Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing
September 10, 2021
Challenges, and U.S. Interests
Kristin Archick
Between 1969 and 1999, roughly 3,500 people died as a result of political violence in Northern
Specialist in European
Ireland, which is one of four component “nations” of the United Kingdom (UK). The conflict,
Affairs
often referred to as “the Troubles,” has its origins in the 1921 division of Ireland and has

reflected a struggle between different national, cultural, and religious identities. Protestants in
Northern Ireland largely define themselves as British and support remaining part of the UK

(unionists). Most Catholics in Northern Ireland consider themselves Irish, and many desire a
united Ireland (nationalists).
Successive U.S. Administrations and many Members of Congress have actively supported the Northern Ireland peace
process. For decades, the United States has provided development aid through the International Fund for Ireland (IFI). In
recent years, congressional hearings have focused on the peace process, police reforms, human rights, and addressing
Northern Ireland’s legacy of violence (often termed dealing with the past). Some Members also are concerned about how
Brexit—the UK’s withdrawal as a member of the European Union (EU) in January 2020—is affecting Northern Ireland.
The Peace Agreement: Progress to Date and Ongoing Challenges
In 1998, the UK and Irish governments and key Northern Ireland political parties reached a negotiated political settlement.
The resulting Good Friday Agreement, or Belfast Agreement, recognized that a change in Northern Ireland’s constitutional
status as part of the UK can come about only with the consent of a majority of the people in Northern Ireland (as well as with
the consent of a majority in Ireland). The agreement called for devolved government—the transfer of specified powers from
London to Belfast—with a Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive in which unionist and nationalist parties would share
power. It also contained provisions on decommissioning (disarmament) of paramilitary weapons, policing, human rights, UK
security normalization (demilitarization), and the status of prisoners.
Despite a much-improved security situation since 1998, full implementation of the peace agreement has been difficult. For
years, decommissioning and police reforms were key sticking points that generated instability in the devolved government. In
2007, the pro-British Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Sinn Fein, the nationalist political party traditionally associated
with the Irish Republican Army (IRA), reached a landmark power-sharing deal. Tensions and distrust persisted, however. In
2017, the devolved government led by the DUP and Sinn Fein collapsed, prompting snap Assembly elections. It took nearly
three years to form a new devolved government. Northern Ireland also faces a number of broad issues in its search for peace
and reconciliation, including reducing sectarian divisions, dealing with the past, addressing lingering concerns about
paramilitary and dissident activity, and promoting further economic development. In late March and early April 2021, the
outbreak of riots and unrest in parts of Northern Ireland—widely characterized as the worst violence in years—highlighted
many of the challenges and underlying fault lines that remain in Northern Ireland.
Brexit and Northern Ireland
Brexit has added to political and societal divisions within Northern Ireland. Preventing a hard border (with customs checks
and physical infrastructure) on the island of Ireland was a key imperative and a major stumbling block in the UK-EU
withdrawal negotiations. Since 1998, as security checkpoints were dismantled in accordance with the peace agreement and
because both the UK and Ireland belonged to the EU single market and customs union, the circuitous 300-mile land border
on the island of Ireland effectively disappeared, helping to promote peace and a dynamic cross-border economy. Concerns
about a hard border developing mostly receded in light of the post-Brexit trade and customs arrangements for Northern
Ireland agreed to by the UK and EU, but implementing these measures—which began on January 1, 2021—disrupted some
trade between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK. In July 2021, the UK government called for significant changes to the
post-Brexit arrangements for Northern Ireland; the EU rejects renegotiating the agreed framework but asserts it is committed
to mitigating the trade disruptions. Tensions over Brexit have exacerbated a sense among unionists that their British identity
is under threat, factored into some unrest in Northern Ireland in spring 2021, and have contributed to instability within the
DUP. Brexit also has renewed debate about Northern Ireland’s constitutional status and prompted calls from Sinn Fein and
others for a border poll, or referendum, on whether Northern Ireland should remain part of the UK. In September 2021, the
DUP warned that its concerns over the post-Brexit trade and customs rules for Northern Ireland could prompt the party to
quit the devolved government, which could lead to new snap Assembly elections. Also see CRS Report R46730, Brexit:
Overview, Trade, and Northern Ireland, coordinated by Derek E. Mix.
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Contacts
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Overview
Between 1969 and 1999, roughly 3,500 people died as a result of political violence in Northern
Ireland, which is a part of the United Kingdom (UK). The conflict, often referred to as “the
Troubles,” has its modern origins in the 1921 division of Ireland (see map in Figure 1).1 At its
core, the conflict reflects a struggle between different national, cultural, and religious identities.
Protestants in Northern Ireland (48% of the population) largely define themselves as British and
support Northern Ireland’s continued incorporation in the UK (unionists). Most Catholics in
Northern Ireland (45% of the population) consider themselves Irish, and many Catholics desire a
united Ireland (nationalists). In the past, more militant unionists (loyalists) and more militant
nationalists (republicans) were willing to use force and resort to violence to achieve their goals.2
The Troubles were sparked in late 1968, when a civil rights movement was launched in Northern
Ireland mostly by Catholics, who had long faced discrimination in areas such as electoral rights,
housing, and employment. This civil rights movement was met with violence by some unionists,
loyalists, and the police, which in turn prompted armed action by nationalists and republicans.
Increasing chaos and escalating violence led the UK government to deploy the British Army on
the streets of Northern Ireland in 1969 and to impose direct rule from London in 1972 (between
1921 and 1972, Northern Ireland had its own regional government).
For years, the UK and Irish governments sought to facilitate a negotiated political settlement to
the conflict in Northern Ireland. Multiparty talks began in June 1996, led by former Senate
Majority Leader George Mitchell, who was serving as U.S. President Bill Clinton’s special
adviser on Ireland. After many ups and downs, the UK and Irish governments and the Northern
Ireland political parties participating in the peace talks announced an agreement on April 10,
1998. This accord became known as the Good Friday Agreement (for the day on which it was
concluded); it is also known as the Belfast Agreement.3
Despite the significant decrease in the levels of violence since the Good Friday Agreement,
implementation of the peace accord has been challenging. Tensions persist among Northern
Ireland’s political parties and between the unionist and nationalist communities more broadly.
Northern Ireland remains a largely divided society and continues to grapple with a number of
issues in its search for peace and reconciliation. Sectarian differences flare periodically, and
addressing Northern Ireland’s legacy of violence (often termed dealing with the past) is
particularly controversial. Many analysts assess that peace and security in Northern Ireland is
fragile. The UK’s withdrawal from the European Union (EU) in January 2020—or Brexit—has
added to divisions within Northern Ireland, as highlighted by the riots and unrest that erupted in
parts of Northern Ireland in late March and early April 2021. Brexit continues to pose challenges
for Northern Ireland’s peace process and economy, has renewed questions about Northern

1 In 1921, the mostly Catholic, southern part of Ireland won independence from the United Kingdom (UK), resulting in
the establishment of the Irish Free State in 1922 within the British Commonwealth. The Irish government formally
declared Ireland a republic in 1948 and severed its remaining constitutional links with the UK. The Republic of Ireland,
with a population of roughly 4.9 million, consists of 26 counties and encompasses about five-sixths of the island of
Ireland; Northern Ireland, with approximately 1.9 million people, comprises six counties and encompasses the
remaining one-sixth of the island.
2 Many unionists and loyalists refer to the six counties that today make up Northern Ireland as Ulster. Technically and
historically, Ulster also includes the three northernmost counties of the Republic of Ireland.
3 The text of the Good Friday Agreement (or Belfast Agreement) may be found at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/
docs//agreement.htm. The unionist/Protestant community tends to use the term Belfast Agreement, viewing the name
Good Friday Agreement as biased in favor of the nationalist/Catholic community. For the purposes of this report, the
peace accord is referred to as the Good Friday Agreement, because this is the name more widely used and recognized
in the United States.
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Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests

Ireland’s constitutional status as part of the UK, and is contributing to heightened political
instability within Northern Ireland’s devolved government.
Successive U.S. Administrations and many Members of Congress have actively supported the
Northern Ireland peace process and encouraged the full implementation of the Good Friday
Agreement, as well as subsequent accords and initiatives to further the peace process and promote
long-term reconciliation. Some Members have been particularly interested in police reforms and
human rights in Northern Ireland. Since 1986, the United States has provided development aid
through the International Fund for Ireland (IFI) as a means to encourage economic development
and foster reconciliation. Some Members of Congress also have demonstrated an interest in how
Brexit will affect Northern Ireland in the years ahead.
Figure 1. Map of Northern Ireland (UK) and the Republic of Ireland

Source: Graphic created by CRS using data from Esri (2017).
The 1998 Peace Agreement
Key Elements
The Good Friday Agreement is a multilayered and interlocking document, consisting of a political
settlement reached by Northern Ireland’s political parties and an international treaty between the
UK and Irish governments. At the core of the Good Friday Agreement is the consent principle—
that is, a change in Northern Ireland’s status can come about only with the consent of the majority
of Northern Ireland’s people, as well as with the consent of a majority in Ireland. Although the
agreement acknowledged that a substantial section of Northern Ireland’s population and a
majority on the island desired a united Ireland, it recognized that the majority of people in
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Northern Ireland wished to remain part of the UK. If the preference of this majority were to
change, the agreement asserted that the UK and Irish governments would have a binding
obligation to bring about the wish of the people; thus, the agreement included provisions for
future polls to be held in Northern Ireland on its constitutional status, should events warrant.
The Good Friday Agreement set out a framework for devolved government—the transfer of
specified powers over local governance from London to Belfast—and called for establishing a
Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive in which unionist and nationalist parties would share
power (known as Strand One). The Good Friday Agreement also contained provisions on several
issues viewed as central to the peace process: decommissioning (disarmament) of paramilitary
weapons, policing, human rights, UK security normalization (demilitarization), and the status of
prisoners. Negotiations on many of these areas had been extremely contentious. Experts assert
that the final agreed text thus reflected some degree of “constructive ambiguity” on such issues.
In addition, the Good Friday Agreement created new “North-South” and “East-West” institutions
(Strand Two and Strand Three, respectively). Among the key institutions called for in these two
strands, a North-South Ministerial Council was established to allow leaders in the northern and
southern parts of the island of Ireland to consult and cooperate on cross-border issues. A British-
Irish Council also was formed to discuss matters of regional interest; the council comprises
representatives of the two governments and the devolved administrations of Northern Ireland,
Scotland, Wales, the Channel Islands, and the Isle of Man.
Implementation
Voters in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland approved the Good Friday Agreement in
separate referendums on May 22, 1998. Although considerable progress has been made in
implementing the agreement, the process has been arduous. For years, decommissioning and
police reforms were key sticking points that contributed to instability in Northern Ireland’s
devolved government. Sporadic violence from dissident republican and loyalist paramilitary
groups that refused to accept the peace process and sectarian strife also helped to feed mistrust
between the unionist and nationalist communities and their respective political parties.
Democratic Power-Sharing Institutions
As noted above, the Good Friday Agreement called for establishing a new Northern Ireland
Assembly and Executive. To ensure that neither unionists nor nationalists could dominate the
108-member Assembly, the agreement specified that “key decisions” must receive cross-
community support (i.e., from a majority of both unionist and nationalist Assembly members).
The Executive would be composed of a first minister, deputy first minister, and other ministers
with departmental responsibilities (e.g., health, education, jobs); positions would be allocated to
political parties according to party strength in the Assembly.
The first elections to the new Northern Ireland Assembly took place on June 25, 1998. The
devolution of power from London to Belfast, however, did not follow promptly because of
unionist concerns about decommissioning, or the paramilitaries’ surrender of their weapons.
Following 18 months of further negotiations, authority over local affairs was transferred to the
Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive in December 1999. Over the next few years, the issue
of decommissioning—especially by the Irish Republican Army (IRA)—contributed to the
suspension of the devolved government and the reinstatement of direct rule from London several
times between 2000 and 2002. (See “Decommissioning,” below.)
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In May 2007, after a nearly five-year suspension, Northern Ireland’s devolved government was
restored following a landmark deal between the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)—which
strongly supports Northern Ireland’s continued integration as part of the UK—and Sinn Fein, the
staunchly nationalist political party traditionally associated with the IRA.4 The DUP and Sinn
Fein have been the largest unionist and nationalist parties, respectively, in Northern Ireland since
2003. The 2007 DUP-Sinn Fein deal paved the way for greater stability in Northern Ireland’s
devolved government over the next decade. Regularly scheduled Assembly elections in 2011 and
2016 produced successive power-sharing governments, also led by the DUP and Sinn Fein.
At the same time, tensions persisted within the devolved government and between the unionist
and nationalist communities. Various incidents—including protests in 2012 and 2013 over the use
of flags and emblems, a 2014 dispute over welfare reform, and the 2015 arrest of a Sinn Fein
leader in connection with the murder of a former IRA member—periodically threatened the
devolved government’s stability. Following the collapse of the devolved government and snap
Assembly elections in 2017, divisions over Brexit and other contentious issues largely stalled
negotiations on forming a new devolved government for almost three years. (See “2017-2020
Crisis in the Devolved Government,” below.)
Decommissioning
For years, decommissioning of paramilitary weapons was a prominent challenge in the
implementation of the Good Friday Agreement. The text of the agreement states, “those who hold
office should use only democratic, non-violent means, and those who do not should be excluded
or removed from office.” Unionists were adamant that the IRA must fully decommission its
weapons. The IRA had been observing a cease-fire since 1997, but it viewed decommissioning as
tantamount to surrender and had long resisted such calls.
Progress toward full IRA decommissioning was slow and incremental. A key milestone came in
July 2005, when the IRA declared an end to its armed campaign and instructed all members to
pursue objectives through “exclusively peaceful means.”5 In September 2005, Northern Ireland’s
Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) announced that the IRA had
put all of its arms “beyond use,” asserting that the IRA weaponry dismantled or made inoperable
matched estimates provided by the security forces.6 The IICD also confirmed decommissioning
by other republican groups and loyalist organizations. The IICD concluded its work in 2011.
Policing
Although recognized as a central element in achieving a comprehensive peace in Northern
Ireland, new policing structures and arrangements were a frequent point of contention between
unionists and nationalists. In 2001, a new Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) was
established to replace the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), Northern Ireland’s former, 92%
Protestant police force. Catholics viewed the RUC as an enforcer of Protestant domination, and
human rights organizations accused the RUC of brutality and collusion with loyalist paramilitary
groups. Defenders of the RUC pointed to its tradition of loyalty and discipline and its record in
fighting terrorism. In accordance with policing recommendations made by an independent
commission (known as the Patten Commission), increasing the proportion of Catholic officers

