Legislative Reforms to Commercial Aircraft
September 9, 2021
Certification
Bart Elias
An important Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) function is certifying the safety of aviation
Specialist in Aviation Policy
products including aircraft, aircraft engines, and major aircraft components. FAA has developed

a broad set of certification regulations pertaining to the type of aircraft that seeks to balance
safety regulations and the degree of FAA oversight with the size and intended use of the aircraft.

Congress has encouraged FAA to delegate its authority over the certification of new and revised
aircraft designs to employees of aircraft and component manufacturers and their consultants, and has maintained a continued
interest in reforming aircraft certification processes across the full spectrum of aircraft categories. A law enacted in
December 2020, the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act (Division V of P.L. 116-260), required FAA to
implement major changes in its policies and procedures concerning certification of transport aircraft, such as commercial
passenger and cargo jets, including changes in policies for delegating certification authority to private entities.
These changes were instigated by two crashes involving the Boeing 737 Max, the newest variant of a Boeing narrow-body jet
that has been one of the most popular airliners for more than 50 years. These crashes prompted a 20-month-long grounding of
the worldwide fleet of Boeing 737 Max airplanes in 2019 and 2020. During this time, congressional attention turned away
from streamlining and simplifying certification processes to instead focus on improving the safety and oversight of those
processes, especially with respect to the certification of transport category airplanes used in passenger airline service.
Multiple inquiries prompted by the Boeing 737 Max crashes unveiled concerns regarding certification of transport category
airplanes, particularly the handling and review of amendments to existing type designs. The events also raised concerns over
FAA’s delegation of certification functions to aircraft designers and manufacturers under its Organization Designation
Authorization (ODA) program. Investigations into the causes of the crashes also raised questions about the increasing use of
automated flight control systems and flight crew interactions with those systems, as well as broader concerns regarding
human performance and human factors assumptions about pilot reactions to abnormal and emergency situations and alerts. In
November 2020, FAA approved design modifications and changes to pilot training permitting the resumption of 737 Max
flights by U.S. air carriers.
P.L. 116-260 mandates that
 FAA institute extensive changes to the ODA program and oversight of that program;
 aircraft manufacturers implement FAA-approved safety management systems (SMSs) that establish formal
organization-wide procedures, practices, and policies to manage safety-related risks;
 FAA review and update requirements and guidance addressing flight deck human factors and the design of
aircraft-pilot interfaces; and
 FAA and manufacturers work with international partners to address pilot training standards in the context
of aircraft certification and assess operational impacts of new automation technologies.
The act makes it unlawful to interfere with the duties of ODA unit members, including exerting undue pressure on unit
members or assigning them work not related to certification duties. The law also repeals two significant provisions of the
FAA Authorization Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-254) that had directed FAA to streamline aircraft certification processes and
reduce delays, in part by fully utilizing its delegation and designation authorities.
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Introduction
An important Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) function is certifying the safety of aircraft,
aircraft engines, and major aircraft components. A law enacted in December 2020, the Aircraft
Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act (Division V of P.L. 116-260), required FAA to
implement major changes in its policies and procedures concerning certification of transport
aircraft, such as commercial passenger and cargo jets. The act includes comprehensive provisions
to review and reform aircraft certification regulations and processes, with particular attention to
the certification of transport category airplanes used in commercial airline service and the process
to review and certify changes to those aircraft over time to incorporate new technologies.
This report provides background on aircraft certification requirements and FAA oversight, as well
as details regarding reforms enacted under the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability
Act.
The Basics of Aircraft Certification
Several different certifications (Figure 1) are required before new aircraft can be placed into
service:
 Type certification refers to the process of reviewing engineering data and
performing inspections and tests to certify that new designs comply with
regulatory requirements and minimum safety standards. Type certification is the
first step in bringing a new aircraft to market or incorporating new technologies
into the design of existing aircraft. FAA may grant amended or supplemental type
certifications to address modifications that, in its opinion, do not change the
design, power, thrust, or weight of the aircraft so extensively that a substantially
complete investigation to determine regulatory compliance is necessary.1 In such
cases, the designer or manufacturer generally must show that the proposed
changes comply with the airworthiness requirements in effect on the date of
application.2 In certain circumstances, FAA’s “changed product rules” permit it
to waive regulatory requirements in approving a type design change so long as an
equivalent level of safety can be demonstrated.

When sufficient or appropriate safety standards do not exist because of novel or
unusual design features of the aircraft, FAA may issue “special conditions”
specifying criteria that establish an equivalent level of safety.3 Increasingly, the
rapid pace of change in flight deck automation and electronic flight control
systems has resulted in greater reliance on special conditions to address software
design, cybersecurity concerns, and human interface and human factors design
considerations.4

Once a type certificate or an amendment to an existing type certificate is issued,

1 14 C.F.R. §21.19
2 14 C.F.R. §21.101.
3 14 C.F.R. §11.19 - What is a special condition?
4 See Federal Aviation Administration, Transport Airplane Issues List, at https://www.faa.gov/aircraft/air_cert/
design_approvals/transport/media/rpttailistforpublicweb.pdf.
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it typically remains valid indefinitely. In rare cases a type certificate can be
voluntarily surrendered, or it can be suspended or revoked by FAA.5
 Production certification permits an aircraft or component manufacturer to build
deliverable aircraft. It involves reviews of facilities, manufacturing processes,
quality assurance, and workplace safety to assess whether the type design can be
safely and reliably reproduced.
 Airworthiness certification is required before an aircraft can begin routine
operations for an airline or other operator. Unlike type certification and
production certification, a separate airworthiness certification is required upon
final assembly of every aircraft manufactured. Processes involve examinations,
inspections, and tests to determine that the aircraft conforms to the certified type
design and meets airworthiness standards.
Figure 1. Types of Aircraft Certification

Source: CRS analysis of 14 C.F.R. Subchapter C - Aircraft.
Type Certification Standards
FAA has developed a broad range of certification standards that vary depending on the size and
intended use of the aircraft. In general, FAA certifies the type designs of aircraft in either
transport or normal categories.
 Transport category airplanes include those designed with a maximum takeoff
weight of more than 19,000 pounds or a configuration of 20 or more seats. This
encompasses most aircraft that passengers would normally fly on in scheduled
commercial service operations. These airplanes must be certified under the
regulatory standards prescribed in 14 C.F.R. Part 25. Manufacturers may seek to
certify smaller airplanes under the transport category requirements, but usually
opt for certification under the normal category.

5 14 C.F.R. §21.51.
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 Normal category certification involves somewhat less stringent standards. As
specified in 14 C.F.R. Part 23, normal category standards vary depending on
maximum seating configuration and operating speeds. Normal category airplanes
may separately be certified for aerobatic maneuvers, whereas transport category
airplanes are not certified for aerobatics. Revised Part 23 certification processes
rely on industry design and construction standards approved by FAA. Most
smaller airplanes now in use, however, were certified prior to changes that were
made to Part 23 in December 2016, and are certified under normal, utility,
commuter, or aerobatic categories based on the requirements that existed at the
time of certification.
 Rotorcraft, such as helicopters, with maximum takeoff weights of 7,000 pounds
or less or having less than 10 seats, can be certified in the normal category under
14 C.F.R. Part 27, but larger rotorcraft must be certified to transport category
standards specified in 14 C.F.R. Part 29.
 Experimental airworthiness certificates are issued on a case-by-case basis,
including for airplanes used specifically for research and development, marketing
and sales (such as the sale of military aircraft to foreign governments),
exhibition, and air racing, and for amateur-built aircraft.
 Light sport aircraft (LSA), one- or two-seat single-engine aircraft weighing less
than 1,320 pounds (or 1,430 pounds for seaplanes) having a maximum rated
speed of 120 knots (138 miles per hour) or less and used strictly for recreation,
are certified to comply with industry consensus standards instead of standards
defined in regulation.
 Powered ultralight aircraft having an empty weight less than 254 pounds and
limited in speed to 55 knots (63 miles per hour) in level flight are not certified by
FAA. Similarly, unpowered ultralight aircraft with an empty weight less than 155
pounds do not receive FAA certification.
Continued Airworthiness
After FAA-certified aircraft are delivered and enter operation, FAA maintains oversight
responsibility to identify operational or maintenance difficulties. Under normal circumstances,
safety deficiencies involving aircraft in operational use are addressed through the continued
airworthiness process. This process involves FAA working with manufacturers, airlines, and
other aircraft operators to identify safety deficiencies, approve fixes, and issue airworthiness
directives ordering operators to address safety concerns through inspections, repairs, and/or
replacements of faulty components. For electronic systems this might involve hardware
replacements or software or firmware updates.
The continued airworthiness process requires international cooperation between aircraft
operators, maintainers, manufacturers, and civil aviation authorities. In the United States, FAA
requires aircraft operators and repair stations to submit timely service difficulty reports (SDRs)
documenting any serious failures, malfunctions, or defects of an aircraft, aircraft engine, or other
aircraft component.6 FAA maintains a centralized database of these SDRs, and investigates
reported difficulties and monitors trends to identify problems that may warrant the issuance of an
airworthiness directive. In this continued airworthiness process, FAA works with operators,

6 See 14 C.F.R. §§121.703, 135.415, 145.221.
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maintainers, and manufacturers to determine suitable corrective actions to address safety
deficiencies.
In addition, FAA may become aware of safety deficiencies requiring corrective actions through
voluntary reporting measures7 and through investigative findings and safety recommendations
issued based on aviation accident investigations conducted by the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) or by investigative bodies in other countries, as well as through FAA’s own
inspections and audits of aircraft operators. Once safety deficiencies are identified, it is ultimately
up to FAA to determine an appropriate remedy in order to maintain operating aircraft of that type
in a safe, airworthy condition, which may result in FAA issuing an airworthiness directive
prescribing corrective actions that must be taken by aircraft operators.
Figure 2. The Continued Airworthiness Process

Source: CRS analysis.
Notes: ASAP: Aviation Safety Action Program; VDRP: Voluntary Disclosure Reporting Program; FOQA: Flight
Operational Quality Assurance.
Managing the Certification Process
Certification is primarily the responsibility of FAA’s Aircraft Certification Service (AIR), which
oversees product development phases, the manufacturing processes covered under production
certification, and the airworthiness certification of all completed aircraft. AIR is part of FAA’s
Office of Aviation Safety, which also includes the Flight Standards Service (FSS). FSS primarily

7 See Federal Aviation Administration, Fact Sheet – Aviation Voluntary Reporting Programs, March 10, 2021, at
https://www.faa.gov/newsroom/aviation-voluntary-reporting-programs-1?newsId=23034.
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inspects and oversees airlines and other aircraft operators, but plays an important role in setting
training standards and reviewing flight operational procedures for newly certified and modified
aircraft designs. AIR shares responsibility for overseeing continued airworthiness with FSS,
which regulates airline operations and pilot training.
FAA’s aircraft certification workforce is augmented by FAA designees. These are employees of
aircraft and aircraft component design and manufacturing organizations and consultants who
carry out certain delegated functions, such as tests and inspections, on FAA’s behalf.
FAA’s annual budget for AIR totals about $260 million, which covers a staff of about 1,350
employed at 13 aircraft certification offices, 19 manufacturing inspection district offices, 4
manufacturing inspection satellite offices, a certificate management office, a certification
program management section at FAA headquarters, and 2 international offices. FAA’s largest
aircraft certification office, located in Seattle, WA, and primarily dedicated to overseeing Boeing
Commercial Airplanes, has a staff of about 40 employees. Overall, AIR oversees about 1,600
manufacturers. Of those, 13 have authority to conduct type certification of their own products
under a program known as Organization Designation Authorization (ODA), and 19 have authority
to perform production certification as of March 30, 2021.8 The largest U.S.-based manufacturer of
aircraft and aviation products, Boeing, has delegated authority to perform type certification,
production certification, and airworthiness certification.
Addressing Pilot Training in the Context of
Aircraft Certification
Whereas FAA’s Air Certification Service is responsible for aircraft certification, the Flight
Standards Service (FSS)9 prescribes the standards for aircraft operations and verifies that
operators, such as airlines, meet those standards. For each aircraft type design, FSS sets up an
aircraft evaluation group to determine required training and operational procedures.
Flight standardization boards are the functional elements of aircraft evaluation groups that deal
specifically with the training and flight operational procedures and requirements for a particular
aircraft.10 This includes determinations regarding the requirement for a pilot to obtain an aircraft
type rating, and minimum training recommendations and requirements for establishing initial
flight crew member competency for the aircraft.
For variants of an existing aircraft type, a flight standardization board may develop Master
Difference Requirements tables that outline the specific differences between various aircraft
covered under the type certification as well as similar aircraft. These tables form the basis for
evaluating an operator’s differences training curriculum for pilots who transition from one variant
of an aircraft type to another or between aircraft with similar characteristics. The tables specify
the training needed to learn and understand the differences between related aircraft types. FAA
operations inspectors assigned to a particular airline or operator may then use these tables, along

