy, January 6,
2021.
69 Ayzirek Imanaliyeva, “ Kyrgyzstan: Japarov, Last Hope or Populist Menace?,” Eurasianet, January 6, 2021; Gulzat
Baialieva and Joldon Kutmalaiev, “ How Kyrgyz Social Media Backed an Imprisoned Politician’s Meteoric Rise to
Power,” Open Democracy, October 15, 2020.
70 “Ahead of Elections, IRI Poll Reveals Kyrgyz Public Expectations,” International Republican Institute, April 2,
2021.
71 Bruce Pannier, “ Does the New Kyrgyz Constitution Set the Country Up for Future Unrest?” RFE/RL, April 13, 2021.
72 Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, “Plunder and Patronage in the Heart of Central Asia,” available
at https://www.occrp.org/en/plunder-and-patronage/; U.S. Department of State, T ransnational Organized Crime
Rewards Program, “ Kamchybek Asanbekovich Kolbayev Criminal Network,” April 9, 2017; U.S. Department of the
T reasury, “ T reasury Designates Key Members of the Brothers’ Circle Criminal Organization,” December 20, 2012;
“Kyrgyzstan: Kolbayev Arrested in Dramatic Fashion, but Is It T heater?” Eurasianet, October 22, 2020.
73 U.S. Department of the T reasury, “ Treasury Sanctions Corrupt Actors in Africa and Asia,” December 9, 2020; U.S.
Department of State, “ On the Occasion of International Anticorruption Day and International Human Rights Day,”
December 10, 2020.
74 Ilgiz Kambarov, “ Japarov’s Many Promises: Can Stability Emerge From Chaos in Kyrgyzstan?” The Diplomat,
October 22, 2020; Chris Rickleton, “ Kyrgyzstan’s Japarov: Revolutionary Crime-Fighting Anti-Corruption Crusader?”
Eurasianet, October 23, 2020; Bruce Pannier, “ Kyrgyz Judiciary Seemingly Moving in Step with New Leader
Japarov,” RFE/RL, October 26, 2020; Umarov, “ Who’s in Charge Following Revolution in Kyrgyzstan?”; “ Former
Kyrgyz Security Council Chief Dismisses New Government ’s Anti-Corruption Efforts as a ‘T heatrical Show,’”
RFE/RL, October 27, 2020.
75 “Kyrgyzstan ‘Ready to Closely Work’ with U.S. After ‘Meddling’ Accusation,” RFE/RL, December 11, 2020; U.S.
Embassy in the Kyrgyz Republic, “ U.S. Embassy Statement on Release of Kamchybek Kolbayev,” March 3, 2021;
U.S. Embassy in the Kyrgyz Republic, “ U.S. Embassy Statement on the Release of Criminal Boss Raimbek
Matraimov,” April 16, 2021.
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Table 2. Kyrgyzstan: Selected Democracy and Human Rights Indexes
Issue
Index
2016 Status/Rank
2020/2021 Status/Rank
Democracy
Freedom House, Freedom in
Partly Free (Score:
Not Free (Score: 28/100)
the World
38/100)
Press Freedom
Reporters Without Borders,
85th of 180 Countries
79th of 180 Countries
World Press Freedom Index
Economic Freedom
Heritage Foundation, Index of
Mostly Unfree (96th of
Moderately Free (78th of
Economic Freedom
178 Countries)
178 Countries)
Perceptions of
Transparency International,
136th of 168 Countries
124th of 179 Countries
Corruption
Corruption Perceptions Index
Rule of Law
World Justice Project, Rule of
83rd of 128 Countries and
87th of 128 Countries and
Law Index
Jurisdictions
Jurisdictions
Source: Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2016 and Freedom in the World 2021; Reporters Without
Borders, 2016 World Press Freedom Index and 2021 World Press Freedom Index; The Heritage Foundation, 2016
Index of Economic Freedom and 2021Index of Economic Freedom; Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions
Index 2016 and Corruption Perceptions Index 2021; World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index 2016 and Rule of Law
Index 2020.
Human Rights
According to the U.S. State Department, significant human rights issues in Kyrgyzstan include
serious restrictions on freedom of expression and the press, corruption, torture and arbitrary
detention, and inadequate judicial independence.76 In 2015, the State Department recognized
imprisoned activist Azimjon Askarov, an ethnic Uzbek from southern Kyrgyzstan, with its Human
Rights Defender Award. This led to significant friction in the U.S.-Kyrgyzstan bilateral
relationship (see “U.S.-Kyrgyzstan Bilateral Relations,” below). Multiple Members of Congress
cal ed upon the Kyrgyz government to release Askarov, but he died in prison in July 2020.77
Kyrgyzstan has a vibrant civil society relative to its neighbors, and its media pluralism has been
described as “exceptional” in the region.78 NGOs assert that politicians and other powerful
individuals have used the justice system to pressure independent media outlets, particularly those
involved in reporting on corruption.79 Recent legislative initiatives have also raised concerns
regarding freedom of expression. In June 2020, Kyrgyzstan’s parliament passed a law that would
enable authorities to censor websites containing information they determined to be untruthful and
require internet service providers to turn user data over to government agencies on request. After
the bil sparked protests and drew criticism from international observers, then-President

76 U.S. Department of State, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Kyrgyz Republic, March 30, 2021.
77 U.S. Department of State, “Winners of the 2014 Human Rights Award,” July 17, 2015; U.S. Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, “Menendez, Six Senate Colleagues Call on Kyrgyzstan President to Release Prisoners,” May 8,
2020; U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “Bipartisan Group of Senators Call on Central Asian Leaders to
Release Unjustly Detained Prisoners at High Risk of COVID-19,” June 30, 2020; Committee to Protect Journalists,
“Journalist Azimjon Askarov Dies in Pprison in Kyrgyzstan,” July 25, 2020; Catherine Putz, “ T he T ragedy of Azimjon
Askarov,” The Diplom at, July 27, 2020; Mihra Rittman, “ Kyrgyzstan Must Answer for the Death of Activist Azimjon
Askarov,” The Washington Post, July 29, 2020.
78 Reporters Without Borders, 2020 World Press Freedom Index: Kyrgyzstan.
79 Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2020: Kyrgyzstan.
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Sooronbay Jeenbekov returned it to the legislature for revision. A new version of the bil passed
in July 2021 and was signed into law by President Japarov in August.80
Nongovernmental organizations operating in Kyrgyzstan also face chal enges. In July 2021,
President Japarov signed into law new financial and programmatic reporting requirements on
NGOs. The bil drew international criticism and inspired protests when it was initial y introduced
in 2020.81 Its passage prompted the State Department to express “deep concern” and urge
Kyrgyzstan’s leadership to reconsider the legislation.82
Economy
Kyrgyzstan is a lower middle income country whose economy is heavily dependent on
remittances and mining. Gold, Kyrgyzstan’s main export commodity, is primarily produced by
the Kumtor mine, which accounted for 12.5% of Kyrgyzstan’s GDP in 2020.83 Kyrgyzstan is one
of the most remittance-dependent economies in the world, with remittances, predominantly from
Russia, equaling roughly 30% of GDP in 2019.84 Kyrgyzstan’s large informal economy is
estimated at about 24% of GDP; some analysts argue it may be even larger.85 China is
Kyrgyzstan’s largest trading partner, followed by Russia. Kyrgyzstan’s 1998 accession to the
World Trade Organization (WTO) helped establish the country as a hub for the re-export of
Chinese goods.86 Kyrgyzstan has been a member of the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union
(EEU, also abbreviated EAEU) since 2015. Accession has proven somewhat controversial
domestical y because EEU membership introduced new regulatory hurdles while failing to confer
some of the expected benefits.87

80 Mariya Zozulya, “ Internet Censorship Looms in Kyrgyzstan,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, August 12,
2020; “Zhogorku Kenesh otklonil zakonproekt o zashchite ot lozhnoi informatsii” [Jogorku Kenesh rejects bill on
protection from false information], Radio Azattyk, June 30, 2021; Bermet T alant, “ Kyrgyz Parliament Sneaks T hrough
‘Fake News’ Law With President’s Blessing,” Eurasianet, July 29, 2021; “ Kyrgyz President Signs Controversial ‘False
Information’ Bill Into Law,” RFE/RL, August 24, 2021.
81 Human Rights Watch, “ Kyrgyzstan: Bills Curbing Basic Freedoms Advance,” June 20, 2020; Ayzirek Imanaliyeva,
“Kyrgyzstan: Draft Bill T hreatens to Drive NGOs Against the W all,” Eurasianet, May 22, 2020; Bakyt T oregel’din
ulu, “Usileniiu kontrolia nad NKO byt’? Spornyi zakon odobren parlamentom vo vtorom chtenii [Strengthening control
over NGOs? Controversial law approved by parliament in second reading],” Radio Azattyk, June 19, 2020.
82 U.S. Department of State, “Kyrgyz Republic’s New Law Directed at NGOs,” Press Statement, July 8, 2021.
83 Kumtor Gold Company, “Contribution to the Economy,” at https://www.kumtor.kg/en/contribution-to-the-kyrgyz-
economy/. Following Japarov’s rise to power, the government of Kyrgyzstan moved to nationalize the mine, which had
been owned by a Canadian company. See Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska, “ Kyrgyzstan Moves to Nationalise Gold
Mine Run by Canadian Company,” Al Jazeera, July 9, 2021; “ US Court Rules Kyrgyzstan in Contempt for Pushing
Ahead with Local Legal Action Against Kumtor Gold,” bne IntelliNews, July 23. 2021.
84 “COVID-19 Crisis T hrough a Migration Lens: Migration and Development Brief 32,” World Bank Group, April,
2020, pp. 18-20.
85 Hans Holzhacker and Dana Skakova, Kyrgyz Republic Diagnostic, EBRD, May 2019, p. 7.
86 Philipp Schroeder and Elina Schroeder, Entrepreneurship in Kyrgyzstan: Adjustments to a Changing Economic
Environm ent (Bishkek: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2017); Roman Mogilevskii, “ Re-export Activities in Kyrgyzstan:
Issues and Prospects,” University of Central Asia, Inst itute of Public Policy and Administration, Working Paper no. 9
(2012); Bartlomej Kaminski and Gael Raballand, “Entrepot for Chinese Consumer Goods in Central Asia: T he Puzzle
of Re-exports T hrough Kyrgyz Bazaars,” Eurasian Geography and Econom ics 50, no. 5 (2009): pp. 581-590.
87 Nurjamal Djanibekova, “Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan Border Crises Complicated by Mutual Distrust,” Eurasianet,
February 6, 2020; “Here’s Looking at EAEU #1: Blowing Hot and Cold,” Eurasianet, June 4, 2020; Roman
Mogilevskii, James T hurlow, and Adeline Yeh, “ Kyrgyzstan’s Accession to the Eurasian Economic Union: Measuring
Economy-Wide Impacts and Uncertainties,” University of Central Asia, Institute of Public Policy and Administration,
Working Paper no. 44 (2018).
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The expanding Chinese economic presence in Kyrgyzstan has sparked controversy and protests.
China’s Export-Import Bank owns almost 40% of Kyrgyzstan’s roughly $4.8 bil ion of foreign
debt.88 As part of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative, China has supported several large-scale
infrastructure projects in Kyrgyzstan, financed primarily through concessional loans. In February
2020, a joint Chinese-Kyrgyz project to build a $280 mil ion logistics center in Kyrgyzstan’s
Naryn province was cancel ed after protests by local residents, who criticized the investment as a
Chinese land-grab.89
The COVID-19 pandemic has had a significant negative impact on Kyrgyzstan’s economy and
the country’s under-resourced healthcare system. The World Bank estimates an 8.6% decline in
GDP in 2020 and projects a rebound to 3.8% growth in 2021. Previous forecasts had predicted
3.4% growth in 2020, and GDP growth had averaged 4% since 2014.90 Remittances to
Kyrgyzstan fel sharply in 2020 as a consequence of the pandemic and the related economic
downturn in Russia.91 Additional y, a large number of people either returned from abroad or were
unable to migrate for work, a circumstance analysts deemed likely to aggravate unemployment
and place additional stress on the country’s social services.92 Kyrgyzstan has received emergency
financial assistance from international financial institutions, and the Kyrgyz government has
requested debt relief from China.93
U.S.-Kyrgyzstan Bilateral Relations
The United States was among the first countries to recognize Kyrgyzstan’s independence
following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. From 2001 to 2014, the United States operated a
Transit Center at Manas, near the Kyrgyz capital of Bishkek, in support of both Operation
Enduring Freedom and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. U.S.
relations with Kyrgyzstan deteriorated under President Almazbek Atambayev (in office 2011-
2017), reportedly in part due to Russian pressure.94 U.S.-Kyrgyzstan relations improved
somewhat under his successor, President Jeenbekov (in office 2017-2020). Bilateral security
cooperation has waned since 2014; the State Department is seeking to develop cooperation in
combatting terrorism and extremism, and promoting regional stability. Other U.S. priorities in

88 Chris Rickleton, “Kyrgyzstan’s China Debt: Between Crowdfunding and Austerity,” Eurasianet, November 17,
2020.
89 “China-Led $280 Million Kyrgyzstan Project Abandoned After Protests,” Reuters, February 18, 2020.
90 World Bank, Europe and Central Asia Economic Update, Spring 2021: Data, Digitalization, and Governance,
March 30, 2021, pp. 31, 131-132; OECD, COVID-19 Crisis Response in Central Asia, June 4, 2020, pp. 5, 37; World
Bank, Global Econom ic Prospects, January 2021, p. 79.
91 “COVID-19 Crisis T hrough a Migration Lens: Migration and Development Brief 32,” World Bank Group, April,
2020, pp. 18-20; Konstantin Larionov, “ The Impact of Global Economic Recession on Kyrgyz Labor Migrants in
Russia,” Central Asian Bureau for Analytical Reporting, April 14, 2020; OECD, COVID-19 Crisis Response in Central
Asia, November 16, 2020, pp. 15-16, 18.
92 OECD, COVID-19 Crisis Response in Central Asia, November 16, 2020, pp. 15-16; Asian Development Bank and
U.N. Development Programme, COVID-19 in the Kyrgyz Republic: Socioeconom ic and Vulnerability Im pact
Assessm ent and Policy Response, August 2020, pp. 21-26.
93 Reid Standish, “ How Will Kyrgyzstan Repay Its Huge Debts to China?” RFE/RL, February 27, 2021; Paul Bartlett,
“China Offers Cash-Strapped Kyrgyzstan a Glimmer of Hope on Debt,” Nikkei Asia, December 3, 2020.
94 Akhilesh Pillalamarri, “T he United States Just Closed Its Last Base in Central Asia,” The Diplomat, June 10, 2014;
Olga Dzyubenko, “U.S. Vacates Base in Central Asia as Russia’s Clout Rises,” Reuters, June 3, 2014.
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Kyrgyzstan include supporting a more inclusive and accountable democracy and improving the
country’s business environment.95
In 2015, after the U.S. State Department presented Azimjon Askarov with its 2014 Human Rights
Defender Award, the Kyrgyz government terminated the bilateral cooperation agreement (BCA)
that had been in place between the United States and Kyrgyzstan since 1993.96 The BCA had
facilitated the provision of U.S. humanitarian and technical economic assistance to Kyrgyzstan by
providing tax exemptions and guaranteeing certain protections for U.S. civilian and military
personnel present in Kyrgyzstan in connection with U.S. assistance programs.97 In 2015, the State
Department warned that the lack of a BCA could put U.S. assistance programs to Kyrgyzstan in
jeopardy.98 Aid programs have continued, however, and U.S. officials have been involved in
efforts to conclude a new BCA.99 The State Department requests $31.4 mil ion in assistance to
Kyrgyzstan for FY2022, compared to $34.4 mil ion al ocated in FY2020, in order to pursue goals
that include supporting democracy in the country, strengthening civil society and independent
media, improving rule of law and promoting good governance, combatting corruption, protecting
human rights, promoting business competitiveness, and combatting tuberculosis. The United
States also seeks to promote law enforcement reform, counter violent extremism, and assist
Kyrgyzstan in professionalizing its military and safely managing its conventional munitions
stockpiles.100
In January 2020, the Trump Administration suspended the issuance of most immigrant visas to
Kyrgyz citizens as part of its expansion of the travel restrictions introduced by Executive Order
13780 of March 6, 2017. The Administration cited Kyrgyzstan’s failure to comply with
information-sharing criteria, deficiencies in the security of Kyrgyz passports, and deficiencies in
the integrity of the country’s passport issuance process.101 Kyrgyzstan’s introduction of biometric
passports was delayed in 2019, reportedly as the result of a corruption investigation involving the
tender for passport booklets.102 Kyrgyzstan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs criticized the U.S. travel
restrictions, stating that they caused “significant damage” to U.S.-Kyrgyzstan relations and noting
that more than 80 countries had yet to introduce biometric passports.103 President Biden revoked

95 U.S. Department of State, Integrated Country Strategy: Kyrgyz Republic, November 16, 2018.
96 “Kyrgyzstan Ends U.S. Cooperation Agreement Amid Human Rights Dispute,” RFE/RL, July 21, 2015.
97 Agreement Between the Government of the United States of American and the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic
Regarding Cooperation to Facilitate the Provision of Assistance, May 19, 1993.
98 U.S. Embassy in the Kyrgyz Republic, “ Kyrgyzstan: T angible Benefit s of U.S. Assistance in Response to
T ermination of the 1993 Bilateral Agreement ,” July 23, 2015.
99 See, for example, U.S. Embassy in the Kyrgyz Republic, “ Readout of U.S. Ambassador Donald Lu’s Meeting with
Foreign Minister of the Kyrgyz Republic Ruslan Kazakbaev,” December 3, 2020; Ibid., “ Successful U.S.-Kyrgyz
Annual Bilateral Consultations: Building Our Partnership ,” July 31, 2019; Ibid., “ USAID Representative Visits the
Kyrgyz Republic to Advance Bilateral Cooperation Agreement ,” April 22, 2019.
100 U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2022 , Appendix 2,
pp. 160, 288, 309, 340, 380-381, 577-578.
101 T he White House, “ Proclamation on Improving Enhanced Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting
Attempted Entry,” January 31, 2020; U.S. Embassy in the Kyrgyz Republic, “ Kyrgyz Republic Designated for U.S.
Immigrant and Diversity Visa Restrictions,” February 1, 2020.
102 Alexandra Li, “ Multimillion Passport Deal Under Investigation in Kyrgyzstan,” Organized Crime and Corruption
Reporting Project, April 19, 2019.
103 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic, “Zaiavlenie Ministerstva innostrannykh del Kyrgyzskoi
Respubliki ot 1go fevralia 2020 goda [Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic dated
February 1, 2020],” February 1, 2020.
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Executive Order 13780 and related proclamations on January 20, 2021, ordering the resumption
of visa processing.104 Kyrgyzstan began issuing biometric passports in May 2021.
Tajikistan
Tajikistan borders four other states, including China and Afghanistan (see Figure 5), and
maintains close ties with Russia. Tajikistan’s population of approximately 9.5 mil ion is
predominantly Tajik (about 84% as of 2014), with a sizeable Uzbek minority (about 14% as of
2014).105 The country’s territory is slightly smal er than Wisconsin. According to local estimates,
more than 90% of Tajikistan’s inhabitants are Muslim, primarily Sunni; Ismaili Shias account for
about 4% of the Muslim population.106 Tajikistan’s long border with Afghanistan and the potential
for instability in that country to spil over into Central Asia draw interest in Tajikistan from China,
Russia, and the United States. Following the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, the government of
Tajikistan has stood out from its neighbors in its strong opposition to a Taliban-led government,
signaling that it would not recognize a government in Afghanistan that it does not see as
inclusive.107 In Afghanistan, opposition to the Taliban is concentrated in the country’s ethnic Tajik
community; Tajiks are estimated to be the second-largest ethnic group in Afghanistan, accounting
for about a quarter of the population. The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic is causing significant
strain on foreign remittances, which come primarily from Russia and equaled roughly a third of
GDP in 2019. Tajikistan is increasingly dependent on China, which is Tajikistan’s largest foreign
creditor and is building a security presence in the country. Tajikistan has faced incidents of
violence attributed to the Islamic State (IS), but it has been asserted by some observers that the
government also uses the prospect of insurgent activity as a pretext for stifling opposition.
President Emomali Rahmon and his family control the government and significant sectors of the
economy. The U.S. Department of State describes corruption in Tajikistan as widespread.108