4 Frank Millar, “Paisley Reaches Out and Grasps Cherished Prize,” Irish Times, March 27, 2007; Mark Davenport, “NI
Politics Moves Away from Edge,” BBC News, May 8, 2007.
5 “IRA Statement in Full,” BBC News, July 25, 2005.
6 Mark Davenport, “IRA Arms: What Next for NI Politics?,” BBC News, September 26, 2005.
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(from 8% to 30% in 10 years) was a key goal for the new PSNI. To help fulfill this goal, the PSNI
introduced a 50-50 Catholic/Protestant recruitment process.7
For several years, Sinn Fein refused to participate in the new Policing Board, a democratic
oversight body. Many viewed Sinn Fein’s stance as discouraging Catholics from joining the PSNI
and preventing the nationalist community from fully accepting the new police force. In 2007,
however, as part of the process to restore the devolved government, Sinn Fein members voted to
support the police and join the Policing Board. Experts viewed Sinn Fein’s decision as historic,
given the IRA’s traditional view of the police as a legitimate target. In 2010, the DUP and Sinn
Fein reached an accord (the Hillsborough Agreement) to devolve policing and justice powers
from London to Belfast (on which the parties had been unable to agree at the time of the Good
Friday Agreement’s signing).
In 2011, the 50-50 recruitment process for Catholic and Protestant PSNI officers concluded.
Officials asserted that the 50-50 process fulfilled the goals set out by the Patten Commission
(including increasing the number of Catholic officers to 30%).8 In recent years, concerns
resurfaced that not enough Catholics were seeking to join the PSNI; partly because of lingering
suspicions about the police within the Catholic/nationalist community but also because of fears
that Catholic police recruits were key targets of dissident republicans. In 2017, the PSNI
introduced a number of procedural changes to help attract more Catholics (and more women).9
Security Normalization
The Good Friday Agreement called for “as early a return as possible to normal security
arrangements in Northern Ireland,” including the removal of security installations. In February
2007, the last of more than 100 armored watchtowers in Northern Ireland was dismantled. In July
2007, the British Army ended its 38-year-long military operation in Northern Ireland. Although a
regular garrison of 5,000 British troops remains based in Northern Ireland, British forces no
longer have a role in policing and may be deployed worldwide.
Rights, Safeguards, and Equality of Opportunity
In accordance with the Good Friday Agreement’s provisions related to human rights and equality,
the UK government incorporated the European Convention on Human Rights into Northern
Ireland law and established a new Human Rights Commission and a new Equality Commission
for Northern Ireland. Some nationalists, however, continue to press for more progress in the area
of human rights and equality. They argue that Northern Ireland needs its own Bill of Rights
(consideration of which is provided for in the Good Friday Agreement) and a stand-alone Irish
Language Act to give the Irish language the same official status as English in Northern Ireland.
The Good Friday Agreement calls for tolerance of linguistic diversity in Northern Ireland and
support for the Irish language. The subsequent St. Andrews Agreement of 2006 provided for an
Irish Language Act, but this issue remains controversial.

7 See A New Beginning: Policing in Northern Ireland, Report of the Independent Commission on Policing for Northern
Ireland, September 1999, at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/police/patten/patten99.pdf.
8 “Police 50-50 Recruiting System Is to End,” BBC News, March 28, 2011.
9 Deborah McAleese, “Top Officer’s ‘Deep Concern’ at Lack of Catholics Signing Up for Police Career in Northern
Ireland,” Belfast Telegraph, October 23, 2015; Vincent Kearney, “PSNI Aims to Recruit 300 New Officers,” BBC
News, October 23, 2017.
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Initiatives to Further the Peace Process
Many analysts view implementation of the most important aspects of the Good Friday Agreement
as complete. Since 2013, however, the Northern Ireland political parties and the UK and Irish
governments have made several attempts to reduce sectarian tensions and promote reconciliation.
Major endeavors include the following:
 The 2013 Haass Initiative. In 2013, the Northern Ireland Executive appointed
former U.S. diplomat and special envoy for Northern Ireland Richard Haass as
the independent chair of interparty talks aimed at tackling some of the most
divisive issues in Northern Ireland society.10 In particular, Haass was tasked with
making recommendations on dealing with the past and the sectarian issues of
parading, protests, and the use of flags and emblems. In December 2013, Haass
released a draft proposal outlining the way forward in these areas, but he was
unable to broker a final agreement among the Northern Ireland political parties.11
 The 2014 Stormont House Agreement. In 2014, financial pressures and
budgetary disputes related to UK-wide welfare reforms and austerity measures
tested Northern Ireland’s devolved government. The UK and Irish governments
convened interparty talks to address government finances and governing
structures, as well as the issues previously tackled by the Haass initiative. In the
resulting December 2014 Stormont House Agreement, the Northern Ireland
political parties agreed to support welfare reform (with certain mitigating
measures), balance the budget, address Northern Ireland’s heavy reliance on the
public sector, and reduce the size of the Assembly and the number of Executive
departments to improve efficiency and cut costs. The agreement also included
measures on parading, flags, and dealing with the past. Continued disagreements
over welfare reform between the DUP and Sinn Fein, however, stalled
implementation of all aspects of the Stormont House Agreement.12
 The 2015 Fresh Start Agreement. In November 2015, the UK and Irish
governments, the DUP, and Sinn Fein reached a new Fresh Start Agreement. Like
the Stormont House Agreement, the accord focused on implementing welfare
reform and improving the stability and sustainability of Northern Ireland’s
budget and governing institutions. It confirmed a reduction in the size of the
Assembly from 108 to 90 members (effective from the first Assembly election
after the May 2016 election), decreased the number of Executive departments,
and made provision for an official opposition in the Assembly. The Fresh Start
Agreement also included provisions on parading and the use of flags, but the
parties were unable to reach final agreement on establishing new institutions to
deal with the past. In addition, the Fresh Start Agreement addressed ongoing
concerns about paramilitary activity, sparked by the arrest of a senior Sinn Fein
official in connection to the August 2015 murder of an ex-IRA member.13

10 Richard Haass served as President George W. Bush’s special envoy for Northern Ireland from 2001 to 2003; he is
currently president of the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations.
11 For the full text of the December 31, 2013, draft agreement presented by Haass and his negotiating team, see
http://www.northernireland.gov.uk/haass.pdf.
12 The Stormont House Agreement is available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-stormont-house-
agreement.
13 The Fresh Start Agreement is available at Government of the UK, “News Story: A Fresh Start for Northern Ireland,”
November 17, 2015, at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/a-fresh-start-for-northern-ireland.
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Ongoing Political Instability and Renewed Turmoil
Despite a much-improved security situation since the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, concerns
remain about the stability of the devolved government and the fragility of community relations in
Northern Ireland. As noted, the devolved government collapsed in January 2017 amid heightened
tensions related to Brexit and other issues. It took nearly three years following the March 2017
snap Assembly elections to reestablish the devolved government, led by former First Minister
Arlene Foster of the DUP and Deputy First Minister Michelle O’Neill of Sinn Fein.
Since then, the devolved government has been tested by the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-
19) pandemic and by challenges due to the implementation of the post-Brexit trade and customs
rules for Northern Ireland, which many unionists view as dividing Northern Ireland from the rest
of the UK (i.e., Great Britain). The post-Brexit arrangements for Northern Ireland also have
prompted political turmoil within the DUP. Arlene Foster stepped down as DUP party leader at
the end of May 2021 and as first minister in June 2021. Sir Jeffrey Donaldson became the leader
of the DUP in late June (the DUP’s second new leader in a month); Paul Givan, a DUP member
of the Assembly, currently serves as first minister. (See “Recent DUP Leadership Crisis,” below.)
The next regularly scheduled Assembly elections are due in May 2022. In September 2021, new
DUP leader Donaldson asserted that the DUP’s concerns about the post-Brexit arrangements for
Northern Ireland could force the party to quit the devolved government. Should the DUP
withdraw its ministers from the Executive (including the first minister), this could lead to early,
snap Assembly elections. (See “Implications of Brexit,” below.)
2017-2020 Crisis in the Devolved Government
March 2017 Snap Assembly Elections
The immediate impetus for the devolved government’s January 2017 collapse was a scandal over
flaws in a renewable energy program initially overseen by then-First Minister Foster in her
previous role as enterprise minister in 2012. Then-Deputy First Minister Martin McGuiness of
Sinn Fein called for Foster to stand aside as first minister temporarily while the energy scheme
was investigated; Foster refused, and McGuinness resigned as deputy first minister in protest.
McGuinness’s resignation in effect forced new elections to be called for March 2, 2017 (under the
rules governing Northern Ireland’s power-sharing arrangements, if either the first minister or the
deputy first minister resigns without a replacement being nominated within seven days, the
government cannot continue and new elections must be held).
Tensions on several issues other than the energy scandal contributed to Sinn Fein’s decision to
force snap Assembly elections. The elections were called in the wake of the June 2016 UK
referendum on EU membership and amid deep unease over Brexit’s implications for Northern
Ireland. Other points of contention included the introduction of a potential Irish Language Act
and the legalization of same-sex marriage; Sinn Fein supported both measures, whereas the DUP
opposed them.14 Foster led the DUP’s election campaign, but Michelle O’Neill succeeded
McGuinness as Sinn Fein’s leader in Northern Ireland and led Sinn Fein’s campaign
(McGuinness was ill and passed away a few weeks after the election).
As seen in Table 1, the number of Assembly seats contested in 2017 was 90 rather than 108
(contested in the regularly scheduled 2016 elections) because of a previously agreed reduction in

14 Sinead O’Shea, “Northern Ireland, Forced by Sinn Fein, Sets Early Election in Shadow of Brexit,” New York Times,
January 16, 2017; “NI Election: Everything You Need to Know About the 2017 Vote,” BBC News, March 4, 2017.
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the size of the Assembly. The DUP retained the largest number of seats in 2017, but Sinn Fein
was regarded as the biggest winner, given its success in reducing the previous gap between the
two parties from 10 seats to 1 seat. A high voter turnout of almost 65%—fueled by anger over the
energy scandal and a perceived lack of concern from London about Brexit’s impact on Northern
Ireland—appears to have favored Sinn Fein and the cross-community Alliance Party. For the first
time in the Assembly, unionist parties did not win an overall majority (a largely symbolic status
because of the power-sharing rules but highly emblematic for the unionist community).15
Table 1. Northern Ireland: Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs)
2016 and 2017 election results
Political Party
2016
2017
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP; hard-line unionist, conservative)
38
28
Sinn Fein (SF; hard-line nationalist, left-wing)
28
27
Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP; moderate nationalist, center-left)
12
12
Ulster Unionist Party (UUP; moderate unionist, center-right)
16
10
Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (APNI; nonsectarian, centrist/liberal)
8
8
Green Party (nonsectarian; left-wing)
2
2
People Before Profit Alliance (PBPA; nonsectarian, left-wing)
2
1
Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV; hard-line unionist, right-wing)
1
1
Independent (unionist)
1
1
Total
108
90
Sources: BBC, “NI Election 2016: Results,” at http://www.bbc.com/news/election/2016/northern_ireland/results, and
BBC, “NI Election 2017: Results,” at http://www.bbc.com/news/election/ni2017/results.
Reestablishing the Devolved Government
Following the March 2017 snap Assembly elections, negotiations between the DUP, Sinn Fein,
and the other main political parties (see text box) on forming a new devolved government
repeatedly stalled, primarily over a potential Irish Language Act. Divisions over Brexit
exacerbated tensions. The DUP was the only major Northern Ireland political party to back
Brexit, which Sinn Fein and the other main Northern Ireland parties strongly opposed. The DUP’s
support for the Conservative Party government in the UK Parliament following the UK’s June
2017 snap general election further heightened distrust between Sinn Fein and the DUP and made
reaching a new power-sharing agreement more difficult.
On December 16, 2019, the UK and Irish governments launched a new round of talks with the
main political parties aimed at reestablishing the devolved government. These negotiations
followed another UK snap general election on December 12, 2019, in which Prime Minister Boris
Johnson’s Conservative Party won a convincing parliamentary majority. The 2019 election results
negated the DUP’s influence in the UK Parliament and thus improved the prospects for restoring
Northern Ireland’s devolved government.16