8 Federal Aviation Administration, FAA ODA Directory, March 30, 2021, at https://www.faa.gov/other_visit/
aviation_industry/designees_delegations/designee_types/media/odadirectory.pdf.
9 See https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/avs/offices/afx/.
10 Federal Aviation Administration, Advisory Circular: Guidance for Conducting and Use of Flight Standardization
Board Evaluations, AC No.: 120-53B, Change 1, October 24, 2016, at http://rgl.faa.gov/
regulatory_and_guidance_library/rgadvisorycircular.nsf/8ce3f88c034ae31a85256981007848e7/
73c2d4ffcdd33ca986257c1b00533848/$FILE/AC_120-53B_CHG_1_incorporated.pdf.
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with more detailed flight standardization board reports, as a guide for reviewing and approving an
operator’s flight training plan.
Human Factors Implications
Automation-related aviation accidents over the past decade have brought complex human-
systems interaction to the forefront of public policy. A number of accidents have involved either
failures of automated systems or pilot confusion over the operation of automated systems. Studies
indicate that pilots often do not fully understand how automated systems operate, and lack
awareness of the various modes and status of flight automation. Moreover, research has shown
that piloting skills associated with maneuvering aircraft using manual controls decline as a
consequence of flying highly automated aircraft. Additionally, some research has shown that
pilots may overestimate their ability to take over and safely maneuver the aircraft in situations
when automation fails, particularly given the likelihood of unanticipated distractions in the
cockpit during a system failure.11 These studies have raised questions about approaches to
training pilots on highly automated aircraft.12 Complicating matters further, automated systems on
modern air transport airplanes are highly adaptable. As a consequence, different airlines and
individual pilots use different automated features and modes to suit their particular operational
needs and personal preferences.13 Experts continue to debate whether greater standardization of
automation design, operating procedures, and training is desirable.
A January 2016 audit report released by the Department of Transportation Office of Inspector
General (DOT OIG) found that while FAA had established certain requirements governing airline
use of flight deck automation, it lacked a process to ensure that airline training and proficiency
standards adequately addressed pilot monitoring capabilities.14 In response, Section 2102 of the
FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-190) directed FAA to develop a
process for verifying that air carrier pilot training programs incorporate automated systems
monitoring and opportunities to hone manual flying skills. FAA is currently considering a
rulemaking to address the design of flight crew interfaces and cockpit alerting systems.15
Delegation Authority
Delegation of various aircraft and aircraft component certification functions to qualified private
entities, such as company employees, independent consultants, or technical organizations, is a
long-standing FAA practice. As far back as the 1920s, federal aviation safety agencies that
preceded FAA relied on private individuals to participate in examination, inspection, and testing
of aircraft during the product certification process. In the 1940s, programs were established to
appoint designees to perform certain product certification approvals. These included designated
engineering representatives and designated manufacturing inspection representatives employed

11 Michael Gillen, “Diminishing Skills?,” Aero Safety World, July 2010, pp. 30-34.
12 “Increased Reliance on Automation May Weaken Pilots’ Skills for Managing Systems Failures,” Flight Safety
Foundation Human Factors & Aviation Medicine, vol. 55, no. 2, March-April 2005.
13 Hemant Bhana, “Trust but Verify,” Air Safety World, July 2010.
14 Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General, Audit Report: Enhanced FAA Oversight Could Reduce
Hazards Associated With Increased Use of Flight Deck Automation, AV-2016-013, January 7, 2016, at
https://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/default/files/FAA%20Flight%20Decek%20Automation_Final%20Report%5E1-7-16.pdf.
15 See Air Carrier Training Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ACT ARC) Products at https://www.faa.gov/
regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/index.cfm/document/information/documentID/3182.
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by aircraft, aircraft engine, and aircraft component manufacturers, as well as airline maintenance
facilities and repair stations.
Since its creation in 1958, FAA has allowed consultants and certain employees of aircraft and
aircraft component manufacturers to conduct various certification functions on its behalf. This
system was restructured in the 1980s, when FAA established a program to designate
Organizational Designated Airworthiness Representatives. These actions were taken under FAA’s
long-standing authority under 49 U.S.C. §44702(d) to delegate activities related to aircraft type
certification, production certification, and airworthiness certification, including examination,
testing, and inspection necessary to issue a certificate, to private individuals and entities.
FAA notes that “[w]hen acting as a representative of the Administrator, these persons or
organizations are required to perform in a manner consistent with the policies, guidelines, and
directives of the Administrator. When performing a delegated function, FAA designees are legally
distinct from and act independent of the organizations that employ them.” Under 49 U.S.C.
§44702(d), FAA has the authority to rescind a delegation issued to a private person at any time for
any appropriate reason. Moreover, any person affected by the action of an entity delegated certain
FAA certification functions may petition FAA for reconsideration, and FAA may, at its own
initiative, consider the actions of a delegated entity at any time. If FAA determines that the
delegated entity’s actions are unreasonable or unwarranted, it may change, modify, or reverse
them.
Organization Designation Authorization
In the 1990s, FAA’s Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee sought industry input regarding
FAA’s delegation of aircraft certification activities. In 1998, the committee recommended that
FAA establish a program known as Organization Designation Authorization (ODA), generally
authorizing companies to conduct a broad array of delegated functions on behalf of the agency.
In 2005, FAA adopted these recommendations, promulgating regulations that formally established
a new program for certifying companies that design and build production aircraft and aircraft
parts. Under a formal ODA framework,16 FAA delegates certification authority to various
aerospace companies, including aircraft manufacturers such as Boeing; engine manufacturers
such as Pratt and Whitney, General Electric, and Rolls Royce; and avionics and flight control
systems suppliers such as Honeywell and Collins Aerospace.17 FAA asserts that using designees
for routine, well-established certification tasks allows it to focus limited resources on safety-
critical certification issues as well as new and novel technologies.18 Congress has generally
supported increased utilization of FAA’s delegation and designation authorities in order to engage
design and manufacturing organizations and their employees more directly in the aircraft
certification process, often by working as proxies for FAA and its aircraft certification inspector
workforce. Nonetheless, legislative language in the 2012 FAA Modernization and Reform Act
(P.L. 112-95) and the 2018 FAA reauthorization (P.L. 115-254) directed FAA to review these
practices to assess their efficiency and safety implications.

16 Federal Aviation Administration, “Establishment of Organization Designation Authorization Program,” 70 Federal
Register 59931-59949, October 13, 2005.
17 A complete listing of ODA certificate holders can be found at https://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/
designees_delegations/designee_types/media/odadirectory.pdf.
18 Federal Aviation Administration, About the FAA Designee Program, at https://www.faa.gov/other_visit/
aviation_industry/designees_delegations/about/#q2.
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Evolution of the ODA Program
Over the past 15 years, the ODA program has expanded despite concerns over the adequacy of
FAA oversight. Based on recommendations from the certification process committee and
mandates in P.L. 112-95, FAA adopted several initiatives to improve and expand the program.19
Following passage of P.L. 112-95, FAA chartered two aviation rulemaking committees, one to
address certification processes and the other to examine regulatory consistency. Among the
recommendations set forth by the Certification Process Committee was expanding delegation
under ODA to include processes for certifying that aircraft meet noise and emissions standards
and for approving continued airworthiness instructions. The recommendations also included
initiatives to address FAA tracking of certification activities, update certification regulations, and
improve consistency of regulatory interpretations.
A 2015 audit by the DOT OIG found that FAA lacked a comprehensive process for determining
aircraft certification service staffing needs for effective ODA oversight and other certification
activities. It urged FAA to develop minimum staffing requirements, issue guidance on the data
that should be routinely monitored and analyzed by ODA oversight staff, improve audit processes
and training, and widely disseminate findings of these audits to ODA oversight teams to assist in
planning future oversight. It also recommended that FAA implement evaluation criteria and risk-
based tools to aid ODA oversight personnel in targeting oversight activities.
In a 2015 statement, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) observed that, while industry
stakeholders favored expanding the ODA program, employee unions raised concerns that FAA
lacked adequate resources to implement and oversee ODA expansion.20 However, two years later,
in March 2017, GAO reported that FAA had carried out its ODA action plan, had launched an
audit training initiative for personnel supervising ODA inspections, and had expanded delegation
under ODA to authorize designees to approve instructions for continued airworthiness, emissions
data, and noise certification.21 According to GAO, FAA, in collaboration with industry, had also
developed an ODA scorecard to measure outcomes related to its ODA initiatives, including
manufacturer compliance with standards set for delegated activities and FAA oversight.22
In 2018, following oversight hearings,23 Congress expressed general support for the ODA
framework, but included extensive language in P.L. 115-254 mandating specific aircraft
certification reforms. It directed FAA to establish a Safety Oversight and Certification Advisory
Committee to develop policy recommendations for the certification process and for FAA
oversight of certification activities, and mandated that FAA establish performance objectives and
metrics. In March 2019, a few months after the law’s enactment, FAA established an ODA Office

19 Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General, FAA Lacks an Effective Staffing Model and Risk-Based
Oversight Process for Organization Designation Authorization,
20 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Aviation Certification: Issues Related to Domestic and Foreign Approval of
U.S. Aviation Products, GAO-15/550T, April 21, 2015.
21 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Aviation Certification: FAA Has Made Continued Progress in Improving Its
Processes for U.S. Aviation Products, GAO-1-508T, March 23, 2017.
22 Ibid.
23 See Building a 21st-Century Infrastructure for America: State of American Aviation Manufacturing, (115-2) Hearing
Before the Subcommittee on Aviation of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of
Representatives, February 15, 2017, at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-115hhrg24210/pdf/CHRG-
115hhrg24210.pdf; FAA Reauthorization: Perspectives on Improving Airport Infrastructure and Aviation
Manufacturing, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Aviation Operations, Safety, and Security, Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, United States Senate, Senate Hearing 115-64, March 23, 2017, at
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-115shrg26596/pdf/CHRG-115shrg26596.pdf.
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within its Aviation Safety Organization to oversee the program and improve ODA practices. The
act also mandated that FAA establish a Regulatory Consistency Communications Board to
improve consistency in regulatory interpretations, especially those concerning aircraft
certification and flight standards. The board provides a forum24 for industry stakeholders to raise
issues of policy or regulatory consistency to FAA anonymously and without fear of retaliation.
In its present form, the ODA framework is predicated on the broader FAA Integrated Oversight
Philosophy, an approach to safety oversight activities based on risk-based strategies for allocating
FAA oversight resources.25 This approach relies on regulated entities, including manufacturers
and airlines, adopting comprehensive safety management systems that continuously collect and
analyze safety data and provide mechanisms for voluntary reporting of safety concerns. FAA, in
turn, uses these data and safety reports to target its oversight based on its own risk assessments. In
this regard, the ODA program bears similarities to the airline Voluntary Disclosure Reporting
Program, which the agency uses to track compliance with continued airworthiness requirements
and other voluntary safety reporting systems at airlines that fall under the umbrella of broader
safety management system approaches.
Safety Management Systems
FAA’s approach to delegating certification authority is based on a risk management method
known as the safety management system (SMS). FAA defines SMS as a formal organization-wide
approach to managing safety risk through structured and systematic procedures, practices, and
policies intended to address and improve safety on a continuing basis.26 It includes formal
processes for decisionmaking regarding safety risks; safety assurance; knowledge sharing; and
promoting a strong safety culture through training, education, and communication.
FAA SMS initiatives address international requirements for safety management, which apply to
airlines and air traffic service providers as well as organizations responsible for the type design
and manufacture of aircraft.27 In 2014, FAA launched a rulemaking initiative to address a
requirement of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) that design and production
approval holders implement SMS. However, it has not issued a proposed rule to that end. Instead,
FAA promotes voluntary compliance with an industry standard, National Aerospace Standard
(NAS) 9927, Safety Management Systems and Practices for Design and Manufacturing, finding
its contents to be consistent with the ICAO Annex 19 standards and FAA SMS requirements for
commercial airlines.28 FAA has implemented a voluntary SMS program for design and
manufacturing organizations using NAS 9927 along with ICAO Annex 19 and SMS regulations

24 See https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/faa_regulations/rccb/.
25 Federal Aviation Administration, FAA Integrated Oversight Philosophy, at https://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/iop/
.
26 See Federal Aviation Administration, Safety Management System (SMS), at https://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/
sms/; Federal Aviation Administration, Safety Management System, National Policy, Order 8000.369C, June 24, 2020,
at https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Order/Order_8000.369C.pdf.
27 International Civil Aviation Organization, Annex 19 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, Safety
Management, Second Edition, July 2016.
28 Letter from Dorenda D. Baker, Director, Aircraft Certification Service, Federal Aviation Administration, to Ali
Bahrami, Vice President, Civil Aviation, Aerospace Industries Association, and Walter Desrosier, Vice President,
Engineering & Maintenance, General Aviation Manufacturers Association, June 9, 2016, at https://www.faa.gov/about/
office_org/headquarters_offices/avs/offices/air/transformation/certification_strategy/media/NAS_9927.pdf.
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for commercial airlines as guides. Manufacturers that implement voluntary SMS programs under
these guidelines can obtain formal FAA recognition of their SMS program.
International Standards and Practices
Internationally, aircraft certification and airworthiness practices are to adhere to standards set by
ICAO, a specialized agency of the United Nations. Specifically, ICAO Annex 8 to the Convention
on International Civil Aviation lays out the type certification process that FAA and other
regulators follow.29 Annex 8 also describes standard procedures for establishing a certification
program, forming a certification team, demonstrating compliance with the certification basis, and
issuing type certificates.
It is up to the civil aviation authority for each individual nation to establish regulations and
oversight of certification activities related to design and manufacturing carried out principally
within that country. Countries generally accept type certificates issued by other countries under
the terms of bilateral agreements on aviation safety and airworthiness, thus allowing for the
import and export and global operation of aircraft.30 The increasing globalization of the supply
chain for aircraft components has created geographic and geopolitical challenges for this scheme
and for FAA. In 2015, the DOT OIG found that much of the certification work conducted at FAA-
regulated aircraft supplier facilities, about a quarter of which were located overseas, was carried
out by ODA holder employees with little or no FAA oversight.31 FAA has stepped up oversight of
priority international suppliers, but given the size of the industry, it continues to rely heavily on
ODA holders and foreign regulators to verify the quality and integrity of aircraft components built
overseas for installation on U.S.-certified aircraft.
While FAA oversees type certification for aircraft and aircraft components designed and
assembled in the United States, other regulatory entities oversee type certification for aircraft and
products assembled in other countries. Notably, the European Union Aviation Safety Agency
(EASA) oversees the type certification process for aircraft and aircraft products designed in
European countries. Because Boeing, based in Chicago, and Airbus, based in Toulouse, France,
jointly control a large majority of worldwide sales of large commercial passenger jets, FAA and
EASA fulfill important roles in certifying passenger airliners operated worldwide. FAA generally
accepts EASA certification of commercial aircraft manufactured by Airbus, and, reciprocally,
European countries under EASA accept FAA certification of U.S.-manufactured aircraft. While
the two regulatory agencies, like the industry giants that they regulate, generally cooperate on
safety matters, they sometimes hold differing views regarding safety design. Such disagreements
came to the fore following the grounding of Boeing 737 Max passenger jets in 2019.
The Boeing 737 Max
The Boeing 737 received its initial type certification in December 1967.32 Over the past five
decades, it has gone through a dozen amended type certifications and a number of smaller