104 T he White House, “ Proclamation on Ending Discriminatory Bans on Entry to The United States,” January 20, 2021.
105 T he CIA World Factbook.
106 U.S. Department of State, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Tajikistan, May 12, 2021.
107 Umida Hashimova, “ T ajikistan and Uzbekistan T ake Different Approaches to Afghanistan ,” The Diplomat,
September 13, 2021; Bruce Pannier, “T ajikistan: T he T aliban’s T oughest Critic,” RFE/RL, September 13, 2021; Ivan
Klyszcz, “ Don’t Underestimate Tajikistan in the Afghanistan Crisis,” The Diplomat, September 2, 2021.
108 U.S. Department of State, 2021 Investment Climate Statements: Tajikistan, July 21, 2021.
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Figure 5. Map of Tajikistan

Source: Graphic created by CRS.
Notes: Abbreviations: TKM—Turkmenistan; KAZ—Kazakhstan.
Political Background
Tajikistan is a presidential republic with power heavily concentrated in the executive. The
president serves as both head of state and head of the government; the role and influence of the
legislature is limited. President Rahmon, 68, has been in power since 1992 and is now the oldest
and longest-serving head of state in the post-Soviet states. He was exempted from term limits in a
2016 constitutional referendum that also granted him and his family immunity from
prosecution.109 Freedom House describes Tajikistan under Rahmon as a “nepotistic kleptocracy,”
as a smal group of families close to the president dominate the political and economic spheres.110
Although six parties have seats in parliament, al support Rahmon, and observers have described
Tajikistan as a de facto one-party state.111 As speaker of the parliament’s upper chamber, the
president’s son, Rustam Emomali, 33, is first in the line of presidential succession. OSCE
observers describe the electoral process in Tajikistan as lacking credibility and transparency.112
Shortly after Tajikistan became independent in 1991, the country entered into a five-year civil war
(1992-1997) during which as many as 300,000 people died and more than a mil ion were
displaced.113 The Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), which fought as part of a

109 Catherine Putz, “Meet Central Asia’s Newest President-for-Life,” The Diplomat, May 23, 2016.
110 Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2018: Tajikistan.
111 Edward Lemon, “T he Fall of T ajikistan’s Opposition,” The Diplomat, March 2020.
112 OSCE ODIHR, Republic of Tajikistan Presidential Election, 11 October 2020: ODIHR Election Assessment
Mission Final Report, 29 January, 2021, p. 1.
113 Estimated fatalities vary widely, from 50,000 to 300,000. See Anna Matveeva, “The Perils of Emerging Statehood:
Civil War and State Reconstruction in T ajikistan,” Crisis States Working Papers Series No. 2, March 2009; and Bruce
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coalition of anti-government forces, was legalized following the 1997 peace deal and adopted an
agenda of democratization. It became Tajikistan’s second-largest political party and held seats in
parliament from 2000 to 2015.114 In 2015, the Tajik government outlawed the IRPT and label ed it
a terrorist organization in what the U.S. State Department characterized as “steps to eliminate
political opposition.”115 Some of the party’s leaders have been sentenced to lengthy prison terms,
while others have fled the country. Tajikistan’s March 2020 parliamentary elections were the first
to be held since the IRPT was outlawed. One opposition party fielded candidates, but failed to
secure any seats. The president’s People’s Democratic Party won a decisive majority of 47 out of
63 seats in the lower chamber, among reports of widespread electoral fraud. International
observers questioned the integrity of the electoral results.116
In October 2020, President Rahmon was reelected for a fifth term with 90.9% of the vote, in an
election that “lacked credibility and transparency” in the assessment of the OSCE.117 Some
analysts had previously speculated that he might be replaced on the bal ot by his son, who was
eligible to run in 2020 following constitutional changes that lowered the age requirement for
candidates. Some argue that it is likely Rahmon wil not serve out his full seven-year term, and
wil resign in favor of his son at some point before the next presidential election, which is set to
take place in 2027.118
Table 3. Tajikistan: Selected Democracy and Human Rights Indexes
Issue
Index
2016 Status/Rank
2020/2021 Status/Rank
Democracy
Freedom House, Freedom in
Not Free (Score: 16/100)
Not Free (Score: 8/100)
the World
Press Freedom
Reporters Without Borders,
150th of 180 Countries
162nd of 180 Countries
World Press Freedom Index
Economic Freedom
Heritage Foundation, Index of
Mostly Unfree (149th of
Mostly Unfree (134th of
Economic Freedom
178 Countries)
178 Countries)
Perceptions of
Transparency International,
151st of 168 Countries
149th of 179 Countries
Corruption
Corruption Perceptions Index
Rule of Law
World Justice Project, Rule of
Not Ranked
Not Ranked
Law Index
Source: Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2016 and Freedom in the World 2021; Reporters Without
Borders, 2016 World Press Freedom Index and 2021 World Press Freedom Index; The Heritage Foundation,
2016 Index of Economic Freedom and 2021Index of Economic Freedom; Transparency International, Corruption
Perceptions Index 2016 and Corruption Perceptions Index 2021; World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index 2016
and Rule of Law Index 2020.

Pannier, “ T ajikistan’s Civil War: A Nightmare the Government Won’t Let Its People Forget,” RFE/RL, June 23, 2017.
114 Ilya Lozovsky, “T he Death of T ajikistan’s Islamic Renaissance,” Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting
Project, June 5, 2018; Human Rights Watch, “ T ajikistan: Reverse Political Party Closure,” September 14, 2015.
115 U.S Department of State, 2015 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Introduction , April 13, 2016.
116 “T ajikistan: Fraud-Ridden Election Hands Crushing Win to Ruling Party,” Eurasianet, March 2, 2020; OSCE
ODIHR, Republic of Tajikistan Parliam entary Elections, 1 March 2020: ODIHR Election Assessm ent Mission Final
Report, May 27, 2020, p. 3.
117 OSCE ODIHR, Republic of Tajikistan Presidential Election, 11 October 2020: ODIHR Election Assessment
Mission Final Report, 29 January, 2021, p. 1.
118 T emur Umarov, “T he Secret of the T ajik President’s Staying Power,” Carnegie Moscow Center, October 10, 2020.
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Human Rights
According to the State Department, significant human rights issues in Tajikistan include
kidnapping and forced repatriation of citizens from foreign countries, forced disappearances,
torture, arbitrary detention, and a non-independent judiciary, as wel as significant restrictions on
freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, freedom of movement, religious freedom, and
political participation.119 Tajikistan has faced criticism, including from some Members of
Congress, for engaging in transnational repression of government critics.120 This includes
targeting IRPT members and other dissidents through law enforcement mechanisms such as
International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) wanted persons notices and pressuring
family members who remain in Tajikistan (see also “Outlook and Issues for Congress,” below).121
Media freedom in Tajikistan reportedly is curtailed severely.122 Reporters Without Borders ranked
Tajikistan 162nd out of 180 countries in its 2021 World Press Freedom Index (see Table 3), down
from 149th in 2018. Some Members of Congress have expressed concerns about government
pressure on independent media outlets in Tajikistan, particularly the U.S.-funded RFE/RL.123
Tajikistan’s government sometimes curtails internet access throughout the country, purportedly in
order to block citizens’ access to critical voices, including those of IRPT leaders.124
The Tajik government restricts and strictly regulates religious practices.125 Authorities target
outward signs of religiosity, such as hijabs and beards. Minors are prohibited from participating in
public religious activities. The government also places restrictions on minority religious groups,
including Christian denominations.126 Tajikistan is designated a “Country of Particular Concern”
(CPC) under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA, P.L. 105-292), but the State
Department has consistently waived related sanctions in consideration of U.S. national interests .
In its 2021 Annual Report, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF)
recommends that the State Department redesignate Tajikistan as a CPC and condition U.S.
assistance to Tajikistan, other than aid to improve humanitarian conditions or advance human
rights, on improvement of religious freedom conditions in the country and mandated religious
freedom training for Tajik officials. Additional y, USCIRF recommends targeted sanctions on

119 U.S. Department of State, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Tajikistan, March 30, 2021.
120 See, for example, Rep. Alcee Hastings, “Introduction of the T ransnational Repression Accountability and
Prevention Act of 2019 (T RAP Act),” remarks in the House, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 165 (September
16, 2019), p. E1153; Rep. Steve Cohen, “ Congressman Cohen Introduces the T ransnational Repression Accountability
and Prevention (TRAP) Act ,” press release, July 29, 2021.
121 Nate Schenkkan and Isabel Linzer, Out of Sight, Not Out of Reach: The Global Scale and Scope of Transnational
Repression, Freedom House, February 2021, pp. 48-49; Edward Lemon, “ Weaponizing Interpol,” Journal of
Dem ocracy 30, no. 2 (2019): pp. 15-29.
122 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2020: Tajikistan.
123 U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “Bipartisan Group of Senators Sends Letter to President of T ajikistan
Regarding Harassment of T ajik Journalists,” October 25, 2019.
124 “T ajikistan’s Internet Goes Down Just as Speech by Exiled Opposition Leader Delivered Online,” RFE/RL,
September 17, 2020; Catherine Putz, “ Muhiddin Kabiri Speaks Online, T ajikistan’s Internet Shuts Down,” The
Diplom at, September 18, 2020. See also “ T ajikistan: Opposition Comes On, Internet Goes Off,” Eurasianet, February
23, 2019.
125 See Jason Morton, Promoting Religious Freedom and Countering Violent Extremism in Tajikistan , U.S.
Commission on International Religious Freedom, November 2020.
126 U.S. Department of State, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Tajikistan, May 12, 2021.
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government agencies and officials responsible for severe violations of religious freedom in
Tajikistan.127
Economy
Tajikistan is one of the world’s poorest countries, with an economy dependent on metal and
mineral exports and remittances from migrant workers. Although Tajikistan has no known
deposits of bauxite, the country’s primary industrial asset is the state-owned Tajikistan Aluminum
Company (Talco), the world’s fourth-largest aluminum smelter. The factory accounts for a
significant fraction of Tajikistan’s GDP. It also consumes about a third of the country’s electricity
supply at a steeply discounted rate and has been implicated in large-scale corruption involving
members of the president’s family.128
Tajikistan has significant hydropower potential. The partial y U.S.-funded Central Asia South
Asia Electricity Transmission and Trade Project (CASA-1000) aims to develop hydropower
infrastructure and export electricity to South Asia.129 If completed, the Rogun Dam could al eviate
domestic electricity shortages and make the country a net energy exporter. Two of the planned six
turbines are currently operational, and construction is slated for completion in 2028.130 Although
Tajikistan has increased electricity exports, the country continues to face rolling blackouts
domestical y.131
Tajikistan depends heavily on remittances from labor migrants in Russia, which equaled almost a
third of Tajikistan’s GDP in 2019 (down from almost half in 2013).132 This renders Tajikistan
highly vulnerable to external shocks. Remittances fel significantly in 2020 due to travel
restrictions and economic disruption in Russia caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.133 The
pandemic response has increased unemployment and exacerbated Tajikistan’s chronic food
insecurity. According to the World Bank’s Listening to Tajikistan survey, in May 2020 more than
41% of respondents reported that their households had reduced their food consumption. The
World Bank estimates that Tajikistan’s GDP growth fel to 2.2% in 2020 (down from 7.5% in
2019), projecting a gradual acceleration in GDP growth in 2021 and 2022.134
Although Russia remains Tajikistan’s primary economic partner, China has increased its presence
in the country in recent years. China has made a range of investments in Tajikistan as part of the
Belt and Road Initiative and now holds the majority of Tajikistan’s foreign debt. In April 2019, a
Chinese state-owned company entered into an agreement to receive a stake in Talco in exchange

127 U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report of the U.S. Commission on International
Religious Freedom , April 2021, p. 48.
128 Cooley and Heathershaw, Dictators Without Borders, pp. 80-111; “ Report: T ajikistan to Yield Share in Aluminum
Plant to China,” Eurasianet, December 5, 2019; David T rilling, “ Russian Aluminum Giant Pries Open Books at
T ajikistan’s Largest Factory,” Eurasianet, June 9, 2014.
129 USAID, Secretariat for CASA-1000 Power Transmission Project Fact Sheet, September 14, 2020.
130 Catherine Putz, “T ajikistan’s Rogun Dam Begins Operations,” The Diplomat, November 20, 2018; Catherine Putz,
“Winter Energy Woes Bedevil Central Asia,” The Diplomat, January 13, 2021.
131 “T ajikistan Returning to Electricity Rationing Regime,” Eurasianet, January 6, 2021; “T ajikistan: Lights Out as
Dams Falter,” Eurasianet, November 17, 2020.
132 World Bank, “ Personal Remittances, Received (% of GDP)—T ajikistan,” available at https://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/BX.T RF.PWKR.DT .GD.ZS?locations=T J.
133 Khiradmand Sheraliev, “ A Critical Lesson for T ajikistan: T he State of Migrant Workers in 2020 ,” The Diplomat,
January 6, 2021; “ T ajikistan: Coronavirus T aking Heavy T oll on Remittances,” Eurasianet, July 22, 2020.
134 World Bank, Tajikistan Country Economic Update Fall 2020: Economic Slowdown Amid the Pandemic , December
23, 2020.
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for investing $545 mil ion in modernizing the facility.135 As much as 90% of Tajikistan’s
telecommunications infrastructure is from China, manufactured by Huawei.136
U.S.-Tajikistan Bilateral Relations
Tajikistan works with the United States to promote greater regional connectivity in Central Asia,
and U.S. officials have viewed it as an important partner for promoting stability in Afghanistan.137
The State Department requests $48.4 mil ion for assistance to Tajikistan in FY2022, compared to
$50.9 mil ion al ocated in FY2020. U.S. aid to Tajikistan includes public health programs
targeting nutrition, tuberculosis, and maternal and child health, as wel as programs intended to
build democratic institutions, political pluralism and civil society; support the modernization of
the country’s education system; address climate change; support agricultural development; and
improve private sector competitiveness.138 U.S. engagement with Tajikistan also includes security
cooperation, particularly in counternarcotics, counterterrorism, nonproliferation, and countering
violent extremism. Tajikistan lies along a major drug trafficking route for opiates from
Afghanistan, and the United States provides equipment and training to relevant Tajik agencies.139
Turkmenistan
Turkmenistan borders the Caspian Sea and four other countries, including Afghanistan and Iran
(see Figure 6). The country is slightly larger than California and is more than 80% desert. The
size of Turkmenistan’s population is disputed; the figure asserted by the government is 6.2
mil ion, but some argue that it may be less than half of that.140 According to the U.S. State
Department, Turkmenistan is approximately 89% Muslim (predominantly Sunni), and about 9%
Eastern Orthodox.141 A large majority of the country’s population is Turkmen (approximately
85% according to U.S. government estimates), with minority groups including Uzbeks and
Russians. Since independence, Turkmenistan’s authoritarian government has kept the country
largely isolated from the outside world and maintained tight control over the economy, although
Turkmenistan’s natural gas resources have attracted foreign investment. Turkmenistan’s
constitution establishes “permanent neutrality” as the core principle of the country’s foreign
policy. History and geography underpin a complicated but important relationship with Russia, and
increasing economic dependence is driving closer ties with China. In recent years, U.S.
engagement with Turkmenistan has focused primarily on border security issues, particularly with
neighboring Afghanistan. Turkmenistan’s government has not acknowledged any cases of
COVID-19 within its borders. Independent media operating outside the country have compiled
evidence of COVID-19 infections and deaths, and report that authorities have imposed pandemic-
related restrictions domestical y.142 The pandemic has exacerbated Turkmenistan’s economic

135 “Report: T ajikistan to Yield Share in Aluminum Plant to China,” Eurasianet, December 5, 2019; “Chast’
imushchestva aliuminievogo giganta T adzhikistana peredadut novoi kompanii [Part of the assets of T ajikistan’s
aluminum giant will be transferred to a new company],” Fergana News, May 22, 2020.
136 Bradley Jardine, “ China’s Surveillance State Has Eyes on Central Asia,” Foreign Policy, November 15, 2019.
137 See, for example, U.S. Department of State, “ U.S. Relations With T ajikistan: Bilateral Relations Factsheet,” January
20, 2021.
138 U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2022, Appendix 2,
pp. 162, 288, 310, 340, 380-381.
139 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, “T ajikistan Summary.”
140 “T urkmenistan Faces ‘Shocking Population Decline’ As Exodus Continues,” RFE/RL, July 12, 2021.
141 U.S. Department of State, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Turkmenistan , May 12, 2021.
142 T urkmen.news, Survival of the Fittest: All About Coronavirus in Turkmenistan, Though Officially the Country Has
No COVID-19 Infections, May 2021.
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situation. Residents face chronic food shortages as wel as difficulties withdrawing cash, which is
used for most transactions.
Figure 6. Map of Turkmenistan

Source: Graphic created by CRS.
Political Background
Executive power in Turkmenistan is largely unchecked, and President Gurbanguly
Berdimuhamedov dominates the country’s political structures. The president has extensive
powers that include presiding over the Cabinet of Ministers, as wel as appointing and dismissing
regional governors and mayors. Although the constitution stipulates the independence of the
judiciary, the president also appoints and dismisses judges. The legislature, termed a “rubber-
stamp body” by observers, became bicameral following constitutional changes introduced in
September 2020.143 Following 2012 legislation al owing for a multi-party system, Turkmenistan
has three official y recognized political parties: the Democratic Party (established in 1991 as the
successor to the Soviet-era Communist Party), the Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, and
the Agrarian Party. The OSCE describes Turkmenistan’s political environment as “only nominal y
pluralist,” as al three parties are aligned with the president and electoral procedures fail to meet
international standards.144
Saparmurad Niyazov, former first secretary of Turkmenistan’s Communist Party, became the
country’s first elected president after an uncontested 1992 race. A 1994 referendum extended his
term to 2002, and in 1999, amendments to the constitution proclaimed him president for life.
Niyazov, known as Turkmenbashi, or Leader of the Turkmen, was an autocratic ruler who created
a cult of personality around himself and his family, isolated the country, and suppressed dissent.

