Russia’s Nuclear Weapons:
September 13, 2021
Doctrine, Forces, and Modernization
Amy F. Woolf
Russia’s nuclear forces consist of both long-range, strategic systems—including intercontinental
Specialist in Nuclear
ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy
Weapons Policy
bombers—and shorter- and medium-range delivery systems. Russia is modernizing its nuclear

forces, replacing Soviet-era systems with new missiles, submarines and aircraft while developing
new types of delivery systems. Although Russia’s number of nuclear weapons has declined

sharply since the end of Cold War, it retains a stockpile of thousands of warheads, with more
than 1,500 warheads deployed on missiles and bombers capable of reaching U.S. territory.
Doctrine and Deployment
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union valued nuclear weapons for both their political and military attributes. While Moscow
pledged that it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons in a conflict, many analysts and scholars believe d the Soviet
Union integrated nuclear weapons into its warfighting plans. After the Co ld War, Russia did not retain the Soviet “no first
use” policy, and it has revised its nuclear doctrine several times to respond to concerns about its security environment and the
capabilities of its conventional forces. When combined with military exercis es and Russian officials’ public statements, this
evolving doctrine seems to indicate that Russia has potentially placed a greater reliance on nuclear weapons and may threaten
to use them during regional conflicts. This doctrine has led some U.S. analysts to conclude that Russia has adopted an
“escalate to de-escalate” strategy, where it might threaten to use nuclear weapons if it were losing a conflict with a NATO
member, in an effort to convince the United States and its NATO allies to withdraw from the c onflict. Russian officials,
along with some scholars and observers in the United States and Europe, dispute this interpretation; however, concerns about
this doctrine have informed recommendations for changes in the U.S. nuclear posture.
Russia’s current modernization cycle for its nuclear forces began in the early 2000s and is likely to conclude in the 2020s. In
addition, in March 2018, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia was developing new types of nuclear
systems. While some see these weapons as a Russian attempt to achieve a measure of superiority over the United States,
others note that they likely represent a Russian response to concerns about emerging U.S. missile defense capabilities. These
new Russian systems include, among others, a heavy ICBM with the ability to carry multiple warheads, a hypersonic glide
vehicle, an autonomous underwater vehicle, and a nuclear-powered cruise missile. The hypersonic glide vehicle, carried on
an existing long-range ballistic missile, entered service in late 2019.
Arms Control Agreements
Over the years, the United States has signed bilateral arms control agreements with the Soviet Union and then Russia that
have limited and reduced the number of warheads carried on their nuclear delivery systems. Early agreements did little to
reduce the size of Soviet forces, as the Soviet Union developed and deployed missiles with multiple warheads. However, the
1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, combined with financial difficulties that slowed Russia’s nuclear modernization
plans, sharply reduced the number of deployed warheads in the Russian force. The 2010 New START Treaty added modest
reductions to this record but still served to limit the size of the Russian force and maintain the transparency afforded by the
monitoring and verification provisions in the treaty.
Congressional Interest
Some Members of Congress have expressed growing concerns about the challenges Russia poses to the United States and its
allies. In this context, Members of Congress may address a number of questions about Russian nuclear forces as they debate
the U.S. nuclear force structure and plans for U.S. nuclear modernization. Congress may review debates about whether the
U.S. modernization programs are needed to maintain the U.S. nuclear deterrent, or whether such programs may fuel an arms
race with Russia. Congress may also assess whether Russia will be able to expand its forces in ways that threaten U.S.
security if the United States and Russia do not continue to limit their forces under the New START Treaty. Finally, Congress
may review the debates within the expert community about Russian nuclear doctrine when deciding whether the United
States needs to develop new capabilities to deter Russian use of nuclear weapons.
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Russia’s Nuclear Weapons: Doctrine, Forces, and Modernization

Introduction
Relations between the United States and Russia have shifted over time—sometimes reassuring
and sometimes concerning—yet most experts agree that Russia is the only nation that poses,
through its arsenal of nuclear weapons, an existential threat to the United States. While its nuclear
arms have declined sharply in quantity since the end of the Cold War, Russia retains a stockpile of
thousands of nuclear weapons, with more than 1,500 warheads deployed on missiles and bombers
capable of reaching U.S. territory.1 The United States has always viewed these weapons as a
potential threat to U.S. security and survival. It has not only maintained a nuclear deterrent to
counter this threat, it has also signed numerous arms control treaties with the Soviet Union and
later Russia in an effort to restrain and reduce the number and capabilities of nuclear weapons.
The collapse of the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty2 and the eventual
expiration of the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START)3 in 2026 may signal
the end to mutual restraint and limits on such weapons.
The 2018 National Defense Strategy identified the reemergence of long-term, strategic
competition with Russia and China as the “the central chal enge to U.S. prosperity and security.”
It noted that Russia seeks “to shatter the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and change European
and Middle East security and economic structures to its favor.” It argued that the chal enge from
Russia is clear when its malign behavior is “coupled with its expanding and modernizing nuclear
arsenal.”4 The Biden Administration’s Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, issued in
March 2021, stated that “Russia remains determined to enhance its global influence and play a
disruptive role on the world stage.”5
The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) amplified this theme, noting that “Russia has
demonstrated its wil ingness to use force to alter the map of Europe and impose its wil on its
neighbors, backed by implicit and explicit nuclear first-use threats.”6 The NPR described changes
to Russia’s nuclear doctrine and catalogued Russia’s efforts to modernize its nuclear forces,
arguing that these efforts have “increased, and wil continue to increase, [Russia’s] warhead
delivery capacity, and provides Russia with the ability to rapidly expand its deployed warhead
numbers.”7
Congress has shown growing concern about the chal enges Russia poses to the United States and
its al ies. It has expressed concerns about Russia’s nuclear doctrine and nuclear modernization
programs and has held hearings focused on Russia’s compliance with arms control agreements

1 U.S. State Department, New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms, Fact Sheet, Washington,
DC, July 2019, https://2017-2021.state.gov/new-start-treaty-aggregate-numbers-of-strategic-offensive-arms-
10/index.html. See, also, Hans Kristensen and Matt Korda, “ Russian nuclear forces, 2019,” Bulletin of the Atom ic
Scientists, 2019, 75/2, p. 74, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2019.1580891.
2 CRS Insight IN10985, U.S. Withdrawal from the INF Treaty, by Amy F. Woolf.
3 On February 3, 2021, the United States and Russia agreed to extend New ST ART through 2026, an optio n permitted
in the text of the treaty. See CRS Report R41219, The New START Treaty: Central Lim its and Key Provisions, by Amy
F. Woolf.
4 U.S. Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America,
Washington, DC, January 2018, p. 2, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-
Strategy-Summary.pdf.
5 T he White House, Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, Washington, DC, March 2021, p. 8,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf.
6 Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, Washington, DC, February 2, 2018, p. 6, https://media.defense.gov/
2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POST URE-REVIEW-FINALREPORT .PDF.
7 Ibid., p. 9.
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and the future of the arms control process. Moreover, Members have raised questions about
whether U.S. and Russian nuclear modernization programs, combined with the potential demise
of restraints on U.S. and Russian nuclear forces, may be fueling an arms race and undermining
strategic stability.
This report seeks to advise this debate by providing information about Russia’s nuclear doctrine,
its current nuclear force structure, and its ongoing nuclear modernization programs. It is divided
into five sections. The first section describes Russia’s nuclear strategy and focuses on ways in
which that strategy differs from that of the Soviet Union. The second section provides a historical
overview of the Soviet Union’s nuclear force structure. The third section details Russia’s current
force structure, including its long-range intercontinental bal istic missiles (ICBM), submarine-
launched bal istic missiles (SLBM), and heavy bombers and shorter-range nonstrategic nuclear
weapons. This section also highlights key elements of relevant infrastructure, including early
warning, command and control, production, testing, and warhead storage. It also describes the
key modernization programs that Russia is pursuing to maintain and, in some cases, expand its
nuclear arsenal. The fourth section focuses on how arms control has affected the size and
structure of Russia’s nuclear forces. The fifth section discusses several potential issues for
Congress.
Strategy and Doctrine
Soviet Doctrine
The Soviet Union valued nuclear weapons for both their political and military attributes. From a
political perspective, nuclear weapons served as a measure of Soviet status, while nuclear parity
with the United States offered the Soviet Union prestige and influence in international affairs.
From a military perspective, the Soviet Union considered nuclear weapons to be instrumental to
its plans for fighting and prevailing in a conventional war that escalated to a nuclear one. As a
leading Russian analyst has written, “for the first quarter-century of the nuclear age, the
fundamental assumption of Soviet military doctrine was that, if a global war was unleashed by the
‘imperialist West,’ the Soviet Union would defeat the enemy and achieve victory, despite the
enormous ensuing damage.”8
Soviet views on nuclear weapons gradual y evolved as the United States and the Soviet Union
engaged in arms control talks in the wake of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, and as the Soviet
Union achieved parity with the United States. During the 1960s, both countries recognized the
reality of the concept of “Mutual y Assured Destruction” (MAD)—a situation in which both sides
had nuclear retaliatory capabilities that prevented either side from prevailing in an al -out nuclear
war. Analysts argue that the reality that neither side could initiate a nuclear war without facing the
certainty of a devastating retaliatory attack from the other was codified in the agreements
negotiated during the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). With the signing of the 1972 Anti-
Bal istic Missile (ABM) Treaty, both sides accepted limits on their ability to protect themselves
from a retaliatory nuclear attack, thus presumably reducing incentives for either side to engage in
a nuclear first strike.
The Soviet Union offered rhetorical support to the nonuse of nuclear weapons throughout the
1960s and 1970s. At the time, this approach placed the Soviet Union on the moral high ground
with nonaligned nations during the negotiations on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The

8 Alexey Arbatov, “Understanding the US-Russia Nuclear Schism,” Survival, 59/2, March 2017,
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00396338.2017.1302189?needAccess=true.
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United States and its NATO al ies refused to adopt a similar pledge, maintaining a “flexible
response” policy that al owed for the possible use of nuclear weapons in response to a massive
conventional attack by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact al ies. At the same time, however,
most U.S. analysts doubted that Soviet support for the nonuse of nuclear weapons actual y
influenced Soviet warfighting plans, even though Soviet-Warsaw Pact advantages in conventional
forces along the Central European front meant that the Soviet Union would not necessarily need
to use nuclear weapons first.
U.S. and NATO skepticism about a Soviet nonuse policy reflected concerns about the Soviet
military buildup of a vast arsenal of battlefield and shorter-range nuclear delivery systems. These
systems could have been employed on a European battlefield in the event of a conflict with the
United States and NATO. On the other hand, interviews with Soviet military officials have
suggested that this theater nuclear buildup was intended to “reduce the probability of NATO’s
first use [of nuclear weapons] and thereby to keep the war conventional.” 9
In addition, many U.S. commentators feared that the Soviet Union might launch a “bolt from the
blue” attack against U.S. territory even in the absence of escalation from a conflict in Europe.
Other military analysts suspect that the Soviet Union would not have initiated such an attack and
likely did not have the capability to conduct an disarming attack against U.S. nuclear forces—a
capability that would have been needed to restrain the effectiveness of a U.S. retaliatory strike.10
Instead, the Soviet Union might have launched its weapons on warning of an imminent attack,
which has sometimes been translated as a retaliatory reciprocal counter strike, or in a retaliatory
strike after initial nuclear detonations on Soviet soil. Many believe that, in practice, the Soviet
Union planned only for these latter retaliatory strikes.11
Regardless, some scholars argue that the Soviet leadership likely retained the option of launching
a first strike against the United States. Improvements to the accuracy of U.S. bal istic missiles
raised concerns in the Soviet Union about the ability of retaliatory forces to survive a U.S. attack.
For Soviet leaders, the increasing vulnerability of Soviet missile silos cal ed into question the
stability of mutual deterrence and possibly raised questions about the Soviet Union’s international
standing and bargaining position in arms control negotiations with the United States.12
In 1982, General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev official y announced that the Soviet Union would
not be the first nation to use nuclear weapons in a conflict. When General Secretary Brezhnev
formal y enunciated the Soviet no-first-use policy in the 1980s, actual Soviet military doctrine
may have become more consistent with this declaratory doctrine, as the Soviet military hoped to
keep a conflict in the European theater conventional. In addition, by the end of the decade, and
especial y in the aftermath of the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, Soviet leader
Mikhail Gorbachev believed that the use of nuclear weapons would lead to catastrophic
consequences.13

9 See BDM Federal, Inc., “Soviet Intentions 1965-1985,” p. 44, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb285/
doc02_I_ch3.pdf.
10 Pavel Podvig, “T he Window of Vulnerability T hat Wasn’t: Soviet Military Buildup in the 1970s—A Research
Note,” International Security, vol. 33, no. 1 (summer 2008), pp. 118-138.
11 Pavel Podvig, “Does Russia have a Launch-on-Warning Posture? T he Soviet Union Didn’t,” Russian Strategic
Nuclear Forces, April 29, 2019, http://russianforces.org/blog/2019/04/does_russia_have_a_launch-on-w.shtml.
12 Brendan R. Green and Austin Long, “T he MAD Who Wasn’t T here: Soviet Reactions to the Late Cold War Nuclear
Balance,” Security Studies, 26/2017, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09636412.2017.1331639.
13 See, for example, William T aubman, Gorbachev: His Life and Times (W.W. Norton and Company, 2017).
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Russian Nuclear Doctrine
Evolving Doctrine
Russia has altered and adjusted Soviet nuclear doctrine to meet the circumstances of the post-
Cold War world. In 1993, Russia explicitly rejected the Soviet Union’s no-first-use pledge, in part
because of the weakness of its conventional forces at the time. Russia has subsequently revised its
military doctrine and national security concept several times over the past few decades, with
successive versions in the 1990s appearing to place a greater reliance on nuclear weapons.14 For
example, the national security concept issued in 1997 al owed for the use of nuclear weapons “in
case of a threat to the existence of the Russian Federation as an independent sovereign state.”15
The military doctrine published in 2000 expanded the circumstances in which Russia might use
nuclear weapons, including in response to attacks using weapons of mass destruction against
Russia or its al ies, as wel as in response to “large-scale aggression utilizing conventional
weapons in situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation.”16
These revisions have led to questions about whether Russia would employ nuclear weapons
preemptively in a regional war or only in response to the use of nuclear weapons in a broader
conflict. In mid-2009, Nikolai Patrushev, the head of Russia’s Security Council, hinted that
Russia would have the option to launch a “preemptive nuclear strike” against an aggressor “using
conventional weapons in an all-out, regional, or even local war.”17
However, when Russia updated its military doctrine in 2010, it did not specifical y provide for the
preemptive use of nuclear weapons. Instead, the doctrine stated that Russia “reserves the right to
utilize nuclear weapons in response to the utilization of nuclear and other types of weapons of
mass destruction against it and (or) its al ies, and also in the event of aggression against the
Russian Federation involving the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the
state is under threat.”18 Compared with the 2000 version, which al owed for nuclear use “in
situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation,” this change seemed to
narrow the conditions for nuclear weapons use.19 The language on nuclear weapons in Russia’s
most current 2014 military doctrine is similar to that in the 2010 doctrine.
In Early June 2020, Russia released a new document, titled “On Basic Principles of State Policy
of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence,” that outlined the threats and circumstances that
could lead to Russia’s use of nuclear weapons.20 This document specifical y notes that Russia