29 International Civil Aviation Organization, Annex 8 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, Airworthiness
of Aircraft, Twelfth Edition, July 2018.
30 See https://www.faa.gov/aircraft/air_cert/international/bilateral_agreements/overview/.
31 Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General, FAA Lacks an Effective Staffing Model and Risk-Based
Oversight Process for Organization Designation Authorization, AV-2016-001, October 15, 2015,
https://www.oig.dot.gov/library-item/32742.
32 Federal Aviation Administration, Type Certification Data Sheet A16WE, https://rgl.faa.gov/
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changes as new variants have been introduced to incorporate new technologies and new
capabilities. The changes were all reviewed and approved by FAA, although considerable
certification work over the years has been delegated to FAA designees, principally Boeing and its
employees, most recently through use of the ODA program. FAA did not require any of these 737
variants to undergo a completely new type certification process.
In 2012, Boeing submitted an application initiating certification of a new variant of the Boeing
737 referred to as the Max.33 The Max introduced larger engines, along with a number of other
design changes to the aircraft structure and flight control systems. The larger engines and the
placement of those engines farther forward required a reengineering of aircraft flight control
systems related to pitch control.34 Under the ODA program, FAA delegated a number of
certification functions to Boeing, including the certification plan for the flight control computers
that automatically make adjustments compensating for certain pitch-up events. The Boeing 737
Max received amended type certification in February 2017, and customer deliveries began in May
2017.
Crashes
On October 29, 2018, Lion Air flight 610, a Boeing 737 Max-8, crashed into the Java Sea shortly
after takeoff from Jakarta, Indonesia, killing all 189 on board. Multiple automatic nose-down trim
commands occurred during the last six to seven minutes of the accident flight, which the pilots
attempted to counteract unsuccessfully by applying nose-up pitch trim commands.35 At the end of
the recorded flight data, the vertical stabilizer had moved to almost the full nose-down position,
and the airplane was in a steep dive.
Two weeks after the Lion Air crash, FAA issued an emergency directive36 ordering U.S. operators
of Boeing 737 Max airplanes to adopt specific procedures to address situations that might trigger
repeated nose-down trim commands by an automated flight control feature known as the
Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, or MCAS. In December 2018, FAA
expanded the scope of the airworthiness directive, ordering the procedural change for all Boeing
737 Max airplanes worldwide.37

Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgMakeModel.nsf/0/9cb444041b857378862586a9005df84b/$FILE/
A16WE_Rev67.pdf.
33 The Max variant refers to a family of similar aircraft that include the -7, which has a maximum seating configuration
of 172; the -8, which has a maximum seating configuration of 210; the -9, which has a maximum seating configuration
of 220; and the -10, which has a maximum seating configuration of 230. All are powered by the CFM LEAP-1B engine
(see https://www.boeing.com/commercial/737max/).
34 Pitch refers to the up and down movement of the nose of the aircraft, and is controlled principally by the aircraft’s
elevator located on the horizontal stabilizer, part of the tail of the airplane. Pilots control pitch by either applying
elevator control inputs by pushing or pulling the aircraft yoke or control stick or by using manual or electric pitch trim
inputs that move trim tabs on the elevator. Automated flight control systems may also control aircraft pitch by making
elevator and pitch trim inputs.
35 Komite Nasional Keselamatan Transportasi, Republic of Indonesia, Preliminary KNKT.18.10.34.04, Aircraft
Accident Investigation Report, PT. Lion Mentari Airlines Boeing 737-8 (MAX); PK-LQP, Tanjung Karawang, West
Java, Republic of Indonesia, 29 October 2018, November 2018, at https://reports.aviation-safety.net/2018/20181029-
0_B38M_PK-LQP_PRELIMINARY.pdf.
36 Rob Mark, “FAA Issues Emergency Airworthiness Directive Against Boeing 737 Max 8,” Flying, November 7,
2018, at https://www.flyingmag.com/faa-emergency-airworthiness-directive-boeing-737-max-8/.
37 Federal Aviation Administration, “Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes,” 83 Federal Register
62697, December 6, 2018.
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This change did not prevent a second accident, on March 10, 2019, when Ethiopian Airlines flight
302 crashed shortly after departure from Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, killing all 157 on board.
Investigation revealed several similarities to the Lion Air flight 610 crash.38 Notably, immediately
upon takeoff and for the short duration of the flight, a critical flight sensor connected to MCAS
indicated an extremely high pitch (roughly 75 degrees nose up), whereas an alternative sensor not
connected to MCAS appeared to report small pitch variations of a few degrees, consistent with a
normal takeoff climb. Over the next few minutes the aircraft experienced a series of automatic
aircraft nose-down trim commands. As with the Lion Air flight, aircraft flight data ceased with
the pitch trim at almost a full nose-down position with the aircraft in a steep descent.
The MCAS system, as equipped on the two accident airplanes, received aircraft angle-of-attack
data from only one of the airplane’s two angle-of-attack sensors. These sensors are essentially
sensitive wind vanes affixed to the side of the fuselage that precisely measure the relative airflow
and thereby convey information about the aircraft’s pitch angle relative to the airflow around it.
The MCAS was added to the Boeing 737 Max as a means to address pitch stability requirements
that were affected by the larger CFM LEAP-1B engines chosen to power the new variant.
According to Boeing, the system was intended to activate to automatically correct for unintended
pitch-up events under certain rare combinations of engine thrust settings and airplane
configurations.39 However, on both Lion Air flight 610 and Ethiopian Airlines flight 302, the
MCAS engaged in response to faulty data from the angle-of-attack sensor falsely indicating that
the aircraft was in a nose-high attitude when, in fact, it was not, triggering repeated nose-down
pitch trim commands. In such situations, if the pilots counteracted the automated nose-down
commands with a nose-up pitch trim, the MCAS would reset after five seconds, then repeat the
nose-down pitch command again. The system would repeat this cycle for as long as it continued
to sense that the aircraft was in a nose-high attitude, even if based on errant sensor data.
Investigations of the 737 Max Certification
The circumstances of the two Boeing 737 Max crashes led authorities in several countries,
including China and the European Union, to immediately ground 737 Max airplanes as the
crashes and the aircraft systems involved were investigated. FAA, Boeing, and U.S. air carriers
did not immediately follow suit. One day after the Ethiopian Airlines crash, FAA instead notified
international civil aviation authorities that it anticipated mandatory design changes to be instituted
no later than April 2019. However, on March 13, 2019, FAA issued an emergency order
grounding all 737 Max aircraft. That order40 remained in place until November 2020, when FAA
approved modifications to the flight control systems and revised pilot training.
The concerns that emerged following the two crashes centered on how the Boeing 737 Max flight
control systems and MCAS specifically were certified, with attention focused on the relationships
between FAA and delegated entities from private industry performing certification work under the
ODA program. Some journalists asserted that certification work on the 737 Max was rushed

38 Federated Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Ministry of Transport, Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau, Aircraft
Accident Investigation Preliminary Report, Ethiopian Airlines Group, B737-8 Max, Registered ET-AVJ, 28 NM South
East of Addis Ababa, Bole International Airport, March 10, 2019, Report No. AI-01/19, at http://www.ecaa.gov.et/
documents/20435/0/Preliminary+Report+B737-800MAX+%2C%28ET-AVJ%29.pdf.
39 Fred George, “Pilots Say MCAS Software Updates Prove Effective in Simulator Demo,” Aviation Week and Space
Technology, April 22-May 5, 2019, pp. 16-18.
40Federal Aviation Administration, “Operators of Boeing Company Model 737-8 and Boeing Company Model 737-9
Airplanes: Emergency Order of Prohibition,” 84 Federal Register 9705-9706, March 18, 2019.
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because of pressures on Boeing employees with certification responsibilities to quickly bring the
airplane to market to compete with the Airbus A320 Neo, which entered service in early 2016.41
FAA quickly convened a technical advisory board to review Boeing’s MCAS software update and
systems safety assessment and recommend steps needed to certify Boeing’s changes and return
the aircraft to service, while regulators in several other countries pursued independent reviews of
the Boeing 737 Max design and certification. A number of investigative reviews of the
certification process, oversight of the certification process, and associated failures that led to the
two crashes were conducted as well.
Joint Authorities Technical Review
In April 2019, FAA convened the multinational Joint Authorities Technical Review (JATR),
chaired by former NTSB Chairman Christopher Hart, to conduct a comprehensive review of the
Boeing 737 Max aircraft’s automated flight control system certification. The JATR was
composed of experts from FAA, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and
representatives from air safety authorities in Europe, Canada, Australia, Brazil, China, Japan,
Indonesia, Singapore, and the United Arab Emirates.42 The JATR published its final report and
recommendations on October 11, 2019.43
Regarding the certification process, the JATR recommended that regulations and guidance be
changed to implement a top-down evaluation of every proposed change from an integrated
perspective. It emphasized the need to implement a comprehensive systems analysis examining
impacts on system interactions and dependencies, including implications for training and
operational procedures for flight crew and maintenance personnel. The JATR review stressed that
the level of assessment should be proportional to the impact of the proposed design change on the
aircraft as a whole.
The JATR also urged reviews of the Boeing 737 Max certification with respect to systems safety
analysis, assessment of airplane handling qualities, and the design and engineering of Boeing 737
Max training simulators. It stressed the importance of early FAA involvement in the type
certification process and recommended regulatory changes to improve FAA awareness of
proposed design changes and underlying design assumptions. It also recommended that the
certification process incorporate feedback paths between the applicant and FAA regarding
regulatory compliance, systems safety principles, and flight deck human factors. The JATR also
recommended that FAA conduct a workforce review of its Boeing Aviation Safety Oversight
Office to ensure sufficient expertise to carry out effective oversight. Moreover, it recommended a
review to ensure that ODA unit members at Boeing do not face undue pressure in performing
certification work and have sufficient lines of communication to FAA certification engineers
without fear of punitive actions or process violations.

41 See, e.g., Dominic Gates, “Flawed Analysis, Failed Oversight: How Boeing, FAA Certified the Suspect 737 MAX
Flight Control System,” Seattle Times, March 17, 2019, at https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/
failed-certification-faa-missed-safety-issues-in-the-737-max-system-implicated-in-the-lion-air-crash/; David Gelles,
Natalie Kitroeff, Jack Nicas and Rebecca R. Ruiz, “Boeing Was ‘Go, Go, Go’ to Beat Airbus With the 737 Max,” New
York Times, March 23, 2019, at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/23/business/boeing-737-max-crash.html.
42 Federal Aviation Administration, FAA Updates on the Boeing 737 MAX, at https://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?
newsId=93206.
43 Joint Authorities Technical Review, Joint Authorities Technical Review: Observations, Findings, and
Recommendations, Submitted to the Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety, U.S. Federal Aviation
Administration, October 11, 2019.
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The JATR recommended that FAA promote safety culture pertaining to product development and
certification compliance. It stressed that aircraft functions should be examined holistically, and
that FAA should encourage manufacturers to assess aircraft safety and design details
independently from the design functions. It noted that adoption of a safety management system
(SMS) would be one way to achieve this goal.
The JATR also recommended that FAA integrate and emphasize human factors design and
human-systems integration throughout the certification process. It stressed the importance of
compliance with regulations pertaining to flight crew system interfaces and cockpit alerts and
warnings, and recommended that FAA expand its aircraft certification human factors resources. It
also recommended that FAA set formal requirements to evaluate operational impacts, systems
integration, and human performance. Moreover, it recommended that FAA address the
implications of flight crew response assumptions and human factors considerations of design
changes in developing training requirements and operating manuals. It specifically recommended
that FAA review training programs pertaining to flight crew handling of uncommanded pitch-up
and pitch-down events and other aircraft mis-trim conditions.
The JATR also recommended that FAA take steps to ensure that manufacturers apply industry
best practices, including requirements management practices, transparency of design
assumptions, process assurance activities, and effective configuration management. It pointed to
the current SAE International Recommended Practice44 on certification of highly integrated or
complex aircraft systems as appropriate guidance on industry best practices, and recommended
that FAA review and amend advisory materials45 to clearly articulate and promote the principles
outlined in the SAE International guidance.
The JATR further recommended that FAA guidance be updated to emphasize the examination of
cumulative impacts resulting from design changes. It also recommended that FAA conduct a
study to determine the adequacy of existing policy, guidance, and assumptions related to aircraft
maintenance. It also recommended that FAA review policies for analyzing safety risk and issuing
interim airworthiness directives to address safety deficiencies following fatal transport category
aircraft accidents. It stressed that FAA should share post-accident safety information with
international partners to the maximum extent possible.
Joint Operations Evaluation Board and Flight Standardization Board
Separate from the JATR, the FAA convened a multinational Joint Operations Evaluation Board
(JOEB), composed of civil aviation authorities from the United States, Canada, Brazil, and the
European Union, to evaluate 737 Max pilot training requirements. The JOEB conducted extensive
flight simulator reviews and made formal training recommendations that were provided to FAA’s
Aircraft Evaluation Group and Flight Standardization Board (FSB) for the Boeing 737 Max
certification review. That work culminated in recommendations for training issued in October
2020 that included dissemination of specific information regarding the functionality of the MCAS
system to pilots and formal simulator training to handle uncommanded pitch-down scenarios
similar to those encountered in the two crashes.