143 Bruce Pannier, “T urkmen Elections Look Like Next Step T oward Dynasty,” RFE/RL, March 22, 2018.
144 OSCE ODIHR, Turkmenistan Parliamentary Elections, 25 March 2018, ODIHR Election Assessment Mission:
Final Report, May 30, 2018.
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Following Niyazov’s death in December 2006, former Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of
Ministers Berdimuhamedov was elected in a 2007 election widely seen as fraudulent. He was
reelected in 2012 and again in 2017 (in 2016, the presidential term was extended from five to
seven years). No constitutional limit exists on the number of terms a president can hold office.
With the passage of constitutional amendments in 2016, presidential candidates no longer have an
upper age limit. Berdimuhamedov has largely followed in his predecessor’s authoritarian
footsteps.145 He has replaced Niyazov’s cult of personality with veneration of himself and uses
the title Arkadag (the Protector).146 Many analysts assess that Berdimuhamedov is positioning his
son Serdar, 39, as his successor.147
Table 4. Turkmenistan: Selected Democracy and Human Rights Indexes
Issue
Index
2016 Status/Rank
2020/2021 Status/Rank
Democracy
Freedom House, Freedom in
Not Free (Score: 4/100)
Not Free (Score: 2/100)
the World
Press Freedom
Reporters Without Borders,
178th of 180 Countries
178th of 180 Countries
World Press Freedom Index
Economic Freedom
Heritage Foundation, Index of
Repressed (174th of 178
Repressed (167th of 178
Economic Freedom
Countries)
Countries)
Perceptions of
Transparency International,
154th of 168 Countries
165th of 179 Countries
Corruption
Corruption Perceptions Index
Rule of Law
World Justice Project, Rule of
Not Ranked
Not Ranked
Law Index
Source: Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2016 and Freedom in the World 2021; Reporters Without
Borders, 2016 World Press Freedom Index and 2021 World Press Freedom Index; The Heritage Foundation,
2016 Index of Economic Freedom and 2021Index of Economic Freedom; Transparency International, Corruption
Perceptions Index 2016 and Corruption Perceptions Index 2021; World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index 2016
and Rule of Law Index 2020.
Human Rights
The State Department identifies human rights issues in Turkmenistan, and Turkmenistan faces
human rights criticism from international nongovernmental organizations. The NGO Freedom
House describes the country as “a repressive authoritarian state where political rights and civil
liberties are almost completely denied in practice.”148 Citizens are reportedly subject to
widespread surveil ance, arbitrary arrest and detention, and torture. The government also imposes
severe restrictions on freedom of movement.149 The State Department describes corruption in

145 Aisha Berdyeva, “T urkmenistan: Berdymukhamedov Marks First Year as President,” Eurasianet, February 11,
2008.
146 Farangis Najibullah, “ T urkmenistan: My Personality Cult Is Better T han Yours,” RFE/RL, February 13, 2012.
147 “T urkmen Leader’s Son T akes On New Roles; Rapid Rise Renews T alk of Succession,” RFE/RL, February 12,
2021; Victoria Clement, “Passing the Baton in T urkmenistan,” Atlantic Council, October 21, 2019.
148 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2018: Turkmenistan.
149 U.S. Department of State, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Turkmenistan , March 30, 2021.
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Turkmenistan as rampant.150 With bil ions of dollars in state revenues al egedly embezzled on
behalf of the president, one NGO has termed Turkmenistan a “model kleptocracy.”151
Because of its violations of religious freedom, Turkmenistan has been designated as a CPC under
the IRFA since 2014. The State Department regularly waives the related sanctions, citing U.S.
national interests. The Secretary of State redesignated Turkmenistan as a CPC in December 2020.
USCIRF describes religious freedom conditions in Turkmenistan as “among the worst in the
world.”152 In its 2021 Annual Report, USCIRF recommends that the State Department continue to
designate Turkmenistan as a CPC and lift the sanctions waiver, given the country’s record of
severe and wide-ranging violations of religious freedom. Additional y, USCIRF recommends that
the U.S. government limit security assistance to Turkmenistan under IRFA Section 405(a)(22) and
impose targeted sanctions on government agencies and officials responsible for severe violations
of religious freedom in Turkmenistan.153
Turkmenistan has long faced international criticism for engaging in widespread use of state-
orchestrated forced labor, particularly in the harvesting of cotton. Public sector employees are
reportedly forced to pick cotton, and private businesses are al egedly also forced to contribute
labor. In 2018, U.S. Customs and Border Protection responded to concerns about forced labor by
issuing a Withhold Release Order banning the importation of al cotton from Turkmenistan, as
wel as al products produced using cotton from Turkmenistan.154 In its 2021 Trafficking in
Persons Report, the State Department assessed that the government of Turkmenistan had a
documented “policy or pattern of forced labor,” and ranked Turkmenistan as a Tier 3 country for
human trafficking.155 Although Turkmenistan has taken steps to mechanize the cotton harvest,
local officials continue to coerce soldiers, public sector workers, and private-sector employees to
pick cotton without pay in order to meet government production quotas. Additional y, students
and public sector workers, including teachers and doctors, continue to face compulsory
mobilization for public works projects such as preparing public spaces for presidential visits and
supporting government-sponsored events.156
Media outlets in Turkmenistan are predominantly state-controlled, and NGOs identify significant
abuses. The Committee to Protect Journalists has condemned the “systematic harassment” of the
few independent journalists active in the country, and, in its 2021 World Press Freedom Index,
Reporters Without Borders ranked Turkmenistan 178th out 180 countries in levels of freedom
available to journalists (see Table 4), terming Turkmenistan “an ever-expanding news ‘black
hole.’”157 The U.S.-funded RFE/RL is one of a smal number of independent news outlets that
reports from within Turkmenistan. Internet censorship is prevalent, and the government blocks
access to many websites.

150 U.S. Department of State, 2021 Investment Climate Statements, July 21, 2021.
151 Crude Accountability, Turkmenistan: A Model Kleptocracy, June 2021.
152 U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report of the U.S. Commission on International
Religious Freedom , April 2021, p. 50.
153 Ibid.
154 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Withhold Release Orders and Findings,” May 18, 2018, at
https://www.cbp.gov/trade/trade-community/programs-outreach/convict-importations/detention-orders.
155 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report, June 2021, p. 565.
156 Ibid., pp. 565-567.
157 Reporters Without Borders, “T urkmenistan,” at https://rsf.org/en/turkmenistan; Committee to Protect Journalists,
“T urkmenistan Journalist Soltan Achilova Barred from T raveling Abroad,” March 25, 2019.
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Economy
The opaque nature of Turkmenistan’s government presents difficulties for accessing reliable data
on the country’s central y-managed economy.158 Turkmenistan is largely dependent on the export
of hydrocarbons, especial y natural gas, which was estimated to have accounted for 83.4% of the
country’s exports by value in 2019, with oil comprising another 9.5%.159 Soviet industrialization
policies established a cotton monoculture in the country, and cotton is Turkmenistan’s largest
export after hydrocarbons. The country’s other major crop, wheat, is cultivated for the domestic
market. Foreign direct investment remains limited beyond the hydrocarbons sector. The
government of Turkmenistan maintains that the country has had no cases of COVID-19. The
country has experienced the economic effects of the global pandemic, with GDP growth slowing
to 0.8% in 2020 according to IMF data.160
Turkmenistan is estimated to have the fourth-largest natural gas reserves in the world, accounting
for about 7% of the global total.161 The country’s export capacity is limited by its infrastructure.
Payment disputes with Russia and Iran halted gas flows from Turkmenistan in 2016 and 2017,
respectively, leaving China as Turkmenistan’s major export market. Roughly half of
Turkmenistan’s gas production is consumed domestical y, while the majority of the rest is
exported to China. Turkmenistan is China’s largest natural gas supplier by pipeline, accounting
for over 60% of pipeline imports in 2019 (see “Oil and Gas,” below). China is also
Turkmenistan’s primary international lender, having provided over $8 bil ion in loans to develop
Turkmenistan’s gas infrastructure. Analysts speculate that Turkmenistan services its Chinese
loans through discounted gas sales.162 Although Russia resumed gas imports from Turkmenistan
in 2019, the volume is relatively minor compared to Turkmenistan’s exports to China.163 The drop
in natural gas prices and lower demand resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic has had a
significant negative impact on Turkmenistan’s economy. The value of China’s imports from
Turkmenistan, which consist almost exclusively of natural gas, fel by 30% in 2020.164
Even before the pandemic, declining revenue from gas exports put pressure on Turkmenistan’s
economy, reducing living standards in recent years. High inflation, currency devaluation, tight
foreign exchange controls, and import restrictions mean that the country faces chronic shortages
of food and constraints on the ability to withdraw paper currency at local banks. The U.S.

158 Economic indicators provided by the government of T urkmenistan are generally seen as unreliable. T he U.S.
Department of Commerce terms GDP and growth rate figures put forward by the government of T urkmenistan
“implausible” and “not credible” (see U.S. Department of Commerce, Turkmenistan Country Commercial Guide, July
21, 2019, available at https://www.export.gov/apex/article2?id=T urkmenistan-Market-Overview). Citing a lack of
reliable data, the World Bank does not publish economic output, income, or growth data for T urkmenistan. See also
Peter Leonard, “ T urkmenistan: End of the Road for the Roaring Growth Myth?” Eurasianet, April 7, 2021.
159 Data from the Economist Intelligence Unit.
160 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook: Managing Divergent Recoveries, April 2021, p. 38. T his
contrasts with the 5.8% growth claimed by the government of T urkmenistan. T he Economist Intelligence Unit
estimates a 0.8% contraction in T urkmenistan’s GDP in 2020.
161 BP, Statistical Review of World Energy 2021, July 2021, p. 34.
162 Luca Anceschi, “A T ale of Four Pipelines: T he International Politics of T urkmen Natural Gas,” in Adam Hug, ed.,
Spotlight on Turkm enistan, T he Foreign Policy Centre, July 2019, pp. 36 -37; Jakub Jakobowski and Mariusz
Marszewski, “Crisis in T urkmenistan: A T est for China’s Policy in the Region,” Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW),
August 31, 2018.
163 Catherine Putz, “Russia Is Buying T urkmen Gas Again. Why?” The Diplomat, April 25, 2019.
164 People’s Republic of China General Administration of Customs, “Imports and Exports by Country (Region) of
Origin/Destination, 12.2020,” January 18, 2021, available at http://english.customs.gov.cn/Statics/81bd4a20-01a8-
45be-bcbc-f0627fd206da.html.
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Department of Commerce describes corruption in Turkmenistan as “pervasive and endemic,” and
notes that foreign companies have reported problems collecting payments for government
contracts.165 The Heritage Foundation’s 2021 Index of Economic Freedom classifies
Turkmenistan as “repressed,” ranking it 167th out of 180 countries. The country’s dire economic
situation has prompted many citizens to emigrate to countries such as Turkey and Russia.166
U.S.-Turkmenistan Bilateral Relations
Turkmenistan’s constitution outlines the principle of “permanent neutrality” as the basis for the
country’s foreign policy. The United Nations official y recognized Turkmenistan’s neutral status
in 1995.167 In practice, Turkmenistan’s neutrality translates to foreign policy isolationism, and the
country is largely closed off from the outside world. While Turkmenistan’s geography and energy
resources make it a potential strategic partner for the United States, the development of U.S.-
Turkmenistan ties is hampered by the country’s uninviting investment climate, repressive
government, and general y closed nature. Bilateral engagement to date has focused largely on
regional security issues. In 2019 testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General
Joseph L. Votel, then-Commander of U.S. Central Command, noted that while international
cooperation is limited by Turkmenistan’s neutrality policy, U.S. efforts have focused on English
language training, medical engagements, and the development of Turkmenistan’s Special Forces.
He identified Turkmenistan’s interest in enhancing its disaster response capability and border
security as avenues of opportunity for U.S. Central Command. “Maintaining a smal , consistent
security cooperation portfolio in Turkmenistan has outsized impact and wil help counter Russian
and Chinese influence,” he concluded.168
The State Department requests $4.1 mil ion in assistance to Turkmenistan in FY2022, compared
to $4 mil ion al ocated in FY2020.169 In order to “help [Turkmenistan] become a partner whose
contributions can help stabilize Afghanistan,” U.S. programs include efforts to improve the
country’s business climate and foster a more diversified economy; combat trafficking in persons;
and advance good governance.170
Uzbekistan
Many analysts see Uzbekistan a potential regional leader.171 Uzbekistan has the largest population
in the region and is the only country that borders al four other Central Asian states (see Figure

165 U.S. Department of Commerce, International T rade Administration, Turkmenistan—Country Commercial Guide,
October 15, 2020.
166 “Istochniki: T urkmenistan v sostoianii depopulatsii. V strane ostalos’ 2,7 milliona naseleniia” [Sources:
T urkmenistan is in a state of depopulation. T here are 2.7 million inhabitants left in the country], Radio Azatlyk, July 2,
2021; Bruce Pannier, “How Many People Live in T urkmenistan? T he Official Figure Is Hard to Believe,” RFE/RL,
January 23, 2020.
167 U.N. General Assembly Resolution 50/80, Maintenance of International Security, December 12, 1995.
168 U.S. Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, Statement of General Joseph L. Votel, Commander, U.S. Central
Com m and, Before the Senate Arm ed Services Com m ittee on the Posture of U.S. Central Com m and , February 5, 2019.
169 U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2022, Appendix 2,
pp. 583-584.
170 Ibid., p. 289.
171 See, for example, Nathan Hutson and Marsha McGraw Olive, “Uzbekistan Rising as Central Asian Integration
Catalyst ,” Eurasianet, February 8, 2021; Wilder Alejandro Sanchez, “ Will an Ascendant Uzbekistan Challenge
Kazakhstan’s Leadership in Central Asia?” Geopolitical Monitor, June 4, 2018; T imur T oktonaliev, “Could Uzbekistan
Lead Central Asia?” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, November 22, 2017.
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7). The country also shares a border with Afghanistan. Uzbekistan is slightly larger than
California, and the majority of the country’s population of approximately 34.9 mil ion is Uzbek
(83.8%), with Tajik (4.8%), Kazakh (2.5%), Russian (2.3%), Karakalpak (2.2%), and Tatar
(1.5%) minorities, among others.172 Most of Uzbekistan’s inhabitants are Muslim (88% according
to U.S. government estimates, and 96% according to the government of Uzbekistan), almost
exclusively Sunni, and about 2.2% of the population is Russian Orthodox.173 The United States
and Uzbekistan cooperate in addressing regional threats such as il egal narcotics, trafficking in
persons, terrorism, and violent extremism.174 Additional y, the wide-ranging reform effort
currently underway in Uzbekistan potential y creates new opportunities for U.S. engagement with
the country across a range of sectors. Uzbekistan previously had sought to position itself as an
intermediary between the Taliban and the Afghan government, in line with Uzbekistan’s stated
aim of facilitating intra-Afghan peace talks.175 Uzbekistan’s stance toward the Taliban is general y
seen as pragmatic, with the priority of ensuring Uzbekistan’s security (see “Afghanistan,”
below).176
Figure 7. Map of Uzbekistan

Source: Graphic created by CRS.

