Changes in the Arctic:
Background and Issues for Congress
Updated August 4, 2021
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
R41153

Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress

Summary
The diminishment of Arctic sea ice has led to increased human activities in the Arctic, and has
heightened interest in, and concerns about, the region’s future. The United States, by virtue of
Alaska, is an Arctic country and has substantial interests in the region. The seven other Arctic
states are Canada, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark (by virtue of Greenland), and
Russia.
The Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA) of 1984 (Title I of P.L. 98-373 of July 31, 1984)
“provide[s] for a comprehensive national policy dealing with national research needs and
objectives in the Arctic.” The National Science Foundation (NSF) is the lead federal agency for
implementing Arctic research policy. The Arctic Council, created in 1996, is the leading
international forum for addressing issues relating to the Arctic. The United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) sets forth a comprehensive regime of law and order in the
world’s oceans, including the Arctic Ocean. The United States is not a party to UNCLOS.
Record low extents of Arctic sea ice over the past decade have focused scientific and policy
attention on links to global climate change and projected ice-free seasons in the Arctic within
decades. These changes have potential consequences for weather in the United States, access to
mineral and biological resources in the Arctic, the economies and cultures of peoples in the
region, and national security.
The geopolitical environment for the Arctic has been substantial y affected by the renewal of
great power competition. Although there continues to be significant international cooperation on
Arctic issues, the Arctic is increasingly viewed as an arena for geopolitical competition among
the United States, Russia, and China.
The Department of Defense (DOD) and the Coast Guard are devoting increased attention to the
Arctic in their planning and operations. Whether DOD and the Coast Guard are devoting
sufficient resources to the Arctic and taking sufficient actions for defending U.S. interests in the
region has emerged as a topic of congressional oversight. The Coast Guard has two operational
polar icebreakers and has received funding for the procurement of two of at least three planned
new polar icebreakers.
The diminishment of Arctic ice could lead in coming years to increased commercial shipping on
two trans-Arctic sea routes—the Northern Sea Route close to Russia, and the Northwest Passage
close to Alaska and through the Canadian archipelago—though the rate of increase in the use of
these routes might not be as great as sometimes anticipated in press accounts. International
guidelines for ships operating in Arctic waters have been recently updated.
Changes to the Arctic brought about by warming temperatures wil likely al ow more exploration
for oil, gas, and minerals. Warming that causes permafrost to melt could pose chal enges to
onshore exploration activities. Increased oil and gas exploration and tourism (cruise ships) in the
Arctic increase the risk of pollution in the region. Cleaning up oil spil s in ice-covered waters wil
be more difficult than in other areas, primarily because effective strategies for cleaning up oil
spil s in ice-covered waters have yet to be developed.
Large commercial fisheries exist in the Arctic. The United States is working with other countries
regarding the management of Arctic fish stocks. Changes in the Arctic could affect threatened and
endangered species, and could result in migration of fish stocks to new waters. Under the
Endangered Species Act, the polar bear was listed as threatened on May 15, 2008. Arctic climate
change is also expected to affect the economies, health, and cultures of Arctic indigenous peoples.
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Introduction
The diminishment of Arctic sea ice has led to increased human activities in the Arctic, and has
heightened interest in, and concerns about, the region’s future. Issues such as geopolitical
competition in the region between the United States, Russia, and China; increased military
operations in the region by the United States, Russia, and other Arctic countries; growth in
commercial shipping through the Arctic; and oil, gas, and mineral exploration in the Arctic could
cause the region in coming years to become an arena of international cooperation, tension, and/or
competition.
The United States, by virtue of Alaska, is an Arctic country and has substantial political,
economic, energy, environmental, and other interests in the region. Decisions that Congress
makes on Arctic-related issues could significantly affect these interests.
This report provides an overview of Arctic-related issues for Congress, and refers readers to more
in-depth CRS reports on specific Arctic-related issues. Congressional readers with questions
about an issue discussed in this report should contact the author or authors of the section of the
report discussing that issue. The authors are identified by footnote at the start of each section.
This report does not track legislation on specific Arctic-related issues. For tracking of legislative
activity, see the CRS reports relating to specific Arctic-related issues that are listed at the end of
this report, just prior to Appendix A.
Background1
Definitions of Arctic
There are multiple definitions of the Arctic that result in differing descriptions of the land and sea
areas encompassed by the term. Policy discussions of the Arctic can employ varying definitions
of the region, and readers should bear in mind that the definition used in one discussion may
differ from that used in another. This CRS report does not rely on any one definition.
Arctic Circle Definition
The most common and basic definition of the Arctic defines the region as the land and sea area
north of the Arctic Circle (a circle of latitude at about 66o 34’ North). For surface locations within
this zone, the sun is general y above the horizon for 24 continuous hours at least once per year (at
the summer solstice) and below the horizon for 24 continuous hours at least once per year (at the
winter solstice). The Arctic Circle definition includes the northernmost third or so of Alaska, as
wel as the Chukchi Sea, which separates that part of Alaska from Russia, and U.S. territorial and
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) waters north of Alaska. It does not include the lower two-thirds
or so of Alaska or the Bering Sea, which separates that lower part of the state from Russia. The
area within the Arctic Circle is about 8.14 mil ion square miles,2 which is about 4.1% (or between

1 Except for the subsection on the Arctic and the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, this section was prepared by
Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and T rade Division.
2 Source: Figure provided to CRS by Geography and Map Division of Library of Congress, May 12, 2020, in
consultation with the National Geodetic Survey (NGS) of National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).
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1/24th and 1/25th) of the Earth’s surface, and more than twice the land area of the United States,
which is about 3.5 mil ion square miles.
Definition in Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA) of 1984
Section 112 of the Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA) of 1984 (Title I of P.L. 98-373 of July
31, 1984)3 defines the Arctic as follows:
As used in this title, the term “Arctic” means all United States and foreign territory north
of the Arctic Circle and all United States territory north and west of the boundary formed
by the Porcupine, Yukon, and Kuskokwim Rivers [in Alaska]; all contiguous seas,
including the Arctic Ocean and the Beaufort, Bering, and Chukchi Seas; and the Aleutian
chain.
This definition, which is codified at 15 U.S.C. 4111,4 includes certain parts of Alaska below the
Arctic Circle, including the Aleutian Islands and portions of central and western mainland Alaska,
such as the Seward Peninsula and the Yukon Delta. The U.S. Coast Guard states that “The U.S.
Arctic encompasses some 2,521 miles of shoreline, an international strait adjacent to the Russian
Federation, and 647 miles of land border with Canada above the Arctic Circle. The U.S.
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the Arctic contains approximately 889,000 square miles of
ocean.”5 Figure 1 below shows the Arctic area of Alaska as defined by ARPA; Figure 2 shows
the entire Arctic area as defined by ARPA.
Other Definitions
Other definitions of the Arctic are based on factors such as average temperature, the northern tree
line, the extent of permafrost on land, the extent of sea ice on the ocean, or jurisdictional or
administrative boundaries. The 10o C isotherm definition of the Arctic, for example, defines the
region as the land and sea area in the northern hemisphere where the average temperature for the
warmest month (July) is below 10o Celsius, or 50o Fahrenheit. This definition results in an
irregularly shaped Arctic region that excludes some land and sea areas north of the Arctic Circle
but includes some land and sea areas south of the Arctic Circle. This definition currently excludes
al of Finland and Sweden, as wel as some of Alaska above the Arctic Circle, while including
virtual y al of the Bering Sea and Alaska’s Aleutian Islands.
As another example, the definition of the Arctic adopted by the Arctic Monitoring and
Assessment Programme (AMAP)—a working group of the Arctic Council—“essential y includes
the terrestrial and marine areas north of the Arctic Circle (66°32’ N), and north of 62° N in Asia
and 60° N in North America, modified to include the marine areas north of the Aleutian chain,
Hudson Bay, and parts of the North Atlantic, including the Labrador Sea.”6 A definition based on
a climate-related factor could circumscribe differing areas over time as a result of c limate change.

3 T itle II of P.L. 98-373 is the National Critical Materials Act of 1984.
4 As codified, the definition reads, “As used in this chapter.... ”
5 Coast Guard, Arctic Strategic Outlook, April 2019, p. 11.
6 For examples of maps of the Arctic reflecting various definitions of the Arctic, see the collection of maps posted at
“Arctic Definitions,” Arctic Portal, accessed April 8, 2021, at https://arcticportal.org/maps/download/arctic-definitions.
See also “Definitions of the Arctic,” UN Environment Programme, accessed April 8, 2021, at https://www.grida.no/
resources/7010; “ Arctic Definition Map,” Arctic Portal Library, accessed April 8, 2021, at
http://library.arcticportal.org/1492/; “ Definitions of the Arctic Region,” Arctic Centre of the University of Lapland,
accessed April 8, 2021, at https://www.arcticcentre.org/EN/arcticregion/Maps/definitions#ac-wg; and the map of the
geographic areas described in Annex 1 of the May 2017 Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific
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Some observers use the term “high north” as a way of referring to the Arctic. Some observers
make a distinction between the “high Arctic”—meaning, in general, the colder portions of the
Arctic that are closer to the North Pole—and other areas of the Arctic that are general y less cold
and further away from the North Pole, which are sometimes described as the low Arctic or the
subarctic.
Figure 1. Arctic Area of Alaska as Defined by ARPA

Source: U.S. Arctic Research Commission
(https://www.arctic.gov/uploads/assets/ARPA_Alaska_only_150dpi.jpg, accessed April 8, 2021).
Population of Arctic
According to one estimate, about 4 mil ion people, or about 0.05% of the world’s population, live
in the Arctic, of which roughly half (roughly 2 mil ion) live in Russia’s part of the Arctic,7 and

Cooperation, accessed April 8, 2021, at both “Arctic Region,” State Department, https://www.state.gov/key-topics-
office-of-ocean-and-polar-affairs/arctic/, and “ Maps,” U.S. Arctic Research Commission,
https://www.arctic.gov/uploads/assets/arctic-sci-agree-150dpi-color.jpg.
7 Sources: “Arctic Peoples,” Arctic Council, accessed April 8, 2021, at https://arctic-council.org/en/explore/topics/
arctic-peoples/; National Snow & Ice Data Center, “ Arctic People,” accessed April 8, 2021, at https://nsidc.org/
cryosphere/arctic-meteorology/arctic-people.html; United Kingdom, House of Commons, Defence Committee, On
T hin Ice: UK Defence in the Arctic, T welfth Report of Session 2017 –19, August 15, 2018 (Ordered by the House of
Commons to be printed 19 July 2018), p. 6; “Arctic Indigenous Peoples,” Arctic Centre, accessed April 8, 2021, at
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roughly 500,000 belong to Indigenous peoples.8 Another source states: “Approximately two and a
half mil ion of Russia’s inhabitants live in Arctic territory, accounting for nearly half of the
population living in the Arctic worldwide.”9 Another source, using a broader definition of the
Arctic, concluded that just over 10 mil ion people live in the Arctic, including 7 mil ion in
Russia’s Arctic.10
Figure 2. Entire Arctic Area as Defined by ARPA

Source: U.S. Arctic Research Commission (https://www.arctic.gov/uploads/assets/ARPA_Polar_150dpi.jpg,
accessed April 8, 2021).

https://www.arcticcentre.org/EN/arcticregion/Arctic-Indigenous-Peoples.
8 Source: “Permanent Participants,” Arctic Council, accessed April 8, 2021, at https://arctic-
council.org/en/about/permanent -participants/
9 “T he Russian Federation,” Arctic Council, accessed May 13, 2021, at https://arctic-
council.org/en/about/states/russian-federation/.
10 T imothy Heleniak, “The Future of Arctic Populations,” Polar Geography, January 3, 2020. Another source states
that “ using more broad definition, according to the University of the Arctic Atlas, there are approximately 13.1 million
people living in the area of the circumpolar North ” (“ Arctic Indigenous Peoples,” Arctic Centre, accessed April 8,
2021, at https://www.arcticcentre.org/EN/arcticregion/Arctic-Indigenous-Peoples).
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Eight Arctic States, Including Five Arctic Coastal States
Eight countries have territory north of the Arctic Circle: the United States (Alaska), Canada,
Russia, Norway, Denmark (by virtue of Greenland, a member country of the Kingdom of
Denmark), Finland, Sweden, and Iceland. These eight countries are often referred to as the Arctic
countries or Arctic States, and they are the member states of the Arctic Council, which is
discussed further below.
A subset of the eight Arctic countries are the five countries that are considered Arctic coastal
states because they have mainland coasts that front onto waters north of the Arctic Circle: the
United States, Canada, Russia, Norway, and Denmark (by virtue of Greenland).11
U.S. Identity as an Arctic Nation
As mentioned earlier, the United States, by virtue of Alaska, is an Arctic country and has
substantial political, economic, energy, environmental, and other interests in the region. Even so,
Alaska is geographical y separated and somewhat distant from the other 49 states, and relatively
few Americans—fewer than 68,000 as of July 1, 2017—live in the Arctic part of Alaska as shown
in Figure 2.12 A March 6, 2020, research paper on the Arctic in U.S. national identity, based on
data collected in online surveys conducted in October-December 2019, stated the following:
We found that Americans continue to mildly disagree with the assertion that the United
States is an Arctic nation with broad and fundamental interests in the region. On a scale
from 1 to 7, with higher numbers indicating stronger agreement, Americans’ average rating
was 3.40, down slightly from 3.51 in 2017. A plurality of respondents (29%) answered
with a score of one, indicating the strongest disagreement. As in previous years, men and
older Americans showed greater inclination to agree with the combined assertion of Arctic
identity and interests than women or younger respondents. Asking separately about Arctic
identity and interests this year revealed stronger disagreement with an Arctic identity, but
a slight inclination to agree with the existence of American interests in the region….
We also asked for associations with Alaska and found that while Americans dominantly
associate Alaska with cold, snow, and ice, they also associate a greater diversity of other
concepts with the state than with the Arctic. In particular, Americans more readily associate
animals and wilderness with Alaska than with the Arctic.13

11 T he northern coast of mainland Iceland is just south of the Arctic Circle. T he Arctic Circle passes through Grimsey
Island, a small offshore island of Iceland that is about 25 miles north of the northern coast of mainland Iceland. See “Is
Iceland in the Arctic Circle?” Iceland Unlimited, January 2017, accessed April 8, 2021, at https://icelandunlimited.is/
blog/is-iceland-in-the-arctic-circle/.
12 Source for figure of fewer than 68,000: CRS analysis of data presented in T able 3.1, entitled Alaska Population by
Region, Borough, and Census Area, 2017 to 2045, in Alaska Department of Labor and Workforce Development,
Research and Analysis Section, Alaska Population Projections: 2017 to 2045 , June 2018, p. 26. T he table shows that of
Alaska’s estimated population as of July 1, 2017 of 737,080, a total of 589,680, of about 80%, resided in the
Anchorage/Matanuska-Susitna region (401,649), the Fairbanks North Star Borough (97,738), the Kenai Peninsula
Borough (58,024), and Juneau (32,269).
13 Zachary D. Hamilla, The Arctic in U.S. National Identity (2019), Arctic Studio, March 6, 2020, p. 1. See also Rodger
Baker, “Remapping the American Arctic,” Stratfor, July 28, 2020.
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U.S. Arctic Research
Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA) of 1984, As Amended
The Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA) of 1984 (Title I of P.L. 98-373 of July 31, 1984)14
“provide[s] for a comprehensive national policy dealing with national research needs and
objectives in the Arctic.”15 The act, among other things
 made a series of findings concerning the importance of the Arctic and Arctic
research;
 established the U.S. Arctic Research Commission (USARC) to promote Arctic
research and recommend Arctic research policy;
 designated the National Science Foundation (NSF) as the lead federal agency for
implementing Arctic research policy;
 established the Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee (IARPC) to
develop a national Arctic research policy and a five-year plan to implement that
policy, and designated the NSF representative on the IARPC as its chairperson;16
and
 defined the term “Arctic” for purposes of the act.
The Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984 was amended by P.L. 101-609 of November 16,
1990. For the texts of the Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984 and P.L. 101-609, see
Appendix A and Appendix B, respectively.
FY2021 NSF Budget Request for Arctic Research
Office of Polar Programs (OPP)
NSF—the lead federal agency for implementing Arctic research policy—carries out Arctic
research activities through its Office of Polar Programs (OPP), which operates as part of NSF’s
Directorate for Geosciences (GEO). NSF requested a total of $419.8 mil ion for OPP for FY2021,
which represented a decrease of 14.1% from the $488.7 mil ion actual for FY2019. (Actuals for
FY2020 were not available when NSF’s FY2021 budget book was prepared.)
Navigating the New Arctic (NNA)
NSF states in the overview of its FY2021 budget request that “in 2021, NSF wil continue to
invest in its Big Ideas and the Convergence Accelerator, which support bold inquiries into the
frontiers of science and engineering. These efforts endeavor to break down the silos of
conventional scientific research funded by NSF to embrace the cross-disciplinary and dynamic
nature of the science of the future. The Big Ideas represent unique opportunities for the U.S. to
define and push the frontiers of global science and engineering leadership and to invest in

14 T itle II of P.L. 98-373 is the National Critical Materials Act of 1984.
15 T hese words are taken from the official title of P.L. 98-373. (Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984 is the short title
of T itle I of P.L. 98-373.) T he remainder of P.L. 98-373’s official title relates to Title II of the act, the short title of
which is the National Critical Materials Act of 1984.
16 T he IARPC currently includes more than a dozen federal agencies, departments, and offices. Additional information
on the IARPC is available at http://www.nsf.gov/od/opp/arctic/iarpc/start.jsp.
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fundamental research. This research wil advance the Nation’s economic competitiveness,
security, and prestige on the global stage. For more information, see the NSF-Wide Investments
chapter.”17 Among the six research Big Ideas, NSF states in its overview that number four is
Navigating the New Arctic (NNA) ($30.0 million): Establishing an observing network of
mobile and fixed platforms and tools, including cyber tools, across the Arctic to document
and understand the Arctic’s rapid biological, physical, chemical, and social changes, in
partnership with other agencies, countries, and native populations.18
NSF’s requested $40.8 mil ion for NNA for FY2021, including $30.0 mil ion (noted above) for
stewardship activities and $10.8 mil ion for foundational activities.19
For additional information on proposed FY2021 funding and efforts for OPP and NNA, see
Appendix C.
Major U.S. Policy Documents Relating to Arctic
Overview
The executive branch in recent years has issued a number of policy documents concerning the
Arctic, including those mentioned briefly below. For excerpts from most of the documents
mentioned below, see Appendix D.
Specific Documents
January 2009 Arctic Policy Directive (NSPD 66/HSPD 25)
On January 12, 2009 (i.e., eight days before its final day in office), the George W. Bush
Administration released a presidential directive establishing a new U.S. policy for the Arctic
region. The directive, dated January 9, 2009, was issued as National Security Presidential
Directive 66/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 25 (NSPD 66/HSPD 25). The directive
was the result of an interagency review, and it superseded for the Arctic (but not the Antarctic) a
1994 presidential directive on Arctic and Antarctic policy. The directive, among other things
 states that the United States is an Arctic nation, with varied and compel ing
interests in the region;
 sets forth a six-element overal U.S. policy for the region;
 describes U.S. national security and homeland security interests in the Arctic; and
 discusses a number of issues as they relate to the Arctic, including international
governance; the extended continental shelf and boundary issues; promotion of
international scientific cooperation; maritime transportation; economic issues,
including energy; and environmental protection and conservation of natural
resources.

17 National Science Foundation, FY 2021 Budget Request to Congress, February 10, 2020, p. Overview-9.
18 National Science Foundation, FY 2021 Budget Request to Congress, February 10, 2020, p. Overview-9. Emphasis as
in original.
19 National Science Foundation, FY 2021 Budget Request to Congress, February 10, 2020, p. NSF-Wide Investments-
11.
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May 2013 National Strategy for Arctic Region
On May 10, 2013, the Obama Administration released a document entitled National Strategy for
the Arctic Region.20 The document appears to supplement rather than supersede the January 2009
Arctic policy directive (NSPD 66/HSPD 25) discussed above.21 The document states that the
strategy is built on three lines of effort:
 advancing U.S. security interests,
 pursuing responsible Arctic region stewardship, and
 strengthening international cooperation.
Actions taken under the strategy, the document states, wil be informed by four guiding
principles:
 safeguarding peace and stability,
 making decisions using the best available information,
 pursuing innovative arrangements, and
 consulting and coordinating with Alaska natives.
January 2014 Implementation Plan for National Strategy for Arctic Region
On January 30, 2014, the Obama Administration released an implementation plan for the May
2013 national strategy for the Arctic region.22 The plan outlines about 36 specific initiatives.
January 2015 Executive Order for Enhancing Coordination of Arctic Efforts
On January 21, 2015, then-President Obama issued Executive Order 13689, entitled “Enhancing
Coordination of National Efforts in the Arctic.” The order established an Arctic Executive
Steering Committee is to provide guidance to executive departments and agencies and enhance
coordination of Federal Arctic policies across agencies and offices, and, where applicable, with
State, local, and Alaska Native tribal governments and similar Alaska Native organizations,
academic and research institutions, and the private and nonprofit sectors.”
December 2017 National Security Strategy Document
A National Security Strategy document released by the Trump Administration in December 2017
mentions the term Arctic once, stating that that “A range of international institutions establishes
the rules for how states, businesses, and individuals interact with each other, across land and sea,

20 National Strategy for the Arctic Region, May 2013, 11 pp.
21 National Strategy for the Arctic Region states on page 6 that the “lines of effort” it describes are to be undertaken
“[t]o meet the challenges and opportunities in the Arctic region, and in furtherance of established Arctic Region
Policy,” at which point there is a footnote referencing the January 2009 Arctic policy directive.
22 Implementation Plan for The National Strategy for the Arctic Region , January 2014, 32 pp. T he news release
announcing the implementation plan is posted at http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/01/30/white-house-releases-
implementation-plan-national-strategy-arctic-region. T he document itself is posted at
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/implementation_plan_for _the_national_strategy_for_the_
arctic_region_-_fi....pdf.
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the Arctic, outer space, and the digital realm. It is vital to U.S. prosperity and security that these
institutions uphold the rules that help keep these common domains open and free.”23
March 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance Document
An Interim National Security Strategic Guidance document released by the Biden Administration
in March 202124 does not include the term Arctic.
U.S. Coordinator for Arctic Region
On July 16, 2014, then-Secretary of State John Kerry announced the appointment of retired Coast
Guard Admiral Robert J. Papp Jr., who served as Commandant of the Coast Guard from May
2010 to May 2014, as the first U.S. Special Representative for the Arctic.25 Papp served as the
U.S. Special Representative until January 20, 2017, the final day of the Obama Administration
and the first day of the Trump Administration. The position remained unfil ed from that date
through July 29, 2020, when it was effectively replaced by the newly created position of the U.S.
coordinator for the Arctic region. On July 29, 2020, the Trump Administration announced that
career diplomat James (Jim) DeHart would be the first U.S. coordinator for the Arctic region;
DeHart began his work in the position that day.26
H.R. 3361, the United States Ambassador at Large for Arctic Affairs Act of 2021, and H.R. 3433,
the Arctic Diplomacy Act of 2021, would each establish a position of United States Ambassador
at Large for Arctic Affairs.27
Arctic Council
The Arctic Council, created in 1996, is the leading international forum for addressing issues
relating to the Arctic. Its founding document is the Ottawa Declaration of September 19, 1996, a
joint declaration (not a treaty) signed by representatives of the eight Arctic states. The State
Department describes the council as “the preeminent intergovernmental forum for addressing
issues related to the Arctic Region. …The Arctic Council is not a treaty-based international
organization but rather an international forum that operates on the basis of consensus, echoing the
peaceful and cooperative nature of the Arctic Region.”28

23 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 2017, p. 40.
24 White House, Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, March 2021, released on March 3, 2021, 23 pp.
25 See “Retired Admiral Robert Papp to Serve as U.S. Special Representative for the Arctic,” Press Statement, John
Kerry, Secretary of State, Washington, DC, July 16, 2014.
26 See Department of State, “ Appointment of U.S. Coordinator for the Arctic Region,” Media Note, Office of the
Spokesperson, July 29, 2020. See also Matthew Lee, “ US Names New Arctic Envoy in Push to Expand Reach in
Region,” Associated Press, July 29, 2020; T imothy Gardner, “ U.S. Appoints Coordinator for Arctic Policy As Mineral
Race Heats Up,” Reuters, July 29, 2020; Courtney McBride, “ New Cold War: U.S. Names Arctic Policy Czar to Keep
T abs on China, Russia,” Wall Street Journal, July 29, 2020; Melody Schreiber, “ T he T rump Administration Appoints a
New State Department Arctic Coordinator,” Arctic Today, July 29, 2020; Levon Sevunts (Radio Canada International),
“Appointment of U.S. Arctic Co-ordinator May Signal More Muscular American Policy,” CBC, July 31, 2020.
27 For a press report discussing legislative proposals for establishing a U.S. Ambassador at Large for Arctic Affairs, see
Hilde-Gunn Bye, “ T op Lawmakers Want to Establish a US Ambassador-at-Large for Arctic Affairs,” High North
News, May 28, 2021.
28 “Arctic Region,” State Department, accessed April 8, 2021, at https://www.state.gov/key-topics-office-of-ocean-and-
polar-affairs/arctic/.
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The Arctic Council’s membership consists of the eight Arctic states. Al decisions of the Arctic
Council and its subsidiary bodies are by consensus of the eight Arctic states. In addition to the
eight member states, six organizations representing Arctic indigenous peoples have status as
Permanent Participants. Thirteen non-Arctic states, 13 intergovernmental and interparliamentary
organizations, and 12 nongovernmental organizations have been approved as observers, making
for a total of 38 observer states and organizations.29
The council has a two-year chairmanship that rotates among the eight member states. The United
States held the chairmanship from April 24, 2015, to May 11, 2017, and wil next hold it in 2031-
2033. In May 2021, the chairmanship was transferred from Iceland to Russia.
Thematic areas of work addressed by the council include environment and climate, biodiversity,
oceans, Arctic peoples, and agreements on Arctic scientific cooperation, cooperation on marine
oil pollution preparedness and response in the Arctic, and cooperation on aeronautical and
maritime search and rescue in the Arctic. The Ottawa Declaration states explicitly that “The
Arctic Council should not deal with matters related to military security.”
The eight Arctic states have signed three legal y binding agreements negotiated under the
auspices of the Arctic Council: a May 2011 agreement on cooperation on aeronautical and
maritime search and rescue (SAR) in the Arctic, a May 2013 agreement on cooperation on marine
oil pollution preparedness and response in the Arctic, and a May 2017 agreement on enhancing
international Arctic scientific cooperation.30
For additional background information on the Arctic Council, see Appendix E.
Arctic and U.N. Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)31
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) “lays down a comprehensive
regime of law and order in the world’s oceans and seas[,] establishing rules governing al uses of
the oceans and their resources.”32 UNCLOS was adopted in 1982, and modified in 1994 by an
agreement relating to the implementation of Part XI of the treaty, which relates to the seabed and
ocean floor and subsoil thereof that are beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. UNCLOS
entered into force in November 1994. As of April 8, 2021 168 parties (167 states and the
European Union) were party to the treaty.33
The United States is not a party to UNCLOS.34 The 1982 treaty and the 1994 agreement were
transmitted to the Senate on October 6, 1994, during the 103rd Congress, becoming Treaty

29 For list of the 38 observers and when they were approved for observer status, see “Who We Are” in Arctic Council,
“Arctic Council,” accessed April 8, 2021, at https://arctic-council.org/en/.
30 For brief summaries of these three agreements and links to the texts of these agreements, see “Arctic Region,” State
Department, accessed April 8, 2021, at https://www.state.gov/key-topics-office-of-ocean-and-polar-affairs/arctic/.
31 Parts of this section were prepared by Marjorie Ann Browne, who was a Specialist in International Relations, Foreign
Affairs, Defense, and T rade Division until her retirement from CRS on October 10, 2015.
32 United Nations, “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, Overview and full text,”
updated February 11, 2020, accessed April 8, 2021, at https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/
convention_overview_convention.htm.
33 Chronological lists of ratifications of, accessions and successions to the Convention and the related Agreements as of
March 9, 2020, accessed April 8, 2021, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/
chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm. T he list shows that most recent state to become a party to the treaty is
Azerbaijan, which became a party on June 16, 2016.
34 T he United States is not a signatory to the treaty. On July 29, 1994, the United States became a signatory to the 1994
agreement relating to the implementation of Part XI of the treaty. T he United States has not ratified either the treaty or
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Document 103-39. The full Senate to date has not voted on the question of whether to give its
advice and consent to ratification of Treaty Document 103-39. Although the United States is not a
party to UNCLOS, the United States accepts and acts in accordance with the nonseabed mining
provisions of the treaty, such as those relating to navigation and overflight, which the United
States views as reflecting customary international law of the sea.35
Part VI of UNCLOS (consisting of Articles 76 through 85), which covers the continental shelf,
and Annex II to the treaty, which established a Commission on the Limits of the Continental
Shelf, are particularly pertinent to the Arctic, because Article 77 states that “The coastal State
exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting
its natural resources,” and that these natural resources include, among other things, “mineral and
other nonliving resources of the seabed and subsoil,” including oil and gas deposits.36
Article 76 states that “the coastal State shal establish the outer edge of the continental margin
wherever the margin extends beyond 200 nautical miles,” and that “Information on the limits of
the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles... shal be submitted by the coastal State to the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf set up under Annex II.... The Commission
shal make recommendations to coastal States on matters related to the establishment of the outer
limits of their continental shelf. The limits of the shelf established by a coastal State on the basis
of these recommendations shal be final and binding.”
For additional background information on UNCLOS, particularly as it relates to the Arctic, see
Appendix F. For information on extended continental shelf submissions to the Commission, see
Appendix H.
House and Senate Arctic Member Organizations
In the House, a congressional Arctic Working Group Caucus is co-chaired by Representative Rick
Larsen and Representative Don Young.37 In the Senate, Senator Lisa Murkowski and Senator
Angus King announced on March 4 and 5, 2015, the formation of a Senate Arctic Caucus.38

the 1994 agreement.
35 In a March 10, 1983, statement on U.S. oceans policy, President Reagan stated, that “ the United States is prepared to
accept and act in accordance with the [treaty’s] balance of interests relating to traditional uses of the oceans—such as
navigation and overflight. In this respect, the United States will recognize the rights of other states in the waters off
their coasts, as reflected in the Convention, so long as the rights and freedoms of the United States and others under
international law are recognized by such coastal states.” (Ronald Reagan Presidential Library & Museum, “ Statement
on United States Oceans Policy,” undated, accessed April 8, 2021, at https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/
31083c.)
36 Other parts of UNCLOS relevant to the Arctic include those relating to navigation and high -seas freedoms, fisheries,
and exclusive economic zones.
37 Source: United States House of Representatives, Committee on House Administration, Congressional Member
Organizations (CMOs), 117th Cong., revised March 2021, p. 5, accessed April 8, 2021, at
https://cha.house.gov/sites/democrats.cha.house.gov/files/2021_117th%20CMOs_3 -22.pdf. See also ‘Congressional
Arctic Working Group,” accessed April 8, 2021, at https://congressionalarcticworkinggroup-larsen.house.gov/.
38 Press release from the office of Senator Angus King, “ King, Murkowski Announce U.S. Senate Arctic Caucus,”
March 4, 2015, accessed April 8, 2021, at http://www.king.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/king-murkowski-
announce-us-senate-arctic-caucus. See also press release from the office of Senator Lisa Murkowski, “ Senators
Murkowski, King Announce U.S. Senate Arctic Caucus,” March 5, 2015, accessed April 8, 2021, at
http://www.murkowski.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/pressreleases?ID=1ce5edcb-540d-4c43-b264-56bdbb570755,
which includes a similar phrase.
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Issues for Congress
Climate Change and Loss of Arctic Sea Ice39
Record low extents of Arctic sea ice in 2012 and 2007 have focused scientific and policy attention
on climate changes in the high north, and on the implications of projected ice-free40 seasons in the
Arctic within decades. The Arctic has been projected by several scientists to be ice-free in most
late summers as soon as the 2030s.41 This opens opportunities for transport through the Northwest
Passage and the Northern Sea Route, extraction of potential oil and gas resources, and expanded
fishing and tourism (Figure 3).
More broadly, physical changes in the Arctic include warming ocean, soil, and air temperatures;
melting permafrost; shifting vegetation and animal abundances; and altered characteristics of
Arctic cyclones. Al these changes are expected to affect traditional livelihoods and cultures in the
region and survival of polar bear and other animal populations, and raise risks of pollution, food
supply, safety, cultural losses, and national security. Moreover, linkages (“teleconnections”)
between warming Arctic conditions and extreme events in the mid-latitude continents are
increasingly evident, identified in such extreme events as the heat waves and fires in Russia in
2010; severe winters in the eastern United States and Europe in 2009/2010 and in Europe in
2011/2012;42 and Indian summer monsoons and droughts. Hence, changing climate in the Arctic
suggests important implications both local y and across the Hemisphere.

39 T his section prepared by Jane Leggett, Specialist in Energy and Environmental Policy, Resources, Science, and
Industry Division.
40 In scientific analyses, “ice-free” does not necessarily mean “no ice.” T he definition of “ice-free” or sea ice “extent”
or “area” varies across studies. Sea ice “extent” is one common measure, equal to the sum of the area of grid cells that
have ice concentration of less than a set percentage—frequently 15%. For more information, see the National Snow and
Ice Data Center, http://nsidc.org/seaice/data/terminology.html.
41 Muyin Wang and James E. Overland, “A Sea Ice Free Summer Arctic within 30 Years?,” Geophysical Research
Letters 36, no. L07502 (April 3, 2009): 10.1029/2009GL037820; Marika Holland, Cecilia M. Bitz, and Bruno
T remblay, “Future abrupt reductions in the summer Arctic sea ice,” Geophysical Research Letters 33, no. L23503
(2006); But see also Julien Boé, Alex Hall, and Xin Qu, “ Sources of spread in simulations of Arctic sea ice loss over
the twenty-first century,” Clim atic Change 99, no. 3 (April 1, 2010): 637-645; I. Eisenman and J. S. Wettlaufer,
“Nonlinear threshold behavior during the loss of Arctic sea ice,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 106,
no. 1 (January 6, 2009): 28-32; Dirk Notz, “ The Future of Ice Sheets and Sea Ice: Between Reversible Retreat and
Unstoppable Loss,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 106, no. 49 (December 8, 2009): 20590-20595.
42 Overland et al. state that “a warm Arctic-cold continent pattern represents a paradox of recent global warming: there
is not a uniform pattern of temperature increases” due to a set of newly recognized processes described in Overland, J.
E, K. R Wood, and M. Wang. “Warm Arctic-cold Continents: Climate Impacts of the Newly Open Arctic Sea.” Polar
Research 30 (2011). T he authors raise a critical, unanswered question, “ Is the observed severe mid-latitude weather in
two adjacent years simply due to an extreme in chaotic processes alone, or do they included a partial but important
Arctic forcing and connection due to recent changing conditions?” In other words, are recent patterns random
anomalies, or might we expect more of the same?; among other examples, see also Lim, Young-Kwon, and Siegfried
D. Schubert. “T he Impact of ENSO and the Arctic Oscillation on Winter T emperature Extremes in the Southeast
United States.” Geophysical Research Letters 38, no. 15 (August 11, 2011): L15706.
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Figure 3. Arctic Sea Ice Extent in September 2008, Compared with Prospective
Shipping Routes and Oil and Gas Resources

Source: Graphic by Stephen Rountree at U.S. News and World Report, http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/
world/2008/10/09/global-warming-triggers-an-international-race-for-the-artic/photos/#1.
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Like the rest of the globe, temperatures in the Arctic have varied43 but show a significant warming
trend since the 1970s, and particularly since 1995.44 The annual average temperature for the
Arctic region (from 60o to 90o N) is now about 1.8o F warmer than the “climate normal” (the
average from 1961 to 1990). Temperatures in October-November are now about 9o F above the
seasonal normal. Scientists have concluded that most of the global warming of the last three
decades is very likely caused by human-related emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG, mostly
carbon dioxide); they expect the GHG-induced warming to continue for decades, even if, and
after, GHG concentrations in the atmosphere have been stabilized. The extra heat in the Arctic is
amplified by processes there (the “polar amplification”) and may result in irreversible changes on
human timescales.
The observed warmer temperatures along with rising cyclone size and strength in the Arctic have
reduced sea ice extent, thickness, and ice that persists year-round (“perennial ice”); natural
climate variability has likely contributed to the record low ice extents of 2007 and 2012. The
2007 minimum sea ice extent was influenced by warm Arctic temperatures and warm, moist
winds blowing from the North Pacific into the central Arctic, contributing to melting and pushing
ice toward and into the Atlantic past Greenland. Warm winds did not account for the near-record
sea ice minimum in 2008.45 In early August 2012, an unusual y large storm with low pressure
developed over the Arctic, helping to disperse the already weak ice into warmer waters and
accelerating its melt rate. By August 24, 2012, sea ice extent had shrunk below the previous
observed minimum of late September 2007.46
Modeling of GHG-induced climate change is particularly chal enging for the Arctic, but it
consistently projects warming through the 21st century, with annual average Arctic temperature
increases ranging from +1° to +9.0° C (+2° to +19.0° F), depending on the GHG scenario and
model used. While such warming is projected by most models throughout the Arctic, some
models project slight cooling localized in the North Atlantic Ocean just south of Greenland and
Iceland. Most warming would occur in autumn and winter, “with very little temperature change
projected over the Arctic Ocean” in summer months.47
Due to observed and projected climate change, scientists have concluded that the Arctic wil have
changed from an ice-covered environment to a recurrent ice-free48 ocean (in summers) as soon as
the late 2030s. The character of ice cover is expected to change as wel , with the ice being

43 T here was a regionally warm period in the Arctic from the mid-1920s to around 1940, which scientist s have assessed
to have been driven by natural climate variability. T hey have found that period to be distinctly different from the recent
multi-decadal warming, in part because the early 20th century warming was concentrated in the northern high latitudes.
See, for example, Figure 2, upper left graphic, in Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory, “ Simulatoin of Early 20 th
Century Warming,” at http://www.gfdl.noaa.gov/early-20th-century-global-warming.
44 Steele, Michael, Wendy Ermold, and Jinlun Zhang. “Arctic Ocean Surface Warming T rends over the Past 100
Years.” Geophysical Research Letters 35, no. 2 (January 29, 2008): L02614.
45 J. Overland, J. Walsh, and M. Wang, Arctic Report Card—Atmosphere (NOAA Arctic Research Program, October 6,
2008), ftp://ftp.oar.noaa.gov/arctic/documents/ArcticReportCard_full_report2008.pdf .
46 National Snow and Ice Data Center, “Arctic sea ice extent breaks 2007 record low” (August 27, 2012); Japanese
Aerospace Exploration Agency, “A new record minimum of the Arctic sea ice extent was set on 24 August 2012”;
Arctic ROOS (Norway), “Daily Updated T ime series of Arctic sea ice area and extent derived from SSMI data
provided by NERSC,” at http://arctic-roos.org/observations/satellite-data/sea-ice/ice-area-and-extent-in-arctic.
47 William L. Chapman and John E. Walsh, “Simulations of Arctic T emperature and Pressure by Global Coupled
Models,” Journal of Climate 20, no. 4 (February 1, 2007): 609-632.
48 See footnote 40. Also, although one Canadian scientist has predicted that recurrent ice-free summers may begin
sometime between 2013 and 2020, this is not consistent with other climate models’ projections.
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thinner, more fragile, and more regional y variable. The variability in recent years of both ice
quantity and location could be expected to continue.
Geopolitical Environment49
Renewed Great Power Competition
Overview
A principal factor affecting the geopolitical environment for the Arctic is the renewal of great
power competition, including chal enges by Russia, China, and other countries to elements of the
U.S.-led international order that has operated since World War II.50 This development, combined
with the diminishment of Arctic ice and the resulting increase in human activities in the Arctic,
has several potential implications for the geopolitical environment for the Arctic, which are
discussed in the following sections.51
Arctic Tradition of Cooperation and Low Tensions
The renewal of great power competition has raised a basic question as to whether the Arctic in
coming years wil be a region general y characterized by cooperation and low tensions, as it was
during the post-Cold War era, or instead be a region characterized at least in part by competition
and increased tensions, as it was during the Cold War. Although there continues to be significant
international cooperation on Arctic issues, the Arctic is increasingly viewed as an arena for
geopolitical competition among the United States, Russia, and China.52 In this regard, the renewal
of great power competition poses a potential chal enge to the tradition of cooperation, low

49 T his section was prepared by Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and T rade
Division. It incorporates material prepared by Kristin Archick, Specialist in European Affairs, Foreign Affairs,
Defense, and T rade Division, and Derek E. Mix, Analyst in European Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and T rade
Division.
50 For more on the renewal of great power competition, see CRS Report R43838, Renewed Great Power Competition:
Im plications for Defense—Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
51 For discussions that emphasize climate change as a factor affecting national security in the Arctic, see, for example,
Sharon E. Burke, “ T he Arctic T hreat T hat Must Not be Named,” War on the Rocks,” January 28, 2021; Melody
Schreiber, “ New US Arctic Strat egies Ignore Climate Risks in Focus on Geopolitics, Experts Say,” Arctic Today,
January 20, 2021; Sherri Goodman et al., Clim ate Change and Security in the Arctic, Center for Climate and Security,
Council on Strategic Risks, and Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, January 2021, 22 pp.
52 See, for example, Jonathan Jordan, “ Russia’s Coercive Diplomacy in the Arctic,” Arctic Institute, July 6, 2021;
Kazunari Hanawa, “ Unfrozen World: Arctic T haw Becomes Major Source of Global Risk,” Nikkei Asia, June 28, 2021;
T homas Grove, “ Melting Arctic Ice Pits Russia Against U.S. and China for Control of New Shipping Route,” Wall
Street Journal, June 23, 2021; Atle Staalesen, “ National Security Chief Says Russia Must Bolster its Arctic Military,”
Barents Observer, June 23, 2021; Economist, “ Who Controls the North,?” Economist, June 14, 2021; Laura Millan
Lombrana, “ T ensions Over Arctic Resource Rights Grow as Russia T akes Leadership Role,” World Oil, May 23, 2021;
Robbie Gramer and Jack Detsch, “ Biden’s Arctic Power Plays, With Russia and China Staking Claims, Can Diplomacy
Stave Off a Militarization of the Far North?” Foreign Policy, May 20, 2021; T ony Barber, “ Arctic Rivalry Heats Up
among the Great Powers,” Financial Tim es, May 19, 2021; Yohei Ishikawa, Ryo Nakamura, and T sukasa Hadano,
“US, Russia and China Seek Edge as Battle for Arctic Heats Up,” Nikkei Asia, May 19, 2021; Mark Magnier, “ A More
Accessible Arctic Becomes Proving Ground for US-China Military Jockeying,” South China Morning Post, May 3,
2021; Sharon E. Burke, “ No One Will Win the Competition in the High North,” Defense News, April 11, 2021; Robert
C. O’Brien and Ryan T ully, “How the United States Can Win in the Arctic,” National Interest, March 8, 2021; Jariel
Arvin, “T he Latest Consequence of Climate Change: T he Arctic Is Now Open for Business Year-Round, Global
Competition in the Arctic Is Heating Up as the Year-Round Sea Ice Retreats,” Vox, February 22, 2021; Andrew A.
Latham, “ Great Power Rivalry in the Arctic Circle is Heating Up ,” National Interest, February 16, 2021.
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tensions, peaceful resolution of disputes, and respect for international law —sometimes referred to
as the “Arctic spirit”—that has characterized the approach used by the Arctic states, particularly
since the founding of the Arctic Council in 1996, for managing Arctic issues.53
Some observers argue that the Arctic states and other Arctic stakeholders should attempt to
maintain the region’s tradition of cooperation and low tensions, and work to prevent the
competition and tensions that have emerged in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere in recent years from
crossing over into the Arctic. These observers argue that security issues and the competitive
aspects of Arctic relations have been overemphasized and can hinder cooperation on shared
concerns such as climate change, that the Arctic tradition of cooperation and low tensions has
proven successful in promoting the interests of the Arctic states and other Arctic stakeholders on a
range of issues, that it has served as a useful model for other parts of the world to follow, and that
in light of tensions and competition elsewhere in the world, this model is needed more now than
ever.54
Other observers could argue that, notwithstanding the efforts of Arctic states and other Arctic
stakeholders to maintain the Arctic as a region of cooperation and low tensions, it is unreasonable
to expect that the Arctic can be kept fully isolated from competition and tensions that have arisen
in other parts of the world. As a consequence, these observers could argue, the Arctic states and
other Arctic stakeholders should take steps to manage increased competition and higher tensions
in the Arctic, precisely so that Arctic issues can continue to be resolved as successful y as
conditions may permit, even in a situation of competition and increased tensions. From a U.S.
standpoint, one way of expressing this perspective is to state that in the Arctic, the United States
should cooperate where it can, but compete where it must.55
Stil other observers might argue that a policy of attempting to maintain the Arctic as a region of
cooperation and low tensions, though wel -intentioned, could actual y help encourage aggressive
behavior by Russia or China in other parts of the world by giving those two countries confidence