14 See “Comparison of the Russian Military Doctrine 1993, 2000, 2010, and 2014, ” Offiziere.ch, undated,
https://www.offiziere.ch/wp-content/uploads-001/2015/08/Comparison-of-the-Russian-Military-Doctrine-1993-2000-
2010-and-2014.pdf.
15 Ibid.
16 Nikolai Sokov, “Russia’s 2000 Military Doctrine,” Nuclear T hreat Initiative, undated, https://www.nti.org/analysis/
articles/russias-2000-military-doctrine/.
17 David Nowak, “Report: Russia to allow Pre-emptive Nukes,” Associated Press, October 14, 2009.
18 See text of the 2010 Russian Military Doctrine, February 5, 2010, at https://carnegieendowment.org/files/
2010russia_military_doctrine.pdf.
19 Nikolai Sokov, “T he New, 2010 Russian Military Doctrine: T he Nuclear Angle,” Center for Nonproliferation
Studies, CNS Feature Story, Monterey, CA, February 5, 2010 , https://www.nonproliferation.org/new-2010-russian-
military-doctrine/.
20 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, On Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation ,
Moscow, June 2, 2020, https://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/foreign_policy/international_safety/disarmament/-/
asset_publisher/rp0fiUBmANaH/content/id/4152094.
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“considers nuclear weapons exclusively as a means of deterrence.” It states that Russia’s nuclear
deterrence policy “is defensive by nature, it is aimed at maintaining the nuclear forces potential at
the level sufficient for nuclear deterrence, and guarantees protection of national sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the State, and deterrence of a potential adversary from aggression against
the Russian Federation and/or its al ies.” It emphasizes that Russia maintains forces that could
“inflict guaranteed unacceptable damage on a potential adversary … in any circumstances”21
The document lists a number of threats that Russia might face and circumstances under which it
might consider the use of nuclear weapons. It indicates that Russia could respond with nuclear
weapons when it has received “reliable data on a launch of bal istic missiles attacking the
territory of the Russian Federation and/or its al ies” and in response to the “use of nuclear
weapons or other types of weapons of mass destruction by an adversary against the Russian
Federation and/or its al ies.” It could also respond with nuclear weapons fol owing an “attack by
adversary against critical governmental or military sites of the Russian Federation, disruption of
which would undermine nuclear forces response actions” and “aggression against the Russian
Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in
jeopardy.”22
As with previous official statements, this document does not cal for the preemptive use of
nuclear weapons during conventional conflicts. But it does not completely resolve the question of
whether Russia would escalate to nuclear use if it were losing a conventional war. It notes that,
“in the event of a military conflict, this Policy provides for the prevention of an escalation of
military actions and their termination on conditions that are acceptable for the Russian Federation
and/or its al ies.” Analysts have assessed that this means Russia might threaten to escalate to
nuclear use as a way to deter a conflict that would threaten the existence of the state.23
Security Concerns
Analysts have identified several factors that contributed to Russia’s increasing reliance on nuclear
weapons during the 1990s. First, with the demise of the Soviet Union and Russia’s subsequent
economic collapse, Russia no longer had the means to support large and effective conventional
forces. Conflicts in the Russian region of Chechnya and, in 2008, neighboring Georgia also
highlighted seeming weaknesses in Russia’s conventional military forces. In addition, Russian
analysts saw emerging threats in other neighboring post-Soviet states; many analysts believed that
by even implicitly threatening that it might resort to nuclear weapons, Russia hoped it could
enhance its ability to deter the start of, or NATO interference in, such regional conflicts.
Russia’s sense of vulnerability, and its view that its security was increasingly threatened, also
stemmed from NATO enlargement.24 Russia has long feared that an expanding al iance would
create a new chal enge to Russia’s security, particularly if NATO were to move nuclear weapons

21 Ibid. Paras 4, 5 and 10.
22 Ibid. Para 19.
23 Nikolai Sokov, Russia Clarifies Its Nuclear Deterrence Policy, Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-
Proliferation, Vienna, Austria, June 3, 2020, https://vcdnp.org/russia-clarifies-its-nuclear-deterrence-policy/.
24 In 1995, NAT O completed a Study on NAT O Enlargement that concluded that “the end of the Cold War provided a
unique opportunity to build improved security in the entire Euro -Atlantic area and that NAT O enlargement would
contribute to enhanced stability and security for all.” Its membership has since expanded from 16 to 29 nations, adding
many nations that were a part of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact prior to 1991. For information, see North Atlantic
T reaty Organization, Mem ber Countries, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52044.htm.
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closer to Russia’s borders. These concerns contributed to the statement in the 1997 doctrine that
Russia might use nuclear weapons if its national survival was threatened.25
For many in Russia, NATO’s air campaign in Kosovo in 1999 underlined Russia’s growing
weakness and NATO’s increasing wil ingness to threaten Russian interests.26 Russia’s 2000
National Security Concept noted that the level and scope of the military threat to Russia was
growing. It cited, specifical y, “the desire of some states and international associations to diminish
the role of existing mechanisms for ensuring international security.” It also noted that “a vital task
of the Russian Federation is to exercise deterrence to prevent aggression on any scale, nuclear or
otherwise, against Russia and its al ies.” Consequently, it concluded, Russia “must have nuclear
forces capable of delivering specified damage to any aggressor state or a coalition of states in any
situation.”27
The potential threat from NATO remained a concern for Russia in its 2010 and 2014 military
doctrines.28 The 2010 doctrine stated that the main external military dangers to Russia were “the
desire to endow the force potential of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with global
functions carried out in violation of the norms of international law and to move the military
infrastructure of NATO member countries closer to the borders of the Russian Federation,
including by expanding the bloc.” It also noted that Russia was threatened by “the deployment of
troop contingents of foreign states (groups of states) on the territories of states contiguous with
the Russian Federation and its al ies and also in adjacent waters” (a reference to the fact that
NATO now included states that had been part of the Warsaw Pact). Russian concerns also
extended to U.S. missile defense deployed on land in Poland and Romania and at sea near
Russian territory as a part of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA).
Russia’s possession of a large arsenal of nonstrategic nuclear weapons and dual-capable systems,
combined with recent statements designed to remind others of the strength of Russia’s nuclear
deterrent, have led some to argue that Russia has increased the role of nuclear weapons in its
military strategy and military planning.29 Before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014, some
analysts argued that Russia’s nonstrategic nuclear weapons had “no defined mission and no
deterrence framework [had] been elaborated for them.” 30 However, subsequent Russian
statements, coupled with military exercises that appeared to simulate the use of nuclear weapons
against NATO members, have led many to believe that Russia might threaten to use its shorter-
range, nonstrategic nuclear weapons to coerce or intimidate its neighbors. Such a nuclear threat

25 For information on the evolution of Russia’s external threat perception and its views on nuclear weapons, see
Stephen Blank, editor, Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, Future (U.S. Army War College, 2011).
26 Alexei Arbatov, “T he Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine: Lessons Learned from Kosovo and Chechnya,”
T he Marshall Center Papers, No. 2, 2000, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a478927.pdf.
27 “2000 Russian National Security Concept”; see text at https://fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/gazeta012400.htm.
28 See text of the 2010 Russian Military Doctrine, February 5, 2010, at https://carnegieendowment.org/files/
2010russia_military_doctrine.pdf. See, also, Dmitri T renin, “ 2014: Russia’s New Military Doctrine T ells All,”
Carnegie Moscow Center, Moscow, December 29, 2014, https://carnegie.ru/commentary/57607.
29 Robin Emmott, “Risk of Nuclear War in Europe Growing, warns Russian Ex -Minister,” Reuters, March 21, 2016.
See, also, Yasmin T adjdeh, “State Dept. Official: Russian Nuclear Disarmament Must Continue,” National Defense,
March 23, 2016.
30 Dmitry Adamsky, “Nuclear Incoherence: Deterrence T heory and Non -Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Russia,”
Journal of Strategic Studies, 37/2014, pp. 91-134, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/
01402390.2013.798583.
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could occur before or during a conflict if Russia believed that a threat to use nuclear weapons
could lead its adversaries, including the United States and its al ies, to back down.31
Consequently, several analysts have argued that Russia has adopted an “escalate to de-escalate”
nuclear doctrine. They contend that when faced with the likelihood of defeat in a military conflict
with NATO, Russia might threaten to use nuclear weapons in an effort to coerce NATO members
to withdraw from the battlefield.32 Officials in the Trump Administration advanced this view, and
it informed decisions made during the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. However, Russia does not
use the phrase “escalate to de-escalate” in any versions of its military doctrine, and debate exists
about whether this is an accurate characterization of Russian thinking about nuclear weapons.33
Conflicting statements from Russia have contributed to disagreements among U.S. analysts over
the circumstances under which Russia would use nuclear weapons. During a March 2018 speech
to the Federal Assembly, President Putin seemed to affirm the broad role for nuclear weapons that
Russia’s military doctrine assigns:
I should note that our military doctrine says Russia reserves the right to use nuclear
weapons solely in response to a nuclear attack, or an attack with other weapons of mass
destruction against the country or its allies, or an act of aggression against us with the use
of conventional weapons that threaten the very existence of the state. This all is very clear
and specific. As such, I see it is my duty to announce the following. Any use of nuclear
weapons against Russia or its allies, weapons of short, medium or any range at all, will be
considered as a nuclear attack on this country. Retaliation will be immediate, with all the
attendant consequences. There should be no doubt about this whatsoever.34
This statement is consistent with the conditions outlined in the 2020 document on The Basic
Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence.
Putin and other Russian officials have extensively used what some Western analysts have
described as “nuclear messaging” in the wake of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and instigation of
conflict in eastern Ukraine. Their references to Russia’s nuclear capabilities have seemed like an
effort to signal that Russia’s stakes are higher than those of the West and that Russia is wil ing to
go to great lengths to protect its interests.35
At times, however, President Putin has offered a more restrained view of the role of nuclear
weapons. In 2016, Putin stated that “brandishing nuclear weapons is the last thing to do. This is
harmful rhetoric, and I do not welcome it.” He also dismissed suggestions that Russia would
consider using nuclear weapons offensively, stating that “nuclear weapons are a deterrent and a
factor of ensuring peace and security worldwide. They should not be considered as a factor in any

31 For a detailed description of Russia’s strategy, see Nikolai N. Sokov, “Why Russia calls a limited nuclear strike
‘deescalation,’” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 2014, http://thebulletin.org/why-russia-calls-limited-
nuclearstrike-de-escalation.
32 John R. Harvey, Franklin C. Miller, Keith B. Payne, and Bradley H. Roberts, “Continuity and Change in U.S.
Nuclear Policy,” RealClear Defense, February 7, 2018, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/02/07/
continuity_and_change_in_us_nuclear_policy_113025.html.
33 T his debate is addressed in more detail below.
34 “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly,” President of Russia, March 1, 2018, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/
president/news/56957.
35 Jacek Durkalec, “Nuclear-Backed ‘Little Green Men:’ Nuclear Messaging in the Ukraine Crisis,” July 14, 2015,
https://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=20165.
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potential aggression, because it is impossible, and it would probably mean the end of our
civilization.”36
In October 2018, President Putin made a statement that some analysts interpreted as potential y
moving toward a “sole purpose” doctrine, by which Russia would use nuclear weapons only in
response to others’ use of nuclear weapons.37 Putin declared
There is no provision for a preventive strike in our nuclear weapons doctrine. Our concept
is based on a retaliatory reciprocal counter strike. This means that we are prepared and wil
use nuclear weapons only when we know for certain that some potential aggressor is
attacking Russia, our territory [with nuclear weapons]…. Only when we know for
certain—and this takes a few seconds to understand—that Russia is being attacked will we
deliver a counterstrike…. Of course, this amounts to a global catastrophe, but I would like
to repeat that we cannot be the initiators of such a catastrophe because we have no provision
for a preventive strike.38
However, as noted above, the 2020 document on Basic Principles … on Nuclear Deterrence
contains a broader range of circumstances, including attacks on nuclear command and control and
attacks with other weapons of mass destruction that might result in a Russian nuclear response.
Soviet Nuclear Forces
The Soviet Union conducted its first explosive test of a nuclear device on August 29, 1949, four
years after the United States employed nuclear weapons against Japan at the end of World War II.
After this test, the Soviet Union initiated the serial production of nuclear devices and work on
thermonuclear weapons, and it began to explore delivery methods for its nascent nuclear arsenal.
The Soviet Union tested its first version of a thermonuclear bomb in 1953, two years after the
United States crossed that threshold. The Soviet stockpile of nuclear warheads grew rapidly
through the 1960s and 1970s, peaking at more than 40,000 warheads in 1986, according to
unclassified estimates (see Figure 1). Within this total, around 10,700 warheads were carried by
long-range delivery systems, the strategic forces that could reach targets in the United States in
the mid-1980s.
By the 1960s, the Soviet Union, like the United States, had developed a triad of nuclear forces:
land-based intercontinental bal istic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched bal istic missiles
(SLBMs), and heavy bombers equipped with nuclear weapons.39 In 1951, the Soviet Union
conducted its first air drop test of a nuclear bomb and began to deploy nuclear weapons with its
Long-Range Aviation forces soon thereafter. Bomber aircraft included the M-4 Bison, which
barely had the range needed to attack the United States and then return home. The Tu-95 Bear
strategic bomber, which had a longer range, entered service in 1956. Later modifications of the
Bear bomber have since been the mainstay of the Soviet/Russian nuclear triad’s air leg.