15 Harry McGee, “DUP Smarting from Close Encounter with Sinn Fein Crocodile,” Irish Times, March 3, 2017; Enda
McClafferty, “Assembly Election a Brutal Result for Unionism,” BBC News, March 4, 2017.
16 Padraic Halpin, “UK Election Clears Way for Northern Ireland Devolution, Dublin Says,” Reuters, December 13,
2019; Annabelle Dickson, “Northern Ireland’s Post-election Refocus,” Politico, December 16, 2019.
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On January 10, 2020, the DUP, Sinn Fein, and the other parties agreed to a deal put forward by
the UK and Irish governments to reestablish the devolved government. The new power-sharing
deal, known as New Decade, New Approach, is wide-ranging and addresses a number of key
issues, including health and education concerns and measures to improve the sustainability of
Northern Ireland’s political institutions. The deal did not include a stand-alone Irish Language
Act, as initially demanded by Sinn Fein, but essentially sought to strike a compromise to promote
the use of the Irish (Gaelic) language while protecting the Ulster-Scots language (a regional
language similar to English), which many unionists consider important to their heritage. The deal
provided for the official recognition in Northern Ireland of both the Irish and the Ulster-Scots
languages and allowed their wider use in government settings. The deal also called for
establishing two new “language commissioners”—one for Irish and one for Ulster-Scots—to
enhance, protect, and develop each language and associated cultural traditions. Both the UK and
the Irish governments promised additional financial support for Northern Ireland as part of the
deal.17
Recent DUP Leadership Crisis
In late April 2021, DUP dissatisfaction with then-First Minister Foster’s leadership over Brexit
and other controversies prompted her to announce that she would step down as DUP party leader
at the end of May and as First Minister in June. In May 2021, the DUP chose Northern Ireland
Agriculture Minister Edwin Poots as its new leader. Poots announced, however, that he did not
intend to serve as first minister and chose a close ally, Paul Givan, to become first minister.
Foster officially resigned as first minister on June 14, 2021. Under the devolved government’s
power-sharing rules, Foster’s resignation also forced Deputy First Minister O’Neill to step down.
The first minister and deputy first minister positions are considered a joint office; if one resigns,
the other also ceases to hold office. Following these resignations, the DUP and Sinn Fein had
seven days to nominate replacements for these positions. As noted, if either party fails to
nominate a replacement by the end of the seven days, new Assembly elections must be called.
These rules mean the first minister and deputy first minister posts essentially must have the
support of both the DUP and Sinn Fein.
Sinn Fein indicated it would refuse to renominate O’Neill as deputy first minister following
Foster’s resignation without progress in enacting into law measures on the Irish language and
other cultural issues (previously agreed to in the 2020 New Decade, New Approach deal). On
June 17, 2021, in order to avoid the prospect of a collapse in the devolved government and
another snap Assembly election, the UK government and Sinn Fein agreed that the UK
parliament would introduce the Irish language and culture legislation in October 2021 if the
Northern Ireland Assembly failed to do so by then. Poots backed this UK-Sinn Fein deal and
nominated Givan as first minister, despite concerns within the DUP about the language legislation
agreement and resulting DUP opposition to proceeding with Givan’s nomination. Although Givan
and O’Neill were confirmed as first minister and deputy first minister, respectively, on June 17,
DUP unhappiness with Poots’s leadership forced him to announce his resignation as party
leader.18

17 The text of the New Decade, New Approach deal is available at Government of the UK, “Deal to See Restored
Government in Northern Ireland Tomorrow,” January 9, 2020, at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/deal-to-see-
restored-government-in-northern-ireland-tomorrow.
18 Shawn Pogatchnik, “Midnight Breakthrough Saves Northern Ireland Power-sharing,” Politico, June 17, 2021; Colm
Kelpie and Ciara Colhoun, “DUP Revolt over First Minister Confirmation,” BBC News, June 17, 2021.
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Sir Jeffrey Donaldson—a DUP member of the UK Parliament—replaced Poots as DUP party
leader on June 30, 2021. Donaldson asserted that his priority as DUP leader would be to “right the
wrong” imposed by the post-Brexit arrangements for Northern Ireland.19 Givan remains first
minister at present, but Donaldson hopes to assume the role in the future. To do so, Donaldson
would need to resign his position as a member of Parliament and become a member of the
Northern Ireland Assembly. Donaldson has signaled his intention to stand as a candidate in the
next Assembly elections.20
Main Political Parties in Northern Ireland
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). The DUP has been the largest unionist party in Northern Ireland since
2003. It enjoys considerable Protestant support and strongly favors union with the United Kingdom (UK). The
party initially opposed the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, viewing virtually any compromise with Irish nationalists
as a net loss for unionists. Socially conservative, the DUP opposes abortion and same-sex marriage. From 2015
until May 2021, the DUP was led by Arlene Foster. In late June 2021, following a period of political turmoil within
the party, Sir Jeffrey Donaldson became the new leader of the DUP.
Sinn Fein. Sinn Fein has been the largest nationalist party in Northern Ireland since 2003. It advocates for a
united Ireland. Sinn Fein is an all-island party and has a political presence in both Northern Ireland and Ireland
(with members in both the Northern Ireland Assembly and the Irish Parliament). Historically, Sinn Fein was the
political party associated with the Irish Republican Army (IRA). A left-wing party, Sinn Fein traditionally has
received considerable support from working-class Catholics. In 2018, Mary Lou McDonald became leader of Sinn
Fein, replacing former long-serving leader Gerry Adams. Since 2017, Michelle O’Neill has led Sinn Fein in the
Northern Ireland Assembly and is considered the party’s “northern leader”; she is also the party’s deputy leader.
Ulster Unionist Party (UUP). The UUP is a smaller, center-right Protestant party that supports union with the
UK. It was the lead unionist party involved in the negotiations on the Good Friday Agreement. In May 2021, the
UUP elected Doug Beattie as its leader.
Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP). The SDLP is a smaller, center-left Catholic party that
supports a united Ireland achieved through peaceful means. It was the lead nationalist party involved in the
negotiations on the Good Friday Agreement. The SDLP has been led by Colum Eastwood since 2015.
Alliance Party. The Alliance Party is a nonsectarian, cross-community party. It is centrist and liberal in political
orientation. The Alliance Party has been led by Naomi Long since 2016.
Resurgence of Rioting and Violence in March-April 2021
In late March and early April 2021, sporadic violence and rioting erupted for roughly 12 days in
several cities and towns in Northern Ireland, including Belfast and Londonderry (or Derry). The
unrest began with gangs of youths in a predominantly unionist/loyalist area of Londonderry on
March 29; rioting in Belfast on April 7—including attacks on police officers and a bus—was
described as some of the worst violence seen in Northern Ireland in years. Almost 90 police
officers were injured over the course of the violence.21
Much of the unrest was concentrated in economically disadvantaged communities where criminal
gangs linked to loyalist paramilitaries have considerable influence, but the violence also spread to
interface areas between unionist and nationalist neighborhoods. Although initial assessments
suggested loyalist paramilitaries could be orchestrating the riots and violence in some areas,
Northern Ireland police authorities subsequently concluded that although individuals with ties to

19 Freya McClements, “Jeffrey Donaldson Ratified as DUP’s New Leader After Meeting of Executive,” Irish Times,
June 30, 2021.
20 “Sir Jeffrey Donaldson to Run for Lagan Valley MLA Seat,” BBC News, August 24, 2021.
21 Jordan Kenny, “Timeline: How Northern Ireland’s Violence Unfolded,” BBC News, April 12, 2021; “Belfast:
Rioting ‘Was Worst Seen in Northern Ireland in Years,’” BBC News, April 14, 2021.
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such loyalist groups may have been involved, the groups did not sanction or organize the unrest.22
(See “Remaining Paramilitary Issues and Dissident Activity,” below.) The Northern Ireland
Assembly unanimously condemned the violence, as did the UK and Irish governments.23
A complex combination of factors lies behind the unrest. Considerable attention has focused on
unionist unhappiness with the post-Brexit border and customs arrangements for Northern Ireland.
Amid other demographic, political, and societal changes in Northern Ireland, the post-Brexit
provisions appear to have exacerbated unionist concerns that their British identity is under threat
and enhanced a sense of unionist disenfranchisement and abandonment. Some analysts suggest
that strong rhetoric against the Brexit arrangements from unionist politicians may have further
fueled tensions in unionist/loyalist communities and contributed to instigating the unrest. (See
“Implications of Brexit,” below.)
At the same time, observers note that the immediate spark for the violence followed a decision in
late March 2021 by Northern Ireland authorities not to prosecute violations of COVID-19 social
distancing restrictions and public health protocols at a 2,000-person funeral in June 2020 for a
former high-ranking IRA official. The funeral was attended by Sinn Fein leadership, including
Deputy First Minister O’Neill. For many unionists, this incident—and what they regarded as a
lack of police enforcement of the COVID-19 restrictions on the funeral—reinforced their long-
standing views of a double standard in policing and the judiciary in favor of nationalists and,
more broadly, a sense that the 1998 peace accord has benefited nationalists and republicans more
than the unionist and loyalist communities. Additional factors behind the rioting also may include
frustration and boredom due to the COVID-19 lockdowns, especially among young people from
economically deprived areas.24
Ongoing Challenges in the Peace Process
The search for peace and reconciliation in Northern Ireland remains challenging. Difficult issues
include bridging sectarian divisions and managing key sticking points (especially parading,
protests, and the use of flags and emblems); dealing with the past; addressing remaining
paramilitary concerns and curbing dissident activity; and furthering economic development and
equality. The 2013 Haass initiative, 2014 Stormont House Agreement, and 2015 Fresh Start
Agreement attempted to tackle some aspects of these long-standing challenges. Some measures
agreed to in these successive accords were delayed amid the absence of a devolved government
between 2017 and 2020.
Sectarian Divisions
Observers suggest that Northern Ireland remains a largely divided society, with Protestant and
Catholic communities existing largely in parallel. Schools and housing developments in Northern
Ireland remain mostly single-identity communities and in some areas, peace walls separate

22 Lisa O’Carroll, “Northern Ireland Police Say Paramilitaries Not Behind Recent Violence,” Guardian, April 9, 2021;
Laura Noonan, “Criminal Gangs Blamed for Stoking Northern Ireland Violence,” Financial Times, April 14, 2021.
23 Peter Foster and Jim Brunsden, “London and Dublin Call for Calm After Fresh Riots in Northern Ireland,” Financial
Times, April 8, 2021; David Young, Rebecca Black, and James Ward, “Stormont Ministers Unite to Condemn Violence
and Rioting,” Belfast Telegraph, April 8, 2021.
24 Shawn Pogatchnik, “Northern Ireland ‘Playing with Matches’ amid Brexit Trade Deal Tensions,” Politico, April 7,
2021; Stephen Castle, “Northern Ireland Sees Spasm of Violence as Old Tensions Resurface,” New York Times, April
8, 2021; Dan Haverty, “How Brexit Lit the Fuse in Northern Ireland,” Foreign Policy, April 13, 2021.
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Protestant and Catholic neighborhoods.25 Estimates of the number of peace walls vary depending
on the definition. Northern Ireland’s Department of Justice and Housing Executive have
responsibility for the majority of peace walls, but when other types of structures are included—
such as fences, gates, and closed roads—the number of physical barriers separating Protestant and
Catholic communities is estimated at over 100. Northern Ireland’s Executive has been working to
remove the peace walls since 2013, but a 2015 survey of public attitudes found that 30% of those
interviewed wanted the walls to remain in place for reasons of safety and security. The same 2015
survey also found that more than 4 in 10 people had never interacted with anyone from the
community living on the other side of the nearest peace wall. A 2019 survey, however, suggests a
gradual attitudinal change in support of removing the peace walls and other barriers, especially
among younger people.26
Sectarian divisions are particularly apparent during the annual summer marching season, when
many unionist cultural and religious organizations hold parades commemorating Protestant
history. Although the vast majority of these annual parades are not contentious, some are held
through or close to areas populated mainly by Catholics (some of whom perceive such unionist
parades as triumphalist and intimidating). During the Troubles, the marching season often
provoked fierce violence. Many Protestant organizations view the existing Parades Commission,
which arbitrates disputes over parade routes, as largely biased in favor of Catholics and have
repeatedly argued for abolishing the commission.27 Efforts over the years to address the
contentious issue of parading and related protests have stalled repeatedly. Following the riots in
spring 2021 and in light of ongoing tensions over Brexit, many officials and analysts worried the
2021 marching season could see increased violence. Parades and related events during the 2021
marching season, however, passed without any significant incidents.28
Sectarian tensions also are evident in relation to the use of flags and emblems in Northern Ireland.
A series of protests in late 2012 and early 2013 following a decision to fly the union (UK) flag at
Belfast City Hall only on designated days (rather than year-round) highlighted frictions on such
issues between the unionist and nationalist communities. The protests, mostly by unionists and
loyalists, occurred in Belfast and elsewhere in Northern Ireland, and some turned violent.
Northern Ireland leaders on both sides of the sectarian divide received death threats, and some
political party offices were vandalized.29
In June 2016, a Commission on Flags, Identity, Culture, and Tradition was established to assess
these contentious issues and to recommend policies and solutions to help address them. This
commission consisted of 15 members, with 7 appointed by Northern Ireland’s political parties
and 8 drawn from outside the government; it was originally proposed by the Haass initiative and
subsequently endorsed in the Stormont House Agreement and the Fresh Start Agreement.
Although this commission was supposed to produce a report with its recommendations within 18
months, its work was delayed by the size of its task and the collapse of the devolved government