53 See, for example, Diana Stancy Correll, “Arctic Will Become ‘Contested’ Without US Presence and Partnerships,
2nd Fleet CO Warns,” Navy Tim es, August 2, 2021; Joshua T allis, “ As ‘Arctic Exceptionalism’ Melts Away, the US
Isn’t Sure What It Wants Next,” Defense One, January 22, 2020; T imo Koivurova, “How US Policy T hreatens Existing
Arctic Governance,” Arctic Today, January 17, 2020; Melody Schreiber, “As the Arctic Changes, International
Cooperation May Be Put to the T est,” Arctic Today, July 25, 2018; Stephanie Pezard, Abbie T ingstad, and Alexandria
Hall, The Future of Arctic Cooperation in a Changing Strategic Environm ent, RAND Europe (PE-268RC), 2018, 18
pp.; Geoff Ziezulewicz, “As Arctic Waters Open, Nations Plant T heir Flags,” Navy Times, April 8, 2018; James
Stavridis, “Avoiding a Cold War in the High North,” Bloomberg, May 4, 2018; Kristina Spohr, “The Race to Conquer
the Arctic—the World’s Final Frontier,” New Statesm an, March 12, 2018.
54 See, for example, Lawson W. Brigham, “ Reflections on the Arctic Council’s Recent Message to the Globe: Peace,
Stability and Cooperation,” Polar Points (Wilson Center), July 23, 2021; Luke Patey, “ Managing US-China Rivalry in
the Arctic, Small States Can Be Players in Great Power Competition,” Dansk Institut for Internationale Studier,
October 9, 2020; Editorial, “ Arctic Science Cannot Afford a New Cold War,” Nature, September 30, 2020; Eilís
Quinn, “Are Potential Arctic Security T hreats Eclipsing Urgent Action on Climate? A New Study Makes Its Case,” Eye
on the Arctic (Radio Canada International), September 10, 2020; Paul T aylor, After the Ice, The Arctic and European
Security, Friends of Europe, Autumn 2020 (September 2020), 113 pp.; Agence France-Presse, “ Iceland Wants T o
Preserve Arctic From US-China T ensions: PM,” Barrons, July 30, 2020; T homas Graham and Amy Myers Jaffe,
“T here Is No Scramble for the Arctic, Climate Change Demands Cooperation, Not Comp etition, in the Far North,”
Foreign Affairs, July 27, 2020; Jeremy T asch, “ Why the T alk of an ‘Artic Cold War’ Is Exaggeration ,” Valdai
Discussion Club, July 7, 2020.
55 Referring to the Coast Guard’s April 2019 Arctic strategy document (see Appendix G), for example, one observer
stated: “ T he way the Arctic is defined in the new strategy is, cooperate where we can but compete where we must .”
(Sherri Goodman, as quoted in Melody Schreiber, “ T he US Coast Guard’s New Arctic Strategy Highlights Geopolitics
and Security,” Arctic Today, April 23, 2019.) DOD’s June 2019 Arctic strategy document (see Appe ndix G) states on
page 6 that DOD will “compete when necessary to maintain favorable regional balances of power” in the Arctic.
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that their aggressive behavior in other parts of the world would not result in punitive costs being
imposed on them in the Arctic. These observers might argue that maintaining the Arctic as a
region of cooperation and low tensions in spite of aggressive Russian or Chinese actions
elsewhere could help legitimize those aggressive actions and provide little support to peaceful
countries elsewhere that might be attempting to resist them. This, they could argue, could
facilitate a divide-and-conquer strategy by Russia or China in their relations with other countries,
which in the long run could leave Arctic states with fewer al ies and partners in other parts of the
world for resisting unwanted Russian or Chinese actions in the Arctic.
Stil others might argue that there is merit in some or al of the above perspectives, and that the
chal enge is to devise an approach that best mixes the potential strengths of each perspective.
In a May 6, 2019, speech in Finland that was given prior to the start of formal discussions at an
Arctic Council ministerial meeting, then-Secretary of State Michael Pompeo emphasized the
competitive dimension of Arctic affairs.56 On April 23, 2020, a senior State Department official
provided a background on the Trump Administration’s strategy for the Arctic.57
Arctic and World Order
One potential implication for the Arctic of the renewal of great power competition concerns
associated chal enges to elements of the U.S.-led international order that has operated since World
War II. One element of the U.S.-led international order that has come under chal enge is the
principle that force or threat of force should not be used as a routine or first-resort measure for
settling disputes between countries. Another is the principle of freedom of the seas (i.e., that the
world’s oceans are to be treated as an international commons).58 If either of these elements of the
U.S.-led international order is weakened or overturned, it could have potential y major
implications for the future of the Arctic, given the Arctic’s tradition of peaceful resolution of
disputes and respect for international law and the nature of the Arctic as a region with an ocean at
its center that washes up against most of the Arctic states.
More broadly, some observers assess that the U.S.-led international order in general may be
eroding or collapsing, and that the nature of the successor international order that could emerge in
its wake is uncertain. An erosion or collapse of the U.S.-led international order, and its
replacement by a new international order of some kind, could have significant implications for
the Arctic, since the Arctic’s tradition of cooperation and low tensions, and the Arctic Council
itself, can be viewed as outgrowths of the U.S.-led order.59

56 State Department, “Looking North: Sharpening America’s Arctic Focus, Remarks, Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of
State, Rovaniemi, Finland, May 6, 2019.” See also Associated Press, “ Pompeo Says US to Expand Arctic Role to Deter
Russia, China,” Associated Press, July 22, 2020.
57 State Department, Briefing on the Administration’s Arctic Strategy, Special Briefing, Office of the Spokesperson,
April 23, 2020. See also Sarah Cammarata, “ POLITICO Pro Q&A: James DeHart, State Department Coordinator for
the Arctic,” Politico Pro, January 15, 2021.
58 For additional discussion, see CRS Report R43838, Renewed Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—
Issues for Congress, and, regarding the principle of freedom of the seas, CRS Report R42784, U.S.-China Strategic
Com petition in South and East China Seas: Background and Issues for Congress.
59 See, for example, Andreas Raspotnik and Andreas Østhagen, “A Global Arctic Order Under T hreat? An Agenda for
American Leadership in the North,” Polar Points (Wilson Center Polar Institute), March 10, 2021.
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Arctic Governance
Spotlight on Arctic Governance and Limits of Arctic Council
The renewal of great power competition has put more of a spotlight on the issue of Arctic
governance and the limits of the Arctic Council as a governing body.60 As noted earlier in this
report, regarding the limits of the Arctic Council as a governing body, the council states that “The
Arctic Council does not and cannot implement or enforce its guidelines, assessments or
recommendations. That responsibility belongs to each individual Arctic State. The Arctic
Council’s mandate, as articulated in the Ottawa Declaration, explicitly excludes military
security.”61
During the post-Cold War era—the period when the Arctic Council was established and began
operating—the limits of the Arctic Council as a governing body may have been less evident or
problematic, due to the post-Cold War era’s general situation of lower tensions and reduced overt
competition between the great powers. With the renewal of great power competition, however, it
is possible that these limits could become more evident or problematic, particularly with regard to
addressing Arctic-related security issues.
If the limits of the Arctic Council as a governing body are judged as having become more evident
or problematic, one option might be to amend the rules of the council to provide for some
mechanism for enforcing its guidelines, assessments, or recommendations. Another option might
be to expand the council’s mandate to include an ability to address military security issues.
Supporters of such options might argue that they could help the council adapt to the major change
in the Arctic’s geopolitical environment brought about the shift in the international security
environment, and thereby help maintain the council’s continued relevance in coming years. They
might also argue that continuing to exclude military security from the council’s mandate risks
either leaving Arctic military security issues unaddressed, or shifting them to a different forum

60 See, for example, Benjamin J. Sacks et al., Exploring Gaps in Arctic Governance, Identifying Potential Sources of
Conflict and Mitigating Measures, RAND, 2021, 29 pp. (report RRA1007.1); Clara Ferreira Marques, “ As the Arctic
Heats Up, How to Keep the Peace,” Bloom berg, May 22, 2021; James Foggo and Rachael A. Gosnell, “ Building a
T rans-Polar Bridge,” Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), May 21, 2021; Ian Birdwell, “ Arctic Governance:
Keeping T he Arctic Council On T arget ,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), July 29, 2020;
Benjamin Chiacchia, “ T he Case for an Arctic T reaty,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 2020; Rashmi Ramesh,
“Changing Geopolitics of the Arctic: Challenges for Governance,” IndraStra, April 9, 2020; Angus Parker, “ Looking
North: How Should the Arctic Be Governed?” Geographical (UK), March 17, 2020; Kevin McGwin, “ An Arctic
T reaty Has Been Rejected by the Region’s Leaders. Again; Academics Will T ell You the Idea of an Arctic T reaty
Sounds T erribly Exciting. Diplomats T hink It Is Just T errible.: Arctic Today, February 12, 2020; Marc Lanteigne, “ So
You Want to Write an Arctic T reaty?” Over the Circle, February 10, 2020; Roman Chuffart, “ Is the Arctic Council a
Paper Polar bear?” High North News, November 29, 2019; David Balton and Fran Ulmer, A Strategic Plan for the
Arctic Council: Recom m endations for Moving Forward, T he Arctic Initiative (Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School) and T he Polar Institute (Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars), June 2019, 15 pp.; Mckenna Coffey, “Concerns Rise Over Governance Gap in Arctic,” New Security Beat
(Wilson Center), August 5, 2019; Melody Schreiber, “ Will the Arctic Council Begin Addressing National Security?”
Arctic Today, May 17, 2019; Arne O. Holm, “ Does the Arctic Council Have Enough Power in It to Keep the Arctic a
Peaceful Region?” High North News, April 27, 2019; Gosia Smieszek, “Costs and Reality of Reforming the Arctic
Council,” Arctic Institute, April 9, 2019.
See also Ebru Caymaz, “ Rethinking Governance in T ime of Pandemics in the Arctic,” Arctic Institute, January 14,
2021.
61 Arctic Council, “About the Arctic Council,” accessed April 8, 2021, at https://arctic-council.org/en/about/.
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that might have traditions weaker than those of the Arctic Council for resolving disputes
peacefully and with respect for international law.
Opponents of such options might argue that they could put at risk council’s ability to continue
addressing successfully nonmilitary security issues pertaining to the Arctic. They might argue that
there is little evidence to date that the council’s limits as a governing body have become
problematic, and that in light of the council’s successes since its founding, the council should be
viewed as an example of the admonition, “if it isn’t broke, don’t fix it.” Arctic security issues,
they might argue, can or are being addressed through existing mechanisms, such as the Arctic
Security Forces Roundtable (ASFR) and the Arctic Chiefs of Defense (ACHOD) Forum.62
China and Arctic Governance
China—which is not one of the eight Arctic states and consequently does not have a
decisionmaking role in the Arctic Council—has raised questions as to whether the Arctic Council
as currently constituted and the current broader legal framework for the Arctic should continue to
be the principal means for addressing issues relating to the Arctic, and has begun to use other

62 Regarding the question of how to address security issues, see Jane George, “ Russia Wants to Revive Military
Meetings Among Arctic Council Members,” Nunatsiaq News, May 20, 2021; Jacob Gronholt -Pedersen, “ Russia Calls
for Military Meetings between Arctic States as T ensions Rise,” Reuters, May 20, 2021; T rine Jonassen, “ Russia on
Arctic Council Chairmanship: Wants to Revive the Military Dialogue Between Arctic States,” High North News, May
20 (updated May 21), 2021; Matthew Lee, “ US, Russia At Odds over Military Activity in the Arctic,” Associated
Press, May 20, 2021; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “ Washington Rallies Support Over Arctic Buildup; Moscow
Worried Over Deployments In Norway,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, May 20, 2021; Hilde-Gunn Bye, “ Arctic
Council, EU, NAT O on Agenda as Military Leaders Addressed Arctic Security Issues,” High North News, May 12
(updated May 14), 2021; EU Reporter Correspondent , “Military Leaders Address Collective Arctic Security Issues,”
Eureporter, May 11, 2021; Anita Parlow, “ T rust and Paradox: T he United States and Russia in the Arctic,” Barents
Observer, May 11, 2021; Sherri Goodman, Marisol Maddox, and Kate Guy, “ We Need Renewed Dialogue Among
Security Forces in the Arctic,” Arctic Today, March 11, 2021; Mathieu Boulègue and Duncan Depledge, Arctic Hard
Security Taskforce: Sum m ary of the 10 Decem ber Expert Workshop , North American and Arctic Defence and Security
Network, Activity Report, March 10, 2021, 8 pp.; Walter Berbrick, Rachael Gosnell, Lars Saunes, and Mary
T hompson-Jones, “ Preventing Conflict in the Arctic with Russia Starts with Dialogue,” National Interest, March 8,
2021; Hilde-Gunn Bye, “ Russia Should Be Invited Back to Arctic Security Forums, New Report Suggests,” High North
News, January 26 (updated January 27), 2021; Walter Berbrick and Lars Saunes, Project Directors, Conflict Prevention
and Security Cooperation in the Arctic Region Fram eworks of the Future, U.S. Naval War College, Newport Scholars
Arctic Initiative, Report No. 1, September 2020, 82 pp.; Joshua T allis, “ NAT O is the Right Forum for Security
Dialogue in the High North,” Defense News, July 28, 2020; Kevin McGwin, “ Denmark Should Support an Arctic
Military Forum, a Danish T hink-Tank Says,” Arctic Today, June 12, 2020; Abbie T ingstad, “ T oday’s Arctic Diplomacy
Can’t Handle T omorrow’s Problems,” Defense One, January 29, 2020; Siri Gulliksen T ømmerbakke, “Why Finland
and Iceland Want Security Politics in the Arctic Council,” Arctic Today, October 25, 2019. See also Depledge and P.
Whitney Lackenbauer, editors, On Thin Ice? Perspectives on Arctic Security, North American and Arctic Defence and
Security Network (NAADSN), T rent University, Peterborough, Ontario, Canada, 2021, 201 pp.; Andreas Østhagen,
“T he Arctic Security Region: Misconceptions and Contradictions,” Polar Geography, Vol. 44, No. 1 (2021), published
online February 28, 2021: 55-74.
For a general discussion of the limits of the Arctic Council and what, if anything, to do about it, see, for example,
Heather Exner-Pirot et al., “ Form and Function: T he Future of the Arctic Council,” Arctic Institute, February 5, 2019.
See also Marc Lanteigne, “T he Growing Role of ‘T rack II’ Organisations in the Arctic,” Over the Circle, May 23,
2018. See also Sabrina Shankman, “ How the T rump Administration’s Climate Denial Left its Mark on the Arctic
Council,” Arctic Today, January 19, 2021.
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approaches for influencing Arctic governance.63 In May 2019, a U.S. official stated that the
United States “reject[s] attempts by non-Arctic states to claim a role” in Arctic governance.64
Relative Priority of Arctic in U.S. Policymaking
The renewal of great power competition has raised a question concerning the priority that should
be given to the Arctic in overal U.S. policymaking. During the post-Cold War era, when the
Arctic was general y a region of cooperation and low tensions, there may have been less need to
devote U.S. policymaker attention and resources to the Arctic. Given how renewed great power
competition and chal enges to elements of the U.S.-led international order might be expressed in
the Arctic in terms of issues like resource exploration, disputes over sovereignty and navigation
rights, and military forces and operations, it might be argued that there is now, other things held
equal, more need for devoting U.S. policymaker attention and resources to the Arctic.65 In August
2020, James DeHart, the U.S. Coordinator for the Arctic, reportedly stated that “if you look at
what is happening in our system over the last couple of months, you wil see that we are
launching a comprehensive and an integrated diplomatic approach and engagement in the Arctic
region,” and that “in a few years, people wil look back at this summer [of 2020] and see it as an
important pivot point, a turning point, with a more sustained and enduring attention by the United
States to the Arctic region.”66
On the other hand, renewed great power competition and chal enges to elements of the U.S.-led
international order are also being expressed in Europe, the Middle East, the Indo-Pacific, Africa,
and Latin America. As a consequence, it might be argued, some or al these other regions might
similarly be in need of increased U.S. policymaker attention and resources. In a situation of
constraints on total U.S. policymaker attention and resources, the Arctic competes against these
other regions for U.S. policymaker attention and resources. As one expression of this issue, it was
reported in January 2020 that 3,000 of a planned force of about 10,500 U.S. military personnel
scheduled to participate in a cold-weather exercise in Norway in March 2020 were to be diverted
to perform missions elsewhere.67 Some observers have expressed concern that the United States is
not al ocating sufficient attention or resources to defend and promote its interests in the Arctic. 68

63 See, for example, Pan Yixuan, “Global Governance Needed for Arctic Affairs,” China Daily, May 10, 2019; Zhang
Yao, “Ice Silk Road Framework Welcomed by Countries, Sets New Direction for Arctic Cooperation,” Global Times,
April 7, 2019; Liu Caiyu, “China’s Role in Arctic Governance ‘Cannot Be Ignored,’” Global Times, November 22,
2018; Harriet Moynihan, “China Expands Its Global Governance Ambitions in the Arctic,” Chatham House, October
15, 2018; Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “China & Russia In T he Arctic: Axis Of Ambivalence,” Breaking Defense, July 6,
2018; Nengye Liu and Michelle Lim, “ How Arctic Governance Could Become a T esting Ground for Sino -US
Relations,” The Conversation, March 29, 2017.
64 Reuters, “US Rejects Interference by Non-Arctic Countries in Polar Region: Official,” Arctic Today, May 3, 2019.
65 For an article bearing on this issue, see Heather A. Conley and Matthew Melino, The Implications of U.S. Policy
Stagnation toward the Arctic Region, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), May 2019, 5 pp.
66 As quoted in Hilde-Gunn Bye, “T he U.S. Is Launching a Comprehensive Diplomatic Approach in the Arctic Region,
Says T op-Level Official,” High North News, August 6 (updated August 7), 2020. See also Hilde-Gunn Bye, “ USA
Steps Up Diplomatic Efforts in the Arctic,” High North News, September 29 (updated September 30), 2020; Levon
Sevunts, “ U.S. Wants to Keep the Arctic An Area of Low T ensions, [Says] T op Official,” Barents Observer, August 6,
2020.
67 John Vandiver, “US T roops Slated for Big Arctic Exercise Get Shifted to Other Missions,” Stars and Stripes,
January 17, 2020; Alte Staalesen, “American Forces Withdraw from Allied Exercise in Arctic Norway,” Arctic Today,
January 17, 2020.
68 See, for example, T yler Olson, “ Biden Admin Faces Lack of Icebreakers, Increasing Russian and Chinese T hreats in
Arctic,” Fox News, May 9, 2021; Rockford Weitz, “ Competition Heats Up in the Melting Arctic, and the US Isn’t
Prepared to Counter Russia,” The Conversation, April 19, 2021; John Rossomando, “ Will Joe Biden Lose the Arctic to
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U.S., Canadian, and Nordic Relations with Russia in the Arctic
Overview
The renewal of great power competition raises a question for U.S., Canadian, and Nordic
policymakers regarding the mix of cooperation and competition to pursue (or expect to
experience) with Russia in the Arctic. In considering this question, points that can be noted
include the following:
 As noted earlier in this report, Russia in May 2021 assumed the chairmanship of
the Arctic Council. Russian officials have stated that sustainable development,
economic growth, and national security concerns wil be a priority for Russia
during its two-year chairmanship period.69
 Geographical y, Russia is the most prominent of the eight Arctic states.
According to one assessment, Russia “has at least half of the Arctic in terms of
area, coastline, population and probably mineral wealth.”70 About 20% of
Russia’s land mass is north of the Arctic Circle.71 Russia has numerous cities and
towns in its Arctic, uses its coastal Arctic waters as a maritime highway for
supporting its Arctic communities, is promoting the Northern Sea Route that runs
along Russia’s Arctic coast for use by others, and is keen to capitalize on natural
resource development in the region, both onshore and offshore. A substantial
fraction of Russia’s oil and gas production and reserves are in the Arctic. In this
sense, of al the Arctic states, Russia might have the most at stake in the Arctic in
absolute terms.72
 The Arctic is a top strategic priority for Russia. In 2008, 2013, 2014, 2017, and
most recently in 2020, the Russian government adopted strategy documents
outlining plans to bolster the country’s Arctic military capabilities, strengthen
territorial sovereignty, and develop the region’s resources and infrastructure.73

Russia or China?” National Interest, April 18, 2021; T he Wallace Institute, “ It’s Bigger T han Icebreakers: America’s
Path Forward in the Arctic,” Defense Post, October 23, 2020.
69 Alina Bykova, “ Russian Arctic Council Chairmanship: ‘Will Welcome More Active Engagement of the Observer
States,’” High North News, March 8 (updated March 12), 2021; Atle Staalesen, “ Moscow Signals It Will Make
National Security a Priority as Russia Prepares to Chair the Arctic Council,” Arctic Today, October 15, 2020. See also
Paul Goble, “ As Arctic Warms, Moscow Increasingly Shifts Focus T here From T rade to Security ,” Eurasia Daily
Monitor, October 20, 2020.
70 “T he Arctic: Special Report,” The Economist, June 16, 2012, p. 11. T he Arctic Council states that “ Russia stretches
over 53 percent of the Arctic Ocean coastline. Approximately two and a half million of Russia’s inhabitants live in
Arctic territory, accounting for nearly half of the population living in the Arctic worldwide. ” (“ T he Russian
Federation,” Arctic Council, accessed May 13, 2021, at https://arctic-council.org/en/about/states/russian-federation/.)
71 T estimony of Admiral Charles W. Ray, Coast Guard Vice Commandant, on “Expanding Opportunities, Challenges,
and T hreats in the Arctic: a Focus on the U.S. Coast Guard Arctic Strategic Outlook” before the Senate Commerce,
Science, & T ransportation Security Subcommittee, December 12, 2019, p. 3.
72 See also Sergey Sukhankin, “Russia’s LNG Strategy: Foreign Competition and the Role of the Arctic Region,”
Eurasia Daily Monitor, July 21, 2021; Eugene Rumer, Richard Sokolsky, and Paul Stronski, Russia in the Arctic—A
Critical Exam ination, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2021, 23 pp.; Gabriella Gricius, “ Russian
Ambitions In T he Arctic: What T o Expect ,” Global Security Review, October 4, 2020; Stephanie Pezard, The New
Geopolitics of the Arctic, Russia’s and China’s Evolving Role in the Region , RAND (T estimony presented before the
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development of the Canadian House of Commons on
November 26, 2018), pp. 1-2.
73 Regarding the 2020 document, see, for example, Atle Staalesen, “Behind Putin's New Arctic Strategy Lies a Rude
Quest for Natural Resources,” Barents Observer, October 20, 2020; Elizabeth Buchanan, “ Russia’s Updated Arctic
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Over the past several years, Russia has invested in the construction of ports and
search-and-rescue facilities, some of which are referred to as dual use (civilian-
military) facilities. Russia also has reactivated and modernized Arctic military
bases that fel into disuse with the end of the Cold War, assigned new forces to
those bases, and increased military exercises and training operations in the
Arctic.
 Arctic ice is diminishing more rapidly or fully on the Russian side of the Arctic
than it is on the Canadian side. Consequently, the Northern Sea Route along
Russia’s coast is opening up more quickly for trans-Arctic shipping than is the
Northwest Passage through the Canadian archipelago.
On the one hand, the United States, Canada, and the Nordic countries continue to cooperate with
Russia on a range of issues in the Arctic, including, for example, search and rescue (SAR) under
the May 2011 Arctic Council agreement on Arctic SAR”). More recently, the United States and
Russia in 2018 cooperated in creating a scheme for managing two-way shipping traffic through
the Bering Strait and Bering Sea,74 and in February 2021, the U.S. Coast Guard and Russia’s
Marine Rescue Service signed an agreement updating a 1989 bilateral joint contingency plan for
responding to transboundary maritime pollution incidents.75 An August 2021 press report stated
that “the U.S., China, Japan and Russia are among the countries planning to conduct joint
research in the Arctic Ocean in a step toward preventing overfishing in the region.…
Representatives from nine countries and the European Union aim to meet in South Korea early
next year to discuss exploratory fishing based on similar treaties covering other regions.”76

Strategy: New Strategic Planning Document Approved,” High North News, October 28, 2020; Atle Staalesen, “ Putin
Signs Arctic Master Plan,” Barents Observer, March 6, 2020; United Press International, “Putin Signs 15-Year Plan to
Invest in Arctic with Jobs, Military Upgrades,” Oil & Gas 360, March 6, 2020; Charles Digges, “Putin Unveils More
Plans to Boost Northern Sea Route,” Maritime Executive, March 7, 2020; Alexandra Brzozowski, “Russia Significantly
Steps Up Arctic Engagement with New Strategy,” Euractiv, March 9, 2020. See also Hilde-Gunn Bye, “ Putin
Approves Russia’s Updated Arctic Development Strategy,” Arctic Today, October 28, 2020; Elizabeth Buchanan,
“Putin’s Real Arctic Playbook: Demography, Development, and Defense,” National Interest, October 27, 2020;
Ekaterina Klimenko, “ Russia’s New Arctic Policy Document Signals Continuity Rather T han Change—Analysis,”
Eurasia Review, April 20, 2020; Marc Lanteigne, “ T he Best -Laid Plans? Russia’s New Arctic Strategies Face Many
Hurdles,” Over the Circle, March 12, 2020; Sergey Sukhankin, “ Russia Steps up Efforts to Dominate Arctic Region,”
Eurasia Daily Monitor, February 24, 2020; Jamestown Foundation, “ Russia Doubles Down On Its Arctic Ambitions,”
OilPrice.com , February 15, 2020; Rachel Menosky, “ Russia’s Plan to Move on the Arctic,” Heritage Foundation,
January 29, 2020. See also Nazrin Mehdiyeva, Russia’s Arctic Papers: The Evolution of Strategic Thinking on the High
North, NAT O Defense College, November 19, 2018. See also T homas Nilsen, “ Ambassador Vasiliev Lists Russia's
New Arctic Priorities with Focus on Fossil Fuels and Positive Effects of Climate Changes,” Barents Observer, January
27, 2021.
74 See, for example, U.S. Coast Guard, “ U.S., Russia Propose Bering Strait Ship T raffic Routing Measures,” January
25, 2018; Amy Midgett , “ U.S., Russia Jointly Propose Bering Strait Routing Measures,” Coast Guard Maritim e
Com m ons, January 25, 2018; Amy Midgett, “ IMO Approves U.S.-Russian Federation Proposal for Bering Strait
Routing Measures,” Coast Guard Maritim e Com m ons, May 25, 2018; Yereth Rosen, “ With Marine T raffic Growing,
International Shipping Agency Approves US-Russia Plan for Bering Strait Shipping Lanes,” Arctic Today, May 26,
2018; Associated Press, “Maritime Organization Approves T wo-Way Shipping Routes in Bering Strait,” CBC, May 27,
2018; “U.S., Russia Propose Bering Strait T raffic Routing,” Maritime Executive, May 27, 2018; Margaret Kriz Hobson,
“Amid Ice Melt, New Shipping Lanes Are Drawn Up off Alaska,” E&E News (Scientific American), May 29, 2018.
75 See Melody Schreiber, “U.S. and Russia Sign New Maritime Pollution Agreement, Conduct Joint Bering Sea
Patrol,” Arctic Today, February 10, 2021.
76 Miki Okuyama, “International Research Planned to Manage Arctic Fish Stocks,” Nikkei Asia, August 1, 2021. See
also Peter Bakkemo Danilov (High North News), “ US, China and Russia Plan Joint Research Aimed at Regulating
Arctic Fishing,” Arctic Today, August 2, 2021.
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Some observers see possibilities for further U.S., Canadian, and Nordic cooperation with Russia
in the Arctic.77 On the other hand, as discussed later in this report, a significant increase in
Russian military capabilities and operations in the Arctic in recent years has prompted growing
concerns among U.S., Canadian, and Nordic observers that the Arctic might once again become a
region of military tension and competition, as wel as concerns about whether the United States,
Canada, and the Nordic countries are adequately prepared militarily to defend their interests in
the region.
In February 2020, a disagreement between Norway and Russia arose regarding Russia’s access to
the Norwegian archipelago of Svalbard under the terms of the Svalbard Treaty of 1920.78
Russian actions outside the Arctic could affect relations between Russia and the other Arctic
states. For example, in protest of Russia’s forcible occupation and annexation of Crimea and its
actions elsewhere in Ukraine, Canada announced that it would not participate in an April 2014
working-level-group Arctic Council meeting in Moscow.79 Economic sanctions that the United
States imposed on Russia in response to Russian actions in Ukraine could affect Russian Arctic
offshore oil exploration.80

77 See, for example, Melody Schreiber and Krestia DeGeorge, “What the Biden-Putin Summit Means—and Doesn’t
Mean—for Arctic Cooperation,” Arctic Today, June 18, 2021; Hilde-Gunn Bye, “ Plenty of Ground for Cooperation in
the Arctic, Putin Says,” High North News, June 17 (updated June 18), 2021; Malgorzata (Gosia) Smieszek, “ US-Russia
Cooperation on an Arctic Methane Agreement Could Improve Relations—and Slow Climate Change,” Arctic Today,
June 14, 2021; Paul Arthur Berkman, “ Cooperation in the Arctic Offers a Model for US-Russia Cooperation
Elsewhere,” Arctic Today, June 11, 2021; T homas Rotnem, “The Arctic Council Power Flex that Could Prove
Prosperous—for America,” National Interest, May 31, 2021; T om Balmforth and Humeyra Pamuk, “ Russia, U.S. T out
Cooperation Ahead of Arctic Council Meeting,” Reuters, May 18, 2021; Heather A. Conley and Colin Wall, “ U.S.-
Russian Arctic Relations: A Change in Climate?” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), March 31,
2021; Sherri Goodman, Marisol Maddox, and Kate Guy, “ We Need Renewed Dialogue Among Security Forces in the
Arctic,” Arctic Today, March 11, 2021; Agence France-Presse, “Russia T o Cooperate With US On Arctic, Forests:
Report ,” Barron’s, March 9, 2021; Mathieu Boulègue and Duncan Depledge, Arctic Hard Security Taskforce:
Sum m ary of the 10 Decem ber Expert Workshop , North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network, Activity
Report, March 10, 2021, 8 pp.; Walter Berbrick, Rachael Gosnell, Lars Saunes, and Mary T hompson-Jones,
“Preventing Conflict in the Arctic with Russia Starts with Dialogue,” National Interest, March 8, 2021.
78 See, for example, Atle Staalesen, “Norway’s Celebration of Svalbard T reaty Was Followed by Ardent and
Coordinated Response from Moscow Media,” Barents Observer, July 2, 2020; Megan Eckstein, “ Foggo: Changing
Conditions Require New Arctic Strategy, International Code of Conduct ,” USNI News, June 26, 2020; Nerijus
Adomaitis, “Norway Rejects Moscow’s Claim It Violated Svalbard T reaty,” Reuters, February 21, 2020; Luke Coffey,
“Russia’s and China’s Interest in Cold Svalbard Heats Up,” National Interest, February 13, 2020; Pavel K. Baev,
“Moscow Plays Hard Ball in the High North,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, February 10, 2020; Brett Davis, “Russia Has
Always Challenged Norway on Svalbard. T his T ime Parts of Its Criticism is [sic] Different,” High North News,
February 10, 2020; Jennifer Alvarez, “As Russia Returns to Svalbard,” KXAN Daily News, February 9, 2020; Marc
Lanteigne, “ Norway, Russia, and a Changing Svalbard,” Over the Circle, February 7, 2020; Arme O. Holm, “If Russia
Wants More Power on Svalbard, T here Is A Far More Efficient Method,” High North News, February 6, 2020; Atle
Staalesen, “Amid Jubilant Celebration at Svalbard, Norway Sends Strong Sign al It Will Not Accept Encroachment on
Sovereignty,” Barents Observer, February 9, 2020; Amund T rtellevik, “Russia With Stern Svalbard Warning to
Norway,” High North News, February 5, 2020; T om Balmforth and Nerijus Adomaitis, “Russia Accuses Norway of
Restricting Its Activities on Arctic Islands,” Reuters, February 4, 2020.
79 For additional discussion of Canadian-Russian relations regarding the Arctic, see Sergey Sukhankin, “Russia’s Arctic
Agenda and the Role of Canada,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, April 15, 2020.
80 See, for example, Reuters staff, “ Expanded U.S. Sanctions May Affect Russia’s Foreign Expansion in Oil and Gas”
Reuters, November 19, 2017.
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Northern Sea Route
Another concern for U.S. policymakers in connection with Russia in the Arctic relates to the
Northern Sea Route (NSR)—the Arctic shipping route linking Europe and Asia via waters
running along Russia’s Arctic coast. Russia considers certain parts of the NSR to be internal
Russian waters and has asserted a right to regulate commercial shipping passing through these
waters81—a position that creates a source of tension with the United States, which considers those
waters to be international waters.82 The U.S.-Russian dispute over this issue could have
implications not only for U.S.-Russian relations and the Arctic, but for other countries and other
parts of the world as wel , since international law is universal in its application, and a successful
chal enge to international waters in one part of the world can serve as a precedent for chal enging
it in other parts of the world.
The issue of the U.S.-Russian dispute over the international legal status of the NSR was largely
dormant for many years. In March 2019, however, Russia announced that
The Russian government has elaborated a set of rules for foreign naval vessels’ sailing on
the Northern Sea Route, [the Russian newspaper] Izvestia informs. The newspaper has
obtained a copy of the document that states that all vessels are obliged to comply.
The foreign state must send a notification about the voyage at least 45 days ahead of its
start. Included will have to be the name of the ship, its objective, route and period of sailing,
as well as ship characteristics such as length, width, deadweight, draft and type of engine
power. Also the name of the ship captain must be listed.
The ships must also have on board a Russian maritime pilot.
In case the voyage is not conducted in line with the regulations, Russia will have the right
to take extraordinary measures including its forced halt, arrest and in extreme cases
elimination, Izvestia writes.83
In September 2019, it was reported that Russia had used military commandos to board a Russian-
flag commercial ship operating in the NSR that Russian authorities suspected of violating certain
regulations.84

81 See, for example, James Foggo III, “Russia, China Offer Challenges in the Arctic,” Defense One, July 10, 2019;
Dmitry Sudakov, “Russia Closes Northern Sea Route for Foreign Warships,” Pravda Report, May 30, 2019; Nastassia
Astrasheuskaya and Henry Foy, “Polar Powers: Russia’s Bid for Supremacy in the Arctic Ocean,” Financial Times,
April 27, 2019; James R. Holmes, “ Don’t Let Russia Create a ‘Caribbean’ in the Arctic,” The Hill, March 28, 2019;
Marex (Maritime Executive), “Russia T ightens Control Over Northern Sea Route,” Maritime Executive, March 8,
2019; Atle Staalesen, “Russia Sets Out Stringent New Rules for Foreign Ships on the Northern Sea Route,” Barents
Observer, March 8, 2019; Will Stewart, “ Moscow T hreatens to Sink Foreign Ships Using Arctic Sea Route T hat Links
Atlantic to the Pacific Unless It Is Given 45 Days Notice of Voyages and Vessels T ake a Russian Pilot on Board,”
Daily Mail, March 6, 2019; “ Russia Will Restrict Foreign Warships in Arctic Ocean, Defense Official Says,” Moscow
Tim es, November 30, 2018.
82 See, for example, Peter B. Danilov, “ Russia has Advanced Unlawful Maritime Claims in the Arctic, Says Antony
Blinken,” High North News, May 19, 2021; Nikolaj Skydsgaard and Humeyra Pamuk, “ Blinken Says Russia Has
Advanced Unlawful Maritime Claims in the Arctic,” Reuters, May 18, 2021.
83 Atle Staalesen, “Izvestia: T his Is What Awaits Foreign Military Vessels on Northern Sea Route,” Barents Observer,
March 7, 2019. (A similar version published as Atle Staalesen, “ Russia Sets Out Stringent New Rules for Foreign Ships
on the Northern Sea Route,” Arctic Today, March 8, 2019.) See also Maritime Executive, “ Russia T ightens Control
Over Northern Sea Route,” Maritime Executive, March 8, 2019; Will Stewart, “ Russia Warning: Moscow Could Sink
or Detain Foreign Ships in Arctic Waters under New Rules,” Express (UK), March 6, 2019.
84 See Atle Staalesen, “Navy Commandos Board Cargo vessel on Northern Sea Route,” Barents Observer, September
13, 2019. See also Luke Coffey, “ Cold truth about Russia’s Arctic ambitions and Northern Sea Route,” Arab News,
March 14, 2020.
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The issue of the NSR was reportedly discussed in detail at the June 2021 U.S.-Russian summit
meeting in Geneva.85
NATO and European Union in the Arctic
NATO
Five of the eight Arctic states—the United States, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, and Norway—are
members of NATO. The renewal of great power competition has led to a renewal of NATO
interest in NATO’s more northerly areas.
During the Cold War, NATO member Norway and its adjacent sea areas were considered to be the
northern flank of NATO’s defensive line against potential aggression by the Soviet-led Warsaw
Pact al iance. With the end of the Cold War and the shift to the post-Cold War era, NATO
planning efforts shifted away from defending against potential aggression by Russia, which was
considered highly unlikely, and toward other concerns, such as the question of how NATO
countries might be able to contribute to their own security and that of other countries by
participating in out-of-area operations, meaning operations in areas outside Europe.
With the renewal of great power competition, NATO is now once again focusing more on the
question of how to deter potential Russian aggression against NATO countries, including in the
Arctic.86 As one consequence of that, Norway and its adjacent sea areas are once again receiving
more attention in NATO planning.87 For example, a NATO exercise cal ed Trident Juncture 18
that was held from October 25 to November 7, 2018, in Norway and adjacent waters of the Baltic
and the Norwegian Sea, with participation by al 29 NATO members plus Sweden and Finland,
was described as NATO’s largest exercise to that point since the Cold War, and featured a strong

T he United States believes that the part of the Northwest Passage that runs through the Canadian archipelago is an
international strait; Canada believes it is internal Canadian waters. In 1985, the use of the waterway by a U.S. polar
icebreaker led to a diplomatic dispute between the United States and Canada. In January 1988, the two countries signed
an agreement under which, observers, say, the two sides essentially agreed to disagree on the issue. T he agreement —
formally called Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America
on Arctic Cooperation—states in part that “ the Government of the United States pledges that all navigation by U.S.
icebreakers within waters claimed by Canada to be internal will be undertaken with the consent of the Government of
Canada,” and that “nothing in this agreement of cooperative endeavour between Arctic neighbours and friends nor any
practice thereunder affects the respective positions of the Governments of the United States and of Canada on the Law
of the Sea in this or other maritime areas or their respective positions regarding third parties. ” T he text of the agreement
as posted by the Canadian government is available at https://www.treaty-accord.gc.ca/text-texte.aspx?id=101701.
85 Atle Staalesen, “On Putin-Biden agenda: the Northern Sea Route,” Barents Observer, June 17, 2021.
86 See, for example, Candace Huntington, “ NAT O Needs Unity as Russia’s Arctic Presence Grows,” Center for
European Policy Analysis (CEPA), May 19, 2021; Christopher Woody, “ Russian and NAT O Militaries Are Getting
More Active in the Arctic, but Neither Is Sure About What the Other Is Doing,” Business Insider, July 21, 2020; Colin
Barnard, “ Why NAT O Needs a Standing Maritime Group in the Arctic,” Center for International Maritime Security,
May 15, 2020; “ NAT O is facing up to Russia in the Arctic Circle,” Economist, May 14, 2020; Sebastian Sprenger,
“NAT O’s Camille Grand on the Alliance’s Arctic T ack,” Defense News, May 12, 2020; Rebecca Pincus, “NAT O
North? Building a Role for NAT O in the Arctic,” War on the Rocks, November 6, 2019; Anna Wieslander, “It’s T ime
for NAT O to Engage in the Arctic,” Defense One, September 16, 2019; T yler Cross, “T he NAT O Alliance’s Role in
Arctic Security,” Maritime Executive, July 19, 2019. See also Gozde Bayar, “ T urkey striving to become polar power:
Analysts,” Anadolu Agency, May 21, 2020.
87 See, for example, T eri Schultz, “NAT O and Washington Worry About Russian Subs in the High North,” Deutsche
Welle, April 26, 2018.
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Arctic element, including the first deployment of a U.S. Navy aircraft carrier above the Arctic
Circle since 1991.88
In September 2020, NATO established a new Atlantic Command in Norfolk, VA, cal ed Joint
Force Command Norfolk, as NATO’s first command dedicated to the Atlantic since 2003. Co-
located with the U.S. Navy’s reestablished 2nd Fleet for the Atlantic, Joint Force Command
Norfolk “wil provide coherent command arrangements for Al ied forces, maintain situational
awareness, conduct exercises, and draw up operational plans covering vast geographic areas,
from the US East Coast, past the Greenland-Iceland-U.K. gap and into the Arctic.”89
The question of NATO’s overal involvement in the Arctic has been a matter of debate within
NATO and among other observers.90 Russia has expressed opposition to the idea of NATO
becoming more involved in the Arctic.91
European Union
Three of the eight Arctic states—Denmark, Finland, and Sweden—are members of the European
Union (EU), and two other Arctic states—Iceland and Norway—have close ties to the EU as
members of the European Economic Area. The EU is showing increased interest in the Arctic,92

88 See, for example, Christopher Woody, “‘We Can Do Better’: T he Navy’s Newest Fleet Commander Says US Ships
and Sailors Got ‘Beat Up’ During NAT O’s Biggest Exercise Since the Cold War,” Business Insider, December 4,
2018; Levon Sevunts, “ NAT O’s Arctic Dilemma; T wo Visions of the Arctic Collide as NAT O and Russia Flex
Muscles,” Radio Canada International, December 3, 2018; Megan Eckstein, “T ruman CSG: Arctic Strike Group
Operations Required Focus on Logistics, Safety,” USNI News, November 6, 2018; Mary T hompson-Jones, “ NATO’s
Arctic Exercise is a Good Start to Standing Up to Russian Militarization of the High North,” National Interest,
November 6, 2018; Pierre-Henry Deshayes, “ Antifreeze and Balaclavas: NAT O T roops in cold War Games,”
Military.com , November 2, 2018; Vasco Cotovio and Frederik Pleitgen, “ Submarines a Centerpiece of Russia’s Navy,”
CNN, November 19, 2018; Shawn Snow, “ T he Corps’ Armor Makes a Big Showing in Norway as Marine s T est Future
Force,” Marine Corps Times, October 25, 2018; T erje Solsvik, “As Winter Comes, NAT O Kicks Off Largest
Maneuvers Since Cold War,” Reuters, October 25, 2018; Kyle Rempfer, “US Breaches the Arctic with Marines,
Fighter Jets and Aircraft Carriers,” Military Tim es, October 23, 2018; Megan Eckstein, “ T ruman Carrier Strike Group
Operating North of Arctic Circle; First T ime for US Navy Since 1991,” USNI News, October 19, 2018; T homas
Gooley, “HST Strike Group Enters Arctic Circle, Prepares for NAT O Exercise,” DVIDS (Defense Visual Information
Distribution Service), October 19, 2018; T homas Nilsen, “ US Marines Launch Exercise in Northern Norway Ahead of
T rident Juncture,” Barents Observer, October 15, 2018.
89 NAT O headquarters news release, “ NAT O’s New Atlantic Command Declared Operational,” September 18, 2020.
See also Levon Sevunts, “ NAT O’s New Atlantic Command to Keep Watch over the European Arctic,” Eye on the
Arctic (Radio Canada International), September 18, 2020.
90 See, for example, David Auerswald, “NAT O in the Arctic: Keep Its Role Limited, for Now,” War on the Rocks,
October 12, 2020; Luke Coffey and Daniel Kochis, “ Brussels NAT O Summit 2018: T ime to Get Serious About the
Arctic,” Heritage Foundation, June 27, 2018 (Issue Brief 4875), p. 1.
91 Peter Bakkemo Danilov, “Russia Warns Against Pulling NAT O into the Arctic,” High North News, June 17, 2020.
92 See, for example, Kevin McGwin, “ EU Lawmakers Push for More Visibility in the Arctic—and a Stronger Response
to Russia and China,” Arctic Today, July 6, 2021; European Interest, “Arctic: MEPs Call for Peace and Reduced
T ension in the Region,” European Interest, July 1, 2021; Andreas Raspotnik, “ A Quantum of Possibilities, T he
Strategic Spectrum of the EU’s Arctic Policy,” Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), December 17, 2020; Atle
Staalesen, “Member of the European Parliament Comes to Barents Coast Calls for Stronger EU Engagement in Ar ctic,”
Barents Observer, February 13, 2020; Romain Chuffart and Andreas Raspotnik, “ T he EU and Its Arctic Spirit: Solving
Arctic Climate Change from Home?” European View, Vol. 18, No. 2, 2019: 156 -162; Kevin McGwin, “T he EU Moves
T oward a New Arctic Strategy—and a More Independent Role in the Region,” Arctic Today, December 11, 2019;
Kevin McGwin, “T he EU Is Poised to T ake a Broader—and More Proactive—Role in the Arctic,” Arctic Today,
November 27, 2019; Adam Stepien and Andreas Raspotnik, “Can the EU’s Arctic Policy Find T rue North?” Centre for
European Policy Studies (CEPS), September 11, 2019; Wesley Morgan, “ Politico Pro Q&A: EU Ambassador at Large
for the Arctic Marie-Anne Coninsx,” Politico Pro, August 6, 2019; Adam Stepien and Andreas Raspotnik, “ T he EU’s
Arctic Policy: Between Vision and Reality,” College of Europe Policy Brief, August 2019, 5 pp.; Martin Breum,
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and the European Parliament (EP) supports an active EU role in the Arctic.93 The EU is
considered an “observer in principle” to the Arctic Council, but to date has been denied full
observer status at the council, alternately by Canada (because of Canadian Inuit objections to the
EU’s ban on the import of seal products) and Russia (following heightened EU-Russian tensions
since Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine).94
In 2016, the European Commission (the EU’s executive) and the EU’s High Representative for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy issued a joint communication (or policy paper), An Integrated
European Union Policy for the Arctic, that states that a “safe, stable, sustainable, and prosperous
Arctic” is important for the region, the EU, and the world, and that “the EU has a strategic
interest in playing a key role in the Arctic region.”95 The policy outlined in the document seeks to
boost the EU’s profile in the region and focuses on three broad themes—climate change and
safeguarding the environment, sustainable development in the Arctic, and international
cooperation on Arctic issues.
In 2017, the EU appointed its first Ambassador-at-Large for the Arctic, and in October 2019, the
EU held its first-ever Arctic Forum, a high-level conference in northern Sweden focused on
promoting EU efforts in the Arctic.96 The EU is also a major financial contributor to Arctic
research, providing around €200 mil ion in the past decade under the Horizon 2020 Research and
Innovation Program.97 Some analysts contend, however, that the EU’s policy statements on the
Arctic have yet to coalesce into a clearly defined narrative with concrete goals; the European
Commission’s in-house think tank argues that the EU must develop a more comprehensive
strategy that balances protecting the Arctic environment with facilitating the sustainable
economic and social development of the region.98