36 “Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club,” President of Russia, October 27, 2016, http://en.kremlin.ru/
events/president/news/53151.
37 Michael Krepon, “Weapons of Last Resort,” Arms Control Wonk, October 29, 2018,
https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1206119/weapons-of-last-resort/.
38 Transcript of the meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club, October 18, 2018, http://kremlin.ru/events/
president/news/58848.
39 Unless explicitly cited, this section draws on Pavel Podvig, ed., Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces (MIT Press, 2001)
and Steven J. Zaloga, The Krem lin’s Nuclear Sword: The Rise and Fall of Russia’s Strategic Nuclear Forces, 1 945-
2002 (Smithsonian Institution Press, 2002).
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Figure 1. Estimates of Soviet/Russian Strategic Forces
Force Level (estimate)
Launchers
Warheads
14000
12000
10000
8000
6000
4000
2000
0
9
2
5
8
1
4
7
0
3
6
9
2
5
8
1
4
7
0
3
6
9
2
5
8
1
49 59 59 59 69 69 69 79 79 79 79 89 89 89 99 99 99 00 00 00 00 10 10 10 20
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

Source: Natural Resources Defense Council, Archive of Nuclear Data and Bul etin of the Atomic Scientists,
Nuclear Notebook.
In 1956, the Soviet Union tested and deployed its first bal istic missile with a nuclear warhead,
the SS-3, a shorter-range, or theater, missile. It tested and deployed the SS-4, a theater bal istic
missile that would be at the heart of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, by 1959. Soviet missile
ranges were further extended with the deployment of an intermediate-range bal istic missile, the
SS-5. The 1957 launch of the Sputnik satel ite on a modified SS-6 long-range missile heralded the
Soviet Union’s development of ICBMs. By the end of the decade, the Soviet Union had launched
an SS-N-1 SLBM from a Zulu-class attack submarine of the Soviet Navy. The undersea leg of the
triad would steadily progress over the following decade with the deployment of SLBMs on the
Golf class attack submarine and then the Hotel and Yankee class nuclear-powered submarines.
Manned since 1959 by a separate military service cal ed the Strategic Rocket Forces, the ICBM
leg came to dominate the Soviet nuclear triad. During the 1960s, the Soviet Union rapidly
augmented its force of fixed land-based ICBMs, expanding from around 10 launchers and two
types of missiles in 1961 to just over 1,500 launchers with eight different types of missiles in
1971.40 Because these missiles were initial y based on soft launch pads or in vertical silos that
could not withstand an attack from U.S. nuclear warheads, many concluded that the Soviet Union
likely planned to use them in a first strike attack against U.S. missile forces and U.S. territory.
Moreover, the United States believed that the design of Soviet ICBMs provided the Soviet Union
with the ability to contemplate, and possibly execute, a successful disarming first strike against
U.S. land-based forces. Half of the ICBM missile types were different variants of the largest
missile, the SS-9 ICBM. The United States referred to this as a “heavy” ICBM due to its
significant throwweight, which al owed it to carry a higher-yield warhead, estimated at around 20
megatons.41 The United States believed, possibly inaccurately,42 that the missile’s combination of

40 T he United States expanded its force from about 12 launchers in 1960 to a peak of 1,054 launchers at the end of the
decade.
41 See the table in Pavel Podvig, “T he Window of Vulnerability T hat Wasn’t: Soviet Military Buildup in the 1970s.”
T hrowweight is a measure of the lifting power, or maximum payload, that a ballistic missile could deliver to a target.
Missiles with greater throwweight could carry and deliver larger warheads and a larger number of warheads against an
adversary.
42 Pavel Podvig, “T he Window of Vulnerability T hat Wasn't: Soviet Military Buildup in the 1970s—A Research Note,”
International Security, vol. 33, no. 1 (summer 2008), pp. 118-138.
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improved accuracy and high yield posed a unique threat to U.S. land-based missiles. Concerns
about Soviet heavy ICBMs persisted throughout the Cold War, affecting both U.S. force structure
decisions and U.S. proposals for arms control negotiations.
Although smal er and less capable than
The Offense/Defense Relationship
its land-based forces, the sea-based leg
Part 1
of the Soviet triad was built up during
Analysts have recognized the connection between offensive
the 1960s, with the deployment of
nuclear weapons and bal istic missile defenses since the 1960s.
SLBMs on Golf-, Hotel-, and Yankee-
While missile defenses might have been able protect critical
class submarines. These submarines
assets and, possibly, cities from missile attack, some believed
they also could spur an arms race in offensive missiles.
carried intermediate-range (rather than
According to this view, both the United States and Soviet Union
intercontinental-range) missiles, but
would be better able to launch a successful attack if they had
their mobility al owed the Soviet
enough offensive missiles to saturate a fixed number of defensive
Union to threaten targets throughout
interceptors. And neither would be wil ing to limit the size of its
Europe and, to a lesser extent, in the
offensive forces if the other could deploy an unlimited number
of defensive interceptors. The 1972 SALT agreements sought to
United States. The Soviet Union began
address this concern. The Interim Agreement on Offensive
the decade with 30 missile launchers
Arms limited the number of land-based and submarine-based
on 10 submarines and ended it with
missile launchers, while the Anti-bal istic Missile (ABM) Treaty
228 launchers on 31 submarines.43
limited the number of missile defense sites and missile defense
interceptors in each country. Together, the two agreements
By the end of the 1960s, the United
sought to ensure that each side had the ability to launch a
States and the Soviet Union had
successful second strike, thereby discouraging either from
initiated negotiations to limit the
launching a first strike. While many believed that this balance
was necessary to maintain stability and security in the nuclear
numbers of launchers for long-range
age, others argued that U.S. security would be better served by
missiles.44 The emerging parity in
developing and deploying extensive defensive systems that could
numbers of deployed nuclear-armed
protect the United States and its al ies from missile attack. The
missiles, coupled with several nuclear
debate over these two perspectives persisted throughout the
Cold War and continues today.
crises, had paved the way for a
recognition of their mutual deterrence
relationship and arms control talks.45 As noted below, the Interim Agreement on Offensive
Arms—negotiated as part of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) and signed in 1972—
capped the construction and size of ICBM silo launchers (in an effort to limit the number of
heavy ICBMs in the Soviet force) and limited the number of launchers for SLBMs. It did not,
however, limit the nuclear warheads that could be carried by ICBMs or SLBMs.
As a result, the Soviet Union continued to modernize and expand its nuclear forces in the 1970s.
During this time, the Soviet Union
 commissioned numerous Delta-class strategic missile submarines, armed with the
single-warhead, intercontinental-range SS-N-8 SLBM;
 developed the Tu-22M Backfire intermediate-range bomber aircraft;

43 T he Soviet ballistic missile submarine force continued to grow during the 1970s, peaking at 993 launchers on 86
submarines in 1979. T he United States deployed 41 ballistic missile submarines by 1969; these carried 656 launchers.
44 A more detailed discussion of the role that arms control has played in shaping and reducing Soviet and Russian
nuclear forces appears on page 25, below.
45 Russian analysts argue that the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, which did not result in a nuclear attack on the Soviet
Union, despite U.S. nuclear superiority, signaled the beginning of the mutual deterrence relationship. A.A. Kokoshin,
V.A. Veselov, A. V. Liss, Sderzhivaniye vo vtorom yadernom veke [Deterrence in the second nuclear century] (Russian
Academy of Sciences, 2001), pp. 9-17.
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 began to develop a new supersonic strategic heavy bomber (eventual y the Tu-
160 Blackjack); and
 began to deploy the SS-20 intermediate-range bal istic missile in 1976, which,
along with other missiles of its class, would be eliminated under the 1987 INF
Treaty.
The Soviet Union also pursued an extensive expansion of its land-based ICBM force. It not only
developed a number of new types of ICBMs, but, in 1974, it began to deploy these missiles with
multiple warheads (known as MIRVs, or multiple independent reentry vehicles).46 During this
time frame the Soviet Union developed, tested, and deployed the 4-warhead SS-17 ICBM, 10-
warhead SS-18 ICBM (a new heavy ICBM that replaced the SS-9), and 6-warhead SS-19 ICBM.
Because each of these missiles could carry multiple warheads, the SALT I limit on ICBM
launchers did not constrain the number of warheads on the Soviet missile force. Moreover, the
ICBM force began to dominate the Soviet triad during this time (see Figure 2).
Figure 2. Estimates of Warheads on Soviet/Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces
# Warheads (estimate)
8000
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
9
2
5
8
1
4
7
0
3
6
9
2
5
8
1
4
7
0
3
6
9
2
5
8
1
49
59
59
59
69
69
69
79
79
79
79
89
89
89
99
99
99
00
00
00
00
10
10
10
20
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
Warheads on ICBM
Warheads on SLBM
Warheads on Bombers

Source: Natural Resources Defense Council, Archive of Nuclear Data and Bul etin of the Atomic Scientists,
Nuclear Notebook.
U.S. analysts and officials expressed particular concern about the heavy SS-18 ICBM and its
subsequent modifications. The Soviet Union deployed 308 of these missiles, each with the ability
to carry up to 10 warheads and numerous decoys and penetration aides designed to confuse
missile defense radars. These concerns contributed to a debate in the U.S. defense community
about a “window of vulnerability” in the U.S.-Soviet nuclear balance due to a Soviet advantage in
cumulative bal istic missile throwweight. Some asserted that the Soviets’ throwweight advantage
could translate into an edge in the number of warheads deployed on land-based missiles. They
postulated that the Soviet Union could attack al U.S. land-based missiles with just a portion of
the Soviet land-based force, leaving it with enough warheads after an initial nuclear attack to
dominate and possibly coerce the United States into surrendering without any retaliation. Others

46 During this time, the United States also deployed multiple warheads on its ICBMs and SLBMs, leading to a rapid
increase in the number of deployed warheads on each nation’s strategic forces.
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disputed this theory, noting that the United States maintained a majority of its nuclear warheads
on sea-based systems that could survive a Soviet first strike and that the synergy of U.S. land-
based, sea-based, and air-delivered weapons would complicate, and therefore deter, a Soviet first
strike.47
Recent research examining the
The Offense/Defense Relationship
records of Soviet planners and
Part II
officials suggests that Soviet missile
Although the United States long insisted that its nuclear forces
developments during the 1970s did
served as a deterrent by providing the United States with the
not seek to achieve, and did not have
ability to retaliate after a Soviet first strike, the Soviet Union
the capabilities needed for, a first-
believed the United States was pursuing a first-strike capability
during the 1980s. Specifical y, the combination of new U.S.
strike advantage or a warfighting
offensive and defensive capabilities raised concerns about a
posture. Instead, the Soviet Union
situation known as the “ragged second strike” problem. In this
began to harden its missile silos so
concept, a U.S. first strike against Soviet missiles would deplete the
they could survive attack and to
Soviet force. U.S. missile defenses, even if they were too limited to
develop an early warning system,
intercept the ful arsenal of Soviet land-based missiles, might then
“mop up” the remaining, retaliating warheads. If, during an extreme
thus moving toward a second-strike
crisis, the Soviet Union believed it was about to fal victim to this
capability.48
attack, it might choose to strike first, while it stil had enough
missiles and warheads to penetrate the U.S. defenses. This
Moreover, the 1980s saw Soviet
pressure to launch first in a crisis, which experts refer to as crisis
planners worrying about maintaining
instability, led to proposals to limit the numbers and capabilities of
their second-strike capability in light
bal istic missile defenses and to reduce the numbers of warheads
of U.S. strategic offense and missile
on vulnerable land-based missiles, which would make them less
lucrative as targets in a first strike. This proposal was captured by
defense programs.49 The United
the 1993 START II Treaty (described below).
States was modernizing its land-
Although SDI never produced an expansive missile defense system,
based ICBMs, bal istic missile
the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2002.
submarines and SLBMs, and heavy
Consequently, Russia stil sees U.S. missile defense programs as a
bombers. Each of the new U.S.
threat to its retaliatory capability, and it continues to seek
missiles would carry multiple
technologies and weapons systems that wil provide it with the
ability to retaliate after a U.S. first strike and in the face of
warheads, and the Soviets believed
expansive U.S. missile defenses.
al would have the accuracy to target
and destroy Soviet land-based
missiles. In March 1983, President Reagan announced the Strategic Defense Initiative, a missile
defense program that he pledged would make bal istic missiles “impotent and obsolete.”50 The
SS-18 ICBM, with its capacity to carry 10 warheads and penetration aids, provided a counter to
these U.S. capabilities.

47 Leslie H. Gelb, “Vulnerability Assumes the Soviets Will Strike First,” New York Times, October 4, 1981,
https://www.nytimes.com/1981/10/04/weekinreview/vulnerability-assumes-the-soviets-will-strike-first.html. See, also,
Michael R. Gordon, “ T he Summit: Reagan’s Missile-Cut Offer T hrows Open ‘Window of Vulnerability’ Debate,”
December 7, 1987. For a detailed review of this theory, see The Report of the President’s Com m ission on Strategic
Forces (T he Scowcroft Commission Report), April 1983, http://web.mit.edu/chemistry/deutch/policy/1983-
ReportPresCommStrategic.pdf.
48 Pavel Podvig, “T he Window of Vulnerability T hat Wasn’t: Soviet Military Buildup in the 1970s-A Research Note,”
International Security, Summer 2008, https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/isec.2008.33.1.118.
49 Brendan R. Green and Austin Long, “T he MAD Who Wasn’t T here: Soviet Reactions to the Late Cold War Nuclear
Balance,” Security Studies, 26/2017, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09636412.2017.1331639.
50 Ronald Reagan, Address to the Nation of National Security, University of Virginia, Miller Center, Presidential
Speeches, March 23, 1983, https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/march-23-1983-address-
nation-national-security.
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During the 1980s, development continued across al three legs of the Soviet nuclear triad. The
Typhoon-class strategic submarine and the Tu-160 Blackjack bomber entered into service. Anti-
ship cruise missiles were joined by modern AS-15 land-attack cruise missiles. The Soviet Union
continued to improve the accuracy of its fixed, silo-based missiles and began to deploy mobile
ICBMs, adding both the road-mobile, single warhead SS-25 missile and the rail-mobile, 10-
warhead SS-24 missile.
By the end of the 1980s, prior to the signing of the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START), the Soviet Union had completed the backbone of what was to become the Russian
nuclear triad of the 1990s. Its air leg consisted of Bear, Backfire, and Blackjack bombers. Its
undersea leg consisted of Delta- and Typhoon-class submarines with MIRV SLBMs. Its ICBM
leg consisted of the SS-18, SS-19, and SS-25 missiles.51
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union produced and deployed a wide range of delivery vehicles
for nonstrategic nuclear weapons. At different times during the period, it deployed devices smal
enough to fit into a suitcase-sized container; nuclear mines; shel s for artil ery; short-, medium-,
and intermediate-range bal istic missiles; short-range, air-delivered missiles; and gravity bombs.
The Soviet Union deployed these weapons at nearly 600 bases, with some located in Warsaw Pact
countries in Eastern Europe, some in the Soviet Union’s non-Russian republics along its western
and southern perimeter, and others throughout the Soviet Union. Estimates vary, but many
analysts believe that by 1991 the Soviet Union had more than 20,000 of these weapons. Before
the collapse of the Warsaw Pact in 1989, the numbers may have been higher, in the range of
25,000 weapons. 52
Russian Nuclear Forces
Like the Soviet Union, the Russia Federation maintains a triad of nuclear forces consisting of
ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. The total number of warheads in the Soviet and Russian
arsenal and the number deployed on Soviet and Russian strategic forces began to decline in the
late 1980s (see Figure 1 and Figure 2 above). These reductions were primarily driven by the
limits in the 1991 START I Treaty, the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, and the 2010
New START Treaty. The reductions also reflect the retirement of many older Soviet-era missiles
and their replacement with new missiles that carry fewer warheads, as wel as the effects of the
fiscal crisis in the late 1990s, which slowed the deployment of the next generation of Russian
missiles and submarines. Moreover, under the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction
program, the United States helped Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan move Soviet-era
nuclear weapons back to Russian territory and to dismantle portions of the Soviet Union’s nuclear
arsenal.
Russia deploys its strategic nuclear forces at more than a dozen bases across its territory. These
bases are shown on Figure 4, below.
Russia is currently modernizing most of the components of its nuclear triad. The current phase of
modernization essential y began in 1998. The Soviet Union replaced its land-based missiles
frequently, with new systems entering the force every 10-15 years and modifications appearing
every few years. Russia has not kept up this pace. When it began the most recent modernization