25 Paul Nolan, “Two Tribes: A Divided Northern Ireland,” Irish Times, April 1, 2017; Robbie Meredith, “Integrated
Education: DUP MLA Says All Schools Should Be Integrated,” BBC News, November 25, 2020.
26 “Northern Ireland Interfaces: More Residents Want Peace Walls to Stay,” BBC News, December 15, 2015; “Will
NI’s Peace Walls Come Down by 2023 to Meet 10-Year Target?,” BBC News, May 3, 2018; International Fund for
Ireland, Peace Walls Programme Attitudinal Survey: Summary of Results, November 2019.
27 The Parades Commission was established in 1998 as an independent body to rule on disputed parades.
28 Julian O’Neill, “Twelfth Parades Across Northern Ireland Passed Without Incident,” BBC News, July 12, 2021;
Megan Specia, “Northern Ireland’s Marching Season Begins in a Fraught Year for Unionists,” New York Times, July
13, 2021.
29 “Q&A: Northern Ireland Flag Protests,” BBC News, December 8, 2012.
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between 2017 and 2020. The commission delivered its report to the first minister and deputy first
minister in July 2020, but the report has not been shared with the rest of the Northern Ireland
Executive, the Assembly, or the public. In March 2021, the Northern Ireland Assembly passed a
motion calling for the Executive to publish the commission’s report.30
Dealing with the Past
Fully addressing the legacy of violence in Northern Ireland remains controversial. The Good
Friday Agreement asserted that, “it is essential to acknowledge and address the suffering of the
victims of violence as a necessary element of reconciliation.” In 2008, the Northern Ireland
Assembly established a Commission for Victims and Survivors aimed at supporting victims and
their families. Several legal processes for examining crimes stemming from the Troubles also
exist. These include investigations into deaths related to the conflict by a dedicated unit within the
PSNI; investigations by the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland (PONI) of historical cases
involving allegations of police misconduct; and public inquiries, such as the Saville inquiry
(concluded in 2010) into the 1972 Bloody Sunday incident.
Critics argue these various legal processes represent a piecemeal approach and give some deaths
or incidents priority over others. Many observers note that progress in investigations has been
slow; as of 2019, there were roughly 1,700 conflict-related cases in total awaiting investigation by
the PSNI or the PONI.31 Others point out the expense and time involved with some of these
processes; for example, the Bloody Sunday inquiry cost £195 million (more than $300 million)
and took 12 years to complete.32 Reaching consensus on the best way to address Northern
Ireland’s legacy of violence has been difficult, in large part because many unionists and
nationalists continue to view the conflict differently and retain competing narratives.
Several recent events further highlighted questions about dealing with Northern Ireland’s legacy
of violence and pursuing justice. In May 2021, a coroner’s inquest released its findings into 10
deaths in August 1971 in the Ballymurphy area of Belfast. The inquest concluded that all 10
people killed were “entirely innocent” and that 9 of the 10 were killed by the British Army (the
inquest could not definitively determine who had shot the 10th victim).33 In July 2021, the Belfast
High Court found that the August 1998 Omagh bombing (in which the dissident Real IRA killed
29 people) possibly could have been prevented and recommended that both the UK and the Irish
governments undertake investigations into the pre-attack intelligence related to the bombing.34
The issue of prosecuting former British soldiers who served in Northern Ireland during the
Troubles also remains contentious. During the 2019 UK general election, Prime Minister Johnson
pledged to protect veterans from prosecutions related to their past service in Northern Ireland. In
April 2021, the UK minister for veterans alleged the government was failing to shield former

30 Jayne McCormack, “Dr. Dominic Bryan: NI Flags Commission’s Brief Too Big,” BBC News, June 27, 2019; “Let
Us See Flags and Culture Report Now,” Belfast Telegraph, February 26, 2021; Jayne McCormack, “Stormont Votes for
Release of Completed Flags and Culture Report,” BBC News, March 22, 2021.
31 Commission for Victims and Survivors, Addressing the Legacy of Northern Ireland’s Past, January 2019, p. 20, at
https://www.cvsni.org/media/1970/jan-2019-addressing-the-legacy-of-northern-ireland-s-past-policy-advice-paper.pdf.
32 James Clarke, “Was the Bloody Sunday Report Value for Money?,” BBC News, June 14, 2010.
33 A coroner’s inquest is a fact-finding exercise to determine the circumstances of a death; it is not a trial and the
coroner does not decide questions of criminal or civil liability. For more information on the Ballymurphy inquest, see
Colm Kelpie, “Ballymurphy Inquest: Coroner Finds 10 Victims Were Innocent,” BBC News, May 11, 2021. Also see
UK House of Commons Library, Investigations of Former Armed Forces Personnel Who Served in Northern Ireland,
February 22, 2021.
34 Rory Carroll, “Omagh Bombing Could Have Been Prevented, Says High Court Judge,” Guardian, July 23, 2021.
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soldiers from Troubles-era prosecutions (he was forced to resign his ministerial position
subsequently). In May 2021, the trial of two former British soldiers accused of murdering a
republican paramilitary in 1972 collapsed due to a lack of admissible evidence. In July 2021,
prosecutors announced they would drop charges against two other former British soldiers accused
of murdering Catholic civilians in 1972 (including during Bloody Sunday), also due to
inadmissible evidence.35
Stormont House Agreement Provisions
The 2014 Stormont House Agreement called for establishing four new bodies to address “legacy
issues” (based largely on proposals made during the 2013 Haass initiative):
 Historical Investigations Unit (HIU). This body would take forward the work
of the PSNI and the PONI in investigating outstanding cases related to the
Troubles. The UK government pledged full disclosure to the HIU.
 Independent Commission for Information Retrieval (ICIR). The ICIR would
enable victims and survivors to seek and privately receive information about
conflict-related violence. It would be established by the UK and Irish
governments but would be separate from the justice systems in each jurisdiction.
Any information provided to the ICIR would be inadmissible in criminal and
civil proceedings, but individuals who provided information would not be
immune to prosecution should evidentiary requirements be met by other means.
 Oral History Archive. This archive would provide a central place for people
from all backgrounds to share experiences and narratives related to the Troubles.
 Implementation and Reconciliation Group. This body would oversee work on
themes, archives, and information recovery in an effort to promote reconciliation
and reduce sectarianism.
Efforts to establish these four new legacy institutions in UK law, however, largely stalled due to
divisions between the UK government, on the one hand, and some nationalists and human rights
advocates, on the other, over proposed “national security caveats” related to the disclosure of
certain information. Victims groups and nationalists were concerned that “national security”
could be used to cover up criminal wrongdoing by state agents. At the same time, unionists
voiced concern that the proposed HIU could unfairly target former soldiers and police officers.
Successive government crises and the stalemate in reestablishing the devolved government
between 2017 and early 2020 also impeded work on implementing these mechanisms to address
Northern Ireland’s legacy of violence.36
New UK Government Proposals
In the January 2020 New Decade, New Approach deal to reestablish the devolved government,
the UK government pledged to introduce legislation in the UK Parliament to set up the legacy
bodies proposed in the 2014 Stormont House Agreement. In March 2020, the UK government

35 “Johnny Mercer: Tory MP Resigns as Defense Minister,” BBC News, April 20,2021; David Young, “Trial of British
Army Veterans Accused of Official IRA Leader’s Murder Collapses,” Irish Times, May 4, 2021; Mike McBride,
“Prosecutors Drop Troubles Cases Against Ex-Soldiers,” BBC News, July 2, 2021.
36 Anne Cadwallader, “Bereaved Families Have a Right to the Truth,” Irish Times, December 31, 2015; “Villiers Meets
U.S. Lawyers in Bid to Resolve National Security Veto Dispute,” Belfast Telegraph, February 17, 2016; Gareth
Gordon, “Troubles Legacy Consultation Launched by Government,” BBC News, May 11, 2018.
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outlined its intentions for the new legacy mechanisms. Instead of the two separate HIU and ICIR
bodies agreed to in the Stormont House Agreement, the UK government said it would propose a
single “independent body” to “oversee and manage both the information recovery and
investigative aspects of the legacy system” in order to ensure the investigations were “effective
and thorough, but quick.”37
UK Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Brandon Lewis asserted that the UK government
would “remain true to the principles of the Stormont House Agreement” but that the proposed
changes would seek to put “greater emphasis on gathering information for families” and “moving
at a faster pace to retrieve knowledge before it is lost” to the passage of time.38 The UK’s March
2020 plan was widely rejected by Sinn Fein, other nationalists, and many human rights
organizations as short-changing victims and families, as it would essentially curtail investigations
and thus impede due process and the delivery of justice. The Irish government and some members
of the UK Parliament also expressed concerns about the proposed changes to the Stormont House
Agreement’s legacy mechanisms.39
In July 2021, the UK government announced its intent to bring forward legislation that essentially
would end all Troubles-related prosecutions, inquests, and civil actions against former soldiers,
security forces, and paramilitaries. The UK government plans to introduce a statute of limitations
“to apply equally to all Troubles-related incidents, bringing an immediate end to the divisive
cycle of criminal investigations and prosecutions, which is not working for anyone and has kept
Northern Ireland hamstrung by its past.”40 Similar to its initial March 2020 proposal, the UK
government confirmed it would establish a single “Information Recovery Body” (rather than the
HIU and ICIR called for in the Stormont House Agreement). This body would be tasked with
investigating deaths or serious injuries for the purpose of “genuine and robust information
recovery, rather than to create a file for prosecution.” The 2021 proposal also includes plans to
establish a “major oral history initiative” and asserts that the government would maintain “many
of the vital aspects proposed for the Implementation and Reconciliation Group.”41
In announcing these new legacy plans, including the statute of limitations, Prime Minister
Johnson asserted that the government’s proposals would allow Northern Ireland to “draw a line
under the Troubles.”42 Secretary of State Lewis acknowledged that, “We know that the prospect
of the end of criminal prosecutions will be difficult for some to accept, and this is not a position
that we take lightly,” but argued that the focus on information recovery—for as many families
and victims as possible—would be more effective than current litigation processes and “the best
way to help Northern Ireland move further along the road to reconciliation.”43

37 Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Brandon Lewis, Statement to the UK Parliament, “Addressing Northern
Ireland Legacy Issues,” March 18, 2020, at https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-statements/detail/2020-
03-18/HCWS168.
38 Ibid. Also see Government of the UK, “UK Government Sets Out Way Forward on the Legacy of the Past in
Northern Ireland,” press release March 18, 2020.
39 Julian O’Neill, “New Plan for NI Troubles Cases to ‘Limit’ Investigations,” BBC News, March 18, 2020;
Government of Ireland, “Statement by Tanaiste on UK Government Legacy Announcement,” press release, March 18,
2020; Rory Carroll, “Troubles Legacy: MPs Condemn Government Plan to Close Cases,” Guardian, October 26, 2020.
40 Government of the UK, Northern Ireland Office, Addressing the Legacy of Northern Ireland’s Past, July 14, 2021,
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/addressing-the-legacy-of-northern-irelands-past.
41 Ibid.
42 As quoted in, “Plan to End All NI Troubles Prosecutions Confirmed,” BBC News, July 14, 2021.
43 Ibid.
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The UK’s 2021 proposals have been heavily criticized by all main political parties in Northern
Ireland. Nationalists contend that ending prosecutions and inquests would allow the UK
government to cover up the truth about the state’s actions during the Troubles, and unionists
object to what they view as establishing “moral equivalency” between the actions of soldiers and
paramilitaries with a blanket statute of limitations. The Irish government, some Members of the
UK parliament, and many human rights and victims groups have expressed serious concerns as
well, including with respect to the planned changes to the legacy bodies envisioned by the
Stormont House Agreement. On July 20, 2021, the Northern Ireland Assembly passed a motion
(without dissent) opposing the UK government’s new legacy plans.44
Remaining Paramilitary Issues and Dissident Activity
Paramilitary Concerns
Experts contend the major republican and loyalist paramilitary organizations active during the
Troubles are now committed to the political process and remain on cease-fire. However, the
apparent continued existence of some groups and their engagement in criminality worries many
in both the unionist and the nationalist communities. In response to heightened concerns about
paramilitary activity in Northern Ireland in 2015, the UK government commissioned a study on
the status of republican and loyalist paramilitary groups.45 This review found that all the main
paramilitary groups operating during the Troubles still exist, but they are on cease-fire and the
leadership of each group, “to different degrees,” is “committed to peaceful means to achieve their
political objectives.” At the same time, the review concluded that individual members of
paramilitary groups still represent a threat to national security, including through their
involvement in organized crime, and “there is regular unsanctioned activity including behavior in
direct contravention of leadership instruction.”46
The 2015 Fresh Start Agreement sought to address concerns about the main paramilitary groups
in Northern Ireland. Among other measures, it enumerated a set of principles that call upon
members of the Assembly and the Executive to work toward disbanding all paramilitary
organizations and to take no instructions from such groups. The agreement also called for
establishing a new, four-member international body to monitor paramilitary activity and to report
annually on progress toward ending such activity. The resulting Independent Reporting
Commission (IRC) began work in 2017; the UK and Irish governments each named one
representative to the IRC, and the Northern Ireland Executive named two.47 In its third annual
report, released in November 2020, the IRC asserted that paramilitarism “remains a reality of
Northern Ireland life” and urged tackling continued paramilitary activity with a “twin track”