44 SAE International, Certification Considerations for Highly Integrated or Complex Aircraft Systems, ARP4754A,
December 21, 2010, at https://www.sae.org/standards/content/arp4754/.
45 Federal Aviation Administration, Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems, Advisory Circular (AC) 20-174,
September 30, 2011, at https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC_20-174.pdf.
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These findings were noteworthy because there has traditionally been little international
coordination in regulating pilot qualifications and training. While ICAO sets general training and
licensing standards for pilots internationally, it is up to individual countries to set formal
requirements for their pilots.46 While the United States adopted more stringent requirements a
decade ago mandating a minimum of 1,500 hours of total flight time for airline pilots, foreign
airlines often operate with first officers who are required to meet international standards only for
multi-crew commercial pilot licenses, which can be obtained with as little as 240 total flight
hours. It is not unusual for entry-level first officers at foreign airlines to have only a few hundred
hours of total flight experience. Moreover, FAA has limited regulatory authority over foreign
airlines that fly into the United States and limited influence over aircraft-specific training
requirements set by foreign countries whose airlines purchase airplanes from Boeing and other
U.S. manufacturers. FAA has urged ICAO to address perceived pilot training deficiencies and
recommended that ICAO update its standards and guidance to include additional training to
prepare airline pilots to operate aircraft manually if automated systems fail.47
National Transportation Safety Board Recommendations
In September 2019, NTSB issued safety recommendations to FAA and to Boeing, urging action to
address design assumptions about pilot response to uncommanded flight control system events,
like an MCAS activation, in the certification process based on its participation in the Boeing 737
Max crash investigations.48 NTSB urged Boeing to ensure that assessments of the 737 Max
consider the effect of all possible cockpit alerts and indications on pilot recognition and response,
and address these factors in cockpit design changes as well as pilot procedures and training. It
similarly urged FAA to change aircraft certification, flight operations, and training standards to
ensure that cockpit warnings and indicators are appropriately designed and assessed for pilot
recognition and response. NTSB also recommended that FAA develop and deploy evaluation
tools, based on input from industry and human factors experts, to help inform aircraft designers
and certifiers regarding pilot response to failure conditions. It also urged FAA to develop formal
design standards and diagnostic tools to improve the clarity and prioritization of cockpit failure
indications and alerts.
Department of Transportation Inspector General Audits
On March 19, 2019, Secretary of Transportation Elaine Chao requested that the DOT OIG
compile a detailed factual history of the Boeing 737 Max type certification. The DOT OIG
received similar requests from various congressional committees and Members of Congress
seeking details regarding FAA’s approach to certifying the Boeing 737 Max, reliance on the ODA
program, and actions in response to the Boeing 737 Max crashes. The focus of the DOT OIG
audit carried out in response to these requests was on FAA’s process for certifying the Boeing
737 Max. The audit also examined FAA actions following the Lion Air crash in October 2018 and
the subsequent Ethiopian Airlines crash in March 2019.49

46 See https://www.icao.int/safety/airnavigation/Pages/peltrgFAQ.aspx.
47 “FAA Urges ICAO to Address Erosion of ‘Manual’ Piloting Skills,” Flight Global, September 25, 2019, at
https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/faa-urges-icao-to-address-erosion-of-manual-piloti-461057/.
48 National Transportation Safety Board, Safety Recommendation Report: Assumptions Used in the Safety Assessment
Process and the Effects of Multiple Alerts and Indications on Pilot Performance, September 19, 2019, at
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/ASR1901.pdf.
49 Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General, Timeline of Activities Leading to the Certification of the
Boeing 737 MAX 8 Aircraft and Actions Taken After the October 2018 Lion Air Accident, Report No. AV2020037,
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The report provides a detailed chronology of certification activities that commenced in early
2012. The audit noted, significantly, that the design of the MCAS system was changed in March
2016, shortly after the first Boeing 737 Max test flight in January 2016. Subsequently, the
certification of the flight control computer, including the MCAS control logic, was delegated to
Boeing in September 2016. Certification flight tests were completed in February 2017, and the
FAA Flight Standardization Board (FSB) approved the transition training for the aircraft in March
2017. The amended type certificate was issued shortly thereafter, paving the way for the first
delivery of the Boeing 737 Max in May 2017.
The audit found that, in August 2017, Boeing identified an issue concerning the fact that not all
737 Max aircraft were equipped with cockpit warnings that would alert pilots to a possible failure
of the angle-of-attack sensor that provides data to the flight control computer, and that such a
failure scenario could trigger MCAS activation of automated nose-down pitch trim in certain
circumstances. Neither the Lion Air nor the Ethiopian Airlines aircraft that crashed were equipped
with these indicators. The audit found that Boeing never formally notified FAA or Boeing 737
Max customers of this finding, but did include it in revised certification documents submitted in
October 2017.
Following the Lion Air crash on October 29, 2018, the audit found that, within days, FAA
initiated a review of the operational service history of the Boeing 737 Max. FAA issued an
operational bulletin alerting operators that erroneous angle-of-attack data could trigger
uncommanded nose-down trim inputs, and subsequently issued an airworthiness directive alerting
operators to possible repeated nose-down trim commands that could lead to difficulty maintaining
pitch control. The directive required operators to revise the Airplane Flight Manual to include
procedures to counteract uncommanded nose-down movements.
The audit found that FAA’s risk analysis of the Lion Air flight 610 crash, completed in late
November 2018, found the expected fatality rate for the 737 Max to be 2.68 fatalities per 1
million flight hours, much higher than FAA’s acceptable risk threshold for transport airplanes of
1 fatality per 10 million flight hours. Based on this risk assessment, FAA concluded that a
software fix to redesign MCAS was needed. It estimated that without the software fix, there was a
risk that the existing design would result in about 15 crashes over the life of the entire Boeing 737
Max fleet. Nonetheless, FAA concluded that the procedural changes mandated by the
airworthiness directive would temporarily mitigate the risk, but only until July 2019.
Boeing concurred with FAA’s risk assessment and agreed to develop software changes to the
MCAS. In January 2019, FAA initiated an internal review of the original MCAS certification
process. The DOT OIG audit found that this was the first time that FAA was presented with the
full details of how MCAS worked. While the audit concluded that FAA did not identify any
noncompliance with certification requirements, FAA noted deficiencies in Boeing’s ability to
trace related documents and clearly explain MCAS functionality and its linkages to other aircraft
systems and functions.
The audit also examined FAA’s internal reviews of the Boeing ODA program 737 Max
certification oversight. The audit revealed that FAA had uncovered evidence of undue pressure on
ODA unit members, prompting Boeing to conduct a survey of its ODA unit members in 2016.
That survey found that almost 40% of respondents had encountered perceived undue pressure,
and 25% had experienced perceived undue pressure beyond their direct reporting structure. The
survey also identified pressures from high workloads, uncertainty about dual roles of ODA unit

June 29, 2020, at https://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/default/files/
FAA%20Oversight%20of%20Boeing%20737%20MAX%20Certification%20Timeline%20Final%20Report.pdf.
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members, and a desire among respondents for Boeing to share information about undue pressure
cases to improve learning and understanding of these issues.
The audit also noted that in 2018 and 2019, the Boeing ODA completed seven internal audits that
found no nonconformities or violations of FAA regulations regarding undue pressure and found
that the processes for reporting concerns were well communicated and supported. Nonetheless, a
perception that there were inadequate protections from actions by leadership outside of the ODA
units was noted in one of the audits, while another audit noted a lack of confidence that the
process for reporting perceived undue pressure incidents would result in satisfactory conclusions
and protect ODA unit members. Previously, FAA and DOT OIG identified additional concerns
about the timeliness and quality of certification documents and the effectiveness of FAA
certification oversight. These findings contributed to FAA’s decision in November 2018 to
initiate formal compliance action against Boeing, citing five specific cases of Boeing ODA unit
member allegations of interference, conflicting duties, and undue pressures from beyond the ODA
unit.
The DOT OIG also initiated an audit of FAA’s pilot training requirements in February 2020,
citing concerns regarding the adequacy of domestic and international pilot training standards for
commercial passenger aircraft and the use of automation on those aircraft. Additionally, in April
2021, the DOT OIG initiated an audit of FAA’s oversight of the Boeing 737 Max’s return to
service, including examination of the risk assessment process and of decisions regarding the
grounding of the aircraft and its subsequent recertification in November 2020.
In February 2021, the DOT OIG published additional audit findings regarding FAA’s certification
of the Boeing 737 Max and its use of delegation authority during the certification process.50 The
audit concluded that, while FAA and Boeing followed established certification processes,
deficiencies in those processes and associated guidance led to a significant misunderstanding of
how the MCAS operated and the risks associated with the MCAS. The DOT OIG found that FAA
certification guidance does not adequately address the integration of new technologies into
existing aircraft models.
The audit report noted that FAA had not yet implemented a risk-based approach to ODA
oversight. Moreover, it found that FAA staff overseeing Boeing faced continuing challenges in
balancing certification reviews and ODA oversight responsibilities. It also concluded that Boeing
ODA personnel lack adequate independence. It cautioned that Boeing ODA structure and
processes and FAA oversight, despite reforms, may be unable to fully address concerns of undue
pressure and may still be unable to effectively identify high-risk safety concerns. The DOT OIG
recommended that FAA
 update changed product rules to address new technologies;
 revise criteria for defining and assessing novel or unusual design features;
 require applicants to submit failure probability analyses identifying key
assumptions as part of the certification process;
 assess and update guidance regarding design assumptions about pilot actions,
pilot reaction times, and failure mode testing;

50 U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General, Weaknesses in FAA’s Certification and Delegation
Processes Hindered Its Oversight of the 737 Max 8, Report No. AV2021020, February 23, 2021, at
hhhttps://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/default/files/
FAA%20Certification%20of%20737%20MAX%20Boeing%20II%20Final%20Report%5E2-23-2021.pdf.
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 establish processes for notifying FAA personnel regarding changes to system
safety assessments, including changes that occur after certification flight testing
has commenced;
 implement procedures for communication and coordination between Boeing and
FAA, and between aircraft certification, flight standards, and flight test groups in
FAA;
 implement policies and procedures for aircraft evaluation group reviews and
approvals and improve consistency of practices among aircraft evaluation
groups;
 incorporate lessons learned from the Boeing 737 Max into ODA oversight,
implementing a risk-based approach;
 clarify priorities, roles, and responsibilities of FAA engineers performing
oversight and certification work, including details regarding the timing of
oversight activities;
 conduct an assessment of ODA unit members to gauge the extent to which they
participate in both design activities and FAA-delegated compliance oversight,
and based on findings, revise ODA guidance;
 revise ODA requirements to ensure adequate internal controls to prevent
interference with ODA unit members;
 determine whether Boeing has met requirements established under a settlement
agreement with FAA on December 18, 2015, including requirements to report
and meet agreed-upon performance metrics regarding safety management and
regulatory compliance;51 and
 complete rulemaking to mandate safety management systems for aircraft
manufacturers, including establishing compliance time frames.
Department of Transportation Special Committee Review
Separately, Secretary Chao established a special committee to review FAA’s aircraft certification
process in April 2019. That committee, composed of aviation and safety experts, published an
official report of its findings and recommendations on January 16, 2020.52 The committee found
that FAA’s certification process was generally rigorous, robust, and overseen by personnel
committed to safety, but identified several areas for improvement. It found FAA’s delegation
system to be an appropriate and effective tool for conducting aircraft certification, and
recommended that it be continued with some revisions, specifically to ensure that ODA units be
completely independent in their role as representatives of FAA in certification matters.
With respect to the Boeing 737 Max certification specifically, the committee concluded that
requiring the aircraft to undergo a new type certification would not have resulted in more scrutiny
of the design and would not have produced a safer airplane. It instead concluded that additional
scrutiny of interactions between changed items and related systems, as well as the cumulative