51 See Appendix A for a timeline of the development and deployment of Soviet/Russian nuclear-capable delivery
systems active since 1989.
52 Joshua Handler, “T he 1991-1992 PNIs and the Elimination, Storage and Security of T actical Nuclear Weapons,” in
Alexander, Brian and Alistair Millar, editors, T actical Nuclear Weapons (Washington, DC: Brassey’s Inc., 2003), p. 31.
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cycle, it was in the midst of a financial crisis. The crisis not only reduced the number of new
missiles entering the force each year, but slowed the process. As a result, some of the systems that
have had been under development since the late 1990s and early 2000s began to enter the force in
the late 2000s, but others wil not do so until the 2020s. In December 2020, Russia’s President
Vladimir Putin reported that about 86% of Russia’s strategic nuclear force was made up of
modern weapons, a number he expected to rise to 88% in 2021.53
Figure 3. Bases for Russian Strategic Forces

Source: Compiled by CRS.
Active Forces
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
As was the case during the Soviet era, Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) are a separate
branch of the Russian armed forces. These forces are stil the mainstay of Russia’s nuclear triad.
Today, the SRF includes three missile armies, which, in turn, comprise 11 missile divisions (see
Figure 3).54 These divisions are spread across Russia’s territory, from Vypolzovo in the west to
the Irkutsk region in eastern Siberia. The Strategic Rocket Forces are estimated to have
approximately 60,000 personnel.55

53 “Defence Ministry Board Meeting,” December 24, 2019, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/62401, cited in
Hans Kristensen and Matt Korda, “ Russian nuclear forces, 2020,” Bulletin of the Atom ic Scientists, 2021, vol. 77, no. 2,
p. 91, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00963402.2021.1885869?needAccess=true .
54 Pavel Podvig, “Strategic Rocket Forces,” Russian strategic nuclear forces, June 2017, http://russianforces.org/
missiles/.
55 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Russia Military Power: Building a Military to Support Great Power
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According to official and unofficial sources, Russia’s ICBM force currently comprises 310
missiles that can carry up to 1,189 warheads, although only about 800 warheads are deployed and
available for use.56 Over half of these missiles are MIRVed, carrying multiple warheads.
Russia is modernizing its ICBM force, replacing the last missiles remaining from the Soviet era
with new single warhead and multiple warhead missiles. According to U.S. estimates, Russia is
likely to complete this modernization around 2022.57 It is anticipated that, after modernization,
Russia’s ICBM force wil come to rely primarily on two missiles: the single-warhead SS-27 Mod
1 (Topol-M) and the SS-27 Mod 2 (Yars), which can carry up to 4 MIRV warheads.
As discussed below, Russia is developing a new heavy ICBM, known as the Sarmat (SS-X-30),
which is expected to deploy with 10 or more warheads on each missile. It may also carry the new
Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle, also described below. According to unclassified reports,
Russia has pursued other projects, including an intermediate-range version of the SS-27 Mod 2
(known as the RS-26) and a rail-mobile ICBM cal ed Barguzin, but their future is unclear.58
Table 1. Russian ICBM Systems
In service and under development
ICBM System
Launchers
Warheads
Notes
SS-18 (R-36M2)
46
10
Retiring, to be replaced by Sarmat
SS-19 (UR-100NUTTH)
0
0
Retired, replaced by Yars
SS-19 with Avangard HGV
4
1 HGV
Deployment of 2 planned in 2019 and
12 planned by 2027
SS-25 (Topol)
27
1
Retiring, being replaced by Yars
SS-27 Mod 1 (Topol-M) silo
60
1
Currently deployed
SS-27 Mod 2 (Topol-M) mobile
18
1
Currently Deployed
SS-27 Mod 2/RS-24 (Yars) mobile
135
4
Currently Deployed
SS-27 Mod 2/RS-24 (Yars) silo
20
4
Currently Deployed
SS-X-30 (Sarmat) silo

10 +
Expected in 2022
Sources: Hans Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Russian nuclear forces, 2020,” Bul etin of the Atomic Scientists, 2021,
vol. 77, no. 2, p. 91, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00963402.2021.1885869?needAccess=true.,
and Pavel Podvig, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces blog.

Aspirations, Washington, DC, 2016, p. 47, https://www.dia.mil/portals/27/documents/news/
military%20power%20publications/russia%20military%20power%20report%202017.pdf.
56 Hans Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Russian nuclear forces, 2020,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2021, vol. 77, no.
2, p. 91, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00963402.2021.1885869?needAccess=true . T he Defense
Intelligence Agency reported that about 1,200 warheads were retained for Russia’s ICBMs in 2016, before Russia met
New ST ART limits. DIA, “ Russia Military Power,” 2016, p. 47, https://www.dia.mil/portals/27/documents/news/
military%20power%20publications/russia%20military%20power%20report%202017.pdf.
57 DIA, “Russia Military Power,” 2016, p. 76.
58 Kristensen and Korda, “Russian nuclear forces, 2019.”
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Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles
Russia’s Strategic Naval Forces are a part of the Russian Navy. Bal istic missile submarines are
deployed with the Northern Fleet, headquartered in Severomorsk in the Murmansk region, and
the Pacific Fleet, headquartered in Vladivostok.59
The Strategic Naval Forces have 10 strategic submarines of three different types: Delta, Typhoon,
and Borei class. Some of these are no longer operational. The last submarine of the Typhoon class
is used as a testbed for launches of the Bulava missile, which is deployed on the Borei-class
submarines. The Delta and Borei-class submarines can each carry 16 SLBMs, with multiple
warheads on a missile, “for a combined maximum loading of more than 700 warheads.”60
However, because Russia may have reduced the number of warheads on some of the missiles to
comply with limitations set by the 2010 New START Treaty, the submarine fleet may carry
around 624 warheads.61
Table 2. Russian Ballistic Missile Submarines and Missiles
Strategic
Number
Type of
Number
Warheads
Submarine
of SSBN
SLBM
of Missiles
per Missile
Notes
Delta III (Project
1
SS-N-18
16
3
Being withdrawn from service,
667BDR)
(R-29R)
with two decommissioned in
2018
Delta IV (Project
6
SS-N-23
96
4
4-5 of each operational at any
667BDRM)
(R-29RM)
given time
Typhoon (Project

Test bed for Bulava missiles
941)
Borei (Project 955)
4
SS-N-32
64
6
Planned deployment of 10
(Bulava R-
submarines
30)
Sources: Hans Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Russian nuclear forces, 2020,” Bul etin of the Atomic Scientists, 2021,
vol. 77, no. 2, p. 91, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00963402.2021.1885869?needAccess=true.
Pavel Podvig, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces blog.
Most of the submarines in Russia’s fleet are the older Delta class, including one Delta III
submarine and 6 Delta IV submarines. The last of these was built in 1992; they are based with
Russia’s Northern Fleet. Although older Delta submarines were deployed with three-warhead SS-
N-18 missiles, the Delta IV submarines carry the four-warhead SS-N-23 missile. An upgraded
version of this missile, known as the Sineva system, entered into service in 2007. Another
modification, known as the Liner (or Layner), could reportedly carry up to 10 warheads.62
Russia began constructing the lead ship in its Borei class of bal istic missile submarines (SSBN)
in 1996. After numerous delays, the lead ship joined the Northern Fleet in 2013. According to
public reports, Russia wil eventual y deploy 10 Borei-class submarines, with 5 in the Pacific
Fleet and 5 in the Northern Fleet. Four submarines are currently in service, al in the Northern

59 Pavel Podvig, “Strategic fleet,” Russian strategic nuclear forces, June 2017, http://russianforces.org/navy/.
60 Hans Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Russian nuclear forces, 2020,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2021, vol. 77, no.
2, p. 91, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00963402.2021.1885869?needAccess=true.
61 Ibid.
62 Pavel Podvig, “Strategic fleet,” Russian strategic nuclear forces, June 2017, http://russianforces.org/navy/.
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Fleet, and four more are in “various stages of construction.”63 One of the operational submarines
and the four under construction are an improved version, known as the Borei-A/II. Russia plans
to complete the first eight ships by 2023 and to finish the last two by 2027. Borei-class
submarines can carry 16 of the SS-N-32 Bulava missiles; each missile can carry six warheads.
The Bulava missile began development in the late 1990s. It experienced numerous test failures
before it entered service in 2018.64
Heavy Bombers
Russia’s strategic aviation units are part of the Russian Aerospace Forces’ Long-Range Aviation
Command. This command includes two divisions of Tu-160 (Blackjack) and Tu-95MS (Bear H)
aircraft, which are the current mainstay of Russia’s strategic bomber fleet. These are located in
the Saratov region, in southwestern Russia, and the Amurskaya region, in Russia’s Far East.65
Unclassified sources estimate that Russia has 60 to 70 bombers in its inventory—50 of them
count under the New START Treaty.66 Around 55 of these are Tu-95MS Bear bombers; the rest
are Tu-160 Blackjack bombers. The former can carry up to 16 AS-15 (Kh-55) nuclear-armed
cruise missiles, while the latter can carry up to 12 AS-15 nuclear-armed cruise missiles. Both
bombers can also carry nuclear gravity bombs, though experts contend that the bombers would be
vulnerable to U.S. or al ied air defenses in such a delivery mission.
Russia has recently modernized both of its bombers, fitting them with a new cruise missile
system, the conventional AS-23A (Kh-101) and the nuclear AS-23B (Kh-102). A newer version of
the Tu-160, which is expected to include improved stealth characteristics and a longer range, is
set to begin production in the mid-2020s. Experts believe the fleet will then include around 50-60
aircraft, with the eventual development of a new stealth bomber, known as the PAK-DA, as a part
of Russia’s long-term plans.67
Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons
Russia has a variety of delivery systems that can carry nuclear warheads to shorter and
intermediate ranges. These systems are general y referred to as nonstrategic nuclear weapons, and
they do not fal under the limits in U.S.-Soviet or U.S.-Russian arms control treaties.68 According
to unclassified reports, Russia has a number of nuclear weapons available for use by its “naval,
tactical air, air- and missile defense forces, as wel as on short-range bal istic missiles.”69 It is
reportedly engaged in a modernization effort focused on “phasing out Soviet-era weapons and
replacing them with newer versions.” Unclassified estimates place the number of warheads
assigned to nonstrategic nuclear weapons at 1,912.70

63 Hans Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Russian nuclear forces, 2020,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2021, vol. 77, no.
2, p. 91, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00963402.2021.1885869?needAccess=true.
64 Pavel Podvig, “Bulava is finally accepted for service,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces blog, June 29, 2018,
http://russianforces.org/blog/2018/06/bulava_is_finally_accepted_for.shtml.
65 Pavel Podvig, “Strategic aviation,” Russian strategic nuclear forces, June 20, 2017, http://russianforces.org/aviation/.
66 Hans Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Russian nuclear forces, 2020,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2021, vol. 77, no.
2, p. 91, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00963402.2021.1885869?needAccess=true.
67 Ibid.
68 For details, see CRS Report RL32572, Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons, by Amy F. Woolf.
69 Hans Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Russian nuclear forces, 2020,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2021, vol. 77, no.
2, p. 91, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00963402.2021.1885869?needA ccess=true.
70 Ibid.
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Recent analyses indicate that Russia is both modernizing existing types of short-range delivery
systems that can carry nuclear warheads and introducing new versions of weapons that have not
been a part of the Soviet/Russian arsenal since the latter years of the Cold War. In May 2019, Lt.
Gen. Robert P. Ashley of the Defense Intel igence Agency (DIA) raised this point in a public
speech. He stated that Russia has 2,000 nonstrategic nuclear warheads and that its stockpile “is
likely to grow significantly over the next decade.” He also stated that
Russia is adding new military capabilities to its existing stockpile of nonstrategic nuclear
weapons, including those employable by ships, aircraft, and ground forces. These nuclear
warheads include theater- and tactical-range systems that Russia relies on to deter and
defeat NATO or China in a conflict. Russia’s stockpile of non-strategic nuclear weapons
[is] already large and diverse and is being modernized with an eye towards greater
accuracy, longer ranges, and lower yields to suit their potential warfighting role. We assess
Russia to have dozens of these systems already deployed or in development. They include,
but are not limited to: short- and close-range ballistic missiles, ground-launched cruise
missiles, including the 9M729 missile, which the U.S. Government determin ed violates the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces or INF Treaty, as well as antiship and antisubmarine
missiles, torpedoes, and depth charges.71
It is not clear from General Ashley’s comments, or from many of the other assessments of
Russia’s nonstrategic nuclear forces, whether Russia wil deploy these new delivery systems with
nuclear warheads. Many of Russia’s medium- and intermediate-range missile systems, including
the Kalibr sea-launched cruise missile and the Iskander bal istic and cruise missiles, are dual-
capable and can carry either nuclear or conventional warheads. This is also likely true of the new
9M729 land-based, ground-launched cruise missile, the missile that the United States has
identified as a violation of the 1987 INF Treaty.72
It unclear why Russia retains, and may expand, its stockpile of nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
Some argue that these weapons serve to bolster Russia’s less capable conventional military forces
and assert that as Russia develops more capable advanced conventional weapons, it may limit its
nonstrategic modernization program and retire more of these weapons than it acquires. Others,
however, see Russia’s modernization of its nonstrategic nuclear weapons as complementary to an
“escalate to de-escalate” nuclear doctrine and argue that Russia wil expand its nonstrategic
nuclear forces as it raises the profile of such weapons in its doctrine and warfighting plans.
Key Infrastructure
Early Warning
Russia deploys an extensive early warning system. Operated by its Aerospace Forces, the system
consists of a network of early warning satel ites that transmit to two command centers: one in the
East, in the Khabarovsk region, and one in the West, in the Kaluga region. The data are then
transmitted to a command center in the Moscow region. Russia also operates an extensive
network of ground-based radars across Russia, as wel as in neighboring Kazakhstan and Belarus,
that are used for early warning of missile launches and to monitor objects at low-earth orbits.