44 “Troubles: Political Reaction to PM’s Plan to End Prosecutions,” BBC News, July 14, 2021; Irish Department of
Foreign Affairs, “Statement by Minister for Foreign Affairs on UK Government Legacy Proposals,” press release, July
14, 2021; Eimear McGovern, “NI Assembly Rejects UK Government Troubles Amnesty Proposals,” Belfast
Telegraph, July 20, 2021; “Victims’ Groups Voice Opposition to Troubles Plans,” BBC News, August 30, 2021.
45 The 2015 assessment focused on the following paramilitary groups: the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF); the Red Hand
Commando (RHC); the Ulster Defense Association (UDA, which also conducted attacks under the name of the Ulster
Freedom Fighters, or UFF); the South East Antrim (SEA) group of the UDA; Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF); the Irish
Republican Army (IRA, also known as the Provisional Irish Republican Army, or PIRA); and the Irish National
Liberation Army (INLA).
46 Government of the UK, Independent Report: Assessment on Paramilitary Groups in Northern Ireland, October 20,
2015, at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/assessment-on-paramilitary-groups-in-northern-ireland.
47 The UK government chose former U.S. Special Envoy for Northern Ireland Mitchell Reiss as its representative on
the IRC. Reiss served as special envoy in the George W. Bush Administration from 2003 to 2007.
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approach that combines policing and criminal justice responses with measures to address the
underlying socioeconomic challenges facing communities in which paramilitaries operate.48
Concerns persist about the influence of paramilitaries in Northern Ireland society. In early March
2021, loyalist paramilitary groups announced they were withdrawing support for the Good Friday
Agreement temporarily due to concerns about the implementation of the post-Brexit trade
arrangements for Northern Ireland that they view as dividing Northern Ireland from the rest of the
UK and threatening the union. Although these loyalist groups remain on cease-fire, they also
warn that the current Brexit-related problems, if not resolved, could lead to the “permanent
destruction” of the peace accord (see “Implications of Brexit,” below).49
The Dissident Threat
Security assessments indicate that dissident republican and loyalist groups not on cease-fire and
opposed to the 1998 peace accord continue to present serious threats. The aforementioned 2015
review of paramilitary groups maintained that the most significant terrorist threat in Northern
Ireland was posed not by the groups evaluated in that report but rather by dissident republicans.
The review described dissident loyalist groups as posing another, albeit “smaller,” threat.
At the same time, experts note that dissident groups do not have the same capacity to mount a
sustained terror campaign as the IRA did between the 1970s and the 1990s. Most of the dissident
republican groups are small in comparison to the IRA during the height of the Troubles.50
According to UK security services, there are currently four main dissident republican groups: the
Continuity IRA (CIRA); Óglaigh na hÉireann (ÓNH); Arm na Poblachta (ANP), and the New
IRA (which reportedly was formed in 2012). These groups have sought to target police officers,
prison officers, and other members of the security services in particular. Between 2009 and 2017,
dissident republicans were responsible for the deaths of two PSNI officers, two British soldiers,
and two prison officers.51
In January 2018, ÓNH declared itself on cease-fire, although a small splinter group formed in
opposition to the cease-fire. The other groups remain active, and authorities warn the threat posed
by the New IRA in particular is severe. Police suspect the New IRA was responsible for a January
2019 car bomb that exploded in Londonderry. The New IRA also claimed responsibility for the
April 2019 death of journalist Lyra McKee, who was shot while covering riots in Londonderry.52
Security services report a “growing sophistication” in dissident republican explosive devices and
that the New IRA has attempted to obtain weapons overseas.53

48 Independent Reporting Commission Third Report, November 17, 2020, at https://www.ircommission.org/news-
centre/irc-third-report.
49 As quoted in Guy Faulconbridge and Amanda Ferguson, “Northern Irish Loyalist Paramilitaries Withdraw Support
for 1998 Peace Deal,” Reuters, March 4, 2021. Also see Shawn Pogatchnik, “Who Are the Northern Ireland Loyalists
Threatening to Shun Peace Deal over Brexit Fears?,” Politico, March 5, 2021.
50 David McKittrick, “Northern Ireland: The Peace Process and the Dissident Menace,” The Independent, February 18,
2014; Richard English, “Why Republican Dissidents Have Not—And Will Not—Go Away,” Irish Times, July 19,
2017.
51 MI5, “Northern Ireland,” at https://www.mi5.gov.uk/northern-ireland.
52 The New IRA issued an apology for McKee’s death, asserting that it had intended to shoot a police officer during the
riots, but hit McKee by accident.
53 Naomi O’Leary, “Northern Ireland Bomb Is a Warning We Can’t Ignore,” January 22, 2019; Julian O’Neill, “Q&A:
Why Is Dissident Republican Activity on the Rise?,” BBC News, September 15, 2019; “Security Report Warns of
Dissidents’ Growing Sophistication,” BBC News, April 30, 2020; Julian O’Neill, “New IRA ‘Still Dangerous’ After
MI5 and PSNI’s Operation Arbacia,” BBC News, September 30, 2020.
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Economic Development and Equal Opportunity
Many assert that one of the best ways to ensure a lasting peace in Northern Ireland and deny
dissident groups new recruits is to promote continued economic development and equal
opportunity for Catholics and Protestants. Northern Ireland’s economy has made considerable
advances since the 1990s. Between 1997 and 2007, Northern Ireland’s economy grew an average
of 5.6% annually (marginally above the UK average of 5.4%). Unemployment decreased from
over 17% in the 1980s to 4.3% by 2007.54 The 2008-2009 global recession affected the region,
however, and economic recovery was slow and uneven over much of the last decade.
The COVID-19 pandemic and resulting restrictions on social and business activity have affected
Northern Ireland’s economy. Both the UK government and the Northern Ireland Executive
implemented a range of measures to mitigate COVID-19’s adverse economic effects. These
measures included financial support to enable businesses to retain workers, assistance for the self-
employed, government-backed loans for businesses, and additional funding for public services.55
During the height of the first COVID-19 lockdown in the second quarter of 2020, Northern
Ireland’s economic output fell by 13.3%, but it rebounded in the third quarter of 2020 to 15.1%
growth. Economic output has decreased in successive quarters by 1.4% (fourth quarter of 2020)
and 1.6% (first quarter of 2021). Although Northern Ireland’s economy declined by 0.6% in real
terms over the year to March 2021, this was a slower rate of decline than the UK average decline
of 6.1%. Northern Ireland’s unemployment rate for April-June 2021 was 3.8%, an increase of 1.2
percentage points over the previous year but lower than the UK average unemployment rate of
4.7%.56
Some long-standing economic difficulties and disparities persist in Northern Ireland. Income
levels and living standards in Northern Ireland remain below the UK average. Of the UK’s 12
economic regions, Northern Ireland had the fifth-lowest gross value added per capita in 2018
(£25,981, or about $33,900), below the UK’s average (£32,216, or about $42,032).57 Northern
Ireland has both a high rate of economic inactivity (26%) and a high proportion of working-age
individuals with no formal qualifications. Studies indicate the historically poorest areas in
Northern Ireland remain so and note that many of these bore the brunt of the Troubles. Although
many of the areas considered the most deprived are predominantly Catholic, others are
predominantly Protestant. Some experts contend the most economically disadvantaged areas in
Northern Ireland have benefitted the least from the so-called peace dividend.58

54 Orla Ryan, “Northern Ireland’s Economic Fears,” BBC News, June 22, 2001; Northern Ireland Executive Economic
Strategy, Consultation on Priorities for Sustainable Growth and Prosperity, January 2011.
55 Northern Ireland Assembly Research and Information Service, Overview of COVID-19 Funding in NI and the
Economic Implications: An Update, December 16, 2020; UK Treasury, “Extra £800 Million to Support Scotland,
Wales and Northern Ireland through Covid-19 This Year,” press release, December 24, 2020.
56 Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Northern Ireland Composite Economic Index Quarter 1 2021, July
8, 2021; Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Northern Ireland Labour Market Report, August 17, 2021.
57 Gross value added (GVA) is similar, although not exactly equivalent, to gross domestic product; the UK government
uses GVA as the measure to compare regional economic performance. House of Commons Library Briefing Paper,
Regional and Country Economic Indicators, February 21, 2021.
58 Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Northern Ireland Multiple Deprivation Measures 2017, November
2017; John Campbell, “Belfast Home to Half of NI’s 100 Most Deprived Areas,” BBC News, November 24, 2017;
Duncan Morrow, Sectarianism in Northern Ireland: A Review, University of Ulster, 2019, pp. 32-35; Testimony of
Monica McWilliams, in U.S. Congress, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Europe, Energy, the
Environment and Cyber, The United States Role in Reaffirming the Good Friday Agreement, hearings, 117th Cong., 1st
sess., May 5, 2021.
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At the same time, Northern Ireland has made strides in promoting equality in its workforce. The
gap in economic activity rates between Protestants and Catholics has shrunk considerably since
1992 (when there was a 10-percentage-point difference) and has largely converged in the last few
years. The most recent data available indicate that in 2017, the economic activity rate was 70%
for Protestants and 67% for Catholics. In addition, the percentage point gap in unemployment
rates between the two communities decreased from 9% in 1992 to 0% in 2017.59
Over the past decade, efforts to improve Northern Ireland’s long-term economic performance
have sought to promote export-led growth and to decrease Northern Ireland’s economic
dependency on the public sector by growing the private sector. The public sector accounts for
about 28% of total employment in the region.60 Northern Ireland policymakers also have focused
on attracting more foreign investment. In February 2021, the Northern Ireland Executive
proposed a £290 million (about $402 million) COVID-19 economic recovery action plan—called
Rebuilding a Stronger Economy—centered on developing a higher skilled and more agile
workforce; stimulating research and innovation; building a greener economy; and promoting
investment, trade, and exports.61
Implications of Brexit62
In the UK’s June 2016 public referendum on EU membership, voters in Northern Ireland favored
remaining in the EU, 56% to 44% (the UK overall voted in favor of leaving, 52% to 48%). The
UK withdrew from the EU on January 31, 2020, but continued to apply EU rules and to
participate in the EU’s single market and customs union until the end of an 11-month transition
period that concluded on December 31, 2020. Brexit has added to divisions within Northern
Ireland and poses considerable challenges, with potential implications for Northern Ireland’s
peace process, economy, and, in the longer term, constitutional status.
The Irish Border and the Withdrawal Agreement
At the time of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, the EU membership of both the UK and the
Republic of Ireland was regarded as essential to underpinning the political settlement by
providing a common European identity for unionists and nationalists in Northern Ireland. EU law
also provided a supporting framework for guaranteeing the human rights, equality, and
nondiscrimination provisions of the peace accord. Since 1998, as security checkpoints were
dismantled in accordance with the peace agreement, and because both the UK and Ireland
belonged to the EU’s single market and customs union, the circuitous 300-mile land border
between Northern Ireland and Ireland effectively disappeared. The open border served as an
important political and psychological symbol on both sides of the sectarian divide and helped
produce a dynamic cross-border economy.
Preventing a hard border with customs checks and physical infrastructure on the island of Ireland
was a key goal, and a major stumbling block, in negotiating the UK’s withdrawal agreement with
the EU. UK, Irish, and EU leaders asserted repeatedly that they did not desire a hard border post-

