Stepping In: The FCC’s Authority to Preempt
September 20, 2021
State Laws Under the Communications Act
Chris D. Linebaugh
The line between federal and state authority plays a central role in modern communications law.
Legislative Attorney
Rather than fully displacing state law, the Communications Act of 1934 (Communications Act or

Act) sets up a dual system of federal and state regulation. At the federal level, the
Eric N. Holmes
Communications Act gives the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission)
Legislative Attorney
broad authority to regulate wired and wireless telephony, radio transmissions, cable services, and

matters that are ancillary to these areas. At the same time, however, the Act expressly preserves
some state regulatory authority over these technologies. Consequently, the boundary between the

FCC’s authority and the states’ has been a source of dispute.
The FCC has the upper hand in such conflicts. The Communications Act gives the FCC broad regulatory authority and, along
with it, the ability to preempt state laws that conflict with or frustrate its regulatory actions. When the FCC is acting within its
proper statutory authority, the U.S. Constitution’s Supremacy Clause ensures that its actions prevail. Nevertheless, the FCC’s
statutory preemption authority is not boundless. The extent to which the FCC may displace state and local laws is limited by
the scope of its regulatory jurisdiction, express statutory provisions preserving or defining the scope of state laws, and
interpretive presumptions that courts have applied to preserve the usual constitutional balance between the federal and state
governments.
Far from being an abstract debate, the FCC’s ability to preempt state laws lies at the heart of many of its regulatory initiatives
in recent years. In particular, preemption is at the forefront of the Commission’s efforts to (1) remove net neutrality
requirements, (2) maintain a lightly-regulated approach to Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), (3) accelerate deployment of
fifth-generation wireless (5G) infrastructure, (4) facilitate municipal (or “community”) broadband, and (5) promote the
provision of cable television and internet services. State and local governments have challenged these initiatives in court. In
some cases, courts have held that the FCC overstepped its statutory bounds. In other cases, the legal challenges remain
ongoing, leaving a cloud of uncertainty over the FCC’s actions.
This Report discusses these issues in more detail. It begins with an overview of the legal framework governing the FCC’s
preemption actions, first discussing general federal preemption principles and then explaining the FCC’s preemption
authority under the Communications Act. The Report then reviews recent FCC initiatives in which FCC preemption plays a
key role. Specifically, it explains how the FCC has exercised its preemption authority—and the extent to which such
authority has been challenged or is uncertain—in the areas of net neutrality, VoIP, 5G infrastructure deployment, community
broadband, and state and local regulation of cable operators.
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he line between federal and state authority plays a central role in modern communications
law. Rather than fully displacing state law, the Communications Act of 1934, as amended,
T sets up a “dual system” of federal and state regulation.1 At the federal level, the
Communications Act gives the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission)
broad authority to regulate the development and operation of the nation’s wireless and wired
communications services. This authority specifically includes regulating landline and mobile
telephony (under Title II of the Act),2 radio transmissions (under Title III),3 and cable services
(under Title VI).4 The Act, as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court, also gives the FCC
“ancillary jurisdiction” to regulate communications services closely related to the areas under its
primary jurisdiction.5 At the same time, the Act expressly preserves some state authority to act in
these areas.6 Consequently, the boundary between the FCC’s authority and that of the states
becomes critical when the two regulatory regimes clash. The FCC’s preemption authority gives it
the upper hand in such conflicts. Under the U.S. Constitution’s Supremacy Clause and the
Communications Act, the FCC has broad authority to preempt state laws that conflict with or
frustrate its actions.7
Nevertheless, the FCC’s preemption authority is not boundless. Courts have said that, as a general
matter, the FCC may only preempt state laws governing a communications service if the FCC has
regulatory jurisdiction over that service.8 For instance, Section 2(b) of the Act,9 as interpreted by
the Supreme Court, prohibits the FCC from regulating purely intrastate services under its
ancillary jurisdiction.10 Even if the Commission has regulatory authority, it must comply with
specific provisions that either expressly preempt or expressly preserve state laws in a given area.

1 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–624.
2 Id. §§ 201–276.
3 Id. §§ 301–399b.
4 Id. §§ 521–573.
5 United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968) ([T]he authority which we recognize today under § 152(a)
is restricted to that reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the Commission’s various responsibilities for
the regulation of television broadcasting.”); United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 662 (1972) (“We
therefore concluded . . . that the Commission does have jurisdiction over CATV ‘reasonably ancillary to the effective
performance of (its) various responsibilities for the regulation of television broadcasting . . . (and) may, for these
purposes, issue ‘such rules and regulations and prescribe such restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent with law,’ as
‘public convenience, interest, or necessity requires.’”) (quoting Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. at 178).
6 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §152(b) (“ . . . nothing in this chapter shall be construed to apply or to give the Commission
jurisdiction with respect to (1) charges, classifications, practices, services, facilities, or regulations for or in connection
with intrastate communication service by wire or radio of any carrier . . .”).
7 See the section “Overview of the FCC’s Preemption Authority Under the Communications Act” for an overview of
the FCC’s preemption authority.
8 See, e.g., La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986) (“[A] federal agency may preempt state law only
when and if it is acting within the scope of its congressionally delegated authority.”); Mozilla Corp. v. FCC, 940 F.3d
1, 75 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“[I]n any area where the Commission lacks the authority to regulate, it equally lacks the power
to preempt state law.”); Public Service Com’n of Maryland v. FCC, 909 F.2d 1510, (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“The FCC cannot
regulate (let alone preempt state regulation of) any service that does not fall within its Title II jurisdiction over common
carrier services or its Title I jurisdiction over matters ‘incidental’ to communication by wire.”).
9 47 U.S.C. § 152(b).
10 AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 379–82 n.8 (1999) (rejecting the argument that 47 U.S.C. § 152(b)
prevents the FCC from issuing rules implementing Title II’s local competition provisions on the ground that Section
201(b) gives the FCC authority to “prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary in the public interest to
carry out the provisions of the Act,” but noting that, “[i]nsofar as Congress has remained silent . . . , § 152(b) continues
to function” and the FCC could not “regulate any aspect of intrastate communication . . . on the theory that it had an
ancillary effect on matters within the Commission's primary jurisdiction.”).
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Stepping In: The FCC’s Authority to Preempt State Laws Under the Communications Act

For example, Section 332(c)(7) of the Act provides that state laws governing the placement,
construction, and modification of “personal wireless service facilities” are only preempted to the
extent the laws “prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the provision of wireless services” or
unreasonably discriminate among providers of services.11 Since this provision defines preemption
in this area, the FCC may not preempt more broadly than what the provision allows.12 The FCC’s
preemption authority also is limited, in some cases, by a “clear statement” rule informed by
federalism principles. In particular, courts have held that the Commission may not preempt state
law in a manner that upsets the “usual constitutional balance” between states and the federal
government, absent a clear statement from Congress authorizing the preemption.13
The FCC’s ability to preempt state laws lies at the heart of many of its regulatory initiatives in
recent years, leading to conflict with state and local governments. In particular, preemption is at
the forefront of the Commission’s efforts to (1) remove net neutrality requirements, (2) maintain
a deregulatory approach to Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) services, (3) accelerate
deployment of fifth-generation wireless (5G) infrastructure, (4) facilitate municipal (or
“community”) broadband, and (5) promote the provision of cable television and internet services.
Preemption has played a notable role in the Commission’s deregulatory approach to net
neutrality, i.e., the concept that internet service providers should “treat internet traffic the same
regardless of source.”14 In 2018, the FCC reversed a prior rule that had imposed a number of net
neutrality requirements on broadband internet access service (BIAS) providers.15 In so doing, the
Commission reclassified BIAS from a Title II “telecommunications service” to a Title I
“information service” no longer subject to its primary jurisdiction.16 To preserve its new
deregulatory policy, the Commission also preempted any state laws that would impose the net
neutrality requirements.17 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit (D.C. Circuit),18
invalidated the FCC’s blanket preemption.19 The court reasoned that because BIAS was now an
information service not subject to its regulatory jurisdiction, the Commission no longer had
affirmative regulatory authority to support the preemption.20 The court, nevertheless, held open
the possibility that the FCC could preempt state laws on a case-by-case basis under principles of
conflict preemption.21

11 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i).
12 See, e.g., City of Arlington, Tex. v. FCC, 668 F.3d 229, 250 (5th Cir. 2012) (stating that Section 332(c)(7)(A)
“certainly prohibits the FCC from imposing restrictions or limitations that cannot be tied to the language of
§ 332(c)(7)(B)”).
13 See, e.g., Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League, 541 U.S. 125, 140–41 (2004) (“[F]ederal legislation threatening to
trench on the States’ arrangements for conducting their own governments should be treated with great skepticism, and
read in a way that preserves a State’s chosen disposition of its own power, in the absence of the plain statement
Gregory requires. . . . The want of any ‘unmistakably clear’ statement to that effect would be fatal to respondents’
reading.”) (internal citations omitted).
14 U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 689 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
15 In the Matter of Restoring Internet Freedom, Declaratory Ruling, Report and Order, and Order, 33 FCC Rcd. 311
(2018) [hereinafter 2018 Internet Order].
16 Id. at 312–13, paras. 2–4.
17 Id. at 426–27, paras. 194, 195.
18 References in this report to a particular circuit (e.g., the D.C. Circuit) refer to the U.S. Court of Appeals for that
circuit.
19 Mozilla Corp. v. FCC, 940 F.3d 1, 74 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
20 Id. at 74–76.
21 Id. at 85.
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The Commission has preempted states’ regulation of VoIP services—i.e., services that enable
users to make voice calls via the Internet—when the services interface with the Public Switched
Telephone Network. Unlike net neutrality, the FCC has not made a determination on whether
VoIP is a telecommunications service or an information service.22 Nevertheless, it has relied on its
ancillary authority to impose some requirements on these services, and it has sought to preempt
state laws that impose more stringent common-carrier regulations on VoIP services.23 Courts thus
far have upheld the FCC’s preemption of such state laws.24
The Commission has used preemption to facilitate the rapid deployment of 5G service. In two
orders issued in 2018, the Commission preempted state and local moratoria on deploying
telecommunications facilities25 and preempted certain requirements on deployment of small
wireless facilities (e.g., 5G small cell sites, components of 5G infrastructure typically installed in
large numbers and close together in densified areas to propagate high-frequency radio waves).26
Specifically, the second of these orders preempted the charging of excessive fees and the
imposition of unreasonable non-fee requirements, such as rules mandating that the small cell sites
meet unreasonable aesthetic requirements.27 This order also implemented “shot clocks” governing
how long state and local governments can take to review and respond to installation and
construction applications.28 In August 2020, the Ninth Circuit largely upheld these 2018 orders,
vacating only the FCC’s standards on permissible aesthetic requirements.29 The FCC also issued a
declaratory ruling in June 2020 clarifying when state and local governments must approve
requests to modify existing wireless towers or base stations.30 As with the 2018 orders, localities
have challenged this declaratory ruling in the Ninth Circuit.
The FCC also has sought, unsuccessfully, to preempt state laws that limit municipalities’ ability to
provide broadband service. The Commission’s approach to state laws restricting community
broadband has varied depending on the nature of the laws and has been the subject of several
court decisions. In a 2001 order, the FCC rejected petitions from cities asking it to preempt state
laws imposing complete bans on municipally provided telecommunications services, concluding
that it did not have authority to constrain states’ control over their own governments without
express authority from Congress.31 The Supreme Court upheld the Commission’s position in
Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League, in which the Court agreed the agency could not preempt
without a clear statutory statement.32 In 2015, however, the FCC preempted state laws in North
Carolina and Tennessee that restricted the geographical area in which municipalities could offer
broadband.33 The Commission distinguished these laws from those at issue in Nixon by arguing

22 See infra “Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP).”
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Accelerating Wireline Broadband Deployment by Removing Barriers to Infrastructure Investment, 33 FCC Rcd.
7705 (2018) [hereinafter Moratorium Order].
26 Accelerating Wireless Broadband Deployment by Removing Barriers to Infrastructure Investment, 33 FCC Rcd.
9088 (2018) [hereinafter Small Cell Order].
27 Id. at 9091, paras. 11–12.
28 Id. at 9093, para. 13.
29 City of Portland v. United States, 969 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2020).
30 Implementation of State and Local Governments’ Obligation to Approve Certain Wireless Facility Modification
Requests, 35 FCC Rcd. 5977 (2020) [hereinafter June 2020 Declaratory Ruling].
31 In the Matter of Missouri Municipal League, Mem. Op. and Order, 16 FCC Rcd. 1162, 1169 (2002).
32 541 U.S. 125, 140–41 (2004).
33 City of Wilson, N.C. Petition for Preemption of N.C. Gen. Stat. Sections 160A-340 et seq., 30 FCC Rcd. 2408
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the North Carolina and Tennessee laws dealt with the manner in which interstate commerce is
conducted, rather than whether municipalities may be able to participate in such commerce in the
first place.34 However, in Tennessee v. FCC, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (Sixth
Circuit) vacated the Commission’s order.35 The court reasoned that even though these laws
regulate interstate communications they still “implicat[ed] core attributes of state sovereignty”
and, under the reasoning of Nixon, the FCC could not preempt them.36
Lastly, the FCC has preempted state and local laws regulating cable television operators in a
manner the Commission deems inconsistent with Title VI of the Act. Title VI expressly preserves
state and local authority to regulate cable operators by requiring them to obtain an operating
franchise from a state or local franchising authority.37 Title VI places some limitations on this
franchising authority, however. For instance, it caps allowable franchise fees and prohibits state
and local authorities from unreasonably refusing to award a franchise.38 In a number of orders, the
FCC has laid out its view of these limitations and has preempted state laws inconsistent with its
interpretations.39 The FCC’s orders go beyond telling states the way in which they may use the
franchising process to regulate cable service. In a 2019 order, the FCC preempted any state or
local fee or requirement in connection with cable operators’ access to public rights of way unless
expressly allowed under Title VI, even if the fee or requirement relates to non-cable services.40
This includes, the Commission explained, state or local fees or other requirements for cable
operators’ provision of broadband internet or other non-cable television services over public
rights of way.41 In May 2021, the Sixth Circuit largely upheld this order in City of Eugene v.
FCC.42
This Report discusses each these issues in more detail below. It begins with an overview of the
legal framework governing the FCC’s preemption actions, first discussing general federal
preemption principles and then explaining the FCC’s preemption authority under the
Communications Act. The Report next reviews recent FCC initiatives in which preemption plays
a key role, explaining how the FCC has exercised its preemption authority and the extent to
which such authority has been challenged or is uncertain.
General Federal Preemption Principles
The federal government’s preemption of state law is “rooted” in the U.S. Constitution’s
Supremacy Clause.43 The Supremacy Clause states that the “Constitution, and the Laws of the