71 See Lt. Gen. Robert P. Ashley Jr., “Russian and Chinese Nuclear Modernization T rends,” Remarks at the Hudson
Institute, May 29, 2019, https://www.dia.mil/News/Speeches-and-T estimonies/Article-View/Article/1859890/russian-
and-chinese-nuclear-modernization-trends/.
72 For details, see CRS Report R43832, Russian Compliance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF)
Treaty: Background and Issues for Congress, by Amy F. Woolf.
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link to page 42 Russia’s Nuclear Weapons: Doctrine, Forces, and Modernization

Russia uses the Okno observation station, located in Tajikistan, to monitor of objects that orbit at
higher altitudes.73
Command and Control
The Russian President is the Supreme Commander in Chief of the Russian Armed Forces, and he
has the authority to direct the use of nuclear weapons. According to a 2016 DIA report, “The
General Staff monitors the status of the weapons of the nuclear triad and wil send the direct
command to the launch crews following the president’s decision to use nuclear weapons. The
Russians send this command over multiple C2 systems, which creates a redundant dissemination
process to guarantee that they can launch their nuclear weapons.” 74 According to DIA, Russia
“also maintains the Perimetr system, which is designed to ensure that a retaliatory launch can be
ordered when Russia is under nuclear attack.” 75 It is unknown whether the order to transfer
warheads from central storage and release them to the forces is part of the launch authorization.76
Production, Testing, and Storage
Russia has an extensive infrastructure of facilities for the production of nuclear weapons and
missiles,77 although it has consolidated and reduced the size of this infrastructure since the end of
the Cold War. Moreover, Russia has improved the security of its nuclear weapons facilities
through U.S.-Russian cooperation under the Nunn-Lugar CTR program.
Russia has about a dozen research institutes and facilities that participate in the design and
manufacture of nuclear and nonnuclear components for its nuclear weapons, provide stockpile
support, and engage in civilian nuclear and other research.78 Russia, which has a significant
stockpile of weapons-usable materials, no longer produces highly enriched uranium or plutonium
for use in nuclear weapons.79
Russia’s nuclear weapons are stored at approximately 12 national central storage sites. According
to analysts, Russia also maintains 34 base-level storage facilities (see Appendix B). A special
unit, the 12th Main Directorate (GUMO), is responsible for security, transportation, and handling
of the warheads. In a period immediately preceding a conflict, it is anticipated that nuclear
warheads could be transferred from the national central storage sites to the base-level facilities.80
Russia ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 2000. Although this treaty has yet
to enter into force, Russia claims it has refrained from explosive nuclear testing in accordance
with the treaty’s requirements. Russia conducts hydrodynamic tests, which do not produce a
nuclear yield, at a site located on Novaya Zemlya, an archipelago located in the Arctic Ocean. In

73 Pavel Podvig, “Early Warning,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, September 29, 2018, http://russianforces.org/sprn/
. Also see Anatoly Zak, “Russian Military and Dual-Purpose Spacecraft: Latest Status and Operational Overview,”
Center For Naval Analyses, June 2019, pp. 14 -16, https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/IOP-2019-U-020191-Final.pdf.
74 DIA, “Russia Military Power,” 2016, pp. 25-27.
75 DIA, “Russia Military Power,” 2016, pp. 25-27.
76 Jeffrey G. Lewis and Bruno T etrais, “ T he Finger on the Button,” CNS Occasional Paper, February 2019,
https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Finger-on-the-Nuclear-Button.pdf.
77 For a map of Russian nuclear facilities, see https://gmap.nti.org/nuclear_russia.html.
78 For more information, see https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/russia/facilities/.
79 IPFM, “Fissile Materials: Russia,” February 12, 2018, http://fissilematerials.org/countries/russia.html.
80 Pavel Podvig and Javier Serratt, “Lock T hem Up: Zero-deployed Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons in Europe,”
UNIDIR, 2017, pp. 14-19.
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his May 2019 speech, DIA Director General Ashley stated that “the United States believes that
Russia probably is not adhering to its nuclear testing moratorium in a manner consistent w ith the
‘zero-yield’ standard.”81 However, when questioned about this assertion, he said that the U.S.
intel igence community does not have “specific evidence that Russia had conducted low-yield
nuclear tests” but that the DIA thinks Russia has “the capability to do that.”82
Key Modernization Programs
Table 3. Russian Nuclear Delivery System Modernization Programs
System
Warheads
Notes
Avangard HGV
One per vehicle,
Can be delivered by SS-19 and potential y the
nuclear
Sarmat ICBMs; intended to overcome missile
defense
RS-28 (Sarmat) silo ICBM
10+, nuclear
Deployment expected around 2022; intended
to overcome missile defense
Poseidon Autonomous Underwater
Conventional or
Carried by special-purpose submarines;
Vehicle
nuclear
intended as a second-strike, retaliatory weapon
Burevestnik Nuclear Powered Cruise
Nuclear
“Unlimited” range, owing to its nuclear
Missile
reactor; intended to overcome missile defense
Kinzhal Air-Launched Bal istic Missile
Conventional or
Intended to target naval vessels
nuclear
Tsirkon Hypersonic Cruise Missile
Conventional or
Intended to attack ships and ground targets
nuclear
Barguzin Rail-Mobile ICBM
up to 4? Nuclear
Program reportedly postponed in 2017
RS-26 Rubezh ICBM
up to 4? Nuclear
Program reportedly postponed in 2018
Source: Compiled by CRS.
Note: While the text used both Russian designations (RS-X) and U.S./NATO designations (SS-X) to identify
deployed Russian weapons systems, this table displays the Russian only the Russian designation (RS-X) because a
NATO designation has not yet been assigned.
In addition to replacing aging Soviet-era ICBMs, SLBMs, and bal istic missile submarines,
Russia is developing several kinds of nuclear delivery vehicles. Some of these, like the Sarmat
ICBM, may replicate capabilities that already exist; others could expand the force with new types
of delivery systems not previously deployed with nuclear warheads. President Putin unveiled
most of these systems during his March 1, 2018, annual State of the Nation address to the Federal
Assembly, when he presented a range of weapons systems currently under development in
Russia.83 His speech also featured videos and animations of new weapons systems.

81 Lt. General Robert P. Ashley Jr., Russian and Chinese Nuclear Modernization Trends, Director, Defense Intelligence
Agency, Remarks at the Hudson Institute, Washington, DC, May 29, 2019, pp. 2 -3, https://www.dia.mil/News/
Speeches-and-T estimonies/Article-View/Article/1859890/russian-and-chinese-nuclear-modernization-trends/.
82 Paul Sonne, “T op U.S. military intelligence official says Russia ‘probably’ not adhering to nuclear test ban,”
Washington Post, May 29, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/top-us-military-
intelligence-official-says-russiaprobably-not-adhering-to-nuclear-test-ban/2019/05/29/815a1a36-8234-11e9-9a67-
a687ca99fb3d_story.html?utm_term=.bdc536a94f9e.
83 “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly,” President of Russia, March 1, 2018, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/
president/news/56957.
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During his speech, President Putin explicitly linked Russia’s new strategic weapons programs to
the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2002. He said
We did our best to dissuade the Americans from withdrawing from the treaty. All in vain.
The US pulled out of the treaty in 2002. Even after that we tried to develop constructive
dialogue with the Americans. We proposed working together in this area to ease concerns
and maintain the atmosphere of trust. At one point, I thought that a compromise was
possible, but this was not to be. All our proposals, absolutely all of them, were rejected.
And then we said that we would have to improve our modern strike systems to protect our
security. [Emphasis added] In reply, the US said that it is not creating a global BMD system
against Russia, which is free to do as it pleases, and that the US will presume that our
actions are not spearheaded against the US….
… the US, is permitting constant, uncontrolled growth of the number of anti-ballistic
missiles, improving their quality, and creating new missile launching areas. If we do not
do something, eventually this will result in the complete devalu ation of Russia’s nuclear
potential. Meaning that all of our missiles could simply be intercepted.
Let me recall that the United States is creating a global missile defence system primarily
for countering strategic arms that follow ballistic trajectories. These weapons form the
backbone of our nuclear deterrence forces, just as of other members of the nuclear club. As
such, Russia has developed, and works continuously to perfect, highly effective but
modestly priced systems to overcome missile defence. They are installed on all of our
intercontinental ballistic missile complexes.
These comments, and President Putin’s repeated reference to U.S. bal istic missile defenses,
provide a possible context for many of the ongoing modernization programs.
The Offense/Defense Relationship
Avangard Hypersonic
Part III
Glide Vehicle
The United States has not developed or deployed bal istic missile
defense systems with the capabilities needed to intercept Russia’s
The Avangard hypersonic glide
strategic bal istic missiles or warheads. According to the Defense
vehicle (HGV),85 previously
Department’s 2019 Bal istic Missile Defense Review Report, the
known as Project 4202, is a
United States “relies on deterrence to protect against large and
reentry body carried atop an
technical y sophisticated Russian and Chinese intercontinental bal istic
existing bal istic missile that can
missile threats to the U.S. homeland.” 84 Russia, however, continues to
believe that the United States wil develop and eventual y deploy
maneuver to evade air defenses
missile defense interceptors with the capabilities needed to counter
and bal istic missile defenses to
Russian missiles and in numbers that can undermine Russia’s strategic
deliver a nuclear warhead to
deterrent. Hence, although the United States cannot defend against
targets in Europe and the United
the existing warheads on Russian bal istic missiles, Russia has
emphasized that Avangard poses a new chal enge to the United States
States. Russia views the Avangard
because missile defenses cannot intercept a maneuvering hypersonic
system as a hedge to buttress its
glide vehicle. Many U.S. analysts and observers have echoed this
second-strike capability, ensuring
assertion, despite the fact that Avangard does not change the existing
that a retaliatory strike can
balance between Russian offensive and U.S. defensive forces.
penetrate U.S. bal istic missile
defenses. In his March 2018 remarks, President Putin specifical y stressed that Russia would
pursue “a new hypersonic-speed, high-precision new weapons systems that can hit targets at

84 Department of Defense, Missile Defense Review, Report, Washington, DC, September 2018, p. 8,
https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jan/17/2002080666/-1/-1/1/2019-MISSILE-DEFENSE-REVIEW.PDF.
85 For details on the technology and role of hypersonic glide vehicles in U.S. defense policy, see CRS Report R41464,
Conventional Prom pt Global Strike and Long -Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues, by Amy F. Woolf.
See, also, CRS Report R45811, Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress, by Kelley M. Sayler.
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inter-continental distance and can adjust their altitude and course as they travel” in response to the
U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. Some U.S. analysts, however, have noted that the
Avangard could be used “as a first strike system to be used specifical y against missile defenses,
clearing the way for the rest of Russia’s nuclear deterrent.”86 Others have stressed that the
Avangard is likely to serve as a niche capability that adds little to Russia’s existing nuclear force
structure.87
The Soviet Union first experimented with HGV technology in the 1980s, partly in response to the
expected deployment of U.S. bal istic missile defense systems under the SDI program. The
current program has been under development since at least 2004 and has undergone numerous
tests.88 In a test on December 26, 2018, the glider was launched atop an SS-19 ICBM from the
Dombarovskiy missile base in the Southern Urals toward a target on the Kamchatka Peninsula
more than 3,500 miles away.89 According to some sources, Russia might deploy the Avangard on
the SS-19 and, potential y, on the new Sarmat ICBMs.90 Experts continue to debate Avangard’s
true technical characteristics. However, President Putin has stated that the system is capable of
“intensive maneuvering” and achieving “supersonic speeds in excess of Mach 20.”91
After the December 2018 test, President Putin announced that the weapon would be added to
Russia’s nuclear arsenal in 2019. In January 2019, an official with Russia’s Security Council
confirmed that the Avangard had been integrated onto the SS-19 force.92 According to the
Commander of Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces, the Dombarovskiy Missile Division wil stand
up a “missile regiment comprising a modified command-and-control post and two silo-based
launchers” in 2019.93 On December 27, 2019, the Russian military announced that the Strategic
Rocket Forces had activated two SS-19 missiles equipped with Avangard hypersonic glide
vehicles. An additional two missiles equipped with Avangard were activated in late 2020.94
Although not specified in the Russian announcement, the missiles are likely deployed with the
13th regiment of the Dombarovskiy (Red Banner) missile division based in the Orenburg region.95

86 Michael Kofman, “Russia’s Avangard hypersonic boost -glide system,” Russia Military Analysis, January 11, 2019,
https://russianmilitaryanalysis.wordpress.com/2019/01/11/russias-avangard-hypersonic-boost -glide-system/.
87 See Pavel Podvig, “Avangard system is tested, said to be fully ready for deployment,” Russian Strategic Nuclear
Forces blog, December 26, 2018, http://russianforces.org/blog/2018/12/avangard_system_is_tested_said.shtml, and
Michael Kofman, “Russia’s Avangard hypersonic boost -glide system,” Russia Military Analysis, January 11, 2019,
https://russianmilitaryanalysis.wordpress.com/2019/01/11/russias-avangard-hypersonic-boost -glide-system/.
88 See table of development in Pavel Podvig, “Avangard system is tested, said to be fully ready for deployment,”
Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces blog, December 26, 2018, http://russianforces.org/blog/2018/12/
avangard_system_is_tested_said.shtml.
89 Aristos Georgiou, “Russia Successfully T ests Weapon T hat T ravels 27 T imes Speed of Sound and Renders Missile
Defense Systems ‘Useless’—Officials,” Newsweek, December 28, 2018, https://www.newsweek.com/russian-new-
weapon-mach-27-avangard-hypersonic-glide-vehicle-intercontinental-1273729?utm_source=T witter&utm_campaign=
NewsweekT witter&utm_medium=Socia.
90 Nikolai Novichkov, “Russia announces successful flight test of Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle,” Jane’s Missiles
& Rockets, January 3, 2019.
91 “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly,” President of Russia, March 1, 2018,
en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957.
92 Nikolai Novichkov, “Russia announces successful flight test of Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle,” Jane’s Missiles
& Rockets, January 3, 2019.
93 Nikolai Novichkov, “Russia beefs up Strategic Missile Forces,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, December 20, 2018.
94 “T wo new ‘Avanguards’ can take up combat duty at the end of December,” Tass, December 17, 2020,
https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/10277813.
95 Julian E. Barnes and David E. Sanger, “ Russia Deploys Hypersonic Weapon, Potentially Renewing Arms Race,”
New York Tim es, December 27, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/27/us/politics/russia-hypersonic-
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According to earlier reports, the 13th regiment is expected to eventual y receive two more SS-19
ICBMs fitted with Avangard warheads, for a total of six. Eventual y, the Strategic Rocket Forces
wil have two missile regiments with six Avangard systems each, by 2027.96
Russian officials have indicated that these missiles wil count under the New START Treaty.
Consequently, Russians officials conducted an exhibition of the system for U.S. inspectors, as
mandated by the New START Treaty, prior to deployment. The exhibition demonstrated that each
missile wil carry one Avangard HGV, but it is not clear whether or how Russia demonstrated that
each HGV would carry only one warhead.97
Sarmat ICBM
The RS-28 Sarmat (SS-X-30) missile is a liquid-fueled heavy ICBM that Russia intends to
eventual y deploy as a replacement for the SS-18 heavy ICBM. Russia has been reducing the
number of SS-18 missiles in its force since the 1990s, when the original START Treaty required a
reduction from 308 to 154 missiles. Russia likely would have eliminated al of the missiles if the
START II Treaty (described below) had entered into force, but it has retained 46 of them under
New START, while awaiting the development of the Sarmat. Reports indicate that the Sarmat can
carry 10, or according to some sources, 15 warheads, along with penetration aids, and potential y
several Avangard hypersonic glide vehicles.98 Putin stated in his March 2018 speech that Sarmat
weighs over 200 tons, but details about the ICBM’s true weight, and thus its payload, remain
unclear.99
Russia began testing the Sarmat missile in 2016; reports indicate that it is likely to be deployed in
the Uzhur Missile Division around 2022.100 Russia also may deploy the missile at the
Dombarovsky Missile Division, with an eventual total of seven Sarmat regiments with 46
missiles.101 This number is equal to roughly the number of SS-18 ICBMs that Russia has retained
under New START and, therefore, indicates that Russia could be planning to deploy the Sarmat in
a manner consistent with the limits in the treaty. Some have speculated, however, that Russia
could exceed the limits in the treaty after its expiration by eventual y expanding its deployment of
Sarmat missiles or increasing the number of warheads on each missile.102