172 Population estimate as of July 1, 2021, from the State Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan on Statistics,
available at https://stat.uz/en/. Ethnic breakdown estimated as of 2017, from the CIA World Fact book.
173 U.S. Department of State, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Uzbekistan , May 12, 2021.
174 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Relations With Uzbekistan: Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet,” January 20, 2021.
175 James Durso, “ Uzbekistan’s Role in Afghan Reconciliation,” The Diplomat, August 18, 2020; Umida Hashimova,
“What Is Uzbekistan’s Role in the Afghan Peace Process?” The Diplomat, March 11, 2019.
176 See, for example, Henry Foy, “T aliban T akeover T urns Uzbekistan into P owerbroker,” Financial Times, September
9, 2021; Muhammad T ahir, “ Majlis Podcast: Uzbekistan Walks the T ightrope in Its Policies T oward Afghanistan,”
RFE/RL, September 5, 2021; Gavin Helf and Barmak Pazhwak, “ Central Asia Prepares for T aliban T akeover,” United
States Institute of Peace, July 20, 2021.
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Political Background
From 1991 to 2016, Uzbekistan was led by President Islam Karimov, a former high-level Soviet
official. International observers considered his rule authoritarian and highly repressive.177
Karimov’s economic policies emphasized self-sufficiency, and his government pursued a largely
isolationist foreign policy. After his death, Karimov was succeeded by Shavkat Mirziyoyev, who
was prime minister under Karimov for 13 years. After serving as acting president, Mirziyoyev
won a December 2016 presidential election that was criticized by international observers as
“devoid of genuine competition.”178 Although Mirziyoyev was widely expected to continue his
predecessor’s policies, he embarked on an ambitious reform program, aiming to transform
Uzbekistan by modernizing and liberalizing the economy, streamlining the bureaucracy, easing
political repression, addressing human rights concerns, reengaging with the international
community, and attracting increased foreign investment.
U.S. officials and other international observers have noted continuing reforms in Uzbekistan since
the country began that process in 2016.179 Uzbek government officials consistently describe the
country’s reform process as “irreversible.”180 Longtime observers describe the overal changes
taking place in Uzbekistan as “remarkable,” particularly with regard to increased openness,
improved governance, and decreased repression, and U.S. officials have voiced strong support for
the country’s ongoing reforms.181 Reform remains a top-down, centralized process, leading to
skepticism among some analysts as to whether the government wil implement true
democratization.182 Analysts note a slower pace in areas such as the privatization of state assets,
decentralization of political power, and combatting corruption.183 Some observers, including the
U.S. government, continue to express concerns about human rights and political freedoms.184

177 See, for example, “Uzbekistan: Authoritarian President Karimov Reported Dead: Legacy Is Quarter Century of
Ruthless Repression,” Human Rights Watch, September 2, 2016; Casey Michel, “ Uzbekistan’s Karimov Leaves
Behind a Legacy of Repression, Slavery, and Kleptocracy ,” The Diplom at, September 2, 2016.
178 OSCE ODIHR, Uzbekistan, Early Presidential Election, 4 December 2016: Final Report, March 22, 2017, p. 1.
179 See, for example, U.S. Embassy in Uzbekistan, “ Secretary Michael R. Pompeo and Uzbekistan Foreign Minister
Abdulaziz Kamilov,” February 3, 2020; Navbahor Imamova, “ U.S.-Uzbekistan: Strategic P artnership, Continuity, and
Mirziyoyev’s Challenges,” Amerika Ovozi, November 22, 2020.
180 See, for example, T he White House, “T he United States and Uzbekistan: Launching a New Era of Strategic
Partnership,” May 16, 2018; United Nations General Assembly, “General Assembly Debate Concludes Amid Calls to
Foster Global Stability through Multilateralism, Cooperation, Respect for Human Rights,” GA/12073, October 1, 2018;
Umida Hashimova, “Uzbek Foreign Minister on Reforms: ‘T here Is No Way Back,’” The Diplomat, February 13,
2019.
181 Navbahor Imamova, “Where Freedoms Are Expanding—Slowly,” The Atlantic, October 5, 2019; U.S. Embassy in
Uzbekistan, “Remarks by Ambassador Alice Wells,” February 27, 2019.
182 See, for example, Fred Harrison, “Uzbekistan Is Being T ransformed, but Where Are the Democratic Reforms?”
BNE Intellinews, January 6, 2021; Dilmira Matyakubowa, “ T here Won’t Be Political Reform in Uzbekistan. Here’s
Why,” The Diplom at, December 22, 2020.
183 See, for example, Nastassia Astrasheuskaya, “ Uzbekistan Reform Agenda Shows Signs of Slowing,” Financial
Tim es, September 9, 2021; Fred Harrison, “ Uzbekistan Is Being T ransformed, but Where Are the Democratic
Reforms?” BNE Intellinews, January 6, 2021; Dilmira Matyakubowa, “T here Won’t Be Political Reform in Uzbekistan.
Here’s Why,” The Diplomat, December 22, 2020.
184 See, for example, Laurence Fletcher, “Uzbekistan Fails to Address Human Rights Violations,” Financial Times,
September 9, 2021; Navbahor Imamova, “ Uzbekistan Reform Pace Questioned as Presidential Election Approaches,”
Voice of Am erica, May 26, 2021; Steve Swerdlow, “ Uzbekistan Needs a Nav ruz for Human Rights,” March 1, 2021;
U.S. Department of State, 2020 Country Reports on Hum an Rights Practices: Uzbekistan , March 30, 2021.
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Freedom House continues to classify Uzbekistan as “not free,” assessing that the country
“remains an authoritarian state with few signs of democratization.”185
Uzbekistan’s centralized government structure grants the executive branch extensive powers,
with the president exercising significant control over the legislature and the judiciary. The
president nominates the prime minister, the chair of the Senate, the general prosecutor, and al
regional governors. He also approves the cabinet of ministers, and appoints and dismisses al
judges. By law, the president is limited to two five-year terms, but this limit was not observed by
Karimov. The bicameral legislature (Oliy Majlis) has historical y provided neither an effective
check on the executive nor a venue for genuine political debate. Its role has expanded somewhat
under Mirziyoyev, who has urged more oversight over the executive and greater initiative from
parliament.186
The country’s first post-Karimov parliamentary elections were held in December 2019 under the
slogan “New Uzbekistan—New Elections.” According to international observers, the elections
took place in an atmosphere of unprecedented openness and engagement with voters but did not
demonstrate genuine competitiveness.187 The composition of parliament remains largely
unchanged, and the five parties that currently hold seats are seen as pro-government. Although no
party has an outright majority, Mirziyoyev’s Liberal Democratic Party received the highest
number of seats (53 of the 150 seats in the chamber). More than half of the incoming deputies
were elected for the first time, and they are on average younger than their predecessors.188 In
2020, legislative amendments expanded the oversight powers of the Oliy Majlis, and the new
parliament has engaged in increased debate on policy issues.189
Table 5. Uzbekistan: Selected Democracy and Human Rights Indexes
Issue
Index
2016 Status/Rank
2020/2021 Status/Rank
Democracy
Freedom House, Freedom in
Not Free (Score: 3/100)
Not Free (Score: 11/100)
the World
Press Freedom
Reporters Without Borders,
166th of 180 Countries
157th of 180 Countries
World Press Freedom Index
Economic Freedom
Heritage Foundation, Index of
Repressed (166th of 178
Mostly Unfree (108th of
Economic Freedom
Countries)
178 Countries)
Perceptions of
Transparency International,
156th of 168 Countries
146th of 179 Countries
Corruption
Corruption Perceptions Index
Rule of Law
World Justice Project, Rule of
93rd of 128 Countries and
92nd of 128 Countries and
Law Index
Jurisdictions
Jurisdictions

185 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2021: Uzbekistan.
186 “Address by the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev to Oliy Majlis,” December 28, 2018,
available at https://www.un.int/uzbekistan/news/address-president -republic-uzbekistan-shavkat -mirziyoyev-oliy-majlis-
0.
187 OSCE ODIHR, Uzbekistan, Parliamentary Elections, 22 December 2019: Final Report, May 13, 2020; OSCE
ODIHR, “Important Progress in Election Legislation Could Not Offset Lack of Real Contest in Uzbekistan’s
Parliamentary Elections, International Observers Say,” December 23, 2019.
188 Zaki Shaikh, Uzbekistan’s New Parliament: Real Reform or Just the Will of the “President’s Men?”, Al Jazeera
Center for Studies, January 23, 2020; Catherine Putz, “ Final T ally on Uzbekistan’s New Parliament: A 2014 Repeat?”
The Diplom at, January 7, 2020.
189 Oleg Zamanov, “Olii Mazhlis poluchil pravo provodit’ rassledovaniia” [Oliy Majlis received the right to conduct
investigations], Norm a, August 11, 2020; Catherine Putz, “ Checking in on Uzbekistan’s Political Progress in 2020: An
Interview with Farkhod T olipov,” The Diplom at, December 15, 2020.
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Source: Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2016 and Freedom in the World 2021; Reporters Without
Borders, 2016 World Press Freedom Index and 2021 World Press Freedom Index; The Heritage Foundation, 2016
Index of Economic Freedom and 2021Index of Economic Freedom; Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions
Index 2016 and Corruption Perceptions Index 2021; World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index 2016 and Rule of Law
Index 2020.
Human Rights
International organizations have lauded Uzbekistan’s progress on human rights since 2016, but
concerns persist among some observers. Human rights activists have long criticized Uzbekistan
for its use of forced labor in harvesting cotton, the country’s primary cash crop. Under Karimov,
the government annual y forced mil ions of people to pick cotton, a practice that dated to the
Soviet era. In its 2019 Trafficking in Persons report, the State Department assessed that
Mirziyoyev’s government has taken “substantive actions” to combat forced labor, and in 2021 the
State Department noted Uzbekistan’s “increasing efforts” in this area.190 The U.S. Department of
Labor (DOL) continues to classify cotton and silk cocoons as goods produced through forced
labor in Uzbekistan. DOL removed Uzbek cotton from a list of products produced through forced
child labor in 2019. In a report published in January 2021, the International Labour Organization
(ILO) found that systematic child labor and systematic forced labor did not occur in the 2020
cotton harvest, although some incidents were reported. While the central government has stated
its strong commitment to eradicating child labor and forced labor, some local officials reportedly
continue to coerce people into picking cotton. The ILO assesses that reforms have led to a
significant and accelerating reduction in forced labor in the cotton harvest, with an estimated 4%
of cotton pickers subjected to direct or perceived forms of coercion in 2020.191
Mirziyoyev has received recognition for releasing dozens of political prisoners, including two
journalists who had been jailed for almost 20 years.192 In August 2019, Mirziyoyev announced
that the notoriously brutal Jaslyk Prison would be closed, a move heralded as a “very positive
step” by international observers.193 Nevertheless, the U.N. Committee Against Torture noted that
as of December 2019, there were reports that torture and il -treatment of prisoners remain
“widespread” and “routine.”194 Although at least 60 political prisoners have been released, they
have not been formal y rehabilitated, meaning they remain legal y presumed guilty of having
committed a crime.195
The Uzbek state strictly controls and monitors religious practices, and unregistered religious
activity is criminalized.196 A law on religion signed by President Mirziyoyev in July 2021 eases
some restrictions but has drawn criticism from religious freedom advocates for maintaining

190 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report, June 2019, p. 493; U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in
Persons Report, June 2021, p. 597.
191 International Labour Organization, 2020 Third-Party Monitoring of Child Labour and Forced Labour During the
Cotton Harvest in Uzbekistan, January 2021.
192 Freedom House, “ Uzbekistan: Freedom House Welcomes Release of Political Prisoners,” August 31, 2020; Steve
Swerdlow, “Charting Progress in Mirziyoyev’s Uzbekistan,” The Diplomat, September 1, 2019.
193 Hugh Williamson and Steve Swerdlow, “Shuttering Notorious Jaslyk Prison A Victory for Human Rights in
Uzbekistan,” Human Rights Watch, August 27, 2019; Steve Swerdlow, “Charting Progress in Mirziyoyev’s
Uzbekistan,” The Diplomat, September 1, 2019.
194 United Nations Committee Against T orture, “Concluding Observations on the Fifth Periodic Report of Uzbekistan:
Advanced Unedited Version,” December 2019.
195 Steve Swerdlow, “ Rehabilitation Here and Now: Pursuing T ransitional Justice in Uzbekistan ,” Central Asian Bureau
for Analytical Reporting, October 5, 2020.
196 U.S. Department of State, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Uzbekistan , May 12, 2021.
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registration requirements and other elements of government control over religious life.197 In
December 2020, the U.S. State Department removed Uzbekistan from its Special Watch List of
countries that engage in severe violations of religious freedom. Uzbekistan had previously been
designated as a CPC from 2006 to 2017, and was placed on the Special Watch List in 2018 and
2019.198 In its 2021 Annual Report, USCIRF noted positive changes in religious freedom
conditions in Uzbekistan, but recommended that the State Department return Uzbekistan to the
Special Watch List.199
Uzbekistan’s media and civil society now operate more freely than under Karimov, but stil face
constraints (see Table 5). Local media have begun covering previously taboo topics such as
forced labor and corruption, but self-censorship persists. Journalists representing international
media outlets have received accreditation, and independent news, social media, and human rights-
related websites that had long been blocked in the country are now accessible. RFE/RL’s Uzbek
service remains blocked, however, and the government has refused to accredit its journalists. The
Mirziyoyev government has eased barriers to NGO registration, but both local and international
organizations face bureaucratic obstacles. It also remains difficult to create a new political party.
No new parties have been able to register, and al existing parties support the government.200
Economy
Uzbekistan is a lower-middle-income country with significant natural resources and relatively
wel developed infrastructure. Major exports include cotton, natural gas, uranium, and gold. The
country is the world’s seventh-largest producer of cotton, and the Uzbek government is moving to
transition from raw cotton exports to textile production. Uzbekistan has sizeable natural gas
reserves; the primary destination for natural gas exports is China, although the majority of
production is consumed domestical y. Uzbekistan is the world’s seventh-largest uranium supplier
and has concluded long-term supply agreements with various countries, including the United
States, China, India, and Japan. According to official figures, about two mil ion Uzbeks work
abroad as labor migrants, primarily in Russia; the actual number may be higher. Remittances
amounted to about 15% of GDP in 2019.
In April 2020, Uzbekistan’s parliament voted in favor of seeking observer status in the Russia-led
Eurasian Economic Union (EEU); the country official y became an EEU observer in December of
that year. Uzbekistan is also pursuing accession to the WTO, a move supported by the United
States.201 Uzbekistan has received sizeable investment from China as part of the Belt and Road
Initiative.

197 Felix Corley and Mushfig Bayram, “ UZBEKIST AN: President to Sign Restrictive New Religion Law?” Forum 18,
July 5, 2021; “ Uzbekistan Disappoints with Secretively Adopted Religion Law,” Eurasianet, July 7, 2021. See also:
European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) and OSCE ODIHR, Uzbekistan: Joint
Opinion on the Draft Law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations,” Venice Commission Opinion
No. 998/2020, OSCE/ODIHR Opinion No. FORB-UZB/387/2020, October 12, 2020.
198 U.S. Department of State, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Uzbekistan , May 12, 2021.
199 U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report of the U.S. Commission on International
Religious Freedom , April 2021, p. 84.
200 Bruce Pannier, “ New Uzbek Opposition Party Runs into the Same Wall as Its Predecessors,” RFE/RL, March 24,
2021.
201 Uzbekistan began the accession process in 1994, but froze talks in 2005, a move related to Karimov’s emphasis on
economic self-sufficiency. Accession negotiations resumed in 2020. See World T rade Organization, “ Uzbekistan
Resumes WT O Membership Negotiations,” July 7, 2020 and Richard Pomfret, “ Uzbekistan and the World T rade
Organization,” June 2020, available at https://iit.adelaide.edu.au/ua/media/726/uzbekistan-wto.pdf.
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The COVID-19 pandemic has had a negative impact on Uzbekistan’s economy, which faces
pressure due to lower exports, lower natural gas prices and export volumes, decreased
remittances, and domestic economic disruption. The World Bank estimates that Uzbekistan’s
GDP expansion slowed to 1.6% in 2020 (down from 5.6% growth in 2019), and projects a
rebound to 4.8% growth in 2021.202
Economic Liberalization
Under President Mirziyoyev, Uzbekistan has implemented economic reforms aimed at reducing
the role of the state in favor of the private sector and attracting large-scale foreign investment.203
The government has prioritized improving the country’s business environment and streamlining
public administration. The World Bank has commended Uzbekistan’s “strong progress” on
economic reforms.204 In 2017, Uzbekistan’s government eased long-standing currency controls
and liberalized its monetary policy, eliminating a major impediment to foreign investment and
privatization. Economic growth remains driven largely by state-funded projects. State-owned
enterprises (SOEs) dominate key sectors of the economy, and some SOEs are slated for
privatization. According to the State Department, Uzbekistan’s government has achieved “notable
improvement” in fiscal transparency and has increased engagement with international experts.205
The U.S. Department of Commerce identifies insufficient protection of intel ectual property
rights, an overregulated and inefficient financial sector, and the dominant role of SOEs as among
the chal enges facing foreign businesses operating in Uzbekistan.206
U.S.-Uzbekistan Bilateral Relations
U.S. relations with Uzbekistan have improved markedly since 2016, reflecting the country’s
broader development of international ties, and U.S. officials have expressed strong support for
Uzbekistan’s reform efforts. President Mirziyoyev traveled to Washington, DC, in May 2018, the
first official visit by an Uzbek president to the United States since 2002, and lauded the “new era
of the strategic partnership” between the two countries.207 According to Trump Administration
officials, Uzbekistan’s reengagement with its neighbors invigorated the U.S.-led C5+1
framework, which provides a high-level forum for discussing regional issues.208
From 2001 to 2005, relations between the United States and Uzbekistan were relatively robust,
and focused heavily on security cooperation related to Afghanistan. In 2002, during a visit by
then-President Karimov to Washington, DC, the two countries signed a Declaration of Strategic
Partnership and Cooperation. U.S.-Uzbekistan relations experienced a severe downturn in 2005,
after government forces kil ed over 100 unarmed civilians during unrest in the eastern city of

202 World Bank, Global Economic Prospects, June 2021, p. 71.
203 Lilia Burunciuc et al., “How Uzbekistan Is T ransforming into an Open Economy,” The Brookings Institution,
December 20, 2018.
204 T he World Bank, “Uzbekistan Economic and Social Reforms Building Better Opportunities for People, Says World
Bank Regional Vice-President,” February 27, 2019.
205 U.S. Department of State, 2019 Investment Climate Statements: Uzbekistan, July 11, 2019.
206 U.S. Department of Commerce, International T rade Administration, Uzbekistan—Country Commercial Guide,
October 14, 2020.
207 T he White House, “Remarks by President T rump and President Mirziyoyev of Uzbekistan Before Bilateral
Meeting,” May 16, 2018.
208 Navbahor Imamova, “Uzbekistan Faces Choice Between Closer T ies to US, Russia,” Voice of America, December
1, 2019.
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Andijan. The government responded to foreign criticism by expel ing numerous international
NGOs and media organizations, ending the Peace Corps program, and demanding the withdrawal
of U.S. forces stationed at the Karshi-Khanabad Air Base in support of military operations in
Afghanistan.209 Uzbekistan continued to provide logistical support for NATO forces in
Afghanistan by al owing the transit of non-lethal shipments through its territory as part of the
Northern Distribution Network, established in 2009.
The value of bilateral trade between the United States and Uzbekistan more than doubled from
2017 to 2018, from approximately $150 mil ion to $315 mil ion, and reached $540 mil ion in
2019.210 The first U.S. Department of Commerce Certified Trade Mission visited Uzbekistan in
June 2019; the then-Secretary of Commerce assessed that “significant opportunities exist to
strengthen commercial and economic ties.”211
U.S. foreign assistance to Uzbekistan aims to support the country’s reform efforts, especial y in
the judicial, education, economic, and financial sectors, in order to increase protection of human
rights, combat corruption, and improve resiliency. Assistance to Uzbekistan includes
nonproliferation activities and public health programs aimed at combatting tuberculosis, as wel
as support for the expansion of civil society, strengthening journalistic professionalism, and
developing the capacity of Uzbekistan’s parliament to initiate legislation and provide meaningful
oversight over the other branches of government. Aid is also intended to promote security and
regional stability by helping Uzbekistan professionalize its defense forces and bolstering border
security and counterterrorism capabilities. The State Department requests $44 mil ion in
assistance to Uzbekistan in FY2022, compared to $43.7 mil ion al ocated in FY2020.212
Regional Issues
U.S. Regional Relations and Interests
As noted above, the United States was among the first countries to recognize the independence of
Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan following the
dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Since that time, the United States has repeatedly
expressed support for the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the five Central
Asian states, and has implemented programs to support democracy, good governance, and
economic reforms in the region. The United States has provided over $9 bil ion in direct
assistance to the countries of Central Asia in the past three decades to support security,
democratic reform, and economic growth, and to meet humanitarian needs.213 Some observers
contend that Central Asia’s importance to the United States has historical y been “derivative of
interests that were not indigenous to Central Asia itself, but rather were functions of U.S. policies,
priorities, and relationships with countries around the region.”214 Central Asia has been described