(2015).
34 Id. at 2412, 2472–74, paras. 12, 154–58.
35 832 F.3d 597 (6th Cir. 2016).
36 Id. at 611–13.
37 47 U.S.C. § 541.
38 Id. §§ 541, 542.
39 For an in-depth discussion of these orders, see CRS Report R46147, The Cable Franchising Authority of State and
Local Governments and the Communications Act, by Chris D. Linebaugh and Eric N. Holmes.
40 Implementation of Section 621(a)(1) of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 34 FCC Rcd. 6844, 6892,
para. 88 (2019) [hereinafter Third Order].
41 Id. at 6900, para. 105.
42 998 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 2021).
43 Metro. Edison Co. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 767 F.3d 335, 341 (3d Cir. 2014) (“The doctrine of federal pre-
emption, in turn, is rooted in the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution . . . .”).
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United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof,” shall be the “supreme Law of the Land”
and that the “Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”44 Under the Supremacy Clause, Congress has the
power to displace state law when it is acting pursuant to its enumerated constitutional powers.45
As the Supreme Court has explained, federal law may preempt state law in one of three ways.46
First, federal law may expressly preempt state law by stating which state laws are preempted.47
Second, federal law preempts any conflicting state law. Such conflict preemption occurs when
either (1) “compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility” or (2)
the “challenged state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress.”48 Lastly, federal law may preempt an entire field of state
regulation by occupying that field “so comprehensively that it has left no room for supplementary
state legislation.”49
The Supreme Court has also explained that regulations adopted by federal agencies “have no less
preemptive effect” than statutes themselves.50 While the “purpose of Congress” is the “ultimate
touchstone” in any preemption analysis, whether by statute or regulation,51 agencies generally do
not need “express congressional authorization” to preempt state law.52 Rather, the Supreme Court
has said that when an agency promulgates regulations intending to preempt state law, the Court
will uphold the preemption unless the agency “exceeded [its] statutory authority or acted
arbitrarily.”53 Nevertheless, in some circumstances, the Court has required a plain statement from
Congress authorizing the preemption. In particular, the Court has said that Congress must be
“unmistakably clear in the language of the statute” if it intends to preempt state law in a way that
would upset the “usual constitutional balance” between states and the federal government.54 The

44 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
45 City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 63 (1988) (“When the Federal Government acts within the authority it
possesses under the Constitution, it is empowered to pre-empt state laws to the extent it is believed that such action is
necessary to achieve its purposes.”); Chicago and N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 317
(1981) (“But when Congress has chosen to legislate pursuant to its constitutional powers, then a court must find local
law pre-empted by federal regulation whenever the ‘challenged state statute “stands an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”’”) (quoting Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 649
(1971)); Oxygenated Fuels Ass’n Inc. v. Davis, 331 F.3d 665, 667 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Congress has the authority, when
acting pursuant to its enumerated powers, to preempt state and local laws.”).
46 Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1480 (2018) (“Our cases have identified three different
types of preemption—‘conflict,’ ‘express,’ and ‘field’ . . . .”).
47 See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582 (2011) (“When a federal law contains an express
preemption clause, we ‘focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of
Congress’ preemptive intent.’”) (quoting CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993)).
48 Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 399 (2012) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
49 Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1480 (quoting R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Durham Cty., 479 U.S. 130, 140 (1986)).
50 Fidelity Federal Sav. and Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982).
51 Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009).
52 Id. at 154; see also City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 64 (1988).
53 de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 154; see also City of New York, 486 U.S. at 64 (“[I]n a situation where state law is claimed
to be preempted by federal regulation, a narrow focus on Congress’ intent to supersede state law is misdirected, for a
preemptive regulation’s force does not depend on express congressional authorization to displace state law. Instead, the
correct focus is on the federal agency that seeks to displace state law and on the proper bounds of its lawful authority to
undertake such action.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
54 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242
(1985)).
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Court has applied this clear statement rule, for instance, to preemption that would infringe on
states’ management of their own officers and subdivisions.55
Overview of the FCC’s Preemption Authority Under
the Communications Act
As with other federal agencies, the FCC generally may enact regulations that preempt state law as
long as it does not “exceed[] its statutory authority” under the Communications Act or act
arbitrarily. While straightforward in principle, determining whether a preemptive action exceeds
the FCC’s statutory authority is a complex question that generally depends on two factors:
(1) whether the Commission has jurisdictional authority over the area of law it seeks to preempt,
and (2) whether any specific provisions in the Communications Act limit or define its preemptive
authority over that area. If the Commission has jurisdiction over an area, it may generally
preempt state laws as long as it does not run afoul of any specific provisions that limit or define
its preemption authority.56 There are some exceptions to this general rule, however. For instance,
Courts have required a plain statement from Congress before allowing the FCC to preempt in a
manner that upsets the “usual constitutional balance” between states and the federal government.
These issues are discussed further below.
The FCC’s Jurisdictional Authority
The Supreme Court and lower federal courts have recognized that, as a general matter, the FCC
may only preempt state laws in areas where it has statutory authority to regulate.57 The Supreme
Court has explained that the FCC’s regulatory jurisdiction takes two forms: its “primary

55 Id. (“Congressional interference with this decision of the people of Missouri, defining their constitutional officers,
would upset the usual constitutional balance of federal and state powers. For this reason, it is incumbent upon the
federal courts to be certain of Congress’ intent before finding that federal law overrides this balance.”) (internal
citations and quotations omitted); Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 140 (2004) (“[T]he liberating preemption
would come only by interposing federal authority between a State and its municipal subdivisions . . . . Hence the need
to invoke our working assumption that federal legislation threatening to trench on the States’ arrangements for
conducting their own governments should be treated with great skepticism, and read in a way that preserves a State’s
chosen disposition of its own power, in the absence of the plain statement Gregory requires.”).
56 See United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 383 (1961) (declining to disturb an agency’s preemption decision “unless
it appears from the statute or its legislative history that the accommodation is not one that Congress would have
sanctioned.”).
57 See City of New York, 486 U.S. at 63–64, 66; La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S 355, 374 (1986) (“[A] federal
agency may preempt state law only when and if it is acting within the scope of its congressionally delegated
authority.”); Mozilla Corp. v. FCC, 940 F.3d 1, 75 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“[I]n any area where the Commission lacks the
authority to regulate, it equally lacks the power to preempt state law.”); Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 909 F.2d 1510,
1515 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“The FCC cannot regulate (let alone preempt state regulation of) any service that does not
fall within its Title II jurisdiction over common carrier services or its Title I jurisdiction over matters ‘incidental’ to
communication by wire.”). As the D.C. Circuit recently explained, Congress may give the Commission preemption
authority even in an area where it has no regulatory authority. Mozilla Corp., 940 F.3d at 75 (“Of course, if a federal
law expressly confers upon the agency the authority to preempt, that legislative delegation creates and defines the
agency’s power to displace state laws.”). While the majority maintained that Congress had to grant express preemption
authority beyond the Commission’s regulatory authority, the dissent in this case argued that such a grant of preemption
authority could be implicit. See id. at 101 (Williams, J., dissenting) (“The same principle undergirds a congressional
choice (express or implied) to grant an agency equivalent preemptive authority without any parallel federal regulation
(by Congress or a federal agency).”). See infra “
Mozilla Corp. v. FCC” for a further discussion of this case.
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jurisdiction” and its “ancillary jurisdiction.”58 Understanding the scope of the FCC’s regulatory
jurisdiction is critical to understanding its preemption power.
The FCC’s primary jurisdiction involves the “express and expansive authority” that the
Communications Act expressly grants the FCC over “certain technologies.”59 In particular,
different titles of the Act give the FCC “express and expansive authority” to regulate: (1)
“telecommunications services,” such as landline telephone services, as common carriers (Title
II);60 (2) “radio transmissions, including broadcast television, radio, and cellular telephony” (Title
III);61 and (3) “cable services, including cable television” (Title VI).62 These titles contain detailed
provisions expressly setting forth the nature and scope of the FCC’s authority. Title II, for
instance, contains a host of requirements that apply to common carriers—such as requiring that
they charge “just and reasonable rates,” refrain from unreasonable discrimination, and allow other
carriers to interconnect with their networks—while giving the FCC discretion to “forbear” from
applying Title II requirements consistent with the public interest.63 Title III, as another example,
provides that, among other things, the Commission may classify radio stations, prescribe the
services rendered by such stations, regulate the apparatus used in radio communications, and
issue licenses to operators of radio stations.64
The Supreme Court has also recognized that the FCC may regulate under its “ancillary
jurisdiction.”65 For the FCC to use its ancillary jurisdiction, “two conditions must be met”: (1)
“the subject of the regulation” must fall under the Commission’s “general grant of jurisdiction”
under Title I of the Communications Act,66 which covers “all interstate and foreign
communication by wire or radio”; and (2) the subject of the regulation must be “reasonably
ancillary” to the “effective performance” of its primary jurisdictional responsibilities.67 Where its

58 AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 380–81 (1999) (“For even though ‘Commission jurisdiction’ always
follows where the Act ‘applies,’ Commission jurisdiction (so-called ‘ancillary’ jurisdiction) could exist even where the
Act does not ‘apply.’ The term ‘apply’ limits the substantive reach of the statute (and the concomitant scope of primary
FCC jurisdiction), and the phrase ‘or to give the Commission jurisdiction’ limits, in addition, the FCC’s ancillary
jurisdiction.”).
59 Mozilla Corp., 940 F.3d at 75.
60 47 U.S.C. §§, 153, 301–399b; Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 645 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“Congress has given the
Commission express and expansive authority to regulate common carrier services, including landline telephony [under
Title II].”).
61 47 U.S.C. §§ 301–399b; Comcast, 600 F.3d at 645.
62 47 U.S.C. §§ 521–573; Comcast, 600 F.3d at 645.
63 47 U.S.C. §§ 160(a), 201(b), 202(a), 251(a).
64 Id. §§ 303, 307; National Ass’n For Better Broadcasting v. FCC, 849 F.2d 665, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (“Title III of the
Act establishes a broad grant of authority to the Commission to regulate radio (and television) communications
including classification of stations, prescription of the nature of services to be rendered, regulation of the apparatus
used, study of new uses and encouragement of more and effective uses of radio, and ultimately the issuance of licenses
to operate stations when it finds that the public interest will be served thereby.”).
65 See, e.g., U.S. v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968); U.S. v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 650 (1972).
66 See 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (“The provisions of this chapter shall apply to all interstate and foreign communication by
wire or radio and all interstate and foreign transmission of energy by radio, which originates and/or is received within
the United States, and to all persons engaged within the United States in such communication or such transmission of
energy by radio, and to the licensing and regulating of all radio stations as hereinafter provided . . . .”).
67 American Library Ass’n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 693 (D.C. Cir. 2005); see also S.W. Cable Co., 392 U.S. at 178
(“[T]he authority which we recognize today under § 152(a) is restricted to that reasonably ancillary to the effective
performance of the Commission’s various responsibilities for the regulation of television broadcasting. The
Commission may, for these purposes, issue ‘such rules and regulations and prescribe such restrictions and conditions,
not inconsistent with law,’ as ‘public convenience, interest, or necessity requires.’”); U.S. v. Midwest Video Corp., 406
U.S. at 650) (“In [Southwestern Cable], . . . we sustained the jurisdiction of the Federal Communications Commission
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primary or ancillary jurisdiction applies, the FCC has authority to “prescribe such rules and
regulations” that “may be necessary in the execution of its functions” and are not “inconsistent
with [the Communications Act].”68
The Commission’s ancillary jurisdiction is limited, however, by Section 2(b) of the Act. Section
2(b) says that, except for several specific exceptions, “nothing [in the Act] shall be construed to
apply or to give the Commission jurisdiction with respect to . . . charges, classifications,
practices, services, facilities, or regulations for or in connection with intrastate communication
service.”69 The Supreme Court has explained that, while this section does not limit the FCC’s
regulatory authority where the Act expressly applies (i.e., its primary jurisdiction), it does carve
out intrastate matters from the Commission’s ancillary jurisdiction.70 However, the Court has also
suggested (without expressly deciding) that Section 2(b)’s limitation does not apply when it is
“not possible to separate the interstate and the intrastate components of the asserted FCC
regulation.”71 Lower courts have fleshed out this “impossibility exception” further. These cases
generally hold that Section 2(b) does not prevent the Commission from preempting state law
where: (1) “the matter to be regulated has both interstate and intrastate aspects”; (2) “preemption
is necessary to protect a valid federal regulatory objective”; and (3) “state regulation would
negate the exercise by the [Commission] of its own lawful authority because regulation of the
interstate aspects of the matter cannot be ‘unbundled’ from regulation of the intrastate aspects.”72
Specific Statutory Provisions Addressing Preemption
Even when the FCC has jurisdictional authority, its preemption must be consistent with any
express preemption provisions in the Communications Act. In a number of areas, the Act
explicitly spells out the extent to which states’ regulatory authority over a particular technology or

to regulate the new industry, at least to the extent ‘reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the
Commission’s various responsibilities for the regulation of television broadcasting’ . . . .”).
68 47 U.S.C. § 154(i) (“The Commission may perform any and all acts, make such rules and regulations, and issue such
orders, not inconsistent with this chapter, as may be necessary in the execution of its functions.”); see also EchoStar
Satellite L.L.C. v. FCC, 704 F.3d 992, 998 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (applying Section 4(i) of the Communications Act to the
FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction).
69 47 U.S.C. § 152(b).
70 AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 379–82 n.8 (1999) (rejecting the argument that Section 2(b) prevents
the FCC from issuing rules implementing Title II’s local competition provisions on the ground that Section 201(b)
gives the FCC authority to “prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary in the public interest to carry out
the provisions of the Act,” but noting that “[i]nsofar as Congress has remained silent, . . . , § 152(b) continues to
function” and the FCC could not “regulate any aspect of intrastate communication . . . on the theory that it had an
ancillary effect on matters within the Commission’s primary jurisdiction.”).
71 La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 375 n.4 (1986) (distinguishing cases where lower courts held it was
“not possible to separate the interstate and the intrastate components of the asserted FCC regulation.”) (emphasis in the
original).
72 Mozilla Corp. v. FCC, 940 F.3d 1, 77–78 (D.C. Cir. 2019); California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217, 1243 (9th Cir. 1990)
(“The impossibility exception, however, is a limited one. The FCC may not justify a preemption order merely by
showing that some of the preempted state regulation would, if not preempted, frustrate FCC regulatory goals. Rather,
the FCC bears the burden of justifying its entire preemption order by demonstrating that the order is narrowly tailored
to preempt only such state regulations as would negate valid FCC regulatory goals.”); Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm’n v.
FCC, 483 F.3d 570, 578 (8th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he “impossibility exception” of 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) allows the FCC to
preempt state regulation of a service if (1) it is not possible to separate the interstate and intrastate aspects of the
service, and (2) federal regulation is necessary to further a valid federal regulatory objective, i.e., state regulation would
conflict with federal regulatory policies.”) (citing Qwest Corp. v. Scott, 380 F.3d 367, 372 (8th Cir. 2004)).
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service is displaced or preserved. Where such provisions apply, the Commission may not preempt
state laws beyond what the statute allows.73
For example, Section 332(c)(7) of the Act (under Title III) defines the extent of states’ regulatory
authority over “personal wireless services.” In particular, Section 332(c)(7)(B) provides that state
or local regulations governing the “placement, construction, and modification of personal
wireless services facilities . . . (I) shall not unreasonably discriminate among providers of
functionally equivalent services; and (II) shall not prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the
provision of personal wireless services.”74 However, Section 332(c)(7)(A) provides that, other
than Section 332(c)(7)(B)’s express limitations, nothing “shall limit or affect the authority of a
State or local government or instrumentality thereof over decisions regarding the placement,
construction, and modification of personal wireless service facilities.”75 Circuit courts have held
that the FCC may implement Section 332(c)(7)(B)’s limitations by clarifying the extent to which
state laws are preempted by this section; however, in doing so, the Commission may not impose
restrictions or limitations that “cannot be tied to the language of § 332(c)(7)(B).”76
Similarly, Section 253 of the Act (under Title II) defines the FCC’s preemption authority over
state laws regulating telecommunication services. It provides that “no State or local statute or
regulation, or other State or local legal requirement, may prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting
the ability of any entity to provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications service.”77
Section 253 further states that if the FCC determines that any state or local requirement violates
this provision, it “shall,” after notice and an opportunity for public comment, “preempt the
enforcement of such statute, regulation, or legal requirement to the extent necessary to correct
such violation or inconsistency.”78 However, similar to Section 322(c)(7)(A), Section 253 also
preserves a sphere of state and local authority, providing that “[n]othing in this section affects the
authority of a State or local government to manage the public rights-of-way or to require fair and
reasonable compensation from telecommunications providers, on a competitively neutral and
nondiscriminatory basis.”79
Other parts of the Communications Act define in even greater detail the bounds of state authority
over particular areas. For instance, Title VI in large part deals with state and local governments’
ability to award franchises to cable operators.80 While this title requires cable operators to obtain a
franchise from a state or local franchising authority before providing cable service, it also
prohibits franchising authorities from, among other things, (1) “unreasonably refus[ing]” to award