51 United States Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, Northwest Mountain Region, Office
of Regional Counsel, Settlement Agreement, In the Matter of: The Boeing Company (Boeing Commercial Airplanes),
December 18, 2015, at https://www.faa.gov/foia/electronic_reading_room/settlement_agreements/media/20151218-
boeing-settlement-agreement.pdf.
52 Special Committee to Review the Federal Aviation Administration’s Aircraft Certification Process, Official Report of
the Special Committee to Review the Federal Aviation Administration’s Aircraft Certification Process, January 16,
2020, at https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/2020-01/scc-final-report.pdf.
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impacts of multiple design changes over time, including impacts on flight crew operations, should
be required.
The committee recommended that FAA take steps to ensure a total system approach to safety,
linking product certification to pilot training and flight operations. It also recommended that FAA
encourage the integration of ODA, SMS, and safety partnership initiatives to improve the
effectiveness of management and oversight of safety and certification. The committee urged that
FAA and industry work collaboratively to remove undue pressure on ODA units, and that ODA
unit decisionmaking be completely independent when representing the FAA on certification
matters.
The committee proposed that system safety assessments be expanded to more fully consider
human-system interactions and include more systematic analysis of human performance and error
assessments. It recommended that FAA require human factors analyses for all safety-critical
functions and failure modes associated with design changes, that tests and evaluations include
multiple failure mode scenarios, and that tests be conducted using pilots who are representative of
airline pilots anticipated to fly delivered aircraft. Moreover, conclusions of safety assessments
pertaining to the safe operation of aircraft should be made available to end users and related flight
information monitored during operational service.
The committee also recommended that FAA consider differences in operations, training, and
oversight in countries where U.S.-designed and -manufactured aircraft are delivered. It
recommended that FAA address minimum flight crew standards and promote advanced training
and qualification programs for foreign pilots. It suggested that FAA expand its engagement with
foreign entities and provide technical assistance and training to foster improved international
safety standards and practices for aircraft certification, operations, and maintenance.
The committee concluded that safety could be improved through enhanced data gathering and
targeted analysis to identify and mitigate risks and implement corrective actions. It recommended
a single repository for aviation safety data, pointing to FAA’s Aviation Safety Information
Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) as an example. It further recommended that FAA propose that
ICAO take steps to improve operational data sharing internationally.
The committee identified the potential for disconnects between design certification and
operational requirements due to the fact that FAA manages aircraft certification and flight
standards aircraft evaluations under separate management structures with different policies,
guidance, leadership, and organizational cultures. It recommended that FAA clarify the roles of
the aircraft evaluation group in Flight Standards in the product certification process and the
working relationship between Flight Standards and Aircraft Certification organizations within
FAA. It emphasized that the aircraft evaluation group should have sufficient engagement
throughout the certification process to be fully aware of design changes.
The committee also recommended that FAA reevaluate its workforce strategy for aircraft
certification to adapt to industry changes and recruit certification personnel with the right range of
skills to meet evolving needs.
With regard to amended type certificates, the committee recommended that FAA ensure its
policies and guidance are updated to fully evaluate changes in the context of aircraft systems,
human interactions with those systems, and the influences of the flight environment. Moreover,
guidance should highlight potential vulnerabilities that can be introduced by changes and
modifications to existing systems, noting that historical assumptions may be inappropriate or may
need specific testing and validation in the context of novel design changes. Additionally, the
committee recommended that FAA clarify roles and responsibilities of the type certificate
applicant and FAA personnel in determining what constitutes a significant change.
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The committee also recommended that FAA’s Innovation Center53 should prioritize changes to
the certification process and regulatory framework to assist the Aircraft Certification Service in
keeping up with new concepts and technologies. It specifically recommended that FAA conduct a
review of management processes and update and strengthen methods, tools, and training for
safety oversight of delegation programs.
It also recommended that FAA review certification regulations and procedures, focusing on
applying a system safety approach to product certification and oversight of industry design
organizations. It stressed that the review should examine minimum qualifications and
organizational requirements for design and manufacturing organizations, including aspects related
to compliance assurance and safety management systems. The committee recommended that FAA
develop comprehensive plans to improve certification addressing personnel, organizational
culture, processes, and change management. It noted that these implementation plans should
include mechanisms to track and monitor initiatives and include metrics for measuring expected
benefits. Additionally, the committee stressed that FAA must improve procedures to quickly
amend and adopt orders, policies, and advisory materials, and rapidly disseminate this
information to the field to implement recommendations emanating from various oversight and
advisory committees and use appropriate metrics to gauge the effectiveness of such actions and
whether anticipated benefits are being realized.
Department of Justice Actions
The Department of Justice launched a criminal probe of Boeing based on a broad subpoena issued
by a Washington, DC, grand jury immediately following the Ethiopian Airlines crash in March
2019.54 On January 7, 2021, Boeing entered into a deferred prosecution agreement in response to
charges that it had deceived FAA about MCAS, resulting in airplane manuals and pilot-training
materials lacking information about MCAS. Boeing agreed to pay a criminal penalty of $243.6
million and provide compensation of $1.77 billion to Boeing 737 Max purchasers and $500
million to establish a crash-victim beneficiaries fund.55
Congressional Hearings and Reports
The congressional committees of jurisdiction over FAA and civil aviation safety matters held a
number of hearings addressing the Boeing 737 Max and implications for aircraft certification and
FAA safety oversight. These included the following:

53 According to FAA, “The Innovation Center concept will provide a single-entry point for emerging technologies,
production methods, and business models into the Aircraft Certification Safety System. It will also provide a forum for
FAA and stakeholders to engage on such innovations and explore the need for new regulations and policy.” The
Innovation Center concept is part of a broader initiative to transform the Aircraft Certification Service to address
changes in processes, and emerging technologies in the aerospace industry (see https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/
headquarters_offices/avs/offices/air/transformation/csp/intro/).
54 Andrew Tangel, Andy Pasztor, and Robert Wall, “Prosecutors, Transportation Department Scrutinize Development
of Boeing’s 737 MAX,” Wall Street Journal, March 18, 2019, at https://www.wsj.com/articles/faas-737-max-approval-
is-probed-11552868400.
55 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, Boeing Charged with 737 Max Fraud Conspiracy and Agrees to
Pay over $2.5 Billion, Justice News, at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/boeing-charged-737-max-fraud-conspiracy-and-
agrees-pay-over-25-billion.
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House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Hearings
 May 15, 2019, Subcommittee on Aviation Hearing, Status of the Boeing 737
MAX
 June 19, 2019, Subcommittee on Aviation Hearing, Status of the Boeing 737
MAX: Stakeholder Perspectives
 July 17, 2019, Subcommittee on Aviation Hearing, State of Aviation Safety
 October 30, 2019, Full Committee Hearing, The Boeing 737 Max: Examining the
Design, Development, and Marketing of the Aircraft
 December 11, 2019, Full Committee Hearing, The Boeing 737 MAX: Examining
the Federal Aviation Administration’s Oversight of the Aircraft’s Certification
Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee Hearings
 March 27, 2019, Subcommittee on Aviation and Space Hearing, The State of
Airline Safety: Federal Oversight of Commercial Aviation
 October 29, 2019, Full Committee Hearing, Aviation Safety and the Future of
Boeing’s 737 MAX
House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Majority Staff Report
(September 2020)
In September 2020, the majority staff of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee
issued a report on the design, development, and certification of the Boeing 737 Max.56 That report
asserted that technical design flaws, faulty assumptions regarding pilot response, management
failures at Boeing, and gaps in FAA oversight contributed to the Boeing 737 Max crashes. It
found that production pressures and economic motivations at Boeing, coupled with a culture of
concealment and faulty design and performance assumptions, contributed to design flaws in the
flight control systems. Moreover, it asserted that inherent conflicts of interest and the elevation of
Boeing’s influence over certification reviews and decisions contributed to an erosion of FAA’s
ability to provide appropriate oversight of the 737 Max certification. The report concluded that
safety concerns regarding the design of the MCAS systems were either inadequately addressed or
dismissed by Boeing, and that FAA’s certification review was grossly insufficient.
Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee Majority Staff
Report (December 2020)
In December 2020, the majority staff of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation released a report focusing on aviation safety oversight, safety culture at FAA, and
whistleblower concerns over how FAA responds to aviation safety concerns.57 While the Senate
committee’s investigation was initially prompted by the Boeing 737 Max crashes and grounding,
the scope of the report encompassed broader concerns about FAA oversight of airline flight

56 Majority Staff of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, U.S. House of Representatives, Final
Committee Report: The Design, Development, and Certification of the Boeing 737 Max, September 2020, at
https://transportation.house.gov/imo/media/doc/
2020.09.15%20FINAL%20737%20MAX%20Report%20for%20Public%20Release.pdf.
57 Commerce Committee Majority Staff, U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Committee Investigation Report: Aviation Safety Oversight, December 2020, at https://www.commerce.senate.gov/
services/files/FFDA35FA-0442-465D-AC63-5634D9D3CEF6.
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operations and maintenance in addition to concerns regarding aircraft design and manufacturing
and aircraft certification. The report detailed a number of examples of significant lapses in
aviation safety that it attributed to poor oversight and failed leadership at FAA.
Significant findings included repeated failures of FAA leadership to implement adequate training
for FAA flight standards personnel to address repeated findings of deficiencies, as well as specific
examples of FAA retaliating against whistleblowers. The investigation found FAA’s oversight of
air carriers to be ineffective, and that at least one airline had exerted improper influence over FAA
regulators to gain favorable treatment regarding regulatory compliance and voluntary reporting.
The investigation unveiled alleged misconduct at FAA’s Honolulu, HI, Flight Standards District
Office, claiming that certain supervisors and senior personnel in the office had cozy relationships
with commercial air tour and charter operators that resulted in favorable treatment of operators
and hampered the ability of inspectors to conduct effective oversight.
The Senate Committee’s staff investigation found that some members of the Flight
Standardization Boards (FSBs) formed to review operational training requirements for the Boeing
737 Max as well as the Gulfstream VII airplane lacked appropriate training, and that some FAA
inspectors were inappropriately qualified on these aircraft. These findings reflected broader
concerns that FAA has lacked accountability with respect to developing and delivering adequate
training for flight standards inspectors in general. The investigation also found that, during 737
Max recertification testing, Boeing inappropriately influenced FAA human factors simulator
testing of pilot reaction times, that at least one FAA test event was improperly influenced by
Boeing, and that at least one FAA pilot appeared to have been complicit in the testing. The
investigation found that these shortcomings compromised FAA oversight of the Boeing 737 Max
certification.
Based on its findings and observations, the committee majority staff recommended that the DOT
OIG conduct a thorough review of FAA compliance philosophy, and that it fully investigate
allegations of aviation whistleblower retaliation and make recommendations for disciplinary
actions arising from such investigations. The report also recommended the creation of an
ombudsman function within FAA to educate FAA employees about whistleblower rights and to
serve as an independent resource for FAA employees to discuss their rights and remedies related
to allegations of misconduct. It urged the FAA Administrator to establish formal policies for
carrying out independent and objective misconduct investigations and subsequent adjudication.
Return to Flight
In November 2020, FAA issued an airworthiness directive mandating corrective action to return
grounded Boeing 737 Max airplanes to revenue service by U.S. air carriers. The directive
generally required owners and operators to update the airplane’s automated flight control logic,
including MCAS, through software updates.58 The directive also required the installation of a
cockpit warning light to alert pilots of possible angle-of-attack sensor failures. Additionally, the
directive required procedural changes to facilitate pilot recognition of and responses to undesired
pitch trim events and the effects of potential angle-of-attack sensor failures. Separately, the
directive required modifications to reroute certain wiring connected to the horizontal stabilizer
trim to address concerns regarding the adequacy of shielding that were identified during the
certification review of the aircraft but were not implicated in either of the crashes.

58 Federal Aviation Administration, “Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes,” 85 Federal Register
74560-74593, November 20, 2020.
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This marked FAA’s official ungrounding of the aircraft, although the return to service of specific
airplanes was predicated on completion of required work and FAA-approved pilot training. U.S.
airlines operating the Boeing 737 Max were able to comply with these requirements and return
some aircraft to revenue operations within one to two months of FAA’s publication of the
directive.
Civil aviation regulators in Brazil, Canada, Europe, and the United Kingdom generally followed
FAA’s lead. The first Boeing 737 Max airplanes to resume revenue flights were operated by the
Brazilian airline Gol on December 9, 2020, 10 days after the Brazilian National Civil Aviation
Agency gave its approval to do so. Transport Canada approved the resumption of Boeing 737
Max flights in January 2021, and the European Union followed suit on January 27, 2021. While
other countries, including the United Arab Emirates, where FlyDubai operates Boeing 737 Max
aircraft, have also lifted grounding orders, China has resisted, indicating that it would not approve
a return to service until it determines that the airplane is airworthy, pilots have been appropriately
retrained, and clear conclusions are drawn from the two crashes.59 In early July 2021, Chinese
aviation officials signaled a general willingness to proceed with flight testing of the Boeing 737
Max, but conditions for validation were still reportedly being negotiated with Boeing.60
The Aircraft Certification, Safety, and
Accountability Act
On December 27, 2020, the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act (Division V of
P.L. 116-260) was signed into law. The act mandates major changes to the aircraft certification
process, the ODA program, and FAA oversight of that program. The following provides a detailed
analysis of the provisions in the act. Rather than offering a section-by-section summary, this
narrative synthesizes and summarizes the legislative provisions based on underlying issues and
objectives. It does not provide information regarding FAA and industry actions to address the
requirements of the act.
Required Safety Management Systems for Manufacturers
The act requires FAA to initiate rulemaking to require that aircraft and component manufacturers
that hold both a type certificate and a production certificate implement an FAA-approved SMS
that meets standards and recommended practices established by ICAO within four years of
enactment.
The law specifies that, at a minimum, the SMS be consistent with and complimentary to existing
SMSs, allow for operational feedback from product customers and pilots, and allow for FAA
approval and routine oversight. FAA is required to conduct risk-based surveillance, inspections,
audits, and continuous monitoring of type and production certificate-holder SMS programs. FAA
was also directed to work closely with ICAO and civil aviation authorities in other countries to
encourage and assist with adoption of SMS by foreign manufacturers.