209 OSCE ODIHR, Preliminary Findings on the Events in Andijan, Uzbekistan, May 13, 2005.
210 Office of the United States T rade Representative, “Uzbekistan,” October 2, 2020.
211 U.S. Embassy in Uzbekistan, “First Commerce Department Certified U.S. T rade Mission Visits Uzbekistan,” Jun e
18, 2019.
212 U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2022, Appendix 2,
pp. 162, 289-290, 310, 350, 371, 584-585.
213 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, “ United States Strategy for Central Asia
2019-2025: Advancing Sovereignty and Economic Prosperity (Overview) ,” February 5, 2020.
214 Eugene Rumer, Richard Sokolsky, and Paul Stronski, U.S. Policy Toward Central Asia 3.0, Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, January 2016, pp. 3-4.
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as a chal enging environment for democracy promotion efforts, and observers have voiced
concerns that democratic progress in the region has been uneven or nonexistent.215
Since 2001, U.S. engagement with Central Asia has largely focused on security cooperation,
particularly in relation to U.S.-led efforts to stabilize Afghanistan. The United States engages in
security cooperation with al five Central Asian countries, implementing programs to provide
training, improve peacekeeping and disaster response capabilities, and bolster border security. In
some cases, security cooperation provides an opportunity to maintain and develop a bilateral
relationship where other opportunities for engagement are limited. Through the National Guard’s
State Partnership Program, four of the five Central Asian countries are paired with U.S. states
(Kazakhstan-Arizona, Kyrgyzstan-Montana, Tajikistan-Virginia, and Uzbekistan-Mississippi),
developing military-to-military contacts and receiving training in areas such as counterterrorism
and disaster preparedness. Turkmenistan previously partnered with Nevada from 1996 to 2011.216
U.S. Strategy for Central Asia
U.S. policy priorities for the region are outlined in the United States Strategy for Central Asia, the
most recent version of which was issued in February 2020.217 The strategy defines the primary
U.S. strategic interest in Central Asia as building “a more stable and prosperous Central Asia that
is free to pursue political, economic, and security interests with a variety of partners on its own
terms; is connected to global markets and open to international investment; and has strong,
democratic institutions, rule of law, and respect for human rights.”218 The strategy reiterates U.S.
commitment to supporting the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the Central
Asian states, while acknowledging that shifts within the region present new opportunities to
promote regional connectivity and intra-regional cooperation.219 Other U.S. priorities in Central
Asia outlined in the Strategy include reducing the threat of terrorism, promoting the rule of law
and human rights, and promoting U.S. investment in the region.
C5+1
Since 2015, U.S. bilateral relationships in the region have been complemented by the C5+1
diplomatic platform, which provides a forum for the United States and the five Central Asian
countries to address the common chal enges they face in areas such as security, economic
connectivity, and environmental vulnerabilities. The State Department notes the format’s success
in “enhancing regional dialogue, cooperation, and partnership among the participating countries”
and contributions to “increasing economic and energy connectivity and trade, mitigating
environmental and health chal enges, jointly addressing security threats, and advocating for the
full participation of women in al aspects of the political, economic, and social life of member

215 See, for example, Rumer et al, U.S. Policy Toward Central Asia 3.0; Sean Roberts, Saving Democracy Promotion
From Short-Term U.S. Policy Interests in Central Asia, T he Century Foundation, 2009; Martha Brill Olcott,
“Democracy Promotion in Central Asia: From High Expectations to Disillusionment,” CORE Workshop on
Democratization in Central Asia, February 10, 2007.
216 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, “ U.S. Security Cooperation with Central Asia,” May
19, 2021.
217 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, “ United States Strategy for Central Asia
2019-2025: Advancing Sovereignty and Economic Prosperity (Overview) ,” February 5, 2020.
218 Ibid.
219 Catherine Putz, “A New U.S. Strategy for Central Asia: Continuity Under Better Conditions,” The Diplomat,
February 6, 2020.
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countries.”220 The most recent C5+1 ministerial took place in September 2021, bringing together
Secretary of State Antony Blinken and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. U.S.-led C5+1 initiatives bring together
government officials, practitioners, and other key stakeholders from al six countries to address
common obstacles and discuss best practices on issues ranging from the rehabilitation and
reintegration for returnees from conflict zones in Syria and Iraq to fostering clean energy
development and regional electricity trade.
Intra-Regional Issues
Central Asia remains one of the least economical y integrated regions in the world.221 After the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, economic links within Central Asia were disrupted. Some of the
bilateral relationships within the region grew tense over issues such as water management and
border disputes. For much of the past three decades, border closures and restrictive visa regimes
hampered travel within the region, and intra-regional trade remained limited.
According to the U.S. State Department, the shift in Uzbekistan’s foreign policy after the
country’s 2016 leadership transition has encouraged regional connectivity.222 Uzbekistan under
Karimov represented “an obstacle to regional integration” and “a knot at the heart of the region,”
in the assessment of one longtime observer, due to tense relations with neighboring countries.223
Trump Administration officials reportedly credited Uzbekistan’s reengagement with its neighbors
with invigorating the U.S.-led C5+1 framework.224 Upon assuming power, President Mirziyoyev
embarked on a “good neighbor” policy, reengaging with the region and declaring Central Asia to
be Uzbekistan’s main foreign policy priority.225 Uzbekistan has moved to normalize and improve
previously strained relations with its Central Asian neighbors, resolving border disputes with
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and engaging in increased regional outreach. Uzbekistan’s government
eased visa restrictions and opened border crossings. Economic integration and intra-regional trade
have grown markedly. Uzbekistan’s trade turnover with each of its four Central Asian neighbors
increased between 53% and 131% from 2016 to 2018.226 In 2018, a meeting between Central
Asia’s heads of state took place for the first time in nine years. The summit, held in Kazakhstan,
was initiated by Mirziyoyev. U.S. Ambassador to Uzbekistan Daniel Rosenblum was later quoted
in the press as crediting President Mirziyoyev with “dramatical y changing the tenor of relations
in the region from mutual suspicion to mutual cooperation.”227

220 U.S. Department of State, “ Joint Statement on the C5+1 Virtual Ministerial,” May 4, 2021.
221 See, for example, U.S. Department of State, Prospects for Regional Integration in Central Asia: Remarks by Fatema
Z. Sumar, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of South and Central Asia, October 28, 2014.
222 U.S. Department of State, Integrated Country Strategy: Uzbekistan, August 3, 2018.
223 Bruce Pannier, “Uzbekistan: T he Suddenly Good Neighbor,” RFE/RL, October 4, 2016.
224 Navbahor Imamova, “Uzbekistan Faces Choice Between Closer T ies to US, Russia,” Voice of America, December
1, 2019.
225 “Central Asia—T he Main Priority of Uzbekistan’s Foreign P olicy,” O’zbekiston Miliy Axborot Agentligi, August
12, 2017.
226 Sam Bhutia, “Uzbekistan’s T rade with Neighbors Rises Sharply,” Eurasianet, September 30, 2019.
227 Navbahor Imamova, “ Analysis: Will Uzbekistan’s Champion of Reform Stay the Course?” Voice of America,
August 30, 2020.
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Border Disputes
Central Asia’s current borders date back to the Soviet government’s effort to carry out a
delimitation of the region along ethnic lines in the 1920s, although they underwent some
subsequent changes.228 These borders were drawn as administrative divisions and were not
intended to serve as international boundaries. Borders were not fully demarcated during the
Soviet period, and it was not uncommon, for instance, for residents of one republic to farm land
that belonged to another.229 This led to a range of issues after the dissolution of the Soviet Union,
when Central Asia’s pre-independence borders became de jure international boundaries. In the
past three decades, border disputes have disrupted travel and economic activity and led to
occasional outbreaks of violence.230 In addition to disagreements over land and water rights,
relations among some Central Asian countries have at times been complicated by the existence of
exclaves—territories belonging to one country but entirely surrounded by the territory of another.
There are eight exclaves in the Fergana Val ey (see Figure 8), which is divided between
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. The largest, Uzbekistan’s Sokh exclave, covers roughly
80 square miles, has a primarily ethnic Tajik population of about 85,000, and is entirely
surrounded by Kyrgyz territory.231 The Kyrgyz, Tajik, and Uzbek governments have taken steps to
ease access to some exclaves, but residents of these territories continue to report difficulties.
Periodic clashes along the Uzbek-Kyrgyz, Kyrgyz-Tajik, and Tajik-Uzbek borders continue to
occur, although al three governments have taken steps in recent years to address outstanding
border disputes.232

228 See, for example, Francine Hirsch, Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet
Union (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005); T erry Martin, The Affirm ative Action Em pire: Nations and Nationalism
in the Soviet Union, 1923-1929 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001); Arne Haugen, The Establishm ent of National
Republics in Soviet Central Asia (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).
229 Nick Megoran, Nationalism in Central Asia: A Biography of the Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan Boundary (Pittsburgh:
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2017); Madeleine Reeves, Border Work: Spatial Lives of the State in Rural Central Asia
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014); Madeleine Reeves, “ A Weekend in Osh,” London Review of Books, July 8,
2010.
230 “Convoluted Borders are Hampering Central Asian Integration,” The Economist, October 31, 2019; Bruce Pannier,
“Signs of Hope (and Conflict) On Central Asia’s Borders,” RFE/RL, May 16, 2020; T imur T oktonaliev, “ Settling
Kyrgyz-T ajik Border Conflicts,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, September 19, 2019.
231 At the time the exclave was created, T ajikistan was an autonomous region within the Uzbek Soviet Socialist
Republic, which is why this predominantly T ajik territory became part of Uzbekistan. Sokh remained part of
Uzbekistan after T ajikistan became a separate republic in 1929. See Rashid Gabdulhakov, “Geographical Enclaves of
the Fergana Valley: Do Good Fences Make Good Neighbors?” OSCE Academ y Central Asia Security Policy Briefs, no.
14 (2014).
232 Catherine Putz, “ Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Border: ‘Resolved 100 Percent ,’” The Diplomat, March 30, 2021.
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Figure 8. Exclaves in the Fergana Valley

Source: Graphic created by CRS.
Notes: “Sokh,” a variant spel ing of So‘x, is used in the text of this report.
Since 2016, Uzbekistan has demined its border with Tajikistan, and rail and flight connections
between the two countries have resumed.233 The two sides are working to finalize the demarcation
of their shared boundary. Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan are in the process of delimiting and
demarcating their border and settling outstanding disputes related to land and water rights,
although the prospect of land swaps has spurred some protests among local residents.234
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are also in the process of demarcating their border. Efforts to resolve
outstanding border issues between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have been less successful; just over
half of their shared border has been delimited and demarcated.235 In April 2021, a fight at a water
intake station that releases water into canals in both countries escalated into a broader clash that
reportedly left dozens of people dead and homes destroyed on both sides of the border.236

233 “T ajik-Uzbek Border Cleared Of Mines,” RFE/RL, January 6, 2020; “ Uzbekistan, T ajikistan Railroad Set for
Imminent Reactivation,” Eurasianet, February 28, 2018; Catherine Putz, “ After Cancellations and Delays, Uzbekistan
and T ajikistan Reopen Air Link,” The Diplom at, April 12, 2017.
234 “Pogranichnye voprosy s Kygystanom namereny reshit’ za tri mesiatsa—Shavkat Mirzieev” [We intend to resolve
border issues with Kyrgyzstan within three months—Shavkat Mirziyoyev], Gazeta.uz, March 11, 2021; Ernist
Nurmatov, “Kyrgyzstan i Uzbekistan namereny za tri mesiatsia reshit’ vse voprosy po granitsam” [Kyrgyzstan and
Uzbekistan intend to resolve all border issues within three months], Radio Azattyk, March 13, 2021; Guliza Avazova,
“V Kara-Suiskom raione zhiteli vyshli protiv peredachi 50 gektarov zemli Uzbekistanu” [In Kara-Su region, residents
demonstrat ed against the transfer of 50 hectares of land to Uzbekistan], Kaktus Media, April 1, 2021.
235 Bruce Pannier, “‘No Issues Remain’? Not So Fast. Kyrgyz-Uzbek Border Disputes Don’t Appear to Be Decided,”
RFE/RL, April 2, 2021; Catherine Putz, “ Settling Central Asia’s Borders Is No Easy T ask,” The Diplom at, April 10,
2021; Kamila Baimuratova, “T ashiev otvetil na kritku eks-glavy MID T adzhikistana ob anklave Vorukh” [T ashiev
responded to criticism from former head of T ajikistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affair s on Vorukh enclave], Kloop, April
1, 2021.
236 Ayzirek Imanaliyeva and Kamila Ibragimova, “ Kyrgyzstan, T ajikistan: Officials T alk peace, but Popular Moods
Still Raw,” Eurasianet, May 1, 2020; Bruce Pannier, “ Conflict on the Kyrgyz-Tajik Border Moves from Sticks and
Stones to Bullets and Bombs,” RFE/RL, April 30, 2021.
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Energy
Oil and Gas
Central Asia is rich in hydrocarbons (see Table 6), and the oil and gas sector has attracted foreign
investment to the region, particularly to Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Because they
are landlocked, these Central Asian countries depend primarily on pipelines to transport their
hydrocarbon production to world markets (see Figure 9). The Caspian Pipeline Consortium
transports crude oil from western Kazakhstan to the port of Novorossiysk on Russia’s Black Sea
coast; other major export routes for Kazakhstan’s crude oil include the Kazakhstan-China
pipeline and the Uzen-Atyrau-Samara pipeline to Russia. Kazakhstan also ships oil by tanker
across the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan, from where it is transported by the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
(BTC) pipeline to Turkey’s Mediterranean coast or by the Northern Route pipeline to
Novorossiysk.237 Turkmenistan exported some oil via the BTC pipeline in the past, but diverted
those flows to Novorossiysk in 2019.238 Central Asian countries previously exported some of their
crude via oil swaps with Iran; little to no crude oil has been swapped since 2011, reportedly due
to complications arising from international sanctions on Iran and Iran’s desire for higher fees per
barrel swapped.239
In the past decade, China has become the primary export destination for Central Asian natural
gas, followed by Russia, although the majority of natural gas produced in Central Asia is
consumed domestical y. The Central Asia-China gas pipeline transports natural gas from
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan to China. Turkmenistan is China’s largest natural gas
supplier by pipeline. The planned Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline,
first proposed in the 1990s, would open new markets for Turkmenistan and improve South Asia’s
regional energy security, but its completion remains highly speculative.240 Because Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan al produce significant volumes of natural gas, many in the United
States and the European Union have argued that these countries represent a potential alternative
to Russian natural gas for the European market.241 To date there has been no direct gas trade
between Central Asia and Europe. The proposed Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline would enable
Turkmenistan to supply gas to European markets, but this project has been hampered by
opposition from Russia and Iran, as wel as by unresolved questions concerning the delimitation
of Caspian seabed rights.242 Azerbaijan has begun exports of Caspian natural gas to Europe, and
in January 2021 the governments of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan signed an agreement to jointly
develop a previously disputed gas field on their maritime border, potential y facilitating future
export of gas from Turkmenistan to Europe.243

237 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Background Reference: Kazakhstan, January 7, 2019.
238 “Oil Exports from Ceyhan Poised to Fall Due to T urkmen Diversion,” Reuters, January 25, 2019; “ Azerbaijan’s Jan-
May Oil Exports via BT C Pipeline Fall 6.6% y/y,” Reuters, June 12, 2020.
239 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Background Reference: Kazakhstan, January 7, 2019.
240 Catherine Putz, “ T aliban Visit T urkmenistan, Promise (Again) to Protect T API,” The Diplomat, February 9, 2021.
241 See CRS Report R42405, European Energy Security: Options for EU Natural Gas Diversification , coordinated by
Michael Ratner.
242 See CRS Report R42405, European Energy Security: Options for EU Natural Gas Diversification , coordinated by
Michael Ratner.
243 David O’Byrne, “Azerbaijan and T urkmenistan Agreement Advances Caspian Gas Cooperation,” Eurasianet,
January 22, 2021.
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Kazakhstan’s oil and gas resources have attracted significant foreign investment, and the country
has longstanding relationships with American energy companies. Chevron and ExxonMobil have
both maintained a presence in Kazakhstan since 1993. The two companies hold 50% and 25%
interests, respectively, in Tengizchevroil, the consortium developing Kazakhstan’s largest oil and
gas field, located in the northwest of the country along the Caspian Sea coast. Chevron, the
largest private oil producer in Kazakhstan, also holds an 18% stake in Karachaganak, one of the
world’s largest gas condensate fields, and is the largest private shareholder in the Caspian
Pipeline Consortium.244 ExxonMobil, meanwhile, has a 16.81% stake in the international
consortium developing the offshore Kashagan oil field.245

Table 6. Oil and Natural Gas in Central Asia
Natural
Natural
Gas
Natural Gas
Gas
Oil
Oil
Oil
Production
Consumption
Reserves
Production
Consumption
Reserves
Country
(bcf)
(bcf)
(tcf)
(kb/d)
(kb/d)
(bnbl)
Kazakhstan
895
547
85
1,959
330
30
Kyrgyz
1
7.7
0.2
1
40
(s)
Republic
Tajikistan
0.6
2.6
0.2
0.2
22
(s)
Turkmenistan
2,874
1,388
265
280
152
0.6
Uzbekistan
2,014
1,481
65
56
95
0.6
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration
Notes: Data from 2018. Units: bcf = bil ion cubic feet; tcf = tril ion cubic feet; kb/d = thousand barrels a day;
bnbl = bil ion barrels; (s) = value too smal for the number of decimal places shown.

244 T engizchevroil, “Overview,” at http://www.tengizchevroil.com/en/about/overview; Chevron, “Kazakhstan,” at
https://www.chevron.com/worldwide/kazakhstan.
245 North Caspian Operating Company, “ NCOC Governance and Management System,” at https://www.ncoc.kz/en/
ncoc/ncoc-governance.
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Figure 9. Oil and Gas in Central Asia

Source: Graphic created by CRS.
Renewables
Central Asian countries have significant potential to develop wind, solar, and hydropower. In
recent years, some Central Asian governments have committed to diversifying towards renewable
energy sources. Kazakhstan’s government has announced that it plans to supply 10% of the
country’s electricity from renewable sources by 2030 and aims to reach 50% by 2050.
Uzbekistan’s government says it intends to increase the share of renewables in electricity
generation to 25% by 2030. Both Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have initiated solar energy projects
with Chinese and European investors.246 In November 2020, Kazakhstan initiated a $95.3 mil ion
wind farm project with Chinese and European financing.247 Any shift to renewables would also
free up hydrocarbons for export.