73 See, e.g., Mozilla, 940 F.3d at 75 (“Of course, if a federal law expressly confers upon the agency the authority to
preempt, that legislative delegation creates and defines the agency’s power to displace state laws.”).
74 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B).
75 Id. § 332(c)(7)(A).
76 City of Arlington v. FCC, 668 F.3d 229, 250–54 (5th Cir. 2012) (stating that Section 332(c)(7)(A) “certainly
prohibits the FCC from imposing restrictions or limitations that cannot be tied to the language of § 332(c)(7)(B),” but
also holding that the FCC is “entitled to deference with respect to its exercise of authority to implement
§ 332(c)(7)(B)(ii) and (v)”); see also Up State Tower Co., LLC v. Town of Kiantone, New York, 718 F. App’x. 29, 31
n.1 (2d Cir. 2017) (“We agree with the 5th Circuit that because the two FCC Orders cited herein are reasonable
constructions of § 332(c)(7)(B), they ‘are thus entitled to Chevron deference.’”) (citing City of Arlington, 668 F.3d at
256).
77 47 U.S.C. § 253(a).
78 Id. § 253(a), (d).
79 Id. § 253(c).
80 In the context of cable television, a “franchise” refers to the right to operate a cable system in a given area. For more
information, see CRS Report R46147, The Cable Franchising Authority of State and Local Governments and the
Communications Act, by Chris D. Linebaugh and Eric N. Holmes.
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franchises, (2) establishing requirements for “video programming or other information services,”
or (3) imposing franchise fees exceeding 5% of the cable operator’s gross annual revenue.81 Title
VI further “preempt[s] and supersede[s]” “any provision of law of any State, political
subdivision, or agency thereof . . . which is inconsistent with this chapter.”82
Later sections of this report discuss the FCC’s implementation of these various preemption
provisions and recent disputes surrounding that implementation.
Clear Statement Rule
Even if the FCC has regulatory jurisdiction over the area it seeks to preempt and its preemption
accords with any specific statutory provisions, its ability to preempt may still be limited by a
“clear statement” rule. In particular, as previously discussed, the Supreme Court has said that
Congress must be “unmistakably clear in the language of the statute” if it intends to preempt state
law in a way that would upset the “usual constitutional balance” between states and the federal
government.83 The Supreme Court has relied on this rule to vacate the FCC’s preemption of state
laws governing a state’s municipalities. Most relevantly, and as discussed later in this report, the
Supreme Court and the Sixth Circuit have held that the FCC does not have authority to preempt
state laws prohibiting or restricting municipalities from providing broadband service because, in
part, Congress had not provided a “plain statement” of its intent to preempt such laws.84
Current Issues
The FCC’s ability to preempt state laws has been at the heart of many of its regulatory initiatives
in recent years. In particular, preemption is at the forefront of the Commission’s efforts to: (1)
remove net neutrality requirements; (2) maintain a lightly-regulated approach to VoIP services;
(3) accelerate deployment of fifth-generation wireless (5G) infrastructure; (4) facilitate municipal
(or “community”) broadband; and (5) promote the provision of cable and internet services. State
and local governments have challenged these initiatives in court, arguing that the FCC has
exceeded its preemption authority. In some cases, courts have agreed that the FCC overstepped its
statutory bounds. In other cases, the legal challenges are ongoing, leaving a cloud of uncertainty
over the FCC’s actions.
This section discusses the FCC’s preemption efforts in each of these areas, including the legal
challenges and issues arising from them.
Net Neutrality
Preemption has played a key part in the FCC’s efforts to establish a nation-wide policy on “net
neutrality,” which is the “principle that broadband providers must treat all internet traffic the
same regardless of source.”85 In 2018, the FCC issued an order removing net neutrality
regulations at the federal level.86 At the same time, the Commission attempted to preempt any

81 47 U.S.C. §§ 541(a)(1), 542(b), 544(b).
82 Id. § 556(c).
83 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanion, 473 U.S. 234, 242
(1985)).
84 Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 140–41 (2004); Tennessee v. FCC, 832 F.3d 597 (6th Cir. 2016).
85 USTA v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 689 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
86 In the Matter of Restoring Internet Freedom, Declaratory Ruling, Report and Order, and Order, 33 FCC Rcd. 311
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state net neutrality regulations.87 In the case of Mozilla v. FCC, the D.C. Circuit upheld most of
the FCC’s repeal of its net neutrality rules.88 However, the court vacated the FCC’s blanket
preemption of any state net neutrality laws.89 As a result, states may be able to enact their own net
neutrality requirements. Some states, such as California, have already done so.90 Nevertheless,
Mozilla left room for state laws to be preempted on a case-by-case basis under principles of
conflict preemption.91 Thus, if a later court determines that a state law “actually undermines” the
FCC’s order, then such a law would be preempted and unenforceable.92 This section discusses the
FCC’s actions, the D.C. Circuit’s Mozilla opinion, and ongoing issues surrounding state net
neutrality laws.
FCC’s Actions
As described in more detail in CRS Report R40616, The Federal Net Neutrality Debate: Access
to Broadband Networks, by Patricia Moloney Figliola, the FCC’s approach towards net neutrality
in recent years has been in flux. In particular, the FCC has toggled between classifying broadband
Internet access service (BIAS) as either: 1) a “telecommunications service,” meaning a common
carrier subject to regulation under Title II of the Act, or 2) an “information service” as defined in
Title I of the Act.93 The FCC has discretion to choose which category is most appropriate for
BIAS, as evidenced by the Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit’s application of the Chevron
doctrine—under which courts generally defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of an
ambiguous statutory provision—to repeatedly uphold the Commission’s different classification
choices.94
The Commission’s choice between the two categories is significant because they have been
treated as “mutually exclusive,” i.e., an information service is not subject to regulations
governing a telecommunications service under Title II.95 Because Title I does not give the FCC
any affirmative regulatory authority over information services—and because information services

(2018) [hereinafter 2018 Internet Order].
87 2018 Internet Order, 33 FCC Rcd. at 427, para. 195 (“We therefore preempt any state or local measures that would
effectively impose rules or requirements that we have repealed or decided to refrain from imposing in this order or that
would impose more stringent requirements for any aspect of broadband service that we address in this order.”).
88 Mozilla, 940 F.3d at 18.
89 Id. at 74.
90 See “Next Steps.”
91 Mozilla, 940 F.3d at 85.
92 Id.
93 47 U.S.C. §§ 153(24), (50)–(51), (53); see also Mozilla, 940 F.3d at 17 (“[T]he 1996 Telecommunications Act
creates two potential classifications for broadband Internet: ‘telecommunications services’ under Title II of the Act and
‘information services’ under Title I. These similar-sounding terms carry considerable significance: Title II entails
common carrier status, see 47 U.S.C. § 153(51) (defining ‘telecommunications carrier’), and triggers an array of
statutory restrictions and requirements (subject to forbearance at the Commission’s election)”).
94 Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 986–1000 (2005); U.S. Telecom Ass’n v.
FCC, 825 F.3d 674–706 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Mozilla, 940 F.3d at 18–35 (2019).
95 See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 976 (“Information-service providers, by contrast, are not subject to mandatory common-
carrier regulation under Title II, though the Commission has jurisdiction to impose additional regulatory obligations
under its Title I ancillary jurisdiction to regulate interstate and foreign communications”); Mozilla, 940 F.3d at 19
(“[G]iven that ‘telecommunications service’ and ‘information service’ have been treated as mutually exclusive by the
Commission since the late 1990s, a premise Petitioners do not challenge, we view Brand X as binding precedent in this
case.”) (internal citations omitted).
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are necessarily outside of Title II—the Commission may only regulate information services
pursuant to its ancillary authority or some other non-Title II source of affirmative authority.96
Furthermore, even if the FCC uses a non-Title II source of authority, it may not use this authority
to impose net neutrality regulations on information service providers that amount to “per se”
common carrier regulations. In a 2010 order, the FCC tried to impose net neutrality rules while
still classifying BIAS as an information service.97 The Commission grounded its legal authority
for the rule in a non-Title II provision—Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.
Section 706 amended the Communications Act to, among other things, direct the Commission to
“encourage the deployment on a reasonable and timely basis” of “advanced telecommunications
capability.”98 The D.C. Circuit rejected this approach in its 2014 decision in Verizon v. FCC.99 The
court deferred to the FCC’s interpretation that Section 706 was an independent grant of authority,
sufficient to support the issuance of rules in the 2010 order.100 Nevertheless, the D.C. Circuit held
that the bulk of these net neutrality rules (specifically, rules prohibiting BIAS providers from
blocking or discriminating against lawful content) amounted to “per se” common carrier rules
imposed on non-common carriers, i.e., information service providers.101 According to the court,
these rules ran “afoul” of the Act’s definition of telecommunications carriers, which provides that
“a telecommunications carrier shall be treated as a common carrier under this chapter only to the
extent that it is engaged in providing telecommunications services.”102
Given the Verizon decision, the FCC issued a new order in 2015 (2015 Open Internet Order) that
addressed the flaw identified in Verizon by reclassifying BIAS as a Title II telecommunications
service.103 The 2015 Open Internet Order, among other things, imposed three bright-line net
neutrality rules on BIAS providers. These rules prohibited BIAS providers from: (1) blocking
lawful content, applications, services, or non-harmful devices; (2) throttling (i.e., impairing or
degrading) lawful content, applications, services, or non-harmful devices; and (3) engaging in
paid prioritization, defined as favoring some internet traffic over others in exchange for
consideration.104 The order also imposed a more flexible standard referred to as the “General
Conduct Rule,” which prohibited BIAS providers from “unreasonably interfer[ing] or
unreasonably disavantag[ing]” users from accessing the content or services of their choice.105 The
following year, in United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, the D.C. Circuit upheld the FCC’s 2015
Open Internet Order in its entirety.106
The Commission reversed course in 2018, however, and issued a new order titled “Restoring
Internet Freedom” (2018 RIF Order).107 The 2018 RIF Order reclassified broadband Internet as an

96 See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 976; Mozilla, 940 F.3d at 76 (“Title I is not an independent source of regulatory authority.”)
(internal citations omitted).
97 See In re Preserving the Open Internet, Report and Order, 25 FCC Rcd. 17905 (2010).
98 Id. at 17968–72; 47 U.S.C. § 1302(b).
99 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
100 Id. at 635–49.
101 Id. at 650–59, 701.
102 Id. at 650; see also 47 U.S.C. § 153(51).
103 In the Matter of Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, Report and Order on Remand, Declaratory Ruling, and
Order, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601 (2015) [hereinafter 2015 Open Internet Order].
104 Id. at 5607–08.
105 Id. at 5609.
106 825 F.3d 674 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
107 In the Matter of Restoring Internet Freedom, Report an Order, and Order, 33 FCC Rcd. 331 (2018) [hereinafter 2018
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“information service” and eliminated the bright-line rules and General Conduct Rule.108 Along
with removing BIAS from Title II, the FCC also forsook any regulatory authority over BIAS
based on Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act, concluding that it was not an independent
grant of regulatory authority.109 Furthermore, most relevant to this report, the 2018 RIF Order
broadly preempted any state or local laws “that would effectively impose rules or requirements
that [it] repealed or decided to refrain from imposing,” or that imposed “more stringent
requirements for any aspect of broadband service” addressed by the 2018 RIF Order.110 The
Commission reasoned that “[a]llowing state and local governments to adopt their own separate
requirements, which could impose far greater burdens than the federal regulatory regime, could
significantly disrupt the balance we strike here.”111 Consequently, it concluded that it should
“exercise [its] authority to preempt any state or local requirements that are inconsistent with the
federal deregulatory approach” it adopted.112 While the 2018 RIF Order reclassified BIAS and
removed the net neutrality requirements, it left in place (and in some cases enhanced) existing
transparency requirements, requiring providers to disclose, among other things, any blocking,
throttling, and paid prioritization practices.113 The Commission also explained that the 2018 RIF
Order restored the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) jurisdiction over BIAS providers, since
such providers are no longer common carriers, and that the FTC would be able to police BIAS
providers’ data security and privacy practices.114
Mozilla Corp. v. FCC
In 2019, the D.C. Circuit weighed in on the 2018 RIF Order’s legality in Mozilla Corp. v. FCC.115
While the court upheld the bulk of the order, it vacated the 2018 RIF Order’s “sweeping”
preemption of “any state or local requirements that are inconsistent with [its] deregulatory
approach.”116 The court reasoned that the FCC no longer has affirmative regulatory authority over
BIAS, now that it is classified as an information service, and the Commission could not preempt
state law in an area over which it does not have regulatory authority without an express
authorization from Congress.117 The court left open, however, the possibility that specific state
laws might be preempted on a case-by-case basis under principles of conflict preemption.118
While the decision was unanimous on other aspects of the case, one member of the three judge