59 “Which Airlines Have Returned the Boeing 737 Max to Service?,” Flight Global, March 10, 2021, at
https://www.flightglobal.com/737-max-two-years-on/which-airlines-have-returned-the-boeing-737-max-to-service/
142791.article.
60 Vyte Klisauskaite, “China’s Problem with Boeing 737 Max: When Will It Fly?,” Aerotime Hub, July 11, 2021, at
https://www.aerotime.aero/28345-Boeing-737-MAX-recertification-China.
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The law specifies that the SMS regulations must provide for a confidential employee reporting
system for reporting hazards, issues, concerns, occurrences, and incidents without concern for
reprisal. Manufacturers are to be required to submit summary reports of employee reports
received at least twice per year. Such information submitted to FAA is to be protected from public
disclosure unless de-identified to protect the identity of submitters.61 The law also mandates the
establishment of a code of ethics for each manufacturer applicable to all employees that formally
sets safety as the organization’s top priority. FAA was required to initiate manufacturer SMS
rulemaking within 30 days of enactment and issue a final rule within 24 months thereafter.
Expert Panel Review
P.L. 116-260 required, within 30 days of enactment, that FAA establish an expert panel to review
and make recommendations regarding the use of ODA at manufacturers of transport category
airplanes. The panel is to assess the extent to which safety management processes promote or
foster a safety culture consistent with ICAO guidelines.62 The panel is also to examine the
effectiveness of measures implemented to instill a commitment to safety above all other priorities
and the ODA certificate holder’s ability to make reasonable and appropriate decisions regarding
delegated authorities.
The 24-member expert panel is to be composed of representatives from NASA, the FAA
Certification Service, the FAA Flight Standards Service, bargaining unit representatives for FAA
aircraft certification service field engineers and FAA safety inspectors, labor unions representing
passenger and cargo airline pilots, a labor union representing employees manufacturing transport
category airplanes, a labor union representing employees engaged in designing transport category
airplanes, air carrier employees with responsibilities for administering SMS programs, four
distinct ODA holders, a lawyer with expertise regarding ODA holders and their interactions with
FAA, and two independent experts holding degrees in aerospace engineering who each have a
minimum of 20 years of relevant applied experience. Panelists are required to disclose to the FAA
Administrator financial interests in businesses engaged in the design or production of transport
category airplanes, engines, or major components or parts used on transport category airplanes.
The act grants the expert panel limited authorities to access ODA holder sites and records,
including appropriately marked proprietary information and trade secrets protected under
nondisclosure agreements, and to interview employees, so long as a majority of review panel
members consider each action to be taken necessary and appropriate.
The expert panel is charged with issuing a report within 270 days of its first meeting. The panel is
to submit the report to the FAA Administrator and to congressional committees of jurisdiction.
Findings must be endorsed by at least 10 members of the review panel, and recommendations
must be endorsed by at least 18 panelists. Dissenting views are to be included as appendixes to
the report. Upon submission of the report, the review panel shall be terminated, and within five
days of receiving the report, the FAA Administrator is required to post it on FAA’s public Internet
site.
Upon review of the expert panel’s findings, FAA may limit, suspend, or terminate an ODA, and
may specify corrective actions for reinstatement of such an ODA. Within six months after receipt
of the panel’s recommendations, FAA must publish on its website and submit to congressional
committees of jurisdiction a detailed explanation for any disagreement with a recommendation,

61 See 49 U.S.C. §44735.
62 See International Civil Aviation Organization, ICAO Doc. No. 9859, Safety Management Manual, Fourth Edition.
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explaining why the Administrator does not believe implementation of the recommendation would
improve aviation safety.
Additionally, within one year after receipt of the panel’s recommendations, FAA is required to
issue a report to congressional oversight committees detailing its determination of whether each
transport airplane ODA holder is able to safely and reliably perform all delegated functions. If
FAA finds that an ODA holder is unable to do so, FAA is to identify risk mitigations or other
corrective actions and associated timelines for remediation, and report on the status of ongoing
investigations and the implementation of expert panel recommendations. FAA is also to include in
its report details regarding procedures for conducting focused oversight of ODA processes related
to the design and production of new and derivative transport airplanes.
FAA must brief the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee and the Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation every 90 days through the end of FY2023
on its efforts to review ODA units, and identify challenges impeding FAA’s ability to oversee
ODA units. One briefing of each committee must discuss measures taken to address the integrity
of FAA employees charged with overseeing aircraft certification ODA and to assure that such
oversight is carried out in accordance with safety management principles and in the interest of
aviation safety.
By the end of December 2021, FAA is required to submit a report to the congressional
committees of jurisdiction on the status of its efforts to address relevant recommendations made
by the Joint Authorities Technical Review, the NTSB, the DOT OIG, and the Safety Oversight
and Certification Advisory Committee,63 and potentially others identified by FAA. FAA is to
provide a determination of whether it concurs in whole or in part with each recommendation,
along with an implementation plan and schedule for implementing all recommendations with
which it concurs. For any recommendations with which FAA does not concur, a detailed
explanation as to why it does not concur must be included in the report.
Independent Study on Type Certification Reforms
Separately, the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act requires FAA to enter into an
agreement with a federally funded research and development center to carry out an independent
review and assessment of options for reforming aircraft type certification. The review is to
address whether there would be an aviation safety benefit to setting a fixed length of time beyond
which a type certificate may not be amended. The review is also to examine the safety benefits
and costs of requiring FAA to document exemptions, exceptions, or findings of equivalent levels
of safety when amended or supplemental type certificates do not comply with the latest
airworthiness standards.
The review is to take into consideration the investigations, reports, and assessments regarding the
Boeing 737 Max, including but not limited to the Joint Authorities Technical Review, and work
performed by the NTSB, the DOT OIG, the DOT Special Committee, congressional committees,
and foreign aviation authorities. The study is also to take into consideration the impacts of
changes to aircraft type certification procedures required by the act.

63 The FAA Safety Oversight and Certification Advisory Committee was established by the FAA Reauthorization Act
of 2018 (P.L. 115-254) to provide policy advice pertaining to aircraft and flight standards certification processes, risk-
based oversight, implementation of SMS, efforts to standardize regulatory interpretations, and other related matters.
The committee charter is available at https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/
media/Amended%20SOCAC%20Charter%20(effective%202-19-2020).pdf.
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Within 270 days after the independent review is submitted to FAA, the agency is to submit a
report to the congressional committees of jurisdiction detailing its response to the findings and
recommendations, along with details of what actions FAA will take in response, or the rationale
for not taking action to address specific recommendations from the study.
Repeal of Aircraft Certification and Flight Standards Performance
Objectives and Metrics
P.L. 116-260 repealed two significant provisions of the FAA Authorization Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-
254) pertaining to performance metrics and objectives of the FAA Aircraft Certification Service
and the FAA Flight Standards Service. Those provisions had directed FAA to establish
performance objectives intended to streamline aircraft certification and reduce delays while
increasing accountability for FAA and the aviation industry, in part by fully utilizing FAA
delegation and designation authorities, as well as by fully implementing risk management
principles and a systems safety approach. Under the now repealed provisions, FAA was to
establish specific performance metrics to track progress toward streamlining aircraft certification
and flight standards functions.
FAA Inspectors and Certification Oversight Staff
The Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act authorizes $27 million for each fiscal
year, from FY2021 through FY2023, for FDA to recruit and retain engineers, safety inspectors,
human factors specialists, software and cybersecurity experts, and other technical experts, as well
as chief scientific and technical advisors, for oversight of certification activities. The act also
directs FAA to carry out a review of its certification workforce to determine whether the agency
has the expertise and capability to assess the safety implications and oversee the adoption of new
or innovative technologies, materials, and procedures used by aircraft designers and
manufacturers. FAA is also to examine its Senior Technical Experts Program64 to determine
whether that program should be enhanced or expanded to bolster the work of the FAA Office of
Aviation Safety, and especially the Aircraft Certification Service and the Flight Standards Service.
The review is to be completed by the end of September 2021.
Within 30 days after completion of the review, the FAA Administrator is required to brief the
congressional committees of jurisdiction on the results, as well as provide an analysis of FAA’s
ability to hire experts for the certification workforce having the requisite expertise to oversee new
developments in aircraft design and manufacturing. The act also directs FAA to include in its
report to congressional committees details regarding efforts to increase the number of engineers,
inspectors, and other qualified technical experts to carry out oversight of ODA holders,
particularly transport airplane ODA holders.
Continuing Education and Training
The act directs FAA to develop a program for recurrent training and continuing education of
engineers, inspectors, and other experts employed in the FAA Aircraft Certification Service.
Additionally, it directs FAA to the maximum extent practicable to provide certification personnel
access to diverse professional opportunities that expand their knowledge and skills regarding
systems design, flight controls, principles of aviation safety, system oversight, and certification

64 FAA’s Senior Technical Experts Program (STEP) consists of a small group of senior scientific and technical advisors
and specialists at FAA who develop policy and advise on regulatory, certification, and oversight programs in their areas
of specialty (see https://www.faa.gov/aircraft/air_cert/step/disciplines/).
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project management. In developing its continuing education and training, FAA is directed to
consult with outside experts to build a curriculum covering current and new aircraft technologies,
human factors, project management, the roles and responsibilities associated with oversight of
designees, and recommended practices for compliance with FAA regulations. It also instructs the
agency to develop programs that will minimize the likelihood of FAA personnel developing
biases toward particular designers or manufacturers. The act authorizes $10 million for each fiscal
year, from FY2021 through FY2023, to implement these continuing education and training
initiatives.
Employment Restrictions
The act imposes specific employment restrictions on FAA employees, prohibiting current FAA
employees from supervising oversight of an aircraft design or manufacturing organization if they
had been employed by that organization in the preceding one-year period. Former FAA inspectors
and engineers may not work as an agent or representative of such an organization before FAA,
including engaging in written and oral communications regarding particular matters, if that
individual served in or supervised inspection or certification functions regarding that
organization, regardless of whether the individual had responsibilities concerning such matters
while employed by FAA.
The act also prohibits FAA from providing performance-based incentives or awards to employees
based on meeting or exceeding schedules, quotas, or deadlines tied to aircraft certification
activities.
Voluntary Safety Reporting Program
The act directs FAA to establish within one year of enactment a voluntary safety reporting
program for engineers, inspectors, systems safety specialists, and other experts employed by FAA
that is consistent with other similar safety reporting programs at FAA. The program is to allow
such individuals a means to confidentially report instances where they have identified safety
concerns during certification or oversight processes. The law specifies that FAA is to maintain a
reporting culture that is voluntary, nonpunitive, and confidential, and protects against adverse
employment action related to participation in the program. FAA is to develop the program in
collaboration with appropriate bargaining unit representatives of the Aircraft Certification Service
and the Flight Standards Service.
The act directs FAA to thoroughly review all voluntary safety reports in a timely manner to
determine whether a safety issue exists and whether the aircraft certification process contributed
to the safety concern. FAA is to establish a corrective action process to address identified safety
issues and improve safety systems, hazard controls, risk reduction, systems certification,
regulatory compliance and conformance, and FAA oversight, and to implement lessons learned.
Safety-Critical Information
The act removes FAA authority for certifying design and production certification organizations65
and replaces it with requirements for transport category airplane type certificate holders to submit
safety-critical information regarding the design to FAA. The law specifies that such safety-critical
information is to include design and operational details, including functions, failure modes, and
mode indications of certain automated systems like autopilots, as well as any failure conditions

65 Specifically, the act repealed Sections 211 and 221 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-254, 49
U.S.C. §44701 Note).
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having a severity level of hazardous or catastrophic. These systems must pass FAA system safety
assessments. Additionally, holders are required to disclose any adverse airplane handling
characteristics that require software to augment the flight controls to produce compliant handling
qualities to meet applicable regulations. Moreover, type certificate holders are required to
disclose newly discovered information fitting these criteria for disclosure on an ongoing basis,
and FAA must establish multiple milestones throughout the certification process to assess whether
systems are novel or unusual and thus require additional scrutiny.
The act also directs FAA to ensure that airplane flight manuals and operating manuals contain
descriptions of automated flight control systems as well as the procedures for responding to a
failure or aberrant behavior of such a system. The act also specifies that FAA may not delegate
airworthiness compliance determinations or system safety assessments until it completes a review
and validation of underlying assumptions related to human factors.
The act establishes authority for FAA to impose civil penalties of up to $1 million per violation
for a transport airplane type certificate holder that fails to disclose safety-critical information
regarding the design. It authorizes FAA to revoke an airline transport pilot certification and issue
a civil penalty to any individual acting on behalf of a type certificate holder that knowingly makes
a false statement with respect to the disclosure of safety-critical design information.
Selection of ODA Unit Members
Beginning on January 1, 2022, each individual selected to be an ODA unit66 member for an ODA
holder must be an employee, contractor, or consultant to that ODA holder or an employee of a
supplier to that ODA holder. Further, FAA must review all individuals nominated to be ODA unit
members by the ODA holder, approving or rejecting them within 30 days of receiving an
application.
For up to 30 days, while the application for an individual is under FAA review, the ODA holder
may conditionally designate the individual to perform ODA unit member functions, provided that
the ODA holder has instituted FAA-approved systems and processes to ensure the integrity and
reliability of conditionally designated ODA unit members and has implemented SMS. FAA, at its
discretion, may prohibit an ODA holder from making conditional designations of ODA unit
members and may prohibit a conditionally assigned ODA unit member from performing
authorized functions at any time and for any reason. If FAA rejects the application of an
individual performing conditionally designated ODA unit functions, then all ODA functions
performed by the individual during the conditional period would be required to undergo an FAA
review.
ODA holders may resubmit applications for individuals who had previously been rejected as
ODA unit members. This allows for reconsideration if an individual’s work experience or
responsibilities change. FAA must ensure that applications for previously rejected individuals
demonstrate that the reasons for prior rejection have been satisfactorily resolved or mitigated.
In general, the law specifies that, to be approved as a member of an ODA unit, an individual must
be technically proficient and qualified to perform the authorized functions sought, have no recent
record of serious FAA enforcement action, and be of good moral character. The individual must
also possess the knowledge of applicable regulations, as well as knowledge of relevant design or