246 Niva Yau, “ Chinese Solar Investments in Central Asia: A Snapshot,” Eurasianet, October 15, 2020.
247 Petr Konstantiov, “Kazakhstan Forges Ahead with Renewable Energy,” European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, November 16, 2020.
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Hydropower and Water Resources
Central Asia’s water resources give some
countries in the region significant hydropower
Figure 10. Aral Sea Watershed
potential, but they also serve as a potential
source of conflict given downstream
countries’ dependence on the region’s rivers
for irrigation. Soviet-era irrigation projects
that diverted large volumes of water for
agricultural purposes from the Syr Darya and
the Amu Darya, the region’s two major rivers,
led to the desiccation of the Aral Sea, once
the world’s fourth-largest lake, with
environmental, economic, and public health

consequences.248 Today, the Syr Darya and
the Amu Darya each cross multiple
Source: Graphic created by CRS.
international borders: the Amu Darya
Notes: Actual Aral Sea water levels fluctuate.
originates in Tajikistan’s Pamir Mountains and flows northwest to what remains of the Aral Sea in
Uzbekistan, forming part of Afghanistan’s northern border with Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and
Turkmenistan; the Syr Darya originates in the Tien Shan Mountains in Kyrgyzstan and flows
northwest through Uzbekistan and southern Kazakhstan to the northern remnants of the Aral Sea
(see Figure 10). Some analysts argue that climate change wil lead to additional stress on Central
Asia’s water resources, heightening the potential for conflict.249
While Central Asian countries have made some progress in resolving recurrent disagreements
over the management of water resources, access to water continues to be a focal point of
intermittent cross-border disputes.250 Historical y, the significant potential of Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan to develop hydropower has been complicated by opposition from downstream
countries. Due to its climate and geography, Uzbekistan is dependent on its upstream neighbors
for much of the water it consumes, including in the water-intensive cotton industry.251 Similarly,
southern Kazakhstan depends on water from the Syr Darya. In the past, Uzbekistan and
Kazakhstan reacted negatively to hydropower projects initiated by Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
Increased intra-regional dialogue has ameliorated the situation somewhat in recent years. In 2020,
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan reached an agreement to construct two hydropower dams in Tajikistan
to supply electricity to Uzbekistan.252 In March 2021, the governments of Kyrgyzstan and
Uzbekistan agreed to a joint project for constructing a hydropower station on the Naryn River.253

248 See, for example, Dante Schulz, “T he Cautionary T ale of the Aral Sea: Environmental Destruction at Economic
Costs,” Caspian Policy Center, December 30, 2020.
249 Khamza Sharifzoda, “ Climate Change: An Omitted Security T hreat in Central Asia,” The Diplomat, July 22, 2019;
World Economic Forum, “Climate Change Is T hreatening Security in Central Asia,” January 25, 2019.
250 Alima Dalbaeva, “ End the Weaponisation of Water in Central Asia,” International Crisis Group, March 15, 2018.
251 Aziz Egamov, “ Uzbekistan’s Impending Water Crisis,” The Diplomat, September 5, 2019.
252 Sam Bhutia, “ Could Energy T rade Be a Win-Win for T ajik-Uzbek T ies?” Eurasianet, February 3, 2020.
253 Ernist Nurmatov, “Kyrgyzstan i Uzbekistan dogovorilis’ vmeste stroit’ GES” [Kyrgyzstan and Uzbek istan have
agreed to jointly construct a hydropower station], Radio Azattyk, March 18, 2021.
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Security
Afghanistan
In the past two decades, promoting stability in Afghanistan has been a key element of the U.S.
approach to Central Asia, and the United States has sought to promote regional connectivity and
intra-regional cooperation both within Central Asia and between Central Asia and Afghanistan.
According to the most recent iteration of the U.S. Strategy for Central Asia, released in 2020, the
United States seeks to “encourage the Central Asian states to develop economic and trade links
with Afghanistan and to model stable governance of multi-ethnic, Muslim-majority countries.”254
The nature of U.S. engagement with Central Asia may evolve in light of the U.S. withdrawal from
Afghanistan and the August 2021 Taliban takeover of the country.255 Analysts assess that recent
events in Afghanistan may lead to an intensified Russian security presence in Central Asia.256
Others conjecture that Taliban control in Afghanistan may also bolster Chinese influence in
Central Asia and the broader region.257 Conversely, one longtime observer of the region contends
that, “it is arguably more likely that little about Central Asia’s relationships with the big powers,
as they currently stand, wil change at al ,” with the United States providing a counterweight to
Russian and Chinese influence in the region.258 Some posit that the Taliban takeover of
Afghanistan may prompt Uzbekistan to redouble efforts to build regional cooperation and solidify
its role as a leader within Central Asia.259
Many analysts assess that the primary concerns of Central Asian governments following the
Taliban takeover of Afghanistan are maintaining stability and ensuring their own countries’
security, including by minimizing the potential for large refugee outflows and the spread of
Islamic State-affiliated or other terrorist groups.260 Taliban leaders have reportedly stated that they
wil not violate the territorial integrity of Afghanistan’s Central Asian neighbors, and that they do
not pose a threat to the region.261 The governments of Central Asia have general y adopted a

254 U.S. Department of State, “ United States Strategy for Central Asia 2019-2025: Advancing Sovereignty and
Economic Prosperity (Overview),” February 5, 2020.
255 See, for example, Alexander Cooley, “A Post -American Central Asia,” Foreign Affairs, August 23, 2021.
256 T emur Umarov, “Do the T aliban Pose a T hreat to Stability in Central Asia?” Carnegie Moscow Center, September
3, 2021; Kate Mallinson, “Afghanistan Creates T ricky New Reality for Central Asia,” Chatham House, August 27,
2021; Andrew Kramer and Anton T roianovski, “ With Afghan Collapse, Moscow T akes Charge in Central Asia,” New
York Tim es, August 19, 2021.
257 Khursand Khurramov, “Usilitsia li vliianie Kitaia v regione posle prikhoda k vlasti ‘T aliban’?” [Will the influence
of China in the region increase after the T aliban have come to power?] Radio Ozodi, September 16, 2021; Reid
Standish, “ China Cautiously Eyes New Regional Leadership Role As Afghanistan Fighting Intensifies,” RFE/RL, July
14, 2021.
258 Bruce Pannier, “ How Much Will Afghanistan Change Central Asia’s Relations with Russia, China, and t he United
States?” RFE/RL, August 24, 2021.
259 See, for example, Henry Foy, “T aliban T akeover T urns Uzbekistan in to Powerbroker,” Financial Times, September
9, 2021.
260 Kate Mallinson, “Afghanistan Creates T ricky New Reality for Central Asia,” Chatham House, August 27, 2021;
Mansur Mirovalev, “Afghanistan’s Central Asian Neighbours Panic, Reject Refugees,” Al Jazeera, August 19, 2021;
Chris Rickleton, “Central Asia and Afghanistan: Enemies at the Gate?” Eurasianet, August 13, 2021; Dmitri T renin,
“Afghanistan After the U.S. Pullout: Challenges to Russia and Central Asia,” Carnegie Moscow Center, July 13, 2021.
261 Umida Hashimova, “Greater Coordination in Central Asian Responses to Afghan Border T roubles,” The Diplomat,
July 19, 2021; Vladimir Isachenkov, “Russian Envoy Expects T aliban Not to T hreaten Central Asia,” Associated Press,
July 14, 2021; Vladimir Isachenkov, “T aliban Visit Moscow to Say T heir Wins Don’t T hreaten Russia,” Associated
Press, July 8, 2021; “As T ajikistan Mobilizes 20,000 T roops, T aliban Says It Poses No T hreat,” Eurasianet, July 6,
2021; Umida Hashimova, “Beyond the Intra-Afghan T alks, Uzbekistan Sees a Bright Future,” The Diplomat,
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pragmatic approach toward the Taliban, particularly Afghanistan’s immediate neighbors
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.262 Turkmenistan’s history of engaging with the Taliban goes back
to the 1990s, and the country’s government hosted Taliban delegations in February and July
2021.263 Since the collapse of the Afghan government, relations between Turkmenistan and the
Taliban have been described as “convivial” and driven by a desire to develop energy exports.264 In
a statement issued on September 8, Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs welcomed the
Taliban’s formation of an interim government in Afghanistan, adding, “We hope that this decision
wil be the first step toward achieving a broad national consensus and lasting peace and stability
in that country. We express our readiness to develop a constructive dialogue and practical
cooperation with the new state organs of Afghanistan.”265 The government of Tajikistan, which
also shares a border with Afghanistan, has by contrast expressed strong opposition to the Taliban
government in Afghanistan, emphasizing the need for an inclusive government that would include
representatives of Afghanistan’s sizeable Tajik minority.266 In remarks delivered on September
17, Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon stated, “Tajiks and other ethnic groups must have
their rightful place in [an] inclusive government,” adding, “only in this way can peace and
stability in Afghanistan be ensured.”267
The Central Asian countries had previously provided support to U.S. and NATO operations in
Afghanistan. As of May 2019, Kazakhstan had contributed $6 mil ion to the NATO-run Afghan
National Army Trust Fund; it was one of 11 non-NATO countries to contribute.268 Al five
countries provided logistical assistance to U.S. military efforts in Afghanistan, ranging from
overflight rights to hosting U.S. forces. The Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan leased bases to the
United States from 2001 to 2014 and from 2001 to 2005, respectively. Beginning in 2009, Central
Asian countries other than Turkmenistan al owed the transit through their territory of non-lethal

September 21, 2020.
262 See, for example, Mulloradzhab Iusufzoda and Barot Iusufi, “Sammit ODBK v Dushanbe: Zhaparov vystupil za
dialog z talibami, Rakhmon vyrazil bespokoistvo situatsiei v Pandzhshere” [CST O summit in Dushanbe: Japarov spoke
in favor of dialogue with the T aliban, Rahmon expressed concern over the situation in Panjshir ], Radio Ozodi,
September 16, 2021; “Kazakhstan gotov k ustanovleniiu delovykh kontaktov s pravitel’stvom Afganistama – T okaev”
[Kazakhstan is prepared to establish business contacts with the government of Afghanistan], Vlast.kz, September 10,
2021; Henry Foy, “T aliban T akeover T urns Uzbekistan into Powerbroker,” Financial Times, September 9, 2021;
Muhammad T ahir, “Majlis Podcast: Uzbekistan Walks T he T ightrope In Its Policies T oward Afghanistan,” RFE/RL,
September 5, 2021; Gavin Helf and Barmak Pazhwak, “Central Asia Prepares for T aliban T akeover,” United States
Institute of Peace, July 20, 2021. Ivan Klyszcz, “ Don’t Underestimate Tajikistan in the Afghanistan Crisis,” The
Diplom at, September 2, 2021; “ T urkmenistan: T aliban of Brothers,” Eurasianet, August 24, 2021.
263 “T urkmenistan: As T aliban Arrives at the Gates, Diplomats and Army Scramble,” Eurasianet, July 13, 2021; Bruce
Pannier, “ T hen and Now: Concerns About a T aliban-Led Afghan Spillover into Central Asia,” RFE/RL, July 12, 2021;
Bruce Pannier and Abubakar Siddique, “ What Happened When t he Taliban Visited T urkmenistan?” RFE/RL, February
11, 2021.
264 “T urkmenistan: T aliban of Brothers,” Eurasianet, August 24, 2021.
265 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan, “ O‘zbekiston Respublikasi T ashqi ishlar vazirligi rasmiy
vakilining bayonoti” [Statement by the official representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of
Uzbekistan], September 8, 2021.
266 Mulloradzhab Iusufzoda and Barot Iusufi, “Sammit ODBK v Dushanbe: Zhaparov vystupil za dialog z talibami,
Rakhmon vyrazil bespokoistvo situatsiei v Pandzhshere” [CST O summit in Dushanbe: Japarov spoke in favor of
dialogue with the T aliban, Rahmon expressed concern over the situation in Panjshir ], Radio Ozodi, September 16,
2021; Bruce Pannier, “ T ajikistan: T he Taliban’s T oughest Critic,” RFE/RL, September 13, 2021; Ivan Klyszcz, “ Don’t
Underestimate T ajikistan in the Afghanistan Crisis,” The Diplom at, September 2, 2021.
267 President of the Republic of T ajikistan, “Speech at a Press Conference Following T alks with the Prime Minister of
the Islamic Republic of Pakistan Imran Khan,” September 17, 2021, available at http://president.tj/en/node/26549.
268 NAT O, Public Diplomacy Division, “Afghan National Army (ANA) T rust Fund,” May 2019.
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shipments for NATO forces as part of the Northern Distribution Network (NDN). In 2018,
Kazakhstan’s government approved an agreement al owing the United States to transport
nonmilitary supplies through two ports on the Caspian Sea, bolstering supply capabilities in the
wake of Russia’s 2015 withdrawal from the NDN. From Kazakhstan, supplies transited to
Afghanistan via Uzbekistan by rail, or via Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan by truck. The NDN had also
been used to remove equipment from Afghanistan. Prior to the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in
August 2021, some analysts speculated that the NDN might continue to be used beyond the
withdrawal of U.S. forces in order to support the Afghan government.269
In the weeks leading up to the completion of the U.S. military withdrawal, Uzbekistan and
Tajikistan bolstered their military presence at their borders with Afghanistan, holding largescale
military exercises.270 Turkmenistan also reportedly deployed additional troops and equipment to
its southern border, although the country’s government denied doing so.271 In August and
September 2021, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan each participated in
bilateral and/or multilateral military exercises with Russia that focused on potential security
threats emanating from Afghanistan.272 Tajikistan also held an anti-terrorism exercise with
China.273 Further military exercises by the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO) are planned in Tajikistan for October and November.274
International human rights organizations have urged Central Asian countries to take in refugees
from Afghanistan, but regional governments have been reluctant to accept large numbers of such
migrants.275 Central Asia has not historical y been a major destination for displaced
Afghans.276Although officials in Tajikistan initial y signaled wil ingness to take in as many as
100,000 refugees, in September the country’s Minister of Internal Affairs stated that Tajikistan
lacks the resources to do so without international assistance.277 Some countries have expressed
wil ingness to accept their coethnics from Afghanistan. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev of
Kazakhstan announced that his government is considering the possibility of repatriating the
Kazakh diaspora in Afghanistan.278 Kazakhstan accepted 35 ethnic Kazakhs from Afghanistan on

269 Bruce Pannier, “Will Central Asia Host U.S. Military Forces Once Again?” RFE/RL, April 23, 2021.
270 “T ajikistan Holds Massive Combat -Readiness Check amid Rising Instability in Neighboring Afghanistan,” RFE/RL,
July 22, 2021; “ T urkmenistan: as T aliban Arrives at the Gates, Diplomats and Army Scramble,” Eurasianet, July 13,
2021.
271 “T urkmenistan Continues Military Buildup near Border amid Deteriorating Afghan Security,” RFE/RL, July 19,
2021; “T urkmenistan Sending Heavy Weaponry, Aircraft to Afghan Border amid Deteriorating Security,” RFE/RL,
July 11, 2021; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of T urkmenistan, Press Release, July 10, 2021, available at
https://www.mfa.gov.tm/en/news/2701.
272 “Russia Wraps Up Drills with Uzbek and T ajik T roops near Afghan Bo rder,” RFE/RL, August 11, 2021; “ Russia-
Led CST O to Hold Military Drills in Central Asia Due to Situation in Afghanistan,” RFE/RL, August 27, 2021;
“Russia-Led CST O Starts Military Drills in Kyrgyzstan Due to Situation in Afghanistan,” RFE/RL, September 7, 2021.
273 Laura Zhou, “ China Conducts Anti-T error Drill with T ajikistan, as Afghan Spillover Worries Grip Central Asia,”
South China Morning Post, August 18, 2021.
274 “Russia-Led CST O T o Hold Military Drills in Central Asia Due to Situation in Afghanistan,” RFE/RL, August 27,
2021. CST O member states include Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and T ajikistan .
275 Mihra Rittman and Hugh Williamson, “ Uzbekistan Should Do More to Help Afghans,” The Diplomat, September 8,
2021; Mansur Mirovalev, “Afghanistan’s Central Asian Neighbours Panic, Reject Refugees,” Al Jazeera, August 19,
2021; “Central Asia Refuses to Accept Afghan Refugees,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, September 8, 2021 .
276 T emur Umarov, “Do the T aliban Pose a T hreat to Stability in Central Asia?” Carnegie Moscow Center, September
3, 2021; Chris Rickleton, “ Central Asia and Afghanistan: Enemies at the Gate?” Eurasianet, August 13, 2021.
277 “Unpacking Eurasia’s Role in the Afghanistan Evacuation,” Eurasianet, September 3, 2021; “T ajikistan Can’t
Afford to T ake in Afghan Refugees Without Help—Police Chief,” Reuters, September 2, 2021.
278 Official Website of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, “Glava gosudarstva prinial v eritel’nye gramoty u
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September 9, 2021, deploying a military plane to evacuate them from Kabul; several hundred
ethnic Kazakhs reportedly remain in Afghanistan.279 After a group of over 300 ethnic Kyrgyz
from Afghanistan’s Wakhan Corridor fled into Tajikistan in July, Kyrgyzstan expressed its
wil ingness to accept them.280 Tajikistan returned them to Afghanistan, however, citing guarantees
from the Afghan government that they would be safe.281
Thousands of Afghan troops reportedly fled to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan as the Taliban
established control of northern Afghanistan, but some have subsequently been repatriated.282 On
August 14 and 15, a reported 46 aircraft from the Afghan Air Force crossed into Uzbekistan
carrying some 500 people, including pilots, crew, and their families.283 The government of
Uzbekistan reportedly faced pressure from the Taliban to return the personnel and their aircraft to
Afghanistan, and requested that the United States relocate them.284 On September 12 and 13,
these Afghan personnel were transferred from Uzbekistan to a U.S. base in the United Arab
Emirates.285 It remains unclear what wil happen to the aircraft, which are said to include Black
Hawk helicopters and PC-12 surveil ance aircraft supplied to Afghanistan by the United States.286
On August 15, a smal er group, reportedly over 140 people and around 18 aircraft, flew from
Afghanistan to Tajikistan.287 A State Department spokesperson was quoted in the media on
September 13 as stating, “the Afghan personnel and aircraft are secure and being housed by the
government of Tajikistan.”288
Central Asian countries have assisted evacuation efforts out of Afghanistan. The U.N. Assistance
Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) has temporarily relocated some of its staff to Almaty,
Kazakhstan. The UNAMA staff deployed to Almaty, who number about 100, are expected to stay
in Kazakhstan for six months, although conditions in Afghanistan may lead to the extension of