RIF Order].
108 Id. at 312–13, paras. 2–4.
109 Id. at 470–80, paras. 268–83.
110 Id. at 427, para. 195.
111 Id. at 426, para. 194.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 437–50, paras 215–38. As authority for these transparency requirements, the Commission cited section 257 of
the Communications Act, which directs the commission to “identify[] and eliminat[e] . . . market entry barriers for
entrepreneurs and other small businesses in the provision and ownership of telecommunications services and
information services, or in the provision of parts or services to providers of telecommunications services and
information services.” 47 U.S.C. § 257(a).
114 Id. at 419–20, 434, paras. 181–84, 208. Under the Federal Trade Commission Act, common carriers are exempt
from the FTC’s jurisdiction. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2).
115 940 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
116 Id. at 74.
117 Id. at 74–76.
118 Id. at 85.
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panel, Judge Williams, dissented from the court’s preemption holding.119 Among other things, he
reasoned that the majority’s position asymmetrically favored regulation over deregulation by only
allowing the Commission to ensure a national policy if it chose to affirmatively regulate BIAS
under Title II.120 Judge Williams also expressed skepticism that any laws would be subject to
conflict preemption, given the majority’s rationale for overturning the Order’s express
preemption provision.121
The majority and dissenting opinions in Mozilla contain a vigorous discussion of the FCC’s
preemption authority and demonstrate the challenges with determining the bounds of this
authority in particular cases. The majority opinion in particular will likely inform district courts
as they consider whether state net neutrality laws are preempted by the 2018 RIF Order under
principles of conflict preemption. Consequently, these opinions are worth examining in further
detail.
Majority Opinion’s Preemption Analysis
In its preemption analysis, the court started with the basic principle, articulated by the Supreme
Court, that an agency “may preempt state law only when and if it is acting within the scope of its
congressionally delegated authority.”122 From there, the court reasoned that, “[b]y the same token,
in any area where the Commission lacks the authority to regulate, it equally lacks the power to
preempt state law.”123 The court recognized, as a caveat, that, “[o]f course, if a federal law
expressly confers upon the agency the authority to preempt, that legislative delegation creates and
defines the agency’s power to displace state laws.”124
Applying this framework to the 2018 RIF Order’s preemption, the court concluded that the
preemption was unlawful because the FCC did not have regulatory authority over BIAS and
Congress had not granted it authority to displace state laws in areas in which it does not have
regulatory power.125 The court explained that the Commission’s “regulatory jurisdiction falls into
two categories”: (1) the “express and expansive authority” it has over common carriers under
Title II, radio transmissions under Title III, and cable services under Title VI; and (2) its
“ancillary authority,” allowing it to regulate matters “reasonably ancillary to the effective
performance” of its express authority.126 The FCC’s preemption “could not possibly be an
exercise of the Commission’s express statutory authority,” the court said, because by reclassifying
BIAS as an information service the FCC “placed broadband outside of its Title II jurisdiction.”127
Further, the court reasoned, broadband is not a radio transmission under Title III or cable service
under Title VI.128 The preemption also did not fall under the FCC’s ancillary authority because it
was not related to the Commission’s “effective performance” of its “statutorily mandated
responsibilities” under Title II, III, or VI.129 Since the Commission had neither express nor

119 Id. at 95 (Williams, J., dissenting).
120 Id. at 99–100.
121 Id. at 106–07.
122 Id. at 74–75 (quoting La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986)).
123 Id. at 75.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 75–76.
126 Id. at 124.
127 Id. at 124–25 (emphasis in original).
128 Id.
129 Id. at 25. The court further noted that the Commission “seemingly agrees,” as it did not claim ancillary authority in
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ancillary authority—and since “Congress [did not] statutorily grant the Commission freestanding
preemption authority to displace state laws even in areas in which it does not otherwise have
regulatory power”—the court concluded that the preemption directive could not stand.”130
While the Commission articulated two other theories for its preemption—the “impossibility
exception” and the “federal policy of nonregulation for information services”—the court rejected
both in turn.131 The impossibility exception, the court explained, is simply an exception to Section
2(b) of the Act’s limitation on the FCC’s authority over “intrastate communication.”132 According
to the court, the impossibility exception “presupposes the existence of statutory authority to
regulate,” and the Commission may not use it as a “substitute for that necessary delegation of
power from Congress.”133
The court found the FCC’s reliance on a “federal policy of nonregulation for information
services” equally unavailing.134 The Commission marshalled several different provisions
supporting this policy, including (1) Section 230(b)(2), which states that the “policy of the United
states [is] to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market . . . for the Internet,” (2) the
statement in the “telecommunications carrier” definition that telecommunications carriers shall
only be treated as common carriers “to the extent [they are] engaged in providing
telecommunications services,” and (3) Section 10(e),135 which provides that states may not
enforce Title II provisions that the Commission has chosen not to apply.136 None of these
provisions, the court explained, give the FCC affirmative authority to regulate information
services. The policy statement in Section 230(b)(2) is “just that”—a policy statement, rather than
a “delegation of regulatory authority.”137 Similarly, the definition of telecommunications carrier is
“not an independent source of regulatory authority,” but in fact contains a “limitation on the
Commission’s authority.”138 Lastly, because the Commission took broadband “out of Title II,” the
court explained, Section 10(e) “has no work to do here,” as it only applies to forbearance under
Title II.139
Lastly, the court rejected the argument—which it said was “invent[ed]” by the dissenting
opinion—that the Commission’s preemption power flows from its authority, under the Chevron
doctrine, to classify BIAS as either a Title I information service provider or a Title II
telecommunications service.140 The majority explained that the dissenting opinion “makes the
mistake of collapsing the distinction between (i) the Commission’s authority to make a threshold
classification decision, and (ii) the authority to issue affirmative and State-displacing legal
commands within the bounds of the classification scheme the Commission has selected (here,

the 2018 RIF Order or its briefing. Id. at 126.
130 Id. at 75–76.
131 Id. at 76–80.
132 Id. at 77–78.
133 Id. at 78.
134 Id.
135 47 U.S.C. § 160(e).
136 Mozilla, 940 F.3d at 78–80.
137 Id. at 78–79.
138 Id. at 79 (emphasis in original).
139 Id.
140 Id. at 82.
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Title I).”141 According to the majority, the “agency’s power to do the former says nothing about
its authority to do the latter.”142
While the court vacated the 2018 RIF Order’s express preemption directive, it explained that it
was not considering whether the order could have preemptive effect under principles of conflict
preemption. The court explained that conflict preemption—which asks whether a state law
“under the circumstances of the particular case stands as an obstacle to the objectives of
Congress”—is inherently fact-specific and cannot be resolved in the abstract, “let alone in
gross.”143 It recognized, however, that “[i]f the Commission can explain how a state practice
actually undermines the 2018 RIF Order, then it can invoke conflict preemption.”144
Judge Williams’s Dissent
While the panel was unanimous on the bulk of the decision, Judge Williams dissented from the
preemption portion of the majority opinion.145 Judge Williams argued that the Communications
Act impliedly gave the Commission authority for its broad preemption.146 Judge Williams
reasoned that, under Chevron, “Congress implicitly delegated to the FCC the power to determine
whether to locate broadband under Title II, where it would be potentially subject to the full gamut
of regulations designed for natural monopoly, or under Title I, which itself authorizes virtually no
federal regulation.”147 Judge Williams argued that “[t]he consequences of the Commission’s
choice of Title I depend on its having authority to preempt,” as without it the Commission “de
facto yields authority over interstate communications to the states.”148 The majority’s refusal to
recognize this authority, Judge Williams contended, resulted in an “asymmetry” based on the
majority’s “staunch[] belie[f] that preemption serves solely to protect affirmative federal
regulations,” rather than a federal deregulatory scheme.149
Judge Williams also criticized the specific logic behind the majority’s decision. In particular, he
faulted the majority’s reliance on the “maxim” that an agency may only preempt state law if
either (1) it has “affirmative regulatory authority” over the area, or (2) there is an express
statutory authorization otherwise giving it preemption authority.150 First, Judge Williams took
issue with the maxim itself because it requires express authorization in the absence of regulatory
authority.151 Judge Williams wrote that the formulation was “entirely the majority’s handiwork”
and is at odds with “our living in a world where judicial interpretation of statutes rarely insists on

141 Id. at 84.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 81.
144 Id. at 85.
145 Id. at 95 (Williams, J., dissenting).
146 Id. at 96–97 (“But Supreme court decisions make clear that a federal agency’s authority to preempt state law need
not be expressly granted . . . . Inquiry into that question proceeds in the usual way of discerning congressional intent. . .
. Congress implicitly delegated to the FCC the power to determine whether to locate broadband under Title II, where it
would be potentially subject to the full gamut of regulations designed for natural monopoly, or under Title I, which
itself authorizes virtually no federal regulation. . . . The consequences of the Commission's choice of Title I depend on
its having authority to preempt.”).
147 Id. at 97 (Williams, J., dissenting).
148 Id.
149 Id. at 99 (Williams, J., dissenting).
150 Id. at 100–01 (Williams, J., dissenting).
151 Id.
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an express provision outside the context of a clear statement rule or its equivalent.”152 According
to Judge Williams, because Congress may preempt state law even when it chooses not to regulate,
it may also make a “choice (express or implied) to grant an agency equivalent preemptive
authority without any parallel federal regulation.”153
Along with questioning the maxim itself, Judge Williams argued that it is “inapplicable” because
the Commission does in fact have affirmative regulatory authority over BIAS.154 Judge Williams
explained that there is “no doubt” that “the day before adoption of [the 2018 RIF Order], the
Commission had authority to apply Title II to broadband.”155 While the Commission’s
reclassification of broadband “forswore any current intention to use Title II vis-à-vis broadband”
it was not “a permanent renunciation of that power.”156
Judge Williams further rejected the idea that case-by-case application of conflict preemption
principles would save the order from being “eviscerate[ed].”157 According to Judge Williams, the
“majority’s view of preemption seems to render any conflict unimaginable” because the majority
“rejects the idea that the Commission has exercised authority as to which [a state’s] enforcement
of a Title II equivalent could stand as an obstacle.”158 The majority, Judge Williams wrote,
“conspicuously never offers an explanation of how a state regulation could ever conflict with the
federal white space to which its reasoning consigns broadband.”159
Next Steps
The D.C. Circuit’s decision in Mozilla is now final. The D.C. Circuit declined to rehear the case
en banc, and the parties did not seek Supreme Court review by the July 6, 2020 deadline.160 With
the change in presidential administration, it is possible that the FCC might reconsider its position
on net neutrality. The new Acting Chairperson, Commissioner Jessica Rosenworcel, dissented
from the 2018 RIF Order, arguing that the decision put the FCC “on the wrong side of history, the
wrong side of the law, and the wrong side of the American public.”161 Absent new FCC action,
future legal disputes surrounding net neutrality will likely focus on state laws.162
As discussed in the previous section, Mozilla left an opening for states to impose net neutrality
requirements at the state level. A number of states have already enacted such laws. Some of these
laws—specifically those of California and Washington—would require all BIAS providers

152 Id. at 100 (Williams, J., dissenting).
153 Id. at 101 (Williams, J., dissenting).
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 106 (Williams, J., dissenting).
158 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
159 Id.
160 Order Denying Petition for Rehearing En Banc, Mozilla Corp. v. FCC, No. 18-1051, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 3726
(D.C. Cir. 2020); Amy Keating and Alan Davidson, Next Steps for Net Neutrality, BLOG.MOZILLA.ORG (July 6, 2020),
https://blog.mozilla.org/netpolicy/2020/07/06/next-steps-for-net-neutrality/ (“Today is the deadline to petition the
Supreme Court for review of the D.C. Circuit decision in Mozilla v. FCC. After careful consideration, Mozilla—as well
as its partners in this litigation—are not seeking Supreme Court review of the D.C. Circuit decision.”).
161 2018 RIF Order, 33 FCC Rcd. at 846–48 (Statement of Jessica Rosenworcel, dissenting).
162 Parties may no longer bring actions challenging the 2018 RIF Order, since the 60 day period for challenging the
Order has passed. See 28 U.S.C. § 2344 (“Any party aggrieved by the final order may, within 60 days after its entry,
file a petition to review the order in the court of appeals wherein venue lies.”).
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operating in the states to comply with net neutrality requirements similar to those in the 2015
Open Internet Order.163 Other laws or executive orders—such as those of Vermont and New
York—would prohibit state agencies or instrumentalities from contracting with BIAS providers
unless they certify they comply with net neutrality principles.164
Some of these state net neutrality laws are subject to legal challenges. In particular, BIAS
providers have brought legal actions in federal district courts arguing that the 2018 RIF Order
preempts California’s and Vermont’s laws.165 Courts have not yet passed judgment on these
challenges. However, on February 23, 2021, the district court overseeing challenges to
California’s law rejected the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, thus allowing the law
to go into effect.166 Furthermore, on July 7, 2020, in a case that could be a bellwether for these
state net neutrality cases, a federal district court rejected arguments that the 2018 RIF Order
preempted a Maine law imposing privacy requirements on BIAS providers.167 The plaintiffs
argued that Maine’s law conflicted with the policy established by the 2018 RIF Order that the
“best way to protect consumers’ privacy interest without imposing costly burdens on [internet
service providers] is to pair mandatory privacy disclosures with FTC enforcement of those
disclosures.”168 The court rejected this argument, reasoning that the Order “is not an instance of
affirmative deregulation,” but instead was the FCC’s decision “that it lacked authority to regulate
in the first place and would defer to the FTC’s enforcement of existing antitrust and consumer
protection laws.”169 Even assuming that an “abdication of authority” could result in preemption,
the court said that plaintiffs failed to identify “any conflict between the FCC’s proclamation that
the FTC is the proper federal regulator of ISPs, and Maine’s decision to impose privacy
protections at the state level.”170 While this case dealt with state-level privacy requirements,
courts weighing challenges to state net neutrality laws might take a similar approach, concluding
that the 2018 RIF Order cannot preempt state laws because it is an “abdication,” rather than an
affirmative assertion, of authority.171 On the other hand, the argument that state net neutrality laws
conflict with the 2018 RIF Order may be stronger than in the privacy context, since these laws
generally re-impose the same requirements the Order removed.
Courts may be even less likely to hold that the 2018 RIF Order preempts state laws that only
prohibit state agencies and subdivisions from contracting with BIAS providers unless they abide
by net neutrality requirements. As discussed in more detail below, the Supreme Court has said
that Congress needs to make a “plain statement” in order to preempt state law in a way that would
infringe on states’ management of their own officers and subdivisions.172