59 Northern Ireland Executive Office, Labour Force Survey Religion Report 2017, January 31, 2019.
60 Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Northern Ireland Quarterly Employment Survey, June 15, 2021.
61 Northern Ireland Department for the Economy, Economic Recovery Action Plan, February 25, 2021, at
https://www.economy-ni.gov.uk/publications/economic-recovery-action-plan.
62 For more information on Brexit, see CRS Report R46730, Brexit: Overview, Trade, and Northern Ireland,
coordinated by Derek E. Mix.
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Brexit. Security assessments suggested that if border or custom posts were reinstated, violent
dissident groups opposed to the peace process would view such infrastructure as targets,
endangering the lives of police and customs officers. Experts feared that such violence would
threaten the region’s security and stability and potentially put the peace process at risk.63
Many in Northern Ireland and Ireland also were eager to maintain an open border to ensure
“frictionless” trade, safeguard the North-South economy, and protect community relations. People
in border communities worried that any hardening of the border could affect daily travel across
the border to work, shop, or visit family and friends. Estimates suggest there are upward of 300
public and private border crossing points along the border today; during the Troubles, only a
fraction of crossing points were open, and hour-long delays due to security measures and
bureaucratic hurdles were common.64
Post-Brexit Arrangements for Northern Ireland
Devising a mechanism to maintain an open border was complicated by the UK government’s
decision to keep the UK outside of the EU’s single market and customs union. In early 2019, the
UK Parliament rejected the initial UK-EU withdrawal agreement three times, in large part
because of concerns about the backstop for the Irish border, which would have kept the UK inside
the EU customs union until the UK and EU determined their future trade relationship. Some
Brexit advocates contended that Ireland and the EU were exaggerating and exploiting the security
concerns about the border to keep the UK close to the EU. Those of this view noted that, although
the Good Friday Agreement commits the UK to normalizing security arrangements—including
the removal of security installations “consistent with the level of threat”—it does not explicitly
require an open border. The Irish government and many in Northern Ireland—as well as most UK
officials—argued that an open border had become intrinsic to peace on the island of Ireland.65
In October 2019, EU and UK negotiators reached a revised withdrawal agreement with a
renegotiated Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland to ensure an open border on the island of
Ireland while safeguarding the rules of the EU single market.66 Under the terms of the protocol,
Northern Ireland remains legally in the UK customs territory but maintains regulatory alignment
with the EU. In effect, this arrangement keeps Northern Ireland for all practical purposes in the
EU single market and customs union, thus eliminating the need for regulatory checks on trade in
goods between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland but essentially creating a customs
border in the Irish Sea between Northern Ireland and Great Britain. Any physical checks
necessary to ensure customs compliance would be conducted at ports or points of entry away
from the Northern Ireland-Ireland land border, with no checks or infrastructure at this border.
The DUP strongly opposed these “Northern Ireland-only” arrangements, contending the effective
customs border in the Irish Sea would divide Northern Ireland from the rest of the UK and
threaten the UK’s constitutional integrity. In light of the large majority won by Prime Minister
Johnson’s Conservative Party in the December 2019 UK parliamentary elections, however, the
DUP lost political influence and was unable to block approval of the renegotiated withdrawal

63 Henry McDonald, “Police Chief Says ‘Hard Brexit’ Irish Border Would Be Paramilitary Target,” Guardian,
February 7, 2018.
64 Sarah Lyall, “On Irish Border, Worries That Brexit Will Undo a Hard-Won Peace,” New York Times, August 5,
2017; Maeve Sheehan, “Irish Army Identifies 300 Border Crossing Points,” Belfast Telegraph, December 17, 2018.
65 John Campbell, “Brexit: Does the Irish Peace Accord Rule Out a Hard Border?,” BBC News, January 30, 2019; Tom
McTague, “Brexit’s Ulster Problem,” Politico, June 12, 2019.
66 Department for Exiting the European Union, New Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration, October 19,
2019, at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/new-withdrawal-agreement-and-political-declaration.
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agreement. Both the UK and the EU subsequently ratified the withdrawal agreement, thus
enabling the UK to end its 47-year membership in the EU in January 2020.
Concerns about a hard border developing on the island of Ireland mostly receded following the
UK Parliament’s approval of the withdrawal agreement and the Ireland/Northern Ireland protocol.
In December 2020, the Joint Committee of UK and EU officials reached an agreement on
implementing the protocol after the end of the transition period. Among other issues, the Joint
Committee agreed on a process for checks on animals and plants and rules for the supply of
medicines and food products entering Northern Ireland from Great Britain; the EU presence in
Northern Ireland; export declaration requirements; and criteria for goods to be considered “not at
risk” of entering the EU (and thus not subject to tariffs).67
Implementation Challenges and Heightened Tensions
Brexit has exacerbated political and societal divisions in Northern Ireland. Even before Brexit,
demographic trends in Northern Ireland (in which the population gap between Protestants and
Catholics is narrowing) and changes in societal attitudes (especially among young people, who
may not be as wedded to traditional religious or ethnic identities) were causing some in the
unionist community to perceive a loss in unionist traditions and dominance. The new post-Brexit
trade arrangements for Northern Ireland appear to be enhancing this sense of unionist
disenfranchisement, partly by raising fears that Northern Ireland will be drawn closer to the
Republic of Ireland’s economic orbit post-Brexit and that this could be a precursor to a united
Ireland.68 Meanwhile, Brexit also has heightened long-standing nationalist doubts about the
trustworthiness of the UK government and eroded trust between the UK and Irish governments.
As the guarantors of the Good Friday Agreement, cooperation between the UK and Ireland is
deemed essential to the continued functioning and implementation of the peace accord.69
Significant challenges have arisen in implementing the protocol, which took effect on January 1,
2021. The new customs and regulatory requirements on goods entering Northern Ireland from
Great Britain have posed trade and administrative difficulties for some businesses and consumers
in Northern Ireland. Problems have included shipping delays and product shortages, especially for
Northern Ireland supermarkets dependent on suppliers elsewhere in the UK (despite grace periods
ranging from three months to a year for full implementation of the new rules).70

67 The UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement concluded in December 2020 was expected to further reduce
concerns about “at risk” goods as the deal provides for tariff-free and quota-free merchandise trade between the UK
and the EU (if rules of origin requirements are met). “Brexit: UK and EU Reach Deal on Northern Ireland Border
Checks,” BBC News, December 8, 2020; European Commission, “Questions and Answers: Joint Committee Formally
Adopts a Set of Implementation Measures Related to the EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement,” December 17, 2020.
68 Ceylan Yeginsu, “In Northern Ireland, Brexit Deal Is Seen as Betrayal,” New York Times, October 24, 2019; Simon
Carswell, “Loyalists on Brexit: A One-Way Route to an Economic United Ireland,” Irish Times, January 30, 2020;
Rory Carroll, “Northern Ireland Clashes Reflect Loyalists’ Fear of Marginalisation,” Guardian, April 5, 2021.
69 Matthew O’Toole, “Of Course the Internal Market Bill Threatens Northern Ireland,” Politico, September 23, 2020;
Etain Tannam and Mary C. Murphy, “The Internal Market Bill May Further Erode Trust and Security in
Ireland/Northern Ireland,” London School of Economics, September 24, 2020; Pat Leahy, “NI Protocol Tensions
Threaten UK-Ireland, UK-EU and UK-US Relations,” Irish Times, June 11, 2021.
70 Physical checks necessary to ensure customs compliance are now being conducted at ports or points of entry on the
northeast coast of Northern Ireland upon arrival from Great Britain. Conor Macauley, “Problems in First Week of Post-
deal GB-NI Trade,” BBC News, January 6, 2021; Shawn Pogatchnik, “Supermarket Pleas Mount as Brexit Leaves
Northern Ireland Shelves Bare,” Politico, January 13, 2021; Arthur Sullivan, “Northern Ireland: The Brexit Problem
That Will Not Go Away,” Deutsche Welle (dw.com), February 10, 2021.
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In late January 2021, the Northern Ireland protocol became entangled in EU efforts to control the
export of COVID-19 vaccines outside the bloc. The EU initially planned to trigger Article 16 of
the protocol—an emergency override mechanism available to either the UK or the EU—to
prevent vaccines being exported from Northern Ireland to the rest of the UK. Invoking Article 16
could have resulted in border checks between Northern Ireland and Ireland. Amid a diplomatic
outcry from the UK, Irish, and Northern Ireland officials, the EU almost immediately reversed
itself on invoking Article 16, claiming it was a mistake made in haste. Nevertheless, the incident
is widely viewed as calling into question Northern Ireland’s post-Brexit arrangements and as
helping to bolster the DUP’s claim that the protocol is “unworkable.”71
The DUP and other unionists subsequently began urging the UK government to abandon the
protocol by invoking Article 16 itself. Then-First Minister Foster asserted that the EU’s
willingness to invoke Article 16 had “lowered the bar” for the UK to do the same.72 Among other
steps in an escalating campaign against the protocol, DUP leaders asserted they would not
cooperate with the Irish government in implementing the protocol and some began to boycott
meetings of the North-South Ministerial Council.73 The DUP and other unionists also launched
legal action to challenge the protocol in judicial review proceedings, arguing the protocol violates
the UK Act of Union, which guarantees unfettered trade throughout the UK.74
The UK and the EU have been seeking to resolve the operational challenges related to the
Northern Ireland protocol, but talks have been contentious and progress has been slow. UK
officials have called repeatedly for additional implementation flexibilities, including prolonged
extensions of the grace periods that limit checks on agri-food products, medicines, and other
items. UK and Northern Ireland officials express concern that unhappiness with the post-Brexit
arrangements could increasingly threaten stability in Northern Ireland and contend that the EU
must take the need to preserve peace into greater consideration. EU officials consistently have
raised concerns that the UK is not implementing certain aspects of the protocol, including
building and properly staffing UK border and custom posts in Northern Ireland, sharing customs
data, and properly declaring goods entering into Northern Ireland.75
In March 2021, with the end of the first grace period approaching and with UK-EU talks over an
extension largely stalled, the UK government announced that it would unilaterally extend this
first grace period, due to expire on April 1 (for parcels and certain agri-food products), for six
months, until October 1, 2021. The UK government also unilaterally relaxed EU restrictions on
the movement of plants and used agricultural machinery into Northern Ireland from the rest of the

71 “Arlene Foster Urges PM to Replace ‘Unworkable’ NI Brexit Deal,” BBC News, January 30, 2021; David M.
Herszenhorn and Jakob Hanke Vela, “EU Drops Irish Border Move in Plan to Curb Vaccine Exports,” Politico, January
30, 2021.
72 As quoted in Shawn Pogatchnik, “Brexit Protocol Row Adds Pressure to Northern Ireland Unionists,” Politico,
February 4, 2021.
73 “Brexit: DUP Vows to Send ‘Strong Message’ to Irish Government over NI Protocol,” BBC News, February 2, 2021.
74 Unionists also argued that the protocol’s provisions were imposed without the consent of the public, which violates
the Good Friday Agreement. In June 2021, the Belfast High Court ruled the protocol is lawful, but this decision likely
will be appealed to the UK Supreme Court. Brian Hutton, “DUP Plans Legal Challenge to Northern Ireland Protocol,”
Irish Times, February 21, 2021; John Campbell, “Brexit: NI Protocol is Lawful, High Court Rules,” BBC News, June
30, 2021.
75 Lisa O’Carroll, Heather Stewart, and Daniel Boffey, “UK in ‘Constructive’ Talks with EU over Northern Ireland
Protocol,” Guardian, February 3, 2021; “Brexit: Preserving NI Protocol Is ‘The Only Way Forward,’ Warns EU,” BBC
News, February 10, 2021; “EU Not Interested in Protecting Belfast Peace Agreement – Northern Ireland First
Minister,” Reuters, March 5, 2021; Jim Brunsden et al., “UK Says That Brussels Trying to ‘Exploit’ Biden Visit to
Exert Brexit Pressure,” Financial Times, June 8, 2021.
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UK.76 EU officials claimed these steps would undermine trust between the EU and the UK. Sinn
Fein and other nationalists contended that the UK was reneging on commitments made in the
protocol and accused the government of pursuing a “reckless and partisan approach” to its
implementation.77 In response to the UK’s unilateral extensions of the grace periods, the EU
launched a legal infringement process against the UK for breaching the terms of the protocol; this
legal action could ultimately lead to the UK’s referral to the European Court of Justice, potential
fines, and/or the imposition of tariffs on imports of goods from the UK.78
Amid these ongoing tensions, in June 2021, the EU agreed to the UK’s request for a three-month
delay in implementing a ban on shipping chilled meat products from the rest of the UK to
Northern Ireland (EU rules generally do not permit the import of items such as fresh sausages
from non-member states). EU officials stressed that this delay until October 1 was temporary—
aimed at allowing Northern Ireland supermarkets more time to adapt their supply chains post-
Brexit—and undertaken to demonstrate the EU’s commitment to “creative solutions … with the
core purpose of benefitting people in Northern Ireland.”79 The EU also put forward measures to
address a number of other UK concerns related to the operation of the protocol, including
ensuring the continued supply of medicines for Northern Ireland.
UK officials maintain that the protocol is not sustainable and that substantial changes are
necessary in order to decrease tensions in Northern Ireland, protect peace, and end market
disruptions for businesses and consumers. In July 2021, the UK government essentially called for
the protocol to be renegotiated, asserting that the EU approach to its implementation remains too
rigid and that a “new balance” must be found so the protocol “can operate pragmatically” in
accordance “with the unique circumstances of Northern Ireland.”80 UK officials asserted that the
government would be justified in invoking Article 16 but would not do so for the time being in
favor of finding a consensual solution through negotiations. Among other changes, the UK
government called for largely removing customs checks on goods from Great Britain intended to
remain in Northern Ireland, removing medicines from the scope of the protocol, and eliminating
the role of the EU institutions in overseeing the protocol’s operation. Some analysts suggest the
UK’s proposals for a revamped protocol would rely mostly on the EU trusting the UK to protect
the EU’s single market rather than on abiding by EU rules.81
The EU rejects renegotiating the Northern Ireland protocol, reiterating that it represents a joint,
already-agreed UK-EU solution to the challenges Brexit poses to the island of Ireland. The EU
asserts that it has proposed several “flexible, practical solutions” to facilitate trade between Great