weapon.html. See, also, Franz-Stefan Gady, “ Russia’s Avangard Hypersonic Warhead Officially Enters Service,” The
Diplom at, December 27, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/12/russias-avangard-hypersonic-warhead-officially-
enters-service/.
96 Nikolai Novichkov, “Russia announces successful flight test of Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle,” Jane’s Missiles
& Rockets, January 3, 2019.
97 “Russia Shows Off Hypersonic Nuclear Missile to U.S. Inspectors,” The Moscow Times, November 26, 2019,
https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/11/26/russia-shows-off-hypersonic-nuclear-missile-to-us-inspectors-a68329.
See, also, Pavel Podvig, “Russia shows Avangard system ‘to maintain viability’ of New ST ART ,” Russian Strategic
Nuclear Forces Blog, http://russianforces.org/blog/2019/11/russia_shows_avangard_system_t.shtml.
98 “RS-28 Sarmat,” Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems, November 19, 2018.
99 See “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly,” President of Russia, March 1, 2018,
en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957; Michael Kofman, “ Emerging Russian Weapons: Welcome to the 2020s:
Part 1,” Russian military analysis, March 4, 2018, https://russianmilitaryanalysis.wordpress.com/2018/03/04/emerging-
russian-weapons-welcome-to-the-2020s-part-1-kinzhal-sarmat-4202/ and “ RS-28 Sarmat,” Jane’s Strategic Weapons
Systems, November 19, 2018.
100 “RS-28 Sarmat,” Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems, November 19, 2018.
101 Pavel Podvig, “Sarmat deployment is said to begin in 2021,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces blog,
http://russianforces.org/blog/2018/10/sarmat_deployment_is_said_to_b.shtml.
102 Lt. General Robert P. Ashley Jr., Russian and Chinese Nuclear Modernization Trends, Director, Defense
Intelligence Agency, Remarks at the Hudson Institute, Washington, DC, May 29, 2019, p. 3, https://www.dia.mil/
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In his March 2018 speech, President Putin highlighted the Sarmat missile’s ability to confound
and evade bal istic missile defense systems. As was the case with the SS-18 missile, the large
number of warheads and penetration aids are designed to increase the probability that the
missile’s warhead could penetrate defenses and reach its target. In addition, President Putin noted
that Sarmat could attack targets by flying over both the North and South Poles, evading detection
by radars seeking missiles flying in an expected trajectory over the North Pole. He also stated that
the missile “has a short boost phase, which makes it more difficult to intercept for missile defense
systems.” He emphasized that Sarmat is a formidable missile and, owing to its characteristics, “is
untroubled by even the most advanced missile defense systems.”103
Poseidon Autonomous Underwater Vehicle
The existence of Poseidon, a nuclear-powered autonomous underwater vehicle (also known as
Status 6 or Kanyon, its NATO designation), was first “leaked” to the press in November 2015,
when a slide detailing it appeared in a Russian Ministry of Defense briefing.104 According to that
slide, the autonomous underwater vehicle, or drone, could reach a depth of 1,000 meters, go at a
speed of 100 knots, and have a range of up to 10,000 km. The slide indicated that the system
would be tested between 2019 and 2025. Press reports indicate, however, that Russia has been
testing the system since at least 2016, with a recent test occurring in November 2018. However,
the system may not be deployed until 2027.105
Russia may deploy the Poseidon drone on four submarines, two in the Northern Fleet and two in
the Pacific Fleet. Each submarine would carry eight drones.106 According to some reports, each
drone would be armed with a two-megaton nuclear or conventional payload that could be
detonated “thousands of feet” below the surface. Russia could release the drone from its
submarine off the U.S. coast and detonate it in a way that would “generate a radioactive tsunami”
that could destroy cities and other infrastructure along the U.S. coast.107 According to Russia’s
President Putin, Russia might target Poseidon drones armed with conventional warheads against a
broad range of targets, “including aircraft carrier groups, shore fortifications, and
infrastructure.”108
When Russia first revealed the existence of this new drone, some analysts questioned whether
Russia was developing a new first-strike weapon that could evade U.S. defenses and devastate the
U.S. coastline. Russia, however, views the nuclear version of this weapon as a second- or third-

News/Speeches-and-T estimonies/Article-View/Article/1859890/russian-and-chinese-nuclear-modernization-trends/.
103 “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly,” President of Russia, March 1, 2018, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/
president/news/56957.
104 Edward Moore Geist, “Would Russia’s undersea ‘doomsday drone’ carry a cobalt bomb?” Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, July 3, 2016, https://thebulletin.org/2016/07/would-russias-undersea-doomsday-drone-carry-a-cobalt -bomb/.
105 Amanda Macias, “Russia’s nuclear-armed underwater drone may be ready for war in eight years,” CNBC, March
29, 2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/25/russias-nuclear-armed-underwater-drone-may-be-ready-for-war-in-
2027.html.
106 “Russian Navy to put over 30 Poseidon strategic underwater drones on combat duty - source,” Tass, January 12,
2019, http://tass.com/defense/1039603. See, also, Michael Kofman, “ Emerging Russian Weapons: Welcome to the
2020s: Part 2,” Russian military analysis, March 4, 2018, https://russianmilitaryanalysis.wordpress.com/2018/03/06/
emerging-russian-weapons-welcome-to-the-2020s-part-2-9m730-status-6-klavesin-2r/.
107 Mark Episkopos, “Russian Navy Will Soon Deploy 32 ‘Poseidon’ Nuclear Drones Across 4 Submarines,” The
National Interest, January 15, 2019, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russian-navy-will-soon-deploy-32-poseidon-
nuclear-drones-across-4-submarines-41617.
108 “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly,” President of Russia, March 1, 2018,
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957.
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strike option that could ensure a retaliatory strike against U.S. cities. Like the Avangard and
Sarmat, this system, according to Russian statements, would also serve as a Russian response to
concerns about the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and U.S. advances in bal istic missile
defenses. As President Putin noted in his March 2018 speech, “we have developed unmanned
submersible vehicles that can move at great depths (I would say extreme depths)
intercontinental y, at a speed multiple times higher than the speed of submarines, cutting-edge
torpedoes and al kinds of surface vessels…. They are quiet, highly manoeuvrable and have
hardly any vulnerabilities for the enemy to exploit.”109
Burevestnik Nuclear-Powered Cruise Missile
The Burevestnik (SSC-X-9 Skyfal ) is a nuclear-powered cruise missile intended to have
“unlimited” range, because it would be powered by a nuclear reactor. In his March 2018 speech,
Putin stressed that the “low-flying stealth missile carrying a nuclear warhead, with almost an
unlimited range, unpredictable trajectory and ability to bypass interception boundaries” would be
“invincible against al existing and prospective missile defense and counter-air defense
systems.”110
According to reports, Russia began conducting tests with a prototype missile, and with an electric
power source instead of a nuclear reactor, in 2016.111 Russia reportedly conducted a successful
test of the missile in January 2019.112 However, a test using a nuclear-powered engine in August
2019 ended in failure when the missile crashed into the White Sea. During an effort to recover the
engine, an explosion kil ed five Russian nuclear scientists and spread radiation in the area.113
According to some reports, Russia is unlikely to deploy the cruise missile for at least another
decade and, even then, the high cost could limit the number introduced into the Russian
arsenal.114 Nevertheless, according to unclassified analysis of satel ite data, Russia seemed to be
preparing for another test of the Burevestnik Cruise Missile in August 2021.115
Kinzhal Air-Launched Ballistic Missile
Russia has developed a nuclear-capable air-launched bal istic missile, known as the Kinzhal, that
could be launched on MiG-31K interceptor aircraft or Tu-22M bombers. It has been deployed

109 Ibid.
110 Ibid.
111 Michael Kofman, “Emerging Russian Weapons: Welcome to the 2020s: Part 2” Russian military analysis, March 4,
2018, https://russianmilitaryanalysis.wordpress.com/2018/03/06/emerging-russian-weapons-welcome-to-the-2020s-
part-2-9m730-status-6-klavesin-2r/.
112 “Tests of Burevestnik nuclear powered cruise missile successfully completed, says source,” Tass, February 16,
2019, https://tass.com/defense/1045012.
113 David Sanger and Andrew Kramer, “ U.S. Officials Suspect New Nuclear Missile in Explosion T hat Killed 7
Russians,” New York Times, August 12, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/12/world/europe/russia-nuclear-
accident -
putin.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit_th_190812?campaign_id=2&instance_id=11410&segment_id=16070&user
_id=7a8ed53b1fc5f7e04a00bb1610157848&regi_id=303468470812.
114 Amanda Macias, “ Vladimir Putin’s so-called missile with unlimited range is too expensive for the Kremlin – and
has yet to fly farther than 22 miles,” CNBC, March 22, 2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/22/putins-missile-with-
unlimited-range-is-too-expensive-and-hasnt-flown-more-than-22-miles.html.
115 Zachary Cohen, “ New satellite images show Russia may be preparing to test nuclear powered ‘Skyfall’ missile,”
CNN, August 18, 2021, https://www.cnn.com/2021/08/18/politics/russia-skyfall-missile-test-satellite-
images/index.html.
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with a special y modified MIG-31 K interceptor since 2017, and was first tested from a Tu-22M
in 2020. According to press reports, the Kinzhal is a variant of the Iskander short-range bal istic
missile currently in service with the Russian Armed Forces. The air-launched version may be
intended to be launched while the aircraft is at supersonic speeds, adding to the system’s
invulnerability to U.S. air and missile defenses.116 President Putin noted this capability in his
March 2018 speech, when he said that the missile “flying at a hypersonic speed, 10 times faster
than the speed of sound, can also maneuver at al phases of its flight trajectory, which also al ows
it to overcome al existing and, I think, prospective anti-aircraft and anti-missile defense systems,
delivering nuclear and conventional warheads in a range of over 2,000 kilometers.”117
Unless Russian aircraft approach U.S. shores before releasing the missile, however, it wil not
have the range needed to target U.S. territory. Instead, experts believe the missile is intended
primarily to target naval vessels. President Putin stated that the system entered service in the
Southern Military District in December 2017. Russia’s Minister of Defense stated in February
2019 that MiG-31 crews have taken the Kinzhal on air patrols over the Black and Caspian seas.118
Tsirkon Anti-Ship Hypersonic Cruise Missile
Russia has been developing the Tsirkon (3M-22, NATO designated SS-N-33), an anti-ship
hypersonic cruise missile, since at least 2011. The missile is “designed for naval surface vessels
and submarines, able to attack both ships and ground targets.” 119 It is intended to replace the SS-
N-19 cruise missile on the Kirov-class cruisers120 and is expected to be test-launched from the
new Yasen-class submarine in 2021.121 Russia conducted several successful tests of the missile
from the Admiral Groshkov frigate in 2020.122
In a February 2019 address to the Federal Assembly, Putin stated that Tsirkon is a “hypersonic
missile that can reach speeds of approximately Mach 9 and strike a target more than 1,000 km
away both under water and on the ground.” He also stated that the missile could be launched from
submarines.123 In late 2019, President Putin also noted that Russia would develop a land-based
version of this missile as a response to the U.S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty.

116 Michael Kofman, “Emerging Russian Weapons: Welcome to the 2020s: Part 1,” Russian military analysis, March 4,
2018, https://russianmilitaryanalysis.wordpress.com/2018/03/04/emerging-russian-weapons-welcome-to-the-2020s-
part-1-kinzhal-sarmat-4202/.
117 “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly,” President of Russia, March 1, 2018, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/
president/news/56957.
118 “New Russian weapons to guarantee security of the country without increasing costs and involvement in the arms
race,” Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, February 20, 2019, http://eng.mil.ru/en/news_page/country/
more.htm?id=12218197@egNews.
119 Roger McDermott, “Moscow Prepares T ests for Hypersonic Cruise Missile,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, March 20,
2019, https://jamestown.org/program/moscow-prepares-tests-for-hypersonic-cruise-missiles/.
120 “3M-22 T sirkon,” Jane’s Weapons: Naval, February 15, 2018.
121 Roger McDermott, “Moscow Prepares T ests for Hypersonic Cruise Missile,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, March 20,
2019, https://jamestown.org/program/moscow-prepares-tests-for-hypersonic-cruise-missiles/.
122 “Russia reports successful test launch of hypersonic missile,” Associated Press, October 7, 2020,
https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2020/10/07/russia-reports-successful-test-launch-of-hypersonic-missile/.
123 “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly,” President of Russia, February 20, 2019, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/
president/news/59863.
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Barguzin Rail-Mobile ICBM
Russia had been developing a rail-mobile ICBM system to replace the SS-24 Mod 3 Scalpel since
2013. An ejection test of the missile appears to have been conducted. However, Russia may have
canceled the program in 2017.124
RS-26 Rubezh ICBM
Russia had been developing a version of its three-stage RS-24 Yars ICBM with only two stages.
According to unclassified reports, Russia conducted four flight tests of this missile in the early
part of this decade. Two of these flight tests—one that failed in September 2011 and one that
succeeded in May 2012—flew from Plesetsk to Kura, a distance of approximately 5,800
kilometers (3,600 miles). The second two tests—in October 2012 and June 2013—were both
successful. In both cases, the missile flew from Kapustin Yar to Sary-Shagan, a distance of 2,050
kilometers (1,270 miles).125 These tests raised questions about whether the missile was designed
to violate, or circumvent, the limits in the 1987 INF Treaty, as that treaty banned the testing and
deployment of missiles with a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. Russia appears to have
cancel ed this missile program in 2018,126 but some analysts believe it might reappear now that
the INF Treaty has lapsed.127
The Effect of Arms Control on Russia’s
Nuclear Forces
The number of warheads on Soviet strategic nuclear delivery vehicles reached its peak in the mid-
1980s and began to decline sharply by the early 1990s (see Figure 2). This decline continued,
with a few pauses, through the 1990s and 2000s. While a number of factors likely contributed to
this decline, most experts agree that these reductions were shaped by the limits in bilateral arms
control agreements.
The SALT Era (1972-1979)
The United States and the Soviet Union signed their first formal agreements limiting nuclear
offensive and defensive weapons in May 1972. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)
produced two agreements: the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (Interim Agreement) and the Treaty on the Limitation of
Anti-Bal istic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty). The parties paired these two agreements, in part, to
forestal an offense-defense arms race, where increases in the number of missile defense
interceptors on one side would encourage the other to increase the number of missiles needed to