163 California Internet Consumer Protection and Net Neutrality Act of 2018, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3100–3104 (2018);
WASH. REV. CODE § 19.385.020 (2018). California’s law goes beyond the 2015 Open Internet Order by prohibiting
zero rating practices. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3101.
164 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 348 (2018); id. tit. 3 app’x, § 3-85; N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 8.175 (2018).
165 Complaint, Am. Cable Ass’n v. Scott, No. 2:18-CV-00167 (D. Vt. Oct. 18, 2018); First Am. Compl., Am. Cable
Ass’n v. Becerra, No. 2:18-CV-02684 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2020). While the U.S. Department Justice also sued to block
California’s net neutrality law, it dropped this case on February 8, 2021. See Pl.’s Notice of Dismissal, United States v.
California, 2:No. 18-cv-02660 (Feb. 8, 2021).
166 Oral Ruling Den. Mot. for Prelim. Inj., Am. Cable Ass’n v. Becerra, No. 2:18-CV-02684 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2021).
167 ACA Connects v. Frey, No. 1:20-cv-00055 (D. Me. July 7, 2020).
168 Id. at *9.
169 Id.
170 Id. at *10.
171 Id.
172 Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 140 (2004) (“[T]he liberating preemption would come only by
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Aside from legal challenges, Congress might weigh in on the dispute surrounding net neutrality
and preemption. While no bills have yet been introduced that would expressly give the FCC
authority for the broad preemption that was struck down in Mozilla, some bills from the 116th
Congress would have established statutory net neutrality requirements. In particular, the Save the
Internet Act—which passed the U.S. House of Representatives and was not taken up in the U.S.
Senate—would have repealed the 2018 RIF Order and “restore[d]” the 2015 Open Internet
Order.173 Restoring the 2015 Open Internet Order would not necessarily preempt existing state net
neutrality laws, though. In that order, the FCC declined to preempt the field of net neutrality
regulation, opting instead to determine whether any state laws conflict with the order’s “carefully
tailored regulatory scheme” on a case-by-case basis.174 Other bills, such as H.R. 1101, H.R. 1006,
H.R. 2136, and H.R. 1096 would have taken a different approach than the Save the Internet
Act.175 These bills would have amended Title I to include net neutrality requirements, such as
prohibitions on blocking or throttling lawful internet traffic, and given the FCC limited regulatory
and enforcement authority to implement the requirements.176 While some of these bills were silent
on the preemption of state law, H.R. 2136 would have expressly preempted state laws “relating to
or with respect to internet openness obligations for provision of broadband internet access
service.”177
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP)
Similar to its approach to internet access itself, the FCC has taken a hands off approach to
regulating internet enabled communications—most notably VoIP, which enables users to make
voice calls using the internet. As discussed further below, the FCC has not clearly taken a position
on whether VoIP is a telecommunications service or an information service. However, it has
nonetheless used its ancillary authority to impose some requirements on VoIP services, and it has

interposing federal authority between a State and its municipal subdivisions . . . . Hence the need to invoke our working
assumption that federal legislation threatening to trench on the States’ arrangements for conducting their own
governments should be treated with great skepticism, and read in a way that preserves a State’s chosen disposition of its
own power, in the absence of the plain statement Gregory requires.”); see “Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League,”
infra, for more discussion.
173 H.R. 1644, 116th Cong. (2019); S. 682, 116th Cong. (2019).
174 2015 Open Internet Order, 30 FCC Rcd. at 19810, para. 432.
175 H.R. 1101, 116th Cong. (2019); H.R. 1006, 116th Cong. (2019); H.R. 2136, 116th Cong. (2019); H.R. 1096, 116th
Cong. (2019).
176 H.R. 1101, 116th Cong. § 1 (2019) (“The Commission shall enforce the obligations established in subsection (a)
through adjudication of complaints alleging violations of such subsection but may not expand the internet openness
obligations for provision of broadband internet access service beyond the obligations established in such subsection,
whether by rulemaking or otherwise.”); H.R. 1006, 116th Cong. § 2 (2019) (giving the Commission authority to
promulgate rules implementing disclosure requirements under the bill and directing the Commission to enforce the
duties under the law “through adjudication of a complaint alleging that a service violates one or more such duties” but
prohibiting the FCC from imposing “regulations on broadband internet access service or any component thereof under
title II”); H.R. 2136, 116th Cong. § 2 (2019) (“The Commission shall enforce [the law’s obligations] through
adjudication of complaints alleging violations . . . but may not, under any provision of law, whether by rulemaking or
otherwise—(A) expand the internet openness obligations for provision of broadband internet access service beyond the
obligations established in [this law]; or (B) expand the internet openness obligations for the offering or provision of
specialized services beyond the obligations established in [this law].”); H.R. 1096, 116th Cong. § 2 (2019) (amending
Title I to include transparency requirements and prohibitions on blocking, impairment and degradation, and paid
prioritization).
177 H.R. 2136, 116th Cong. § 2 (2019).
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preempted state laws that would impose more regulations.178 Courts have, thus far, upheld the
FCC’s preemption of such state laws.179
Background
The FCC first addressed the rise of “IP-enabled services” in a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
issued on March 10, 2004.180 In this notice, the Commission observed that services and
applications provided over the internet were becoming competitive with, and potentially
replacing, services traditionally provided by incumbent telecommunications carriers.181 Since
issuing its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the Commission has relied on its ancillary authority
to extend several Title II requirements to VoIP service providers when the service interfaces with
the Public Switched Telephone Network.182 Most recently, on December 13, 2019, the FCC issued
a notice seeking comment on whether truth-in-billing requirements should extend to VoIP
providers.183 Since issuing its first notice, the FCC has not affirmatively classified VoIP as either a
“telecommunications service” or an “information service,” instead relying on VoIP’s interstate
nature and the Commission’s various statutory responsibilities to regulate VoIP through its
ancillary authority.184
State Action and Legal Challenges
As discussed, the Communications Act creates a model of “dual federalism” over the nation’s
communications networks. To the extent the FCC relies on its ancillary authority, it may not
regulate purely intrastate communications, which remain the province of the states.185 However,
under the FCC’s “impossibility exception,” the FCC may use its ancillary authority to displace
state regulation when state regulation affects both intrastate and interstate communications and
distinguishing between intrastate and interstate effects is impossible or impractical.186
Some states have addressed VoIP through regulation. In 2005, Florida became the first state to
deregulate VoIP.187 In 2003, conversely, the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission issued an
order requiring Vonage, a VoIP provider, to comply with state common carrier regulations.188

178 Vonage Holdings Corp., 19 FCC Rcd. 22404, 22411, para. 14 (2004) (relying on “impossibility” preemption to
preempt a state regulatory order).
179 See Vonage Holdings Corp. v. Neb. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 564 F.3d 900, 904 (8th Cir. 2009); Charter Advanced
Servs. (MN) LLC v. Lange, 903 F.3d 715, 719 (8th Cir. 2018).
180 IP-Enabled Services, 19 FCC Rcd. 4863 (2004).
181 See id. at 4865–67.
182 E.g., IP-Enabled Services, E911 Requirements for IP-Enabled Service Providers, 20 FCC Rcd. 10245 (2005)
(requiring VoIP providers to supply 911 emergency calling capabilities); Universal Service Contribution Methodology,
21 FCC Rcd. 7518 (establishing universal service contribution obligations for VoIP providers); Implementation of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 22 FCC Rcd. 6927 (2007) (extending consumer privacy requirements to VoIP
providers); IP-Enabled Services, 22 FCC Rcd. 11275 (2007) (extending Telecommunications Relay Service
requirements to VoIP providers).
183 Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau Seeks to Refresh the Record on Truth-In-Billing Rules To Ensure
Protections for All Consumers of Voice Services, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N (Dec. 13, 2019),
https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/1213540824304/DA-19-1271A1.pdf.
184 See “State Action and Legal Challenges” infra.
185 See “The FCC’s Jurisdictional Authority” for more discussion of “impossibility” preemption.
186 Id.
187 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 364.01(3) (2011); id. § 364.011(3).
188 In re Complaint of the Minn. Dep’t of Commerce Against Vonage Holding Corp Regarding Lack of Authority to
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Vonage petitioned the FCC for review of Minnesota’s order, and the FCC issued an order (Vonage
Order) on November 12, 2004 concluding that Vonage was not subject to Minnesota’s common
carrier regulations.189 The FCC reached this conclusion under its theory of “impossibility”
preemption, stating that intrastate communications made over VoIP were practically
indistinguishable from interstate communications.190 The FCC further noted that state regulation
of VoIP directly conflicted with the FCC’s “pro-competitive deregulatory rules and policies.”191
This would be true regardless of whether VoIP were classified as an “information service” or a
“telecommunications service.”192 Minnesota challenged the FCC’s order in federal court, where
the Eighth Circuit upheld the order on the grounds that the FCC’s exercise of “impossibility”
preemption was not arbitrary or capricious.193
Because the FCC has declined to classify VoIP as either a telecommunications service or an
information service, and has instead relied on its ancillary authority and “impossibility”
preemption to displace state action, states have continually pushed the boundaries of permissible
state regulation. For example, Nebraska attempted to require VoIP providers to collect state
Universal Service Fund fees, arguing that the Vonage Order preempted only “traditional
telephone company” regulations.194 However, federal courts routinely affirm the FCC’s power to
preempt these regulations using “impossibility” preemption.195 By contrast, at least one federal
court has taken a different approach. In Charter Advanced Services (MN) LLC v. Lange, the
Eighth Circuit held that VoIP is an “information service” under the Communications Act and is
therefore not subject to Title II regulation.196 The court then restated an earlier conclusion of the
Eighth Circuit—that “any state regulation of an information service conflicts with the federal
policy of nonregulation”—in holding that because VoIP is an information service, no state
regulation would stand.197
As discussed supra, the FCC attempted to preempt state regulation of another “information
service” in its 2018 RIF Order to no avail.198 The FCC’s bases for preemption invalidated in
Mozilla v. FCC closely track those articulated in the VoIP context: the “federal policy of
deregulation for information services” and “impossibility” preemption.199 When the Supreme
Court denied review in Charter Advanced Services, Justice Clarence Thomas authored a
concurrence to express his doubt that a federal policy of nonregulation could preempt state
regulation.200 Justice Thomas explained that the constitutional source of preemption authority, the

Operate in Minn., No. P-6214/C-03-108, 2003 WL 22336092 (Minn. P.U.C. Sept. 11, 2003), enjoined by Vonage
Holdings Corp. v. Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 290 F. Supp. 2d 993 (D. Minn. 2003).
189 Vonage Holdings Corp., 19 FCC Rcd. 22404 (2004).
190 See id. at 22412, para. 15.
191 Id. at 22415, para. 20.
192 Id. at 22415–17, paras. 20–22.
193 Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. FCC, 483 F.3d 570, 578–79 (8th Cir. 2007).
194 Vonage Holdings Corp. v. Neb. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 564 F.3d 900, 904 (8th Cir. 2009) (preempting state
regulation).
195 See, e.g., id.; N.M. Pub. Regulation Comm’n v. Vonage Holdings Corp., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1370 (D.N.M. 2009)
(dismissing declaratory judgment action by state requiring Vonage to pay into New Mexico Universal Service Fund).
196 903 F.3d 715, 719 (8th Cir. 2018).
197 Id. (quoting Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 483 F.3d at 580).
198 See “Net Neutrality.”
199 Compare Mozilla v. FCC, 904 F.3d 1, 76–80 (D.C. Cir. 2019) with Charter Adv. Servs., 903 F.3d at 719; see also
Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 483 F.3d at 576.
200 Lipschultz v. Charter Adv. Servs. (MN), LLC, 140 S. Ct. 6 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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Supremacy Clause, “requires that pre-emptive [sic] effect be given only to those federal standards
and policies that are set forth in, or necessarily flow from, the statutory text that was produced
through the constitutionally required bicameral and presentment procedures.”201 Consequently,
allowing an agency policy of nonregulation to have preemptive effect “authorizes the Executive
to make ‘Law’ by declining to act, and it authorizes the courts to conduct ‘a freewheeling judicial
inquiry’ into the facts of federal nonregulation.”202
However, VoIP differs from BIAS in that VoIP services frequently use telephone numbers and
connect users to traditional telecommunications networks. On this basis, the FCC has relied on its
ancillary authority to affirmatively regulate VoIP providers, in contrast to its approach to BIAS.203
Whereas the Mozilla court did not find BIAS to fall under any FCC jurisdictional authority absent
a classification as a Title II “telecommunications service,” the FCC has repeatedly relied on its
ancillary jurisdiction to regulate VoIP without facing legal challenges for doing so.204
Wireless Facility Siting for Fifth Generation (5G) Networks
Preemption has also played a leading part in the FCC’s efforts to speed the deployment of fifth
generation (5G) wireless infrastructure. The infrastructure necessary to support 5G wireless
networks involves the placement of “small cell” wireless equipment on existing structures,
including municipally owned property. In 2018, the FCC acted to preempt state and local
authority to regulate the placement of small cells when such regulations “materially inhibit” the
deployment of 5G infrastructure. The Commission also set “shot clocks” that control the
timeframe in which local governments must review applications for small cell siting. In 2020, the
FCC clarified its rules requiring state and local governments to approve requests to modify
existing wireless facilities when the modification “does not substantially change the physical
dimensions” of the facility. These regulatory actions have been challenged in federal courts by
municipalities and public utilities, and while the Ninth Circuit largely upheld the FCC’s 2018
actions, litigation concerning the 2020 action is still ongoing, with proceedings stayed until
November 2021.205
Technical Background
Mobile wireless services function by transmitting information between devices over radio waves
through a network of antennae and similar equipment. Each node in these networks is a cell site: a
collection of communications equipment capable of receiving and transmitting wireless signals
over a given area (a cell).
In legacy networks (e.g., 3G, 4G), telecommunication providers use macro cell sites (e.g., tall
towers, antennas, radio equipment) to provide coverage over wide areas. 5G networks leverage

201 Id. at 7 (quoting Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 586 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring).
202 Id. at 7–8 (quoting Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 588 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas nonetheless concurred in the
denial of certiorari because the petition did not raise the basis of preemption. Id.
203 See, e.g., 47 CFR § 9.11 (requiring interconnected VoIP service providers to provide 911 service); 47 CFR § 54.706
(requiring interconnected VoIP providers to contribute to federal universal service support mechanisms); 47 CFR
§ 64.604 (requiring VoIP contributions to Telecommunications Relay Service fund).
204 E.g., IP-Enabled Services E911 Requirements for IP-Enabled Service Providers, 20 FCC Rcd. 10245, 10261–66,
paras. 26-35 (2005).
205 See City of Portland v. United States, 969 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2020) (upholding all of the FCC’s requirements
except for its aesthetic requirements); Order, League of Cal. Cities v. FCC, No. 20-71765 (9th Cir. July 28, 2021), ECF
No. 63 (granting FCC’s motion to stay the proceedings).
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4G macro cell sites but also rely on “small cells” with coverage areas of hundreds of feet.206
Because the coverage area is small, an effective 5G network requires placement of a large number
of cell sites in close proximity to each other. These small cell sites are much smaller than those
that support extant wireless networks and may therefore be attached to existing structures, rather
than requiring construction of freestanding macro cell towers.207
State and Local Authority
Constructing wireless facilities or attaching wireless equipment to existing structures generally
requires some sort of government approval depending on who controls the site of construction.
With the exception of federal lands, state or local authorities manage construction projects. For
cell site projects, typical state and local concerns include historical preservation, environmental
protection, public safety, accessibility requirements, and aesthetics.208
To date, a number of states have passed or proposed legislation to speed up the permitting process
for small cell deployment.209 These laws generally address this objective by placing time limits
(or “shot clocks”) on application processing and limiting or capping fees charged by local
authorities for small cell site applications.210
FCC Statutory Authority and Procedure
Two provisions of the Communications Act—Sections 253 and 332—address how FCC authority
over interstate communications intersects with local land use authority. First, Section 253 permits
the FCC to preempt enforcement of any act of state or local government that “prohibit[s] or ha[s]
the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to provide any interstate or intrastate
telecommunications service.”211 It contains two exceptions, however. First, Section 253(b)
provides that:
[n]othing in this section shall affect the ability of a State to impose, on a competitively
neutral basis . . . requirements necessary to preserve and advance universal service, protect
the public safety and welfare, ensure the continued quality of telecommunications services,
and safeguard the rights of consumers.212
Further, Section 253(c) reserves to state and local governments “the authority . . . to manage
public rights-of-way or to require fair and reasonable compensation from telecommunications
providers, on a competitively neutral and nondiscriminatory basis” for use of such rights of
way.213