“Spurred by Chinese and Russian Activity, EU President Juncker Is Making the Arctic More Central to EU Policy,”
Arctic Today, February 20, 2019. See also Natalia Skripnikova and Andreas Raspotnik, “ Has Russia Heard about the
European Union’s Arcticness? T he EU’s Arctic Steps As Seen from Russia,” Polar Record (Cambridge University
Press), March 26, 2020.
93 In March 2017, the EP adopted a resolution largely endorsing the 2016 joint communication on an integrated EU
policy for the Arctic (by 483 votes to 100, with 37 abstentions). (European Parliament, Resolution on An Integrated EU
Policy for the Arctic, P8_T A(2017)0093, March 16, 2017.) T he resolution advocated keeping the Arctic a low-tension
area, recognized the important role of the Arctic Council in maintaining constructive cooperation and stability in the
region, and called upon the EU to develop a more concrete EU Arctic strategy and ac tion plan.
94 Kamrul Hossain, “EU Engagement in the Arctic: Do the Policy Responses from the Arctic States Represent the EU
as a Legitimate Stakeholder?,” Arctic Review on Law and Politics, Vol. 6, No. 2, November 2015.
95 European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joint
Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, An Integrated European Union Policy for the Arctic,
April 27, 2016, p. 2.
96 Martin Breum, “EU Plays Catch-up with US, China, Russia in Arctic,” EUObserver.com, October 3, 2019.
97 European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joint
Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, An Integrated European Union Policy for the Arctic,
April 27, 2016, p. 2.
98 European Political Strategy Centre/European Commission, Walking on Thin Ice: A Balanced Arctic Strategy for the
EU, July 2019; Adam Stepien and Andreas Raspotnik, “ T he EU’s Arctic Policy: Between Vision and Reality,” College
of Europe Policy Brief, August 2019.
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In July 2020, the European Commission and the European External Action Service jointly
launched a public consultation on a way forward for the EU’s Arctic policy.99 An updated EU
policy document for the Arctic may be released in 2021.100
China in the Arctic
China’s Growing Activities in the Arctic
China’s diplomatic, economic, and scientific activities in the Arctic have grown steadily in recent
years, and have emerged as a major topic of focus for the Arctic in a context of renewed great
power competition.
In 2013, China was one of six non-Arctic states that were approved for observer status by the
Arctic Council.101 In January 2018, China released a white paper on China’s Arctic policy that
refers to China as a “near-Arctic state.”102 (China’s northernmost territory, northeast of Mongolia,
is at about the same latitude as the Aleutian Islands in Alaska, which, as noted earlier in this
report, the United States includes in its definition of the Arctic for purposes of U.S. law.) The
white paper refers to trans-Arctic shipping routes as the Polar Silk Road, and identifies these

99 New Europe Online, “ EU Reflects on the Future of Arctic Policy,” New Europe, July 20, 2020. See also Kevin
McGwin, “For the EU’s New Arctic Envoy, Low T ension Is Job No. 1,” Arctic Today, September 14, 2020.
100 Kevin McGwin, “ An Updated EU Arctic Policy Is Expected Next Year,” Arctic Today, October 22, 2020. See also
Andreas Raspotnik, “ T he Presence of the EU’s Arctic Future,” Euractiv, March 16, 2021; Gabriella Gricius, “ T he EU’s
New Arctic Policy: Lessons from Human Security and the European Green Deal,” European Leadership Network,
March 1, 2021.
101 T he other five were India, Italy, Japan, Singapore, and South Korea. For a list of the observer states and when they
were approved for observer status, see Arctic Council, “ Non-Arctic States,” accessed April 8, 2021, at https://arctic-
council.org/en/about/observers/non-arctic-states/.
102 “Full T ext: China’s Arctic Policy,” Xinhua, January 26, 2018. The white paper states that “China is an important
stakeholder in Arctic affairs. Geographically, China is a ‘Near-Arctic State’, one of the continental States that are
closest to the Arctic Circle. T he natural conditions of the Arctic and their changes have a direct impact on China’s
climate system and ecological environment, and, in turn, on its economic interests in agriculture, forestry, fishery,
marine industry and other sectors. China is also closely involved in the trans-regional and global issues in the Arctic,
especially in such areas as climate change, environment, scientific research, utilization of shipping routes, resource
exploration and exploitation, security, and global governance. T hese issues are vital to the existence and develo pment
of all countries and humanity, and directly affect the interests of non -Arctic States including China.”
Somewhat similarly, France’s June 2016 national roadmap for the Arctic refers to France as a “polar nation.”
(Republique Francaise, Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres et du Developpement International, The Great Challenge of
the Arctic, National Roadm ap for the Arctic, June 2016, 60 pp.) T he document states on page 9 that “ France has
established itself over the last three centuries as a polar nation, with a strong tradition of expeditions and exploration,
and permanent research bases at the poles,” and on page 17 that “[b]uilding on its long-standing tradition of exploration
and expeditions in high latitudes, France has carved out its place as a polar nation over the last three centuries. France
has permanent scientific bases in the Arctic and in Antarctica.” It can also be noted that the northernmost part of
mainland France, next to Belgium and across the Strait of Dover from England, is almost as far north as the more
southerly parts of the Aleutian Islands.
Also somewhat similarly, a November 2018 UK parliamentary report refers to the UK as a “near -Arctic neighbour.”
T he report states the following: “ While the UK is not an Arctic state, it is a near-Arctic neighbour. T he UK’s weather
system is profoundly affected by changes in the Arctic’s climate and sea currents. T he UK has been an Observer to the
Arctic Council since 1998.” (United Kingdom, House of Commons, Environmental Audit Committee, The Changing
Arctic, Twelfth Report of Session 2017-19, November 29, 2018, p. 3. [Report, together with formal minutes relating to
the report, Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed November 6, 2018]. See also pp. 6, 29, and 32.)
See also Eva Dou, “A New Cold War? China Declares Itself a ‘Near-Arctic State,’ Wall Street Journal, January 26,
2018; Grant Newsham, “China As A ‘Near Arctic State’—Chutzpah Overcoming Geography,” Asia Times, January 30,
2018.
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routes as a third major transportation corridor for the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China’s
major geopolitical initiative, first announced by China in 2013, to knit Eurasia and other regions
together in a Chinese-anchored or Chinese-led infrastructure and economic network.103 The polar
regions (both the Arctic and Antarctic) are included in China’s 14th Five-Year Plan, covering the
period 2021-2025.104
China has a Ukrainian-built polar-capable icebreaker, Xue Long (Snow Dragon), that in recent
years has made several transits of Arctic waters—operations that China describes as research
expeditions.105 A second polar-capable icebreaker (the first that China has built domestical y),
named Xue Long 2, entered service in 2019.106 China in 2018 announced an intention to build a
30,000-ton (or possibly 40,000-ton) nuclear-powered icebreaker,107 which would make China
only the second country (following Russia) to operate a nuclear-powered icebreaker. In December
2019, it was reported that China’s third polar-capable icebreaker might instead be built as a
26,000-ton, conventional y powered ship.108 (By way of comparison, the new polar icebreakers
being built for the U.S. Coast Guard are to displace 22,900 tons each.)
China in recent years has engaged in growing diplomatic activities with the Nordic countries, and
has increased the size of its diplomatic presences in some of them. China has also engaged in
growing economic discussions with Iceland and also with Greenland, a territory of Denmark that
might be moving toward eventual independence.109 China’s engagement with Greenland appears
related in significant part to Greenland’s deposits of rare earth elements. Like several other

103 See, for example, Maria Shagina and Elizabeth Buchanan, “China Enters the Arctic Digitization Race,” National
Interest, January 17, 2021; Nima Khorrami, “ Data Hunting in Subzero T emperatures: T he Arctic as a New Frontier in
Beijing’s Push for Digital Connectivity,” Arctic Institute, August 4, 2020; Marc Lanteigne, “ T he T wists and T urns of
the Polar Silk Road,” Over the Circle, March 15, 2020; Zhang Chun, “ China’s ‘Arctic Silk Road,’” Maritim e
Executive, January 10, 2020; Sabena Siddiqui, “ Arctic Ambition: Beijing Eyes the Polar Silk Road,” Asia Tim es,
October 25, 2018. T he BRI’s other two main corridors, which were announced at the outset of the BRI, are a land
corridor that runs east to west across the middle of Eurasia—the “ belt” in BRI—and a sea corridor called the Maritime
Silk Road that passes through the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean to the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean
Sea—the “ road” in BRI. For more on the BRI, see CRS In Focus IF10273, China’s “One Belt, One Road,” by Susan
V. Lawrence and Gabriel M. Nelson. See also Atle Staalesen, “ Chinese Money for Northern Sea Route,” Barents
Observer, June 12, 2018. See also Lin Boqiang, “ China Can Support Arctic Development as Part of B&R,” Global
Tim es, August 9, 2018.
104 See, for example, Marc Lanteigne, “T he Polar Policies in China’s New Five-Year Plan,” Diplomat, March 12, 2021.
105 See, for example, “Icebreaker Sets Sail on China’s 9th Arctic Research Expedition,” Xinhua, July 20, 2018; “China
Begins 9th Arctic Expedition to Help Build ‘Polar Silk Road,’” Global Tim es, July 20, 2018.
106 “China Delivers First Self-Built Icebreaking Research Vessel,” People’s Daily Online, July 12, 2019; Kamaran
Malik, “China Launches First Locally-made Icebreaker,” Asia Times, July 11, 2019.
107 See T rym Aleksander Eiterjord, “Checking in on China’s Nuclear Icebreaker,” Diplomat, September 5, 2019;
T homas Nilsen, “Details of China’s Nuclear-Powered Icebreaker Revealed,” Barents Observer, March 21, 2019; Zhao
Yusha, “China One Step Closer to Nuke-Powered Aircraft Carrier with Cutting-Edge Icebreaker Comes on Stream,”
ChinaMil.com, June 23, 2018; China Daily, “China’s 1st Nuclear-Powered Icebreaker in the Pipeline,” People’s Daily
Online, June 25, 2018; Kyle Mizokami, “ China Is P lanning a Nuclear-Powered Icebreaker,” Popular Mechanics, June
25, 2018; China Military Online, “ Why Is China Building a 30,000-Ton Nuclear-Powered Icebreaker?” ChinaMil.com,
June 30, 2018.
108 Malte Humpert, “China Reveals Details of a Newly Designed Heavy Icebreaker,” Arctic Today, December 17,
2019.
109 See, for example, Marc Lanteigne, “Greenland’s Widening World,” Over the Circle, March 28, 2020; Marco Volpe,
“T he T ortuous Path of China’s Win-Win Strategy in Greenland,” Arctic Institute, March 24, 2020; Marc Lanteigne,
“Stumbling Block: China-Iceland Oil Exploration Reaches an Impasse,” Over the Circle, January 24, 2018. “Greenland
Plans Office in Beijing to Boost T rade T ies with China,” Reuters, July 18, 2018.
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nations, China has established a research station in the Svalbard archipelago. China maintains a
second research station in Iceland.
China appears to be interested in using the NSR to shorten commercial shipping times between
Europe and China110 and perhaps also to reduce China’s dependence on southern sea routes
(including those going to the Persian Gulf) that pass through the Strait of Malacca—a maritime
choke point that China appears to regard as vulnerable to being closed off by other parties (such
as the United States) in time of crisis or conflict.111 China reportedly reached an agreement with
Russia on July 4, 2017, to create an “Ice Silk Road,”112 and in June 2018, China and Russia
agreed to a credit agreement between Russia’s Vnesheconombank (VEB) and the China
Development Bank that could provide up to $9.5 bil ion in Chinese funds for the construction of
select infrastructure projects, including in particular projects along the NSR.113 In September
2013, the Yong Shen, a Chinese cargo ship, became the first commercial vessel to complete the
voyage from Asia to Rotterdam via the NSR.114
China has made significant investments in Russia’s Arctic oil and gas industry, particularly the
Yamal natural gas megaproject located on Russia’s Yamal Peninsula in the Arctic.115 China is also
interested in mining opportunities in the Arctic seabed, in Greenland, and in the Canadian
Arctic.116 Given Greenland’s very smal population, China may view Greenland as an entity that
China can seek to engage using an approach similar to ones that China has used for engaging with
smal Pacific and Indian Ocean island states.117 China may also be interested in Arctic fishing
grounds.

110 See, for example, Eduardo Baptista, “China ‘More T han Other States’ Looks to Future Sea Route T hrough
Resource-Rich Arctic, Study Says,” South China Morning Post, September 22, 2020.
111 See, for example, Jonathan Hall, “Arctic Enterprise: T he China Dream Goes No rth,” Journal of Political Risk,
September 2019. See also Andrew Latham, “ China Looks to the Arctic to Avoid Another Suez Slowdown,” National
Interest, April 2, 2021.
112 Xinhua, “ China, Russia agree to jointly build ‘Ice Silk Road,’” Xinhuanet, July 4, 2017.
113 Atle Staalesen, Chinese Money for Northern Sea Route,” Barents Observer, June 12, 2018. See also Xie Wenwen
(Caixin Globus), “For Chinese Companies, Investment I Arctic Infrastructure Offers Both Opportunities and
Challenges,” Arctic Today, June 17, 2019.
114 “Chinese Make First Successful North Sea Route Voyage,” The Arctic Journal, September 12, 2013. See also Malte
Humpert, “Chinese Shipping Company COSCO T o Send Record Number of Ships T hrough Arctic,” High North News,
June 13, 2019; Marex (Maritime Executive), “ Russia and China Sign Arctic Deal,” Maritim e Executive, June 8, 2019.
115 See, for example, Malte Humpert (High North News), “China Acquires 20 Percent Stake in Novatek’s Arctic LNG
2 Project,” Arctic Today, April 30, 2019; Ernesto Gallo and Giovanni Biava, “A New Energy Frontier Called ‘Polar
Silk Road,’” China Daily, April 12, 2019.
116 See, for example, Robert Fife and Steven Chase, “ T op Defence Official Says China is a T hreat to Canadian Arctic,”
Globe and Mail (Canada), March 10 (updated March 11), 2021; Marc Montgomery, “ China’s Effort to Buy an Arctic
Gold Mine Raises Many Concerns,” Radio Canada International, August 10 (updated August 11), 2020; Vipal Monga,
“China’s Move to Buy Arctic Gold Mine Draws Fire in Canada,” Wall Street Journal, July 26, 2020; Mingming Shi
and Marc Lanteigne, “ A Cold Arena? Greenland as a Focus of Arctic Competition,” Diplomat, June 10, 2019; Nadia
Schadlow, “Why Greenland Is Really About China,” The Hill, August 28, 2019; Marc Lanteigne and Mingming Shi,
“China Steps up Its Mining Interests in Greenland,” Diplomat, February 12, 2019; John Simpson, “How Greenland
Could Become China’s Arctic Base,” BBC, December 18, 2018; Marc Lanteigne, “Do Oil and Water Mix? Emerging
China-Greenland Resource Cooperation,” Over the Circle, November 2, 2018; Martin Breum, “ China and the US Both
Have Strategic Designs for Greenland,” Arctic Today, October 17, 2018; Mia Bennett, “T he Controversy over
Greenland Airports Shows China Isn’t Fully Welcome in the Arctic—Yet,” Arctic Today, September 13, 2018;
Mingming Shi and Marc lanteigne, “T he (Many0 Roles of Greenland in china’s Developing Arctic Policy,” Diplomat,
March 30, 2018; Miguel Martin, “China in Greenland: Mines, Science, and Nods to Independence,” China Brief,
March 12, 2018.
117 For further discussion of China-Greenland relations, see Kevin McGwin, “ Greenland Lawmakers Will Consider
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China’s growing activities in the Arctic may also reflect a view that as a major world power,
China should, like other major world powers, be active in the polar regions for conducting
research and other purposes. (Along with its growing activities in the Arctic, China has recently
increased the number of research stations in maintains in the Antarctic.118)
Particularly since China published its Arctic white paper in January 2018, observers have
expressed curiosity or concern about China’s exact mix of motivations for its growing activities
in the Arctic, and about what China’s ultimate goals for the Arctic might be.119
Arctic States’ Response
The renewal of great power competition underscores a question for the Arctic states regarding
whether and how to respond to China’s growing activities in the Arctic. China’s growing
activities in the Arctic could create new opportunities for cooperation between China and the
Arctic states.120 They also, however, have the potential for posing chal enges to the Arctic states
in terms of defending their own interests in the Arctic.121

Opening an East Asia Office,” Arctic Today, April 6, 2020.
118 For additional discussion, see CRS Report R46708, Antarctica: Overview of Geopolitical and Environmental Issues,
by Pervaze A. Sheikh, Bruce Vaughn, and Kezee Procita. See also Alexander B. Gray, “ China's Next Geopolitical
Goal: Dominate Antarctica,” National Interest, March 20, 2021.
119 See, for example, Emil Avdaliani, “China Seeks T o Boost Role In T he Arctic—Analysis,” Eurasia Review, May 26,
2021; Abigail Ng, “ T ensions Will Likely Grow as China Seeks Bigger Role in the Arctic,” CNBC, May 20 (updated
May 22), 2021; Rush Doshi, Alexis Dale-Huang, and Gaoqi Zhang, Northern Expedition, China’s Arctic Activities and
Am bitions, Brookings Institution, April 2021, 69 pp.; Nengye Liu, “ Why China Needs an Arctic Policy 2.0, It Is T ime
for China to Shed Light on Which Kind of Order It Would Like to Construct in the Arctic Using Its Rising Power,”
Diplom at, October 22, 2020; Mary Kay Magistad, “ China's Arctic Ambitions Have Revived US Interest in the
Region,” The World, October 12, 2020; T homas Ayres, “ Op-ed | China’s Arctic Gambit a Concern for U.S. Air and
Space Forces,” Space News, October 5, 2020; Marco Giannangeli, “ China Expanding into Melting Arctic in Major
Military T hreat to West ,” Express (UK), August 2, 2020; Joel Gehrke, “ China Aims to Control Ports and Shipping
Lanes in Europe and the Arctic,” Washington Exam iner, July 1, 2020; T ies Dams, Louise van Schaik, and Adaja
Stoetman, Presence Before Power, China’s Strategy in Iceland and Greenland , Netherlands Institute of International
Relations (Clingendael), June 2020; T rine Jonassen, “ Rejects Notion that China is a T hreat to the Arctic,” High North
News, May 27, 2020 (which reports remarks by State Secretary Audun Halvorsen of the Norwegian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs); Swee Lean Collin Koh, “ China’s Strategic Interest in the Arctic Goes Beyond Economics,” Defense
News, May 12, 2020; Marc Lanteigne, “ Identity and Relationship-Building in China’s Arctic Diplomacy,” Arctic
Institute, April 28, 2020; Nick Solheim, “ T ime to Crush China’s Arctic Influence,” Spectator, April 20, 2020; Yun Sun,
“Defining the Chinese T hreat in the Arctic,” Arctic Institute, April 7, 2020; Sanna Kopra, “China and its Arctic
T rajectories: T he Arctic Institute’s China Series 2020,” Arctic Institute, March 17, 2020; Atle Staalesen, “China’s
Ambassador Brushes Off Allegations His Country Is T hreat in Arctic,” Barents Observer, February 16, 2020; Luke
Coffey, “China’s Increasing Role in the Arctic,” Heritage Foundation, February 11, 2020; Jacquelyn Chorush, “Is
China Really T hreatening Conquest in the Arctic?” High North News, January 6, 2020.
120 See, for example, Ellis Quinn, “ Iceland Welcomes ‘Peaceful, Low-T ension Cooperation’ with China in Arctic, Says
Foreign Minister,” Eye on the Arctic (Radio Canada International), February 15, 2021; Atle Staalesen, “ As Arctic
T alks Move to China, Leaders Downplay Divides,” Barents Observer, May 11, 2019; T homas Nilsen, “China Seeks a
More Active Role in the Arctic,” Barents Observer, May 11, 2019; Nathan Vanderklippe, “Agreeing on the Arctic:
Amid Dispute, Canada Sides with China over the U.S. on How to Manage the North,” Globe and Mail, May 10, 2019;
“China and Finland: T he Ice Road Cometh?” Over the Circle, March 17, 2020; Nong Hong, “Arctic Ambitions of
China, Russia—and Now the US—Need Not Spark a Cold War,” South China Morning Post, March 11, 2019.
121 See, for example, David Pugliese, “Canada Calls Out China, Climate Change as Growing Concerns in Arctic,”
Defense News, April 11, 2021; Sanna Kopra and Matti Puranen, “ China’s Arct ic Ambitions Face Increasing Headwinds
in Finland,” Diplom at, March 18, 2021; T homas Nilsen, “ China Wanted to Buy Airport in Lapland for North Pole
Climate Research Flights, T he Finnish Defence Forces Spurned an Offer by the Chinese Polar Research Institute to
Buy or Rent Kemijärvi Airport over Security Reasons,” Barents Observer, March 4, 2021; Mingming Shi and Marc
Lanteigne, “ China’s Central Role in Denmark’s Arctic Security Policies,” Diplomat, December 08, 2019; Humphrey
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For U.S. policymakers, a general question is how to integrate China’s activities in the Arctic into
the overal equation of U.S.-China relations, and whether and how, in U.S. policymaking, to link
China’s activities in the Arctic to its activities in other parts of the world. Some observers see
potential areas for U.S.-Chinese cooperation in the Arctic.122 As noted earlier, an August 2021
press report stated that “the U.S., China, Japan and Russia are among the countries planning to
conduct joint research in the Arctic Ocean in a step toward preventing overfishing in the
region.… Representatives from nine countries and the European Union aim to meet in South
Korea early next year to discuss exploratory fishing based on similar treaties covering other
regions.”123 Other observers view the Arctic as emerging arena of U.S.-China strategic
competition.124 Stil other observers view the Arctic as a mixed situation involving potential
elements of cooperation and competition.125
A specific question could be whether to impose punitive costs on China in the Arctic for
unwanted actions that China takes elsewhere. As one potential example of such a cost-imposing
action, U.S. policymakers could consider moving to suspend China’s observer status on the Arctic

Hawksley, “Nordic Nations Can Stand Up to China in the Arctic,” Nikkei Asian Review, June 13, 2019; T homas Nilsen,
“‘We Must Be Prepared for Clearer Chinese Presence in Our Neighborhood’; Chief of Norway’s Military Intelligence
Service, Lieutenant General Morten Haga Lunde, Highlighted Chinese, Russian Arctic Cooperations in His Annual
Focus Report,” Barents Observer, February 11, 2019.
122 See, for example, Pavel Devyatkin, “Science Cooperation with the Snow Dragon: Can the U.S. and China work
together on the Arctic Climate Crisis?” Arctic Institute, April 15, 2021; James Stavridis, “ Can the U.S. and China
Cooperate? Sure,” Bloom berg, July 31, 2020; Stephen Delaney, “ T he United States Must Work with China to Ensure
Freedom of Navigation in the Arctic,” Global Security Review, September 6, 2019; Alison McFarland, “ Arctic Options:
Why America Should Invest in a Future with China,” National Interest, September 30, 2018.
123 Miki Okuyama, “International Research Planned to Manage Arctic Fish Stocks,” Nikkei Asia, August 1, 2021. See
also Peter Bakkemo Danilov (High North News), “ US, China and Russia Plan Joint Research Aimed at Regulating
Arctic Fishing,” Arctic Today, August 2, 2021.
124 See, for example, Michael Krull, “ T he Arctic: China Wants It; We Need to Deny T hem,” American Military News,
September 8, 2020; Simone McCarthy, “T rade, tech … and Now the Arctic? T he Next Frontier in the China -US
Struggle for Global Control,” South China Morning Post, January 14, 2020 (ellipsis as in the article’s title); Chen
Zinan, “T o Keep Hegemony, US T rying to Obstruct China’s Rights in Arctic,” Global T imes, December 25, 2019.
125 See, for example, Laura Zhou, “ US Admiral Warns of Risk of ‘Bogus’ Chinese Claims in Arctic,” South China
Morning Post, June 28 (updated June 29), 2020.
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Council126 as a punitive cost-imposing measure for unwanted Chinese actions in the South China
Sea.127 In a May 6, 2019, speech in Finland, Secretary of State Pompeo stated (emphasis added)
The United States is a believer in free markets. We know from experience that free and fair
competition, open, by the rule of law, produces the best outcomes.
But all the parties in the marketplace have to play by those same rules. Those who violate
those rules should lose their rights to participate in that marketplace. Respect and
transparency are the price of admission.
And let’s talk about China for a moment. China has observer status in the Arctic
Council, but that status is contingent upon its respect for the sovereign rights of Arctic
states. The U.S. wants China to meet that condition and contribute responsibly in the
region. But China’s words and actions raise doubts about its intentions.128
China’s interest in Greenland, particularly as a potential site for mining rare earth elements, is a
matter of concern for U.S. policymakers.129 In February 2019, it was reported that the United

126 Paragraph 37 of the Arctic Council’s rules of procedure states the following:
Once observer status has been granted, Observers shall be invited to the meetings and other
activities of the Arctic Council unless SAOs [Senior Arctic Officials] decide otherwise. Observer
status shall continue for such time as consensus exists among Ministers. Any Observer that engages
in activities which are at odds with the Council’s [Ottawa] Declaration [of September 19, 1996,
establishing the Council] or these Rules of Procedure shall have its status as an Observer
suspended.
Paragraph 5 of Annex II of the Arctic Council’s rules of procedure—an annex regarding the accreditation and review of
observers—states the following:
Every four years, from the date of being granted Observer status, Observers should state
affirmatively their continued interest in Observer status. Not later than 120 days before a
Ministerial meeting where Observers will be reviewed, the Chairmanship shall circulate to the
Arctic States and Permanent Participants a list of all accredited Observers and up -to-date
information on their activities relevant to the work of the Arctic Council.
(Arctic Council, Arctic Council Rules of Procedure, p. 9. T he document was accessed April 8,
2021, at https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/940.
Paragraph 4.3 of the Arctic Council’s observer manual for subsidiary bodies states in part
Observer status continues for such time as consensus exists among Ministers. Any Observer that
engages in activities which are at odds with the Ottawa Declaration or with the Rules of Procedure
will have its status as an Observer suspended.
(Arctic Council. Observer Manual for Subsidiary Bodies, p. 5. T he document was accessed April 8,
2021, at https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/939.)
See also Alyson JK Bailes, “ Understanding T he Arctic Council: A ‘Sub-Regional’ Perspective,” Journal of Military
and Strategic Studies, Vol. 15, Issue 2, 2013: 48; Brianna Wodiske, “ Preventing the Melting of the Arctic Council:
China as a Permanent Observer and What It Means for the Council and the Environment,” Loyola of Los Angeles
International and Com parative Law Review, Vol. 315, Issue 2, 2014 (November 1, 2014): 320; Sebastian Knecht ,
“New Observers Queuing Up: Why the Arctic Council Should Expand—And Expel,” Arctic Institute, April 20, 2015;
Evan Bloom, “ Establishment of the Arctic Council,” undated; accessed April 8, 2021, at https://2009-2017.state.gov/e/
oes/ocns/opa/arc/ac/establishmentarcticcouncil/index.htm, which states “ T he following paper was authored by Evan
Bloom in July 1999 when serving as an attorney in the Office of the Legal Adviser at the U.S. Department of State. Mr.
Bloom is now the Director of the Office of Oceans and Polar Affairs for the Bureau o f Oceans and International
Environmental and Scientific Affairs at the U.S. Department of State.” See also Kevin McGwin, “After 20 years, the
Arctic Council Reconsiders the Role of Observers,” Arctic Today, October 24, 2018.
127 For more on China’s actions in the South China Sea and their potential implications for U.S. interests, see CRS
Report R42784, U.S.-China Strategic Com petition in South and East China Seas: Background and Issues for Congress.
128 State Department, “Looking North: Sharpening America’s Arctic Focus, Remarks, Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of
State, Rovaniemi, Finland, May 6, 2019.”
129 See, for example, Robinson Meyer, “ Greenland’s Rare-Earth Election,” Atlantic, May 3, 2021; Liselotte Odgaard,
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States in 2018 had urged Denmark to finance the construction of airports that China had offered
to build in Greenland, so as to counter China’s attempts to increase its presence and influence
there.130 In May 2019, the State Department announced plan for establishing a permanent
diplomatic presence in Greenland,131 and on June 2020, the State Department formal y announced
the reopening of the U.S. consulate in Greenland’s capital of Nuuk.132 In April 2020, the U.S.
government announced $12.1 mil ion economic aid package for Greenland that the Trump
Administration presented as a U.S. action done in a context of Chinese and Russian actions aimed
at increasing their presence and influence in Greenland.133 Some observers argue that a desire to
preclude China (or Russia) from increasing its presence and influence in Greenland may have
been one of the reasons why President Trump in August 2019 expressed an interest in the idea of

“Greenland’s National Election and the US-China T ech Competition: The Rare Earth Challenge,” Hudson Institute,
April 9, 2021; Antonia Noori Farzan, “ How an Election in Greenland Could Affect China—and the Rare-Earth
Minerals in Your Cellphone,” Washington Post, April 8, 2021; Stacy Meichtry and Drew Hinshaw, “ China’s Greenland
Ambitions Run Into Local Politics, U.S. Influence,” Wall Street Journal, April 8, 2021; Agence France-Presse,
“Greenland Gears Up for Election Sparked by Debate over Chinese-Backed Rare Earths Mining,” South China
Morning Post, April 4, 2021; Sam Dunning, “ 56,000 Greenlanders Could Shape the Future of Rare Earths, Washington
and Beijing Are Watching a Snap Election on the Huge Island Closely,” Foreign Policy, March 10, 2021; Mary Kay
Magistad, “ How China's Belt and Road and an Australian Mining Company Could be the Deciding Issues in the
Greenland Election,” ABC [Australian Broadcasting Corporation] News, March 6 (updated March 14), 2021; Eric
Onstad, “ Five Eyes Alliance Urged to Forge T ies with Greenland to Secure Minerals,” Reuters, March 4, 2021; Jacob
Gronholt -Pedersen and Eric Onstad, “ Mining Magnets: Arctic Island Finds Green Power Can Be a Curse,” Reuters,
March 1, 2021; Per Kalvig and Hans Lucht , “ Greenland’s Minerals to Consolidate China’s Rare Earth Dominance?”
Dansk Institut for Internationale Studier (DIIS), February 25, 2021.
130 Drew Hinshaw and Jeremy Page, “How the Pentagon Countered China’s Designs on Greenland; Washington Urged
Denmark to Finance Airports that Chinese Aimed to Build on North America’s Doorstep,” Wall Street Journal,
February 10, 2019. See also Marc Lanteigne, “Greenland’s Airport Saga: Enter the US?” Over the Circle, September
18, 2018; Marc Lanteigne, “Greenland’s Airports: A Balance between China and Denmark?” Over the Circle, June 15,
2018; Arne Finne (translated by Elisabeth Bergquist), “Intense Airport Debate in Greenland,” High North News, May
30, 2018.
131 State Department, “Secretary Pompeo Postpones T ravel to Greenland,” Press Statement, Morgan Ortagus,
Department Spokesperson, May 9, 2019. See also Krestia DeGeorge, “US State Department Announces Plans for a
Diplomatic Presence in Greenland,” Arctic T oday, May 9, 2019; Morten Soendergaard Larsen and Robbie Gramer,
“T rump Puts Down New Roots in Greenland,” Foreign Policy, November 8, 2019.
132 See, for example, Eavan Cull, “Setting Up Shop in Nuuk,” Foreign Service Journal, May 2021; Lauren Meier and
Guy T aylor, “ U.S. Reopens Consulate in Greenland Amid Race for Arctic Supremacy,” Washington Tim es, June 10,
2020.
133 For State Department briefings about the economic aid package, see State Department, Briefing On the Road to
Nuuk: Economic Cooperation, Special Briefing, Michael J. Murphy, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European
and Eurasian Affairs, Francis R. Fannon, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Energy Resources, Jonathan Moore, Principal
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Oceans and International En vironmental and Scientific Affairs, Gretchen Birkle,
USAID Deputy Assistant Administrator, May 15, 2020; and State Department, Briefing on the Administration’s Arctic
Strategy, Special Briefing, Office of the Spokesperson, April 23, 2020.
For press reports about the economic aid package, see, for example, Jessica Donati, “ U.S. Offers Aid to Greenland to
Counter China, Russia,” Wall Street Journal, April 23, 2020; Carol Morello, “ U.S. to Give Aid to Greenland, Open
Consulate in Bid to Counter Russia and China,” Washington Post, April 23, 2020; Jacob Gronholt -Pedersen and
Humeyra Pamuk, “ US Extends Economic Aid to Greenland to Counter China, Russia in Arctic,” Reuters, April 23,
2020; Laura Kelly, “ US Announces New Funding for Greenland in Push for Stronger Arctic Presence,” The Hill, April
23, 2020; Paul McCleary, “ Battle For T he Arctic: Russia Plans Nuke Icebreaker, US Counters China In Greenland,”
Breaking Defense, April 23, 2020; Katrina Manson and Richard Milne, “ US Financial Aid for Greenland Sparks
Outrage in Denmark,” Financial Tim es, April 23, 2020; Alex Fang, “ US Rejects China’s ‘Near-Arctic State’ Claim in
New Cold War; Washington to Open Consulate in Greenland and Give Economic Aid,” Nikkei Asian Review, April 24
(updated April 26), 2020; Martin Breum, “ T he US Aid Package to Greenland Marks a New Chapter in a Long,
Complex Relationship,” Arctic Today, April 29, 2020; Malte Humpert, “ U.S. Says Arctic No Longer Immune from
Geopolitics As It Invests $12m in Greenland,” High North News, April 29, 2020; T om Parfitt, “ US, China and Russia
Wrestle for Influence in Greenland and the Arctic Circle,” Tim es (UK), May 1, 2020.
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buying Greenland from Denmark.134 In May 2021, Secretary of State Antony Blinken made a stop
in Greenland while returning to the United States from an Arctic Council ministerial meeting in
Reykjavik. During the stop, he was accompanied by Greenland’s prime minister, Greenland’s
foreign minister, and Denmark’s foreign minister.135
For Russia, the question of whether and how to respond to China’s activities in the Arctic may
pose particular complexities. On the one hand, Russia is promoting the NSR for use by others, in
part because Russia sees significant economic opportunities in offering icebreaker escorts,
refueling posts, and supplies to the commercial ships that wil ply the waterway. In that regard,
Russia presumably would welcome increased use of the route by ships moving betw een Europe
and China. More broadly, Russia and China have increased their cooperation on security and
other issues in recent years, in no smal part as a means of balancing or countering the United
States in international affairs, and Russian-Chinese cooperation in the Arctic (including China’s
investment in Russia’s Arctic oil and gas industry) can both reflect and contribute to that
cooperation.136 The U.S. Department of Defense stated in 2020 that China’s “expanding Arctic
engagement has created new opportunities for engagement between China and Russia. In April
2019, China and Russia established the Sino-Russian Arctic Research Center. In 2020, China and
Russia plan to use this center to conduct a joint expedition to the Arctic to research optimal routes

134 See, for example, Marc Lanteigne and Mingming Shi, “ ‘No Sale’: How T alk of a US Purchase of Greenland
Reflected Arctic Anxieties,” Over the Circle, September 17, 2020; Stuart Lau, “ Did China’s Growing Presence in
Arctic Prompt Donald T rump’s Offer to Buy Greenland?” South China Morning Post, September 1, 2019; Nadia
Schadlow, “Why Greenland Is Really About China,” The Hill, August 28, 2019; Daniel Lippman, “T rump’s Greenland
Gambit Finds Allies Inside Government,” Politico, August 24, 2019; Seth Borenstein (Associated Press), “Icy Arctic
Becomes Hot Property for Rival Powers,” Navy Times, August 22, 2019; Ragnhild Grønning, “Why T rump Is Looking
to Buy Greenland—Even If It’s Not for Sale,” High North News, August 19, 2019. See also Caitlin Hu and Stephen
Collinson, “ Why Exactly Is the US So Interested in Greenland?” CNN, July 23, 2020. See also T arisai Ngangura, “ Ex-
Staffer: T rump Wanted to T rade ‘Dirty’ Puerto Rico for Greenland,” Vanity Fair, August 19, 2020; Jacob Gronholt -
Pedersen, “ As the Arctic’s Attractions Mount, Greenland is a Security Black Hole,” Reuters, October 20, 2020; Gordon
Lubold, “U.S. Holds T alks Over Economic, Security Arrangements With Greenland,” Wall Street Journal, October 28,
2020
135 Kevin McGwin, “ Blinken’s Stop-Over in Greenland Highlights Its Importance to the US,” Arctic Today, May 21,
2021. See also Rebecca Beitsch, “ Blinken Confirms US No Longer Seeking to Purchase Greenland,” The Hill, May 21,
2021.
136 See, for example, Andrea Kendall-T aylor and David Shullman, “China and Russia’s Dangerous Convergence,”
Foreign Affairs, May 3, 2021; Sherri Goodman and Yun Sun, “ What You May Not Know About Sino-Russian
Cooperation in the Arctic and Why it Matters,” Diplom at, August 13, 2020; Sarah Cammarata, “ Russia and China
Should Be Viewed as ‘One Alliance’ in the Arctic, U.K. Defense Official Warns,” Politico, June 6, 2020; Owen
Matthews, “ Putin Needs Xi More than China Needs Russia,” Spectator USA, May 25, 2020; Ken Moriyasu, “ US
Awakens to Risk of China-Russia Alliance in the Arctic,” Nikkei Asian Review, May 24, 2020; Christopher Weidacher
Hsiung, “ T he Emergence of a Sino-Russian Economic Partnership in the Arctic?” Arctic Institute, May 19, 2020;
Mario Giagnorio, “ A Cold Relation: Russia, China and Science in the Arctic,” New Eastern Europe, March 25, 2020
(interview with Rasmus Gjedssø Bertelsen and Mariia Kobzeva); Alana Monteiro, “ Strategic Partnership, Arctic-Style:
How Russia and China Play the Game,” Modern Diplom acy, March 14, 2020; Matteo Giovannini, “ China and Russia
Strengthen Strategic Partnership Along ‘Polar Silk Road,’” China Daily, December 6, 2019; “Russia Reinforces its
Arctic Policies (With China Alongside),” Over the Circle, April 19, 2019: Melody Schreiber, “ US Has ‘Vital National
Interests’ at Stake in Russia-China Relationship in the Arctic, Expert Says,” Arctic Today, April 2, 2019; Rebecca
Pincus, China and Russia in the Arctic, T estimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission
Hearing on “An Emerging China-Russia Axis? Implications for the United States in an Era of Strategic Competition,”
March 21, 2019; Liz Ruskin, “China, Russia Find Common Cause in Arctic,” Alaska Public Media, March 21, 2019;
Olga Alexeeva and Frederic Lasserre, “An Analysis of Sino-Russian Cooperation in the Arctic in the BRI Era,”
Advances in Polar Science, December 2018: 269-282; Marc Lanteigne, “ Northern Crossroads, Sino -Russian
Cooperation in the Arctic,” National Bureau of Asian Research, March 2018, 6 pp.
Nicholas Groffman, “Why China-Russia Relations Are Warming Up in the Arctic,” South China Morning Post,
February 17, 2018.
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of the Northern Sea Route and the effects of climate change. The PRC wil cover 75 percent of
the expedition’s expenses.”137
On the other hand, Russian officials are said to be wary of China’s continued growth in wealth
and power, and of how that might eventual y lead to China becoming the dominant power in
Eurasia, and to Russia being relegated to a secondary or subordinate status in Eurasian affairs
relative to China. Increased use by China of the NSR could accelerate the realization of that
scenario: As noted above, the NSR forms part of China’s geopolitical Belt and Road Initiative
(BRI). Some observers argue that actual levels of Sino-Russian cooperation in the Arctic are not
as great as Chinese or Russian announcements about such cooperation might suggest.138
Linkages Between Arctic and South China Sea
Another potential implication of the renewal of great power competition is a linkage that is
sometimes made between the Arctic and the South China Sea relating to international law of the
sea or the general issue of international cooperation and competition.139 One aspect of this linkage
relates to whether China’s degree of compliance with international law of the sea in the South
China Sea has any implications for understanding potential Chinese behavior regarding its
compliance with international law of the sea (and international law general y) in the Arctic.
A second aspect of this linkage, mentioned earlier, is whether the United States should consider
the option of moving to suspend China’s observer status on the Arctic Council as a punitive cost-
imposing measure for unwanted Chinese actions in the South China Sea.

137 Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020, Annual
Report to Congress, generated August 21, 2020, released September 1, 2020, p. 133.
138 For additional discussion, see, for example, Jim T ownsend and Andrea Kendall-T aylor, Partners, Competitors, or a
Little of Both? Russia and China in the Arctic, Center for a New American Security (CNAS), March 2021, 17 pp.;
Duncan Depledge, “ Why We Must Watch Sino-Russia Relations in the Arctic,” Sunday Guardian, November 28,
2020; Elizabeth Buchanan, “ Russia and China in the Arctic: Assumptions and Realities,” Australian Strategic Policy
Institute, September 25, 2020; Maria Shagina and Benno Zogg, “ Arctic Matters: Sino-Russian Dynamics,” Center for
Security Studies (CSS) at ET H Zurich, September 2020, 4 pp.; Elizabeth Buchanan, “ T here Is No Arctic Axis, Russia
and China’s Partnership in the North is Primarily Driven by Business, Not Politics,” Foreign Policy, July 21, 2020;
Mariia Kobzeva, “ A Framework for Sino-Russian Relations in the Arctic,” Arctic Institute, May 5, 2020; Ling Guo and
Steven Lloyd Wilson, “ China, Russia, and Arctic Geopolitics,” Diplom at, March 29, 2020; James Foggo III, “ Russia,
China Offer Challenges in the Arctic,” Defense One, July 10, 2019; Anita Parlow, “Does a Russia-China Alignment in
the Arctic Have Staying Power?” Arctic Today, June 27, 2019; Marc Lanteigne, “Scenes from a Northern Crossroad:
China and Russia in the Arctic,” Over the Circle, February 20, 2019; Marc Lanteigne, “No Borderline: A Norway -
Russia Frontier Festival Connects with China,” Over the Circle, February 16, 2019; Atle Staalesen, “ Beijing Finds a
Chinatown on NoRway’s Arctic Coast,; T he Asian Superpower Looks towards the Arctic and Finds a Home in T his
Year’s Barents Spektakel Winter Festival,” Barents Observer, February 12, 2019; Elizabeth Wishnick, “Russia and the
Arctic in China’s Quest for Great -Power Status,” in Ashley J. T ellis, Alison Szalwinski, and Michael Wills, editors,
Strategic Asia 2019, China’s Expanding Strategic Ambitions, National Bureau of Asian Research, Seattle and
Washington, DC, pp. 64-75.
139 See, for example, Robinson Meyer, “T he Next ‘South China Sea’ Is Covered in Ice,” Atlantic, May 15, 2019; Justin
D. Nankivell, “T he Role of History and Law in the South China Sea and Arctic Ocean,” Maritime Awareness Project,
August 7, 2017; Sydney J. Freedberg, “Is T he Arctic T he next South China Sea? Not Likely,” Breaking Defense,
August 4, 2017; Caroline Houck, “T he Arctic Could Be the Next South China Sea, Says Coast guard Commandant,”
Defense One, August 1, 2017; Daniel T homassen, “ Lessons from the Arctic for the South China Sea,” Center for
International Maritime Security, April 4, 2017. For a different perspective, see Elizabeth Buchanan and Bec Strating,
“Why the Arctic Is Not the ‘Next’ South China Sea,” War on the Rocks, November 5, 2020.
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A third aspect of this linkage concerns the question of whether the United States should become a
party to UNCLOS: Discussions of that issue sometimes mention both the situation in the South
China Sea140 and the extended continental shelf issue in the Arctic.141
Extended Continental Shelf Submissions, Territorial Disputes,
Sovereignty Issues
For additional background information on extended continental shelf submissions, territorial
disputes, and sovereignty issues in the Arctic, see Appendix H.
U.S. Military Forces and Operations142
Overview
During the Cold War, the Arctic was an arena of military competition between the United States
and the Soviet Union, with both countries, for example, operating long-range bombers, tactical
combat aircraft, maritime patrol aircraft, nuclear-powered submarines, surface warships, and
ground forces in the region. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of most elements of the
Russian military establishment following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991
greatly reduced this competition, leading to a post-Cold War period of reduced emphasis on the
Arctic in U.S. military planning. In more recent years, the return of great power competition and a
significant increase in Russian military capabilities and operations in the Arctic has led to
growing concerns among U.S. officials and other observers that the Arctic is once again
becoming a region of military tension and competition,143 and to a renewed focus on the Arctic in
U.S. military planning.
As noted earlier, Russia since 2008 has adopted a series of strategy documents outlining plans
that cal for, among other things, bolstering the country’s Arctic military capabilities. Among
other actions, Russia has established a new Arctic Joint Strategic Command at Severomorsk (the
home of the Russian navy’s Northern Fleet), reactivated and modernized Arctic military bases
that fel into disuse with the end of the Cold War, assigned new forces to those bases, and
increased military exercises and training operations in the Arctic.144 Some observers have

140 For further discussion of this situation, see CRS Report R42784, U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and
East China Seas: Background and Issues for Congress.
141 See, for example, Ben Werner, “Zukunft: U.S. Presence in Arctic Won’t Stop Chinese, Russia Encroachment
Without Law of the Sea Ratification,” USNI News, August 1, 2017.
142 T his section prepared by Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and T rade
Division.
143 See, for example, Nancy T eeple, “ T he Impact of the Post-Arms Control Context and Great Power Competition in
the Arctic,” Arctic Institute, June 22, 2021; Christopher Woody, “As Militaries Get Busier in the Arctic, the US and
Russia Are Running Out of Ways to Solve Problems T here,” Business Insider, May 26, 2021; Kris Osborn, “ Russia vs.
U.S. Navy: How a Warming Arctic Is Heating up Military Competition ,” National Interest, January 12, 2021; Rebecca
Hersman, Eric Brewer, and Maxwell Simon , Strategic Stability and Com petition in the Arctic, Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS), January 2021, 11 pp.; Christopher Woody, “ As T rump Shakes Up the Military Footprint
in Europe, the US and Russia Are Making Moves in the High North,” Business Insider, August 30, 2020; Anya
Gorodentsev, “ Will the Arctic Become the Next South China Sea?” National Interest, May 17, 2020; “ America and
Britain Play Cold-War Games with Russia in the Arctic,” Econom ist, May 10, 2020. See also “ Arctic Military Activity
T racker,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
144 Regarding increased Russian military capabilities and operations in the Arctic, see, for example, Andrew E. Kramer,
“In the Russian Arctic, the First Stirrings of a Very Cold War,” New York Times, May 22, 2021; Sarah Rainsford,
“Russia Flexes Muscles in Challenge for Arctic Control,” BBC News, May 20, 2021; Kostya Manenkov and Vladimir
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expressed growing concern at these developments. Other observers have noted the continued
cooperative aspects of relations among the Arctic states, including Russia, and argue that the
competitive aspects of the situation have been overstated.145 Some observers argue that Russia’s
recent military investment in the Arctic is sometimes exaggerated, reflects normal modernization
of aging capabilities, or is intended partly for domestic Russian consumption.146
With the return of great power competition, the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Coast
Guard (which is part of the Department of Homeland Security [DHS]) are devoting increased
attention to the Arctic in their planning and operations. DOD as a whole, the Army, the Navy and
Marine Corps, the Air Force, and the Coast Guard have each issued Arctic strategy documents in
recent years (see Appendix G for excerpts from these documents, as wel as DOD and Coast
Guard testimony on their Arctic strategies and operations). Al U.S. military services are

Isachenkov, “ Russia’s Northernmost Base Projects Its Power Across Arctic,” Associated Press, May 18, 2021; John
Grady, “Panel Warns of Economic and Military Impacts from Russia’s Plans for Arctic,” USNI News, May 11, 2021;
Sebastian Sprenger, “ Russian Military Buildup in the Arctic Has Northern NAT O Members Uneasy,” Defense News,
April 12, 2021; Alexander Bratersky, “ Russia’s Arctic Activity to Increase with Fresh Strategy and More Capability
T ests,” Defense News, April 11, 2021; Kris Osborn, “ Why Did Russia Send More S-400 Missile Defense Systems to
the Arctic?” National Interest, April 7, 2021; C. T odd Lopez, “ DOD Closely Monitoring Russian Activities in Arctic,”
DOD News, April 5, 2021; Abraham Mahshie, “ Russia T hreatens US Interests in Arctic with Military Buildup,”
Washington Exam iner, April 5, 2021; Ellen Mitchell, “ Satellite Images Show Large Russian Military Build Up in
Arctic: Report ,” The Hill, April 5, 2021; Stephen Silver, “ Danger Ahead: Russia Is Increasing Its Military Presence in
the Arctic,” National Interest, April 5, 2021; Nick Paton Walsh, “ Satellite Images Show Huge Russian Military
Buildup in the Arctic,” CNN, April 5, 2021; Christopher Woody, “ The US Military Wants to Get Ahead of ‘More
Complex’ Russian Operations, T op North American Commander Says,” Business Insider, April 1, 2021..
See also Heather A. Conley and Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Ice Curtain: Tiksi Airbase—Many Russian Announcem ents,
Little Equipm ent, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), March 2020, 9 pp.; Heather A. Conley and
Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Ice Curtain: Why Is There a New Russian Military Facility 300 Miles from Alaska ? Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), March 2020, 6 pp.; Matthew Melino, Heather A. Conley, and Joseph S.
Bermudez Jr., Modernization on the Kola Peninsula, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), March
2020, 15 pp.; Matthew Melino and Heather A. Conley, “ T he Ice Curtain: Russia’s Arctic Military Presence,” Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), March 26, 2020.
145 See, for example, Robert David English and Morgan Grant Gardner, “Phantom Peril in the Arctic, Russia Doesn’t
T hreaten the United States in the Far North—But Climate Change Does,” Foreign Affairs, September 29, 2020; Mia
Bennett, “U.S. Rhetoric About the Strategic Importance of the Arctic Is Out of Step with Its Spending Priorities,”
Arctic Today, July 26, 2019; “ Arctic Conflict With Russia ‘Not Likely In T he Short -T erm’, Analyst Says,” Forces,
January 30, 2019; Danita Catherine Burke, “ Why the New Arctic ‘Cold War’ Is a Dangerous Myth,” The Conversation,
December 13, 2018; Martin Breum, “Why Russia Is Likely to Remain Cooperative in the Arctic,” Arctic Today,
November 22, 2018; John Grady, “Panel: Cooperation, Not Conflict Key to Future of the Arctic,” USNI News, April 8,
2018; Levon Sevunts,” NAT O Wants to Keep the Arctic An Area of Low T ensions, Stoltenberg,” Radio Canada
International, April 4, 2018; Levon Sevunts, “ Arctic Nations Develop Coast Guard Co-operation,” Independent
Barents Observer, March 13, 2018.
146 See, for example, Hilde-Gunn Bye, “Russia Pays Considerable Attention to Improve Arctic Infrastructure, Says
Defence Minister,” High North News, April 14, 2021; Lyle Goldstein, “ Washington Should Chill Out over Russia’s
Arctic Ambitions,” Defense News, November 13, 2020; Robert D. English, “ Why an Arctic Arms Race Would Be a
Mistake,” Arctic Today, June 18, 2020; Marc Montgomery, “Russia’s Military Feat in Arctic, Spectacular, But No Real
T hreat to West ,” Radio Canada International, May 12, 2020; Elizabeth Buchanan and Mathieu Boulègue, “ Russia’s
Military Exercises in the Arctic Have More Bark T han Bite,” Foreign Policy, May 20, 2019; Arne F. Finne, “Russia Is
a Responsible Actor in the Arctic,” High North News, January 22, 2019; Stephanie Pezard, The New Geopolitics of the
Arctic, Russia’s and China’s Evolving Role in the Region, RAND (T estimony presented before the Standing
Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development of the Canadian House of Commons on November 26,
2018), pp. 2-4 (which presents comments on both sides of the issue of whether other countries should be concerned by
Russia’s Arctic military capabilities); T homas Nilsen, “New Weapons T esting Is Worrying, But Does Not Raise
T ensions in the North, [Norway’s] Defense Minister Says,” Barents Observer, August 26, 2018. See also Hilde-Gunn
Bye, “From Norway to North America: Differing Views On New Russian Weapon Systems,” High North News,
February 24, 2020.
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conducting increased exercises and training operations in the region, some in conjunction with
forces from NATO al ies and non-NATO Nordic countries, that are aimed at
 reacquainting U.S. forces with—and responding to changes in—operating
conditions in the region,147
 rebuilding Arctic-specific warfighting skil s that eroded during the post-Cold War
era,
 strengthening interoperability with al ied forces in the region,
 identifying Arctic military capability gaps,
 testing the performance of equipment under Arctic conditions, and
 sending Russia and China signals of resolve and commitment regarding the
Arctic.148
A July 28, 2021 press report stated:
US military leaders said on Tuesday [July 27] that they see Arctic operations as a deterrent
to China, which has staked a claim to the region as part of its Belt and Road Initiative, and
increasingly as a base for operations in the Indo-Pacific.
Panellists including US Air Force officials Kelli Seybolt and Lieutenant General Clinton
Hinote discussed the strengthening of what Seybolt called defence relationships with “six
of the seven other Arctic nations providing key strategic advantages”, excluding Russia….
While Russia’s military activities in the Arctic are understandable given that it has an
interest in oil and gas from its deposits in the region, and the US would be open to including
Moscow in discussions among Arctic nations in the long-term if relations were to improve,
Seybolt said, China’s claim in 2018 to be a near-Arctic nation was a “kind of mind-
boggling statement”….