66 The legislation defines an ODA unit as a group of two or more individuals who perform, under the supervision of an
ODA holder, authorized functions under an ODA (see 49 U.S.C. §44736).
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production principles, system safety principles, or safety risk management processes appropriate
for the authorized functions sought.
Under the requirements of the act, FAA is to carry out a review to determine whether existing
ODA unit members meet the minimum qualifications to continue to serve in the ODA unit. For
individuals found to be unqualified, FAA will be required to specify remedial action for the
individual to meet the qualification standards, or otherwise take other appropriate action,
including prohibiting such an individual from performing an authorized function.
The act authorizes $3 million for each fiscal year from FY2021 through FY2023 to carry out its
qualification reviews of ODA unit members.
Prohibition on Interference with ODA Units
P.L. 116-260 makes it unlawful to interfere with the duties of ODA unit members. The act
expressly prohibits a supervisor working for an ODA holder that manufactures transport category
airplanes from interfering with an ODA unit member performing authorized functions. Under the
provision, interference refers to “blatant or egregious statements or behavior, such as harassment,
beratement, or threats,” but can also consist of assigning non-ODA unit duties or activities that
interfere with performance of authorized ODA unit functions. The law directs FAA to
continuously seek to eliminate or minimize interference by an ODA holder that affects the
authorized functions carried out by ODA unit members. ODA holders must designate offices to
handle and investigate reports of interference submitted by ODA unit members, and must notify
FAA regarding reports of interference and the conclusion of any investigation into alleged
interference.
ODA Unit Records
The Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act requires ODA holders to maintain
records, including data, applications, manuals and other information required by the holder’s
FAA-approved procedures manual. Additionally, ODA holders must maintain records on the
names, responsibilities, qualifications, and training for all ODA unit members and example
signatures for all ODA unit members who carry out FAA-delegated functions.
FAA ODA Unit Oversight and FAA Safety Advisors
The act requires FAA to perform periodic audits of each ODA unit and its procedures at least
once every seven years. The ODA holder is required to maintain records of each audit and
corrective actions resulting from the findings of such audits. FAA is also required to conduct
regular oversight activities by inspecting ODA holder delegated functions and taking actions
based on validated inspection findings.
Under the act, FAA is required to assign FAA aviation safety personnel with appropriate expertise
to serve as advisors to ODA units at large transport airplane and airplane engine manufacturers.
These advisors are to communicate with ODA unit members on an ongoing basis to ensure that
they are knowledgeable about applicable FAA policies and acceptable means of compliance, and
to monitor performance to ensure consistency with such policies. The act prohibits the ODA
holder or FAA from prohibiting communication between assigned FAA staff and ODA unit
members. FAA is to submit a report to the congressional committees of jurisdiction by September
30, 2022, detailing its efforts to implement these provisions.
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ODA Best Practices
The Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act requires FAA to carry out a review of
best practices among a sampling of ODA holders. At a minimum, identified best practices are to
address preventing and deterring undue pressure on or by an ODA unit member, or within an
ODA or by an ODA holder, and maintaining independence between FAA, the ODA holder, and
ODA unit members. The review panel is also directed to examine other regulated industries to
gather lessons learned and assess procedures and processes that address undue pressure on
employees, coziness between regulators and regulated entities, and other factors affecting the
ability to maintain regulatory independence. The review panel is also to identify ways to improve
communications between an ODA administrator, ODA unit members, and FAA engineers and
inspectors in order to enable direct communications regarding technical concerns that arise during
a certification project, without fear of reprisal to the ODA administrator or to ODA unit members.
The panel is also to examine other FAA designee programs, including the assignment of FAA
advisors to designees to determine what elements of these programs may help improve FAA
oversight of ODA units, individual ODA unit members, and the ODA program in general.
Within 180 days of receiving the report detailing the panel’s review and recommendations, the
FAA Administrator is to establish a set of best practices that are generally applicable to all ODA
holders and require such procedures and policies to be incorporated, as applicable, into each ODA
program holder’s approved procedures manual. FAA is to make public notice of the established
best practices and allow for a public comment period of at least 60 days prior to establishing them
as required elements of ODA programs.
Type Certification Integrated Project Teams
Under P.L. 116-260, FAA must convene an interdisciplinary integrated project team upon receipt
of every application for a new type certificate for a transport category airplane received. An
integrated project team will be responsible for coordinating review and providing advice and
recommendations to FAA regarding the application, and it is to be available, upon request of the
FAA Administrator, during the certification process. Each integrated project team is to consist of
FAA employees or employees of other federal agencies, such as the Air Force, the DOT Volpe
National Transportation Systems Center, or NASA, with specialized experience in engineering,
systems design, human factors, and pilot training.
The integrated project team is to make written recommendations about plans, analyses,
assessments, and reports required to document the certification process regarding new
technologies or novel design features. These recommendations are to be retained in the
certification project file, and are to consist of an initial review of design proposals, identification
of new technologies and novel designs, and safety-critical design aspects. The file is also to
include a determination of compliance findings, system safety assessments, and safety-critical
design features, and an evaluation of FAA expertise needed to support the project. The team is to
review and evaluate any requests for exceptions or exemptions from compliance with
airworthiness standards; the conduct of design reviews, procedure evaluations, and training
evaluations; and the applicant’s final design documentation and other data to evaluate regulatory
compliance. FAA is to provide a written response to each recommendation issued by a project
team to be retained in the certification project file.
Within one year after enactment, and annually thereafter through FY2023, FAA is to submit a
report to congressional committees of jurisdiction on the establishment of each integrated project
team required under this provision, detailing the composition and role of each such team.
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Appeals of Certification Decisions
The Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act directs FAA to order a formal process
through which decisions and findings regarding compliance or noncompliance with aircraft
design requirements may be appealed. The order is to include processes for resolving technical
issues at preestablished stages of the certification process and automatic elevation to alert FAA
management when major certification milestones are not completed or resolved within an agreed-
upon time. It is to spell out processes for handling elevated issues, including appeals seeking
resolution of unresolved issues. The FAA Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety is to issue a
written decision for each such appeal submitted. This decision may be appealed to the FAA
Administrator for final review and determination. The FAA Administrator may, in turn, render a
final determination or may decline to review the matter. During the appeals process, no FAA
employee may engage in ex parte communication with any individual representing or acting on
behalf of the certificate holder or applicant. Any FAA official made aware of ex parte
communications must disclose all details of such communication in a public record released
along with the written determination. Determinations under this process are not subject to judicial
review. At the conclusion of each calendar year through 2025, FAA is to submit a report to
congressional oversight committees summarizing each such appeal that was resolved under this
process during the year.
System Safety Assessments
The Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act requires FAA to promulgate regulations
by the end of December 2022, requiring organizations seeking to amend a transport category
airplane type certificate to perform a system safety assessment regarding each proposed design
change that FAA considers to be significant. The assessment is to consider the effects of errors,
malfunctions, and failures, and to consider realistic pilot response times to address such
occurrences. Applicants are to provide FAA oversight personnel with the data and assumptions
underlying each assessment and amendments to those assessments, and provide FAA with clear,
traceable documentation explaining changes to aircraft type designs and system safety assessment
certification. The FAA Aircraft Certification Service and the FAA Flight Standards Service will
review each such system safety assessment and supporting information provided to determine
whether it adequately addresses systems safety under error, malfunction, or failure conditions.
The act directs FAA to work with civil aviation authorities from other nations where aircraft are
designed to maintain international harmonization of relevant regulations regarding system safety
assessments. The act instructs FAA to issue guidance or advisory materials emphasizing the
importance of clear documentation of technical details, failure modes, and effects of significant
design changes covered under system safety assessment.
Nonconformity with Approved Type Designs
P.L. 116-260 expressly prohibits an aircraft manufacturer holding a production certificate from
seeking airworthiness certification of a production aircraft that does not conform to the original
type design certification. The statute establishes a civil penalty of up to $1 million for every
nonconforming aircraft presented for airworthiness certification. In levying such fines, FAA is
instructed to consider the nature, circumstances, extent, and gravity of the violation, including the
length of time the manufacturer was aware of the nonconformity, the degree of culpability, the
size of the business, and any history of prior violations.
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Flight Crew Alerting
The act requires FAA to adopt NTSB recommendations regarding flight crew alerting systems by
incorporating these recommendations into future certification requirements. The provision also
includes sense-of-Congress language that the NTSB recommendations be applied to any system
safety assessments of existing Boeing 737 Max designs.
Further, the act prohibits FAA from issuing a type certificate for a transport category airplane
unless the airplane incorporates a flight crew alerting system that displays and differentiates its
warnings, cautions, and advisories, and includes functions to assist flight crews in prioritizing
corrective actions and responding to system failures. For transport category aircraft other than
airplanes, such as helicopters, the statue requires that the type certificate applicant provide a
means acceptable to FAA to assist the flight crew in prioritizing corrective actions and responding
to system failures.
Pilot Training and Human Factors
The Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act requires FAA to independently review
any manufacturer proposal regarding the scope, format, or minimum training requirements for a
new transport category airplane. Until FAA establishes approved training requirements,
manufacturers are prohibited from making any assurances or other contractual commitments,
whether written or verbal, to a potential purchaser unless a clear and conspicuous disclaimer, in a
form approved by FAA, is included regarding the status of training requirements for the airplane.
Moreover, in marketing the airplane, manufacturers are prohibited from offering financial
incentives, such as rebates, to a potential purchaser related to the scope, format, or magnitude of
pilot training.
The act also requires applicants seeking amended type certificates for transport category airplanes
to demonstrate to FAA that the design of systems and instrumentation adequately accounts for
realistic assumptions regarding the time required for pilots to respond to abnormal conditions.
These demonstrations and underlying assumptions are to be based on test data, analysis, or other
technical validation methods, and to conform with generally accepted scientific consensus among
human factors experts regarding pilot response times.
Expert Safety Review
The act directs FAA to initiate an expert safety review of design and certification assumptions for
transport category airplanes regarding pilot operations and training. The review is to include an
examination of applicable regulations, guidance, and directives related to pilot response
assumptions and human factors and human systems integration considerations, particularly those
related to pilot-aircraft interfaces. It is also to include a focused examination of underlying
assumptions regarding the time required for pilots to respond to abnormal conditions, including
response to safety-significant failure conditions and failure scenarios that trigger multiple, and
possibly conflicting, warnings and alerts. The review is to include details of human factors
assumptions and relevant operational data, human factors research findings, and the
recommendations of human factors experts regarding possible recommendations for
modifications to existing assumptions. The review is to also examine modifications to pilot
certification standards over the past four years, focusing on any possible effects on pilot
competency in basic manual flying skills. It is also to take into consideration the global nature of
aviation and differences in levels of pilot competency and pilot training programs worldwide.
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The review is to identify a process for various aviation stakeholders, including pilots, airlines,
inspectors, engineers, test pilots, and human factors experts, to provide and discuss observations,
feedback, and best practices. The review also is to examine processes for ensuring that type
certification reviews address the cumulative effects of new technologies and the interaction of
those technologies with existing aircraft systems on pilot performance. FAA is to examine current
processes to adjust system safety assessments, design requirements, and pilot procedures and
training requirements when changes are made to underlying certification assumptions.
Upon completion of the review, FAA is to provide a report to the congressional committees of
jurisdiction detailing the results and any recommendations for actions to address pilot response
assumptions, including potential tools and methods to better integrate human factors into the
aircraft certification process. The legislation directs FAA to update its regulations in response to
the expert safety review. Additionally, FAA is to inform other international civil aviation
authorities that certify transport category airplane type designs of the expert panel report and
encourage them to reevaluate existing regulations and processes based on the findings and
recommendations of the review.
Call-to-Action on Airman Certification Standards
The act instructed FAA to initiate a call-to-action safety review of pilot certification standards,
including a detailed examination of FAA regulations, guidance, and directives related to pilot
certification standards, revisions to those standards over the past five years, and potential effects
on pilot competency in manual flying skills and the management of aircraft automation. The
review is to identify a process for including flight training students, instructors, designated pilot
examiners, pilots, airlines, labor organization representatives, and aviation safety experts in
discussions of observations, feedback, and best practices.
Ninety days after the call-to-action safety review is completed, FAA is to submit a report to the
congressional committees of jurisdiction detailing the results of the review and any
recommendations for actions or best practices to ensure competency in manual flying skills and
effective management of aircraft automation. FAA is to also identify what actions it will take in
response to the recommendations.
International Pilot Training Standards
The act directs the Secretary of Transportation and the FAA Administrator to take on a leadership
role internationally in setting global standards to improve air carrier pilot training and
qualifications. The objectives are to identify common standards for monitoring and managing
aircraft automation and manual flying, controlling the flightpath without automated flight
systems, effectively managing automated flight systems under appropriate conditions, identifying
when automated flight system usage is appropriate and when it is not, and recognizing and
appropriately responding to abnormal conditions.
In exercising leadership, DOT and FAA are to consider the latest information regarding human
factors, aircraft manufacturing trends related to cockpit automation, how cockpit automation
improves aviation safety and how it introduces novel risks, the availability of opportunities for
pilots to practice manual flying skills, the need for consistency in maintaining and enhancing
manual flying skills worldwide, recommended practices in this respect from other countries, and
whether a need exists for initial and recurrent training standards to improve manual flying skills
and proficiency in managing automated flight systems. The Secretary or the FAA Administrator is
to brief the congressional committees of jurisdiction on a regular basis on the status of efforts to
address international pilot training required by the legislation.
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Additionally, the act directs DOT and FAA to work with the Department of State to engage in
bilateral and multilateral discussions with other nations and through ICAO to bolster international
collaboration, data sharing, and harmonization of safety requirements. Toward this objective,
DOT and FAA are instructed to promote continued sharing of operational safety information,
prioritize better airmanship by addressing pilot training deficiencies regarding manual flying
skills and overreliance on aircraft automation, encourage regulations pertaining to flight crew
training requirements having safety advantages, and address other training areas FAA believes
will enhance international aviation safety. Further, FAA is to seek to expand its role in providing
technical assistance in support of international aviation safety by promoting and enhancing
effective oversight systems, including operational safety enhancements identified through data
collection and analysis. DOT and FAA are also to promote and encourage compliance with
international safety standards, work to minimize cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities
throughout the aviation ecosystem, and support the sharing of safety data, risk assessments,
mitigations, and best practices through established international aviation safety groups.
The act authorizes $5 million for each fiscal year from FY2021 through FY2023 to carry out
these initiatives related to pilot training, and an additional $2 million for each of those fiscal years
to fulfill the obligations related to bilateral and multilateral aviation safety engagement. The act
authorizes FAA to provide technical assistance to other nations in connection with bilateral and
multilateral agreements, including initiatives to further bolster airmanship.
The provisions regarding international pilot training standards include sense-of-Congress
language finding that increased reliance on flight automation risks a degradation of manual flying
skills that are essential for pilot confidence and competence. It references an ICAO working
paper67 on pilot training improvements to address automation dependency that identifies a need
for new or amended international standards or guidance to mitigate the consequences of
automation dependency, and expresses a sense of Congress that the recommendations of this
paper should be made a priority by the ICAO Assembly and that the United States should work
with ICAO and other international aviation safety groups to further bolster components of
airmanship.
Pilot Operational Evaluations
The Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act directs FAA to ensure that pilot
operational evaluations of transport airplane type designs submitted for certification are carried
out using pilots from air carriers that are expected to operate such airplanes. Airplane
manufacturers are to satisfactorily demonstrate to FAA that airline pilots asked to participate in
such evaluations have a range of levels of experience. FAA is required to implement these
changes within one year of enactment.
Human Factors Education Program
The act also requires FAA to develop a human factors education program that addresses the
effects of modern flight deck systems on transport airplanes, including automated systems, on
human performance and approaches to better integrate human factors into aircraft design and
certification. The training is intended to be integrated into the training protocols for, and routinely
administered to, appropriate employees in the Flight Standards Service and the Aircraft