206 For further technical background, see CRS Report R45485, Fifth-Generation (5G) Telecommunications
Technologies: Issues for Congress, by Jill C. Gallagher and Michael E. DeVine.
207 Small Cell Order, 33 FCC Rcd. 9088, 9089 para. 3 (2018); see also 47 CFR § 1.6002(l) (defining “small wireless
facilities”).
208 See generally Municipal Action Guide: Small Cell Wireless Technology in Cities at 5, NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES
(2018) (outlining potential issues faced by municipalities in managing small cell sites), https://www.nlc.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/08/CS_SmallCell_MAG_FINAL.pdf.
209 See Michael T.N. Fitch, Legislation Streamlining Wireless Small Cell Deployment Enacted in 25 States, NAT’L L.
REV. (July 8, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/legislation-streamlining-wireless-small-cell-deployment-
enacted-25-states.
210 E.g. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 29-27-403, 38-5.5-108 (2020); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 17 §§ 1605, 1609 (1974).
211 47 U.S.C. § 253(a), (d); see “Overview of the FCC’s Preemption Authority Under the Communications Act.”
212 Id. § 253(b).
213 Id. § 253(c).
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Similar to Section 253, Section 332 prohibits state and local governments from using local zoning
authority in a manner that “prohibit[s] or ha[s] the effect of prohibiting the provision of wireless
services.”214 It further prohibits state and local governments from “unreasonably discriminat[ing]
among providers of functionally equivalent services,” and it requires them to “act on any request
for authorization to place, construct, or modify personal wireless service facilities within a
reasonable period of time.”215 Apart from these requirements and a few specific limitations,216
Section 332 preserves state and local authority over decisions regarding the “placement,
construction, and modification of personal wireless service facilities.”217
Both of these statutes provide mechanisms through which a party subject to a state or local
requirement may challenge the requirement. Section 253 permits parties to file a petition with the
FCC to preempt enforcement of a requirement that violates the section.218 Section 332 allows
such a party to bring an action in federal court.219
In addition to these statutory provisions, Section 6409(a) of the Spectrum Act of 2012220 requires
that state and local governments approve any request to modify an existing wireless facility “that
does not substantially change the physical dimensions” of the facility.221 While this provision
does not direct the FCC to preempt state action or provide a mechanism for parties to challenge
state action, as Sections 253 and 332 do, Section 6409(a) is enforced by the Commission and
therefore the Commission may promulgate regulations implementing it.222
The FCC’s Orders
In 2018, the FCC issued two orders addressing state and local authority over small cell siting. The
first of these orders prohibits localities from instituting moratoria on processing applications
relating to telecommunications infrastructure deployment, including cell sites (Moratorium
Order).223 The second order clarifies the FCC’s position that a state or local requirement
“effectively prohibits” the provision of services articulated in Sections 253 and 332 when such
requirement “materially inhibits” the deployment of telecommunications facilities (Small Cell
Order).224 In 2020, the FCC issued a declaratory ruling clarifying its rules implementing Section
6409(a) of the Spectrum Act (June 2020 Declaratory Ruling).225 Recognizing that 5G deployment

214 Id. § 332(c)(7)(B); see “Overview of the FCC’s Preemption Authority Under the Communications Act.”
215 Id. §§ 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II), 332(c)(7)(B)(ii).
216 Section 332 also prohibits state and local governments from “unreasonably discriminat[ing] among providers of
functionally equivalent services.” Id. § 332(c)(7)(B). State and local governments are also prohibited from regulating
“the placement, construction, and modification of personal wireless service facilities on the basis of the environmental
effects of radio frequency emissions to the extent that such facilities comply with the Commission’s regulations
concerning such emissions.” Id. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iv).
217 Id. § 332(c)(7)(A).
218 Id. § 253(d); see also 47 CFR § 1.1.
219 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v).
220 Pub. L. No. 112-96, title VI, 126 Stat. 156, 232 (codified as 47 U.S.C. § 1455).
221 47 U.S.C. § 1455(a).
222 See 47 U.S.C. § 1403(a) (directing the FCC to implement and enforce the Spectrum Act “as if [it] is a part of the
Communications Act of 1934”).
223 Moratorium Order, 33 FCC Rcd. 7705 (2018).
224 Small Cell Order, 33 FCC Rcd. 9088 (2018).
225 Implementation of State and Local Governments’ Obligation to Approve Certain Wireless Facility Modification
Requests, 35 FCC Rcd. 5977 (2020) [hereinafter June 2020 Declaratory Ruling]; see also Acceleration of Broadband
Deployment by Improving Wireless Siting Policies, 30 FCC Rcd. 31, 43, paras. 135–241 (2014) [hereinafter 2014
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will not depend solely on small cells, the June 2020 Declaratory Ruling addresses FCC
regulations governing state and local approval of modifications to existing wireless equipment.226
The Moratorium Order
The FCC made clear in the Moratorium Order that “explicit refusals to authorize deployment and
dilatory tactics that amount to de facto refusals to allow deployment” of telecommunications
facilities violate Section 253.227 The Commission focused both on “express moratoria”—written
legal requirements that prevent or suspend the processing of permits and applications necessary
for deploying wireless facilities—and “de facto moratoria” that effectively prevent or suspend
such processing but are not codified.228 Both express and de facto moratoria, the FCC observed,
inherently violate Section 253 because such moratoria “prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting”
deployment of facilities necessary to provide telecommunications service.229 The Commission
rejected the argument that such moratoria do not violate Section 253 because they are time-
limited, noting that some localities impose “temporary” moratoria without definite end dates or
continually extend such moratoria.230
The FCC also determined that the exceptions in Section 253(b) and Section 253(c) do not
ordinarily apply to express and de facto moratoria. As mentioned, Section 253(b) reserves “the
ability of a State” to impose requirements on a “competitively neutral basis” that are necessary to
“preserve and advance universal service, protect the public safety and welfare, ensure the
continued quality of telecommunications services, and safeguard the rights of consumers.”231 The
Commission reasoned that this exception generally would not apply because it discusses only the
authority of a state, and the absence of any indication that the exception applies to local
government would preclude its application to municipal moratoria.232 Further, the FCC noted that
even if local moratoria fell within Section 253(b)’s jurisdictional scope, most moratoria would not
meet the exception’s substantive requirements, such as being “competitively neutral” or being
necessary for any of the four “public interest” purposes listed in the subsection.233 The
Commission acknowledged, however, that in “limited situations” a moratoria may be necessary to
“protect the public safety and welfare,” such as in the instance of a natural disaster that results in
a widespread power or telecommunications outage.234
The Commission likewise concluded that Section 253(c) does not apply. As mentioned, Section
253(c) reserves to state and local governments “the authority . . . to manage public rights-of-way
or to require fair and reasonable compensation from telecommunications providers, on a

Infrastructure Order] (promulgating regulations under Section 6409(a)).
226 June 2020 Declaratory Ruling, 35 FCC Rcd. at 5978–79, para. 2.
227 Moratorium Order, 33 FCC Rcd. at 7775, para. 140. Because the Moratorium Order relies on Section 253, it applies
to all facilities used in the provision of telecommunications service, not just wireless facilities. Compare 47 U.S.C.
§ 253(a) (applying to any legal requirement that affects “any interstate or intrastate telecommunications service) with
47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7) (singling out “personal wireless service facilities”).
228 Id. at 7777, 7780, paras. 145, 149.
229 Id. at 7779, 7782, paras. 147, 151.
230 Id. at 7779–80, para. 148.
231 47 U.S.C. § 253(b).
232 Moratorium Order, 33 FCC Rcd. at 7782–83, para. 154.
233 Id. at 7783-84, para. 155–56.
234 Id. at 7784-85, para. 157.
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competitively neutral and nondiscriminatory basis” for use of such rights of way.235 Per the
Moratorium Order, Section 253(c)’s applicability to a moratorium depends on whether moratoria
may constitute management of public rights-of-way.236 Although Section 253 does not define
management of public rights-of-way, past FCC precedent specifies “coordination of construction
schedules, determination of insurance, bonding and indemnity requirements, establishment and
enforcement of building codes, and keeping track of the various systems using the rights-of-way
to prevent interference between them” as examples of public rights-of-way management.237 From
this precedent, the Commission concluded that Section 253(c) applies to “certain activities that
involve the actual use of the right-of-way,” rather than activities that preclude access to the right-
of-way at all.238 Thus, the FCC held that Section 253(c) did not apply to moratoria.
The Small Cell Order
In comparison to the relatively narrow issue addressed in the Moratorium Order, the Small Cell
Order deals with a wide range of topics relating to state and local government authority to slow
the deployment of small wireless facilities. Most notably, the Small Cell Order addresses (1)
when state or local actions “prohibit or effectively prohibit” the provision of wireless service, and
(2) the timeframes within which state and local governments must act on small cell applications.
With respect to the first issue, and in contrast to the Moratorium Order, the FCC based the Small
Cell Order on Sections 253 and 332—both of which include the same “prohibit or effectively
prohibit” language. The Small Cell Order applied the “prohibit or effectively prohibits” language
to reach three rulings.
 The appropriate standard for determining whether state or local conduct
“prohibit[s] or effectively prohibit[s]” the provision of service under Sections
253 or 332 is whether the conduct “materially limits or inhibits the ability of any
competitor or potential competitor to compete in a fair and balanced legal and
regulatory environment.”239
 State and local fees associated with the deployment of wireless infrastructure
only comply with this “materially limits or inhibits” standard if they are non-
discriminatory and reasonably approximate the state or locality’s reasonable
costs.240
 Aesthetic requirements only comply with the “materially limits or inhibits”
standard if they are reasonable, non-discriminatory, “objective and published in
advance.”241
With respect to the appropriate standard, the FCC relied on FCC precedent that first articulated
the “materially inhibit” standard.242 The Commission further adopted the interpretations of the

235 47 U.S.C. § 253(c).
236 Moratorium Order, 33 FCC Rcd. at 7786, para. 159.
237 Id. at para. 160 (quoting TCI Cablevision of Oakland Cty., 12 FCC Rcd. 21396, 21441, para. 103 (1997)).
238 Id. at 7786–87, para. 160.
239 Small Cell Order, 33 FCC Rcd. 9088, 9102, para. 35 (2018) (quoting California Payphone Ass’n, Petition for
Preemption of Ordinance No. 576 NS of the City of Huntington Park, Cal., 12 FCC Rcd. 14191, 14206, para. 31 (1997)
[hereinafter California Payphone]).
240 Id. at 9112-13, para. 50.
241 Id. at 9132, para. 86.
242 Id. at 9102, para. 35 (citing California Payphone, 12 FCC Rcd. at 14206, para. 31).
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First, Second, and Tenth Circuits, which held that a legal requirement can meet the “materially
inhibit” standard even if it does not present an “insurmountable barrier” to the entry or provision
of wireless services.243 The FCC clarified that wireless service is “materially inhibited” not only
when legal requirements materially inhibit the introduction of wireless service, but also when
legal requirements materially inhibit improvement of existing services, such as by densifying an
existing network.244
Regarding fees, the Commission concluded that fees “materially inhibit” the provision of wireless
service unless they reasonably approximate the state or local government’s costs, take into
account only “objectively reasonable costs,” and are “no higher than the fees charged to similarly-
situated competitors in similar situations.”245 The FCC relied in part on the text of Section 253(c),
which permits state and local governments to collect “fair and reasonable compensation from
telecommunications providers, on a competitively neutral basis, for use of public rights-of-way
on a nondiscriminatory basis.”246 The FCC did not decide whether Section 253(a) preempts all
fees not expressly reserved by Section 253(c), but concluded that in the context of small wireless
facilities, otherwise “small” fees may materially inhibit facility deployment when considered in
the aggregate, given the expected volume of small wireless facilities.247 The Commission also
identified a “safe harbor” of presumptively valid fees, including a $500 “upfront” application fee
for up to five small wireless facilities or a $1,000 non-recurring fee for a new utility pole, and
$270 per small wireless facility per year for all recurring fees.248
Addressing aesthetic requirements, the FCC noted that such requirements impose additional cost
on wireless providers and therefore may materially inhibit the provision of wireless service in
violation of Sections 253 and 332.249 The FCC concluded that the harms aesthetic requirements
are meant to address are analogous to the “costs” borne by state and local governments and
therefore aesthetic requirements that are reasonably directed at resolving these harms would be
permissible.250 To demonstrate this, the aesthetic requirements must not burden small wireless
facilities more than similar infrastructure deployments, and they must “incorporate clearly-
defined and ascertainable standards, applied in a principled manner.”251
Lastly, in addition to clarifying when state or local actions “prohibit or effectively prohibit”
wireless service under Sections 253 and 332, the Small Cell Order separately set forth “shot
clocks” governing review of applications for wireless facilities. The Commission set a time limit
of 60 days for attachment of a small wireless facility to an existing structure and 90 days for a
new structure.252 For authority, the FCC relied on Section 332(c)(7)’s requirement that localities
“act on any request for authorization to place, construct, or modify personal wireless service
facilities within a reasonable time,” as well as on that section’s “prohibit or effectively prohibit”

243 Id.; see, e.g., TCG N.Y., Inc. v. City of White Plains, 305 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2002); P.R. Telephone Co. v.
Municipality of Guayanilla, 450 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2006); RT Commc’ns v. FCC, 201 F.3d 1264, 1268 (10th Cir.
2000).
244 Small Cell Order, 33 FCC Rcd. at 9104, para. 37.
245 Id. at 9112–13, para. 50.
246 Id. at 9113–14, para. 52 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 253(c)).
247 Id. at 9114, para. 53.
248 Id. at 9129, para. 79.
249 Id. at 9132, para. 87.
250 Id.
251 Id. at 9132, paras. 87–88.
252 Id. at 9092, para. 13.
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language.253 The Small Cell Order explains that in situations where a jurisdiction misses the shot
clock deadline, the applicant should, in most cases, be able to obtain expedited relief in court
under Section 332(c)(7), which directs courts to decide suits brought by any adversely affected
person on an “expedited basis.”254 According to the Order, in such cases, applicants should have a
relatively low hurdle to clear in establishing a right to expedited judicial relief,” since missing the
shot clock would amount to a presumptive violation of Section 332(c)(7).255
The June 2020 Declaratory Ruling
In 2014, the Commission issued rules implementing Section 6409(a) (“2014 Infrastructure
Order”), including specifying what qualifies as “substantially chang[ing] the physical
dimensions” of a wireless facility and setting a 60-day shot clock for facility modifications.256
After a coalition of municipalities challenged this order in court, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
2014 Infrastructure Order, holding that the Commission had statutory authority to make its rules
and had not defined any terms in Section 6409(a) unreasonably.257
The June 2020 Declaratory Ruling clarifies the rules implemented by the Commission in the 2014
Infrastructure Order. Recognizing that localities had inconsistently applied the 2014 Infrastructure
Order’s 60-day shot clock, the FCC clarified that the shot clock begins when (1) the party
applying for the modification “takes the first procedural step” required by the local jurisdiction’s
review process, and (2) the applicant demonstrates in writing that the proposed modification is
covered by Section 6409(a).258 In addition to addressing the shot clock, the June 2020 Declaratory
Ruling further elaborates what qualifies as “substantially chang[ing] the physical dimensions” of
a wireless facility, addressing several definitional ambiguities found in the regulations issued
under the 2014 Infrastructure Order.259
Legal Challenges
A number of parties, including state and local governments, utilities, telecommunications
providers, and interest groups have petitioned federal courts for review of the FCC’s orders.
While the Ninth Circuit recently upheld the bulk of the Small Cell and Moratorium Orders—
vacating only the Small Cell Order’s aesthetic requirements—the litigation surrounding the June
2020 Declaratory Ruling is ongoing.260
In the challenges to the Small Cell and Moratorium Orders, state and local governments
challenged the FCC’s action under a number of theories, including a number of evergreen
administrative law doctrines such as the “arbitrary and capricious” standard and Chevron
deference framework.261 The local governments argued that the FCC’s orders go beyond what