124 Pavel Podvig, “ Barguzin rail-mobile ICBM is cancelled (again),” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, December 4,
2017, http://russianforces.org/blog/2017/12/barguzin_rail-mobile_icbm_is_c.shtml.
125 Hans Kristensen, “Russian Missile T est Creates Confusion and Opposition in Washington ,” FAS Strategic Security
blog, July 3, 2013, http://blogs.fas.org/security/2013/07/yars-m/.
126 Pavel Podvig, “ By cancelling RS-26 Russia keeps its options open,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, April 2,
2018, http://russianforces.org/blog/2018/04/by_cancelling_rs-26_russia_kee.shtml.
127 T he United States first determined that Russia had violated the INF T reaty in 2014, and withdrew from the treaty in
early 2019 after Russia refused to acknowledge its violation or return to compliance. T he treaty lapsed on August 2,
2019. For more information, see CRS Report R43832, Russian Com pliance with the Interm ediate Range Nuclear
Forces (INF) Treaty: Background and Issues for Congress, by Amy F. Woolf.
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saturate those defenses. The United States also sought to limit the number of large ICBMs in the
Soviet offensive force, an area where the Soviet Union had an advantage over the United States.
As a result, the Interim Agreement imposed a freeze on the number of launchers for ICBMs that
the United States and the Soviet Union could deploy. (At the time the United States had 1,054
ICBM launchers and the Soviet Union had 1,618 ICBM launchers.) The two countries also agreed
to freeze their number of SLBM launchers and modern bal istic missile submarines, though they
could add SLBM launchers if they retired old ICBM launchers.128
Although the Interim Agreement limited the number of Soviet ICBM and SLBM launchers, it did
not restrain the growth in the number of warheads carried on the missiles deployed in those
launchers. After signing the agreement, both nations expanded the number of warheads on their
missiles by deploying missiles with multiple warheads (MIRVs). The Soviet deployment of
MIRVs led to a sharp increase—from around 2,000 to more than 6,100—in the number of
warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs between 1972 and 1979. The second Strategic Arms Limitation
Treaty (SALT II) sought to curb this growth by limiting the number of missiles that could carry
multiple warheads. The treaty would have capped al strategic nuclear delivery systems at 2,400
and limited each side to 1,320 MIRVed ICBMs, MIRVed SLBMs, and heavy bombers equipped to
carry nuclear-armed, air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs). The treaty would not have limited
the total number of warheads that could be carried on these delivery vehicles, even though the
parties agreed that they would not deploy MIRVed ICBMs with more than 10 warheads each and
MIRVed SLBMs with more than 14 warheads each.
SALT II proved to be highly controversial. Some analysts argued that it would fail to reduce
nuclear warheads or curb the arms race, while others argued that the treaty would al ow the
Soviet Union to maintain strategic superiority over the United States with its force of large,
heavily MIRVed land-based bal istic missiles. Shortly after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan
in December 1979, President Carter withdrew the treaty from the Senate’s consideration. The
Soviet Union continued to increase the number of warheads on its ICBMs and SLBMs, reaching
around 10,000 warheads in 1989.
INF and START (1982-1993)
President Reagan entered office in 1981 planning to expand U.S. nuclear forces and capabilities
in an effort to counter the perceived Soviet advantages in nuclear weapons. Initial y, at least, he
rejected the use of arms control agreements, but after Congress and many analysts pressed for
more diplomatic initiatives, the Reagan Administration outlined negotiating positions to address
intermediate-range missiles, long-range strategic weapons, and bal istic missile defenses. These
negotiations began to bear fruit in the latter half of President Reagan’s second term, with the
signing of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 1987. In the INF Treaty, the
United States and Soviet Union agreed to destroy al intermediate-range and shorter-range
ground-launched bal istic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles with ranges between 500
and 5,500 kilometers (between 300 and 3,400 miles). The Soviet Union destroyed 1,846 missiles,
including 654 SS-20 missiles that carried three warheads apiece, resulting in a reduction of more
than 3,100 deployed warheads.129 The INF Treaty was seen as a significant milestone in arms

128 T he Interim Agreement was to remain in force for five years, unless the parties replaced it with a more
comprehensive agreement limiting strategic offensive weapons. In 1977, both nations agreed to observe the agreement
until they completed the SALT II T reaty, which was then under negotiation .
129 T he United States destroyed 846 single-warhead Pershing II ballistic missiles and Gryphon cruise missiles.
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control because it established an intrusive verification regime and eliminated entire classes of
weapons that both sides regarded as modern and effective.130
The United States and the Soviet Union began negotiations on the Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty (START) in 1982, although the talks stopped between 1983 and 1985 after a Soviet
walkout in response to the U.S. deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Europe. The Soviet
Union viewed START as a continuation of the SALT process and initial y proposed limits on the
same categories of weapons defined in the SALT II Treaty: total delivery vehicles, MIRVed
bal istic missiles, and heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear-armed ALCMs. The United
States, however, sought to change the units of account from launchers to missiles and warheads,
and proposed deep reductions rather than marginal changes from the SALT II level. The United
States specifical y sought sublimits on heavy ICBMs (the Soviet SS-18) and heavily MIRVed
ICBMs (at the time, the Soviet SS-19), but it did not include any limits on heavy bombers.131
The nations adjusted their positions in 1985 and 1986 and saw the beginnings of a convergence
after the October 1986 summit in Reykjavik, Iceland. However, they were unable to reach
agreement by the end of the Reagan Administration. President George H. W. Bush continued the
negotiations during his term, and the United States and the Soviet Union signed START in July
1991. The countries agreed that each side could deploy up to 6,000 attributed warheads on 1,600
bal istic missiles and bombers, with up to 4,900 warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs (see Table
4).132 START also limited each side to 1,540 warheads on “heavy” ICBMs, which represented a
50% reduction in the number of warheads deployed on the SS-18 ICBMs. The United States
placed a high priority on reductions in Soviet heavy ICBMs during the negotiations (as it had
during the SALT negotiations) and seemed to succeed, with this provision, in reducing the Soviet
advantage in this category of weapons.
When the Soviet Union collapsed at the end of 1991, about 70% of the strategic nuclear weapons
covered by START were deployed at bases in Russia, and the other 30% were deployed in
Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. In May 1992, the four newly independent countries and the
United States signed a protocol that made al four post-Soviet states parties to the treaty, and
Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan agreed to eliminate al of the nuclear weapons on their
territory. The collapse of the Soviet Union also led to cal s for deeper reductions in strategic
offensive arms. As a result, the United States and Russia signed a second treaty, known as START
II, in January 1993, weeks before the end of the Bush Administration. START II would have
limited each side to between 3,000 and 3,500 warheads; reductions initial y w ere to occur by the
year 2003, but that deadline would have been extended until 2007 if the nations had approved a
new protocol. In addition, START II would have banned al MIRVed ICBMs. As a result, it would

130 In 2014, the United States determined that Russia had violated the INF T reaty by developing and testing a new
ground-launched cruise missile of INF range. After years of seeking to convince Russia to return to compliance, the
United States announced that it would withdraw from the treaty on August 2, 2019. For details, see CRS Report
R43832, Russian Com pliance with the Interm ediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Background and Issues for
Congress, by Amy F. Woolf.
131 Before the talks broke down in 1983, the United States had added a limit of 400 heavy bombers to its proposal, in
response to criticism that the U.S. position was far too one-sided with its focus on limiting MIRVed ICBMs.
132 While ST ART contained a limit on the number of permitted warheads, the two sides did not actually count the
warheads on each missile. T hey listed the number of warheads attributed to each type o f missile in a database and
calculated the number that counted under the treaty. The parties could not deploy missiles with more than the attributed
number of warheads, and, with some exceptions, the calculation would count the attributed number of warheads even if
the parties reduced the number on some missiles. Moreover, some weapons carried on bombers did not count against
the treaty’s limits, so each side could deploy 8,000 or 9,000 actual weapons while remaining within the limit of 6,000
total weapons.
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have accomplished the long-standing U.S. objective of eliminating the Soviet SS-18 heavy
ICBMs.
Although START II was signed in early January 1993, its full consideration was delayed until
START entered into force at the end of 1994, during a dispute over the future of the Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency. The U.S. Senate eventual y consented to its ratification on January 26,
1996. The Russian Duma also delayed its consideration of START II as members addressed
concerns about some of the limits. Russia also objected to the economic costs it would bear when
implementing the treaty, because, with many Soviet-era systems nearing the end of their service
lives, Russia would have to invest in new systems to maintain forces at START levels. This
proved difficult as Russia endured a financial crisis in the latter half of the 1990s. The treaty’s
future clouded again after the United States sought to negotiate amendments to the 1972 ABM
Treaty. With these delays and disputes, START II never entered into force, although Russian
nuclear forces continued to decline as Russia retired its older systems.
The Moscow Treaty and New START
Although the START Treaty was due to remain in force through December 2009, the United
States and Russia signed the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, known as the Moscow Treaty,
in May 2002. The United States had not expected to negotiate a new treaty. During a summit
meeting with Russian President Putin, President Bush stated that the United States would reduce
its “operational y deployed” strategic nuclear warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads
during the next decade. President Putin indicated that Russia wanted to use the formal arms
control process to reach a “reliable and verifiable agreement” in the form of a legal y binding
treaty that would provide “predictability and transparency” and ensure the “irreversibility of the
reduction of nuclear forces.”133 The United States preferred a less formal process—such as an
exchange of letters and, possibly, new transparency measures—that would al ow the United
States to maintain the flexibility to size and structure its nuclear forces in response to its own
needs. The resulting treaty satisfied these objectives; it codified the planned reductions to 1,700-
2,200 warheads, but it contained no definitions, counting rules, or schedules to guide
implementation. Each party would simply declare the number of operational y deployed warheads
(a term that remained undefined) in its forces at the implementation deadline of December 31,
2012. The treaty would then expire, al owing both parties to restore forces or remain at the limit.
The treaty also lacked monitoring and verification provisions, but because the original START
Treaty remained in force, its verification provisions continued to provide insights into Russian
forces.
Knowing that the verification provisions in START were due to expire in late 2009, the United
States and Russia began to discuss options for arms control after START in mid-2006, but they
were unable to agree on a path forward. The United States initial y did not want to negotiate a
new treaty, but it would have been wil ing to informal y extend some of START’s monitoring
provisions. Russia wanted to replace START with a new treaty that would further reduce
deployed forces while using many of the same definitions and counting rules in START. In
December 2008, the two sides agreed that they wanted to replace START before it expired, but
acknowledged that this task would have to be left to negotiations between Russia and the Obama
Administration. These talks began in early 2009; the United States and Russia signed the new
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) in April 2010.

133 Comments of General Yuri Baluyevskiy. U.S. Department of Defense. Under Secretary Feith Joint Media
Availability with Russian First Deputy Chief. News T ranscript. Washington, January 16, 2002.
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The New START Treaty limits each side to no more than 800 deployed and nondeployed ICBM
and SLBM launchers and deployed and nondeployed heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear
armaments. Within that total, it limits each side to no more than 700 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs,
and heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear armaments. The treaty also limits each side to no
more than 1,550 deployed warheads; this limit counts the actual number of warheads carried by
deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, and one warhead for each deployed heavy bomber equipped for
nuclear armaments. New START also contains a monitoring regime, similar to the regime in
START, that requires extensive data exchanges, exhibitions, and on-site inspections to verify
compliance with the treaty.
The limits in New START differ from those in the original START Treaty in a number of ways.
First, START contained sublimits on warheads attributed to different types of strategic weapons,
in part because the United States wanted the treaty to impose specific limits on elements of the
Soviet force that were deemed to be destabilizing. New START, in contrast, contains only a single
limit on the aggregate number of deployed warheads, thereby providing each nation with the
freedom to mix their forces as they see fit. Second, under START, to determine the number of
warheads that counted against the treaty limits, the United States and Russia tal ied the number of
deployed launchers, assuming that each launcher contained a missile carrying the number of
warheads “attributed” to that type of missile. Under New START, the United States and Russia
also count the number of deployed launchers, but instead of calculating an attributed number of
warheads, they simply declare the total number of warheads deployed across their force.
Table 4 summarizes the limits in START, the Moscow Treaty, and New START. Figure 4 shows
how the numbers of warheads and launchers in Russia’s strategic nuclear forces have declined
over the last 20 years. Because the definitions and counting rules differ, it is difficult to compare
the force sizes across treaties. Moreover, Russia’s fiscal crisis in the late 1990s and subsequent
delays in some of its modernization programs may have produced similar reductions even in the
absence of arms control. Nevertheless, while the numbers of warheads on Soviet strategic nuclear
forces peaked in the late 1980s, the numbers have declined since the two sides began
implementing the reductions mandated by these treaties.
Table 4. Limits in START, Moscow Treaty, and New START
Treaty
START (1991)
Moscow Treaty (2002)
New START (2010)
Limits on Delivery
1,600 strategic nuclear
No limits
800 deployed and
Vehicles
delivery vehicles
nondeployed ICBM
launchers, SLBM launchers,
and heavy bombers
equipped to carry nuclear
weapons
Within the 800 limit, 700
deployed ICBMs, SLBMs,
and heavy bombers
equipped to carry nuclear
weapons
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Treaty
START (1991)
Moscow Treaty (2002)
New START (2010)
Limits on Warheads
6,000 warheads attributed
1,700-2,200 deployed
1,550 deployed warheads
to ICBMs, SLBMs, and
strategic warheads
No sublimits
heavy bombers
No sublimits

4,900 warheads attributed
to ICBMs and SLBMs
1,100 warheads attributed
to mobile ICBMs
1,540 warheads attributed
to heavy ICBMs
Limits on Throwweight
3,600 metric tons
No limit
No limit
Source: State Department fact sheets.
Figure 4. Russian Strategic Forces and Arms Control
START: 1994-2009, New START: 2011-2019