147 See, for example, Caitlin M. Kenney, “ In the Newly Noisy Arctic, Underwater Operations Are Getting Harder,”
Defense One, August 2, 2021; Court ney Mabeus, “ T he Navy Sent Another Carrier on a Rare T rip to the High North.
Here’s How Sailors Kept It Going in Harsh Conditions Around Alaska,” Business Insider, July 25, 2021.
148 See, for example, T heresa Hitchens, “ Air Force Plans Wargames, T ech Experiments T o Flesh Out Arctic Strategy ,”
Breaking Defense, July 27, 2021; Immanuel Johnson, “ Fires Shock Artillery Drills End in the Arctic as US Army
Launches Rockets in Norway,” Stars and Stripes, June 11, 2021; Philip Athey, “ A Marine Fight in the Arctic May
Look Like T his,” Marine Corps Tim es, June 4, 2021; John Harper, “ Cold Front: Special Operations Forces Bracing for
Arctic Missions,” National Defense, May 14, 2021; USS T heodore Roosevelt Public Affairs, “ U.S. T heodore Roosevelt
Carrier Strike Group Begins Exercise Northern Edge 2021 ,” U.S. Navy, May 4, 2021; Stavros Atlamazoglou, “ How
Delta, Rangers, and the Green Berets’ Unique T raining Would Pay Off in an Arctic War with Russia,” Business
Insider, April 15, 2021; Christen McCurdy, “ U.S. Marines, Norwegian Military Hold Arctic T raining Exercise,” United
Press International, April 8, 2021; T homas Nilsen, “ U.S. Special Operation Forces Exercise Winter Combat in
Northern Sweden,” Barents Observer, April 8, 2021; Rachel S. Cohen, “ ‘Northern Edge’ Brings Firepower to Alaska,
with an Eye on Arctic Jockeying,” Air Force Tim es, April 1, 2021; Sam LaGrone, “ Carrier Strike Group, 15th Marine
Expeditionary Unit Will Join Air Force in Massive Alaska Exercise,” USNI News, March 31, 2021; Brian W. Everstine,
“U.S., Canadian Aircraft T rain to Protect Arctic Airspace,” Air Force Magazine, March 26, 2021; Ed Adamczyk, “B-2
bomber, Norwegian F-35s Integrate in Arctic Circle Exercise,” United Press International, March 22, 2021; Nunatsiaq
News, “ NORAD Exercise T akes to the Arctic Skies,” Nunatsiaq News, March 22, 2021; Brian W. Everstine, “ B-1s, B-
2s Fly T ogether Near Iceland, Highlighting Importance of Arctic Ops,” Air Force Magazine, March 17, 2021; David
Axe, “U.S. Air Force Bomber Crews Brave T he Cold As T he Pentagon Expands Its Arctic Options,” Forbes, March
10, 2021; Christen McCurdy, “ B-1B Conducts Bomber T ask Force Mission in Norway and Sweden,” United Press
International, March 9, 2021; T homas Nilsen, “ U.S. B-1 Bomber Makes First Landing Inside Norway’s Arctic Circle,”
Barents Observer, March 9, 2021; Brian W. Everstine, “ First B-1 Deployment to Norway Shows Importance of Arctic,
Cold-Weather Ops,” Air Force Magazine, March 5, 2021; Paul McLeary, “ No ‘New Cold War’ As US Bombers Move
Into Norwegian Base,” Breaking Defense, March 5, 2021; Marcy Sanchez, “ FinnsT teach American Soldiers How to
Fight a ‘Winter War,’” Audacy, March 1, 2021.
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Also on the panel was William Liquori, a lieutenant general serving in the new United
States Space Force….
While promoting integration with the Arctic forces of Canada, Finland, Norway and other
US allies as a way to counter objectionable activities by China, the panellists said military
installations in Alaska were becoming crucial as bases for operations in the Indo-Pacific,
where Washington is working more closely with regional partners to check Beijing’s
expansive maritime claims.
“You could also think of military power that is stationed in the high north, and especialy
in Alaska, as being forward positioned in two major theatres, the Indo -Pacific and in
Europe, and in essence you could conceivably do power projection sorties out of Alaska to
both of those areas,” Hinote said.
“What we have seen in our war gaming is that it’s an incredibly effective place to base air
operations out of,” he added. “And so this gets into the reason why we are investing so
much in places like [Anchorage and Fairbanks], and what we’ve got going on with the
extended operations.149
In addition to these increased exercises and training operations, the Coast Guard, as a major new
acquisition project, is procuring new polar icebreakers cal ed Polar Security Cutters (PSCs) to
replace its aging heavy polar icebreakers. (For further discussion, see the following section of this
report on polar icebreaking.)
Canada, the UK, and the Nordic countries are taking steps to increase their own military presence
and operations in the region, and as noted above, have participated alongside U.S. military forces
in certain Arctic exercises.150 As mentioned earlier, a NATO exercise cal ed Trident Juncture 18
that was held from October 25 to November 7, 2018, in Norway and adjacent waters of the Baltic
and the Norwegian Sea, with participation by al 29 NATO members plus Sweden and Finland,
was described as NATO’s largest exercise to that point since the Cold War, and featured a strong
Arctic element, including the first deployment of a U.S. Navy aircraft carrier above the Arctic
Circle since 1991.151

149 Robert Delaney, “ Arctic Is Key Region in Countering China’s Aggression, US Air Force Officials Say,” South
China Morning Post, July 28, 2021. See also Jim Garamone, “ Austin Says Alaska Is Strategic Hotspot for Indo-Pacific,
Arctic Operations,” DOD News, July 25, 2021.
150 See, for example, Andrew Eversden, “ 7 Allies Sign onto Polar Research Project,” C4ISRNet, April 11, 2021; Larry
Luxner, “ How Russia, China, and Climate Change Are Shaking Up the Arctic,” Atlantic Council, March 23, 2021;
John Grady, “ Norwegian Officials: Russian Arctic Expansion Making Security Landscape ‘Difficult,’” USNI News,
March 22, 2021; Ed Adamczyk, “ NORAD Readies for Arctic Air Defense Exercises,” United Press International,
March 17, 2021; Larisa Brown, “ Royal Navy to Defend Arctic T rade as Ice Melts,” Times (UK), March 10, 2021;
Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs, “ Acting SecAF, Nordic Ministers of Defense Sign Letter of Intent
Strengthening US-Nordic Defense T ies,” U.S. Air Force, February 18, 2021; Richard Milne, “ Denmark Raises
Investment in Arctic Surveillance to Counter Russian Build-up,” Financial Tim es, February 14, 2021; Jacob Gronholt -
Pedersen, “ Denmark to Spend More on Arctic Defence as Melting Sea Ice Prompts Jostle for Control,” Reuters,
February 11, 2021; Patricia Kime, “ Nordic Allies Help Navy Improve Ship Ops in Icy Waterways as Arctic
Competition Heats Up,” Military.com , February 4, 2021.
151 See, for example, Christopher Woody, “‘We Can Do Better’: T he Navy’s Newest Fleet Commander Says US Ships
and Sailors Got ‘Beat Up’ During NAT O’s Biggest Exercise Since the Cold War,” Business Insider, December 4,
2018; Levon Sevunts, “ NAT O’s Arctic Dilemma; T wo Visions of the Arctic Collide as NAT O and Russia Flex
Muscles,” Radio Canada International, December 3, 2018; Megan Eckstein, “T ruman CSG: Arctic Strike Group
Operations Required Focus on Logistics, Safety,” USNI News, November 6, 2018; Mary T hompson-Jones, “NATO’s
Arctic Exercise is a Good Start to Standing Up to Russian Militarization of the High North,” National Interest,
November 6, 2018; Pierre-Henry Deshayes, “ Antifreeze and Balaclavas: NAT O T roops in cold War Games,”
Military.com , November 2, 2018; Vasco Cotovio and Frederik Pleitgen, “ Submarines a Centerpiece of Russia’s Navy,”
CNN, November 19, 2018; Shawn Snow, “ T he Corps’ Armor Makes a Big Showing in Norway as Marines T est Future
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An exercise to be held in Norway in 2022, cal ed Cold Response 2022, reportedly wil be largest
military exercise inside the Arctic Circle in Norway since the 1980s.152
Some observers have expressed concern about whether the United States is doing enough
militarily to defend its interests in the Arctic, and in some cases have offered their
recommendations for doing more.153 Whether DOD and the Coast Guard are devoting sufficient
resources to the Arctic and taking sufficient actions for defending U.S. interests in the region has
emerged as a topic of congressional oversight. Those who argue that DOD and the Coast Guard
are not devoting sufficient resources and taking sufficient actions argue, for example, that DOD
and the Coast Guard should build ice-hardened surface ships other than icebreakers for
deployment to the Arctic and/or establish a strategic port in Alaska’s north to better support DOD
and Coast Guard operations in the Arctic.154 A June 17, 2021, press report states:
The Pentagon’s 2022 budget is light on funding for defending the Arctic, but Defense
Department officials expect future funding requests to rise with the region’s growing
importance.
Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III, testifying before the Senate Appropriations defense
subcommittee June 17, said the current fiscal 2022 request provides only “some capability”
for the Arctic, adding, “We have to better resource our Arctic efforts in the future.”
The Pentagon is hashing out a new National Defense Strategy, he said, and “my goal is to
make sure that our efforts in the Arctic, our requirements in the Arctic, are reflected in the
new National Defense Strategy.”
U.S. Northern Command boss Gen. Glen D. VanHerck testified to the Senate Armed
Services Committee June 9 that the Arctic region is not getting the funding it needs.
“Senator, I think when I look at the FY22 budget, I see an inching along in all of the
services, he said. “I’m encouraged: They all have strategies now, and the department has a
strategy, and my strategy heavily relies on the Arctic,” the Air Force four-star said. “But
we didn’t move the ball very far down the field this year in the budget.”…

Force,” Marine Corps Times, October 25, 2018; T erje Solsvik, “As Winter Comes, NAT O Kicks Off Largest
Maneuvers Since Cold War,” Reuters, October 25, 2018; Kyle Rempfer, “US Breaches the Arctic with Marines,
Fighter Jets and Aircraft Carriers,” Military Times, October 23, 2018; Megan Eckstein, “T ruman Carrier Strike Group
Operating North of Arctic Circle; First T ime for US Navy Since 1991,” USNI News, October 19, 2018; T homas
Gooley, “HST Strike Group Enters Arctic Circle, Prepares for NAT O Exercise,” DVIDS (Defense Visual Information
Distribution Service), October 19, 2018; T homas Nilsen, “ US Marines Launch Exercise in Northern Norway Ahead of
T rident Juncture,” Barents Observer, October 15, 2018.
152 T homas Nilsen, “ Norway to Host Biggest Exercise Inside Arctic Circle Since Cold War,” Barents Observer, April
14, 2021.
153 See, for example, David Auerswald, “A U.S. Security Strategy for the Arctic,” War on the Rocks, May 27, 2021;
T homas Grove, “ Russian Military Seeks to Outmuscle U.S. in Arctic,” Wall Street Journal, May 25,m 2021; T imothy
Greenhaw, Daniel L. Magruder Jr., Rodrick H. McHaty, and Michael Sinclair, US Military Options To Enhance Arctic
Defense, Brookings Institution, May 2021, 15 pp.; Mark Magnier, “ A More Accessible Arctic Becomes Proving
Ground for US-China Military Jockeying,” South China Morning Post, May 3, 2021; C. T odd Lopez, “ U.S. Must Get
‘On the Field’ in Arctic to Defend National Interests T here,” DOD News, April 15, 2021; Christen McCurdy,
“NORT HCOM says U.S. must defend interests in the Arctic,” United Press International, April 15, 2021; John Grady,
“Panel: NAT O Needs to T ake Russian Offensive, Defensive Advances in Arctic Seriously ,” USNI News, July 1, 2020;
Jerry Hendrix, “ T he United States Must Defend Open Seas in the Arctic,” National Review, May 13, 2020; Mathieu
Boulegue, “Military Assets in the Arctic: A Russia-West Correlation of Forces,” Russia Matters, January 22, 2020.
154 See, for example, Dermot Cole, “T he US Writes, But Does Not Implement, Arctic Strategies,” Arctic Today,
January 13, 2020; John M. Doyle, “U.S. Lacks Ice Hardened Sh ips, Repair and Refueling Ports for Arctic Ops,”
Seapower, March 4, 2020; Ben Werner, “ Navy, Marines T ell Congress Emphasis on Arctic is Growing,” USNI News,
March 5, 2020.
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Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark A. Milley, appearing alongside Austin,
said the 2022 budget request provides adequate investment “for right now.” But he said the
region will become “increasingly important geostrategically” and that DOD has little
choice but to “increase resourcing in the Arctic.”155
March 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance Document
As mentioned earlier, an Interim National Security Strategic Guidance document released by the
Biden Administration in March 2021156 does not specifical y mention the Arctic.
January 2018 National Defense Strategy Document
An unclassified summary of the National Defense Strategy released by the Trump Administration
in January 2018157 does not specifical y mention the Arctic.
U.S. and Canada Plan to Update Warning Radars in Arctic
A February 27, 2021, press report states:
The U.S. and Canada plan to modernize a network of defense satellites and radar in the
Arctic, in a bid to counter a growing military presence in the north from Russia and China.
President Biden asked Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau to ramp up Canada’s
spending on defense, including an upgrade of the North American Aerospace Defense
Command, commonly known as Norad, during a bilateral meeting between the two leaders
on Tuesday [February 23], according to an official familiar with the discussions….
… On Friday [February 26], the U.S. State Department listed the defense system as one of
the priorities for the U.S. and Canadian bilateral relationship, ahead of a meeting between
U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Mr. Trudeau along with other senior
officials….
Norad also came up during a Jan. 22 call between the leaders, highlighting the importance
the U.S. is placing on the upgrade of a surveillance system that was first developed in the
1950s.158
April 2021 Agreement Regarding Bases in Norway
An April 19, 2021, press report states:

155 Brian W. Everstine, “ DOD Leaders Want More Arctic Funding, But Not Right Now,” Air Force Magazine, June 17,
2021. See also Greg Hadley, “ VanHerck: Services ‘Didn’t Move the Ball Very Far’ With Arctic Spending in 2022 ,”
Air Force Magazine, June 10, 2021.
156 White House, Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, March 2021, released on March 3, 2021, 23 pp.
157 Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America:
Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge, January 2018, 11 pp.
158 Vipal Monga and Paul Vieira, “ Cold War-Era Defense System to Get Upgrade to Counter Russia, China,” Wall
Street Journal, February 27, 2021. See also Hilde-Gunn Bye, “ USA and Canada Agree to Modernize NORAD,” High
North News, February 24,2021; Levon Sevunt s, “ NORAD Modernization to Dominate Agenda of Canada-U.S.
Defence Relations, Experts Say,” Eye on the Arctic (Radio Canada International), February 5, (updated February 6),
2021. See also Hilde-Gunn Bye, “ NORAD, NORT HCOM Strategy Highlights Changing Strategic Environment in the
Arctic,” High North News, March 18, 2021; T om Yun, “ T hreats from Russia, China Underscore Need to Modernize
Norad: Expert ,” CTV News (Canada), March 30, 2021; Frank Wolfe, “ Modernization of North Warning System for
Arctic Needed, Hinote Says,” Defense Daily, July 27, 2021.
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American and NATO ships, submarines, and aircraft will soon come calling at a handful
of new ports and airfields in the Norwegian Arctic, thanks to a major new pact signed
Friday [April 16].
The Supplementary Defense Cooperation Agreement will allow the US to build
infrastructure at three air bases and a navy facility along the Norwegian coast to bolster
American and NATO allied operations in the Arctic and North Atlantic….
Once it’s approved, the US will be able to start building new facilities at the Rygge, Sola,
and Evenes airfields, along with the Ramsund navy base, while rotating troops and
contractors to those bases to maintain facilities and service US aircraft and ships.
The Ramsund facilities would mark the second base where American submarines and ships
can regularly resupply along Norway’s North Atlantic coast, following the expected
opening of the Tromso port even further north to American submarines in the coming
weeks after undergoing a major expansion effort last year….
The new work is likely to include facilities for P-8 surveillance planes and B-1 bombers,
which would use the bases as a launching pad to monitor Russian submarines sailing from
Northern Fleet’s main base on Kola peninsula, hard up against the Norwegian border.
The US government will pay for all facilities it builds on Norwegian soil, and won’t
permanently base any troops there, officials in Oslo were quick to point out. It’s a point the
Norwegian government has long stressed when talking about US Marine rotations to the
country for training.159
August 2020 Press Report About Marines in Norway
In August 2020, it was reported that a force of about 700 U.S. Marines that had been stationed in
Norway on a rotational basis since 2017 would be withdrawn, leaving only 20 Marines
permanently stationed there, and that in the future Marines would visit Norway in larger numbers
only in connection with exercises.160
Surveillance and Reconnaissance, Domain Awareness, and Communications
DOD and Coast Guard officials have stated that recent U.S. military operations in the Arctic have
highlighted a need for improved capabilities for conducting surveil ance and reconnaissance in
the region, so as to support improved domain awareness (i.e., real-time or near-real-time
awareness of military and other activities taking place across the region), and for improved
communication abilities, because existing U.S. military communications systems were designed
to support operations in lower latitudes rather than in the polar regions. A September 21, 2020,
press report states:
The United States and its allies have been chilling out this summer, but experts and officials
say something has been missing that prevents them from making the most of the
experience….
… according to analysts, governments and a senior former military official, the Western
coalition lacks adequate surveillance and intelligence in the region.

159 Paul McLeary, “ Norway, US Bolster Russian Sub Watching With New Bases,” Breaking Defense, April 19, 2021.
See also Chad Garland, “ US Can Build Military Facilities in Norway Under New Defense Cooperation Pact,” Stars and
Stripes, April 16, 2021; T homas Nilsen, “ U.S. Navy Will Build Airport Infrastructure in Northern Norway to Meet
Upped Russian Submarine Presence,” Barents Observer, April 16, 2021; T erje Solsvik and Nerijus Adomaitis,
“Norway to Allow U.S. Military to Build on Its Soil in New Accord,” Reuters, April 16, 2021.
160 See, for example, Atle Staalesen, “Most US Marines Based in Norway Will Leave T his Fall,” Arctic Today, August
6, 2020.
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“We have significant domain awareness challenges, and that really begins in the high
latitudes,” former U.S. Coast Guard Commandant Adm. Paul Zukunft told a virtual
audience at the 2020 Defense News Conference, which took place Sept. 9-10. “Things start
to get pretty dark once you get up higher than 72 degrees north.”…
To illustrate the issue, Zukunft said the Coast Guard recently made a stunning discovery in
the Arctic—something for which the service should have received early warning from
intelligence officials.
“We sent a national security cutter to patrol that region in a relatively ice-free portion of
the season,” Zukunft recounted. “And we stumbled upon a joint exercise between Russia
and China. Our intelligence community did not have awareness that this was going on. So
we were the originators of this information and otherwise we would not have known. We
need to continue to invest in domain awareness.”
Zukunft posited that it should be possible to identify high-threat locations in the Arctic
region and send assets to monitor those areas. That would be more effective than trying to
saturate the whole region with air and surface assets, he said.161
U.S. military services are starting to take actions to address the need for improved surveil ance
and reconnaissance, domain awareness, and communications in the Arctic.162
Impact of Warmer Temperatures on U.S. Military Bases in Alaska
An August 9, 2020, press report about the impact of warmer temperatures on U.S. military bases
in Alaska stated
When warming temperatures melted the frozen ground under the munitions repair facility
here [Eielson Air Force Base] years ago, the foundation shifted, causing deep cracks to
spread across the thick concrete walls.
Over time, the repair bay for missiles and other explosives began to separate from the floor,
forcing the 12-foot blast-proof doors out of alignment so they could not be properly closed,
according to Defense Department documents and interviews with base construction
officials.
Then the entire facility, built on a sloping hillside and hidden in a patch of dense trees,
started slowly sliding toward the base of 10,000 people working and living below….
The detrimental effect of global warming is pushing up the cost of ongoing operations at
three of Alaska’s four major U.S. military bases: Eielson [Air Force Base], Fort
Wainwright and Clear Air Force Base. All are located in the warming south-central swath
of Alaska where patchwork or “discontinuous” permafrost exists and is prone to melting.
Military planners have requested more than $1 billion over five years to fund construction
needed to keep the three bases operational and to support the employees and families who

161 David B. Larter, “ T he Arctic Is a Strategic Hot Spot, but Western Allies Lack Good Intel,” Defense News,
September 21, 2020.
162 See, for example, Bill Liquori and Iris Ferguson, “How the US Space Force Plans to Improve Arctic
Communication,” C4ISRNet, July 14, 2021; William McCormick, “ NORT HCOM, NORAD Request $80M Budget for
T esting of Arctic Communication Satellites,” ExecutiveBiz, June 11, 2021; Nathan Strout, “ NORAD, NORT HCOM
Want $80 Million to T est SpaceX and OneWeb in the Arctic,” C4ISRNet, June 10, 2021; Frank Wolfe, “ 10 Starlink
Satellites to Enhance Arctic Communications for NORT HCOM,” Defense Daily, April 15, 2021; T heresa Hitchens,
“AFRL, NORT HCOM Eye Commercial Internet Sats For Arctic,” Breaking Defense, March 3, 2021; Frank Wolfe,
“Air Force Envisions Improved Communications and Sensor Capabilities for Arctic,” Defense Daily, October 5, 2020;
Joseph T revithick, “ The Navy Is Building A Network Of Drone Submarines And Sensor Buoys In T he Arctic,” The
Drive, October 1, 2020.
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work and live on them, according to a Howard Center for Investigative Journalism analysis
of military service construction requests submitted to Congress from fiscal year 2015-2020.
While only a portion of that spending was for climate-related work, that portion is expected
to grow.163
June 2021 DOD Creation of Ted Stevens Center for Arctic Security Studies
A June 9, 2021, DOD News article states:
The Defense Department announced today the creation of a new DOD center to focus on
issues related to the Arctic.
The Ted Stevens Center for Arctic Security Studies will be the sixth such regional c enter
for the department, Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby said during a briefing today at
the Pentagon.
“The Ted Stevens Center will provide a new venue to collaborate across the U.S.
government and with our allies and partners to advance shared interests for a peaceful and
prosperous Arctic,” Kirby said. “Defense Department regional centers are international
academic venues for bilateral and multilateral research, communication and training, with
the goal of building strong, sustainable, international networks of security leaders.”164
FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 6395/P.L. 116-283)
The FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 6395/P.L. 116-283 of January 1, 2021;
conference report H.Rept. 116-617 of December 3, 2020) includes a number of provisions
relating to the Arctic, including the following:
 Section 905, which directs the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs to assign responsibility for the Arctic region to the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Western Hemisphere or any other Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense the Secretary of Defense considers appropriate.
 Section 1045, which directs the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff to continue assessing potential multidomain risks in the
Arctic, identifying capability and capacity gaps in the current and projected
force, and planning for and implementing the training, equipping, and doctrine
requirements necessary to mitigate such risks and gaps, and authorizes the
Secretary to conduct research and development on the current and future
requirements and needs of the Armed Forces for operations in the Arctic.
 Section 1089, which directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination, with the
Secretary of State, to submit a plan to establish a DOD Regional Center for
Security Studies for the Arctic, and authorizes the Secretary, subject to the
availability of appropriations, to establish and administer such a center, to be
known as the Ted Stevens Center for Arctic Security Studies.

163 Sara Karlovitch, Luciana Perez-Uribe, Julia Lerner, and Lindsey Collins, “Global Warming Is Having a Costly, and
Dangerous, Impact on Key Military Bases in Alaska,” Seattle Tim es, August 9, 2020. See also Brian W. Everstine,
“Climate Change Will Guide How the Air Force Builds Arctic Infrastructure,” Air Force Magazine, November 20,
2020; Rhemi Marlatt , “ T he Intersection of U.S. Military Infrastructure & Alaskan Permafrost T hrough the 21st
Century,” Arctic Institute, October 27, 2020.
164 Department of Defense news release, “ DOD Announces Center to Collaborate on, Advance Shared Interests in
Arctic Region,” DOD News, June 9, 2021. See also Department of Defense, “ The Department of Defense Announces
Establishment of Arctic Regional Center,” June 9, 2021.
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 Section 1208, which directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the
Secretary of State, to submit, within 90 days of enactment of the FY2021
National Defense Authorization Act, a plan to establish a Department of Defense
Regional Center for Security Studies for the Arctic, and authorizes the Secretary
of Defense, not earlier than 30 days after the plan is submitted, and subject to the
availability of appropriations, to establish and administer a Department of
Defense Regional Center for Security Studies for the Arctic, to be known as the
“Ted Stevens Center for Arctic Security Studies.”
Division G of H.R. 6395/P.L. 116-283 is the Elijah E. Cummings Coast Guard Authorization Act
of 2020, which includes the following additional provisions relating to the Arctic:
 Section 8421, which makes a number of findings regarding the strategic
importance of the Arctic and expresses the sense of the Congress regarding the
strategic importance of the Arctic and on actions the Coast Guard should take to
better align its mission prioritization and development of capabilities to meet the
growing array of chal enges in the region.
 Section 8422, which directs the Coast Guard to engage directly with local coastal
whaling and fishing communities in the Arctic region when conducting the
Alaskan Arctic Coast Port Access Route Study.
 Section 8424, which directs the Coast Guard to shal submit a report setting forth
the results of a study on the Arctic capabilities of the Armed Forces, and to enter
into a contract with an appropriate federal y funded research and development
center for the conduct of the study.
 Section 8425, which directs the Coast Guard to submit a report on the Coast
Guard’s search and rescue capabilities in Arctic coastal communities.
H.R. 4135 and S. 2294 of 117th Congress
 H.R. 4135 and S. 2294 of 117th Congress, referred to as the Arctic Security
Initiative Act of 2021, would “requir[e] the Department of Defense (DOD) to
conduct a security assessment of the Arctic region and establish an Arctic
Security Initiative (ASI) with a five-year plan to fully resource the DOD and
individual service-specific strategies for the Arctic that have been released over
the past several years. U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) would lead
the independent assessment in coordination with U.S. Indo-Pacific Command
(USINDOPACOM) and U.S. European Command USEUCOM).”165
Navy and Coast Guard
Overview
The Navy has increased deployments of attack submarines and surface ships to the Arctic for
exercises and other operations.166 Many of the Navy’s attack submarines are ice-hardened and

165 T he bill’s title of the Arctic Security Initiative Act of 2021 and the quoted summary of what the bill wold require are
taken from Office of Senator Dan Sullivan, “ Sullivan, King, Gallagher & Luria Launch Arctic Security Initiative Act ,”
press release dat ed June 24, 2021, accessed July 16, 2021, at https://www.sullivan.senate.gov/newsroom/press-
releases/sullivan-king-gallagher-and-luria-launch-arctic-security-initiative-act.
166 See, for example, Diana Stancy Correll, “Destroyer Ross T reks into the Barents Sea’s Arctic Waters—Again,” Navy
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capable of surfacing through thinner Arctic ice. The Coast Guard annual y deploys a polar
icebreaker, other cutters, and aircraft into the region to perform various Coast Guard missions and
to better understand the implications of operating such units there. Key points relating to the
Navy and Coast Guard in the Arctic that have emerged in recent years include the following:
 The diminishment of Arctic ice is creating new operating areas in the Arctic for
Navy surface ships and Coast Guard cutters.
 U.S. national security interests in the Arctic include “such matters as missile
defense and early warning; deployment of sea and air systems for strategic
sealift, strategic deterrence, maritime presence, and maritime security operations;
and ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight.”167
 Search and rescue (SAR) in the Arctic is a mission of increasing importance,
particularly for the Coast Guard, and one that poses potential y significant
operational chal enges;
 Navy officials have stated that they do not see a strong near-term need for
building ice-hardened surface ships and deploying them into the Atlantic, but
acknowledge that such a need might emerge in the longer run.168
 More complete and detailed information on the Arctic as an operating area is
needed to more properly support expanded Navy and Coast Guard ship and
aircraft operations in the region.
 The Navy and the Coast Guard currently have limited infrastructure in place in
the Arctic to support expanded ship and aircraft operations in the Arctic.169
 Cooperation with other Arctic countries wil be valuable in achieving defense and
homeland security goals.
2018 Reestablishment of 2nd Fleet for North Atlantic and Arctic
In May 2018, the Navy announced that it would reestablish the 2nd Fleet, which was the Navy’s
fleet during the Cold War for countering Soviet naval forces in the North Atlantic. The fleet’s
formal reestablishment occurred in August 2018. The 2nd Fleet was created in 1950 and

Tim es, October 21, 2020; T homas Nilsen, “ U.S. Warship Returns to Barents Sea,” Barents Observer, October 20, 2020;
John Vandiver, “ For the T hird T ime T his Year, a Navy Destroyer Enters the Barents Sea,” Stars and Stripes, October
20, 2020; Caleb Larson, “ T he U.S. Navy Wants to Make Sure It Can T ake on Russia in the Arctic,” National Interest,
October 7, 2020; Christopher Woody, “ A US Navy Destroyer T eamed Up with Canada’s Navy to Learn How to
Operate in Harsh Arctic Conditions,” Business Insider, September 17, 2020; Caitlin M. Kenney, “ US Participates in
Arctic Exercise as Region Sees Increased Military Activity from Russia and China,” Military.com , August 4, 2020;
Christopher Woody, “ With Russia Keeping Watch, US Navy Subs Ventured Back to the High North to T rain Where
T here’s ‘No Safe Haven,’” Business Insider, June 10, 2020.
167 NSPD 66/HSPD 25, Section III B.
168 See, for example, Ben Werner, “Arleigh Burke Destroyers Are More Viable Option for Near -T erm Navy Presence
in Arctic,” USNI News, September 18, 2019; Megan Eckstein, “ CNO: Arctic Operations Limited Now, But Future Ship
Designs Should Consider Environment,” USNI News, September 12, 2016.
169 See, for example, Christopher Woody, “The Navy Is Putting ‘T he Proper Equipment’ Back on Its Ships to Operate
in Harsh Arctic Conditions,” Business Insider, August 8, 2020; Andrew Eversden, “Failure to Communicate: US Navy
Seeks Faster Data T ransfers amid Arctic Ice,” Defense News, May 12, 2020; Nathan Strout, “ SpaceX Could Fill the US
Military’s Arctic Communications Gap by the End of T his Year,” C4ISRNet, May 4, 2020; Geoff Ziezulewicz,
“Welcome to the Arctic: Degraded Radios, Poor Satellite Geometry and Sea Charts Dating Back to Capt. Cook,” Navy
Tim es, September 19, 2019.
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disestablished in September 2011. In its newly reestablished form, it is described as focusing on
countering Russian naval forces not only in the North Atlantic but in the Arctic as wel .170
2019 Announcement of Potential Freedom of Navigation (FON) Operation
In January 2019, the Navy announced that “in coming months” it would send a Navy warship
through Arctic waters on a freedom of navigation (FON) operation to assert U.S. navigational
rights under international law in Arctic waters.171 The U.S. government’s FON program was
established in 1979 and annual y includes multiple U.S. Navy FON operations conducted in
various parts of the world.172 The announced FON operation in the Arctic, however, would
reportedly be the Navy’s first ever FON operation in the Arctic. Some observers have expressed
concern about a potential increase in regional tensions that could result from the United States
conducting an FON operation in Arctic waters.173
Polar Icebreaking174
Polar Icebreaker Operations and Current Polar Icebreaker Fleet
Within the U.S. government, the Coast Guard is the U.S. agency responsible for polar
icebreaking. U.S. polar ice operations conducted in large part by the Coast Guard’s polar
icebreakers support 9 of the Coast Guard’s 11 statutory missions.175 The roles of U.S. polar
icebreakers can be summarized as follows:
 conducting and supporting scientific research in the Arctic and Antarctic;

170 See, for example, Christopher Woody, “The US Navy’s Newest Fleet Is Bulking Up for ‘Leaner, Agile’ Operations
to Counter Russia in the Atlantic and the Arctic,” Business Insider, January 18, 2019; Patricia Kime, “T he Navy Isd
gearing Up for ‘Leaner, Agile’ Operations in Arctic, North Atlantic,” Military.com, January 16, 2019; Rich Abott, “2nd
Fleet T o Be Fully Operational in 2019, Sees Real Russian T hreat,” Defense Daily, December 3, 2018; Sam LaGrone,
“U.S. 2nd Fleet Racing T oward a 2019 Operational Capability,” USNI News, November 29, 2018; Paul McLeary, “New
Second Fleet T o Stay Lean, Unpredictable, Commander Says; & Watching China,” Breaking Defense, November 29,
2018; Sam LaGrone, “ CNO: New 2nd Fleet Boundary Will Extend North to the Edge of Russian Waters,” USNI News,
August 24, 2018.
171 See, for example, Ben Kesling, “Cold War Games: U.S. Is Preparing to T est the Waters in Icy Arctic,” Wall Street
Journal, January 11, 2019; Samuel Osborne, “ US Navy to Sail Warship T hrough Arctic Waters in Show of Strength to
Russia and China,” Independent (UK), January 14, 2019. See also Megan Eckstein “Navy May Deploy Surface Ships
to Arctic T his Summer as Shipping Lanes Open Up,” USNI News, January 8, 2019; Malte Humpert , “ U.S. Navy Plans
to Send Surface Vessels T hrough Arctic,” High North News, March 11, 2019.
172 For background information on the FON program, see the section entitled “ Freedom of Navigation (FON) Program”
in CRS Report R42784, U.S.-China Strategic Com petition in South and East China Seas: Background and Issues for
Congress.
173 See, for example, Rebecca Pincus, “ Rushing Navy Ships into the Arctic for a FONOP is Dangerous,” U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings, January 2019; Hilde-Gunn Bye, “ U.S. Freedom of Navigation Operation in the Arctic: ‘Would
Be a High-Risk Gesture with Unpredictable Consequences,’” High North News, September 11, 2020.
174 T his section prepared by Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and T rade
Division. For more on the Coast Guard’s polar icebreakers, see CRS Report RL34391, Coast Guard Polar Security
Cutter (Polar Icebreaker) Program : Background and Issues for Congress.
175 T he nine missions supported by polar ice operations are search and rescue; maritime safety; aids to navigation; ice
operations; marine environmental protection; living marine resources; ot her law enforcement (protect the exclusive
economic zone [EEZ]); ports, waterways and costal security; and defense readiness. T he two missions not supported by
polar ice operations are illegal drug interdiction and undocumented migrant interdiction. (Depar tment of Homeland
Security, Polar Icebreaking Recapitalization Project Mission Need Statem ent, Version 1.0 , approved by DHS June 28,
2013, p. 10.)
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 defending U.S. sovereignty in the Arctic by helping to maintain a U.S. presence
in U.S. territorial waters in the region;
 defending other U.S. interests in polar regions, including economic interests in
waters that are within the U.S. exclusive economic zone (EEZ) north of Alaska;
 monitoring sea traffic in the Arctic, including ships bound for the United States;
and
 conducting other typical Coast Guard missions (such as search and rescue, law
enforcement, and protection of marine resources) in Arctic waters, including U.S.
territorial waters north of Alaska.176
The Coast Guard’s large icebreakers are cal ed polar icebreakers rather than Arctic icebreakers
because they perform missions in both the Arctic and Antarctic. Operations to support National
Science Foundation (NSF) research activities in both polar regions account for a significant
portion of U.S. polar icebreaker operations.
The operational U.S. polar icebreaking fleet currently consists of one heavy polar icebreaker,
Polar Star, and one medium polar icebreaker, Healy. In addition to Polar Star, the Coast Guard
has a second heavy polar icebreaker, Polar Sea. Polar Sea, however, suffered an engine casualty
in June 2010 and has been nonoperational since then. Polar Star and Polar Sea entered service in
1976 and 1978, respectively, and are now wel beyond their original y intended 30-year service
lives. The Coast Guard in recent years has used Polar Sea as a source of spare parts for keeping
Polar Star operational.
Providing support for NSF’s research in the Antarctic focuses on performing an annual mission,
cal ed Operation Deep Freeze (ODF), to break through Antarctic sea ice so as to reach and
resupply McMurdo Station, the large U.S. Antarctic research station located on the shore of
McMurdo Sound, near the Ross Ice Shelf. The Coast Guard states that Polar Star, the Coast
Guard’s only currently operational heavy polar icebreaker, “spends the [northern hemisphere]
winter [i.e., the southern hemisphere summer] breaking ice near Antarctica in order to refuel and
resupply McMurdo Station. When the mission is complete, the Polar Star returns to dry dock [in
Seattle] in order to complete critical maintenance and prepare it for the next ODF mission. Once
out of dry dock, it’s back to Antarctica, and the cycle repeats itself.”177 In terms of the maximum
thickness of the ice to be broken, the annual McMurdo resupply mission general y poses the
greatest icebreaking chal enge for U.S. polar icebreakers, though Arctic ice can frequently pose
its own significant icebreaking chal enges for U.S. polar icebreakers. The Coast Guard’s medium
polar icebreaker, Healy, spends most of its operational time in the Arctic supporting NSF research
activities and performing other operations.
Although polar ice is diminishing due to climate change, observers general y expect that this
development wil not eliminate the need for U.S. polar icebreakers, and in some respects might
increase mission demands for them. Even with the diminishment of polar ice, there are stil
significant ice-covered areas in the polar regions, and diminishment of polar ice could lead in
coming years to increased commercial cargo ship, cruise ship, research ship, and naval surface

176 T his passage, beginning with “T he roles of …,” originated in an earlier iteration of this CRS report and wa s later
transferred by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) with minor changes to Government Accountability
Office, Coast Guard[:]Efforts to Identify Arctic Requirem ents Are Ongoing, but More Com m unication about Agency
Planning Efforts Would Be Beneficial, GAO-10-870, September 2010, p. 53.
177 NyxoLyno Cangemi, “Coast Guard Icebreaker Crew Completes Second Arctic Mission; U.S. Interests in Arctic
Domain Depends [sic] on Fleet Recapitalization,” DVIDS (Defense Visual Information Distribution System ), October
19, 2018.
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ship operations, as wel as increased exploration for oil and other resources, in the Arctic—
activities that could require increased levels of support from polar icebreakers, particularly since
waters described as “ice free” can actual y stil have some amount of ice.178 Changing ice
conditions in Antarctic waters have made the McMurdo resupply mission more chal enging since
2000.179
Polar Security Cutter (PSC) Program
A Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Mission Need Statement (MNS) approved in June
2013 states that “current requirements and future projections ... indicate the Coast Guard wil
need to expand its icebreaking capacity, potential y requiring a fleet of up to six icebreakers (3
heavy and 3 medium) to adequately meet mission demands in the high latitudes.... ”180
The Coast Guard in its FY2013 budget initiated a program to acquire three new heavy polar
icebreakers, to be followed years from now by the acquisition of up to three new medium polar
icebreakers. The program was original y referred to as the polar icebreaker program but is now
referred to as the Polar Security Cutter (PSC) program.
The Coast Guard estimates the total procurement costs of the new three heavy PSCs as $1,039
mil ion (i.e., about $1.0 bil ion) for the first ship, $792 mil ion for the second ship, and $788
mil ion for the third ship, for a combined estimated cost of $2,619 mil ion (i.e., about $2.6
bil ion). The first ship wil cost more than the other two because it wil incorporate design costs
for the class and be at the start of the production learning curve for the class.
The PSC program has received a total of $1,754.6 mil ion (i.e., about $1.8 bil ion) in procurement
funding through FY2021. With the funding the program has received through FY2021, the first
two PSCs are now fully funded.
Search and Rescue (SAR)181
Overview
Increasing sea and air traffic through Arctic waters has increased concerns regarding Arctic-area
search and rescue (SAR) capabilities.182 Table 1 presents figures on ship casualties in Arctic
Circle waters from 2005 to 2019. As shown in the table, the number of ship casualties in Arctic
waters since 2009 has ranged between about 40 and 70, most of which are caused by damage to

178 For more on changes in the Arctic due to diminishment of Arctic ice, see CRS Report R41153, Changes in the
Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress.
179 National Research Council, Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World, An Assessment of U.S. Needs, Washington,
2007, pp. 6-7, 14, 63.
180 Department of Homeland Security, Polar Icebreaking Recapitalization Project Mission Need Statement, Version
1.0, approved by DHS June 28, 2013, p. 9.
181 T his section prepared by Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and T rade
Division.
182 See, for example, Romain Chuffart, “French and Danish Navies Hold Joint SAR Exercises in Greenland’s Waters,”
High North News, September 6, 2019; “ Arctic Search and Rescue May Face Challenges,” Cruise Industry News, June
27, 2019; Robbie Gramer, “Stretched T hin on T hin Ice; With the Arctic Melting and Norther Coast Guards Struggling
to Keep Up, the Next Disaster Is a Matter of When, Not If,” Foreign Policy, September 12, 2018; Edward Struzik, “ As
Ice Recedes, the Arctic Isn’t Prepared for More Shipping T raffic,” phys.org, September 5, 2018; Derek Minemyer,
“Arctic Council Members Say Alaska Needs Search and Rescue in the Arctic, Now,” KTUU, August 16, 2018;
T imothy William James Smith, Search and Rescue in the Arctic: Is the U.S. Prepared? RAND Corporation, 2017, 148
pp. (Dissertation report RGSD-382.)
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or failure of ship machinery, the wrecking or stranding (grounding) of ships, or fires or explosions
on ships.
Table 1. Ship Casualties in Arctic Circle Waters, 2005-2019
(Ships of 100 gross tons or more)