253 Id. at 9148–49, paras. 117–118.
254 Id. at 9149, para. 120.
255 Id.
256 2014 Infrastructure Order, 30 FCC Rcd. 31, 43, paras. 135–241 (2014).
257 Montgomery Cty. v. FCC, 811 F.3d 121 (4th Cir. 2015).
258 June 2020 Declaratory Ruling, 35 FCC Rcd. at 5986, para. 16.
259 Id. at 5989–99, paras. 24–44; see 47 CFR 1.6100(b)(7) (defining “substantial change” for purposes of Section
6409(a)).
260 City of Portland v. United States, 969 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2020) (upholding all of the FCC’s requirements except for
its aesthetic requirements); Order, League of Cal. Cities v. FCC, No. 20-71765 (9th Cir. July 28, 2021), ECF No. 63
(granting FCC’s motion to stay the proceedings).
261 See Brief for Petitioners, City of Portland v. United States, No. 18-72689 (9th Cir. June 10, 2019), ECF No. 62.
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Sections 253 and 332 permit and do not articulate administrable standards.262 They further argued
that the orders violated the Constitution by, among other things, compelling them to enforce or
administer a federal regulatory program in violation of the Tenth Amendment.263
However, in August 2020, in City of Portland v. United States, the Ninth Circuit largely upheld
both orders.264 As a threshold matter, the Court upheld the FCC’s application of its “material
inhibition” standard to determine when municipal regulations “prohibit or effectively prohibit”
the provision of services under Sections 253 or 332.265 The court reasoned that this standard was
consistent with Ninth Circuit precedent and that any differences in the way the FCC now applied
this standard in the 5G context could be “reasonably explained” by the differences in
technology.266 Moving on to the orders’ specific rulings, the court held that the Small Cell Order’s
fee limitations and shot clocks, and the Moratorium Order’s definitions of express and de facto
moratoria, were consistent with the statutory provisions and were not arbitrary or capricious.267
The court vacated and remanded, however, the Small Cell Order’s aesthetics requirements.268 It
reasoned that Section 332 “expressly permits some difference in treatment of different providers,
so long as the treatment is reasonable.”269 Consequently, the FCC’s blanket prohibition that
municipalities may not impose aesthetic requirements on small wireless facilities more
burdensome than similar infrastructure deployments was, according to the court, inconsistent with
Section 332.270 The court further held that the FCC acted arbitrarily and capriciously by
prohibiting aesthetic requirements.271 The court explained that aesthetic regulation of small cells
“should be directed to preventing the intangible public harm of unsightly or out-of-character
deployments,” and that such harms are “at least to some extent, necessarily subjective.”272
Separate from the statutory and administrative law issues, the court rejected the constitutional
arguments advanced by the municipalities.273 Most notably, the court rejected the argument that
the orders violated the Tenth Amendment by requiring the municipalities to “enforce federal
law.”274 The court explained that, rather than “commandeer[ing] State and local officials in
violation of the Tenth Amendment,” the orders simply “confer[red] on private entities a federal
right to engage in certain conduct subject to only certain (federal) constraints.”275
In addition to the Small Cell and Moratorium Order challenges, a consortium of municipalities in
California and Oregon have challenged the June 2020 Declaratory Ruling, alleging that the FCC
violated the Administrative Procedure Act, the Constitution, and the Communications Act in
issuing it.276 These proceedings have been stayed until November 2021, with no briefing schedule

262 Id. at 29–34.
263 Id. at 106–16.
264 City of Portland v. United States, 969 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2020).
265 Id. at 1035.
266 Id.
267 Id. at 1037–39, 1043–45, 1047–48.
268 Id. at 1040–43.
269 Id. at 1040.
270 Id. at 1040–41.
271 Id. at 1042.
272 Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
273 Id. at 1048–49.
274 Id. at 1049.
275 Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
276 Pet. for Rev., League of Cal. Cities v. FCC, No. 20-71765 (9th Cir. June 22, 2020).
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currently set.277 However, one possible point of contention may be whether the Declaratory
Ruling impermissibly promulgated new “rules,” rather than merely clarifying existing rules.278
Legislative Activity
Two bills from the 116th Congress addressed state and local authority over small cell siting. One
of these bills, the STREAMLINE Small Cell Deployment Act (STREAMLINE Act),279 would
have largely adopted the FCC’s conclusions in the Small Cell Order. Notable differences between
the STREAMLINE Act and the Small Cell Order include slightly different “shot clock” times and
the presence in the STREAMLINE Act of a “deemed granted” remedy (i.e., allowing a wireless
provider’s application to be deemed granted after a sufficient period of inaction). Another bill, the
Accelerating Broadband Development by Empowering Local Communities Act,280 would have
invalidated the Small Cell Order and Moratorium Order.
Community Broadband
A number of local governments throughout the United States offer consumers an option to receive
broadband service from a public entity (known as “community broadband” or “municipal
broadband”). A number of states currently place restrictions on local government ability to
provide community broadband services. The FCC has attempted to preempt state restrictions on
community broadband when such restrictions are inconsistent with FCC regulations; however, a
recent Sixth Circuit decision held that the FCC could not preempt state regulation of community
broadband without an express statutory grant of preemption authority from Congress. Even if
Congress expressly grants the FCC authority to preempt state restrictions on community
broadband, such a delegation of authority is likely to face constitutional challenges. The FCC’s
approach to community broadband, particularly as it implicates the authority of states, involves
issues under Gregory v. Ashcroft’s “plain statement” rule and, in some cases, the Tenth
Amendment.281
Background
Municipal broadband or community broadband refers generally to any arrangement in which a
local government participates in the provision of high-speed internet service to members of its
community.282 Government participation can range from public-private partnerships to broadband
cooperatives or publicly owned networks. The Institute for Local Self-Reliance identifies more
than 560 communities in the United States served by some form of municipal broadband.283

277 Order, League of Cal. Cities v. FCC, No. 20-71765 (9th Cir. July 28, 2021), ECF No. 63.
278 Id.; see also Nat’l League of Cities, Comment on Implementation of State and Local Governments’ Obligation to
Approve Certain Wireless Facility Modification Requests, 8-9 (Oct. 29, 2019) (asserting that changing the
Commission’s Section 6409(a) rules through a declaratory ruling “would not comport with the APA’s requirements”).
See generally 5 U.S.C. § 553 (setting forth procedures for rulemaking).
279 S. 1699, 116th Cong. (2019).
280 H.R. 530, 116th Cong. (2019).
281 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (articulating the “plain statement” rule); U.S. CONST. amend. X
(reserving to the states “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States”).
282 For more background on community broadband generally, see CRS Report R44080, Municipal Broadband:
Background and Policy Debate, by Lennard G. Kruger and Angele A. Gilroy.
283 Community Network Map, COMMUNITY BROADBAND NETWORKS (last visited Sept. 16, 2021),
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The FCC has historically been supportive of community broadband. In its 2010 National
Broadband Plan, the Commission noted that restricting deployment of community broadband “in
some cases restricts the country’s ability to close the broadband availability gap.”284 As early as
2000, the Commission favorably acknowledged direct public investment in broadband
infrastructure by municipalities.285
FCC Action and Statutory Authority
A number of states currently restrict municipal participation in the provision of broadband
service. Some states, such as Nebraska, directly prohibit local governments from participating in
the provision of broadband service.286 Other states require municipalities to obtain a certain
amount of local support in a referendum before offering broadband service.287 Some states, such
as Utah, require municipalities to undergo a series of steps before they may provide broadband
service.288
Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League
In several instances, municipalities have petitioned the FCC to preempt state laws that restrict
municipal participation in broadband or telecommunications. One of the earliest of these petitions
involved a Missouri law, passed in 1997, that prohibited municipalities from providing
“telecommunications service.”289 Municipalities petitioned the FCC to preempt this law under
Section 253, which, as mentioned, enables the FCC to preempt state or local requirements that
“may prohibit or have the effect or prohibiting the ability of any entity to provide” a
telecommunications service.290 The FCC, however, declined to preempt the Missouri law based
on its understanding that Section 253’s reference to “any entity” does not extend to political
subdivisions of a state.291 The FCC relied on the “clear statement” rule of Gregory v. Ashcroft in
reaching this conclusion, determining that an intent to apply Section 253 to political subdivisions
was not sufficiently clear from the statute’s text to support abrogating the state’s power.292 The
case reached the Supreme Court, which affirmed the FCC’s decision in the case Nixon v. Missouri
Municipal League.293 Writing for the majority, Justice Souter invoked the Court’s “working
assumption that federal legislation threatening to trench on the States’ arrangements for
conducting their own governments should be treated with great skepticism” in the absence of the

https://muninetworks.org/communitymap.
284 FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, CONNECTING AMERICA: THE NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN 169 (2010),
https://transition.fcc.gov/national-broadband-plan/national-broadband-plan.pdf.
285 FED. COMMCN’S COMM’N, DEPLOYMENT OF ADVANCED TELECOMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY: SECOND REPORT 61, 63-
64, 72-73, paras. 140, 150, 181-82 (2000),
https://transition.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Orders/2000/fcc00290.pdf.
286 NEB. REV. STAT. § 86-594 (2020).
287 E.g., MINN. STAT. § 237.19 (2020).
288 UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-18-202 (2020).
289 MO. ANN. STAT. § 392.410 (2016). The law explicitly carves out “internet-type services” from its application. Id.
290 See 47 U.S.C. § 253; “FCC Statutory Authority and Procedure,” supra.
291 Mo. Mun. League, 16 FCC Rcd. 1157, 1162, para. 9 (2001).
292 Id. at 1169, para. 19.
293 541 U.S. 125 (2004).
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plain statement required under Gregory.294 Justice Souter observed that section 253’s reference to
“any entity” is susceptible to multiple readings and therefore insufficiently clear.295
Tennessee v. FCC
The cities of Wilson, North Carolina and Chattanooga, Tennessee later brought petitions to
preempt state laws restricting the development of municipal broadband in their respective states.
Tennessee permits any municipality operating an electric plant to offer cable, video, and internet
services only “within its service area.”296 North Carolina similarly restricts city-owned
communications providers to providing service “within the corporate limits of the city providing
the communications service.”297 Both Wilson and Chattanooga sought to expand coverage of their
broadband networks beyond what state law would permit and asked the FCC to preempt their
respective state’s law to allow expansion.
The Commission granted the cities’ petitions, relying on Section 706 of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996.298 Section 706 provides, in relevant part:
The Commission . . . shall encourage the deployment on a reasonable and timely basis of
advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans . . . by utilizing, in a manner
consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity, price cap regulation,
regulatory
forbearance,
measures
that
promote
competition
in
the
local
telecommunications market, or other regulating methods that remove barriers to
infrastructure investment.299
Though Section 706 does not explicitly mention preemption of state law, the FCC interpreted
“regulating methods that remove barriers to infrastructure investment” to “undoubtedly” include
preemption.300 The Commission squared this interpretation with the Supreme Court’s decisions in
Gregory and Nixon by determining that the “clear statement” rule did not apply to issues of
“federal oversight of interstate commerce,” rather than direct limitations on state government.301
In the Commission’s view, “the question . . . is not whether the municipal systems can provide
broadband at all, but rather whether the states may dictate the manner in which interstate
commerce is conducted and the nature of competition that should exist for interstate
communications.”302 The FCC therefore preempted the Tennessee and North Carolina laws, but
emphasized that it would only preempt state laws in instances where a state chooses to permit
municipalities to provide broadband, but also limits the municipalities’ exercise of that
authority.303

294 Id. at 140.
295 Id.
296 TENN. CODE. ANN. § 7-52-601 (2020).
297 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 160A-340.1(a)(3) (2020).
298 30 FCC Rcd. 2408 (2015).
299 47 U.S.C. § 1302.
300 30 FCC Rcd. at 2411–12, 2468–69, paras. 9, 145.
301 Id. at 2412, 2472–74, paras. 12, 154–58; see United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 107–08 (2000) (“an ‘assumption’
of nonpre-emption [sic] is not triggered when the State regulates in an area where there has been a history of significant
federal presence.”).
302 30 FCC Rcd. at 2412, para. 12.
303 Id., para. 11.
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Following a petition for review from Tennessee and North Carolina, the Sixth Circuit overturned
the Commission in Tennessee v. FCC.304 Contrary to the Commission’s determinations, the court
determined that the clear statement rule applied to the FCC’s exercise of preemption authority
under Section 706. The court noted that, as in Nixon, Tennessee and North Carolina had “made
discretionary determinations for their political subdivisions” by passing the laws at issue.305 The
FCC’s distinction between preempting state authority over political subdivisions and preempting
regulation in a traditionally federal space was, the Sixth Circuit determined, a false one: the court
noted that the Tennessee and North Carolina laws “implicate core attributes of state sovereignty
and regulate interstate communications,” rather than one or the other.306 Having determined that
the clear statement rule applied, the court held that Section 706 does not include a clear statement
authorizing preemption of Tennessee and North Carolina’s laws.307 The court maintained,
however, that its holding did not address whether Section 706 provides any preemptive authority
at all or whether Congress could, consistent with the Constitution, provide the FCC with the
power to preempt state laws regulating municipal broadband.308
Constitutional Issues
The courts in Nixon and Tennessee both relied on the “clear statement” rule to determine that
Congress had not delegated to the FCC the power to preempt state restrictions on municipally
owned broadband or communications networks. Consequently, neither court reached the issue of
whether such a delegation would be constitutional.
The United States operates as “a system of dual sovereignty between the States and the Federal
Government.”309 Within this system, states “retain substantial sovereign authority” over those
aspects not delegated to the federal government by the Constitution.310 Among the reserved rights
under this state sovereign authority is the right to manage state government through the creation
of political subdivisions.311 Relatedly, the Supreme Court has observed that a municipal
government “has no privileges or immunities under the Federal Constitution which it may invoke
in opposition to the will of its creator.”312 Political subdivisions, in other words, are arms of a
state without any sovereign authority of their own, absent a delegation of such power from a
state.313
Because the Nixon and Tennessee courts determined the FCC lacked a “plain statement” of
authority to preempt state restrictions on municipal broadband and telecommunications services,

304 832 F.3d 597 (6th Cir. 2016).
305 Id. at 611.
306 Id. at 612.
307 Id. at 613.
308 Id.
309 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991).
310 Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. X.
311 U.S. CONST. amend. X; see Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 607–08 (1991) (“The principle is
well settled that local ‘governmental units are created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental
powers of the State as may be entrusted to them . . . in [its] absolute discretion.’” (quoting Sailors v. Bd. of Ed. of Kent
Cty., 387 U.S. 105, 108 (1967) (alteration in original))); City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv., Inc., 536
U.S. 424, 437 (2002) (“Whether and how to [allocate municipal authority] is a question central to state self-
government.”).
312 Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 40 (1933).
313 See Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178–79 (1907) (“The number, nature, and duration of the powers conferred
upon [municipal corporations] rests in the absolute discretion of the state.”)
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neither court discussed whether such a grant of authority—if made plainly—would be
constitutionally permissible. Federal courts have upheld federal legislation that permits
municipalities to take actions contrary to state law in other contexts.314 The Nixon court indirectly
suggested that a clear statement might be sufficient to support such preemption.315 Because these
constitutional issues remain unaddressed, any legislative action taken to preempt state restrictions
on community broadband may be subject to constitutional scrutiny.
Legislative Activity
As of the date of this report, several bills have been introduced in the 117th Congress that would
address community broadband.316 Additionally, several legislative proposals from past congresses
address community broadband. Table 1 summarizes these proposals.
Table 1. Introduced Community Broadband Legislation
Bill No.
Short Title
Congress
Summary
S. 240
Community Broadband
114th
Would have prohibited state law from “prohibiting or
Act
substantially inhibiting” provision of
telecommunications service by a public provider
S. 597, H.R.
States’ Rights Municipal
114th
Would have amended Section 706 to explicitly permit
1106
Broadband Act
states to regulate municipal broadband
H.R. 6013
Community Broadband
114th
Would have amended Section 706 to explicitly forbid
Act
states from prohibiting or effectively prohibiting
municipal broadband
S. 2853
None
115th
Would have amended Section 706 to include language
that would prevent the FCC from relying on Section
706 as a grant of authority
H.R. 7302
Accessible, Affordable
116th
Would have amended Section 706 to prohibit states
(incorporated Internet for All Act
from forbidding provision of advanced
into H.R. 2),
telecommunications capability by a public provider,
S. 4131
public-private partnership, or cooperatively organized
provider
H.R. 7363
CONNECT Act
116th
Would have prohibited states or political subdivisions
from offering broadband internet access service
Source: CRS compilation of introduced bil s.
A bill corresponding to H.R. 7302 (116th Congress) has been introduced as H.R. 1783 and S. 745
in the 117th Congress.317 A bill corresponding to H.R. 7363 (116th Congress) has been introduced
as H.R. 1149 in the 117th Congress.318