Source: State Department Fact Sheets.
Notes: The break in the graph between 2009 and 2011 reflects the fact that START expired in 2009 and New
START entered into force in 2011. Although the Moscow Treaty remained in force during that time, the two
parties did not exchange data under that treaty.
Issues for Congress
Congress has held several hearings in recent years where it has sought information about Russian
nuclear weapons and raised concerns about the pace and direction of Russia’s nuclear
modernization programs. Specifical y, some Members have questioned whether Russia and the
United States are approaching a new arms race as both modernize their forces; they have
addressed concerns about the future size and structure of Russia’s nuclear forces after the New
START Treaty lapses, and they have sought to understand the content of and debate about
Russia’s nuclear doctrine. This section reviews some of the key issues discussed in these
hearings.
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Arms Race Dynamics
The United States and Russia are both pursuing modernization programs to rebuild and
recapitalize their nuclear forces. Each began this process to replace existing systems that have
been in service since the Cold War and are reaching the end of their service lives. In many cases,
both nations have extended the life of these aging systems. Russia retains some bal istic missiles
that the Soviet Union first fielded in the 1980s (and, therefore, were expected to be replaced by
the early 2000s); it may retire many of these over the next 10 years as it completes its current
modernization programs. The United States extended the life of its Ohio-class submarines from
30 to 42 years by refueling their reactor cores, and it extended the lives of both land-based and
submarine-based missiles by replacing the propel ant in existing motors and replacing guidance
systems. The United States plans to begin fielding new systems in the late 2020s.134
Many analysts and observers have identified an arms race dynamic in these paral el
modernization programs. Some believe that Russia is at fault—that the United States is fal ing
behind because Russia began to deploy new missiles and submarines in the early 2000s, while the
United States wil not field similar systems until the late 2020s, and because Russia is developing
new and more exotic systems, as described above. David Trachtenberg, the Principal Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, raised this point in April 2018, when he noted that “it
takes two to race.” He stated that the United States is “not interested in matching the Russians
system for system. The Russians have been developing an incredible amount of new nuclear
weapons systems, including the novel, nuclear systems that President Putin unveiled to great
fanfare a number of months ago.”135 Franklin Mil er, a former Pentagon and National Security
Council official, made a similar point during a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing in
early 2019 when he noted that “the [U.S.] program is not creating a nuclear arms race. Russia and
China began modernizing and expanding their nuclear forces in the 2008-2010 timeframe and
since then have been placing large numbers of new strategic nuclear systems in the field. The
United States has not deployed a new nuclear delivery system in this century and the first
products of our nuclear modernization program wil not be deployed until the mid to late
2020s.”136
Others argue that the United States is spurring the arms race, in that the expansive U.S.
modernization program might heighten the mistrust between the two nations and provide Russia
with an incentive to expand its programs beyond what was needed to replace aging Soviet-era
systems.137 Former Secretary of Defense Wil iam Perry raised this point in an interview in 2015,
when the Obama Administration offered its support to the full scope of U.S. nuclear
modernization programs. He noted that “we're now at the precipice, maybe I should say the brink,
of a new nuclear arms race” that “wil be at least as expensive as the arms race we had during the
Cold War, which is a lot of money.”138

134 For details on U.S. life extension and modernization programs, see CRS Report RL33640, U.S. Strategic Nuclear
Forces: Background, Developm ents, and Issues, by Amy F. Woolf.
135 David T rachtenberg, The Future of U.S. Extended Deterrence, Brookings Institution, April 24 2018.
136 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Nuclear Policy and Posture, 116th Cong., 1st sess., February
28, 2019.
137 Scott Paltrow, “Special Report: In modernizing nuclear arsenal, U.S. stokes new arms race,” Reuters, November 21,
2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-nuclear-modernize-specialreport/special-report-in-modernizing-nuclear-
arsenal-u-s-stokes-new-arms-race-idUSKBN1DL1AH. See, also, Richard Sokolosky and Gordon Adams, “ Obama Is
About T o Launch A New Nuclear Arms Race. T here’s a Better Way.,” Defense One, January 18, 2016,
https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2016/01/obama-about -launch-new-nuclear-arms-race-theres-better-way/125174/.
138 Aaron Mehta, “Former SecDef Perry: US on ‘Brink’ of New Nuclear Arms Race,” Defense News, December 3,
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Some have disputed the notion that the modernization programs are either evidence of an arms
race or an incentive to pursue one. Both nations are modernizing their forces because existing
systems are aging out; neither is pursuing these programs because the other is modernizing its
forces, and neither would likely cancel its programs if the other refrained from its efforts. As
former Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter noted in 2016, “In the end, though, this is about
maintaining the bedrock of our security and after too many years of not investing enough, it’s an
investment that we, as a nation, have to make because it’s critical to sustaining nuclear deterrence
in the 21st century.”139 Russia seems to be in a similar position; it delayed a planned
modernization cycle in the late 1990s and has been pursuing a number of programs at a relatively
slow pace since that time. Moreover, the new types of strategic offensive arms introduced
recently seem to be more of a response to concerns about U.S. missile defense programs than a
response to U.S. offensive modernization programs.
The Future of Arms Control
In 2018 and 2019, Trump Administration officials indicated that they were reviewing New
START and assessing whether it continued to serve U.S. national security interests before
deciding whether the United States would propose or accept a five-year extension.140 In April
2019, President Trump directed his staff to develop proposals for expanded arms control efforts,
instead of pursuing an extension of New START, that would include China as a party and that
would capture al of Russia’s nuclear weapons, including several of the new types of systems
described in this report.141 Nevertheless, the Trump Administration held several meetings with
Russia in 2020 to discuss the possible extension of the treaty.142
While these talks continued through October 2020, the two sides were unable to reach an
agreement. The United States eventual y agreed, in principle, to extend New START for one year
in exchange for Russia’s agreement on a one-year freeze on the size of nuclear stockpile.143 The
parties did not, however, agree on the precise definitions needed to implement the warhead freeze
or the necessary verification procedures needed to monitor it.144 The United States and Russia did
not resolve their differences before the end of the Trump Administration. The Biden

2015, https://dod.defense.gov/News/T ranscripts/T ranscript-View/Article/956079/remarks-by-secretary-carter-to-
troops-at-minot-air-force-base-north-dakota/s://; www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2015/12/03/former-secdef-perry-us-
on-brink-of-new-nuclear-arms-race/.
139 U.S. Department of Defense, Remarks by Secretary Carter to troops at Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota ,
T ranscript, Washington, DC, September 26, 2016, https://dod.defense.gov/News/T ranscripts/Transcript-View/Article/
956079/remarks-by-secretary-carter-to-troops-at-minot-air-force-base-north-dakota/.
140 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Status of U.S.-Russia Arms Control Efforts, Hearing, 115th
Cong., 2nd sess., September 18, 2018. See the prepared statement of Honorable David T rachtenberg, Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/091818_Trachtenberg_T estimony.pdf.
141 Paul Sonne and John Hudson, “T rump orders staff to prepare arms-control push with Russia and China,”
Washington Post, April 25, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-orders-staff-to-
prepare-arms-control-push-with-russia-and-china/2019/04/25/c7f05e04-6076-11e9-9412-daf3d2e67c6d_story.html?
utm_term=.3e294ce0a8e9.
142 For a detailed description of these negotiations, see CRS Report R41219, The New START Treaty: Central Limits
and Key Provisions, by Amy F. Woolf, pp. 46-50.
143 Michael R. Gordon, “U.S., Russia Move T oward Outline of Nuclear Deal, Administration Says,” Wall Street
Journal, October 5, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-russia-move-toward-outline-of-nuclear-deal-
administration-official-says-11601933654.
144 David Lawler, “T rump aiming for nuclear arms deal with Russia before Election Day,” Axios, October 9, 2020,
https://www.axios.com/trump-russia-nuclear-arms-agreement -new-start-4fe42c37-83e0-4088-aa26-b37f8a07bf7f.html.
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Administration endorsed a five-year extension of New START on January 21, 2021; the United
States and Russia exchanged diplomatic notes that achieved this goal on February 3, 2021.145
Russia’s nuclear modernization programs, in general, and its development of new kinds of
strategic offensive arms were one of the key issues that raised concerns in discussions about New
START extension. For example, General John Hyten, while serving as the commander of U.S.
Strategic Command (STRATCOM), stated that he believed New START serves U.S. national
security interests because its monitoring regime provides transparency and visibility into Russian
nuclear forces, and because its limits provide predictability about the future size and structure of
those forces. However, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in February
2019, General Hyten expressed concern about Russia’s new nuclear delivery systems—the
Poseidon underwater drone, the Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile, the Kinzhal air-
launched bal istic missile, and the Tsirkon hypersonic cruise missile—which would not count
under New START’s limits. He noted that these weapons could eventual y pose a threat to the
United States and that he believed the United States and Russia should expand New START so
they would count them under the treaty.146
Some analysts have questioned whether this approach made sense because Russia is not likely to
deploy these systems until later in the 2020s. Even then, the numbers are likely to be relatively
smal . On the other hand, Russia began to deploy the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle in late
December 2019 and may deploy the Sarmat heavy bal istic missile in 2022. Both wil count under
New START. However, if New START had expired, Russia would no longer be bound by any
numerical limits on the number of long-range missiles and heavy bombers it can deploy, or the
number of nuclear warheads that could be deployed on those missiles and bombers. Because
Russia is already producing new missiles like the Yars, it could possibly accelerate production to
increase the number of warheads added to the force. Russia could also possibly add to the number
of warheads deployed on some of these missiles, increasing them from four warheads to six to
eight warheads per missile. In addition, Russia wil likely have to limit the deployment of the
Sarmat missile and retire old SS-18 missiles to remain under New START limits, but it could
have deployed hundreds of new warheads on the Sarmat between 2022 and 2026 if the treaty
were not in place. According to some analyses, if Russia had expanded its forces with these
changes, it could possibly add more than 1,000 warheads to its force without increasing the
number of deployed missiles between 2021 and 2026.147
The Debate Over Russia’s Nuclear Doctrine
The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) adheres to the view that Russia has adopted an
“escalate to de-escalate” strategy and asserts that Russia “mistakenly assesses that the threat of

145 Antony J. Blinken, U.S. Secretary of State, On the Extension of the New ST ART T reaty with the Russian
Federation, U.S. Department of State, press statement, Washington, DC, February 3, 2021, https://www.state.gov/on -
the-extension-of-the-new-start-treaty-with-the-russian-federation/. See, also, Statement by the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Russian Federation on the extension of the T reaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation
of Strategic Offensive Arms, February 3, 2021, htt ps://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/-
/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4551078.
146 Joe Gould, “US nuclear general worries over Russia’s weapons outside New ST ART ,” Defense News, February 26,
2019, https://www.defensenews.com/smr/nuclear-arsenal/2019/02/26/us-nuclear-general-worries-over-russias-
weapons-out side-new-start/.
147 For a detailed discussion on these implications, see Vince Manzo, Nuclear Arms Control Without a Treaty? Risks
and Options after New START, Center for Naval Analysis, Arlington, VA, March 2019, p, 53. https://www.cna.org/
CNA_files/PDF/IRM-2019-U-019494.pdf.
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nuclear escalation or actual first use of nuclear weapons would serve to ‘de-escalate’ a conflict on
terms favorable to Russia.”148 The NPR’s primary concern is with a scenario where Russia
executes a land-grab on a NATO al y’s territory and then presents U.S. and NATO forces with a
fait accompli by threatening to use nuclear weapons. The NPR thus recommends that the United
States develop new low-yield nonstrategic weapons that, it argues, would provide the United
States with a credible response, thereby “ensuring that the Russian leadership does not
miscalculate regarding the consequences of limited nuclear first use.”149
While some experts outside government agree with the assessment of Russian nuclear doctrine
described in the Nuclear Posture Review,150 others argue that it overstates or is inconsistent with
Russian statements and actions. Some have argued that the NPR’s “evidence of a dropped
threshold for Russian nuclear employment is weak.” They note that, although some Russian
authors and analysts advocated such an approach, was not evident in the government documents
published in 2010 and 2014. As a result, they argue that the advocates for this type of strategy
may have lost the bureaucratic debates.151 Others have reviewed reports on Russian military
exercises and have disputed the conclusion that there is evidence that Russia simulated nuclear
use against NATO in large conventional exercises.152
One analyst has postulated that Russia may actual y raise its nuclear threshold as it bolsters its
conventional forces. According to this analyst, “It is difficult to understand why Russia would
want to pursue military adventurism that would risk al -out confrontation with a technological y
advanced and nuclear-armed adversary like NATO. While opportunistic, and possibly even
reckless, the Putin regime does not appear to be suicidal.”153 As a study from the RAND
Corporation noted, Russia has “invested considerable sums in developing and fielding long-range
conventional strike weapons since the mid-2000s to provide Russian leadership with a buffer
against reaching the nuclear threshold—a set of conventional escalatory options that can achieve
strategic effects without resorting to nuclear weapons.”154 Others note, however, that Russia has
integrated these “conventional precision weapons and nuclear weapons into a single strategic
weapon set,” lending credence to the view that Russia may be prepared to employ, or threaten to
employ, nuclear weapons during a regional conflict.155

148 Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, Washington, DC, February 2, 2018, p. 8,
https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POST URE-REVIEW-
FINALREPORT .PDF.
149 Ibid., p. 30.
150 Matthew Kroenig, “T he Case for U.S. T actical Nukes,” Wall Street Journal, January 24, 2018,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-case-for-tactical-u-s-nukes-1516836395. See also Elbridge Colby, “ Countering
Russian Nuclear Strategy In Central Europe,” Center for New Am erican Security, November 11, 2015,
https://www.cnas.org/publications/commentary/countering-russian-nuclear-strategy-in-central-europe.
151 Olga Oliker and Andrey Baklitsky, “T he Nuclear Posture Review and Russian ‘De-Escalation:’ a Dangerous
Solution to a Nonexistent Problem,” War on the Rocks, February 20, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/02/
nuclear-posture-review-russian-de-escalation-dangerous-solution-nonexistent -problem/.
152 Bruno T etrais, “Does Russia really include limited nuclear strikes in its large-scale military exercises?,” Survival,
February 15, 2018, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/survival-blog/2018/02/russia-nuclear.
153 Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, “T he Myth of Russia’s Lowered Nuclear T hreshold,” War on the Rocks, September 22,
2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/09/the-myth-of-russias-lowered-nuclear-threshold/.
154 Scott Boston and Dara Massicot, “T he Russian Way of Warfare,” RAND Perspective, 2017, https://www.rand.org/
pubs/perspectives/PE231.html.
155 Dave Johnson, “Russia’s Conventional Precision Strike Capabilities, Regional Crises, and Nuclear T hresholds,”
LLNL paper, February 2018, https://cgsr.llnl.gov/content/assets/docs/Precision-Strike-Capabilities-report-v3-7.pdf.
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Appendix A. Russian Nuclear-Capable
Delivery Systems

Source: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Assessing the Arsenals: Past, Present, and Future
Capabilities, March 15, 2019, https://csbaonline.org/research/publications/
Assessing_the_Arsenals_Past_Present_and_Future_Capabilities/publication.
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Appendix B. Russian Nuclear Storage Facilities

Source: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), Lock them Up: Zero-deployed Non-
strategic Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 2017, http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/lock-them-up-zero-
deployed-non-strategic-nuclear-weapons-in-europe-en-675.pdf.

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Author Information

Amy F. Woolf

Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy

Acknowledgments
Anya Fink, working as a CRS research intern, contributed valued assistance in research and writing of this
report.

Disclaimer
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