2005
2006 2007 2008
2009 2010
2011 2012
2013
2014
2015 2016
2017
2018
2019
Machinery
damage/failure
2
3
5
13
14
16
12
13
20
27
45
32
46
23
14
Wrecked/
stranded
1
4
10
11
14
9
9
8
10
14
6
11
9
7
6
Fire/explosion
0
0
3
1
2
6
6
1
4
2
4
1
3
6
8
Col ision
0
0
0
1
4
10
4
4
2
0
3
2
4
2
3
Contact (e.g.,
harbor wal )
0
0
1
1
2
4
1
3
6
4
5
1
1
0
1
Hul damage
0
1
3
1
6
2
2
1
2
1
1
2
2
0
0
Foundered
(i.e., sunk or
0
0
1
1
2
0
3
1
1
2
0
1
0
1
1
submerged)
Labor dispute
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
Miscel aneous
0
0
5
1
4
4
2
6
5
5
6
4
6
4
8
Total
3
8
28
30
48
51
39
37
50
55
70
55
71
43
41
Sources: Al ianz Global Corporate & Specialty, Safety and Shipping Review 2015, p. 28. (Table entitled “Arctic
Circle Waters—Al Casualties including Total Losses 2005–2014.”); Al ianz Global Corporate & Specialty, Safety
and Shipping Review 2018, p. 29. (Table entitled “Arctic Circle Waters—Causes of Casualties (Shipping Incidents)
2008-2017.”): Al ianz Global Corporate & Specialty, Safety and Shipping Review 2020, p. 33. (Table entitled
“Incidents In Arctic Circle Waters.”) The tables include similar source notes; the one for the third source states
“Source: Lloyd’s List Intel igence Casualty Statistics; Data Analysis & Graphic: Al ianz Global Corporate &
Specialty.”)
Given the location of current U.S. Coast Guard operating bases, it could take Coast Guard aircraft
several hours, and Coast Guard cutters days or even weeks, to reach a ship in distress or a downed
aircraft in Arctic waters. The Coast Guard states that “the closest Coast Guard Air Station to the
Arctic is located in Kodiak, AK, approximately 820 nautical miles south of Utqiagvik, AK, which
is nearly the same distance as from Boston, MA, to Miami, FL.”183 In addition to such long
distances, the harsh climate complicates SAR operations in the region.
A 2017 survey of Arctic SAR capabilities conducted as part of the Finnish Border Guard’s Arctic
Maritime Safety Cooperation project in cooperation with the Arctic Coast Guard Forum stated the
following:
The key challenges for Arctic search and rescue identified in this survey include long
distances, severe weather, ice and cold conditions, a poor communications network, lack
of infrastructure and lack of resource presence in the region. In addition, the capacity to
host patients, achieving situational awareness, and unsuitable evacuation and survival
equipment pose major challenges for maritime safety and SAR in the Arctic.
The Arctic SAR authorities have recognized a need to further develop advanced
information sharing between coast guards, emergency authorities, and other stakeholders

183 Coast Guard, Arctic Strategic Outlook, April 2019, p. 11.
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involved in SAR operations. In addition, joint training and systematic sharing of lessons
learned, as well as technological innovation in communications networks and connections,
navigation, survival and rescue equipment, and healthcare services are being called for in
order to improve SAR capabilities in the Arctic.
The survey recommends enhancing practical cooperation between various stakeholders
involved in Arctic SAR such as coast guards, rescue centers, other authorities, industry
groups, private operators, academia and volunteer organizations. It encourages further
information sharing on infrastructure projects and resource assets, Automatic Identification
System and weather data, emergency plans and standard operating procedures, as well as
exercises and lessons learned via a common database. Furthermore, developing joint
courses specifically intended for Arctic SAR and establishing a working group that
examines new innovations and technological developments, are recommended as potential
initiatives for improving practical international cooperation.184
Particular concern has been expressed about cruise ships carrying large numbers of civilian
passengers that may experience problems and need assistance.185 There have already been
incidents of this kind with cruise ships in recent years in waters off Antarctica, and a Russian-
flagged passenger ship with 162 people on board ran aground on Canada’s Northwest Passage on
August 24, 2018.186 A 2020 report from Al ianz Global Corporate & Specialty (AGCS) states:
Last year’s [2019’s] engine failure incident involving the cruise ship demonstrates how
such events could quickly turn into a major disaster, particularly if they occur in remote
waters such as the Arctic, where a growing number of such vessels are expected to operate
in future.
In March 2019, the Viking Sky cruise ship suffered engine failure with 1,373 people on
board when sailing from Tromsø to Stavanger in Norway when it hit bad weather. The
vessel, which narrowly avoided grounding, was left without power or propulsion and had
to rely on rescue helicopters to evacuate passengers as sea conditions did not allow for the
use of lifeboats or tugs….
“The incident with the Viking Sky clearly shows how a problem with engines or fuel could
quickly turn into a major disaster,” says Captain Rahul Khanna, Global Head of Marine
Risk Consulting at AGCS. “This incident is a reminder of the importance to have the right
amount of fuel and lubrication oil on board and that it is not impacted by the running of the
vessel in heavy weather. Otherwise the consequences can be dire, including grounding,
sinking or foundering.”
The incident is also a wake-up call for cruise ships operating in polar waters, raising
questions for emergency response capabilities. Had such an incident happened in the
Arctic, a rapid rescue response would most likely not have been possible.187

184 Emmi Ikonen, Arctic Search and Rescue Capabilities Survey: Enhancing International Cooperation 2017 , Finnish
Border Guard, Arctic Maritime Safety Cooperation (SARC) project, August 2017, p. iv. See also Finnish Red Cross,
Red Cross Arctic Disaster Managem ent Study, August 2018, 71 pp.
185 See, for example, Ken Potter, “Passenger Vessels and the Canadian Arctic: A Risky Combination?” Maritime
Executive, June 9, 2021; Jane George, “ Exercise Held to Prepare for Arctic Cruise Ship Mishap,” Nunatsiaq News,
April 15, 2019; Brian Castner, “How to Rescue a Cruise Ship in the Northwest Passage,” Motherboard (Vice), October
24, 2017; Henry Fountain, “With More Ships in the Arctic, Fears of Disaster Rise,” New York Times, July 23, 2017;
Gwladys Fouche, “ Uncharted Waters: Mega-Cruise Ships Sail the Arctic,” Reuters, October 10, 2016; Abbie T ingstad
and T imothy Smith, “Being Safer in the Arctic,” National Interest, October 3, 2016.
186 Malte Humpert, “A Cruise Ship Runs Aground in Canada’s Arctic Waters; T he Akademik Ioffe’s Sister Ship Was
Nearby, and T ogether with Canadian Coast guard Ships, Was Able to Rescue All Passengers,” Arctic Today, August
28, 2018.
187 Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty, Safety and Shipping Review 2020, p. 32.
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Coast Guard officials have noted the long times that would be needed to respond to potential
emergency situations in certain parts the Arctic. The Coast Guard is participating in exercises
focused on improving Arctic SAR capabilities.188 Increasing U.S. Coast Guard SAR capabilities
for the Arctic could require one or more of the following: enhancing or creating new Coast Guard
operating bases in the region; procuring additional Arctic-capable aircraft, cutters, and rescue
boats for the Coast Guard; and adding systems to improve Arctic maritime communications,
navigation, and domain awareness.189 It may also entail enhanced forms of cooperation with
navies and coast guards of other Arctic countries.
May 2011 Arctic Council Agreement on Arctic SAR
On May 12, 2011, representatives from the member states of the Arctic Council, meeting in
Nuuk, Greenland, signed an agreement on cooperation on aeronautical and maritime SAR in the
Arctic. Key features of the agreement include the following:
 Article 3 and the associated Annex to the agreement essential y divide the Arctic
into SAR areas within which each party has primary responsibility for
conducting SAR operations, stating that “the delimitation of search and rescue
regions is not related to and shal not prejudice the delimitation of any boundary
between States or their sovereignty, sovereign rights or jurisdiction,” and that
“each Party shal promote the establishment, operation and maintenance of an
adequate and effective search and rescue capability within its area.”
 Article 4 and the associated Appendix I to the agreement identify the competent
authority for each party. For the United States, the competent authority is the
Coast Guard.
 Article 5 and the associated Appendix II to the agreement identify the agencies
responsible for aeronautical and maritime SAR for each party. For the United
States, those agencies are the Coast Guard and the Department of Defense.
 Article 6 and the associated Appendix III to the agreement identify the
aeronautical and/or maritime rescue coordination centers (RCCs) for each party.
For the United States, the RCCs are Joint Rescue Coordination Center Juneau
(JRCC Juneau) and Aviation Rescue Coordination Center Elmendorf (ARCC
Elmendorf).
 Article 12 states that “unless otherwise agreed, each Party shal bear its own costs
deriving from its implementation of this Agreement,” and that “implementation
of this Agreement shal be subject to the availability of relevant resources.”190

188 See, for example, Jane George, “ Arctic Reps Practise Response to Maritime Emergency,” Nunatsiaq News, April
17, 2021; Eilís Quinn, “ Arctic Guardian Exercise 2021 Underway to T est Joint Emergency Marine Response,” Barents
Observer, April 13, 2021; Melody Schreiber, “ Arctic Disaster Responders T rain T ogether in a First-of-Its-Kind Joint
Exercise,” Arctic Today, April 15, 2021.
189 For a report assessing certain emergency scenarios in the Arctic, including search and rescue scenarios, see Opening
the Arctic Seas, Envisioning Disasters and Fram ing Solutions, Coastal Response and Research Center, University of
New Hampshire, report of January 2009, based on conference held March 18 -20, 2008, at Durham, NH.
190 Source: T ext of final version of agreement made ready for signing and dated April 21, 2011, accessed April 8, 2 021,
at https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/531/EDOCS-1910-v1-
ACMMDK07_Nuuk_2011_Arctic_SAR_Agreement_unsigned_EN.PDF? sequence=8&isAllowed=y. For a State
Department fact sheet on the agreement, see “ Secretary Clinton Signs the Arct ic Search and Rescue Agreement with
Other Arctic Nations,” May 12, 2011, accessed April 8, 2021, at https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/05/
163285.htm.
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Figure 4 shows a map of the national areas of SAR responsibility based on the geographic
coordinates listed in the Annex to the agreement.
Figure 4. Arctic SAR Areas in Arctic SAR Agreement
(Based on geographic coordinates listed in the agreement)

Source: Map posted at “Arctic Region,” State Department, accessed April 8, 2021 at https://www.state.gov/key-
topics-office-of-ocean-and-polar-affairs/arctic/.
An October 12, 2015, press report states the following:
More people are wishing to explore icy environments, says Peter Hellberg, manager
responsible for the SAR process at the Swedish Maritime Administration. Hellberg is part
of an IMO/International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) working group that is re-
evaluating search and rescue (SAR) operations in Polar waters as a result of this push.
The working group includes both a maritime and aeronautical perspective, and it has
identified a need for more detailed guidance for SAR organizations which will be achieved
through an update of the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue
Manual (IAMSAR) planned for 2019.
While the IAMSAR manual is not mandatory, it is followed by most SAR organizations
around the world. It provides the framework for setting up a multi-national SAR, giving
different parties guidance on the necessary arrangements for Arctic areas.
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The guidance will be expanded on based on the Polar Code and other recent IMO
regulatory updates, and from an aeronautical perspective, from lessons learned after the
disappearance of Malaysian Airlines’ MH370.191
Commercial Sea Transportation192
Background
The search for a shorter route from the Atlantic to Asia has been the quest of maritime powers
since the Middle Ages. The melting of Arctic ice raises the possibility of saving several thousands
of miles and several days of sailing between major trading blocs.193 If the Arctic were to become
a viable shipping route, the ramifications could extend far beyond the Arctic. For example, lower
shipping costs could be advantageous for China (at least its northeast region), Japan, and South
Korea because their manufactured products exported to Europe or North America could become
less expensive relative to other emerging manufacturing centers in Southeast Asia, such as
India.194 Melting ice could potential y open up two trans-Arctic routes (see Figure 3):195
 The Northern Sea Route (NSR, a.k.a. the “Northeast Passage”), along Russia’s
northern border from Murmansk to Provideniya, is about 2,600 nautical miles in
length. It was opened by the Soviet Union to domestic shipping in 1931 and to
transit by foreign vessels in 1991. This route would be applicable for trade
between northeast Asia (north of Singapore) and northern Europe. In recent
summers, less than a handful of large, non-Russian-flagged cargo ships have
transited the NSR.196 Russia reportedly seeks to reserve carriage of oil and gas
extracted along the NSR to Russian-flagged ships.197
 The Northwest Passage (NWP) runs through the Canadian Arctic Islands. The
NWP actual y consists of several potential routes. The southern route is through
Peel Sound in Nunavut, which has been open in recent summers and contains
mostly one-year ice. However, this route is circuitous, contains some narrow
channels, and is shal ow enough to impose draft restrictions on ships. The more
northern route, through McClure Strait from Baffin Bay to the Beaufort Sea north
of Alaska, is much more direct and therefore more appealing to ocean carriers,
but more prone to ice blockage.198 The NWP is potential y applicable for trade
between northeast Asia (north of Shanghai) and the northeast of North America,

191 Wendy Laursen, “MH370, Polar Code Spark SAR Rethink,” Maritime Executive, October 12, 2015.
192 T his section prepared by John Frittelli, Specialist in T ransportation Policy, Resources, Science, and Industry
Division.
193 Extended daylight hours in the Arctic during the summer may also be an advantage.
194 Presentation by Stephen Carmel, Senior Vice President, Maersk Line Ltd., Halifax International Security Forum,
Arctic Security: The New Great Gam e? November 21, 2009, available at http://fora.tv/.
195 A third but more remote possibility is a route directly over the North Pole.
196 Northern Sea Route Information Office; http://www.arctic-lio.com/.
197 T he Independent Barents Observer, “Icebreaking T ankers Have Course for Russia’s New Arctic LNG Plant, And
T hey All Carry Foreign Flags,” December 11, 2017; https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/industry-and-energy/2017/12/
icebreaking-tankers-have-course-russias-new-arctic-lng-plant -and-they.
198 T his was the route pioneered by the SS Manhattan, an oil tanker modified for ice breaking in 1969 to carry Alaskan
North Slope oil to the Atlantic. T his was the first commercial passage through the NWP, but the building of the
Alaskan pipeline was found to be the more economical means of transporting oil from the North Sl ope to the lower 48
states.
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but it is less commercial y viable than the NSR.199 Cargo ship transits have been
extremely rare but cruise vessel excursions and research vessels are more
common.
Destination Traffic, Not Trans-Arctic Traffic
Most cargo ship activity currently taking place in the Arctic is to transport natural resources from
the Arctic or to deliver general cargo and supplies to communities and natural resource extraction
facilities. Thus, cargo ship traffic in the Arctic presently is mostly regional, not trans -Arctic.
While there has been a recent uptick in Arctic shipping activity, this activity has more to do with a
spike in commodity prices than it does with the melting of Arctic ice. Even so, fewer ships ply the
Arctic seas now than in the past. The NSR continues to account for the bulk of Arctic shipping
activity.
Unpredictable Ice Conditions Hinder Trans-Arctic Shipping
Arctic waters do not necessarily have to be ice free to be open to shipping. Multiyear ice can be
over 10 feet thick and problematic even for icebreakers, but one-year ice is typical y 3 feet thick
or less. This thinner ice can be more readily broken up by icebreakers or ice-class ships (cargo
ships with reinforced hulls and other features for navigating in ice-infested waters). However,
more open water in the Arctic has resulted in another potential obstacle to shipping: unpredictable
ice flows. In the NWP, melting ice and the opening of waters that were once covered with one-
year ice has al owed blocks of multiyear ice from farther north and icebergs from Greenland to
flow into potential sea lanes. The source of this multiyear ice is not predicted to dissipate in spite
of climate change. Moreover, the flow patterns of these ice blocks are very difficult to forecast.200
Thus, the lack of ice in potential sea lanes during the summer months can add even greater
unpredictability to Arctic shipping. This is in addition to the extent of ice versus open water,
which is also highly variable from one year to the next and seasonal y.
The unpredictability of ice conditions is a major hindrance for trans-Arctic shipping in general,
but can be more of a concern for some types of ships than it is for others. For instance, it would
be less of a concern for cruise ships, which may have the objective of merely visiting the Arctic
rather than passing through and could change their route and itinerary depending on ice
conditions. On the other hand, unpredictability is of the utmost concern for container ships that
carry thousands of containers from hundreds of different customers, al of whom expect to unload
or load their cargo upon the ship’s arrival at various ports as indicated on the ship’s advertised
schedule. The presence of even smal blocks of ice or icebergs from a melting Greenland ice sheet
requires slow sailing and could play havoc with schedules. Ships carrying a single commodity in
bulk from one port to another for just one customer have more flexibility in terms of delivery
windows, but would not likely risk an Arctic passage under prevailing conditions.
Ice is not the sole impediment to Arctic shipping. The region frequently experiences adverse
weather, including not only severe storms, but also intense cold, which can impair deck

199 Although the NWP is often compared to the alternative route through the Panama Canal in terms of distance and
sailing days from Asia to the U.S. east coast , another alternative to consider is the shorter and faster transcontinental
rail route across Canada or the United States.
200 S.E.L. Howell and J.J. Yackel, “A Vessel T ransit Assessment of Sea Ice Variability in the Western Arctic, 1969 -
2002: Implications for Ship Navigation,” Canadian Journal of Remote Sensing, vol. 30, no. 2, 2004.
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machinery. During the summer months when sea lanes are open, heavy fog is common in the
Arctic.
Commercial ships would face higher operating costs on Arctic routes than elsewhere. Ship size is
an important factor in reducing freight costs. Many ships currently used in other waters would
require two icebreakers to break a path wide enough for them to sail through; ship owners could
reduce that cost by using smal er vessels in the Arctic, but this would raise the cost per container
or per ton of freight.201 Also, icebreakers or ice-class cargo vessels burn more fuel than ships
designed for more temperate waters and would have to sail at slower speeds. The shipping season
in the Arctic only lasts for a few weeks, so icebreakers and other special required equipment
would sit idle the remainder of the year. None of these impediments by themselves may be
enough to discourage Arctic passage but they do raise costs, perhaps enough to negate the savings
of a shorter route. Thus, from the perspective of a shipper or a ship owner, shorter via the Arctic
does not necessarily mean cheaper and faster.202
Basic Navigation Infrastructure Is Lacking
Considerable investment in navigation-related infrastructure would be required if trans-Arctic
shipping were to become a reality. Channel marking buoys and other floating visual aids are not
possible in Arctic waters because moving ice sheets wil continuously shift their positions.
Therefore, vessel captains would need to rely on marine surveys and ice charts. For some areas in
the Arctic, however, these surveys and charts are out of date or not sufficiently accurate.203 To
remedy this problem, aviation reconnaissance of ice conditions and satel ite images would need to
become readily available for ship operators.204 Ship-to-shore communication infrastructure would
need to be instal ed where possible. Refueling stations may be needed, as wel as, perhaps,
transshipment ports where cargo could be transferred to and from ice-capable vessels at both ends
of Arctic routes. Shipping lines would need to develop a larger pool of mariners with ice
navigation experience. Marine insurers would need to calculate the proper level of risk premium
for polar routes, which would require more detailed information about Arctic accidents and
incidents in the past.
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, along with the state of Alaska, has studied the feasibility of a
“deep-draft” port in the Arctic (accommodating ships with a draft of up to 35 feet). The northern
and northwestern coastlines of Alaska are exceptional y shal ow, general y limiting harbor and
near-shore traffic to shal ow-draft barges. Coast Guard cutters and icebreakers have drafts of 35
to 40 feet while NOAA research vessels have drafts of 16 to 28 feet, so at present these vessels
are based outside the Arctic and must sail considerable distances to reach Arctic duty stations.
Supply vessels supporting offshore oil rigs typical y have drafts over 20 feet. A deep-draft port
could serve as a base of operations for larger vessels, facilitating commercial maritime traffic in
the Arctic.205 The study concluded that the existing harbors of Nome or Port Clarence on Alaska’s

201 “Arctic Unlikely to See Major Shipping Growth,” New Zealand Transport and Logistics Business Week, April 24,
2008.
202 Stephen M. Carmel, Senior Vice President, Maersk Line Ltd., “T he Cold, Hard Realities of Arctic Shipping,”
United States Naval Institute, Proceedings; July 2013, pp. 38-41.
203 In July and August 2010, NOAA surveyed the Bering Straits area in order to update its charts but stated that it will
take more than 25 years to map the prioritized areas of navigational significance in U.S. A rctic waters. See
http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2010/20100720_fairweather.html.
204 Ice reporting that currently exists is intended for scientists not mariners.
205 For further information, see http://www.poa.usace.army.mil/en/cw/AKPortsStudy.htm, and FY2013 USACE Budget
Justification, p. POD-5.
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west coast may be the most suitable for deepening because of their proximity to the Bering Strait
and deeper water.206 However, at a July 2016 hearing, the Coast Guard indicated its preferred
strategy was to rely on mobile assets (vessels and aircraft) and seasonal bases of operation rather
than pursue a permanent port in the Arctic.207
The U.S. Committee on the Marine Transportation System, a Cabinet-level committee of federal
agencies with responsibilities for marine transportation, identified a list of infrastructure
improvements for Arctic navigation in a 2013 report.208 The report prioritizes improvements to
information infrastructure (weather forecasting, nautical charting, ship tracking) and emergency
response capabilities for ships in distress.
Regulation of Arctic Shipping
Due to the international nature of the shipping industry, maritime trading nations have adopted
international treaties that establish standards for ocean carriers in terms of safety, pollution
prevention, and security. These standards are agreed upon by shipping nations through the
International Maritime Organization (IMO), a United Nations agency that first met in 1959.209
Key conventions that the 168 IMO member nations have adopted include the Safety of Life at Sea
Convention (SOLAS), which was original y adopted in response to the Titanic disaster in 1912
but has since been revised several times; the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL),
which was adopted in 1973 and modified in 1978; and the Standards for Training, Certification,
and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (SCTW), which was adopted in 1978 and amended in 1995. It is
up to ratifying nations to enforce these standards. The United States is a party to these
conventions, and the U.S. Coast Guard enforces them when it boards and inspects ships and
crews arriving at U.S. ports and the very few ships engaged in international trade that sail under
the U.S. flag.
Like the United States, most of the other major maritime trading nations lack the ability to
enforce these regulations as a “flag state” because much of the world’s merchant fleet is
registered under so-cal ed “flags of convenience.” While most ship owners and operators are
headquartered in major economies, they often register their ships in Panama, Liberia, the
Bahamas, the Marshal Islands, Malta, and Cyprus, among other “open registries,” because these
nations offer more attractive tax and employment regulatory regimes. Because of this
development, most maritime trading nations enforce shipping regulations under a “port state
control” regime—that is, they require compliance with these regulations as a condition of cal ing
at their ports. The fragmented nature of ship ownership and operation can be a further hurdle to
regulatory enforcement. It is common for cargo ships to be owned by one company, operated by a
second company (which markets the ship’s space), and managed by a third (which may supply

206 Alaska Deep-Draft Arctic Port System Study, March 2013; http://www.poa.usace.army.mil/Library/
ReportsandStudies/AlaskaRegionalPortsStudy.aspx. T he navigation channel at Nome presently ranges from 10 to 20
feet in depth. Much of the harbor at Port Clarence has a natural depth of 35 to 40 feet; http://www.charts.noaa.gov/
OnLineViewer/AlaskaViewerT able.shtml.
207 Oral testimony of Admiral Charles D. Michel, Coast Guard Vice Commandant, House Committee on T ransportation
and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime T ransportation, Coast Guard Arctic Im plem entation
Capabilities, July 12, 2016.
208 U.S. Committee on the Marine T ransportation System, U.S. Arctic Marine Transportation System: Overview and
Priorities for Action, 2013; http://www.cmts.gov/downloads/CMT S_Arctic_MT S_Report _Narrative.pdf.
209 See http://www.imo.org/ for more information.
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the crew and other services a ship requires to sail), each of which could be headquartered in
different countries.
New Arctic Polar Code
While SOLAS and other IMO conventions include provisions regarding the operation of ships in
ice-infested waters, they were not specific to the polar regions. To supplement these requirements,
a new IMO polar code went into effect on January 1, 2017.210 The code applies to passenger and
cargo ships of 500 gross tons or more engaged in international voyages. It does not apply to
fishing vessels, military vessels, pleasure yachts, or smal er cargo ships. The polar requirements
are intended to improve safety and prevent pollution in the Arctic, and they include provisions on
ship construction, ship equipment related to navigation, and crew training and ship operation. The
code requires ships to carry fully or partial y enclosed lifeboats. The code requires that the crew
have training in ice navigation. Nations can enforce additional requirements on ships arriving at
their ports or sailing through their coastal waters. For instance, U.S. Coast Guard regulations
largely follow IMO conventions but mandate additional requirements in some areas. U.S. coastal
states can require ships cal ing at their ports to take additional safety and pollution prevention
safeguards.211 Canada and Russia have additional pollution regulations for Arctic waters
exceeding MARPOL. The U.S. Coast Guard has studied and has recommended a specific vessel
traffic separation scheme for the Bering Strait between Alaska and Russia, which experiences
over 400 transits per year.212 The U.S. Coast Guard is seeking IMO approval of this routing
scheme.
Oil, Gas, and Mineral Exploration213
Decreases in summer polar ice may alter options for oil, gas, and mineral exploration in Arctic
offshore and onshore areas. Offshore of Alaska, the U.S. outer continental shelf (OCS) covers
more than 1 bil ion acres,214 including some areas with high oil and gas potential. Even with
warmer temperatures, exploration and development in the Arctic are stil subject to harsh
conditions, especial y in winter. This makes it costly and chal enging to develop the infrastructure
necessary to produce, store, and transport oil, gas, and minerals from newly discovered deposits.
Severe weather poses chal enges to several ongoing offshore operations as wel as to new
exploration.
Offshore oil and gas exploration is affected by efforts to map the margins of the U.S. OCS.
Shrinking sea ice cover in the Arctic has intensified interest in surveying and mapping the
continental margins of multiple countries with lands in the Arctic. Delineating the extent of the
continental margins beyond the 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) could lead to
consideration of development on substantial amounts of submerged lands. Mapping projects are
underway, by individual countries and through cooperative government studies, to support

210 http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotT opics/polar/Pages/default.aspx.
211 For example, see Alaska State Legislature, HJR 19, Arctic Marine Safety Agreements; http://www.akleg.gov/basis/
Bill/Detail/30?Root=HJR%2019.
21282 Federal Register 11935, February 27, 2017.
213 T his section prepared by Laura Comay, Analyst in Natural Resources Policy, Resources, Science, and Industry
Division; Peter Folger, Section Research Manager, Resources, Science, and Industry Division; and Marc Humphries,
Analyst in Energy Policy, Resources, Science, and Industry Division.
214 T his region includes some areas within the Arctic boundary as defined by the ARPA (15 U.S.C. 4111; see Figure
1), such as the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas, and some areas outside that boundary, such as Cook Inlet.
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submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, including for areas that
may contain large amounts of oil, natural gas, methane hydrates, or minerals.
With respect to onshore development, shrinking glaciers could expose land containing economic
deposits of gold, iron ore, or other minerals previously covered by glacial ice. At the same time,
warming that causes permafrost to melt could pose chal enges to oil, gas, and mineral activities
because ground structures, such as pipelines and other infrastructure that depend on footings sunk
into the permafrost for support, could be compromised. In addition, warmer temperatures shorten
the ice road transport seasons for oil, gas, and mineral development, creating transportation
chal enges.
Offshore Oil and Gas Exploration
The shrinking Arctic ice cap, or conversely, the growing amount of ice-free ocean in the
summertime, has increased interest in exploring for offshore oil and gas in the Arctic. Reduced
sea ice in the summer means that ships towing seismic arrays215 can explore regions of the Arctic
Ocean, Chukchi Sea, Beaufort Sea, and other offshore regions for longer periods of time with less
risk of colliding with floating sea ice. Less sea ice over longer periods compared to previous
decades also means that the seasonal window for offshore Arctic dril ing remains open longer in
the summer, increasing the chances for making a discovery.
In addition to the improved access to larger portions of the Arctic afforded by shrinking sea ice,
interest in Arctic oil and gas was fueled by a 2008 U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) appraisal of
undiscovered oil and gas north of the Arctic Circle.216 The USGS stated that the “extensive Arctic
continental shelves may constitute the geographical y largest unexplored prospective area for
petroleum remaining on Earth.”217 In the report, the USGS estimated that 90 bil ion barrels of oil,
nearly 1,700 tril ion cubic feet of natural gas, and 44 bil ion barrels of natural gas liquids may
remain to be discovered in the Arctic (including both U.S. and international resources north of the
Arctic Circle).218 This would constitute approximately 13% of the world’s undiscovered
conventional oil resources and 30% of natural gas, according the U.S. Energy Information
Administration.219 In terms of U.S. resources specifical y, DOI’s Bureau of Ocean Energy
Management (BOEM) estimated in 2017 that the Alaska portions of the U.S. OCS contain
undiscovered, technical y recoverable resources of approximately 27 bil ion barrels of oil and 132
tril ion cubic feet of natural gas (although not al of these resources may be economical y viable
to recover).220

215 A seismic array is typically a long string or streamer of geophones—acoustic devices used for recording seismic
signals—towed behind a ship while the ship traverses a prospective oil and gas-bearing portion of the seafloor. T he
seismic signals are processed and interpreted to give a cross-section or three-dimensional image of the subsurface.
216 See USGS Fact Sheet 2008-3049, Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North
of the Arctic Circle, at http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/, hereinafter referred to as “ USGS 2008 Fact Sheet.”
217 USGS 2008 Fact Sheet.
218 USGS 2008 Fact Sheet, p. 1.
219 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Today in Energy: Arctic Oil and Natural Gas Resources,” January 20,
2012, at http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=4650.
220 Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, “Assessment of Undiscovered T echnically Recoverable Oil and Gas
Resources of the Nation’s Outer Continental Shelf, 2016a,” at https://www.boem.gov/UT RR-Update_BT U/. Although
dated 2016, the assessment reflects 2017 updates of nearshore Beaufort Sea resources based on new data from seismic
surveys and drilling onshore and in state waters, pursuant to DOI Secretarial Order 3352. Not all of the undiscovered
technically recoverable resources would necessarily be econom ically recoverable. BOEM’s 2019-2024 Outer
Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Draft Proposed Program (January 2015, chapter 5, at https://www.boem.gov/
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Despite the warming trend in the Arctic, severe weather and sea ice continue to pose chal enges to
exploration. In addition, any discovery of new oil and gas deposits far from existing storage,
pipelines, and shipping facilities could not be developed until infrastructure is built to extract and
transport the petroleum.
Some have expressed interest in expanding America’s ocean energy portfolio in the region.
Currently, among 15 federal planning areas in the region, the Beaufort Sea and Cook Inlet are the
only two areas with active federal leases,221 and only the Beaufort Sea has any producing wel s in
federal waters (from a joint federal-state unit).222 The Trump Administration has stated its interest
in promoting offshore development in the region. In January 2018, the Administration issued a
draft 5-year offshore oil and gas leasing program for 2019-2024 that would schedule lease sales
in al 15 Alaska planning areas, including three sales in the Beaufort Sea and three in the Chukchi
Sea.223 Current lease sales on the Alaska OCS are governed by the Obama Administration’s
leasing program for 2017-2022, which includes one lease sale in the Cook Inlet (scheduled for
2021) and none in other Alaska planning areas.224
Offshore oil and gas activities in the region have fluctuated as industry weighs changing oil
prices, development costs, and regulations. For example, in 2015, Shel Oil Company announced
its decision to cease exploration in offshore Alaska for the foreseeable future. Shel cited several
reasons for the decision, including insufficient indications of oil and gas at its Burger J wel in the
Chukchi Sea, the high costs associated with Arctic exploration, and the “chal enging and
unpredictable” federal regulatory environment.225 BOEM also reported that, between February
and November 2016, companies relinquished more than 90% of leases they had held in the
Beaufort and Chukchi Sea planning areas, in the midst of a slump in oil prices.226 While there
were 450 active leases in the Chukchi Sea planning area at the end of 2015, as of November 2019
there were none.227 In the Beaufort Sea, active leases dropped from 77 at the end of 2015 to 40 in
November 2019.228 Despite these changes, some activities have indicated ongoing industry
interest in the region. For example, in November 2017, the Trump Administration approved an
application for permit to dril (APD) on a lease in the Beaufort Sea held by the Eni U.S.
Operating Company.229 In October 2018, BOEM issued conditional approval to Hilcorp Alaska

NP-Draft -Proposed-Program-2019-2024/, hereinafter cited as “ BOEM 2019-2024 Draft Proposed Program.”) estimates
a range of resources that would be economically recoverable under various oil and gas price points and cost conditions.
221 Although part of BOEM’s Alaska region, Cook Inlet lies outside the Arctic boundary as defined by the ARPA (15
U.S.C. 4111; see Figure 1).
222 Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, “BP Exploration (Alaska) (BPXA) —Northstar,” at http://www.boem.gov/
About -BOEM/BOEM-Regions/Alaska-Region/Leasing-and-Plans/Plans/BP-North-Star.aspx.
223 BOEM 2019-2024 Draft Proposed Program, p. 8.
224 Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, 2017-2022 Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Proposed Final
Program , November 2016, at https://www.boem.gov/2017-2022-OCS-Oil-and-Gas-Leasing-PFP/, hereinafter cited as
“BOEM 2017-2022 Proposed Final Program.”
225 Royal Dutch Shell, PLC, “Shell Updates on Alaska Exploration,” press release, September 28, 2015, at
http://www.shell.com/global/aboutshell/media/news-and-media-releases/2015/shell-updates-on-alaska-
exploration.html.
226 BOEM 2017-2022 Proposed Final Program, p. S-3.
227 For 2015 data, see BOEM, “Combined Leasing Report, as of January 1, 2016,” at https://www.boem.gov/
Combined-Leasing-Reports-2016/. For November 2019 data, see BOEM, “ Combined Leasing Report, as of November
1, 2019,” at https://www.boem.gov/sites/default/files/documents/oil-gas-energy/leasing/
Combined%20Leasing%20Statistics%20November%202019.pdf.
228 Ibid.
229 Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE), “BSEE Approves New Drilling Operations in Arctic,”
press release, November 28, 2017, at https://www.bsee.gov/newsroom/latest-news/statements-and-releases/press-
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LLC for an oil and gas development and production plan in the Beaufort Sea, which would be the
region’s first production facility entirely in federal waters.230 Recent discoveries onshore and in
state waters on Alaska’s North Slope have contributed to ongoing interest in the region.
The evolving federal regulatory environment for Arctic offshore activities has been shaped by
concerns about industry’s ability to respond to potential oil spil s, given the region’s remoteness
and harsh conditions. The section of this report on “Oil Pollution Implications of Arctic Change”
discusses this issue in greater detail. In July 2016, BOEM and the Bureau of Safety and
Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) released final safety regulations for Arctic exploratory
dril ing that include multiple requirements for companies to reduce the risks of potential oil
spil s—for example, the requirement that companies have a separate rig available at dril sites to
dril a relief wel in case of a loss of wel control.231 Some Members of Congress and industry
stakeholders opposed the regulations as overly prescriptive and unnecessarily burdensome, while
other Members and environmental organizations asserted that the rules did not go far enough in
protecting the region from potential environmental damage and addressing the potential
contributions of Arctic oil and gas activities to climate change.232 In a 2017 executive order,
President Trump directed the Secretary of the Interior to review the Arctic regulations, and in
2018 the Department of the Interior announced work on rule revisions.233 Legislation was
introduced in the 115th Congress both to repeal the Obama Administration’s version of the Arctic
rule and, conversely, to codify it in law.234
Concerns about the impacts of oil and gas activities have led in the past to bans by both Congress
and the President on leasing in certain Arctic Ocean areas deemed especial y sensitive.235 For
example, congressional and presidential moratoria since the 1980s effectively banned federal y
regulated planning and permitting in the Bristol Bay area of the North Aleutian Basin. Congress
al owed most statutory bans in the region to expire in 2004.236 President Obama reinstated the

releases/bsee-approves-new-drilling-operations-in. T he BSEE Director stated in the press release that “ responsible
resource development in the Arctic is a critical component to achieving American energy dominance.”
230 Department of the Interior press release, “Interior Approves Long-Awaited First Oil Production Facility in Federal
Waters Offshore Alaska,” October 24, 2018, at https://www.doi.gov/pressreleases/interior-approves-long-awaited-first-
oil-production-facility-federal-waters-offshore. On May 29, 2019, NOAA’s National Marine Fisheries Service issued a
proposed rule to govern the taking of marine mammals incidental to the construction and operation of the project’s
drilling and production island (84 Federal Register 24926). Public comments were accepted through July 31, 2019 (84
Federal Register 32697).
231 Department of the Interior, “Requirements for Exploratory Drilling on the Arctic Outer Continental Shelf,” 81
Federal Register 46477, July 15, 2016.
232 For differing congressional viewpoints, see, e.g., U.S. Congress, House Committee on Natural Resources,
Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resources, hearing on Arctic Resources and American Competitiveness, 114 th
Cong., 1st sess., June 16, 2015, at http://naturalresources.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=398713.
233 Executive Order 13795, “ Implementing an America-First Offshore Energy Strategy,” April 28, 2017, at
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2017-05-03/pdf/2017-09087.pdf. For the DOI announcement, see
Department of the Interior, “Semiannual Regulatory Agenda,” 83 Federal Register 58039, November 16, 2018.
234 For example, in the 115th Congress, H.R. 4239, the SECURE American Energy Act, would have provided that the
Arctic rule would have no force or effect. Conversely, S. 2720, the Clean Coasts Act, would have enacted the
regulation into law. T hese measures were not enacted, and no similar legislation has been in troduced to date in the
116th Congress.
235 Section 12(a) of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (43 U.S.C. §1341(a)) authorizes the President to, “from time
to time, withdraw from disposition any of the unleased lands of the outer Continental Shelf.”
236 FY2004 DOI Appropriations (P.L. 108-108). Furthermore, the Continuing Appropriations Resolution 2009 (P.L.
110-329) did not extend the annual congressional moratorium on oil and gas leasing activities in the lower 48 states. On
March 11, 2009, the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 ( P.L. 111-8) was enacted without moratorium provisions,
confirming that the congressional oil and gas development bans in federal waters along the Atlantic and Pacific coasts,
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moratorium in the North Aleutian Basin, indefinitely withdrawing acreage located in Bristol Bay
from eligibility for oil and gas leasing.237 Also, in December 2016, President Obama indefinitely
withdrew from leasing disposition other large portions of the U.S. Arctic, including the entire
Chukchi Sea planning area and almost al of the Beaufort Sea planning area.238 President Obama
separately withdrew from leasing consideration planning areas in the North Bering Sea.239 In
April 2017, President Trump issued Executive Order 13795, which modified President Obama’s
withdrawals so as to open al of these areas for leasing consideration except for the North
Aleutian Basin.240 However, in a March 2019 court decision, the U.S. District Court for the
District of Alaska vacated this provision in President Trump’s executive order, ruling that the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act gives the President the authority to make withdrawals, but not
to revoke prior presidential withdrawals.241
Extent of the Continental Margin
Increased interest in developing offshore resources in the Arctic has sparked efforts by Arctic
coastal states to map the extent of their continental margins beyond the 200-mile EEZ limit. As
discussed earlier, under Article 76 of UNCLOS, nations can make a submission to the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (hereinafter referred to as the Commission)
concerning the extent of their continental shelves. Under Article 76, the extent of the continental
margin beyond the 200-mile limit depends on the position of the foot of the continental slope, the
thickness of sediments, and the depth of water. Also, the continental margin could include
geologic features that extend from the continent out to sea, which may include undersea ridges
continuing for hundreds of miles offshore.
Arctic coastal states have conducted complex investigations needed to support submissions to the
Commission for an extended continental shelf in the Arctic. Submissions regarding Arctic waters
have been made to the Commission by four of the Arctic coastal states, including the Russian
Federation, which made its initial UNCLOS submission to a portion of the Arctic continental

parts of Alaska, and the Gulf of Mexico that had been in place since 1982 had not been restored in 2009 appropriations
measures.
237 Presidential Memorandum, “Withdrawal of Certain Areas of the United States Outer Continental Shelf from Leasing
Disposition,” December 16, 2014, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/12/16/presidential-
memorandum-withdrawal-certain-areas-united-states-outer-con. Earlier, President Obama had withdrawn the area from
leasing for a time-limited period. Presidential Memorandum, “ Withdrawal of Certain Areas of the United States Outer
Continental Shelf from Leasing Disposition,” March 31, 2010, at http://www.doi.gov/whatwedo/energy/ocs/upload/
2010alaska-mem-rel.pdf.
238 Presidential Memorandum, “Withdrawal of Certain Portions of the United States Arctic Outer Continen tal Shelf
from Mineral Leasing,” December 20, 2016, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/12/20/presidential-
memorandum-withdrawal-certain-portions-united-states-arctic. Earlier, President Obama had indefinitely withdrawn
from leasing disposition certain smaller areas in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas, including the Hanna Shoal region of
the Chukchi Sea and other areas. Presidential Memorandum, “ Withdrawal of Certain Areas of the United States Outer
Continental Shelf Offshore Alaska from Leasing Disposition,” January 27, 2015, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2015/01/27/presidential-memorandum-withdrawal-certain-areas-united-states-outer-con.
239 Executive Order 13754, “North Bering Sea Climat e Resilience,” December 9, 2016, at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
pkg/FR-2016-12-14/pdf/2016-30277.pdf.
240 Executive Order 13795, “Implementing an America-First Offshore Energy Strategy,” April 28, 2017, at
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2017-05-03/pdf/2017-09087.pdf. For additional discussion, see CRS Legal Sidebar
WSLG1799, Trum p’s Executive Order on Offshore Energy: Can a Withdrawal be Withdrawn?
241 League of Conservation Voters v. T rump, 363 F.Supp.3d 1013 (D.Alaska 2019). T he President’s withdrawal
authority is contained in Sect ion 12(a) of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (43 U.S.C. Section 1341(a)).
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shelf in 2001.242 Russia’s 2001 submission included the Lomonosov Ridge, an undersea feature
spanning the Arctic from Russia to Canada, as an extension of its continental margin. The
submission demonstrated Russia’s bid to extend activities in Arctic regions. The Russian
Federation presented a revised submission in 2015 to the Commission that included not only the
Lomonosov Ridge but also the Mendeleev Rise—another subsea feature claimed by Russia to be
a natural part of its continental margin—as components of the extended Russian continental
shelf.243 The Commission has not rendered a decision on the revised Russian Federation
submission as of late 2019. (For additional information on extended continental shelf submissions
to the Commission, see Appendix H.)
The United States has started to gather and analyze data for a potential submission through an
initiative cal ed the Extended Continental Shelf (ECS) Project.244 The U.S. ECS project has also
assisted more than 30 countries with their efforts to delineate their extended continental shelves
worldwide.245 Canada and the United States share overlapping regions of the seabed as part of the
extended continental margin of both nations. Much of the data to delineate the ECS for both
countries was collected in a two-ship operation involving the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Healy and
the Canadian Coast Guard ship Louis S. Saint Laurent.246 The two-ship operation collected more
than 13,000 linear kilometers (about 8,078 miles) of seismic data over four field seasons in the
Arctic beginning in 2007. The data collected wil help each country delineate the extent of its
own ECS, which should then enable the countries to determine the amount of overlap in the
seabed and ultimately establish a maritime boundary in the Arctic.247
The United States also has potential y overlapping ECS areas with Russia. Russia (then the Soviet
Union) and the United States agreed to a maritime boundary in 1990, and so far Russia has not
asserted its ECS in any areas that might be considered part of the U.S. ECS.248