314 See, e.g., Lawrence Cty. v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist. No. 40-1, 469 U.S. 256, 257–61 (1985) (holding that a
federal statute authorizing local government to spend payments “for any governmental purpose” preempts state statute
requiring such funds to be spent in a particular manner); City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 357 U.S. 320, 324–
26, 341 (1958) (permitting city’s exercise of eminent domain over state-owned lands to construct federally authorized
dam).
315 See Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 140 (2004) (observing that “in some instances,” preemption of a state
restriction on municipal activity might “operate straightforwardly to provide local choice”).
316 H.R. 1783, S. 745, 117th Cong. (2021); S. 2071, 117th Cong. (2021); H.R. 1149, 117th Cong. (2021).
317 H.R. 1783, 117th Cong. (2021).
318 H.R. 1149, 117th Cong. (2021).
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Cable Operators
Lastly, the Commission has preempted state and local laws regulating cable operators in a manner
it deems inconsistent with Title VI, which is the portion of the Communications Act governing
cable communications.319 In particular, the Commission has (1) banned state and local
governments from taking actions it deems an “unreasonable refusal” to award a cable franchise,
(2) required state and local governments to count certain costs toward a statutory cap on cable
franchise fees, and (3) limited state and local governments from regulating non-cable services
provided by cable operators.320
Title VI
Title VI codifies a “deliberately structured dualism” in the regulation of cable.321 On the one
hand, Title VI gives the FCC authority over various operational aspects of cable such as technical
standards governing signal quality,322 ownership restrictions,323 and requirements for carrying
local broadcast stations.324 On the other hand, it preserves state authority by requiring cable
operators to obtain a “franchise” from the relevant state or local authority in the region in which it
wishes to provide service.325 It further allows state and local governments to place conditions on
the award of franchises, such as requiring cable operators to designate “channel capacity” for
public, educational, and government (PEG) programs.326
Title VI, nevertheless, places important limitations on state and local authority. In particular, it
caps the “franchise fees” charged to cable operators at 5% of the operator’s gross annual revenue
derived from cable services.327 Title VI also prevents franchising authorities (i.e., state and local
governments responsible for regulating cable operators) from “unreasonably refus[ing] to award
an additional competitive franchise,”328 and it prohibits those authorities from regulating “video
programming or other information services.”329
FCC Actions
In a series of orders, the FCC has sought to limit state and local authority over cable operators by
elaborating on Title VI’s restrictions. These orders have built on one another and have responded
to, and been shaped by, court decisions reviewing their legality. This subsection, consequently,
discusses the orders and court decisions together in chronological order.

319 47 U.S.C. §§ 521–573.
320 CRS Report R46147, The Cable Franchising Authority of State and Local Governments and the Communications
Act, by Chris D. Linebaugh and Eric N. Holmes, discusses the FCC’s preemption under Title VI and the legal issues
raised by such preemption in more detail. Consequently, this section only provides a brief overview of this topic.
321 All. for Cmty. Media v. FCC, 529 F.3d 763, 767 (6th Cir. 2008)
322 47 U.S.C. § 544(e); 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.601–76.640.
323 47 U.S.C. § 533; 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.501–76.502.
324 47 U.S.C. § 534; 47 C.F.R. § 76.56.
325 47 U.S.C. §§ 541(a)–(b), 522(10).
326 Id. §§ 531, 541(a)(4)(B).
327 Id. § 542.
328 Id. § 541.
329 Id. § 544(a), (b).
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The FCC issued its first order on this issue in 2007 (First Cable Order).330 In the First Cable
Order, the Commission sought to remove burdensome state and local requirements preventing
new entrants into the cable market. It did this largely by clarifying when practices by franchising
authorities amount to an “unreasonabl[e] refus[al]” to award a franchise.331 The First Cable Order
explained that such practices include, among other things, failing to make a final decision on
franchise applications within timeframes specified in the order or requiring cable operators to
“build out” their cable systems to provide service to certain areas or customers as a condition of
granting the franchise.332 The First Order also provided guidance on which costs count toward the
5% franchise fee cap. Among other things, it explained that in-kind expenses unrelated to
provision of cable service—such as requests that the cable operator provide traffic light control
systems—count toward the 5% cap.333 Lastly, the FCC clarified the limits of franchising authority
jurisdiction over “mixed-use” networks providing both cable and non-cable services. It
maintained that, under Title VI, franchise authorities only have jurisdiction over cable services.334
Consequently, the FCC said that franchising authorities may not withhold franchises based on
issues related to non-cable services or facilities (the “mixed-use” rule).335 Although state and local
franchising authorities and their representative organizations challenged the legality of the First
Cable Order, the Sixth Circuit denied those challenges.336 In Alliance for Community Media v.
FCC, the Sixth Circuit upheld both the FCC’s authority to issue rules construing Title VI and the
specific rules in the First Cable Order itself.337
The First Cable Order applied only to new entrants to the cable market. However, the FCC
shortly thereafter adopted another order (Second Cable Order) extending many of the First Cable
Order’s rulings to incumbent cable television service providers as well.338 Following the release
of the Second Cable Order, the Commission received three petitions for reconsideration, to which
it responded with a further order in 2015 (Reconsideration Order).339 In the Reconsideration
Order, the FCC affirmed the Second Cable Order’s extension of the First Cable Order’s rulings to
incumbent cable operators.340 Most notably, the Reconsideration Order also clarified that “in-
kind” (i.e., noncash) payments exacted by franchising authorities, even if related to the provision
of cable service, may count toward the maximum 5% franchise fee allowable under Section
622.341
In 2017, in the case Montgomery County v. FCC, the Sixth Circuit vacated the FCC’s
determinations in the Second Cable Order and Reconsideration Order on both the issue of

330 Implementation of Section 621(a)(1) of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 22 FCC Rcd. 5101 (2007)
[hereinafter First Order].
331 Id. at 5103.
332 Id. at 5134–37, 5142–43, paras. 66–73, 87–91.
333 Id. at 5149–50, paras. 105–108.
334 Id. at 5155, para. 121.
335 Id.
336 All. for Community Media v. FCC, 529 F.3d 763 (6th Cir. 2008).
337 Id. at 772–87.
338 Implementation of Section 621(a)(1) of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 22 FCC Rcd. 19633 (2007)
[hereinafter Second Cable Order].
339 Implementation of Section 621(a)(1) of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 30 FCC Rcd. 810 (2015)
[hereinafter Reconsideration Order].
340 Id. at 816, paras. 14–15.
341 Id. at 814–16, paras. 11–13.
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incumbent providers and cable-related in-kind expenses.342 Regarding incumbent providers, the
court held that the FCC’s extension of its mixed-use network rule to incumbent cable providers
was “arbitrary and capricious” in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).343 To
support its mixed-use rule, the FCC had relied on the statutory definition of “cable system,”
which explicitly excludes common carrier facilities except to the extent they are “used in the
transmission of video programming directly to subscribers.”344 However, the court explained that,
unlike most new entrants, incumbent cable providers are generally not common carriers.345
Consequently, the Commission needed to identify a statutory provision that supported applying
the mixed-use rule to non-common carrier entities, which it failed to do.346 Furthermore, the court
held that the Commission’s inclusion of cable-related in-kind expenses in the 5% franchise fee
cap was arbitrary and capricious.347 The court reasoned that the FCC gave “scarcely any
explanation at all” for its decision to expand its interpretation of “franchise fee” to include cable-
related exactions.348
In response to Montgomery County, the FCC adopted a new order on August 1, 2019 (Third
Cable Order), which clarifies its interpretations of the Cable Act.349 Among other things, the order
reiterates the FCC’s position that in-kind (i.e., non-monetary) expenses, even if related to cable
service, may count toward the 5% franchise fee cap.350 Per the Sixth Circuit’s admonition, the
FCC provided additional justification for this decision, reasoning that, among other things, the
statutory definition of franchise fee is broad enough to encompass such expenses and none of the
specific statutory exceptions to this definition excludes them entirely.351 The Third Cable Order
also reiterates its application of the mixed-use rule to incumbents, relying this time on the Title VI
provision prohibiting franchising authorities from “establish[ing] requirements for video
programming or other information services.”352
Beyond clarifying that franchising authorities cannot use their Title VI authority to regulate the
non-cable aspects of a mixed-use cable system, the Third Cable Order explicitly preempts state
and local laws that “impose[] fees or restrictions” on cable operators for the “provision of non-
cable services in connection with access to [public] rights-of-way, except as expressly authorized
in [Title VI].”353 The Commission responded specifically to an Oregon Supreme Court case, City
of Eugene v. Comcast. In this case, the court upheld the City of Eugene's imposition of a 7%
fee—pursuant to a city ordinance, rather than the franchising process—on the revenue a cable
operator generated from its provision of broadband internet services.354 The Third Cable Order
rejects City of Eugene’s conclusion, however, and preempts the type of state regulation that case

342 863 F.3d 485 (6th Cir. 2017).
343 Id. at 493.
344 Second Cable Order, 22 FCC Rcd. 19633, 19640, para. 17 (2007).
345 Id. at 492–93.
346 Id.
347 Id. at 491–92
348 Id.
349 Implementation of Section 621(a)(1) of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 34 FCC Rcd. 6844 (2019)
[hereinafter Third Cable Order].
350 Id. at 6850–52, para. 12.
351 Id. at 6849–58, paras. 11–22.
352 Id. at 6883, para. 122 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1)).
353 Id. at 6892–93, para. 88.
354 375 P.3d 446, 450–51, 463 (Or. 2016).
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upheld.355 The FCC reasoned that Title VI establishes the “basic terms of a bargain” by which a
cable operator may “access and operate facilities in the local rights-of-way.”356 It explained that,
although Congress was “well aware” that cable systems would carry non-cable services as well as
cable, it nevertheless “sharply circumscribed” the authority of state and local governments to
“regulate the terms of this exchange.”357
Several cities, franchising authorities, and advocacy organizations filed petitions for review of the
Third Cable Order in various courts of appeals,358 and these petitions were consolidated and
transferred to the Sixth Circuit.359 The Sixth Circuit largely upheld the Third Cable Order in City
of Eugene v. FCC.360 In its decision, the Sixth Circuit determined that the FCC’s inclusion of
cable-related in-kind expenses in the 5% franchise fee cap was not arbitrary and capricious.361
Addressing the FCC’s “mixed-use” rule, and specifically the FCC’s repudiation of City of Eugene
v. Comcast, the Sixth Circuit opined that whether a franchising authority has overstepped its
power depends on “whether state or local action is ‘inconsistent with’ a specific provision of the
[Communications] Act.”362 The court held that the imposition of broadband service fees on a
cable operator would be inconsistent with the Title VI provision prohibiting franchising
authorities from “establish[ing] requirements for video programming or other information
services.”363 Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit held that the FCC may preempt the City of Eugene’s
imposition of a broadband service fee on cable operators.364 The court rejected the FCC’s
proposed standard for calculating the monetary value of in-kind exactions, holding that the value
of these exactions should be calculated based on a cable operator’s cost, rather than their “market
value.”365
Conclusion
The scope of the FCC’s preemption authority is not simply an academic issue. The Commission’s
authority to displace state law is central to many of its regulatory initiatives and continues to be
litigated in federal courts. Delineating the contours of the FCC’s preemption authority can
become complex once specific statutory provisions are brought to bear on particular issues.
However, at its core the analysis involves applying the basic principles of preemption. As with
preemption generally, Congress’s purpose is the ultimate “touchstone” for determining the scope

355 Third Cable Order, 34 FCC Rcd. at 6889, para. 80.
356 Id. at 6891, para. 84.
357 Id. at 6892, para. 88.
358 See City of Pittsburgh v. FCC, No. 19-3478 (3d Cir. Oct. 28, 2019); State of Hawaii v. United States, No. 19-72699
(9th Cir. Oct. 24, 2019); Anne Arundel Cty. v. FCC, No. 72760 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 24, 2019); All. for Commc’ns
Democracy v. FCC, No. 19-72736 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 23, 2019); Pet. for Rev., City of Portland v. United States, No. 19-
72391 (9th Cir. Sept. 19, 2019); Pet. for Rev., City of Eugene v. FCC, No. 19-72219 (9th Cir. Aug. 30, 2019).
359 City of Eugene v. FCC, No. 19-72391 (9th Cir. Nov. 26, 2019) (order granting motion to consolidate petitions and
transfer petitions to the Sixth Circuit); City of Eugene v. FCC, No. 19-4161 (6th Cir. Dec. 2, 2019) (docketing case in
the Sixth Circuit).
360 998 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 2021).
361 Id. at 708–09.
362 Id. at 711.
363 Id. at 715; see 47 U.S.C. § 544(c).
364 City of Eugene v. FCC, 998 F.3d at 715. Though the Sixth Circuit focused on the mixed-use rule as applied to the
City of Eugene, the court’s reasoning suggests that it may uphold similar FCC attempts to preempt state and local
“mixed-use” requirements based on the FCC’s theory that these requirements are inconsistent with Title VI.
365 Id. at 710.
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of the FCC’s preemption authority.366 Courts determine this purpose by examining the FCC’s
regulatory authority and any specific statutory provisions limiting its ability to preempt state
laws.367 This analysis is also informed by federalism considerations, with courts on rare occasions
requiring a clear statement from Congress authorizing the FCC to preempt state law in a way that
upsets the usual balance between the state and federal government.368
Any congressional attempts to address the FCC’s authority to preempt may benefit from
consideration of each of these issues. To ensure that the Commission has jurisdictional authority
to preempt, any desired exercise of preemption should arise under a regulatory function delegated
to the FCC—and, should Congress so desire, it may delegate new functions to the FCC by
statute.369 If Congress seeks to address the bounds of specific statutory limits on the
Commission’s preemption authority, it may explicitly spell out those limits. And to mitigate
constitutional concerns in areas that might disrupt the “normal constitutional balance,” ensuring
that any preemptive language is a “clear statement” of congressional intent to preempt could
remain key.370

Author Information

Chris D. Linebaugh
Eric N. Holmes
Legislative Attorney
Legislative Attorney

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
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copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

366 Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009).
367 See, e.g., “Overview of the FCC’s Preemption Authority Under the Communications Act,” supra.
368 See, e.g., “Clear Statement Rule,” supra.
369 See Mozilla, 940 F.3d 1, 75 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
370 See Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 140 (2004).
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