76 Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Brandon Lewis, Written Ministerial Statement to the UK House of Commons,
March 3, 2021, at https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-statements/detail/2021-03-03/hcws819. Also see
Shawn Pogatchnik, “Soiled Deal: UK Defies EU Ban on British Dirt on Plants Shipped to Northern Ireland,” Politico,
March 5, 2021.
77 As quoted in Ali Gordon, “Boris Johnson Visits Northern Ireland amid Unionist Tension,” BBC News, March 12,
2021. Also see, Guy Faulconbridge, “Britain Says Unionist Anger over Brexit Deal Could Put Northern Ireland ‘in
Quite a Dangerous Place,’” Reuters, March 19, 2021.
78 European Commission, Withdrawal Agreement: Commission Sends Letter of Formal Notice to the United Kingdom
for Breach of its Obligations Under the Protocol on Ireland and Northern Ireland, March 15, 2021.
79 European Commission, “EU-UK Relations: Solutions Found to Help Implementation of the Protocol on Ireland and
Northern Ireland,” press release, June 30, 2021.
80 Government of the UK, Northern Ireland Protocol: The Way Forward, July 21, 2021, p. 15, https://www.gov.uk/
government/publications/northern-ireland-protocol-next-steps.
81 See, for example, the analysis by John Campbell in “Brexit: Stormont Parties Divided on UK Call to Amend NI
Protocol,” BBC News, July 21, 2021; and Jennifer Rankin, “UK’s Northern Ireland Protocol Demands Sap Brussels’
Goodwill,” Guardian, July 21, 2021.
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Britain and Northern Ireland and that it will continue to work with the UK to overcome
difficulties but notes that any solutions must be found “within the framework” of the protocol.82
At the end of July 2021, the EU decided to pause its legal infringement action against the UK
begun in March. Irish officials reportedly regarded this step as “a genuine goodwill gesture” by
the EU to de-escalate tensions with the UK.83
Sinn Fein, other nationalists, and the Irish government maintain that the protocol is the only
viable option to avoid a hard border on the island of Ireland in light of the UK’s decision to
withdraw from the EU and leave the EU single market and customs union. The EU contends that
80% of the regulatory and customs checks required by the protocol would be eliminated if the UK
agreed to align with EU food and veterinary standards. The UK government rejects this approach,
given that a key rationale for Brexit was to free the UK from EU rules and regulations and due to
concerns that such alignment could impede new UK free trade deals with other countries, such as
the United States.84
On September 6, 2021, the UK government announced that it would indefinitely extend the grace
periods and easements related to the protocol’s trade rules that were due to expire at the end of
the month in order to “provide space” for further discussions with the EU on the protocol’s
future.85 The EU reiterated that it would not renegotiate the protocol but would “engage
constructively” with the UK; the EU also said that it would not resume infringement proceedings
(although it reserved the right to do so in the future).86 UK-EU talks on the protocol are expected
to continue.
On September 9, 2021, DUP leader Donaldson warned that the DUP may withdraw its ministers
from Northern Ireland’s Executive (including Givan as first minister) if concerns over the
protocol are not resolved. Such a move by the DUP could collapse the devolved government and
lead to snap Assembly elections. Donaldson also asserted that the DUP would end its engagement
with the North-South bodies (except for cooperation on health matters) established under Strand
Two of the Good Friday Agreement, would seek to block additional protocol-required customs
checks at Northern Ireland ports, would examine the legality of the current customs checks, and
would “seek to frustrate and prevent” the Northern Ireland Assembly from aligning legislation
with laws passed by the EU.87

82 European Commission, “Statement by Vice-President Maros Sefcovic Following Today’s Announcement by the UK
Government Regarding the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland,” press release, July 21, 2021.
83 John Campbell, “Brexit: EU Pauses Legal Action Against UK Over NI Protocol Breaches,” BBC News, July 27,
2021; Hans von der Burchard, “EU Pauses Both Brexit Lawsuits Against the UK,” Politico, July 28, 2021.
84 Chris Morris, “Brexit: Can the UK and the EU Reach a Deal on Northern Ireland?,” BBC News, June 16, 2021;
Mark Landler, “Britain and the EU Defer Action on Northern Ireland,” New York Times, June 30, 2021; “Donaldson
and McDonald Hold ‘Constructive and Frank’ First In-Person Meeting,” Irish Times, July 5, 2021.
85 Minister of State in the Cabinet Office Lord Frost, Written Ministerial Statement to the UK House of Lords,
September 6, 2021, at https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-statements/detail/2021-09-06/hlws257.
86 European Commission, “Statement by the European Commission Following the UK Announcement Regarding the
Operation of the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland,” press release, September 6, 2021.
87 Democratic Unionist Party, Speech by DUP Leader Sir Jeffrey Donaldson MP, September 9, 2021,
https://mydup.com/news/sir-jeffrey-donaldson-now-is-the-time-to-act. Also see, “NI Protocol: DUP Could Quit from
Stormont Within Weeks,” BBC News, September 9, 2021.
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Economic Concerns
Following the 2016 UK referendum, many experts expressed concern about Brexit’s possible
economic consequences for Northern Ireland. According to a UK parliamentary report, Northern
Ireland depends more on the EU market (and especially that of Ireland) for its exports than does
the rest of the UK.88 In 2019, approximately 59% of Northern Ireland’s exports went to the EU,
including 38% to Ireland, which was Northern Ireland’s top single export and import partner.89
Significant fears existed in particular that a no-deal Brexit (i.e., without a withdrawal agreement
in place) would have jeopardized labor markets and industries that operate on an all-island basis.
Many manufacturers in Northern Ireland and Ireland depend on integrated supply chains north
and south of the border. For example, raw materials that go into making milk, cheese, butter, and
alcoholic drinks often cross the border between Northern Ireland and Ireland several times for
processing and packaging.90 The vast majority of cross-border transactions are made by micro and
small businesses, which dominate Northern Ireland’s economy.91
UK and DUP leaders asserted that the rest of the UK is overall more important economically to
Northern Ireland than the EU given the value of exports. In 2019, sales to other parts of the UK
(£11.3 billion) were more than double the value of exports to Ireland (£4.5 billion) and more than
four times the value of exports to the rest of the EU (£2.4 billion).92 Among the DUP’s initial
objections to the post-Brexit arrangements agreed in 2019, the DUP argued that they would be
detrimental to the region’s economy. The DUP asserts that such concerns have proven correct
given the supply problems and shipping delays affecting Northern Ireland since the new post-
Brexit customs and regulatory requirements took effect. Major UK supermarket chains warn that
full implementation of the protocol could lead to increased costs for Northern Ireland consumers,
while some drug manufacturers may cease to supply certain medicines produced in Great Britain
to Northern Ireland due to the cost and complexity of meeting duplicate regulations for the
Northern Ireland market. One study from the University of Ulster estimates that the costs of the
protocol to Northern Ireland’s public and private sectors could be around £850 million (around
$1.2 billion) per year.93
UK officials maintain that the government is determined to safeguard Northern Ireland’s interests
and “make a success of Brexit” for Northern Ireland.94 They insist that Brexit offers new
economic opportunities for Northern Ireland outside the EU. Supporters of the post-Brexit
arrangements for Northern Ireland argue the arrangements will help to improve the region’s
economic prospects. Northern Ireland remains part of the UK customs union and thus will be able
to participate in future UK trade deals, but it also retains privileged access to the EU single

88 Report of the UK House of Lords European Union Committee, Brexit: UK-Irish Relations, December 2016.
89 Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Overview of Northern Ireland Trade, August 4, 2021.
90 Simon Marks, “Brexit Is (Maybe) the Ruin of Irish Whiskey,” Politico, March 3, 2017; Colm Kelpie, “Brexit: How
Would No-Deal Affect Northern Ireland?,” BBC News, September 22, 2019.
91 Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Overview of Northern Ireland Trade, August 4, 2021.
92 Ibid.
93 John Campbell, “Brexit Deal Could Reduce Spending, Investment, and Trade in NI,” BBC News, October 22, 2019;
“Brexit: Supermarkets Warn of Rising Costs Due to NI Protocol,” BBC News, July 18, 2021; Sarah Neville, George
Parker, and Mehreen Khan, “Northern Ireland Set to Lose Access to 2,000 Medicines,” Financial Times, July 22, 2021;
Esmond Birnie, “The Irish Sea Border Is Costing Northern Ireland £850m a Year,” newsletter.co.uk, August 12, 2021.
94 UK Government Press Release, “Brokenshire Holds Inaugural Meeting of Northern Ireland Business Advisory
Group,” September 1, 2016; Stephen Walker, “Brexit: Northern Ireland Can Be Success Outside EU,” BBC News,
October 4, 2016.
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market. These provisions may help increase competitiveness of Northern Ireland firms and make
the region a more attractive destination for foreign direct investment. Some Northern Ireland
business leaders report broad satisfaction with the protocol and note that it has a number of
benefits, including keeping cross-border trade open.95
Constitutional Status and Border Poll Prospects
Brexit has revived questions about Northern Ireland’s constitutional status. Sinn Fein argues that
“Brexit changes everything” and could generate greater support for a united Ireland.96 Since the
2016 Brexit referendum, Sinn Fein has repeatedly called for a border poll (a referendum on
whether Northern Ireland should remain part of the UK or join the Republic of Ireland) in the
hopes of realizing its long-term goal of Irish unification. As noted previously, the Good Friday
Agreement provides for the possibility of a border poll in Northern Ireland, in line with the
consent principle.
Any decision to hold a border poll in Northern Ireland on its constitutional status rests with the
UK Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. In accordance with the Good Friday Agreement, a
border poll must be called if it “appears likely” that “a majority of those voting would express a
wish that Northern Ireland should cease to be part of the United Kingdom and form part of a
united Ireland.”97 At present, experts believe there is not sufficient evidence to convince the UK
government to call a referendum on Northern Ireland’s constitutional status. Most opinion polls
indicate that a majority of people in Northern Ireland continue to support the region’s position as
part of the UK. Although a January 2021 survey found that 51% of people in Northern Ireland
would support holding a border poll in the next five years (with 44% opposed and 5% having no
opinion), it also found that 47% favored Northern Ireland remaining in the UK versus 42% in
support of a united Ireland. An April 2021 survey found similar results, with 49% of those polled
in Northern Ireland supporting the region’s continued position within the UK versus 43% for a
united Ireland.98 Prime Minister Johnson reportedly has asserted that there will be no referendum
on Northern Ireland’s status for “a very, very long time to come.”99
At the same time, experts note that several factors could boost support for a united Ireland and
influence whether a border poll is called in the years ahead. As discussed, Northern Ireland’s
demographics are changing; many experts expect forthcoming census data will show that
Catholics equal or outnumber Protestants in Northern Ireland. The post-Brexit arrangements for
Northern Ireland could lead to enhanced trade ties with the Republic of Ireland and greater
economic integration (data as of mid-2021 indicate a significant increase in cross-border trade
since the Northern Ireland protocol took effect). Analysts suggest that nonaligned voters who do
not identify as unionist or nationalist may be the decisive swing bloc in any future border poll and
that such voters are likely to be swayed on the question of Irish unification more by its
implications for issues such as the economy, health care, and pensions than by identity politics. In

95 Clodagh Rice, “Brexit: My NI Business Now Has the Best of Both Worlds,” BBC News, February 5, 2021; Sandra
O’Connell, “Businesses Recognize North’s Unique Trading Status Despite Fears,” Irish Times, February 26, 2021;
Shawn Pogatchnik, “Northern Ireland to Frost: Enforce the Protocol, Don’t Fight It,” Politico, July 9, 2021.
96 Sinn Fein Discussion Document, Towards a United Ireland, November 2016.
97 UK Government, Northern Ireland Act 1998.
98 Gerry Moriarty, “Poll Finds Majority Favours Holding a Border Poll in Next Five Years,” Irish Times, January 24,
2021; BBC News, “NI 100: Majority Believe NI Will Leave UK Within 25 Years,” April 20, 2021.
99 As quoted in Brian Hutton, “Boris Johnson: No Border Poll for Very Long Time to Come,” Irish Times, April 20,
2021.
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addition, should Sinn Fein win the largest number of seats in the next Assembly elections in
Northern Ireland, this could increase pressure on the UK government to call a border poll.100
Irish unification also would be subject to Ireland’s consent and approval. In Ireland’s February
2020 parliamentary election, Sinn Fein secured the largest percentage of the vote for the first time
in Ireland’s history, and some commentators suggest the party’s electoral success has helped push
the question of unification higher on the political agenda in the Republic of Ireland. Ireland’s
three-party coalition government, consisting of Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael, and the Green Party, has
launched a “Shared Island” initiative to promote cross-border dialogue and research on common
challenges and the future of the island but has adopted what many view as a “go slow” approach
to the question of Irish unification. The Irish government maintains that voters, both north and
south, must have a clear idea of what a united Ireland would look like—and how unionists would
be accommodated politically—before any border poll is held.101
Some experts question the current extent of support in Ireland for unification, given concerns that
unification could spark renewed loyalist violence in Northern Ireland as well as the potential
economic costs. The UK provides Northern Ireland annually with a roughly £10 billion (about
$14 billion) budget subsidy to make up the shortfall in the region’s tax revenues. Although part of
this subsidy helps to fund Northern Ireland’s share of the UK’s national debt and sizeable defense
spending—costs that would not be incurred to the same extent by Dublin—Northern Ireland’s
budget deficit points to concerns about the region’s economy and reliance on the public sector. An
April 2021 poll found that 67% of people surveyed in Ireland would support unification, but 54%
reported they would be unwilling to pay higher taxes to fund a united Ireland.102
U.S. Policy and Congressional Interests
Support for the Peace Process
Successive U.S. Administrations have viewed the Good Friday Agreement as the best framework
for a lasting peace in Northern Ireland. The Clinton Administration was instrumental in helping
the parties forge the agreement, and the George W. Bush Administration strongly backed its full
implementation. U.S. officials welcomed the end to the IRA’s armed campaign in 2005 and the
restoration of the devolved government in 2007.
The Obama Administration remained engaged in the peace process. In October 2009, then-U.S.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Northern Ireland, addressed the Assembly, and urged
Northern Ireland’s leaders to reach an agreement on devolving policing and justice powers. In
February 2010, President Obama welcomed the resulting Hillsborough Agreement. In June 2013,
President Obama visited Northern Ireland and noted that the United States would always “stand