242 Denmark, Norway, and Canada have also filed submissions regarding Arctic waters. A fifth country, Iceland,
though not an Arctic coastal state, has filed a submission regardin g waters in the vicinity of the Arctic Circle. Source:
United Nations, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, “Submissions, through the Secretary -General of the
United Nations, to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, pursuant to article 76, paragraph 8, of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982,” updated April 1, 2021, accessed April 8,
2021, at https://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/commission_submissions.htm. See also Department of State,
“Frequently Asked Questions—U.S. Extended Continental Shelf Project ,” accessed April 8, 2021, at
https://www.state.gov/frequently-asked-questions-u-s-extended-continental-shelf-project/. For additional information,
see Appe ndix H.
243 United Nations, “Partial Revised Submission of the Russian Federation to the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf in Respect of the Continental Shelf of the Russian Federation in the Arctic Ocean,” 2015, accessed
April 8, 2021, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01_rev15/
2015_08_03_Exec_Summary_English.pdf.
244 T he purpose of the U.S. Extended Continental Shelf (ECS) Project is to establish the full extent of the continental
shelf of the United States, consistent with international law. T he work to delineate the ECS is coordinated by the ECS
T ask Force, located at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA’s) National Centers for
Environmental Information in Boulder, CO. T he Department of State, U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), and NOAA
conduct the majority of work on the project. NOAA has the lead in collecting bathymetric data. USGS has the lead in
collecting seismic data. For more information, see the project’s website at https://www.state.gov/u-s-extended-
continental-shelf-project/.
245 U.S. ECS Project, https://www.state.gov/international-support-and-cooperation-u-s-extended-continental-shelf-
project/.
246 Ibid.
247 Ibid.
248 T he Senate gave advice and consent to ratify the maritime boundary agreement in 1991. Although the Russian
Duma has not approved the agreement, both countries continue to provisionally apply the bounda ry agreement. See
U.S. Extended Continental Shelf Project, https://www.state.gov/frequently-asked-questions-u-s-extended-continental-
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Onshore Mineral Development
A warming Arctic means new opportunities and chal enges for mineral exploration and
development onshore. Receding glaciers expose previously ice-covered land that could host
economic mineral deposits that were previously undetectable and unmineable below the ice.
Longer summers also would extend exploration seasons for areas that are not currently ice-
covered, but are only accessible for ground surveys during the warmer months. In some parts of
the Arctic, less sea ice al ows ships to transport heavy equipment to remote locations, and to
convey ore from mines to the market further south. Some railway and mining operators are
considering developing railroads and other infrastructure to transport ore year-round. As with
onshore oil and gas development, however, mining infrastructure that depends on footings sunk
into permafrost could become unstable if the permafrost melts in response to warmer
temperatures.249 Also, mineral deposits that may be technical y recoverable with current
technology may not be economical y profitable.
Some industry commentators suggest that mining might offer better long-term economic
development opportunities compared to oil and gas development because of a larger permanent
workforce and project lifetimes of several decades.250 Similar to oil and gas, however, industry
observers note that uncertainties and knowledge gaps exist in the understanding of environmental
change in the Arctic, and how to deal with the risks associated with significant Arctic industrial
activity.251
One important part of the current infrastructure in the Arctic that supports oil, gas, and mineral
development is the construction and use of ice roads—built and used during the winter, but not
passable during the warmer months. Warmer temperatures are shortening the ice road transport
seasons and creating transportation chal enges. For example, the opening date for tundra roads in
northern Alaska usual y occurred in early November prior to 1991 and has shifted to January in
recent years.252
Oil Pollution and Pollution Response253
Oil Pollution Implications of Arctic Change
Climate change impacts in the Arctic, particularly the decline of sea ice and retreating glaciers,
has led to increased human activities in the region, some of which have the potential to create oil

shelf-project/.
249 T his section does not treat onshore oil and gas development on federal lands in the Arctic region, such as the
National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska or the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. For more information on the oil and gas
program for the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge and related issues, see CRS Report RL33872, Arctic National Wildlife
Refuge (ANWR): An Overview.
250 See, e.g., Cecelia Jamasmie, “Melting Arctic is nothing but good news for the mining industry: Lloyd's/Chatham
House,” Mining.com, April 13, 2012, at http://www.mining.com/melting-arctic-is-nothing-but-good-news-for-the-
mining-industry-lloydschatam-house/.
251 Charles Emmerson and Glada Lahn, Arctic Opening: Opportunity and Risk in the High North , Chatham House,
2012, at https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/182839.
252 See National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “Arctic Change,” at https://www.pmel.noaa.gov/arctic-
zone/detect/land-road.shtml?page=land.
253 T his section prepared by Jonathan L. Ramseur, Specialist in Environmental Policy, Resources, Science, and Industry
Division.
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pollution.254 A primary concern is the threat of a large oil spil in the area. Although a major oil
spil has not occurred in the Arctic, potential economic activity, such as tourism (cruise ships), oil
and gas exploration, and cargo transportation, increases the risk of oil pollution (and other kinds
of pollution) in the Arctic.255 Significant spil s in high northern latitudes (e.g., the 1989 Exxon
Valdez spil on the southern coast of Alaska and spil s in the North Sea) suggest that the “potential
impacts of an Arctic spil are likely to be severe for Arctic species and ecosystems.”256
Risk of Oil Pollution in the Arctic
A primary factor determining the risk of oil pollution in the Arctic is the level and type of human
activity conducted in the region. Although changes to the Arctic climate are expected to increase
access to natural resources and shipping lanes, the region wil continue to present logistical
chal enges that may hinder human activity in the region. For example, unpredictable ice
conditions may discourage trans-Arctic shipping. If trans-Arctic shipping were to occur
frequently, it would likely represent a considerable portion of the overal oil pollution risk in the
region. In recent decades, many of the world’s largest oil spil s have been from oil tankers, which
can carry mil ions of gal ons of oil.257
Offshore oil exploration and extraction activities in the Arctic may present a risk of oil pollution.
Interest in these activities in the region has fluctuated in recent years. Historical y, oil wel
blowouts from offshore oil operations have been a source of major oil spil s, eclipsing the largest
tanker spil s. The largest unintentional oil spil in recent history was from the 2010 Deepwater
Horizon incident in the Gulf of Mexico.258 During that incident, the uncontrolled wel released
(over an 87-day period) approximately 200 mil ion gal ons of crude oil.259 The second-largest
unintentional oil spil in recent history—the IXTOC I, estimated at 140 mil ion gal ons—was due
to an oil wel blowout in Mexican Gulf Coast waters in 1979.260
Until the 2010 Deepwater Horizon incident, the spil record for offshore platforms in U.S. federal
waters had shown improvement from prior years.261 A 2003 National Research Council (NRC)
study of oil and gas activities on Alaska’s North Slope stated “blowouts that result in large spil s
are unlikely.”262 Similar conclusions were made in federal agency documents regarding deepwater

254 For further discussion of issues relating to oil spills in general, see CRS Report RL33705, Oil Spills: Background
and Governance.
255 Arctic Council, Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response Working Group, Guide to Oil Spill Response in
Snow and Ice Conditions, 2015, at https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/403; see also Brian Dunn, “ Report
on 12th Arctic Shipping Summit, Montreal, February 21 -22,” Canadian Sailings, March 12, 2018, pp. 34-36.
256 Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), Arctic Oil and Gas 2007, 2008.
257 For example, the Exxon Valdez spilled approximately 11 million gallons of oil, but its carrying capacity was
approximately 60 million gallons.
258 Larger oil spills occurred during the 1991 Iraq War, but many of those spills were deliberate. A 1910 -1911 onshore
oil blowout in the California San Joaquin Valley is reported to have spilled 9.4 million barrels of crude oil (almost 400
million gallons).
259 An estimated 17% of this oil did not enter the Gulf environment but was directly recovered from the wellhead by the
responsible party (Brit ish Petroleum, BP). See the Federal Interagency Solutions Group, Oil Budget Calculator Science
and Engineering T eam, Oil Budget Calculator: Deepwater Horizon-Technical Docum entation, November 2010; and
CRS Report R42942, Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Recent Activities and Ongoing Developm ents.
260 National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academies of Science, Oil in the Sea III: Inputs, Fates, and
Effects, 2003.
261 See CRS Report RL33705, Oil Spills: Background and Governance; and Dagmar Etkin (Environmental Research
Consulting), Analysis of U.S. Oil Spillage, Prepared for American Petroleum Institute, August 2009.
262 National Research Council of the National Academies of Science, Cumulative Environmental Effects of Oil and Gas
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dril ing in the Gulf of Mexico before the 2010 Deepwater Horizon event.263 Some would likely
contend that the underlying analyses behind these conclusions should be adjusted to account for
the 2010 Gulf oil spil . However, others may argue that any activities in U.S. Arctic waters
present less risk of an oil wel blowout than was encountered by the Deepwater Horizon dril rig,
because the proposed U.S. Arctic operations would be in shal ower waters (150 feet) than the
deepwater wel (approximately 5,000 feet) that was involved in the 2010 Gulf oil spil . In
addition, some have pointed out that the pressures in the Chukchi Sea would be two to three times
less than they were in the wel involved in the 2010 Gulf oil spil .264 Regardless of these
differences, even under the most stringent control systems, oil exploration and extraction
activities would present some level of oil spil risk in the region, as some accidents are likely to
occur from equipment failure or human error. In addition, as discussed below, an oil spil in the
Arctic would present unique response and cleanup chal enges.
Potential Impacts
No oil spil is entirely benign. Even a relatively minor spil , depending on the timing and location,
can cause significant harm to individual organisms and entire populations. Regarding aquatic
spil s, marine mammals, birds, bottom-dwel ing and intertidal species, and organisms in early
developmental stages—eggs or larvae—are especial y vulnerable. However, the effects of oil
spil s can vary greatly. Oil spil s can cause impacts over a range of time scales, from only a few
days to several years, or even decades in some cases.
Conditions in the Arctic may have implications for oil spil impacts that are less understood than
in the more temperate regions.265 According to a 2016 study, “oil spil science in ice-covered
waters is at an ad hoc level.”266 For example, information on the long-term effects of oil and its
environmental persistence within the Arctic is limited.267 In addition, the historical data for the
region do not provide reliable baselines to assess current environmental or ecosystem states,268
presenting chal enges to those tasked with measuring impacts.
Response and Cleanup Challenges in the Arctic
Conditions in the Arctic impose unique chal enges for personnel charged with (1) oil spil
response, which is the process of getting people and equipment to the incident, and (2) cleanup
duties, either recovering the spil ed oil or mitigating the contamination so that it poses less harm
to the ecosystem. These chal enges may play a role in policy development for economic activities
in the Arctic.

Activities on Alaska’s North Slope, 2003.
263 See, for example, Minerals Management Service (MMS), Outer Continental Shelf Oil & Gas Leasing Program:
2007-2012, Final Environmental Impact Statement, 2007, chapter 4; MMS, Proposed Gulf of Mexico OCS Oil and Gas
Lease Sale 206, Central Planning Area, Environmental Assessment, 2007.
264 Letter from Marvin E. Odum, President, Shell Oil Company to S. Elizabeth Birnbaum, Minerals Ma nagement
Service (May 14, 2010). Cited in a staff paper from the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
and Offshore Drilling (“ T he Challenges of Oil Spill Response in the Arctic, ” 2011).
265 National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academies of Science, Responding to Oil Spills in the U.S. Arctic
Marine Environm ent, 2014 (hereinafter, NRC Report, 2014).
266 Mawuli Afenyo, “A State-of-the-Art Review of Fate and T ransport of Oil Spills in Open and Ice-Covered Water,”
Ocean Engineering, 2016.
267 NRC Report, 2014.
268 Ibid.
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Spill Response Challenges
Response time is a critical factor for oil spil recovery. With each hour, spil ed oil becomes more
difficult to track, contain, and recover, particularly in icy conditions, where oil can migrate under
or mix with surrounding ice.269 Most response techniques cal for quick action, which may pose
logistical chal enges in areas without prior staging equipment or trained response professionals.
Many stakeholders are concerned about a “response gap” for oil spil s in the Arctic.270 A response
gap is a period of time in which oil spil response activities would be unsafe or infeasible. A 2016
study (prepared for the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement) estimated response
gaps for two locations in the U.S. Beaufort and Chukchi Seas during the summer and winter
seasons, and for the year overal .271 The study found that during the summer months (July-
October), open water oil recovery would not be “favorable” approximately 33% of the time.272 By
comparison, that estimate increases to 75% and 95% for the year overal and for the winter
months (November-June), respectively. The response gap for the northern Arctic latitudes is
likely to be extremely high compared to other regions.273
In the event of an oil spil , the Coast Guard has response authority in the coastal zone.274 A Coast
Guard official would serve as the On-Scene Coordinator with the authority to perform cleanup
immediately using federal resources, monitor the response efforts of the spiller, or direct the
spil er’s cleanup activities. According to a 2014 National Research Council (NRC) report, “the
lack of infrastructure in the Arctic would be a significant liability in the event of a large oil
spil .”275 The logistics in the Arctic were described as a “tyranny of distance” by the Vice
Commandant of the Coast Guard.276
The Coast Guard has no designated air stations north of Kodiak, AK, which is almost 1,000 miles
from the northernmost point of land along the Alaskan coast in Point Barrow, AK.277 Although
some of the communities have airstrips capable of landing cargo planes, no roads connect these
Arctic communities to the main highway systems or large communities in Alaska.278 Vessel

269 World Wildlife Fund, Oil Spill: Response Challenges in Arctic Waters (2007).
270 Coastal Response Research Center, Opening the Arctic Seas: Envisioning Disasters and Framing Solutions (2009),
partnership between the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the University of New Hampshire.
271 Nuka Research and Planning Group, Estimating an Oil Spill Response Gap for the U.S. Arctic Ocean, 2016; study
funded by the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement.
272 A 2017 study stated that most of the marine activities in the Arctic region occur during the summer m onths. See
Jeremy Wilkinson, et al., “Oil Spill Response Capabilities and T echnologies for Ice-Covered Arctic Marine Waters: A
Review of Recent Developments and Established Practices,” Ambio, 2017.
273 A 2007 estimate of Prince William Sound (PWS) also may be instructive. A 2007 study found a response gap for
PWS of 38% for the time of the study period (65% during the winter season). Note that PWS has existing infrastructure
for response, while the more remote Arctic areas do not. Nuka Research and Planning Group, LLC, Response Gap
Estim ate for Two Operating Areas in Prince William Sound, Alaska (2007), Report to Prince William Sound Regional
Citizens’ Advisory Council.
274 For more details, see CRS Report RL33705, Oil Spills: Background and Governance.
275 NRC Report, 2014.
276 Admiral Ray Charles, Vice Commandant of the Coast Guard, T estimony before the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and T ransportation, December 12, 2019, https://www.commerce.senate.gov/2019/12/expanding-
opportunities-challenges-and-threats-in-the-arctic-a-focus-on-the-u-s-coast -guard-arctic-strategic-outlook.
277 G.M. Sulmasy and A.P. Wood, U.S. Coast Guard Academy, “U.S. Coast Guard Activity in the Arctic Region,” Law
of the Sea Institute, Occasional Paper #6, 2014; and U.S. Coast Guard, Report to Congress: U.S. Coast Guard Polar
Operations, 2008.
278 NRC Report, 2014.
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infrastructure is also limited. The nearest major port is in the Aleutian Islands, approximately
1,300 miles from Point Barrow.
A 2010 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report identified further logistical obstacles
that would hinder an oil spil response in the region, including “inadequate” ocean and weather
information for the Arctic and technological problems with communications.279 A 2014 GAO
report highlighted steps taken by some groups (e.g., the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration) to improve some of these logistical elements.280 The U.S. Coast Guard includes
an initiative to “strengthen marine environmental response in the Arctic” as part of its Arctic
Strategy Implementation Plan.281 A 2016 GAO Report provided an initial assessment of these
efforts.282 In 2019, the Coast Guard issued its Arctic Strategic Outlook, which stated one of its
objectives was to “enhance capability to operate effectively in a dynamic Arctic.”283
In addition, the Department of the Interior’s BOEM and BSEE issued a final rule in 2016
requiring certain safety measures for dril ing operations in the Arctic, but, as discussed above, the
status of that rulemaking is uncertain.284
The costs of an oil spil response would likely be significantly higher than a similar incident in
lower latitude locations of comparable remoteness. This could place a relatively larger burden on
the oil spil liability and compensation framework.285 Pursuant to the Oil Pollution Act (OPA),286
parties responsible for an oil spil may be liable for cleanup costs, natural resource damages, and
specific economic damages.287 OPA provided both limited defenses from liability and conditional
liability limits for cleanup costs and other eligible damages.288 The Oil Spil Liability Trust Fund
(OSLTF) provides an immediate source of funds for federal responses to oil spil s and
compensation for certain damages.289 The OSLTF can be used if a responsible party’s liability
limit is reached, but the fund can only provide $1 bil ion per incident.290
Oil Spill Cleanup Challenges
The history of oil spil response in the Aleutian Islands highlights the chal enges and concerns for
potential spil s in the Arctic:
The past 20 years of data on response to spills in the Aleutians has also shown that almost
no oil has been recovered during events where attempts have been made by the responsible

279 Government Accountability Office, Coast Guard: Efforts to Identify Arctic Requirements Are Ongoing, but More
Com m unication about Agency Planning Efforts Would Be Beneficial, GAO-10-870, 2010.
280 Government Accountability Office, Key Issues Related to Commercial Activity in the U.S. Arctic over the Next
Decade, GAO-14-299, 2014.
281 U.S. Coast Guard, Arctic Strategy Implementation Plan, 2015, https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/
DCO%20Documents/5pw/Arctic%20Policy/CGAS%20IPlan%20Final%20Signed.pdf?ver=2017-08-25-075935-927.
282 Government Accountability Office, Arctic Strategy Is Underway, but Agency Could Better Assess How Its Actions
Mitigate Known Arctic Capability Gaps, GAO-16-453, 2016.
283 U.S. Coast Guard, Arctic Strategic Outlook, 2019, https://www.uscg.mil/Portals/0/Images/arctic/
Arctic_Strategic_Outlook_APR_2019.pdf.
284 See the section above titled “ Offshore Oil and Gas Exploration.”
285 For more information on this framework, see CRS Report RL33705, Oil Spills: Background and Governance.
286 P.L. 101-380, primarily codified at 33 U.S.C. §2701 et seq.
287 33 U.S.C. §2702.
288 33 U.S.C. §2703 and §2704.
289 33 U.S.C. §2712.
290 26 U.S.C. §9509.
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parties or government agencies, and that in many cases, weather and other conditions have
prevented any response at all.291
The behavior of oil spil s in cold and icy waters is not as wel understood as oil spil s in more
temperate climates.292 In addition, in the summer months, the sea ice zone is a particularly
chal enging environment because the concentration of ice floes within a region is continuously
changing.293 The 2014 NRC report highlights some recent advancements in understanding oil
spil behavior in the Arctic climate. At the same time, the report recommends further study on a
range of related issues.
The 2014 NRC report states that in colder water temperatures or sea ice, “the processes that
control oil weathering—such as spreading, evaporation, photo-oxidation, emulsification, and
natural dispersion—are slowed down or eliminated for extended periods of time.”294 In some
respects, the slower weathering processes may provide more time for response strategies, such as
in situ burning or skimming. On the other hand, the longer the oil remains in an ecosystem, the
more opportunity there is for exposure to humans and other species in the ecosystem.
In addition, the 2014 report states the following:
Arctic conditions impose many challenges for oil spill resp onse—low temperatures and
extended periods of darkness in the winter, oil that is encapsulated under ice or trapped in
ridges and leads, oil spreading due to sea ice drift and surface currents, reduced
effectiveness of conventional containment and recovery systems in measurable ice
concentrations, and issues of life and safety of responders.
Oil Spill Policy–Regional Framework
The existing framework for international governance of maritime operations in the Arctic
combines broader maritime agreements and agreements that focus on the geographic region. In
terms of broader frameworks, the Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS) and other
International Maritime Organization (IMO) conventions include provisions regarding ships in icy
waters, but the provisions are not specific to the polar regions.
The IMO’s International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code) entered into
force in 2017 and is mandatory under SOLAS and the International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships (known as MARPOL).295 The Polar Code addresses a range of
issues, including environmental protection.
In 2013, the member states of the Arctic Council signed an Agreement on Cooperation on Marine
Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic.296 The agreement’s objective is to
“strengthen cooperation, coordination, and mutual assistance .. on oil pollution preparedness and

291 T ransportation Research Board of the National Academy of Sciences, Risk of Vessel Accidents and Spills in the
Aleutian Islands: Designing a Com prehensive Risk Assessm ent (2008), Special Report 293, National Academies Press.
Washington, DC.
292 NRC Report, 2014.
293 Jeremy Wilkinson, et al., “Oil Spill Response Capabilities and T echnologies for Ice-Covered Arctic Marine Waters:
A Review of Recent Developments and Established Practices,” Ambio, 2017.
294 NRC Report, 2014.
295 See the above section titled “Regulation of Arctic Shipping.”
296 Available at http://www.arctic-council.org. T he agreement is sometimes described as the Agreement on Cooperation
on Marine Oil Spill Preparedness and Response in the Arctic (MOSPA).
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response in the Arctic.” The agreement entered force in 2016.297 A 2018 Coast Guard document
describes the agreement as “binding.”298 The agreement includes multiple requirements for the
parties, including oil spil notification, a process for requesting assistance and seeking
reimbursement for costs, and joint preparation activities. Pursuant to the agreement the Arctic
nations have conducted several joint training exercises.299
In addition, the United States has separate bilateral agreements with Canada and Russia that
address oil spil response operations. The agreement with Canada was established in 1974 for the
Great Lakes and has been amended several times to add more geographic areas, including Arctic
waters.300 According to the 2014 NRC report: “formal contingency planning and exercises with
Canada have enabled both the United States and Canada to refine procedures and legal
requirements for cross-border movement of technical experts and equipment in the event of an
emergency.”
The U.S.-Russian agreement was made in 1989 and applies to oil spil -related activities in Arctic
waters. The 2014 NRC report asserted that the agreement has not been tested to the same extent
as the U.S.-Canada agreement. In 2018, officials from both nations reportedly held a tabletop
exercise for an oil spil scenario in the Bering Strait.301
Fisheries302
The effects of climate change such as increasing sea surface temperatures and decreasing
permanent sea ice are altering the composition of marine ecosystems in the Arctic. Climate
change is likely to affect the ranges and productivity of living marine resources including species
that support marine fisheries. In addition, ocean acidification is occurring as the increasing
concentration of carbon dioxide (CO2) in the atmosphere leads to greater absorption of CO2 in the
world’s oceans. The increase in CO2 absorption changes ocean chemistry and makes ocean waters
more acidic (decreases the pH). Ocean acidification is more pronounced at higher latitudes and is
likely to affect marine organisms and ecosystems in the Arctic region.
As a greater portion of the waters in the central Arctic Ocean become open for longer periods, the
region’s resources wil become more accessible to commercial fishing. Large commercial
fisheries already exist in the Arctic, including in the Barents and Norwegian Seas north of
Europe, the Central North Atlantic off Greenland and Iceland, the Bering Sea off Russia and the
United States (Alaska), and the Newfoundland and Labrador Seas off northeastern Canada.303 As

297 Arctic Council, Status of ratification of Agreements negotiated under the auspices of the Arctic Council, 2016.
298 U.S. Coast Guard, Marine Environmental Response and Preparedness Manual, 2018, https://media.defense.gov/
2018/Oct/01/2002046527/-1/-1/0/CIM_16000_14A.PDF.
299 See Arctic Council, Emergency Prevention Preparedness and Response Working Group , Planning Guidance for
MOSPA Exercises, 2019; see also Michael LeVine et al., “ Oil Spill Response in the North American Arctic,” in
Managing the Risks of Offshore Oil and Gas Accidents: The International Legal Dim ension , edited by Gunther Handl
and Kristoffer Svendsen, 2019.
300 For more information, see U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Oil Spill
Preparedness, Prevention, and Response on the Alaska OCS , 2019.
301 World Wildlife Federation, “Russia and the United States Hold Joint Exercises to Respond to Oil Spills in the
Bering Strait,” November 2018, https://wwf.ru/en/resources/news/bioraznoobrazie/rossiya-i-ssha-proveli-sovmestnye-
ucheniya-po-reagirovaniyu-na-razlivy-nefti-v-beringovom-prolive/.
302 T his section was prepared by Harold Upton, Analyst in Natural Resources Policy, Resources, Science, and Industry
Division.
303 Erik J. Molenaar and Robert Corell, Arctic Fisheries, Arctic T ransform, February 9, 2009; available at http://arctic-
transform.org/download/FishBP.pdf.
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climate changes and ocean acidification increases, fishery managers wil be chal enged to adjust
management measures for existing fisheries. Uncertainties related to these changes and potential
new fisheries in the central Arctic Ocean have prompted many fishery managers to support
precautionary approaches to fisheries management in the region. Currently, there is no
commercial fishing in central Arctic Ocean and it is questionable whether existing fisheries
resources could sustain a fishery.
For waters under U.S. jurisdiction, in 2009, the National Marine Fisheries Service in the
Department of Commerce’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration implemented the
North Pacific Fishery Management Council’s (NPFMC) Fishery Management Plan for Fish
Resources of the Arctic Management Area (Arctic plan).304 The management area includes marine
waters in the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas.305 The
Arctic plan addresses concerns that inadequately regulated commercial fisheries in the U.S. EEZ
off Alaska could harm marine resources such as commercial fish populations, fish habitat, and
other marine populations. The Arctic plan prohibits commercial fishing in the Arctic Management
Area and moves the northern boundary of the Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands king and tanner crab
fishery management plan out of the Arctic Management Area south to the Bering Strait. The plan
takes a precautionary approach by requiring the collection of more information before developing
commercial fisheries in the region. The NPFMC recently developed a discussion paper that
examines exploratory fishing undertaken by regional fishery management organizations and
potential application of these efforts to the Arctic Ocean.306
The United States also has been active in promoting international approaches to management of
stocks in the Arctic Ocean. International cooperation is necessary to manage Arctic resources
because fish stocks are shared to some degree among the five adjacent jurisdictional zones of the
Arctic rim nations. Further, a large portion of the central Arctic Ocean is a high seas area roughly
the size of the Mediterranean Sea (2.8 mil ion square kilometers) that lies outside the EEZs of
these nations. Ideal y, regional management would recognize the need to coordinate management
for those fish populations that move among these national jurisdictional zones and the high seas.
On June 1, 2008, Congress passed a joint resolution (P.L. 110-243) that directed “the United
States to initiate international discussions and take necessary steps with other nations to negotiate
an agreement for managing migratory and transboundary fish stocks in the Arctic Ocean.” The
joint resolution also supported establishment of a new international fisheries management
organization or organizations for the region. On July 16, 2015, the five nations that surround the
Arctic Ocean signed a nonbinding declaration to prevent unregulated commercial fishing in the
high seas portion of the central Arctic Ocean.307 The five nations agreed that a precautionary
approach to fishing is needed because there is limited scientific knowledge of marine resources in
the central Arctic Ocean. The declaration also recognized the interests of indigenous peoples and
the need to encourage other countries such as major fishing nations to take actions that are
consistent with the interim measures.

304 74 Federal Register 56734-56746, November 3, 2009.
305 T he state of Alaska has jurisdiction over waters from 0-3 nautical miles from the baseline. T he baseline generally
follows the shoreline.
306 Steve MacLean, Exploratory Fishing in Global Regional Fishery Management Organizations, North Pacific Fishery
Management Council, Anchorage, AK, February 2018.
307 T he five Arctic rim nations include Canada, Denmark (Faroe Islands and Greenland), Norway, the Russian
Federation, and the United States. See https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/departementene/ud/vedlegg/folkerett/
declaration-on-arctic-fisheries-16-july-2015.pdf.
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The declaration was followed by negotiations among officials from the five nations that surround
the Arctic Ocean, four major fishing nations, and the European Union.308 On October 3, 2018, the
parties signed a legal y binding international accord to prevent unregulated high seas fisheries in
the central Arctic Ocean.309 The objective of the accord, as stated in its preamble, is
to prevent unregulated fishing in the high seas portion of the central Arctic Ocean through
the application of precautionary conservation and management measures as part of a long-
term strategy to safeguard healthy marine ecosystems and to ensure the conservation and
sustainable use of fish stocks.310
The parties agreed that no commercial fisheries wil be conducted in the Arctic high seas before
an international management regime is put in place to regulate commercial fishing. The ban on
unregulated commercial fishing wil remain in force for 16 years and for successive 5-year
increments unless any party presents a formal objection to extension of the agreement. The
agreement also established a joint scientific program to conduct research and monitor the region’s
marine ecosystem. The parties are required to meet every two years to share and review scientific
information. The agreement is seen as the first step toward establishing one or more regional
fisheries management organizations for the Arctic Ocean. On May 17, 2020, Norway become the
seventh of the 10 signatories, including the United States, to ratify the agreement.311 The
agreement wil enter into force when al 10 parties ratify. However, it remains an open question
whether an Arctic Ocean regional fishery management organization wil be established, which
countries would be included in such an arrangement, and if sustainable commercial fisheries can
be developed in the central Arctic Ocean.
Protected Species312
Concern over development of the Arctic relates to how such development might affect threatened
and endangered species. Under the Endangered Species Act (ESA, 16 U.S.C. §§1531-1543), the
polar bear was listed as threatened on May 15, 2008. The failure by the Fish and Wildlife Service
(FWS) to make a 90-day finding on a 2008 petition to list Pacific walrus led to submission of 60-
days’ notice of a future citizen suit. However, eventual y walruses were listed as candidate species
under ESA;313 this status means that federal agencies carrying out actions that may affect the
species must confer with FWS though they are not necessarily obliged to modify their actions.
Both polar bears and walruses are heavily dependent during their life cycles on thick sea ice,
making them especial y susceptible to the shrinking Arctic ice cap.
On December 30, 2008, the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) determined that a listing
of ribbon seal as threatened or endangered was not warranted.314 On October 22, 2010, NMFS

308 T he agreement includes Arctic indigenous peoples as participants in meetings and as a source of scientific
information and local knowledge.
309 T he four major fishing nations include Iceland, Japan, South Korea, and the People’s Republic of China.
310 Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean ,
October 3, 2018, https://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/international/agreement-accord-eng.htm.
311 Atle Staalesen, “Norway rat ifies a landmark agreement to protect Arctic fish stocks,” The Independent Barents
Observer, May 23, 2020. As of June 1, 2020, China, Iceland, and Demark have not ratified the agreement.
312 Prepared by Lynne Corn and Eugene Buck, Specialists in Natural Resources Policy, Resources, Science, and
Industry Division.
313 Fish and Wildlife Service, “Endangered and T hreatened Wildlife and Plants; Review of Native Species T hat Are
Candidates for Listing as Endangered or T hreatened; Annual Notice of Findings on Resubm itted Petitions; Annual
Description of Progress on Listing Actions; Proposed Rule,” 76 Federal Register 66370-66439, October 26, 2001.
314 73 Federal Register 79822-79828.
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listed the southern distinct population segment (DPS) of spotted seals as threatened.315 Listing of
two other DPS (Okhotsk and Bering Sea) had earlier been determined to not be warranted.316 On
December 10, 2010, NMFS proposed that (1) four subspecies of ringed seal be listed as
threatened,317 and (2) that two DPS of one subspecies of bearded seal be listed as threatened.318
In either terrestrial or marine environments, the extreme pace of change makes a biological
response many times more difficult. For species with adaptations for a specific optimum
temperature for egg development, or production of young timed to match the availability of a
favored prey species, or seed dispersal in predictable fire regimes, etc., evolutionary responses
may wel not keep pace with the rate of change.319 While species of plants and animals farther
south might migrate, drift, or be transplanted from warming habitats to more northerly sites that
may continue to be suitable,320 once a terrestrial species reaches the Arctic Ocean, it is very
literal y at the end of the line. No more northern or colder habitat is available.
The Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA; 16 U.S.C. §§1361 et seq.) protects whales, seals,
walruses, and polar bears. The MMPA established a moratorium on the “taking” of marine
mammals in U.S. waters and by U.S. nationals on the high seas, including the Arctic. The MMPA
protects marine mammals from “clubbing, mutilation, poisoning, capture in nets, and other
human actions that lead to extinction.” Under the MMPA, the Secretary of Commerce, acting
through National Marine Fisheries Service, is responsible for the conservation and management
of whales and seals. The Secretary of the Interior, acting through the Fish and Wildlife Service, is
responsible for walruses and polar bears.321 Despite the MMPA’s general moratorium on taking,
the MMPA al ows U.S. citizens to apply for and obtain authorization for taking smal numbers of
mammals incidental to activities other than commercial fishing (e.g., offshore oil and gas
exploration and development) if the taking would have only a negligible impact on any marine
mammal species or stock, provided that monitoring requirements and other conditions are met.
Indigenous People Living in Arctic322
People have been living in the Arctic for thousands of years, and indigenous peoples developed
highly specialized cultures and economies based on the physical and biological conditions of the
long-isolated region. However, with trade, the influx of additional populations especial y since

315 75 Federal Register 65239-65248.
316 74 Federal Register 53683-58696, October 20, 2009.
317 75 Federal Register 77476-77495.
318 75 Federal Register 77496-77515.
319 Among biologists, it is traditionally said that a species faced with extreme change can respond in three basic ways:
“migrate, mutate, or die.” When change is rapid enough, mutation (accompanied by natural selection of individuals
within the population more suited to the changed environment) may not be able to occur fast enough, leaving migration
and death as the only options. T he problem of response rate is more severe for species that reproduce slowly (e.g., polar
bears) and less severe for species that reproduce rapidly (e.g., algae).
320 T he efficacy and the effect of this tactic is often questioned, since natural migration is unlikely to involve the entire
suite of species in an ecosystem (e.g., host plants might not move north (or up) as fast as their m oth herbivores, nor as
fast as the birds that depend on the moths). Moreover, the southerners will not find a land of sterile bare dirt —the
species that are already there may be threatened themselves by the competition from the new arrivals, perhaps tippin g
the balance and pushing still more species toward extinction.
321 Under the MMPA, both NMFS and FWS have responsibility for additional marine mammal species (e.g., manatees,
sea otters, dolphins) which are not currently found in the Arctic.
322 T his section was originally prepared by Roger Walke, who was a Specialist in American Indian Policy, Domestic
Social Policy Division, until his retirement from CRS in October 2010. It has been updated by Jane A. Leggett,
Specialist in Environmental and Energy Policy in CRS’s Resources, Science and Industry Division.
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the 19th century, and ongoing physical changes in the Arctic, indigenous populations have already
experienced substantial change in their lifestyles and economies. Over the past two decades,
greater political organization across indigenous populations has increased their demands for
international recognition and broader rights, as wel as attention to the economic, health, and
safety implications of climate change in the North.
Background
Seven of the eight Arctic nations have indigenous peoples,323 whose predecessors were present in
parts of the Arctic over 10,000 years ago, wel before the arrival of peoples with European
backgrounds.324 Current Arctic indigenous peoples comprise dozens of diverse cultures and speak
dozens of languages from eight or more non-Indo-European language families.325
Before the arrival of Europeans, Arctic indigenous peoples lived in economies that were chiefly
dependent, in varying proportions, on hunting land and marine mammals, catching salt- and
fresh-water fish, herding reindeer (in Eurasia), and gathering, for their food, clothing, and other
products.326 Indigenous peoples’ interaction with and knowledge of Arctic wildlife and
environments has developed over mil ennia and is the foundation of their cultures.327
The length of time that Arctic indigenous peoples were in contact with Europeans varied across
the Arctic. As recorded by Europeans, contact began as early as the 9th century CE, if not before,
in Fennoscandia328 and northwestern Russia, chiefly for reasons of commerce (especial y furs); it
progressed mostly west-to-east across northern Asia, reaching northeastern Arctic Asia by the 17th
century.329 North American Arctic indigenous peoples’ contact with Europeans started in Labrador
in the 16th century and in Alaska in the 18th century, and was not completed until the early 20th
century.330 Greenland’s indigenous peoples first saw European-origin peoples in the late 10th

323 Arctic Human Development Report, ed. Joan Nymand Larsen et al. (Akureyri, Iceland: Stefansson Arctic Institute,
2004), p. 47; this report is subsequently cited in this section as AHDR. T he seven countries are Canada, Denmark-
Greenland, Finland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States.
324 John F. Hoffecker, A Prehistory of the North: Human Settlement of the Higher Latitudes (New Brunswick, NJ:
Rutgers University Press, 2005), pp. 8, 81, 112 -115.
325 AHDR, pp. 47, 53; David Crystal, Cambridge Encyclopedia of Language, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1997), chap. 50; Ethnologue: Languages of the World, 16th ed., ed. M. Paul Lewis (Dallas: SIL
International, 2009), available at http://www.ethnologue.com/. T he number of languages and language families varies
not only with definitions of the Arctic but with definitions of languages and language families.
326 Jim Berner et al., Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), chapter 12;
this report is subsequently cited in this section as ACIA.
327 ACIA, pp. 654-655.
328 Fennoscandia refers to the Scandinavian Peninsula, Finland, the Kola Peninsula of Russia, and ce rtain parts of
Russia bordering on Finland.
329 Janet Martin, Treasure in the Land of Darkness: The Fur Trade and Its Significance for Medieval Russia
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 41 -42; James Forsyth, A History of the Peoples of Siberia:
Russia’s North Asian Colony, 1581-1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 69-83, 102; Lassi K.
Heininen, “Different Images of the Arctic and the Circumpolar North in World Politics,” in Knowledge and Power in
the Arctic, Proceedings at a Conference in Rovaniemi, April 16-18, 2007, Arctic Centre Reports 48, ed. Paula
Kankaanpaa et al. (Rovaniemi, Finland: University of Lapland, Arctic Centre, 2007), p. 125.
330 James W. VanStone, “Exploration and Contact History of Western Alaska,” and David Damas, “Copper Eskimo,”
and J. Garth T aylor, “Historical Ethnography of the Labrador Coast,” in Handbook of North American Indian: Vol. 5,
Arctic, vol. ed. David Damas, gen. ed. William C. Sturtevant (Washington: Smithsonian, 1984), pp. 149 -155, 408, 509-
510.
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century, but those Europeans died out during the 15th or 16th century and Europeans did not return
permanently until the 18th century.331
Contact led to significant changes in Arctic indigenous economies, political structures, foods,
cultures, and populations, starting especial y in the 20th century. For example, life expectancy
among Alaska Natives has increased from 47 years in 1950 to over 69 years in 2000 (though it
stil lags behind that of U.S. residents overal , at 77 years).332
Also, at present, most Arctic indigenous peoples have become minorities in their countries’ Arctic
areas, except in Greenland and Canada. (One source estimates that, around 2003, about 10% of an
estimated 3.7 mil ion people in the Arctic were indigenous.)333 While many Arctic indigenous
communities remain heavily dependent on hunting, fishing, and herding and are more likely to
depend on traditional foods than nonindigenous Arctic inhabitants,334 there is much variation.
Most Arctic indigenous people may no longer consume traditional foods as their chief sources of
energy and nutrition.335 Major economic change is also relatively recent but ongoing.336 Many
Arctic indigenous communities have developed a mixture of traditional economic activities and
wage employment.337 The economics of subsistence and globalization wil be key factors in the
effects of climate change on Arctic indigenous peoples, and on their reactions to Arctic climate
change.
Arctic indigenous peoples’ current political structures vary, as do their relationships with their
national governments. Some indigenous groups govern their own unique land areas within the
national structure, as in the United States and Canada; others have special representative bodies,
such as the Saami parliaments in Norway, Finland, and Sweden;338 a few areas have general
governments with indigenous majorities, such as Greenland (a member country of Denmark),
Nunavut territory in Canada, and the North Slope and Northwest Arctic boroughs in Alaska.339
Control of land, through claims and ownership, also varies among Arctic indigenous peoples, as
do rights to fishing, hunting, and resources.340 Arctic indigenous peoples’ political relationships to
their national and local governments, and their ownership or claims regarding land, are also

331 Inge Kleivan, “History of Norse Greenland,” in Handbook, Vol. 5, Arctic, op. cit., pp. 549-555; Finn Gad, “Danish
Greenland Policies,” in Handbook of North American Indians: Vol. 4, History of Indian-White Relations, vol. ed.
Wilcomb E. Washburn, gen. ed. William C. Sturtevant (Washington: Smithsonian, 1988), p. 110.
332 Parkinson, Alan J. T he Arctic Human Health Initiative. Washington , DC: U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, 2006.
333 AHDR, pp. 19, 29. Estimates of Arctic indigenous populations are complicated by varying definitions not only of the
Arctic but also of indigenous peoples; for instance, Russia does not count some non-European Arctic ethnic groups,
such as the Yakut, as “ indigenous minorities” (see “ Peoples of the Arctic: Characteristics of Human Populations
Relevant to Pollution Issues,” in AMAP Assessment Report: Arctic Pollution Issues, ed. Simon J. Wilson et al. (Oslo:
Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme, 1998), pp. 167 -169; this report is subsequently cited in this section as
AMAP 1998.
334 AMAP 1998, chapter 5; see also Birger Poppel et al., SLiCA Results, Survey of Living Conditions in the Arctic
(Anchorage: Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of Alaska Anchorage, 2007), pp. 4 -7,
http://www.arcticlivingconditions.org.
335 Annika E. Nilson and Henry P. Huntington, Arctic Pollution 2009 (Oslo: Arctic Monitoring and Assessment
Programme, 2009), pp. 39-41; this report is subsequently cited in this section as AMAP 2009.
336 ACIA, p. 1000.
337 SLiCA Results, op. cit., pp. v, 4-8.
338 AHDR, p. 232.
339 AHDR, chapter 4, and pp. 232-233.
340 AHDR, chapters 6-7, and pp. 232-233.
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significant factors in the responses to Arctic climate change by the indigenous peoples and by
Arctic nations’ governments.
Effects of Climate Change
Arctic climate change is expected to affect the economies, population, subsistence, health,
infrastructure, societies, and cultures of Arctic indigenous peoples. Changes in sea ice and sea
level, permafrost, tundra, weather, and vegetation distributions, as wel as increased commercial
shipping, mineral extraction, and tourism, wil affect the distribution of land and sea mammals, of
freshwater and marine fish, and of forage for reindeer. These wil in turn affect traditional
subsistence activities and related indigenous lifestyles.341 Arctic indigenous peoples’ harvesting of
animals is likely to become riskier and less predictable, which may increase food insecurity,
change diets, and increase dependency on outside, nontraditional foods.342 Food cel ars in many
locations have thawed during summers, threatening food safety. Related health risks of diabetes,
obesity, and mental il ness have been associated with these changes.343
Sea, shoreline ice, and permafrost changes have damaged infrastructure and increased coastal and
inland erosion, especial y in Alaska, where GAO found in 2003 that “coastal vil ages are
becoming more susceptible to flooding and erosion caused in part by rising temperatures.”344 In
response, Congress funded the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to conduct a Baseline Erosion
Assessment that identified and prioritized among the 178 communities identified at risk from
erosion.345 (Risks from flooding were not examined.) GAO concluded in 2009 that many Native
vil ages must relocate, but even those facing imminent threats have been impeded by various
barriers, including difficulties identifying appropriate new sites, piecemeal programs for state and
federal assistance, and obstacles to eligibility for certain federal programs.346 The Alaska
Federation of Natives placed among its 2010 federal priorities a request to Congress to mitigate
flooding and erosion in Alaska Native vil ages and to fund relocation of vil ages where
necessary.347 However, “the cost is extraordinary,” acknowledges Senator Lisa Murkowski.348

341 ACIA, pp. 1000-1001, 1004.
342 ACIA, pp. 1000-1001, 1004.
343 Parkinson, Alan J. The Arctic Human Health Initiative. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, 2006; Brubaker, Michael, James Berner, Raj Chavan, and John Warren. “ Climate Change and Hea lth Effects
in Northwest Alaska.” Global Health Action 4 (October 18, 2011).
344 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Alaska Native Villages: Villages Affected by Flooding and Erosion
Have Difficulty Qualifying for Federal Assistance, GAO-04-895T , June 29, 2004, p. i, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d04895t.pdf. See also, Government Accountability Office, Alaska Native Villages: Most Are Affected by Flooding and
Erosion, but Few Qualify for Federal Assistance, GAO-04-142, December 12, 2003, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d04142.pdf.
345 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Alaska Baseline Erosion Assessment (BEA), March 2009.
346 GAO, Alaska Native Villages: Limited Progress Has Been Made on Relocating Villages Threatened by Flooding
and Erosion, June 3, 2009.
347 Alaska Federation of Natives, Human Resources Committee, 2010 Federal Priorities (Anchorage: Alaska
Federation of Natives, 2010), pp. 22-23, available at https://www.nativefederation.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/
2010-afn-federal-priorities.pdf. See also, Government Accountability Office, Alaska Native Villages: Lim ited Progress
Has Been Made on Relocating Villages Threatened by Flooding and Erosion , GAO-09-551, June 3, 2009,
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09551.pdf. For a more detailed anecdote, see a 2012 interview with Brice Eningowuk,
Shishmaref Erosion and Relocation Committee member at Shearer, Christine. “Climate Crisis: Alaskan Village
Shishmaref Sinking Into the Sea.” Imagined Magazine, July 8, 2012, http://imaginedmag.com/2012/07/climate-crisis-
alaskan-village-shishmaref-sinking-into-the-sea/.
348 Press Office of Senator Lisa Murkowski. “Murkowski Urges Greater T ribal Consultation from Administration;
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Oil, gas, and mineral exploration and development are expected to increase, as are other
economic activities, such as forestry and tourism, and these are expected to increase economic
opportunities for al Arctic residents, including indigenous peoples.349 Pressures to increase
participation in the wage economy, however, may speed up changes in indigenous cultures.
Increased economic opportunities may also lead to a rise in the nonindigenous population, which
may further change the circumstances of indigenous cultures. Some representatives of Arctic
indigenous people have related a “conflicting desire between combating climate change and
embracing the potential for economic growth through foreign investment.”350
Although important advances in public health have occurred in indigenous communities over past
decades, some health problems may increase with continued Arctic climate change. Economic
development may exacerbate Arctic pollution problems, including higher exposure to mercury, air
pollution, and food contamination. The influx and redistribution of contaminants in the air,
oceans, and land may change in ways that are now poorly understood.351 Warmer temperatures
and longer warm seasons may increase insect- and wildlife-borne diseases.352 Climate change
may lead to damage to water and sanitation systems, reducing protection against waterborne
diseases.353 Changes in Arctic indigenous cultures may increase mental stress and behavioral
problems.354
The response to climate change by Arctic indigenous peoples has included international activities
by Arctic indigenous organizations and advocacy before their national governments. As one
report noted, “the rise of solidarity among indigenous peoples organizations in the region is
surely a development to be reckoned with by al those interested in policy issues in the Arctic.”355
Six national or international indigenous organizations are permanent participants of the Arctic
Council, the regional intergovernmental forum.356 Due in part to advocacy by Arctic indigenous
people, the United Nations General Assembly adopted in 2007 the Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples.357 In April 2009, the Inuit Circumpolar Council (an organization of Inuit in
the Arctic regions of Alaska, Canada, Greenland, and Russia) hosted in Alaska the worldwide

Senator Spotlights ‘Monumental’ Climat e Struggles Faced by Alaska Nat ives, Coastal Communities,” July 19, 2012.
349 ACIA, pp. 1001, 1004.
350 Aqqaluk Lynge, Chair, Inuit Circumpolar Council, quoted in Stephanie McFeeters, “Lynge talks future of Inuit
people,” The Dartmouth, February 8, 2012.
351 See, for example, “Health: Increased Bacterial Loads in Potable Water Could Have Significant Health Effects on
Indigenous People From the Arctic to Uganda, Says Vanier Scholar.” National Aboriginal Health Organization
(NAHO), February 17, 2012. http://www.naho.ca/blog/2012/02/17/health-increased-bacterial-loads-in-potable-water-
could-have-significant -health-effects-on-indigenous-people-from-the-arctic-to-uganda-says-vanier-scholar/; or,
Kallenborn et al., Com bined Effects of Selected Pollutants and Clim ate Change in the Arctic Environm ent . Oslo,
Norway: Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), Arctic Council, 2011.
352 AMAP Assessment 2009: Human Health in the Arctic, ed. Simon J. Wilson and Carolyn Symon (Oslo: Arctic
Monitoring and Assessment Programme, 2009), pp. 4-6, 143.
353 Brubaker, Michael, James Berner, Raj Chavan, and John Warren. “Climate Change and Health Effects in Northwest
Alaska.” Global Health Action 4 (October 18, 2011); John Warren, “Climate change could affect human health,”
Mukluk Telegraph, January/February 2005, pp. 5-6.
354 John Warren, “Climate change could affect human health,” Mukluk Telegraph, January/February 2005, pp. 5-6.
355 AHDR, p. 235.
356 See http://www.arctic-council.org/. T he six organizations are the Aleut International Association, Arctic Athabaskan
Council, Gwich’in Council International, Inuit Circumpolar Council, RAIPON (Russian Association of Indigenous
Peoples of the North), and Saami Council.
357 United Nations, Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Resolution A/RES/61/295, at http://www.un-
documents.net/a61r295.htm.
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“Indigenous Peoples Global Summit on Climate Change.”358 The conference report, forwarded to
the Copenhagen Conference of the Parties of the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate
Change (December 2009), noted “accelerating” climate change caused by “unsustainable
development” and, among several recommendations, cal ed for a greater indigenous role in
national and international decisions on climate change, including a greater role for indigenous
knowledge in climate change research, monitoring, and mitigation.359
CRS Reports on Specific Arctic-Related Issues
CRS In Focus IF10740, The Nordic Countries and U.S. Relations, by Kristin Archick
CRS Insight IN11161, Greenland, Denmark, and U.S. Relations, by Kristin Archick
CRS Report RL34391, Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (Polar Icebreaker) Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke
CRS Report RL33872, Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR): An Overview, by M. Lynne
Corn, Michael Ratner, and Laura B. Comay
CRS Report RL32838, Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR): Votes and Legislative Actions,
96th-114th Congresses, by Laura B. Comay
CRS Report R45192, Oil and Gas Activities Within the National Wildlife Refuge System, by R.
Eliot Crafton, Laura B. Comay, and Marc Humphries
CRS Report RL33705, Oil Spills: Background and Governance, by Jonathan L. Ramseur