poslov riada gosudarstv” [T he head of state received credentials from the ambassadors of a number of states],
September 8, 2021.
279 “Spetsbort iz Kabula: 35 etnicheskikh kazakhov pribyli na istorichesku rodinu, sotni ostaiutsia v Afgan istane
[Special flight from Kabul: 35 ethnic Kazakhs arrived in their historical homeland, hundreds more remain in
Afghanistan], Radio Azattyq, September 10, 2021.
280 “Afganskikh kyrgyzov, bezhavshikh ot talibov, planiruiut evakuirovat’ v Kyrgyzstan” [Ethnic Kyrgyz who fled the
T aliban are to be evacuated to Kyrgyzstan], 24.kg, July 15, 2021.
281 Andrew Kramer, “ T hese Herders Lived in Peaceful Isolation. Now, War Has Found T hem,” New York Times, July
29, 2021; “T adzhikistan vernul etnicheskikh kyrgyzov v Afgan istan. Komentarii MID KR” [T ajikistan returned ethnic
Kyrgyz to Afghanistan. Commentary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic ], 24.kg, July 20, 2021;
“MID Kyrgyzstana prokommentiroval vozvrashchenie T adzhikistanom etnicheskikh kyrgyzov v Afganistan”
[Kyrgyzstan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs commented on T ajikistan’s return of ethnic Kyrgyz to Afghanistan], Radio
Azattyk, July 20, 2021.
282 “Unpacking Eurasia’s Role in the Afghanistan Evacuation,” Eurasianet, September 3, 2021.
283 Catherine Putz, “Afghan Forces Flee, Fly to Central Asia,” The Diplomat, August 17, 2021; Siobhan Hughes and
Jessica Donati, “ Uzbekistan Warns U.S. T hat Afghan Pilots and T heir Families Can’t Stay ,” Wall Street Journal,
August 30, 2021; Jessica Donati and Siobhan Hughes, “ Afghan Pilots Who Sought Safety in Uzbekistan Begin U.S.
T ransfer Under New Agreement ,” Wall Street Journal, September 13, 2021.
284 Phil Stewart, “Afghan Pilots Start Leaving Uzbekistan for UAE, Despite T aliban Pressure—Source,” Reuters,
September 12, 2021; Siobhan Hughes and Jessica Donati, “ Uzbekistan Warns U.S. T hat Afghan Pilots and T heir
Families Can’t Stay,” Wall Street Journal, August 30, 202.
285 Jessica Donati and Siobhan Hughes, “ Afghan Pilots Who Sought Safety in Uzbekistan Begin U.S. T ransfer Under
New Agreement ,” Wall Street Journal, September 13, 2021.
286 Ibid.
287 Bruce Pannier, “T ajikistan: T he T aliban’s T oughest Critic,” RFE/RL, September 13, 2021; Catherine Putz, “ What’s
Next for Afghan Pilots Who Escaped to Central Asia?” The Diplom at, September 13, 2021.
288 Catherine Putz, “ What’s Next for Afghan Pilots Who Escaped to Central Asia?” The Diplomat, September 13, 2021.
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their stay. Depending on the security situation in Afghanistan, U.N. staff may use Almaty as a hub
to rotate in and out of the country.289 Uzbekistan facilitated the transit of Afghans and foreign
nationals out of Afghanistan, al owing European military aircraft to fly evacuees from Kabul to
airports in Tashkent, Navoiy, and Bukhara.290 From there, evacuees, including some U.S. citizens,
were flown to Europe on special y chartered civilian airliners.291 Tajikistan also facilitated
evacuations from Afghanistan, including flights via Dushanbe organized by Turkey and India.292
In testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on September 13, 2021, Secretary of
State Antony Blinken stated that the United States is working with countries including Uzbekistan
and Tajikistan to ensure that U.S. citizens, residents, and visa-holders are able to cross their
borders in order to leave Afghanistan, and that the United States has basic agreements in place
with those countries to make that possible.293 Some limited overland evacuations of U.S. citizens
and others from Afghanistan have taken place since August 30, 2021, but U.S. officials have
declined to state where those evacuations took place.
In remarks reported on August 27, 2021, President Mirziyoyev expressed Uzbekistan’s
wil ingness to facilitate the delivery of international humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, noting that
the only railroad connection to the northern Afghan city of Mazar-i-Sharif runs from
Uzbekistan.294 President Mirziyoyev also stated Uzbekistan’s intention to provide aid to
Afghanistan.295 On September 14, Uzbekistan delivered a shipment of 1,300 tons of aid, including
food, medicine, and clothing, to Afghanistan’s northern Balkh province via rail.296 The U.N.
World Food Programme is setting up its primary logistics center for the provision of humanitarian
aid to Afghanistan in Termez in southern Uzbekistan.297

289 United Nations Kazakhstan, “UN Statement on T emporary Relocation of the UNAMA Staff to Almaty,” August 20,
2021; United Nations, “ Daily Press Briefing by the Office of the Spokesperson for the Secretary -General,” August 18,
2021; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, “On T emporary Deployment of the UN Mission in
Almaty,” August 18, 2021.
290 “Uzbekistan predostavil tretii aeroport dlia evakuatsii iz Afganistana—Bukharu” [Uzbekistan has made a third
airport available for evacuation from Afghanistan—Bukhara], Fergana News, August 23, 2021.
291 “‘You Have Seen the Outrageous and Achieved Incredible T hings,’ Germany T ells T roops,” Reuters, August 27,
2021; “AKK spricht mit Bundeswehrsoldaten in T aschkent ” [AKK speaks with Bundeswehr soldiers in T ashkent],
Deutsche Welle, August 27, 2021; Official Website of the Republic of Poland, T he Chancellery of the Prime Minister,
“Premier: Polska jest tam, gdzie inni tej pomocy od nas potrzebują” [Prime Minister: Poland is there when others need
help from us], August 26, 2021, available at https://www.gov.pl/web/premier/premier-polska-jest-tam-gdzie-inni-tej-
pomocy-od-nas-potrzebuja; “ Hungary Ends Afghan Evacuations with 540 Flown Out ,” Agence France Presse, August
26, 2021.
292 “Afghanistan Evacuees Arrive in T ajikistan, Uzbekistan,” RFE/RL, August 21, 2021; Manjeet Negi, “IAF T ransport
Aircraft Return from T ajikistan after Afghanistan Evacuations,” India Today, August 30, 2021.
293 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearing: Afghanistan 2001- 2021: Evaluating the
Withdrawal and U.S. Policies—Part 1, September 13, 2021, available at https://youtu.be/R2MEJjKUk0Q?t=14689.
294 “‘Radi spokoistva naroda, ia provedu peregovory s liuboi storonoi’: Mirzieev o situatsii v Afganistane” [“ For the
sake of the peace of my people, I will negotiate with any side”: Mirziyoyev on the situation in Afghanistan ], Kun.uz,
August 27, 2021.
295 Ibid.
296 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan, “About the Humanitarian Aid Delivery Ceremony,”
September 14, 2021; “ Uzbekistan Sends in Large Consignment of Emergency Aid t o Neighboring Afghanistan,”
Ariana News, September 14, 2021.
297 United Nations, “V Uzbekistane sozdaiut logisticheskii tstentr VPP dlia okazaniia pomoshchi Afganistanu” [A WFP
logistics center is being set up in Uzbekistan to provide assistance to Afghanistan], September 14, 2021; United
Nations, “ First Humanitarian Flight to Kabul Marks ‘T urning Point’ in Crisis: WFP,” September 14, 2021.
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Terrorism and Violent Extremism
Acts of terrorism within Central Asia are rare. Between 2008 and 2018, Central Asian
governments reportedly label ed 19 attacks by non-state actors as terrorism, with 138 reported
fatalities (78 members of law enforcement, 49 attackers, and 11 civilians).298 Human rights
advocates and others note that Central Asian governments use broadly written anti-extremism
legislation also to punish critics and suppress dissent, and that repressive government measures in
the name of counter-extremism can fuel radicalization.299 Potential spil over from Afghanistan
and the return of Central Asian national foreign terrorist fighters from conflict zones in Syria and
Iraq raise terrorism concerns in the region (see “Foreign Terrorist Fighters,” below).
Tajikistan’s long, porous border with Afghanistan is a particular source of security concerns
because of transnational threats such as violent extremism and narcotics trafficking. In 2019, the
United Nations estimated that about 100 Tajik nationals were present in Afghanistan as part of
terrorist groups affiliated with Al Qaeda or the Islamic State (IS).300 Afghanistan-based terrorist
groups cooperate with organized criminal networks involved in smuggling narcotics from
Afghanistan into Tajikistan. Tajikistan has experienced several violent incidents attributed to IS,
including prison riots in 2018 and 2019 and a 2019 attack on a border post. Some analysts argue
that Tajik authorities’ lack of transparency makes it difficult to determine the true nature of these
events.301 In 2018, four Western cyclists, including two Americans, were kil ed in a terrorist
attack while traveling on a highway south of Dushanbe. Tajik authorities blamed the attack on the
IRPT, though the attackers had recorded a video declaring their IS al egiance.302
Foreign Terrorist Fighters
Thousands of Central Asian nationals traveled to Syria and Iraq in order to join IS or other
extremist groups. The precise number of such nationals is difficult to determine; researchers from
the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation estimated the total population of Central
Asians affiliated with IS in Syria and Iraq at about 5,700 to 7,100 as of 2019.303 Analysts assess
that the radicalization of many of these individuals occurred largely abroad, often linked to their
experiences of discrimination and marginalization as labor migrants in Russia.304 Because many
Central Asian foreign fighters traveled to Syria and Iraq with their families, the overal total of

298 Edward Lemon, “T alking Up T errorism in Central Asia,” Kennan Cable no. 38, December 2018.
299 Eric Rosand, “ CVE’s Relevance and Challenges: Central Asia as Surprising Snapshot ,” Just Security, January 7,
2020; Edward Lemon, “ T alking Up T errorism in Central Asia,” Kennan Cable 38 (December 2018).
300 U.N. Security Council, Letter Dated 15 July 2019 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee Pursuant to
Resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) Concerning Islam ic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-
Qaida and Associated Individuals, Groups, Undertakings and Entities Addressed to the President of the Security
Council, S/2019/570, July 15, 2019, p. 15.
301 Catherine Putz, “Discussing Violence and T errorism in T ajikistan: An Interview with Edward Lemon,” The
Diplom at, November 20, 2019.
302 “T ajikistan Blames Banned Party for Attack on Foreign Cyclists; IS Posts Video,” RFE/RL, July 31, 2018.
303 John Heathershaw and David W. Montgomery, “Who Says Syria’s Calling? Why It Is Sometimes Better to Admit
T hat We Just Do Not Know,” Communities Engaging with Difference and Religion, February 17, 2015; Joana Cook
and Gina Vale, From Daesh to ‘Diaspora’ II: The Challenges Posed by Wom en and Minors After the Fall of the
Caliphate, International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, July 2019, p. 20.
304 Noah T ucker, Central Asian Involvement in the Conflict in Syria and Iraq: Drivers and Responses, USAID, May 4,
2015; Lynch et al., The Return of Foreign Fighters to Central Asia . T he number of Central Asians who travelled to
Syria and Iraq equates to a very small fraction of the overall number of Central Asians who travel to Russia as labor
migrants. See Caress Schenk, “ T he Migration—Extremism Fallacy,” Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs,
September 30, 2020.
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Central Asian nationals involved includes large numbers of women and children.305 Foreign
fighters from Central Asia remain an international concern due to their ongoing participation in
other armed groups active in Syria and Afghanistan, including Al Qaeda and the IS-Khorasan
Province.306
Repatriation and Rehabilitation
Following the territorial defeat of the Islamic State in March 2019, the international community
has faced the quandary of what to do with thousands of remaining foreign fighters and their
families held in prisons as wel as in camps for displaced persons in Iraq and northern Syria. The
United States has cal ed on countries to repatriate their citizens, and the U.N. High Commissioner
for Human Rights has also appealed for the repatriation of foreign fighters and their families.307
U.N. Security Council Resolution 2396 cal s on member states “to help build the capacity of
other Member States to address the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighter returnees and
relocators and their accompanying family members, prioritizing those Member States most
affected by the threat.”308
Central Asian countries—in particular, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan—
have carried out repatriation efforts, bringing back hundreds of their citizens since January
2019.309 This marks a shift in policy, as Central Asian governments previously enacted legislation
introducing harsh penalties, including revocation of citizenship, for fighting abroad and for
participation in recognized terrorist groups.310 In light of their repatriation operations, some
analysts have termed Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan “pioneers.”311 A senior State
Department official described these countries as “the tip of the spear” in dealing with repatriation
and reintegration.312 The vast majority of those repatriated are children, many of whom are
orphans. The United States provided logistical support for certain repatriation efforts by
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and the U.S.-funded United States Institute of Peace is supporting
rehabilitation programs throughout Central Asia.

305 Cook and Vale, From Daesh to ‘Diaspora’ II, p. 20.
306 U.N. Security Council, Letter Dated 15 July 2019 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee Pursuant to
Resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) Concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al -
Qaida and Associated Individuals, Groups, Undertakings and Entities Addressed to the President of the Security
Council, S/2019/570, July 15, 2019; Eleventh Report of the Secretary-General on the Threat Posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to
International Peace and Security and the Range of United Nations Efforts in Support of Mem ber States in Countering
the Threat, S/2020/774, August 4, 2020.
307 Patrick Wintour, “ US Pushes France and UK to T ake Isis Fighters Back from Iraq and Syria,” The Guardian, June
28, 2021; U.N. Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, “Bachelet Urges States to Help T heir Nationals
Stranded in Syrian Camps,” June 22, 2020.
308 U.N. Security Council, Resolution 2396 (2017), S/RES/2396(2017), December 21, 2017.
309 As of June 2021, the numbers of repatriates by country are Kazakhstan: 722; Uzbekistan: 435; T ajikistan: 84;
Kyrgyzstan: 79. See Cholpon Orozbekova et al., The Repatriation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Wom en and
Children from Syria and Iraq: The Experiences of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan , T he Bulan
Institute for Peace Innovations, June 2021.
310 Elena Zhirukhina, “Foreign Fighters from Central Asia: Between Renunciation and Repatriation,” Istituto Per Gli
Studi Di Politica Internazionale, October 3, 2019.
311 Emil Juraev, Rehabilitation and Reintegration Processes of Repatriates in Central Asia: Policy Priorities,
Approaches, Best Practices, and Lessons Learned, Search for Common Ground, 2019, p. 3; Gavin Helf, “ Central Asia
Leads the Way on Islamic State Returnees.”
312 U.S. Department of State, “Acting Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs Alice
Wells at the 74th Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” September 26, 2019.
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Counternarcotics
Counternarcotics is an active area of cooperation between the United States and Central Asian
countries. Al five Central Asian states are transit countries for heroin and other opiates from
Afghanistan en route to Russia and Europe (and in the case of Turkmenistan, Turkey). The United
States seeks to improve Central Asian countries’ capacity to combat drug trafficking and related
criminal activity. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration maintains an office in Almaty,
Kazakhstan. The State Department classifies al five Central Asian states as “major money
laundering countries,” defined by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C.
§2291), as countries “whose financial institutions engage in currency transactions involving
significant amounts of proceeds from international narcotics trafficking.”313
Nonproliferation
Before they became independent, al five Central Asian countries were integrated into Soviet
weapons production infrastructure, leaving a legacy of environmental damage and proliferation
risks. Since the 1990s, the United States has supported nonproliferation activities in the region,
providing assistance in areas such as securing nuclear materials, destroying biological weapons
production facilities, and decontaminating testing sites.314 Additional y, as part of the Department
of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, the United States funded the construction of a
secure laboratory in Kazakhstan to assist the monitoring of high-risk, natural y occurring
diseases, replacing Soviet-era laboratories that had fal en into disrepair and presented significant
safety risks.315
Foreign Relations
Russia
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia has consistently sought to maintain close ties
with other former Soviet states, including the Central Asian countries, although relations are
sometimes strained.316 As former Soviet republics, the five Central Asian states share a common
institutional legacy with Russia that underpins military, political, economic, and cultural ties. The
Russian language remains spoken to varying degrees throughout Central Asia; it has official
status in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and is recognized as the language of interethnic
communication in Tajikistan’s constitution. According to public opinion polling, Russia enjoys
much higher approval among Central Asians than do either China or the United States.317 While
Russia remains Central Asia’s primary security partner, its economic role in the region is being
exceeded by that of China. Russia remains the primary destination for labor migrants from
Central Asia, however. According to Russian government figures, about 9.5 mil ion Central

313 U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Vol. 1, Drug and Chemical Control,
March 2020, p. 6.
314 See CRS Report RL33865, Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements, by Amy F.
Woolf, Paul K. Kerr, and Mary Beth D. Nikitin , and CRS Report R43143, The Evolution of Cooperative Threat
Reduction: Issues for Congress, by Mary Beth D. Nikitin and Amy F. Woolf.
315 Andrew Weber and Richard Pilch, “ Kazakhstan’s New National Laboratory Is a Regional Resource for a Global
Cause,” James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, May 18, 2020.
316 See CRS Report R46761, Russia: Foreign Policy and U.S. Relations, by Andrew S. Bowen and Cory Welt .
317 Eric McGlinchey and Marlene Laruelle, “ Explaining Great Power Status in Central Asia: Unfamilarity and
Discontent ,” Minerva Research Initiative, October 29, 2019
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Asians registered with the country’s migration authorities in 2019; the total number of Central
Asian migrants in the country is likely higher.318
Eurasian Economic Union
The Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) is a single market that unites Armenia, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia.319 Established in 2015, the EEU grew out of a customs
union between Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan launched in 2011, following several previous
attempts at regional integration. Uzbekistan became an EEU observer in December 2020 and
plans to obtain full membership by 2025 (Moldova and Cuba are also observer states; see Figure
11).320 Tajik authorities have been considering membership in recent years, but are reportedly
hesitant to give up income from customs duties.321 The EEU eases labor migration within the bloc
while trade continues to face administrative barriers.322 While Russia dominates the EEU and
accounts for most of the bloc’s col ective GDP, Kazakhstan in particular has resisted Russian
efforts to develop the EEU into more of a political union.323 The EEU has been a source of
frustration for some member states due to unilateral actions by Russia. For example, after
Russia’s 2014 annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea region, sanctions imposed on Russia by the United
States and the European Union and countersanctions introduced by Russia affected other EEU
members’ economies.324