67 See International Civil Aviation Organization, Working Paper: Pilot Training Improvements to Address Automation
Dependency, Presented by the United States, Canada, Peru, and Trinidad and Tobago, A40-WP/296, August 2, 2019, at
https://www.icao.int/Meetings/a40/Documents/WP/wp_296_en.pdf.
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Certification Service as well as other employees and authorized representatives determined to
require such training by the FAA Administrator.
Human Factors Research
The Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act requires FAA to develop research
requirements to address the integration of human factors in the design and certification of air
transport aircraft. FAA is to consult with aircraft manufacturers, operators, and pilots in
developing the research program. Further, it is to identify research requirements and establish
research goals relevant to advancing technology, improving design engineering and certification
practices, and facilitating better understanding of human factors concepts relevant to the
increased reliance on automated and complex flight deck systems and aircraft operations. The
language directs FAA to include research to help develop diagnostic tools to validate pilot
recognition and response assumptions and improve the clarity of failure indications. Toward these
objectives, FAA is to leverage ongoing and planned research focusing on preventing future
accidents involving U.S.-manufactured transport category airplanes and addressing increasingly
complex aircraft systems and designs. The legislation authorizes $7.5 million annually from
FY2021 through FY2023 to conduct this human factors research.
In carrying out this research program, FAA is to work with organizations with appropriate
expertise, especially the existing FAA Center of Excellence for Technical Training and Human
Performance and a new Center of Excellence for Automated Systems and Human Factors in
Aircraft authorized by the act. This new center is intended to facilitate collaboration among
academic experts, FAA, the aircraft and airline industries, and pilots. It is to establish research
goals to improve technology, engineering practices, understanding of related human factors
concepts, and associated education and training. The center is also directed to examine issues
related to human-systems integration and pilot interfaces, including human factors considerations
for aircraft design and certification, and to review safety reports to identify human factors
research for further study. The provision instructs FAA to avoid duplication of work performed by
other centers of excellence, but does not preclude coordination and collaboration among them.
FAA is directed to ensure that the center reflects a balance of viewpoints across broad disciplines
in the aviation industry and gives priority to subject-matter experts whose professional experience
enables them to make objective and impartial contributions. Any individual working within the
center of excellence who was formerly engaged in certification of the 737 Max MCAS system as
either a Boeing or an FAA employee must disclose his or her involvement in that certification
work prior to performing any work for the FAA center.
The legislation authorizes $2 million for each fiscal year, from FY2021 through FY2023, to fund
the development and research of the Center for Excellence for Automated Systems and Human
Factors in Aircraft.
Changed Products and Amended Type Certificates
The Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act directs FAA to revise and improve the
process of issuing amended type certificates. It requires FAA to initiate rulemaking and develop
or revise related guidance and training materials by the end of December 2022. It directs FAA to
ensure that proposed changes to aircraft are evaluated from an integrated aircraft system
perspective. The regulations are to consider the work of the Certification Management Team and
of various international harmonization efforts and assess whether establishing a fixed time
beyond which a type certificate could no longer be amended would improve aviation safety. The
regulations are to limit the extent to which new or revised flight control systems, structural
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changes, or the introduction of novel or unusual systems or components that pose hazardous or
catastrophic risks can be approved under an amended type certificate.
The act also requires FAA to develop objective criteria for determining what constitutes a
significant change requiring a new type certification. It directs FAA to implement mandatory
reviews throughout the certification process and establish requirements for maintaining relevant
records of agreements between FAA and certificate applicants regarding documentation and
deliverables, including any regulatory exceptions or exemptions.
The provisions state that FAA’s orders and regulatory guidance pertaining to amended type
certificates should provide for
 early FAA involvement and feedback mechanisms to ensure FAA awareness of
changes;
 early coordination with FAA regarding functional hazard assessment validations
and preliminary system safety assessment reviews;
 presentation of new technologies, novel designs, or safety-critical features and
systems to FAA initially and throughout the certification process;
 clear terms for determining when new type certificates may be required and what
certification functions may be delegated;
 improvements to type certification data sheets to clearly identify compliance
requirements with applicable regulations and amendments; and
 clear policies to guide applicants regarding clarity and consistency of key design
and compliance information submitted for certification.
The act also directs FAA to develop training materials for establishing the certification basis for
changed aircraft designs and related products.
The act also directs FAA to assume a leadership role in the creation of international policies and
standards relating to the issuance of amended type certificates. In carrying out this directive, the
legislation encourages FAA certification management team members to examine and address
relevant recommendations issued by the NTSB, the Joint Authorities Technical Review, the DOT
Office of Inspector General, the Safety Oversight and Certification Advisory Committee, and
others as determined appropriate by FAA. It instructs FAA to reevaluate existing assumptions and
practices pertaining to the amended type certificate process and ensure, to the greatest extent
practicable, that FAA regulations regarding amended type certificates are harmonized with those
of foreign countries that issue aircraft design certifications.
Whistleblower Protections
The Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act expands aviation industry
whistleblower protections to include employees of type or production certificate holders, as well
as employees of contractors, subcontractors, or suppliers of those certificate holders. It prohibits
employers from firing or otherwise discriminating against employees who provide information or
testify regarding a violation or alleged violation of federal laws, regulations, and standards
pertaining to aviation safety. The whistleblower protections, however, do not apply to employees
who deliberately cause a violation.
The act renamed the FAA Aviation Safety Whistleblower Investigation Office the Office of
Whistleblower Protection and Aviation Safety Investigations. It expands the office’s role to
receive allegations of whistleblower retaliation and to work with the FAA Office of Investigations
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and Professional Responsibility, the DOT OIG, and the Office of Special Counsel on
investigations related to whistleblower retaliation within FAA.
A new position within the office, the Whistleblower Ombudsman, is to be filled by an individual
with a background in federal labor law, government human resource management, and conflict
resolution. The Whistleblower Ombudsman is to assume responsibility for educating FAA
employees about the consequences of retaliation against whistleblowers and available rights and
remedies of employees facing retaliation. The ombudsman is also to assist in developing training
to help prevent and mitigate retaliation. The ombudsman is to serve as an independent
confidential resource to discuss allegations of retaliation and available rights and remedies based
on the specific circumstances of a case, and to coordinate with human resources, the Office of
Whistleblower Protection and Aviation Safety Investigations, and the FAA Office of Chief
Counsel, as well as the DOT OIG Whistleblower Protection Coordinator and the Office of Special
Counsel as necessary.
The act directs FAA to rename the Office of Investigations the Office of Investigations and
Professional Responsibility, and directs FAA to review and revise policies pertaining to
investigations of misconduct by an individual in a supervisory or management position at FAA.
The revisions are to ensure independent and objective investigation and accurate recording and
reporting of investigative activities and findings, including proper management of case files. FAA
is to ensure that interviews conducted as part of a whistleblower investigation are carried out in a
manner that promotes truthful answers and accurate records, and that investigations are
coordinated with the DOT OIG, the Office of Special Counsel, and the Department of Justice, as
appropriate.
FAA Compliance Program Oversight
The act directs FAA to establish an executive council to oversee its compliance program used to
track deviations from regulatory standards through comprehensive safety data sharing between
FAA and regulated entities.68 The steering committee is to identify, collect, analyze, and monitor
data related to the compliance program across relevant FAA program offices and provide the
executive council with information necessary to carry out its functions as well as
recommendations pertaining to the functions, operations, and effectiveness of the compliance
program.
The executive council chair is to report relevant annual findings, including trends in
noncompliance, FAA deficiencies in implementing the program, and any recommendations to
improve the compliance program to the FAA Administrator. The law also requires the chair to
provide annual briefings through calendar year 2023 to the congressional committees of
jurisdiction on the effectiveness of the compliance program and recommendations. The act
expressly prohibits the FAA Administrator or the Secretary of Transportation from prohibiting the
chair from performing his or her duties, including reporting to Congress. Under the terms of the
provision, the executive council will be dissolved on October 1, 2023.
Transport Airplane Risk Assessment Methodology Review
The Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act instructed FAA to enter into an
agreement with the National Academies of Sciences (NAS) to examine the approach and
effectiveness of the Transport Airplane Risk Assessment Methodology (TARAM) process used by

68 Federal Aviation Administration, Federal Aviation Administration Compliance Program, Order 8000.373A, October
31, 2018, at https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Order/FAA_Order_8000.373A.pdf.
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FAA. NAS is to deliver a report to the congressional committees of jurisdiction assessing the
TARAM analysis process and its effectiveness toward improving aviation safety, along with
recommendations to improve the methodology and its effectiveness.
The act also requires FAA to provide notice to the congressional committees of jurisdiction on the
findings and recommendations issued using the TARAM process following any transport airplane
accident involving a loss of life or any other accident in which the FAA Administrator determines
that an airworthiness directive is likely needed to correct an unsafe condition associated with the
aircraft’s design.
Boeing Settlement Agreement
The act also included sense-of-Congress language that FAA should pursue all available remedies
to demand full payment of any deferred civil penalties if it finds that Boeing has not fully met all
of its obligations included in the formal settlement agreement signed December 18, 2015.69 The
act requires FAA to brief the congressional committees of jurisdiction within 60 days of
enactment, and every six months thereafter, until all obligations under the settlement agreement
have been met.
National Air Grant Fellowship Program
The law creates a National Air Grant Fellowship program under the leadership of a director
appointed by the FAA Administrator. Under the program, FAA is to work with institutes of higher
education that offer degrees in fields related to aerospace to provide fellowships in aerospace
policy to graduate students and post-graduate degree recipients. Fellows are to be placed in
positions in the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government, with priority
placement to congressional committees with jurisdiction over FAA and in the offices of Members
of Congress who have demonstrated interest in aerospace policy. Fellowships cannot exceed one
year in duration. The act authorizes $15 million annually for FY2021 through FY2025, which
may remain available until expended, to carry out the fellowship program.
Emerging Safety Trends in Aviation
The Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act directs FAA to enter into agreement
with the Transportation Research Board (TRB) to develop and issue annual reports identifying,
categorizing, and analyzing emerging safety trends in air transportation. The act instructs the
TRB, in consultation with the Secretary of Transportation and the FAA Administrator, to
harmonize data and sources from existing reporting systems within DOT and FAA. Beginning in
2022 and extending through FY2031, the TRB is to submit biennial reports to the congressional
committees of jurisdiction identifying emerging safety trends in air transportation.
The act further directs FAA to conduct an annual internal safety culture assessment each year
through FY2031. FAA is to survey employees in its aviation safety organization to assess safety
culture and the implementation of voluntary safety reporting programs.

69 United States Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, Northwest Mountain Region, Office
of Regional Counsel, Settlement Agreement, In the Matter of: The Boeing Company (Boeing Commercial Airplanes),
December 18, 2015, at https://www.faa.gov/foia/electronic_reading_room/settlement_agreements/media/20151218-
boeing-settlement-agreement.pdf.
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Aviation Maintenance Schools and Technical Training
The Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act requires FAA to promulgate interim
final regulations governing the certification of aviation maintenance technician schools to replace
existing training requirements and curricula specified in 14 C.F.R. Part 147. The law prescribes
that aviation maintenance school applications are to include a description of facilities and details
regarding the manner in which the school’s curriculum will ensure that students acquire the
knowledge and skills needed to attain an FAA mechanic certificate and associated ratings.
Additionally, aviation maintenance technician schools will be required to demonstrate the manner
in which they will provide qualified instructors who hold appropriate ratings and qualifications,
teach in a manner that ensures positive educational outcomes, and maintain a student-to-instructor
ratio the does not exceed 25:1 for any shop class.
Under future rule revisions, schools are to ensure that the curriculum continuously aligns with
FAA mechanic certification standards and assure that students are properly trained in the
knowledge and skills needed to be eligible to take the appropriate tests for a mechanic
certification and associated ratings. Moreover, each school is to be properly accredited as an
institution of higher education, or must obtain and maintain FAA approval pertaining to
administration and record-keeping. Schools must maintain a student pass rate on FAA mechanic
exams of at least 70% within 60 days of graduation over the past three-year period, and are
subject to periodic FAA inspections to assess regulatory compliance and adherence to FAA-
approved operating specifications.
Ongoing FAA Oversight Challenges
Addressing the numerous requirements set forth in the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and
Accountability Act will be a major safety focus for FAA over the next several years. Assessing
the effectiveness of FAA initiatives to implement mandated changes may prove challenging.
Developing appropriate safety metrics to measure the efficacy of future actions, such as the
implementation of SMS at aircraft manufacturing facilities, is likely to be difficult. Moreover,
FAA faces continuing challenges in recruiting, hiring, and training workers with the skills needed
to effectively carry out certification activities and monitor safety compliance at aircraft design
and manufacturing facilities.
A November 2020 GAO study found that FAA had examined gaps in critical competencies
among its safety inspectors and engineers only on a limited basis.70 It also found that FAA did not
routinely assess its training curricula for safety inspectors and engineers. GAO recommended that
FAA assess critical competencies for its inspector and engineer workforce and assess gaps in
meeting these competencies on a recurring basis. It also recommended that FAA assess training
curricula for its inspectors and engineers on a recurring basis to align training with core
competency needs.
Another factor potentially affecting FAA involvement in certification activities and manufacturer
oversight is the continuing uncertainty of federal budgets. In the past, the inability of Congress to
agree on appropriations bills in a timely manner has resulted in temporary shutdowns of some
government activities. While entities with delegated authority can continue certification work

70 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Aviation Safety: FAA’s Office of Aviation Safety Should Take Additional
Actions to Ensure Its Workforce Has Needed Skills, GAO-21-94, November 2020, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-
21-94.pdf.
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during a government shutdown, certification activities that depend on FAA action may be
deferred, potentially delaying product development and certification.

Author Information

Bart Elias

Specialist in Aviation Policy

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
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under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
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