358 See http://www.indigenoussummit.com/servlet/content/home.html.
359 K. Galloway-McLean et al., Report of the Indigenous Peoples’ Global Summit on Climate Change: 20 -24 April
2009, Anchorage, Alaska (Darwin, Australia: United Nations University—T raditional Knowledge Initiative, 2009), pp.
5-7; available at http://www.indigenoussummit.com/servlet/content/home.html.
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Appendix A. Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA)
of 1984 (Title I of P.L. 98-373)
The text of the Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA) of 1984 (Title I of P.L. 98-373 of July 31,
1984)360 is as follows:
TITLE I – ARCTIC RESEARCH AND POLICY
SHORT TITLE
SEC. 101. This title may be cited as the “Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984”.
FINDINGS AND PURPOSES
SEC. 102. (a) The Congress finds and declares that-
(1) the Arctic, onshore and offshore, contains vital energy resources that can reduce the
Nation’s dependence on foreign oil and improve the national balance of payments;
(2) as the Nation’s only common border with the Soviet Union, the Arctic is critical to
national defense;
(3) the renewable resources of the Arctic, specifically fish and other seafood, represent one
of the Nation’s greatest commercial assets;
(4) Arctic conditions directly affect global weather patterns and must be understood in
order to promote better agricultural management throughout the United States;
(5) industrial pollution not originating in the Arctic region collects in the polar air mass,
has the potential to disrupt global weather patterns, and must be controlled through
international cooperation and consultation;
(6) the Arctic is a natural laboratory for research into human health and adaptation, physical
and psychological, to climates of extreme cold and isolation and may provide information
crucial for future defense needs;
(7) atmospheric conditions peculiar to the Arctic make the Arctic a unique testing ground
for research into high latitude communications, which is likely to be crucial for future
defense needs;
(8) Arctic marine technology is critical to cost-effective recovery and transportation of
energy resources and to the national defense;
(9) the United States has important security, economic, and environmental interests in
developing and maintaining a fleet of icebreaking vessels capable of operating effectively
in the heavy ice regions of the Arctic;
(10) most Arctic-rim countries, particularly the Soviet Union, possess Arctic technologies
far more advanced than those currently available in the United States;
(11) Federal Arctic research is fragmented and uncoordinated at the present time, leading
to the neglect of certain areas of research and to unnecessary duplication of effort in other
areas of research;
(12) improved logistical coordination and support for Arctic research and better
dissemination of research data and information is necessary to increase the efficiency and
utility of national Arctic research efforts;

360 T itle II of P.L. 98-373 is the National Critical Materials Act of 1984.
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(13) a comprehensive national policy and program plan to organize and fund currently
neglected scientific research with respect to the Arctic is necessary to fulfill national
objectives in Arctic research;
(14) the Federal Government, in cooperation with State and local governments, should
focus its efforts on the collection and characterization of basic data related to biological,
materials, geophysical, social, and behavioral phenomena in the Arctic;
(15) research into the long-range health, environmental, and social effects of development
in the Arctic is necessary to mitigate the adverse consequences of that development to the
land and its residents;
(16) Arctic research expands knowledge of the Arctic, which can enhance the lives of
Arctic residents, increase opportunities for international cooperation among Arctic-rim
countries, and facilitate the formulation of national policy for the Arctic; and
(17) the Alaskan Arctic provides an essential habitat for marine mammals, migratory
waterfowl, and other forms of wildlife which are important to the Nation and which are
essential to Arctic residents.
(b) The purposes of this title are-
(1) to establish national policy, priorities, and goals and to provide a Federal program plan
for basic and applied scientific research with respect to the Arctic, including natural
resources and materials, physical, biological and health sciences, and social and behavioral
sciences;
(2) to establish an Arctic Research Commission to promote Arctic research and to
recommend Arctic research policy;
(3) to designate the National Science Foundation as the lead agency responsible for
implementing Arctic research policy; and
(4) to establish an Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee to develop a national
Arctic research policy and a five year plan to implement that policy.
ARCTIC RESEARCH COMMISSION
SEC. 103. (a) The President shall establish an Arctic Research Commission (hereafter
referred to as the “Commission”).
(b)(1) The Commission shall be composed of five members appointed by the President,
with the Director of the National Science Foundation serving as a nonvoting, ex officio
member. The members appointed by the President shall include-
(A) three members appointed from among individuals from academic or other research
institutions with expertise in areas of research relating to the Arctic, including the physical,
biological, health, environmental, social, and behavioral sciences;
(B) one member appointed from among indigenous residents of the Arctic who are
representative of the needs and interests of Arctic residents and who live in areas directly
affected by Arctic resource development; and
(C) one member appointed from among individuals familiar with the Arctic and
representative of the needs and interests of private industry undertaking resource
development in the Arctic.
(2) The President shall designate one of the appointed members of the Commission to be
chairperson of the Commission.
(c)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, the term o f office of each
member of the Commission appointed under subsection (b)(1) shall be four years.
(2) Of the members of the Commission originally appointed under subsection (b)(1)-
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(A) one shall be appointed for a term of two years;
(B) two shall be appointed for a term of three years; and
(C) two shall be appointed for a term of four years.
(3) Any vacancy occurring in the membership of the Commission shall be filled, after
notice of the vacancy is published in the Federal Register, in the manner pro vided by the
preceding provisions of this section, for the remainder of the unexpired term.
(4) A member may serve after the expiration of the member’s term of office until the
President appoints a successor.
(5) A member may serve consecutive terms beyond the member’s original appointment.
(d)(1) Members of the Commission may be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in
lieu of subsistence, as authorized by section 5703 of title 5, United States Code. A member
of the Commission not presently employed for compensation shall be compensated at a
rate equal to the daily equivalent of the rate for GS-16 of the General Schedule under
section 5332 of title 5, United States Code, for each day the member is engaged in the
actual performance of his duties as a member of the Commission, not to exceed 90 days of
service each year. Except for the purposes of chapter 81 of title 5 (relating to compensation
for work injuries) and chapter 171 of title 28 (relating to tort claims), a member of the
Commission shall not be considered an employee of the United States for any purpose.
(2) The Commission shall meet at the call of its Chairman or a majority of its members.
(3) Each Federal agency referred to in section 107(b) may designate a representative to
participate as an observer with the Commission.
These representatives shall report to and advise the Commission on the activities relating
to Arctic research of their agencies.
(4) The Commission shall conduct at least one public meeting in the State of Alaska
annually.
DUTIES OF COMMISSION
SEC. 104. (a) The Commission shall-
(1) develop and recommend an integrated national Arctic research policy;
(2) in cooperation with the Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee established
under section 107, assist in establishing a national Arctic research program plan to
implement the Arctic research policy;
(3) facilitate cooperation between the Federal Government and State and local governments
with respect to Arctic research;
(4) review Federal research programs in the Arctic an d suggest improvements in
coordination among programs;
(5) recommend methods to improve logistical planning and support for Arctic research as
may be appropriate and in accordance with the findings and purposes of this title;
(6) suggest methods for improving efficient sharing and dissemination of data and
information on the Arctic among interested public and private institutions;
(7) offer other recommendations and advice to the Interagency Committee established
under section 107 as it may find appropriate; and
(8) cooperate with the Governor of the State of Alaska and with agencies and organizations
of that State which the Governor may designate with respect to the formulation of Arctic
research policy.
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(b) Not later than January 31 of each year, the Commission shall-
(1) publish a statement of goals and objectives with respect to Arctic research to guide the
Interagency Committee established under section 107 in the performance of its duties; and
(2) submit to the President and to the Congress a report des cribing the activities and
accomplishments of the Commission during the immediately preceding fiscal year.
COOPERATION WITH THE COMMISSION
SEC. 105. (a)(1) The Commission may acquire from the head of any Federal agency
unclassified data, reports, and other nonproprietary information with respect to Arctic
research in the possession of the agency which the Commission considers useful in the
discharge of its duties.
(2) Each agency shall cooperate with the Commission and furnish all data, reports, and
other information requested by the Commission to the extent permitted by law; except that
no agency need furnish any information which it is permitted to withhold under section
552 of title 5, United States Code.
(b) With the consent of the appropriate agency head, the Commission may utilize the
facilities and services of any Federal agency to the extent that the facilities and services are
needed for the establishment and development of an Arctic research policy, upon
reimbursement to be agreed upon by the Commission and the agency head and taking every
feasible step to avoid duplication of effort.
(c) All Federal agencies shall consult with the Commission before undertaking major
Federal actions relating to Arctic research.
ADMINISTRATION OF THE COMMISSION
SEC. 106. The Commission may-
(1) in accordance with the civil service laws and subchapter III of chapter 53 of title 5,
United States Code, appoint and fix the compensation of an Executive Director and
necessary additional staff personnel, but not to exceed a total of seven compensated
personnel;
(2) procure temporary and intermittent services as authorized by section 3109 of title 5,
United States Code;
(3) enter into contracts and procure supplies, services, and personal property; and
(4) enter into agreements with the General Services Administration for the procurement of
necessary financial and administrative services, for which payment shall be made by
reimbursement from funds of the Commission in amounts to be agreed upon by the
Commission and the Administrator of the General Services Administration.
LEAD AGENCY AND INTERAGENCY ARCTIC RESEARCH POLICY
COMMITTEE
SEC. 107. (a) The National Science Foundation is designated as the lead agency
responsible for implementing Arctic research policy, and the Director of the National
Science Foundation shall insure that the requirements of section 108 are fulfilled.
(b)(1) The President shall establish an Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee
(hereinafter referred to as the “Interagency Committee”).
(2) The Interagency Committee shall be composed of representatives of the following
Federal agencies or offices:
(A) the National Science Foundation;
(B) the Department of Commerce;
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(C) the Department of Defense;
(D) the Department of Energy;
(E) the Department of the Interior;
(F) the Department of State;
(G) the Department of Transportation;
(H) the Department of Health and Human Services;
(I) the National Aeronautics and Space Administration;
(J) the Environmental Protection Agency; and
(K) any other agency or office deemed appropriate.
(3) The representative of the National Science Foundation shall serve as the Chairperson
of the Interagency Committee.
DUTIES OF THE INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE
SEC. 108. (a) The Interagency Committee shall-
(1) survey Arctic research conducted by Federal, State, and local agencies, universities,
and other public and private institutions to help determine priorities for future Arctic
research, including natural resources and materials, physical and biological sciences, and
social and behavioral sciences;
(2) work with the Commission to develop and establish an integrated national Arctic
research policy that will guide Federal agencies in developing and implementing their
research programs in the Arctic;
(3) consult with the Commission on-
(A) the development of the national Arctic research policy and the 5-year plan
implementing the policy;
(B) Arctic research programs of Federal agencies;
(C) recommendations of the Commission on future Arctic research; and
(D) guidelines for Federal agencies for awarding and administering Arctic research grants;
(4) develop a 5-year plan to implement the national policy, as provided for in section 109;
(5) provide the necessary coordination, data, and assistance for the preparation of a single
integrated, coherent, and multiagency budget request for Arctic research as provided for in
section 110;
(6) facilitate cooperation between the Federal Government and State and local governments
in Arctic research, and recommend the undertaking of neglected areas of research in
accordance with the findings and purposes of this title;
(7) coordinate and promote cooperative Arctic scientific research programs with other
nations, subject to the foreign policy guidance of the Secretary of State;
(8) cooperate with the Governor of the State of Alaska in fulfilling its responsibilities under
this title;
(9) promote Federal interagency coordination of all Arctic research activities, including -
(A) logistical planning and coordination; and
(B) the sharing of data and information associated with Arctic research, subject to section
552 of title 5, United States Code; and
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(10) provide public notice of its meetings and an opportunity for the public to participate
in the development and implementation of national Arctic research policy.
(b) Not later than January 31, 1986, and biennially thereafter, the Interagency Committee
shall submit to the Congress through the President, a brief, concise report containing-
(1) a statement of the activities and accomplishments of the Interagency Commit tee since
its last report; and
(2) a description of the activities of the Commission, detailing with particularity the
recommendations of the Commission with respect to Federal activities in Arctic research.
5-YEAR ARCTIC RESEARCH PLAN
SEC. 109. (a) The Interagency Committee, in consultation with the Commission, the
Governor of the State of Alaska, the residents of the Arctic, the private sector, and public
interest groups, shall prepare a comprehensive 5-year program plan (hereinafter referred to
as the “Plan”) for the overall Federal effort in Arctic research. The Plan shall be prepared
and submitted to the President for transmittal to the Congress within one year after the
enactment of this Act and shall be revised biennially thereafter.
(b) The Plan shall contain but need not be limited to the following elements:
(1) an assessment of national needs and problems regarding the Arctic and the research
necessary to address those needs or problems;
(2) a statement of the goals and objectives of the Interagency Committee for national Arctic
research;
(3) a detailed listing of all existing Federal programs relating to Arctic research, including
the existing goals, funding levels for each of the 5 following fiscal years, and the funds
currently being expended to conduct the programs;
(4) recommendations for necessary program changes and other proposals to meet the
requirements of the policy and goals as set forth by the Commission and in the Plan as
currently in effect; and
(5) a description of the actions taken by the Interagency Committee to coordinate the
budget review process in order to ensure interagency coordination and cooperation in (A)
carrying out Federal Arctic research programs, and (B) eliminating unnecessary
duplication of effort among these programs.
COORDINATION AND REVIEW OF BUDGET REQUESTS
SEC. 110. (a) The Office of Science and Technology Policy shall-
(1) review all agency and department budget requests related to the Arctic transmitted
pursuant to section 108(a)(5), in accordance with the national Arctic research policy and
the 5-year program under section 108(a)(2) and section 109, respectively; and
(2) consult closely with the Interagency Committee and the Commission to guide the Office
of Science and Technology Policy’s efforts.
(b)(1) The Office of Management and Budget shall consider all Federal agency requests
for research related to the Arctic as one integrated, coherent, and multiagency request
which shall be reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget prior to submission of
the President’s annual budget request for its adherence to the Plan. The Commission shal,
after submission of the President’s annual budget request, review the request and report to
Congress on adherence to the Plan.
(2) The Office of Management and Budget shall seek to facilitate planning for the design,
procurement, maintenance, deployment, and operations of icebreakers needed to provide a
platform for Arctic research by allocating all funds necessary to support icebreaking
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operations, except for recurring incremental costs associated with specific projects, to the
Coast Guard.
AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS; NEW SPENDING AUTHORITY
SEC. 111. (a) There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary for
carrying out this title.
(b) Any new spending authority (within the meaning of section 401 of the Congressional
Budget Act of 1974) which is provided under this title shall be effective for any fiscal year
only to such extent or in such amounts as may be provided in appropriation Acts.
DEFINITION
SEC. 112. As used in this title, the term “Arctic” means all United States and foreign
territory north of the Arctic Circle and all United States territory north and west of the
boundary formed by the Porcupine, Yukon, and Kuskokwim Rivers; all contiguous seas,
including the Arctic Ocean and the Beaufort, Bering, and Chukchi Seas; and the Aleutian
chain.
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Appendix B. P.L. 101-609 of 1990, Amending ARPA
The Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA) of 1984 (see Appendix A) was amended by P.L.
101-609 of November 16, 1990. The text of P.L. 101-609 is as follows:
SECTION 1. Except as specifically provided in this Act, whenever in this Act an
amendment or repeal is expressed as an amendment to, or repeal of a provision, the
reference shall be deemed to be made to the Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984.
SEC. 2. Section 103(b)(1) (15 U.S.C. 4102(b)(1)) is amended—
(1) in the text above clause (A), by striking out ‘five’ and inserting in lieu thereof ‘seven’;
(2) in clause (A), by striking out ‘three’ and inserting in lieu thereof ‘four’; and
(3) in clause (C), by striking out ‘one member’ and inserting in lieu thereof ‘two members’.
SEC. 3. Section 103(d)(1) (15 U.S.C. 4102(d)(1)) is amended by striking out ‘GS-16’ and
inserting in lieu thereof ‘GS-18’.
SEC. 4. (a) Section 104(a) (15 U.S.C. 4102(a)) is amended—
(1) in paragraph (4), by striking out `suggest’ and inserting in lieu thereof `recommend’;
(2) in paragraph (6), by striking out `suggest’ and inserting in lieu thereof `recommend’;
(3) in paragraph (7), by striking out `and’ at the end thereof;
(4) in paragraph (8), by striking out the period and inserting in lieu thereof a semicolon;
and
(5) by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraphs:
‘(9) recommend to the Interagency Committee the means for developing international
scientific cooperation in the Arctic; and
‘(10) not later than January 31, 1991, and every 2 years thereafter, publish a statement of
goals and objectives with respect to Arctic research to guide the Interagency Committee
established under section 107 in the performance of its duties.’.
(b) Section 104(b) is amended to read as follows:
‘(b) Not later than January 31 of each year, the Commission shall submit to the President
and to the Congress a report describing the activities and accomplishments of the
Commission during the immediately preceding fiscal year.’.
SEC. 5. Section 106 (15 U.S.C. 4105) is amended—
(1) in paragraph (3), by striking out ‘and’ at the end thereof;
(2) in paragraph (4), by striking out the period at the end thereof and inserting in lieu
thereof; and’; and
(3) by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph:
‘(5) appoint, and accept without compensation the services of, scientists and engineering
specialists to be advisors to the Commission. Each advisor may be allowed travel expenses,
including per diem in lieu of subsistence, as authorized by section 5703 of title 5, United
States Code. Except for the purposes of chapter 81 of title 5 (relating to compensation for
work injuries) and chapter 171 of title 28 (relating to tort claims) of the United States Code,
an advisor appointed under this paragraph shall not be considered an employee of the
United States for any purpose.’
SEC. 6. Subsection (b)(2) of section 108 (15 U.S.C. 4107(b)(2)) is amended to read as
follows:
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‘(2) a statement detailing with particularity the recommendations of the Commission with
respect to Federal interagency activities in Arctic research and the disposition and
responses to those recommendations.’
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Appendix C. FY2021 NSF Budget Request for
Arctic Research
Office of Polar Programs (OPP)
NSF—the lead federal agency for implementing Arctic research policy—carries out Arctic
research activities through its Office of Polar Programs (OPP), which operates as part of NSF’s
Directorate for Geosciences (GEO). NSF is requesting a total of $419.8 mil ion for OPP for
FY2021, a decrease of 14.1% from the $488.7 mil ion actual for FY2019. (Actuals for FY2020
were not available when NSF’s FY2021 budget book was prepared.) Within the $419.8 mil ion
requested for OPP for FY2021 is $101.3 mil ion requested for research in both the Arctic and
Antarctic, a decrease of 17.7% from the $123.1 mil ion actual for FY2019. Also within the $419.8
mil ion requested for OPP for FY2021 is $40.5 mil ion requested for Arctic research and support
logistics, a decrease of 19.2% from the $50.2 mil ion actual for FY2019.361 Regarding its FY2021
budget request for OPP, NSF states that
OPP invests in polar scientific research and education as well as provides research support
and logistics including infrastructure, such as permanent stations and temporary field
camps, in the Antarctic and the Arctic. OPP’s FY 2021 Request is influenced by three key
priorities: (1) maintaining strong disciplinary programs that provide the basis for
investments in cross-disciplinary system science programs; (2) supporting critical facilities
that enable research in the Earth’s polar regions; and (3) supporting the construction phase
of the Antarctic Infrastructure Modernization for Science (AIMS) project which was
awarded to Leidos Corporation in May 2019. These priorities reflect opportunities for
fundamental scientific discovery uniquely accessible in polar regions, as well as studies to
investigate the causes and future trajectory of environmental, biological, and human system
changes now being observed in the polar regions that have possible global implications.
OPP is the primary U.S. supporter of fundamental research in the polar regions. In the
Arctic, NSF helps coordinate research planning as directed by the Arctic Research Policy
Act of 1984, and the NSF Director chairs the Interagency Arctic Research Policy
Committee (IARPC) created for this purpose.…
In addition to shared cross-directorate basic research objectives, OPP investments will be
guided by recent sponsored studies to identify priority areas and ensure effective polar
research programs:
• For the Arctic, IARPC’s Arctic Research Plan: FY 2017-2021 and the World
Meteorological Organization’s Year of Polar Prediction Implementation Plan 2 inform
science investment priorities. Efforts to build an integrated research capacity to address the
potential opportunities and challenges of Arctic change fo r the Nation’s security and
economics and well-being of Arctic residents will continue….
Major Investments…
• Arctic programs will continue to focus on integrating sustained observations, process
studies, theory, and modeling of the natural and social systems to understand and improve
predictions of the changing Arctic and its role in the Earth system. This has, in prior years
and will in FY 2021, include investments in polar cyberinfrastructure, data analytics, and
software. A major FY 2019 investment was made in the Multidisciplinary drifting
Observatory for the Study of Arctic Climate (MOSAiC),4 an international study of the

361 National Science Foundation, FY 2021 Budget Request to Congress, February 10, 2020, p. OPP -1. The dollar
figures in this paragraph have been rounded to the nearest tenth of a million.
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formation and melt of sea-ice in the central Arctic Ocean with a year-round field presence
that extends into FY 2020. NSF will continue to invest in this effort as the project
transitions from field work to analysis of the data generated by the observations. Arctic
programs will continue to invest in the Navigating the New Arctic NSF-wide Big Idea that
will support research needed to inform the economy, security, and resilience of the Nation,
the larger region, and the globe in the face of a rapidly changing Arctic.362
Navigating the New Arctic (NNA)
NSF states in the overview of its FY2021 budget request that “in 2021, NSF wil continue to
invest in its Big Ideas and the Convergence Accelerator, which support bold inquiries into the
frontiers of science and engineering. These efforts endeavor to break down the silos of
conventional scientific research funded by NSF to embrace the cross-disciplinary and dynamic
nature of the science of the future. The Big Ideas represent unique opportunities for the U.S. to
define and push the frontiers of global science and engineering leadership and to invest in
fundamental research. This research wil advance the Nation’s economic competitiveness,
security, and prestige on the global stage. For more information, see the NSF-Wide Investments
chapter.”363 Among the six research Big Ideas, NSF states in its overview that number four is
Navigating the New Arctic (NNA) ($30.0 million): Establishing an observing network of
mobile and fixed platforms and tools, including cyber tools, across the Arctic to document
and understand the Arctic’s rapid biological, physical, chemical, and social changes, in
partnership with other agencies, countries, and native populations.364
NSF’s is requesting $40.8 mil ion for NNA for FY2021, including $30.0 mil ion (noted above)
for stewardship activities and $10.8 mil ion for foundational activities.365 NSF’s discussion of
NNA states:
Overview
Arctic temperatures are rising faster than nearly everywhere else on Earth. The rapid and
wide-scale changes occurring in response to this warming portend new opportunities and
risks to natural systems; social and cultural systems; economic, political, and legal systems;
and infrastructure and other engineered systems of the Arctic and across the globe. Gaps
in scientific observations and the prevalence of interdependent social, natural, and built
systems in the Arctic make it challenging to predict the region’s future. Understanding and
adapting to a changing Arctic will require creative new directions for Arctic -specific
research, education, workforce development, and leveraging of science, engineering, and
technology advances from outside the Arctic.
NNA, one of NSF’s Big Ideas, embodies the Foundation’s forward-looking response to
these profound challenges. NNA seeks innovations in Arctic observational networks and
fundamental convergence research across engineering and the social, natural,
environmental, and computing and information sciences, that address the interactions or
connections between natural and built environments and social systems and how these
connections inform our understanding of Arctic change and its local and global effects.
NNA empowers new research communities; diversifies the next generation of Arctic
researchers; integrates the co-production of knowledge with local and Indigenous people

362 National Science Foundation, FY 2021 Budget Request to Congress, February 10, 2020, pp. OPP -1 to OPP-2.
363 National Science Foundation, FY 2021 Budget Request to Congress, February 10, 2020, p. Overview-9.
364 National Science Foundation, FY 2021 Budget Request to Congress, February 10, 2020, p. Overview-9. Emphasis as
in original.
365 National Science Foundation, FY 2021 Budget Request to Congress, February 10, 2020, p. NSF-Wide Investments-
11.
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and organizations; and engages with interdisciplinary, interagency, and international
partners to further pan-Arctic and Arctic-global perspectives.
With respect to observational research, NNA will address key gaps in the existing array of
observation, communication, computation and data systems. Strong coupling of
observation, communication, and computation and data, including the theoretical
foundations underlying these, will be supported to ensure progress. NNA will leverage
resources with the Mid-scale RI and HDR Big Ideas as appropriate.
NNA also strongly encourages projects with components that advance STEM education;
that deepen public understanding of the changing Arctic to benefit both citizens and policy
makers; and that advance workforce-development objectives. NNA will build on NSF’s
STEM investments and the NSF INCLUDES Big Idea to encourage innovative and
appropriately evaluated education and public engagement efforts that leverage exciting
NNA science and inspire diverse participation in STEM.
By drawing upon expertise from across the agency, NNA investments will accelerate
research needed to inform decisions regarding the national security, economic
development, and societal well-being of the U.S. as an Arctic nation and enable resilient,
sustainable Arctic communities. NSF plans to invest in NNA through FY 2023.
Goals
1. Improved understanding of Arctic change and its local and global effects that capitalizes
on: innovative and optimized observation infrastructure; advances in understanding of
fundamental processes; and new approaches to modeling interactions among the natural
environment, built environment, and social systems.
2. New and enhanced research communities that are diverse, integrative, and well-
positioned to carry out productive research on the interactions or connections between
Arctic natural and built environments and social systems and how these connections inform
our understanding of Arctic change and its local and global effects.
3. Research outcomes that inform U.S. national security, economic development, and
societal well-being and enable resilient, sustainable Arctic communities.
4. Enhanced efforts in formal and informal education that focus on the multi-scale impacts
of Arctic change on natural and built environments and social systems and broadly
disseminate research outcomes.
In FY 2017, NSF issued a Dear Colleague letter (DCL) on the Growing Convergence
Research Big Idea (NSF 17-065)1 to explore convergence approaches within four of the
research-focused NSF Big Ideas, including NNA. This DCL requested proposals for
Research Coordination Networks (RCNs), workshops, and activities to enhance Arctic
observational systems. In FY 2018, NSF issued a DCL on Stimulating Research Related to
NNA (NSF 18-048),2 requesting research proposals building on the FY 2017 awards, as
well as proposals for workshops and RCNs. NSF awarded 25 new projects under these two
DCLs and related opportunities with budgets ranging from $50,000 to $1.50 million lasting
up to 60 months. In FY 2019, NSF issued a solicitation for NNA (NSF 19-511)3 and made
13 awards to support research projects, and eight awards to support planning projects that
will develop convergence research teams, with budgets ranging from $13,000 to $3.0
million lasting up to 60 months.
FY 2021 Investments
NSF’s NNA activities in FY 2021 will focus on enabling advances in priority areas, which
will be developed by building on outcomes from FY 2017 to FY 2020 activities. In FY
2020, NNA is focusing on convergent social/built/natural environment systems science;
advances in observation, communication, and computation and data systems; and
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community-coordination activities. In FY 2021, NSF will continue support for NNA, and
expects to issue another solicitation.
NSF will continue to coordinate and leverage NNA -related activities with external
stakeholders, including:
• other federal agencies through the Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee chaired
by the NSF Director;
• local residents and indigenous peoples through state and local governance structures of
Alaska; and
• international partners through fora such as the biannual International Arctic Science
Ministerial.
The portfolio of FY 2021 NNA activities will support the goals listed above.366
August 2020 Memorandum on FY2022 Research and Development
Priorities
An August 14, 2020, memorandum from the Executive Office of the President on the
Administration’s FY2022 research and development budget priorities and cross-cutting actions
included the following references to the Arctic:
4. American Energy and Environmental Leadership
Advancing energy technologies to assure a secure and abundant energy supply,
understanding our unexplored ocean and expanding use of ocean data, improving our Earth
system prediction capabilities, and the Arctic are Administration priorities that will
enhance the Nation’s economic vitality, national security, and environmental quality and
are critical to the well-being and prosperity of all Americans ….
Arctic: The United States is an Arctic nation, and the rapidly changing conditions in the
Arctic have national security, commerce, and transportation implications that other nations
are already addressing. Departments and agencies should prioritize research investments
that enhance our ability to observe, understand, and predict the physical, biological, and
socio-economic processes of the Arctic to protect and advance American interests.367

366 National Science Foundation, FY 2021 Budget Request to Congress, February 10, 2020, pp. NSF-Wide
Investments–11 to NSF-Wide Investments–12.
367 Executive Office of the President, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, Subject:
Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Administration Research and Development Budget Priorities and Cross-cutting Actions, August
14, 2020, pp. 6, 7.
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Appendix D. Major U.S. Policy Documents Relating
to Arctic
January 2009 Arctic Policy Directive (NSPD 66/HSPD 25)
On January 12, 2009, the George W. Bush Administration released a presidential directive
establishing a new U.S. policy for the Arctic region. The directive, dated January 9, 2009, was
issued as National Security Presidential Directive 66/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 25
(NSPD 66/HSPD 25). The text of NSPD 66/HSPD 25 is as follows:
SUBJECT: Arctic Region Policy
I. PURPOSE
A. This directive establishes the policy of the United States with respect to the Arctic region
and directs related implementation actions. This directive supersedes Presidential Decision
Directive/NSC-26 (PDD-26; issued 1994) with respect to Arctic policy but not Antarctic
policy; PDD-26 remains in effect for Antarctic policy only.
B. This directive shall be implemented in a manner consistent with the Constitution and
laws of the United States, with the obligations of the United States under the treaties and
other international agreements to which the United States is a party, and with customary
international law as recognized by the United States, including with respect to the law of
the sea.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The United States is an Arctic nation, with varied and compelling interests in that region.
This directive takes into account several developments, including, among others:
1. Altered national policies on homeland security and defense;
2. The effects of climate change and increasing human activity in the Arctic region;
3. The establishment and ongoing work of the Arctic Council; and
4. A growing awareness that the Arctic region is both fragile and rich in resources.
III. POLICY
A. It is the policy of the United States to:
1. Meet national security and homeland security needs relevant to the Arctic region;
2. Protect the Arctic environment and conserve its biological resources;
3. Ensure that natural resource management and economic development in the region are
environmentally sustainable;
4. Strengthen institutions for cooperation among the eight Arctic nations (the United States,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, and Sweden);
5. Involve the Arctic’s indigenous communities in decisions that affect them; and
6. Enhance scientific monitoring and research into local, regional, and global
environmental issues.
B. National Security and Homeland Security Interests in the Arctic
1. The United States has broad and fundamental national security interests in the Arctic
region and is prepared to operate either independently or in conjunction with other states
to safeguard these interests. These interests include such matters as missile defense and
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early warning; deployment of sea and air systems for strategic sealift, strategic deterrence,
maritime presence, and maritime security operations; and ensuring freedom of navigation
and overflight.
2. The United States also has fundamental homeland security interests in preventing
terrorist attacks and mitigating those criminal or hostile acts that could increase the United
States vulnerability to terrorism in the Arctic region.
3. The Arctic region is primarily a maritime domain; as such, existing policies and
authorities relating to maritime areas continue to apply, including those relating to law
enforcement.[1] Human activity in the Arctic region is increasing and is projected to
increase further in coming years. This requires the United States to assert a more active
and influential national presence to protect its Arctic interests and to project sea power
throughout the region.
4. The United States exercises authority in accordance with lawful claims of United States
sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction in the Arctic region, including sovereignty
within the territorial sea, sovereign rights and jurisdiction within the United States
exclusive economic zone and on the continental shelf, and appropriate control in the United
States contiguous zone.
5. Freedom of the seas is a top national priority. The Northwest Passage is a strait used for
international navigation, and the Northern Sea Route includes straits used for international
navigation; the regime of transit passage applies to passage through those straits.
Preserving the rights and duties relating to navigation and overflight in the Arctic region
supports our ability to exercise these rights throughout the world, including through
strategic straits.
6. Implementation: In carrying out this policy as it relates to national security and homeland
security interests in the Arctic, the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Homeland Security,
in coordination with heads of other relevant executive departments and agencies, shall:
a. Develop greater capabilities and capacity, as necessary, to protect United States air, land,
and sea borders in the Arctic region;
b. Increase Arctic maritime domain awareness in order to protect maritime commerce,
critical infrastructure, and key resources;
c. Preserve the global mobility of United States military and civilian vessels and aircraft
throughout the Arctic region;
d. Project a sovereign United States maritime presence in the Arctic in support of essential
United States interests; and
e. Encourage the peaceful resolution of disputes in the Arctic region.
C. International Governance
1. The United States participates in a variety of fora, international organizations, and
bilateral contacts that promote United States interests in the Arctic. These include the
Arctic Council, the International Maritime Organization (IMO), wildlife conservation and
management agreements, and many other mechanisms . As the Arctic changes and human
activity in the region increases, the United States and other governments should consider,
as appropriate, new international arrangements or enhancements to existing arrangements.
2. The Arctic Council has produced positive results for the United States by working within
its limited mandate of environmental protection and sustainable development. Its
subsidiary bodies, with help from many United States agencies, have developed and
undertaken projects on a wide range of topics. The Council also provides a beneficial venue
for interaction with indigenous groups. It is the position of the United States that the Arctic
Council should remain a high-level forum devoted to issues within its current mandate and
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not be transformed into a formal international organization, particularly one with assessed
contributions. The United States is nevertheless open to updating th e structure of the
Council, including consolidation of, or making operational changes to, its subsidiary
bodies, to the extent such changes can clearly improve the Council’s work and are
consistent with the general mandate of the Council.
3. The geopolitical circumstances of the Arctic region differ sufficiently from those of the
Antarctic region such that an “Arctic Treaty” of broad scope—along the lines of the
Antarctic Treaty—is not appropriate or necessary.
4. The Senate should act favorably on U.S. accession to the U.N. Convention on the Law
of the Sea promptly, to protect and advance U.S. interests, including with respect to the
Arctic. Joining will serve the national security interests of the United States, including the
maritime mobility of our Armed Forces worldwide. It will secure U.S. sovereign rights
over extensive marine areas, including the valuable natural resources they contain.
Accession will promote U.S. interests in the environmental health of the oceans. And it
will give the United States a seat at the table when the rights that are vital to our interests
are debated and interpreted.
5. Implementation: In carrying out this policy as it relates to international governance, the
Secretary of State, in coordination with heads of other relevant executive departments and
agencies, shall:
a. Continue to cooperate with other countries on Arctic issues through the United Nations
(U.N.) and its specialized agencies, as well as through treaties such as the U.N. Framework
Convention on Climate Change, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, the Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air
Pollution and its protocols, and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer;
b. Consider, as appropriate, new or enhanced international arrangements for the Arctic to
address issues likely to arise from expected increases in human activity in that region,
including shipping, local development and subsistence, exploitation of living marine
resources, development of energy and other resources, and tourism;
c. Review Arctic Council policy recommendations developed within the ambit of the
Council’s scientific reviews and ensure the policy recommendations are subject to review
by Arctic governments; and
d. Continue to seek advice and consent of the United States Senate to accede to the 1982
Law of the Sea Convention.
D. Extended Continental Shelf and Boundary Issues
1. Defining with certainty the area of the Arctic seabed and subsoil in which the United
States may exercise its sovereign rights over natural resources such as oil, natural gas,
methane hydrates, minerals, and living marine species is critical to our national interests in
energy security, resource management, and environmental protection . The most effective
way to achieve international recognition and legal certainty for our extended continental
shelf is through the procedure available to States Parties to the U.N. Convention on the
Law of the Sea.
2. The United States and Canada have an unresolved boundary in the Beaufort Sea. United
States policy recognizes a boundary in this area based on equidistance. The United States
recognizes that the boundary area may contain oil, natural gas, and other resources.
3. The United States and Russia are abiding by the terms of a maritime boundary treaty
concluded in 1990, pending its entry into force. The United States is prepared to enter the
agreement into force once ratified by the Russian Federation.
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4. Implementation: In carrying out this policy as it relates to extended continental shelf and
boundary issues, the Secretary of State, in coordination with heads of other relevant
executive departments and agencies, shall:
a. Take all actions necessary to establish the outer limit of the continental shelf appertaining
to the United States, in the Arctic and in other regions, to the fullest extent permitted under
international law;
b. Consider the conservation and management of natural resources during the process of
delimiting the extended continental shelf; and
c. Continue to urge the Russian Federation to ratify the 1990 United States-Russia maritime
boundary agreement.
E. Promoting International Scientific Cooperation
1. Scientific research is vital for the promotion of United States interests in the Arctic
region. Successful conduct of U.S. research in the Arctic region requires access throughout
the Arctic Ocean and to terrestrial sites, as well as viable international mechanisms for
sharing access to research platforms and timely exchange of samples, data, and analyses.
Better coordination with the Russian Federation, facilitating access to its domain, is
particularly important.
2. The United States promotes the sharing of Arctic research platforms with other countries
in support of collaborative research that advances fundamental understanding of the Arctic
region in general and potential Arctic change in particular. This could include collaboration
with bodies such as the Nordic Council and the European Polar Consortium, as well as
with individual nations.
3. Accurate prediction of future environmental and climate change on a regional basis, and
the delivery of near real-time information to end-users, requires obtaining, analyzing, and
disseminating accurate data from the entire Arctic region, including both paleoclimatic data
and observational data. The United States has made significant investments in the
infrastructure needed to collect environmental data in the Arctic region, including the
establishment of portions of an Arctic circumpolar observing network through a
partnership among United States agencies, academic collaborators, and Arctic residents.
The United States promotes active involvement of all Arctic nations in these efforts in order
to advance scientific understanding that could provide the bas is for assessing future
impacts and proposed response strategies.
4. United States platforms capable of supporting forefront research in the Arctic Ocean,
including portions expected to be ice-covered for the foreseeable future, as well as
seasonally ice-free regions, should work with those of other nations through the
establishment of an Arctic circumpolar observing network. All Arctic nations are members
of the Group on Earth Observations partnership, which provides a framework for
organizing an international approach to environmental observations in the region . In
addition, the United States recognizes that academic and research institutions are vital
partners in promoting and conducting Arctic research.
5. Implementation: In carrying out this policy as it relates to promoting scientific
international cooperation, the Secretaries of State, the Interior, and Commerce and the
Director of the National Science Foundation, in coordination with heads of other relevant
executive departments and agencies, shall:
a. Continue to play a leadership role in research throughout the Arctic region;
b. Actively promote full and appropriate access by scientists to Arctic research sites
through bilateral and multilateral measures and by other means;
c. Lead the effort to establish an effective Arctic circumpolar observing network with broad
partnership from other relevant nations;
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d. Promote regular meetings of Arctic science ministers or research council heads to share
information concerning scientific research opportunities and to improve coordination of
international Arctic research programs;
e. Work with the Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee (IARPC) to promote
research that is strategically linked to U.S. policies articulated in this directive, with input
from the Arctic Research Commission; and
f. Strengthen partnerships with academic and research institutions and build upon the
relationships these institutions have with their counterparts in other nations.
F. Maritime Transportation in the Arctic Region
1. The United States priorities for maritime transportation in the Arctic region are:
a. To facilitate safe, secure, and reliable navigation;
b. To protect maritime commerce; and
c. To protect the environment.
2. Safe, secure, and environmentally sound maritime commerce in the Arctic region
depends on infrastructure to support shipping activity, search and rescue capabilities, short-
and long-range aids to navigation, high-risk area vessel-traffic management, iceberg
warnings and other sea ice information, effective shipping standards, and measures to
protect the marine environment. In addition, effective search and rescue in the Arctic will
require local, State, Federal, tribal, commercial, volunteer, scientific, and multinational
cooperation.
3. Working through the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the United States
promotes strengthening existing measures and, as necessary, developing new measures to
improve the safety and security of maritime transportation, as well as to protect the marine
environment in the Arctic region. These measures may include ship routing and reporting
systems, such as traffic separation and vessel traffic management schemes in Arctic
chokepoints; updating and strengthening of the Guidelines for Ships Operating in Arctic
Ice-Covered Waters; underwater noise standards for commercial shipping; a review of
shipping insurance issues; oil and other hazardous material pollution response agreements;
and environmental standards.
4. Implementation: In carrying out this policy as it relates to maritime transportation in the
Arctic region, the Secretaries of State, Defense, Transportation, Commerce, and Homeland
Security, in coordination with heads of other relevant executive departments and agencies,
shall:
a. Develop additional measures, in cooperation with other nations, to address issues that
are likely to arise from expected increases in shipping into, out of, and through the Arctic
region;
b. Commensurate with the level of human activity in the region, establish a risk-based
capability to address hazards in the Arctic environment. Such efforts shall advance work
on pollution prevention and response standards; determine basing and logistics support
requirements, including necessary airlift and icebreaking capabilities; and improve plans
and cooperative agreements for search and rescue;
c. Develop Arctic waterways management regimes in accordance with accepted
international standards, including vessel traffic-monitoring and routing; safe navigation
standards; accurate and standardized charts; and accurate and timely environmental and
navigational information; and
d. Evaluate the feasibility of using access through the Arctic for strategic sealift and
humanitarian aid and disaster relief.
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G. Economic Issues, Including Energy
1. Sustainable development in the Arctic region poses particular challenges. Stakeholder
input will inform key decisions as the United States seeks to promote economic and energy
security. Climate change and other factors are significantly affecting the lives of Arctic
inhabitants, particularly indigenous communities . The United States affirms the
importance to Arctic communities of adapting to climate change, given their particular
vulnerabilities.
2. Energy development in the Arctic region will play an important role in meeting growing
global energy demand as the area is thought to contain a substantial portion of the world’s
undiscovered energy resources. The United States seeks to ensure that energy development
throughout the Arctic occurs in an environmentally sound manner, taking into account the
interests of indigenous and local communities, as well as open and transparent market
principles. The United States seeks to balance access to, and development of, energy and
other natural resources with the protection of the Arctic environment by ensuring that
continental shelf resources are managed in a responsible manner and by continuing to work
closely with other Arctic nations.
3. The United States recognizes the value and effectiveness of existing fora, such as the
Arctic Council, the International Regulators Forum, and the International Standards
Organization.
4. Implementation: In carrying out this policy as it relates to economic issues, including
energy, the Secretaries of State, the Interior, Commerce, and Energy, in coordination with
heads of other relevant executive departments and agencies, shall:
a. Seek to increase efforts, including those in the Arctic Council, to study changing climate
conditions, with a view to preserving and enhancing economic opportunity in the Arctic
region. Such efforts shall include inventories and assessments of villages, indigenous
communities, subsistence opportunities, public facilities, infrastructure, oil and gas
development projects, alternative energy development opportunities, forestry, cultural and
other sites, living marine resources, and other elements of the Arctic’s socioeconomic
composition;
b. Work with other Arctic nations to ensure that hydrocarbon and other development in the
Arctic region is carried out in accordance with accepted best practices and internationaly
recognized standards and the 2006 Group of Eight (G-8) Global Energy Security
Principles;
c. Consult with other Arctic nations to discuss issues related to exploration, production,
environmental and socioeconomic impacts, including drilling conduct, facility sharing, the
sharing of environmental data, impact assessments, compatible monitoring programs, and
reservoir management in areas with potentially shared resources;
d. Protect United States interests with respect to hydrocarbon reservoirs that may overlap
boundaries to mitigate adverse environmental and economic consequences related to their
development;
e. Identify opportunities for international cooperation on methane hydrate issues, North
Slope hydrology, and other matters;
f. Explore whether there is a need for additional fora for informing decisions on
hydrocarbon leasing, exploration, development, production, and transportation, as well as
shared support activities, including infrastructure projects; and
g. Continue to emphasize cooperative mechanisms with nations operating in the region to
address shared concerns, recognizing that most known Arctic oil and gas resources are
located outside of United States jurisdiction.
H. Environmental Protection and Conservation of Natural Resources
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1. The Arctic environment is unique and changing. Increased human activity is expected
to bring additional stressors to the Arctic environment, with potentially serious
consequences for Arctic communities and ecosystems.
2. Despite a growing body of research, the Arctic environment remains poorly understood.
Sea ice and glaciers are in retreat. Permafrost is thawing and coasts are eroding. Pollutants
from within and outside the Arctic are contaminating the region. Basic data are lacking in
many fields. High levels of uncertainty remain concerning the effects of climate change
and increased human activity in the Arctic. Given the need for decisions to be based on
sound scientific and socioeconomic information, Arctic environmental research,
monitoring, and vulnerability assessments are top priorities. For example, an understanding
of the probable consequences of global climate variability and change on Arctic
ecosystems is essential to guide the effective long-term management of Arctic natural
resources and to address socioeconomic impacts of changing patterns in the use of natural
resources.
3. Taking into account the limitations in existing data, United States efforts to protect the
Arctic environment and to conserve its natural resources must be risk-based and proceed
on the basis of the best available information.
4. The United States supports the application in the Arctic region of the general principles
of international fisheries management outlined in the 1995 Agreement for the
Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
of December 10, 1982, relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks and similar instruments. The United States
endorses the protection of vulnerable marine ecosystems in the Arctic from destructive
fishing practices and seeks to ensure an adequate enforcement presence to safeguard Arctic
living marine resources.
5. With temperature increases in the Arctic region, contaminants currently locked in the
ice and soils will be released into the air, water, and land. This trend, along with increased
human activity within and below the Arctic, will result in increased introduction of
contaminants into the Arctic, including both persistent pollutants (e.g., persistent organic
pollutants and mercury) and airborne pollutants (e.g., soot).
6. Implementation: In carrying out this policy as it relates to environmental protection and
conservation of natural resources, the Secretaries of State, the Interior, Commerce, and
Homeland Security and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, in
coordination with heads of other relevant executive departments and agencies, shall:
a. In cooperation with other nations, respond effectively to increased pollutants and other
environmental challenges;
b. Continue to identify ways to conserve, protect, and sustainably manage Arctic species
and ensure adequate enforcement presence to safeguard living marine resources, taking
account of the changing ranges or distribution of some species in the Arctic. For species
whose range includes areas both within and beyond United States jurisdiction, the United
States shall continue to collaborate with other governments to ensure effective conservation
and management;
c. Seek to develop ways to address changing and expanding commercial fisheries in the
Arctic, including through consideration of international agreements or org anizations to
govern future Arctic fisheries;
d. Pursue marine ecosystem-based management in the Arctic; and
e. Intensify efforts to develop scientific information on the adverse effects of pollutants on
human health and the environment and work with other nations to reduce the introduction
of key pollutants into the Arctic.
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IV. Resources and Assets
A. Implementing a number of the policy elements directed above will require appropriate
resources and assets. These elements shall be implemented consistent with applicable law
and authorities of agencies, or heads of agencies, vested by law, and subject to the
availability of appropriations. The heads of executive departments and agencies with
responsibilities relating to the Arctic region shall work to identify future budget,
administrative, personnel, or legislative proposal requirements to implement the elements
of this directive.
———————————————————————————
[1] These policies and authorities include Freedom of Navigation (PDD/NSC-32), the U.S.
Policy on Protecting the Ocean Environment (PDD/NSC-36), Maritime Security Policy
(NSPD-41/HSPD-13), and the National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS).368
May 2013 National Strategy for Arctic Region
On May 10, 2013, the Obama Administration released a document entitled National Strategy for
the Arctic Region.369 The document appears to supplement rather than supersede the January 2009
Arctic policy directive (NSPD 66/HSPD 25) discussed above.370 The executive summary of
National Strategy for the Arctic Region states the following:
The National Strategy for the Arctic Region sets forth the United States Government’s
strategic priorities for the Arctic region. This strategy is intended to position the United
States to respond effectively to challenges and emerging opportunities arising from
significant increases in Arctic activity due to the diminishment of sea ice and the
emergence of a new Arctic environment. It defines U.S. national security interests in the
Arctic region and identifies prioritized lines of effort, building upon existing initiatives by
Federal, state, local, and tribal authorities, the private sector, and international partners, and
aims to focus efforts where opportunities exist and action is needed. It is designed to meet
the reality of a changing Arctic environment, while we simultaneously pursue our global
objective of combating the climatic changes that are driv ing these environmental
conditions. Our strategy is built on three lines of effort:
1. Advance United States Security Interests – We will enable our vessels and aircraft to
operate, consistent with international law, through, under, and over the airspace and waters
of the Arctic, support lawful commerce, achieve a greater awareness of activity in the
region, and intelligently evolve our Arctic infrastructure and capabilities, including ice-
capable platforms as needed. U.S. security in the Arctic encompasses a broad spectrum of
activities, ranging from those supporting safe commercial and scientific operations to
national defense.
2. Pursue Responsible Arctic Region Stewardship – We will continue to protect the
Arctic environment and conserve its resources; establish and institutionalize an integrated
Arctic management framework; chart the Arctic region; and employ scientific research and
traditional knowledge to increase understanding of the Arctic.