100 Tony Barber, “Brexit Raises the Spectre of the UK’s Break-Up,” Financial Times, October 22, 2019; Alex Kane,
“Unionists May Find Being Bounced into Border Poll Is Boris’s Preferred Option,” Irish Times, February 8, 2021;
Peter Foster and Laura Noonan, “Brexit Ignites the Debate About a United Ireland,” Financial Times, April 6, 2021;
Eoin Burke-Kennedy and Freya McClements, “Imports from NI to Republic Up 77% Since UK’s EU Exit,” Irish
Times, August 17, 2021.
101 Naomi O’Leary, “Sinn Fein Surge Makes Irish Political History,” Politico, February 9, 2020; Shawn Pogatchnik and
Giovanna Coi, “Can Northern Ireland Survive Brexit?,” Politico, April 13, 2021.
102 Henry Farrell, “After Britain’s Elections, People Are Talking About a United Ireland. Don’t Hold Your Breath,”
Washington Post, December 13, 2019; Fionnan Sheahan, “Majority Favour a United Ireland, but Just 22pc Would Pay
for It,” Irish Independent, May 1, 2021; Eoin Burke-Kennedy, “What Would Be the Economic Costs and Benefits of a
United Ireland?,” Irish Times, May 7, 2021.
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by” Northern Ireland.103 The Obama Administration welcomed the conclusion of both the 2014
Stormont House Agreement and the 2015 Fresh Start Agreement.
Like its predecessors, the Trump Administration offered support and encouragement to Northern
Ireland. In November 2017, a U.S. State Department spokesperson expressed regret at the
impasse in discussions to restore Northern Ireland’s power-sharing institutions and asserted that
the United States remained “ready to support efforts that ensure full implementation of the Good
Friday Agreement and subsequent follow-on cross-party agreements.”104 In March 2020,
President Trump appointed his former acting Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney as U.S. special envoy
to Northern Ireland.105
President Biden has close ties to Ireland and is a long-standing supporter of the Northern Ireland
peace process. In March 2021, President Biden reiterated strong U.S. support for the Good Friday
Agreement during annual St. Patrick’s Day meetings with officials from the Republic of Ireland
and Northern Ireland. A joint U.S.-Irish statement asserted that the two governments are
“unequivocally committed” to the 1998 accord, which has served as “the bedrock of peace,
stability, and prosperity in Northern Ireland.”106 President Biden also underlined the ongoing U.S.
commitment to the Northern Ireland peace process during his visit to the United Kingdom in June
2021. A joint U.S.-UK statement noted, “It took a deep partnership between the UK, Ireland, and
the U.S. to support the people of Northern Ireland in bringing the Troubles to an end, and it will
take a continued and ongoing partnership to advance and safeguard Northern Ireland’s stability
and prosperity into the future.”107
Many Members of Congress have actively supported the Northern Ireland peace process for
decades. Congressional hearings have focused on the implementation of the Good Friday
Agreement, policing reforms, and human rights in Northern Ireland. Some Members have been
interested in the status of public inquiries into several past murders in Northern Ireland in which
collusion between the security forces and paramilitary groups is suspected—including the 1989
slaying of Belfast attorney Patrick Finucane and the 1997 killing of Raymond McCord, Jr. Most
recently, on May 5, 2021, the House Foreign Affairs Committee’s Subcommittee on Europe,
Energy, the Environment and Cyber held a hearing titled “Reaffirming the Good Friday
Agreement.” Some Members of Congress have urged President Biden to appoint a new special
envoy to Northern Ireland to protect the gains of the peace process in light of recent tensions.108
On the economic front, the United States is a key trading partner and an important source of
investment for Northern Ireland. According to statistics from the Northern Ireland Executive, in
2017, exports to the United States accounted for 17% of total Northern Ireland exports, and
imports from the United States accounted for 10% of total Northern Ireland imports. Foreign
direct investment by U.S.-based companies totaled £1.8 billion (about $2.5 billion) between 2008

103 As quoted in BBC News, “G8 Summit: U.S. Will Stand by Northern Ireland, Says Obama,” June 17, 2013.
104 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, “Statement on Northern Ireland Power-Sharing Talks,”
November 1, 2017.
105 Mulvaney resigned as special envoy in January 2021.
106 White House, “Remarks by President Biden and Prime Minister Martin of Ireland Before Vitual Bilateral Meeting,”
March 17, 2021; White House, “Joint Statement by President Joe Biden and Taoiseach Micheál Martin,” March 17,
2021.
107 White House, “Joint Statement on the Visit to the United Kingdom of the Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr., President
of the United States of America at the Invitation of the Rt. Hon. Boris Johnson, MP, the Prime Minister of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,” June 10, 2021.
108 Suzanne Lynch, “US Politicians Urge Biden to Appoint Northern Ireland Envoy,” Irish Times, May 13, 2021.
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and 2018.109 Between 2009 and 2011, a special U.S. economic envoy to Northern Ireland worked
to further economic ties between the United States and Northern Ireland and to underpin the
peace process by promoting economic prosperity.
Views on Brexit and Northern Ireland
In contrast to President Trump’s support for Brexit, President Biden has maintained a skeptical
view of Brexit since his time as Vice President in the Obama Administration. During the 2020
U.S. presidential election campaign, then-candidate Biden stressed that Brexit must not
undermine the Good Friday Agreement or jeopardize the open border between Northern Ireland
and Ireland. Biden raised these issues in a phone call as President-elect with UK Prime Minister
Johnson. Biden Administration officials subsequently have noted concerns about rising Brexit-
related tensions in Northern Ireland and reiterated that the gains from the peace process must be
protected.110
The Biden Administration also has conveyed U.S. support for the Northern Ireland protocol.111
U.S. officials note that the Administration views the protocol as “a way to manage the practical
challenges around the EU single market while preventing a return of a hard border” on the island
of Ireland. At the same time, Administration officials assert that the current difficulties in
implementing the protocol are trade issues for the UK and the EU to resolve and that President
Biden “is interested in having strong relations with both the UK and the EU.”112 In early May
2021, during a visit to London, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken urged both the UK and
the EU “to prioritize political and economic stability in Northern Ireland” in implementing the
post-Brexit arrangements for the region.113
During President Biden’s June 2021 visit to the UK, news reports indicate he offered support for
a possible way to ease some of the trade challenges posed by the Northern Ireland protocol.
President Biden reportedly sought to assure Prime Minister Johnson and UK officials that a
temporary UK-EU agreement on food standards—aimed at reducing protocol-related trade
difficulties between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK—would not be a barrier to a separate
U.S.-UK free trade deal in the future.114 Negotiations on a post-Brexit U.S.-UK free trade
agreement began during the Trump Administration, but the Biden Administration has not
indicated whether it will continue with these talks. It would likely take several years to conclude
any future U.S.-UK trade deal.115

109 Northern Ireland Department for the Economy, Trade in Goods Data Analysis Northern Ireland – USA (2015-2017),
June 2018; Northern Ireland Department for the Economy, Northern Ireland Trade and Investment Patterns, October 2,
2018.
110 Patrick Wintour, “Biden and Pelosi Warn UK Over Risking Good Friday Agreement,” Guardian, September 16,
2020; George Parker and Katrina Manson, “Joe Biden Warns Boris Johnson Not to Let Brexit Upend Northern Ireland
Peace Process,” Financial Times, November 9, 2020; “G7 Summit: Don’t Imperil NI Peace, Biden to Warn UK and
EU,” BBC News, June 9, 2021; Jules Darmamin, Shawn Pogatchnik, and Emilio Casalicchio, “US Reprimands UK
Over Northern Ireland Protocol Row,” Politico, June 10, 2021.
111 See, for example, the White House, “Readout of Vice President Kamala Harris Meeting with First Minister Arlene
Foster and Deputy First Minister Michelle O’Neill of Northern Ireland,” March 17, 2021.
112 White House, “Background Press Call by Senior Administration Officials on President Biden’s Upcoming Virtual
Bilateral with Ireland,” March 17, 2021.
113 U.S. Department of State, Secretary Antony J. Blinken and UK Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab at a Joint Press
Availability,” May 3, 2021.
114 Shawn Pogatchnik, “Ireland: UK-EU Food Safety Deal Wouldn’t Stop UK-US Trade Pact,” Politico, June 11, 2021.
115 Joe Mayes and Eric Martin, “U.K.-U.S. Trade Deal Is Likely Years Away as Biden Shifts Focus,” Bloomberg.com,
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Some Members of Congress also have demonstrated an interest in Brexit’s implications for
Northern Ireland. Although many Members back, in principle, a future U.S.-UK free trade
agreement, some Members have tied their support to protecting the peace process. In April 2019,
House Speaker Nancy Pelosi stated there would be “no chance whatsoever” for a U.S.-UK trade
agreement if Brexit were to weaken the Northern Ireland peace process.116 In December 2019, the
House passed H.Res. 585, reaffirming support for the Good Friday Agreement in light of Brexit
and asserting that any future U.S.-UK trade agreement and other U.S.-UK bilateral agreements
must include conditions to uphold the peace accord. In May 2021, the Senate passed S.Res. 117,
expressing support for the Good Friday Agreement and the Ireland/Northern Ireland protocol and
asserting that any future U.S.-UK trade or other bilateral agreements must “take into account”
whether obligations in the Good Friday Agreement are being met.
International Fund for Ireland
The United States has provided development aid to Northern Ireland primarily through the
International Fund for Ireland (IFI), which was created in 1986. The UK and Irish governments
established the IFI based on objectives in the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, but the IFI is an
independent entity. It supports economic regeneration and social development projects in areas
most affected by the conflict in Northern Ireland and in the border areas of the Republic of
Ireland; in doing so, the IFI has sought to foster dialogue and reconciliation. The United States
has contributed more than $544 million since the IFI’s establishment, roughly half of total IFI
funding. The EU, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have provided funding for the IFI as well.
In the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. appropriations for the IFI averaged around $23 million annually; in
the 2000s, U.S. appropriations averaged $18 million each year.117
According to the IFI, the vast majority of projects it has supported with seed funding have been
located in disadvantaged areas that have suffered from high unemployment, a lack of facilities,
and little private sector investment. In its first two decades, IFI projects in Northern Ireland and
the southern border counties focused on economic and business development and sectors such as
tourism, agriculture, and technology. In 2006, the IFI announced it would begin shifting its focus
toward projects aimed at promoting community reconciliation and overcoming past divisions.
Successive U.S. Administrations and many Members of Congress have backed the IFI as a means
to promote economic development and encourage divided communities to work together. Support
for paramilitary and dissident groups in Northern Ireland traditionally has been strongest in
communities with high levels of unemployment and economic deprivation. Thus, many observers
have long viewed the creation of jobs and economic opportunity as a key part of resolving the
conflict in Northern Ireland and have supported the IFI as part of the peace process.
Many U.S. officials and Members of Congress also have encouraged the IFI to place greater
focus on reconciliation activities and were pleased with the IFI’s decision to do so in 2006. At the
same time, some critics have questioned the IFI’s effectiveness, viewing certain IFI projects as
largely wasteful and unlikely to bridge community divides in any significant way.

March 26, 2021; Pan Pylas, “US Downplays Prospect of Post-Brexit Trade Deal with UK,” Associated Press, May 6,
2021.
116 Simon Carswell, “Pelosi Warns No US-UK Trade Deal if Belfast Agreement Weakened by Brexit,” Irish Times,
April 15, 2019.
117 The Anglo-Irish Agreement Support Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-415) authorizes U.S. contributions to the International
Fund for Ireland.
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In FY2011, amid the U.S. economic and budget crisis, some Members of Congress began to call
for an end to U.S. funding for the IFI as part of a raft of budget-cutting measures. Some Members
asserted that U.S. contributions to the IFI were no longer necessary given Ireland and Northern
Ireland’s improved political and economic situation (relative to what it was in the 1980s). In the
final FY2011 continuing budget resolution (P.L. 112-10), Congress did not specify an allocation
for the IFI (and has not done so in subsequent fiscal years).
Since FY2011, successive Administrations have allocated funds from Economic Support Fund
(ESF) resources to the IFI in the form of a grant for specific IFI activities to support peace and
reconciliation programs. The United States provided $2.5 million per year to the IFI from ESF
funding between FY2011 and FY2014, $750,000 per year from FY2015 to FY2019, $2 million
for FY2020, and $2.5 million for FY2021.

Author Information

Kristin Archick

Specialist in European Affairs

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