318 Sher Khashimov et al., Introducing the Central Asia Migration Tracker, Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs,
December 15, 2020.
319 See CRS In Focus IF10309, Eurasian Economic Union, by Edward Y. Gracia et al.
320 Umida Hashimova, “ Uzbekistan Joins Online Eurasian Economic Union Meeting as an Observer ,” The Diplomat,
December 14, 2020; Umida Hashimova, “ Uzbek Parliament Approves EAEU Observer Status,” The Diplomat, May 4,
2020.
321 “Russia Using Crisis in T ajikistan to Advance EAEU Agenda?” Eurasianet, February 12, 2021; Umida Hashimova,
“Will T ajikistan Ever Join the Eurasian Economic Union?” The Diplomat, August 10, 2020.
322 Almaz Kumenov, “ Kazakhstan Grumbles at Russia Breaking T rade Bloc Rules,” Eurasianet, April 28, 2021; Oybek
Madiyev, “ T he Eurasian Economic Union: Repaving Central Asia’s Road to Russia?” Migration Policy Institute,
February 3, 2021; Nurjamal Djanibekova, “ Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan Border Crises Complicated by Mutual Distrust,”
Eurasianet, February 6, 2020.
323 See, for example, “ Kazakhstan Rejects Proposal to Join Russian Sanctions-Busting Plans,” Eurasianet, June 7,
2021.
324 Evgeny T roitskiy, “ The Eurasian Economic Union at Five: Great Expectations and Hard T imes,” Wilson Center,
January 14, 2020.
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Figure 11. The Eurasian Economic Union

Source: Graphic created by CRS.
Military Cooperation
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia has been Central Asia’s primary security
partner, at least in part due to a shared Soviet military legacy. Russia continues to provide military
training and defense equipment to Central Asian countries and is estimated to account for over
60% of arms transfers to the region by value between 2015 and 2020.325 Most Central Asian
military leaders studied at one of Russia’s military academies, and Russian professional military
education continues to be seen as the most prestigious option for Central Asian officers.326 Russia
also maintains military instal ations in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan (see Figure 12).
These include a missile defense testing site and a test flight center in Kazakhstan; an airbase, an
anti-submarine weapons test base, a naval communications facility, and a seismographic
laboratory in Kyrgyzstan; and a large military base and a space surveil ance station in
Tajikistan.327 Kazakhstan’s Baikonur Cosmodrome, the largest spaceport in the world, is leased
by the Russian government and serves as the sole launch site for Russia’s manned space missions.
Although previously under Russian military control, the spaceport is now managed by Russia’s
civilian space agency, Roscosmos. The Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO), established in 1992, is a security al iance that includes Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and
Tajikistan, as wel as Armenia and Belarus.328 Under the auspices of the CSTO, member states
conduct joint military exercises and training; member states are also able to purchase Russian
military equipment at reduced prices. Uzbekistan left the CSTO in 2012, but the country has
increased security cooperation with Russia under President Mirziyoyev. As part of its

325 Data from SIPRI Arms T ransfers Database. By country, the estimated percentage of arms transferred from Russia
by value between 2015 and 2020 is as follows: Kazakhstan—91%; Kyrgyzstan—98%; T ajikistan—88%;
T urkmenistan—12%; Uzbekistan—24%. Per SIPRI data, T urkmenistan’s largest arms suppliers in this period were
T urkey (41%) and China (33%), while Uzbekistan received slightly more from China (28%) than fro m Russia and 23%
from France.
326 Erica Marat, “ China’s Expanding Military Education Diplomacy in Central Asia,” PONARS Eurasia, April 19,
2021.
327 Agnieszka Rogozinska and Aleksander Ksawery Olech, The Russian Federation’s Military Bases Abroad, Institute
of New Europe, 2020, pp. 23-37, 53-57.
328 See CRS Report R46761, Russia: Foreign Policy and U.S. Relations, by Andrew S. Bowen and Cory Welt .
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constitutional y mandated neutrality policy, Turkmenistan avoids membership in multilateral
security organizations.
Figure 12. Russian Military Installations in Central Asia

Source: Graphic created by CRS.
Notes: Abbreviations: AZE—Azerbaijan.
China
China has expanded its economic presence in Central Asia, becoming the largest source of
investment in the region, and is establishing a security footprint. Analysts note a shift in recent
years from large-scale infrastructure projects to manufacturing facilities intended to build
industrial capacity. Government-to-government lending has been decreasing (with the possible
exceptions of Uzbekistan, which did not engage in much foreign borrowing before 2016, and
Turkmenistan, whose government borrowing is opaque) amid a steady stream of Chinese private
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investments.329 China has also increased efforts to bolster its soft power in Central Asia, including
through educational initiatives and outreach to civil society.330
Public opinion surveys indicate that many in Central Asia remain wary of China.331 Sinophobic
attitudes in countries like Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have been fueled by fears of potential
Chinese territorial encroachment, resentment of Chinese labor migrants, and anger at China’s
repression of Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim minorities in Xinjiang, including ethnic
Kazakhs and Kyrgyz. Anti-China sentiments have driven numerous protests in Kazakhstan and
Kyrgyzstan in recent years. Some of the largest protests in post-independence Kazakhstan took
place in 2016 over proposed land reform legislation that some feared would permit Chinese
entities to purchase land in the country; smal er-scale demonstrations expressing anti-China
sentiments continue to take place.332 In Kyrgyzstan, protests against Chinese investment projects
have sometimes turned violent. In February 2020, a planned joint Kyrgyz-Chinese venture to
construct a $280 mil ion logistics center near Kyrgyzstan’s border with China was cancel ed after
demonstrations by local residents.333
Belt and Road Initiative
In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the investment program now known as the Belt
and Road Initiative (BRI) during a speech in Kazakhstan’s capital. Central Asia is a key
component of the overland “belt” intended to connect China to European markets. China has
invested in a range of large-scale infrastructure projects in al five Central Asian countries. As
part of the Digital Silk Road component of the BRI, China has supplied digital surveil ance
equipment to Central Asian governments, which are implementing “Safe City” projects using
Chinese technology.334 Some within the region as wel as some outside observers assert that
Chinese investment enables corruption by Central Asian elites.335 Others contend that China has
provided valuable infrastructure and transport linkages.336 While some analysts assess that China
may reduce BRI-related lending in the near term in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, others
expect that competition with the United States wil lead China to increase its engagement with
Central Asia.337

329 Dirk van der Kley, “China Diversifies in Central Asia,” Eurasianet, November 23, 2020.
330 See, for example, Niva Yau, “China Polishes Its Image in Central Asia T hrough the Soft Power of L anguage,” Open
Democracy, March 23, 2021.
331 See McGlinchey and Laruelle, “ Explaining Great Power Status in Central Asia: Unfamilarity and Discontent .”
332 Abdujalil Abdurasulov, “Kazakhstan’s Land Reform Protests Explained,” BBC, April 28, 2016.
333 “China-Led $280 Million Kyrgyzstan Project Abandoned After Protests,” Reuters, February 18, 2020; “ Hundreds
Join Protests Against Chinese Investment in Kyrgyzstan,” RFE/RL, February 17, 2020.
334 Cian Stryker, “Digital Silk Road and Surveillance T echnology in Central Asia,” in Nargis Kassenova and Brendan
Duprey, eds., Digital Silk Road in Central Asia: Present and Future, Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies,
June 2021, pp. 17-54.
335 Gül Berna Özcan, “Chinese Business in Central Asia: How Crony Capitalism is Eroding Justice,” Foreign Policy
Research Institute, March 30, 2021; T emur Umarov, “Dangerous Liaisons: How China Is T am ing Central Asia’s
Elites,” Carnegie Moscow Center, January 29, 2021; International Crisis Group, Central Asia’s Silk Road Rivalries,
Europe and Central Asia Report no. 245, July 27, 2017, pp. 13 -14.
336 Susan A. T hornton, “China in Central Asia: Is China Winning the ‘New Great Game’?” Brookings Institution, June
2020.
337 Cissy Zhou, “ China Debt: Beijing May Cut Belt and Road Lending Due to Domestic Pressure, to Ensure Future of
Project ,” South China Morning Post, November 24, 2020; Srdjan Uljevic, “ China’s Central Asia Strategy in the Age of
‘Extreme Competition,’” Eurasianet, March 29, 2021.
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Increasing Security Cooperation
China has significantly increased its security presence in Central Asia, although it has not
matched that of Russia.338 According to internal Chinese documents leaked in 2019, Chinese
President Xi is concerned about the potential infiltration of Central Asia by terrorist organizations
following the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan.339 Arms transfers from China to
Central Asia have grown in recent years: from 1.5% of total arms supplied to the region by value
in 2010-2014 to 13% in 2015-2020; the total value of arms transferred to Central Asia almost
tripled across these two time periods.340 Since 2014, China has increased the number of bilateral
military exercises it organizes with Central Asian countries. China also engages Central Asia
multilateral y. In July 2020, China held the first meeting of the C+C5, a high-level forum bringing
together China and the five Central Asian states to discuss security and other regional issues.
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan are members of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO), an intergovernmental organization headquartered in Beijing that focuses on
security cooperation in Eurasia; Turkmenistan has participated as a guest at SCO summits.341
Increased Chinese investment in the region has brought with it the presence of Chinese private
security firms, notably in Kyrgyzstan.342 Tajikistan in particular is increasingly engaging in
security cooperation with China, which views the country as an important barrier against potential
extremist spil over from Afghanistan into Xinjiang. China has deployed personnel from its
People’s Armed Police to Tajikistan’s Pamir Mountains, close to the border with Afghanistan.343
Outlook and Issues for Congress
U.S. security cooperation with Central Asian states may evolve in light of the U.S. withdrawal
from Afghanistan. On September 1, 2021, the U.S. embassy in Dushanbe announced a project to
construct new border guard facilities in Tajikistan along the Tajik-Afghan-Uzbek border.344 The
United States has overflight agreements in place with al Central Asian countries other than
Kyrgyzstan. Some speculate that the United States may request access to bases in the region to
support counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan.345 Russia has expressed opposition to a U.S.
military presence in Central Asia, however.346 Following a CSTO summit held in Dushanbe on
September 16, 2021, the government of Kazakhstan reportedly stated that President Kassym-

338 See, for example, Rafaello Pantucci, “ Not-So-Hidden Dragon: China Reveals Its Claws in Central Asian Security,”
Carnegie Moscow Center, February 25, 2021.
339 Austin Ramzy and Chris Buckley, “ ‘Absolutely No Mercy’: Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass
Detentions of Muslims,” The New York Tim es, November 16, 2019.
340 Data from SIPRI Arms T ransfers Database. See also Bradley Jardine and Edward Lemon, “Avoiding Dependence?
Central Asian Security in a Multipolar World,” Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs,” September 28, 2020.
341 T he SCO was established in 2001. Its current member states are China, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan,
Russia, T ajikistan, and Uzbekistan.
342 Niva Yau and Dirk van der Kley, The Growth, Adaptation, and Limitations of Chinese Private Security Companies
in Central Asia, T he Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, October 13, 2020.
343 Dirk van der Kley, “ China’s Security Activities in T ajikistan and Afghanistan’s Wakhan Corridor,” NBR Special
Report no. 80 (September 2019), pp. 71-89.
344 U.S. Embassy in T ajikistan, “ U.S. Embassy to Support a New Border Guard Detachment at Ayvoj, Along the T ajik-
Afghan-Uzbek Border,” September 1, 2021.
345 Navbahor Imamova, “ US Seeking New Security Arrangements in Central Asia,” Voice of America, May 21, 2021.
346 “Lavrov Says Russia Doesn’t Want to See U.S. T roops in Central Asia,” RFE/RL, August 24, 2021.
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Jomart Tokayev “supported the joint CSTO position that the placement of Afghan refugees or
foreign military bases on our countries’ territories is unacceptable.”347
Prior to the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, the United States expanded its diplomatic
engagement to encompass multilateral meetings involving Afghanistan and Central Asian
countries. In May 2020, officials from the United States, Uzbekistan, and Afghanistan held an
inaugural trilateral meeting to discuss deepening cooperation on regional security and other
issues.348 A similar meeting between the United States, Tajikistan, and Afghanistan took place in
March 2021.349 In July 2021, the United States, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, and Pakistan announced
a new quadrilateral format focused on enhancing regional connectivity.350 It remains unclear
whether the United States wil establish diplomatic relations with the Taliban government, as does
the future of such multilateral meetings.
Corruption and Human Rights
Some Members of Congress have sought to counter kleptocracy and combat authoritarian
governments’ efforts to exert pressure on political opponents beyond their borders through
transnational repression.351 Scholars assert that Central Asian elites use international financial
institutions and offshore accounts to conceal bil ions of dollars of wealth obtained through
corruption.352 According to a Freedom House study that examines the period from 2014 to 2020,
exiles from Tajikistan faced “the largest wave of transnational repression in Eurasia,” and the
governments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan also engaged in physical
repression of their opponents abroad.353 In a media environment characterized by limited press
freedom, the U.S.-funded RFE/RL plays an important role by reporting on such corruption and
human rights abuses in Central Asia.
Trade
Trade relations between the United States and four of the five Central Asian countries—
Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—are governed by Section 402 of the
Trade Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-618), the so-cal ed Jackson-Vanik amendment. This section denies
normal trade relations (NTR) status to some current and former nonmarket economy countries
unless they adhere to certain freedom-of-emigration requirements. These requirements were
initial y aimed at promoting free emigration from the Soviet Union and were prompted by Soviet

347 “Russia’s Central Asian allies say won’t host Afghan refugees,” Reuters, September 16, 2021.
348 U.S. Department of State, “ Joint Statement on the U.S.-Afghanistan-Uzbekistan T rilateral Meeting,” May 27, 2020.
349 U.S. Department of State, “ Joint Statement on the Occasion of a T rilateral Discussion Among Afghanistan,
T ajikistan and the United States,” March 19, 2021.
350 U.S. Department of State, “ Announcing the U.S.-Afghanistan-Uzbekistan-Pakistan Quad Regional Support for
Afghanistan-Peace Process and Post Settlement ,” July 16, 2021.
351 T he T ransnational Repression Accountability and Prevention Act, introduced as S. 1591 in the 117th Congress, seeks
to address politically-motivated abuse of INT ERPOL by authoritarian governments such as Kazakhstan and T ajikistan.
It was previously introduced as H.R. 4330 and S. 2483 in the 116th Congress. See Rep. Alcee Hastings, “ Introduction of
the T ransnational Repression Accountability and Prevention Act of 2019 (TRAP Act),” remarks in the House,
Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 165 (September 16, 2019), p. E1153. T he Countering Russian and Other
Overseas Kleptocracy Act, introduced as H.R. 402 in the 117th Congress, seeks to support international anti-corruption
efforts and bolster good governance and the rule of law abroad, particularly during windows of opportunity for reform
in foreign countries. T he bill was previously introduced as H.R. 3843 and S. 3026 in the 116th Congress.
352 Cooley and Heathershaw, Dictators Without Borders.
353 Schenkkan and Linzer, Out of Sight, Not Out of Reach, pp. 48-49.
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restrictions on Jewish emigration. Following Kyrgyzstan’s WTO accession, that country was
exempted from the amendment via the Trade and Development Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-200).
Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan receive temporary NTR status under a
provision of the Jackson-Vanik amendment that al ows the President to extend NTR status to a
country affected by the amendment by either waiving the freedom-of-emigration requirements or
determining that the country is not in violation of the amendment’s provisions, subject to annual
review. A complete lifting of the Jackson-Vanik requirements would require Congress to enact
relevant legislation. Kazakhstan and Tajikistan acceded to the WTO in 2015, but because the
Jackson-Vanik amendment prevents the conferral of permanent NTR status on these two
countries, the United States cannot fully benefit from their WTO membership.354 Language to
exempt Kazakhstan from the Jackson-Vanik amendment was introduced in previous congresses.
Uzbekistan resumed WTO accession negotiations in 2020 after a 15-year hiatus. The Uzbekistan
Normalized Trade Act (H.R. 1913), introduced in the 117th Congress, would exempt Uzbekistan
from Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974 should the President proclaim the extension of
nondiscriminatory treatment to imports from Uzbekistan.

354 CRS In Focus IF10294, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan: WTO Accession and U.S. Trade Relations, by Vivian C. Jones
and Ian F. Fergusson.
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Appendix. Central Asian Countries’ Performance on
Selected Democracy and Human Rights Indexes
Table 7. Central Asia on Selected Democracy and Human Rights Indexes
2020/2021
Issue
Index
Country
2016 Status/Rank
Status/Rank
Democracy
Freedom House,
Kazakhstan
Not Free
Not Free
Freedom in the World
(Score: 24/100)
(Score: 23/100)

Kyrgyzstan
Partly Free
Not Free
(Score: 38/100)
(Score: 28/100)

Tajikistan
Not Free
Not Free
(Score: 16/100)
(Score: 8/100)

Turkmenistan
Not Free
Not Free
(Score: 4/100)
(Score: 2/100)

Uzbekistan
Not Free
Not Free
(Score: 3/100)
(Score: 11/100)
Press Freedom
Reporters Without
Kazakhstan
160th of 180 Countries
155th of 180 Countries
Borders, World Press

Freedom Index
Kyrgyzstan
85th of 180 Countries
79th of 180 Countries

Tajikistan
150th of 180 Countries
162nd of 180 Countries

Turkmenistan
178th of 180 Countries
178th of 180 Countries

Uzbekistan
166th of 180 Countries
157th of 180 Countries
Economic
Heritage Foundation,
Kazakhstan
Moderately Free
Mostly Free
Freedom
Index of Economic
(68th of 178 Countries)
(34th of 178 Countries)
Freedom
Kyrgyzstan
Mostly Unfree
Moderately Free
(96th of 178 Countries)
(78th of 178 Countries)
Tajikistan
Mostly Unfree
Mostly Unfree
(149th of 178
(134th of 178 Countries)
Countries)
Turkmenistan
Repressed
Repressed
(174th of 178
(167th of 178 Countries)
Countries)
Uzbekistan
Repressed
Mostly Unfree
(166th of 178
(108th of 178 Countries)
Countries)
Perceptions of
Transparency
Kazakhstan
131st of 168 Countries
94th of 179 Countries
Corruption
International,
Corruption
Kyrgyzstan
136th of 168 Countries
124th of 179 Countries
Perceptions Index
Tajikistan
151st of 168 Countries
149th of 179 Countries
Turkmenistan
154th of 168 Countries
165th of 179 Countries
Uzbekistan
156th of 168 Countries
146th of 179 Countries
Rule of Law
World Justice Project,
Kazakhstan
73rd of 128 Countries
62nd of 128 Countries
Rule of Law Index
and Jurisdictions
and Jurisdictions
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Kyrgyzstan
83rd of 128 Countries
87th of 128 Countries
and Jurisdictions
and Jurisdictions

Tajikistan
Not Ranked
Not Ranked

Turkmenistan
Not Ranked
Not Ranked

Uzbekistan
93rd of 128 Countries
92nd of 128 Countries
and Jurisdictions
and Jurisdictions
Source: Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2016 and Freedom in the World 2021; Reporters Without
Borders, 2016 World Press Freedom Index and 2021 World Press Freedom Index; The Heritage Foundation, 2016
Index of Economic Freedom and 2021Index of Economic Freedom; Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions
Index 2016 and Corruption Perceptions Index 2021; World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index 2016 and Rule of Law
Index 2020.

Author Information

Maria A. Blackwood

Analyst in Asian Policy

Disclaimer
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