368 Source for text: http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-66.htm. The text is also available at http://www.nsf.gov/od/opp/
opp_advisory/briefings/may2009/nspd66_hspd25.pdf.
369 National Strategy for the Arctic Region, May 2013, 11 pp. T he document includes a cover letter from President
Obama dated May 10, 2013.
370 National Strategy for the Arctic Region states on page 6 that the “lines of effort” it describes are to be undertaken
“[t]o meet the challenges and opportunities in the Arctic region, and in furtherance of established Arctic Region
Policy,” at which point there is a footnote referencing the January 2009 Arctic policy directive.
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3. Strengthen International Cooperation – Working through bilateral relationships and
multilateral bodies, including the Arctic Council, we will pursue arrangements that advance
collective interests, promote shared Arctic state prosperity, protect the Arctic environment,
and enhance regional security, and we will work toward U.S. accession to the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Law of the Sea Convention).
Our approach will be informed by the following guiding principles:
• Safeguard Peace and Stability – Seek to maintain and preserve the Arctic region as an
area free of conflict, acting in concert with allies, partners, and other interested parties.
Support and preserve: international legal principles of freedom of navigation and overflight
and other uses of the sea and airspace related to these freedoms, unimpeded lawful
commerce, and the peaceful resolution of disputes for all nations.
• Make Decisions Using the Best Available Information – Across all lines of effort,
decisions need to be based on the most current science and traditional knowledge.371
• Pursue Innovative Arrangements – Foster partnerships with the state of Alaska, Arctic
states, other international partners, and the private sector to more efficiently develop,
resource, and manage capabilities, where appropriate and feasible, to better advance our
strategic priorities in this austere fiscal environment.
• Consult and Coordinate with Alaska Natives – Engage in a consultation process with
Alaska Natives, recognizing tribal governments’ unique legal relationship with the United
States and providing for meaningful and timely opportunity to inform Federal policy
affecting Alaskan Native communities.372
January 2014 Implementation Plan for National Strategy for
Arctic Region
On January 30, 2014, the Obama Administration released an implementation plan for the May
2013 national strategy for the Arctic region.373 The plan states that it
complements and builds upon existing initiatives by Federal, State, local, and tribal
authorities, the private sector, and international partners, and focuses efforts where
opportunities exist and action is most needed. The Implementation Plan reflects the reality
of a changing Arctic environment and upholds national interests in safety, security, and
environmental protection, and works with international partners to pursue global objectives
of addressing climatic changes.
This Implementation Plan follows the structure and objectives of the Strategy’s three lines
of effort and is consistent with the guiding principles. The lines of effort of the Strategy
and the Implementation Plan are as follows:
• Advance United States Security Interests
• Pursue Responsible Arctic Region Stewardship

371 A footnote in the document at this point states the following: “ T raditional knowledge refers to a body of evolving
practical knowledge based on observations and personal experience of indigenous communities over an extensive,
multigenerational time period.” (BOEM Ocean Science, Vol. 9, Issue 2, May/April/June 2012, page 4).
372 National Strategy for the Arctic Region, May 2013, pp. 2-3.
373 Implementation Plan for The National Strategy for the Arctic Region , January 2014, 32 pp. T he news release
announcing the implementation plan is posted at http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/01/30/white-house-releases-
implementation-plan-national-strategy-arctic-region. T he document itself is posted at
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/implementation_plan_for_the_national_strategy_for _the_
arctic_region_-_fi....pdf.
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• Strengthen International Cooperation
These lines of effort and guiding principles are meant to be implemented as a coherent
whole.374
The plan also states the following:
Climate change is already affecting the entire global population, and Alaska residents are
experiencing the impacts in the Arctic. To ensure a cohesive Federal approach,
implementation activities must be aligned with the Executive Order on Preparing the
United States for the Impacts of Climate Change375 while executing the Strategy. In
addition to the guiding principles, the following approaches are important in implementing
the activities across all of the lines of effort:
• Foster Partnerships with Arctic Stakeholders. As outlined in the Strategy, all lines of
effort must involve Arctic partners, particularly the State of Alaska and Alaska Natives in
the Arctic region. Federal agencies, the State of Alaska, tribal communities, local
governments, and academia will work with other nations, industry stakeholders, non-
governmental organizations, and research partners to address emerging challenges and
opportunities in the Arctic environment. The Federal Government should strive to maintain
the free flow of communication and cooperation with the State of Alaska to support
national priorities.
• Coordinate and Integrate Activities across the Federal Government. Multiple Federal
bodies currently have authority for Arctic policy (e.g., the National Ocean Council (NOC),
Arctic Policy Group, and Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee (IARPC)). The
National Security Council Staff will develop an Executive Order through the interagency
process to maximize efficiency, align interagency initiatives, and create unity of effort
among all Federal entities conducting activities in the Arctic.376
The plan outlines about 36 specific initiatives. For each, it presents a brief statement of the
objective, a list of next steps to be taken, a brief statement about measuring progress in achieving
the objective, and the names of the lead and supporting federal agencies to be involved.
On March 9, 2016, the Obama Administration released three documents discussing the
implementation of the national strategy for the Arctic:377 (1) a report entitled 2015 Year in
Review—Progress Report on the Implementation of the National Strategy for the Arctic Region;378
(2) an appendix to that report entitled Appendix A, Implementation Framework for the National
Strategy for the Arctic Region:379 and (3) another appendix to that report entitled Appendix B,

374 Implementation Plan for The National Strategy for the Arctic Region , January 2014, p. 1.
375 T he passage contains a footnote at this point stating that this executive order was signed by the President on
November 1, 2013. It is Executive Order 13653. T he text of the order is posted at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-
2013-11-06/pdf/2013-26785.pdf and http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/11/01/executive-order-
preparing-united-states-impacts-climate-change. A fact sheet about it is posted at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2013/11/01/fact-sheet-executive-order-climate-preparedness.
376 Implementation Plan for The National Strategy for the Arctic Region, January 2014, p. 4.
377 For the text of the Obama Administration’s announcement releasing these documents, see “Advancing
Implementation of the National Strategy for the Arctic Region,” March 9, 2016, accessed April 8, 2021, at
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2016/03/09/advancing-implementation-national-strategy-arctic-region.
378 2015 Year in Review—Progress Report on the Implementation of the National Strategy for the Arctic Region ,
Prepared by the Arctic Executive Steering Committee, March 2016, 35 pp., accessed April 8, 2021, at
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/documents/
Progress%20Report%20on%20the%20Implem entation%20of%20the%20National%20Strategy%20for%20the%20Arct
ic%20Region.pdf.
379 Appendix A, Implementation Framework for the National Strategy for the Arctic Region, March 2016, 33 pp.,
accessed April 8, 2021, at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/documents/
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Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee 5-Year Plan Collaboration Teams: 2015 Summary
of Accomplishments and 2016 Priorities.380
January 2015 Executive Order for Enhancing Coordination of
Arctic Efforts
On January 21, 2015, then-President Obama issued Executive Order 13689, entitled “Enhancing
Coordination of National Efforts in the Arctic.” The order states the following in part:
As the United States assumes the Chairmanship of the Arctic Council, it is more important
than ever that we have a coordinated national effort that takes advantage of our combined
expertise and efforts in the Arctic region to promote our shared values and priorities.
As the Arctic has changed, the number of Federal working groups created to address the
growing strategic importance and accessibility of this critical region has increased.
Although these groups have made significant progress and achieved important milestones,
managing the broad range of interagency activity in the Arctic requires coordinated
planning by the Federal Government, with input by partners and stakeholders, to facilitate
Federal, State, local, and Alaska Native tribal government and similar Alaska Native
organization, as well as private and nonprofit sector, efforts in the Arctic....
There is established an Arctic Executive Steering Committee (Steering Committee), which
shall provide guidance to executive departments and agencies (agencies) and enhance
coordination of Federal Arctic policies across agencies and offices, and, where applicable,
with State, local, and Alaska Native tribal governments and similar Alaska Native
organizations, academic and research institutions, and the private and nonprofit sectors....
... the Steering Committee will meet quarterly, or as appropriate, to shape priorities,
establish strategic direction, oversee implementation, and ensure coordination of Federal
activities in the Arctic....
The Steering Committee, in coordination with the heads of relev ant agencies and under the
direction of the Chair, shall:
(a) provide guidance and coordinate efforts to implement the priorities, objectives,
activities, and responsibilities identified in National Security Presidential Directive
66/Homeland Security Pres idential Directive 25, Arctic Region Policy, the National
Strategy for the Arctic Region and its Implementation Plan, and related agency plans;
(b) provide guidance on prioritizing Federal activities, consistent with agency authorities,
while the United States is Chair of the Arctic Council, including, where appropriate,
recommendations for resources to use in carrying out those activities; and
(c) establish a working group to provide a report to the Steering Committee by May 1,
2015, that:
(i) identifies potential areas of overlap between and within agencies with respect to
implementation of Arctic policy and strategic priorities and provides recommendations to
increase coordination and reduce any duplication of effort, which may include ways to
increase the effectiveness of existing groups; and

National%20Strategy%20for%20the%20Arctic%20Region%20Implementation%20Framework%20%28Appendix%20
A%29%20Final.pdf.
380 Appendix B, Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee 5-Year Plan Collaboration Teams: 2015 Summary of
Accom plishm ents and 2016 Priorities, undated, 13 pp., accessed April 8, 2021, at
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/documents/
Appendix%20B%20IARPC%202015%20Annual%20Report.pdf .
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(ii) provides recommendations to address any potential gaps in implementation....
It is in the best interest of the Nation for the Federal Government to maximize transparency
and promote collaboration where possible with the State of Alaska, Alaska Native tribal
governments and similar Alaska Native organizations, and local, private -sector, and
nonprofit-sector stakeholders. To facilitate consultation and partnerships with the State of
Alaska and Alaska Native tribal governments and similar Alaska Native organizations, the
Steering Committee shall:
(a) develop a process to improve coordination and the sharing of information and
knowledge among Federal, State, local, and Alaska Native tribal governments and similar
Alaska Native organizations, and private-sector and nonprofit-sector groups on Arctic
issues;
(b) establish a process to ensure tribal consultation and collaboration, consistent with my
memorandum of November 5, 2009 (Tribal Consultation). This process shall ensure
meaningful consultation and collaboration with Alaska Native tribal governments and
similar Alaska Native organizations in the development of Federal policies that have
Alaska Native implications, as applicable, and provide feedback and recommendations to
the Steering Committee;
(c) identify an appropriate Federal entity to be the point of contact for Arctic matters with
the State of Alaska and with Alaska Native tribal governments and similar Alaska Native
organizations to support collaboration and communication; and
(d) invite members of State, local, and Alaska Native tribal governments and similar Alaska
Native organizations, and academic and research institutions to consult on issues or
participate in discussions, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law.381
As stated in the above-quoted passage, Executive Order 13689, among other things, established
an Arctic Executive Steering Committee (AESC) to “provide guidance to executive departments
and agencies (agencies) and enhance coordination of Federal Arctic policies across agencies and
offices, and, where applicable, with State, local, and Alaska Native tribal governments and similar
Alaska Native organizations, academic and research institutions, and the private and nonprofit
sectors.” Regarding the AESC, a February 28, 2019, press report states the following: “Although
the [executive] order has not been rescinded, the Trump administration has left the committee
dormant for the past two years.”382

381 Executive order, “ Enhancing Coordination of National Efforts in the Arctic,” January 21, 2015, accessed April 8,
2021, at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/21/executive-order-enhancing-coordination-
national-efforts-arctic.
382 Melody Schreiber, “T wo U.S. Bills Could Advance American Presence in t he Arctic,” Arctic Today, February 28,
2019.
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Appendix E. Arctic Council
This appendix provides additional background information on the Arctic Council.
Overview
The Arctic Council is the leading international forum for addressing issues relating to the Arctic.
It was created in September 1996, following a series of meetings initiated by Finland in 1989.383
Its founding document is the Ottawa Declaration of September 19, 1996, a joint declaration (not a
treaty) signed by representatives of the eight Arctic states. The declaration states that the council
“is established as a high level forum to,” among other things, “provide a means for promoting
cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic States, with the involvement of the
Arctic indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues, in
particular issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic….”384
The council describes itself on its website as “the leading intergovernmental forum promoting
cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic States, Arctic Indigenous peoples and
other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues, in particular on issues of sustainable
development and environmental protection in the Arctic.”385 The State Department describes the
council as “the preeminent intergovernmental forum for addressing issues related to the Arctic
Region…. The Arctic Council is not a treaty-based international organization but rather an
international forum that operates on the basis of consensus, echoing the peaceful and cooperative
nature of the Arctic Region.386
Areas of focus addressed by the council include Arctic peoples, safeguarding Arctic biodiversity,
the Arctic in a changing climate, cooperation for a sustainable Arctic Ocean, addressing pollution,
and preventing and responding to emergencies.387 The Ottawa Declaration states explicitly that
“The Arctic Council should not deal with matters related to military security.”
Organization and Operations
Eight Member States and Their Senior Arctic Officials (SAOs)
The Arctic Council’s membership consists of the eight Arctic states. Each member state is
represented by a Senior Arctic Official (SAO), who is usual y drawn from that country’s foreign
ministry. SAOs meet at least twice per year.388

383 T he council states, “ T he establishment of the Arctic Council was preceded by the Arctic Environmental Protection
Strategy (June 1991), a declaration on the protection of the Arctic environment.” (Arctic Council, “ Frequently Asked
Questions,” updated May 7, 2015, accessed April 8, 2021, at https://arctic-council.org/en/news/frequently-asked-
questions/.)
384 Arctic Council, “ Ottawa Declaration (1996),” accessed April 8, 2021, at https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/
11374/85.
385 Arctic Council, “ T he Arctic Council: A Backgrounder,” updated September 13, 2018, accessed April 8, 2021, at
https://arctic-council.org/en/about/
386 State Department, “Arctic Region,” undated, accessed April 8, 2021, at https://www.state.gov/key-topics-office-of-
ocean-and-polar-affairs/arctic/.
387 See “Where We Focus” in Arctic Council, “Arctic Council,” accessed April 8, 2021, at https://arctic-council.org/en/.
388 Arctic Council, “Frequently Asked Questions,” updated May 7, 2015, accessed April 8, 2021, at https://arctic-
council.org/en/news/frequently-asked-questions/.
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Indigenous Permanent Participants
In addition to the council’s eight member states, six organizations representing Arctic indigenous
peoples have status as Permanent Participants: the Aleut International Association, the Arctic
Athabaskan Council, the Gwich’in Council International, the Inuit Circumpolar Council, the
Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, and the Saami Council. The Permanent
Participants “have full consultation rights in connection with the Council’s negotiations and
decisions. The Permanent Participants represent a unique feature of the Arctic Council, and they
make valuable contributions to its activities in al areas.”389
Observers
Thirteen non-Arctic states have been approved as observers to the council: Germany, the
Netherlands, Poland, and the United Kingdom (approved in 1998); France (2000); Spain (2006);
China, India, Italy, Japan, Singapore, and South Korea (2013); and Switzerland (2017). A
November 22, 2019, press report states that “in 2015, uncertainty about their role led to a hiatus
in observers being admitted.”390 In addition to state observers, 13 intergovernmental and
interparliamentary organizations and 12 nongovernmental organizations have been approved as
observers, making for a total of 38 observer states and organizations.391 The most recently added
observer was the International Maritime Organization (IMO), which was added to the list of
intergovernmental and interparliamentary observer organizations in 2019.
Working Groups
The council’s work is carried out primarily in six working groups that focus on Arctic
contaminants; Arctic monitoring and assessment; conservation of Arctic flora and fauna;
emergency prevention, preparedness and response; protection of the Arctic marine environment;
and sustainable development.392 The council may also establish task forces or expert groups for
specific projects.
Secretariat
The council’s standing Secretariat formal y became operational in June 2013 in Tromsø,
Norway.393
Chairmanship
The council has a two-year chairmanship that rotates among the eight member states. The United
States held the chairmanship from April 24, 2015, to May 11, 2017, a period which began during

389 Arctic Council, “Permanent Participants,” accessed April 8, 2021, at https://arctic-council.org/en/about/permanent-
participants/.
390 Kevin McGwin, “Iceland Begins Its Arctic Council Chairmanship with a Focus on Observers,” Arctic Today,
November 22, 2019.
391 For list of the 38 observers and when they were approved for observer status, see “Who We Are” in Arctic Council,
“Arctic Council,” accessed April 8, 2021, at https://arctic-council.org/en/.
392 For more on the working groups, see “Working Groups” in “Arctic Council,” Arctic Council, accessed April 8,
2021, at https://arctic-council.org/en/.
393 For more on the Secretariat, see “Arctic Council Secretariat,” Arctic Council, accessed April 8, 2021, at
https://arctic-council.org/en/about/secretariat/.
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the Obama Administration and continued into the first 16 weeks of the Trump Administration.394
The United States wil next hold the chairmanship in 2031-2033. On May 11, 2017, the
chairmanship was transferred from the United States to Finland. On May 7, 2019, it was
transferred from Finland to Iceland, which held the position until May 2021, when it was
transferred to Russia.395
Decisionmaking
The council states that “Al decisions of the Arctic Council and its subsidiary bodies are by
consensus of the eight Arctic Member States.”396 More specifical y, the council states that
“Decisions at al levels in the Arctic Council are the exclusive right and responsibility of the eight
Arctic States with the involvement of the Permanent Participants,”397 and that “Arctic Council
assessments and recommendations are the result of analysis and efforts undertaken by the
Working Groups. Decisions of the Arctic Council are taken by consensus among the eight Arctic
Council States, with full consultation and involvement of the Permanent Participants.”398
Limits of Arctic Council as a Governing Body
Regarding the limits of the Arctic Council as a governing body, the council states that
The Arctic Council is a forum; it has no programming budget. All projects or initiatives
are sponsored by one or more Arctic States. Some projects also receive support from other
entities.
The Arctic Council does not and cannot implement or enforce its guidelines, assessments
or recommendations. That responsibility belongs to individual Arctic States or
international bodies.
The Arctic Council’s mandate, as articulated in the Ottawa Declaration, explicitly excludes
military security.399

394 See, for example, Yereth Rosen, “US Ends Arctic Council Chairmanship With Reluctance on Climate Action,”
Alaska Dispatch News, May 11, 2017.
395 See Arctic Council, “ Arctic Council Ministers meet, pass Chairmanship from Finland to Iceland, Arctic States
Conclude Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting by Signing a Joint Statement ,” May 7, 2019, accessed April 8, 2021, at
https://arctic-council.org/en/news/arctic-council-ministers-meet-pass-chairmanship-from-finland-to-iceland-arctic-
states-conclude-arctic-council-ministerial-mee/. T he council states, “ The theme of the Arctic Council Chairmanship
program for 2019-2021 reflects Iceland’s commitment to the principle of sustainable development and refers to the
necessity of close cooperation between the states and peoples of the region and beyond. With sustainable development
as an overarching theme, Iceland will highlight four priorities: T he Arctic Marine Environment, Climate and Green
Energy Solutions, People and Communities of the Arctic, and a Stronger Arctic Council. ” (Arctic Council, “ Icelandic
Chairmanship,” accessed April 8, 2021, at https://arctic-council.org/en/about/chairmanship/.)
396 Arctic Council, “Working Groups,” accessed April 8, 2021, at https://arctic-council.org/en/about/working-groups/.
397 Arctic Council, “Observers,” accessed April 8, 2021, at https://arctic-council.org/en/about/observers/.
398 Arctic Council, “How We Work,” accessed April 8, 2021, at https://arctic-council.org/en/explore/work/.
399 Arctic Council, “About the Arctic Council,” accessed April 8, 2021, at https://arctic-council.org/en/about/.
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Appendix F. Arctic and U.N. Convention on Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS)400
This appendix provides additional background information on the U.N. Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS), particularly as it relates to the Arctic.
Overview of UNCLOS
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) “lays down a comprehensive
regime of law and order in the world’s oceans and seas[,] establishing rules governing al uses of
the oceans and their resources.”401 It builds on four 1958 law of the sea conventions to which the
United States, following Senate consent to ratification, became a party in 1961, and which
entered force between 1962 and 1966.402 Al four treaties remain in force for the United States.403
UNCLOS was adopted in 1982 as the “culmination of more than 14 years of work involving
participation by more than 150 countries representing al regions of the world, al legal and
political systems and the spectrum of socio/economic development.”404 The treaty was modified
in 1994 by an agreement relating to the implementation of Part XI of the treaty, which relates to
the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof that are beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
UNCLOS entered into force in November 1994. As of April 8, 2019, 168 nations were party to
the treaty.405 As discussed later in more detail, the United States is not a party to the treaty.

400 Parts of this section were prepared by Marjorie Ann Browne, who was a Specialist in International Relations,
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and T rade Division until her retirement from CRS on October 10, 2015.
401 United Nations, “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, Overview and full text,”
updated February 11, 2020, accessed April 8, 2021, at https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/
convention_overview_convention.htm.
402 T hese are the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, which entered into force on September 10,
1964, the Convention on the Continental Shelf, which entered into force on 10 June 10, 1964, the Convention on the
High Seas, which entered into force on September 30, 1962, and the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living
Resources of the High Seas, which entered into force on March 20, 1966. T he four 1958 treaties resulted from the first
Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I), which took place in 1958. (For additional discussion, see United
Nations, “ United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,” accessed April 8, 2021, at http://legal.un.org/
diplomaticconferences/1958_los/, and United Nations, “ 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea,” accessed
April 8, 2021, at http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/gclos/gclos.html.)
403 See Department of State, Treaties in Force, Section 2, Multilateral Treaties in Force as of January 1, 2019 , pp. 526,
501, 525, and 516, respectively.
404 United Nations, “United Nations Convent ion on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, Overview and full text,”
updated February 11, 2020, accessed April 8, 2021, at https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/
convention_overview_convention.htm. More specifically, the treaty resulted from the T hird United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which took place between 1973 and 1982. For additional discussion, see United
Nations, “ T hird United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,” accessed April 8, 2021, at http://legal.un.org/
diplomaticconferences/1973_los/.
405 Chronological lists of ratifications of, accessions and successions to the Convention and the related Agreements as
of March 9, 2020, accessed April 8, 2021, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/
chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm.
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Part VI of UNCLOS and Commission on Limits of
Continental Shelf
Part VI of UNCLOS (consisting of Articles 76 through 85), which covers the continental shelf,
and Annex II to the treaty, which established a Commission on the Limits of the Continental
Shelf, are particularly pertinent to the Arctic, because Article 77 states that “The coastal State
exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting
its natural resources,” and that these natural resources include, among other things, “mineral and
other nonliving resources of the seabed and subsoil,” including oil and gas deposits.406
Article 76 states that “The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the seabed and subsoil of
the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of
its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical
miles” if the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance. Article 76
states that “the coastal State shal establish the outer edge of the continental margin wherever the
margin extends beyond 200 nautical miles,” and that “Information on the limits of the continental
shelf beyond 200 nautical miles... shal be submitted by the coastal State to the Commission on
the Limits of the Continental Shelf set up under Annex II.... The Commission shal make
recommendations to coastal States on matters related to the establishment of the outer limits of
their continental shelf. The limits of the shelf established by a coastal State on the basis of these
recommendations shal be final and binding.”
Under Annex II, the commission reviews the information submitted by a coastal state and, by a
two-thirds majority, approves its recommendations to the submitting state. If the submitting state
disagrees with the commission’s recommendations, it “shal , within a reasonable time, make a
revised or new submission to the Commission.” (For information on extended continental shelf
submissions to the Commission, see Appendix H.)
U.S. Not a Party to UNCLOS
As noted earlier, the United States is not a party to UNCLOS.407 Although the United States is not
a party to UNCLOS, the United States accepts and acts in accordance with the nonseabed mining
provisions of the treaty, such as those relating to navigation and overflight, which the United
States views as reflecting customary international law of the sea.408
The United States did not sign UNCLOS when it was adopted in 1982 because the United States
objected to the seabed mining provisions of Part XI of the treaty. Certain other countries also
expressed concerns about these provisions.409 The United Nations states that “To address certain

406 Other parts of UNCLOS relevant to the Arctic include those relating to navigation and high -seas freedoms, fisheries,
and exclusive economic zones.
407 T he United States is not a signatory to the treaty. On July 29, 1994, the United States became a signatory to the 1994
agreement relating to the implementation of Part XI of the treaty. T he United States has not ratified either the treaty or
the 1994 agreement.
408 In a March 10, 1983, statement on U.S. oceans policy, President Reagan stated, that “ the United States is prepared to
accept and act in accordance with the [treaty’s] balance of interests relating to traditional uses of the oceans—such as
navigation and overflight. In this respect, the United States will recognize the rights of other states in the waters off
their coasts, as reflected in the Convention, so long as the rights and freedoms of the United States and others under
international law are recognized by such coastal states.” (Ronald Reagan Presidential Library & Museum, “ Statement
on United States Oceans Policy,” accessed April 8, 2021, at https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/31083c.)
409 In a March 10, 1983, statement on U.S. oceans policy, President Reagan stated, “Last July, I announced that the
United States will not sign the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention that was opened for signature on December
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difficulties with the seabed mining provisions contained in Part XI of the Convention, which had
been raised, primarily by the industrialized countries, the Secretary-General convened in July
1990 a series of informal consultations which culminated in the adoption, on 28 July 1994, of the
Agreement relating to the implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982. The Agreement entered into force on 28 July 1996.”410
The United States signed the 1994 agreement on July 29, 1994, and U.S. administrations since
then have supported the United States becoming a party to UNCLOS. The United Nations
includes the United States on a list of countries for which the 1994 agreement is in a status of
“provisional application,” as of November 16, 1994, by virtue of its signature.411
The 1982 treaty and the 1994 agreement were transmitted to the Senate on October 6, 1994,
during the 103rd Congress, becoming Treaty Document 103-39. Subsequent Senate action on
Treaty Document 103-39, as presented at Congress.gov,412 can be summarized as follows:
 In 2004, during the 108th Congress, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held
hearings on Treaty Document 103-39 and reported it favorably with a resolution
of advice and consent to ratification with declarations and understandings. No
further action was taken during the 108th Congress, and the matter was re-
referred to the committee at the sine die adjournment of the 108th Congress.
 In 2007, during the 110th Congress, the committee held hearings on Treaty
Document 103-39 and reported it favorably with a resolution of advice and
consent to ratification with declarations, understandings, and conditions. No
further action was taken during the 110th Congress, and the matter was re-referred
to the committee at the sine die adjournment of the 110th Congress.
 In 2012, during the 112th Congress, the committee held hearings on Treaty
Document 103-39. No further action was taken during the 112th Congress.
The full Senate to date has not voted on the question of whether to give its advice and consent to
ratification of Treaty Document 103-39. The latest Senate action regarding Treaty Document 103-
39 recorded at Congress.gov is a hearing held by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on
June 28, 2012.

10. We have taken this step because several major problems in the Convention’s deep seabed mining provisions are
contrary to the interests and principles of industrialized nations and would not help attain the aspirations of developing
countries. T he United States does not stand alone in those concerns. Some important allies and friends have not signed
the convention. Even some signatory states have raised concerns about these problems.” (Ronald Reagan Presidential
Library & Museum, “ Statement on United States Oceans Policy,” accessed April 8, 2021, at
https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/31083c.)
410 United Nations, “ Agreement relating to the implementation of Part XI of the United Nat ions Convention on the Law
of the Sea of 10 December 1982,” September 2, 2016, accessed April 8, 2021, at https://www.un.org/depts/los/
convention_agreements/convention_overview_part_xi.htm.
411 United Nations, “ Agreement relating to the implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea of 10 December 1982,” status as of April 8, 2021, accessed April 8, 2021, at https://treaties.un.org/Pages/
ViewDetails.aspx?src=T REAT Y&mtdsg_no=XXI-6-a&chapter=21&clang=_en.
412 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Senate Consideration of T reaty Document 103-39, accessed
April 8, 2021, at https://www.congress.gov/treaty-document/103rd-congress/39. For a timeline of selected key events
relating to the treaty, see Department of State, “ Law of the Sea Convention,” accessed April 8, 2021, at
https://www.state.gov/law-of-the-sea-convention/. In addition to the timeline, the website presents a list of 60
“organizations and companies that have expressed support for U.S. accession” to UNCLOS as modified by the 1994
agreement.
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Supporters of the United States becoming a party to UNCLOS argue in connection with the
Arctic that changing circumstances in the Arctic strengthen the case for the United States
becoming a party, on the grounds that it would improve the ability of the United States to protect
its interests in the Arctic, particularly in relation to navigation rights and the continental shelf.413
Opponents of the United States becoming a party to UNCLOS argue in connection with the
Arctic that “The U.S. does not need to join the convention in order to access oil and gas resources
on its extended continental shelf, in the Arctic, or in the Gulf of Mexico. To the extent necessary,
the U.S. can and should negotiate bilateral treaties with neighboring nations to demarcate the
limits of its maritime and continental shelf boundaries…. The U.S. has successfully protected its
interests in the Arctic since it acquired Alaska in 1867 and has done so during the more than 30
years that the convention has existed. The harm that would be caused by the convention’s
controversial provisions far outweighs any intangible benefit that al egedly would result from
U.S. accession.”414
The Obama Administration’s January 2014 implementation plan for its national strategy for the
Arctic region (see earlier section) included, as one of its 36 or so initiatives, one entitled “Accede
to the Law of the Sea Convention.” Under this initiative, the State Department and other federal
agencies are to “continue to seek the Senate’s advice and consent to accede to the Law of the Sea
Convention.” The document states that “the [Obama] Administration is committed, like the last
three Administrations, to pursuing accession to the Convention on the Law of the Sea and wil
continue to place a priority on attaining Senate advice and consent to accession.”415
The State Department’s web page for UNCLOS provides a timeline of events relating to the law
of the sea from 1958 through 2012, and a list 60 organizations and companies that have expressed
support for the United States becoming a party to UNCLOS.416
Potential Alternatives or Supplements to UNCLOS
Some observers over the years have occasional y suggested that a separate international legal
regime be negotiated to address the changing circumstances in the Arctic. They argue that these
changing circumstances were not envisioned at the time UNCLOS was negotiated. Other
observers have occasional y suggested that the Arctic region above a certain paral el be
designated a wilderness area. As precedent, they cite Article 4 of the Antarctic Treaty, under
which any current claims to sovereign territory are frozen and
No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force shall constitute a basis
for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or create
any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. No new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim,
to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while the present Treaty is in force.

413 See, for example, Dermot Cole, “Scare T actics on Sea T reaty Put US Arctic Interests at Risk,” Arctic Today, June
17, 2019; Steve Haycox, “Why Signing the Law of the Sea T reaty Would Mean a T ougher U.S. Position in the Arctic,”
Anchorage Daily News, March 22, 2018; Ben Werner, “ Zukunft: U.S. Presence in Arctic Won’t Stop Chinese, Russian
Encroachment Without Law of the Sea Ratification,” USNI News, August 1, 2017; John Grady, “ Senators Renew Call
to Ratify Law of the Sea T reaty to Help Chart Future of the Arctic,” USNI News, July 19, 2017.
414 T heodore R. Bromund, James Jay Carafano, and Brett D. Schaefer, “7 Reasons U.S. Should Not Ratify UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea,” Heritage Foundation, June 4, 2018. See also Steven Groves, “ T his Senate May
Smile on Faulty Law of the Sea T reaty,” Heritage Foundation, March 19, 2021.
415 Implementation Plan for The National Strategy for the Arctic Region, January 2014, p. 29.
416 Department of State, “ Law of the Sea Convention,” accessed April 8, 2021, at https://www.state.gov/law-of-the-sea-
convention/.
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Appendix G. DOD and Coast Guard Testimony and
Strategy Documents
This appendix reprints the texts of prepared statements form DOD and Coast Guard witnesses at
hearings held in February and March 2020 on DOD and Coast Guard Arctic capabilities, and
excerpts from Navy, Coast Guard, and Air Force strategy documents for the Arctic.
Testimony
DOD Testimony (March 3, 2020)
At a March 3, 2020, hearing before the Readiness and Management Support subcommittee of the
Senate Armed Services Committee on U.S. policy and posture in support of Arctic readiness,
James H. Anderson, currently Performing the Duties of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,
testified as follows:
The 2019 DoD Arctic Strategy is anchored in the priorities of the National Defense
Strategy (NDS), focusing on great power competition as the principal challenge to long-
term U.S. security and prosperity. It describes the Department’s desired end-state for the
Arctic as “a secure and stable region where U.S. national interests are safeguarded, the U.S.
homeland is defended, and nations work cooperatively to address shared challenges.”
Strategic competitors are seeking to take advantage of the increasing accessibility of the
Arctic to expand their activities in the region. Russia and China are both increasingly active
in the region, although in different ways, for different reasons, and with different
implications for U.S. national security. Russia’s military investments in the Arctic
contribute to its territorial defense, but may result in greater operational risk to forces that
access the region. China is seeking a role in Arctic governance, despite the fact that it does
not have territory claims in the region. There is also a distinct risk that China may repeat
the predatory economic behavior in the Arctic that it has exhibited in other regions to
further its strategic ambitions.
DoD’s focus, however, is on achieving our defense objectives, rather than seeking to
duplicate the capabilities or approaches of our competitors —since doing so plays to their
strengths and fails to gain full value from our key advantages. To this end, the DoD Arctic
Strategy establishes three defense objectives that guide the Department’s approach to
addressing strategic competition in the Arctic.
1) Defend the homeland;
2) Compete when necessary to maintain favorable regional balances of power; and
3) Ensure common domains remain free and open.
Competition in the Arctic must be considered in the context of the relationship between the
Arctic and key regions identified in the NDS. The Arctic is a potential avenue for expanded
great power competition and aggression, since it is located between the two key NDS
regions (the Indo-Pacific and Europe) and the U.S. homeland. The Arctic is a region
through which the United States may project power to advance favorable balances of power
in these key regions. For example, the Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK) Gap illustrates the
close relationship between the Arctic and the regional balance of power in Europe.
Furthermore, competitors may be tempted to use malign or coercive activities in the Arctic
in an attempt to advance their objectives in other regions.
The Department, both independently and in cooperation with allies and partners, is taking
steps to enhance the Joint Force’s ability to operate in the Arctic and project power through
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and beyond the region. For example, we are pursuing enhanced domain awareness, regular
exercises and training, interoperable supporting infrastructure, and extreme cold weather
resilience with allies and partners. Of special note, our cooperation with Canada through
the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD), a long -standing bi-national
organization, is vital for homeland defense.
More broadly, our network of allies and partners is the cornerstone of the Department’s
approach to the Arctic region and represents a strategic advantage for the United States,
which China and Russia do not possess. Six of the seven other Arctic nations are either
NATO Allies or are NATO Enhanced Opportunities Partners. Our allies and partners are
highly capable and proficient in the Arctic region’s operating conditions, and they share
the United States’ interest in maintaining and strengthening the international rules-based
order—including in the Arctic. Defense cooperation with allies and partners complements
broader U.S. Government cooperation in other forums, such as the Arctic Council (which
excludes matters related to military and security from its mandate).
The Joint Force must have the proficiency to respond to regional contingencies, both
independently and in cooperation with allies and partners. This will require agile and
capable forces that are able to conduct operations flexibly in the region. We recognize that
this task has implications for the Joint Force’s capabilities, given that operations in the
harsh Arctic environment place unique demands on the Joint Force.
The Department assesses global posture needs based on strategic priorities, the Joint
Force’s operational capability needs, and other factors. The Department balances the
mission demands of a particular region like the Arctic against other global demands, in a
manner consistent with the NDS. In accordance with DoD’s Arctic Strategy, and consistent
with Section 1752 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2020, the Department
is assessing infrastructure needs in the Arctic to support operational flexibility and power
projection. The Department regularly re-evaluates its capability and infrastructure needs as
conditions, opportunities, and risks related to U.S. national security evolve. The
Department is reviewing potential strategic port sites in the Arctic within the broader
context of NDS priorities.
Although the Arctic presents unique challenges to the Department, we believe the
Department has the right strategic approach, and a strong network of allies and partners, to
navigate the region in an era of strategic competition.417
At the same hearing, Air Force General Terrence O’SHAUGHNESSY, Commander, U.S.
Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), testified as
follows:
Chairman Sullivan, Ranking Member Kaine, and distinguished members of the
Subcommittee: I am honored to appear before you today and to serve as the Commander
of U.S. Northern Commarid (USNORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace Defense
Command (NORAD). I would like to begin by thanking the Subcommittee for your
steadfast support of our commands ’ shared homeland defense mission and for the
opportunity to discuss the significant challenges associated with operating in the Arctic.
USNORTHCOM and NORAD are driven by a single unyielding priority: defending the
homeland. In the years following the Cold War, our nation enjoyed the benefits of military
dominance as well as geographic barriers that kept our homeland beyond the reach of most
conventional threats. Our power projection capabilities and technological overmatch
allowed us to fight forward, focusing our energy on the conduct of operations overseas.

417 Statement for the Record before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Readiness and
Management Support, on U.S. Policy and Posture in Support of Arctic Readiness, March 3, 2020, 4 pp.
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However, our key adversaries watched and learned, invested in capabilities to offset our
strengths while exploiting our weaknesses, and have demonstrated patterns of behavior that
indicate they currently have the capability, capacity, and intent to hold o ur homeland at
significant risk below the threshold of nuclear war. Eroding military advantage is
undermining our ability to detect threats, defeat attacks, and therefore deter aggression
against the homeland.
This is emboldening competitors and adversaries to challenge us at home, holding at risk
our people, our critical infrastructure, and our ability to project power forward. The threats
facing the United States and Canada are real and significant. The Arctic is no longer a
fortress wall, and our oceans are no longer protective moats; they are now avenues of
approach for advanced conventional weapons and the platforms that carry them. Our
adversaries’ capability to directly attack the homeland has leapt forward, and they are
engaged in overt, concerted efforts to weaken our national technological, economic, and
strategic advantage. To address this reality, our two distinct but complementary commands
are taking significant, vigorous steps to ensure our homeland defense enterprise is ready to
deter, detect, and defeat threats now and well into the future.
Throughout 2019, Russia continued to expand its military infrastructure in the Arctic.
Throughout the year, Russia lengthened existing runways and built new ones at multiple
airfields in the high north. In September, Russia deployed a Bastion coastal defense cruise
missile unit to the Chukotka Peninsula, opposite the Bering Sea from Alaska, for a first-
ever training launch from that region. The missile successfully struck a sea-based target
more than 200 kilometers away, according to the Russian Defense Ministry. When
deployed to the Russian northeast, this system has the capability not only to control access
to the Arctic through the Bering Strait, but also to strike land targets in parts of Alaska with
little to no warning.
Like the Russians, China also continues to invest heavily in the Arctic, determined to
exploit the region’s economic and strategic potential as a self-proclaimed “near Arctic”
nation. In the last few years, Chinese survey vessels have conducted several deployments
to the Bering and Chukchi Seas, providing familiarity and experience that could eventualy
translate to Chinese naval operations in the region.
The Arctic is the new frontline of our homeland defense as it provides our adversaries with
a direct avenue of approach to the homeland and is representative of the changing strategic
environment in our area of responsibility. More consistently navigable waters, mounting
demand for natural resources, and Russia’s military buildup in the region make the Arctic
an immediate challenge for USNORTHCOM, NORAD, our northern allies, and our
neighboring geographic combatant commands, U.S. European Command and U.S. Indo-
Pacific Command.
By fielding advanced, long-range cruise missiles–to include land attack missiles capable
of striking the United States and Canada from Russian territory–and expanding its military
presence in the region, Russia has left us with no choice but to improve our homeland
defense capability and capacity. In the meantime, China has taken a number of incremental
steps toward expanding its own Arctic presence. In tum, USNORTHCOM and NORAD
are strengthening the four pillars of our defenses in the high north: domain awareness,
communications, infrastructure improvement, and sustainable presence in our own Arctic
territory.
I want reiterate my thanks to the subcommittee for your constant support as
USNORTHCOM and NORAD have met our homeland defense challenges in the Arctic
head-on. There are no easy solutions to the challenges presented by the extreme climate,
terrain, and distances inherent in Arctic operations. However, due in no small measure to
your continued attention and advocacy for our commands ’ requirements, we have seen
significant attention, expertise, and resources brought to bear on the homeland defense
mission in the Arctic from throughout the Department of Defense.
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Over the last year, our commands have worked alongside the military Services and the
Office of the Secretary of Defense to ensure that our warfighting requirements are met,
with particular emphasis on improving joint domain awareness and communications. In
order to reclaim our strategic advantage in the high north, it is critical that we improve our
ability to detect and track surface vessels and aircraft in our Arctic approaches and establish
more reliable secure communications for our joint force warfighters operating in the higher
latitudes. This focus is now apparent in the 2019 DOD Arctic Strategy, which reflects my
command priorities and makes it clear that DOD must defend the homeland against threats
emanating from our northern approaches.
As stated in the National Defense Strategy, a core Department of Defense objective is to
ensure that common domains remain open and free. In pursuit of that objective,
USNORTHCOM and NORAD are very proud of our work with allies and partners to
improve our shared presence and interoperability in the region and update our information
sharing agreements with our Arctic allies and partners. Of note in the last year,
USNORTHCOM and NORAD leaders also conducted engagements with the Danish Joint
Arctic Command in Greenland and joined the United Kingdom Ministry of Defense in
direct staff talks. These collaborative efforts help to reaffirm our commitment to our
international partners while enhancing USNORTHCOM and NORAD’s defense
capability.
We are leveraging the on-the-ground experience and expertise of our warfighters in
USNORTHCOM’s Alaska Command along with leaders, planners, and combatants from
USINDOPACOM and USEUCOM as we prepare for ARCTIC EDGE 20- the nation’s
premier Arctic exercise. ARCTIC EDGE 20 will take full advantage of the unsurpassed
capabilities of the Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex (JP ARC) and allow us to test our
capability to fight, communicate, and win in the harsh terrain and climate of the high north.
I am personally placing significant emphasis on this important exercise, as the lessons we
learn from ARCTIC EDGE 20 will play an important role in validating the requirements
that will allow us to deter, detect, and defeat potential adversaries along the front line of
our nation’s defenses.
Our adversaries have the ability to threaten our homeland in multiple domains and from
numerous avenues of approach- and our commands are especially focused on improving
our ability to defend our northern approaches. We cannot deter what we cannot defeat, and
we cannot defeat that which we cannot detect. In order to effectively defend the homeland,
USNORTHCOM and NORAD have developed a Homeland Defense Design (HDD)
consisting of three main elements: a layered sensing grid for domain awareness, an
adaptive architecture for joint all-domain command and control (JADC2), and new defeat
mechanisms for advanced threats. These three elements are vital to deterring and defeating
advanced threats to the homeland, and USNORTHCOM and NORAD are moving with a
sense of profound urgency to bring these capabilities into the fight.
Our need to improve our domain awareness begins with developing and integrating
advanced sensors capable of detecting and tracking threats no matter where they originate.
These sensors must be able to detect, track, and discriminate advanced cruise missiles,
ballistic missiles, hypersonics, and small unmanned aerial systems at the full ranges from
which they are employed. The sensors must also detect and track the platforms –aircraft,
ships, and submarines–that carry those weapons. A robust and resilient space layer is
increasingly critical to provide the earliest possible detection and fidelity of data required.
Stovepiped transmission of data from non-compatible sensors presents a significant
impediment to our ability to defend against advanced threats. To overcome this issue, we
need a robust architecture for JADC2 to effectively gather data from a myriad of sensors
across all domains and share it seamlessly. The architecture must facilitate rapid data
fusion, processing, and analytics to feed decision makers at all levels with accurate,
decision-quality information at the speed of relevance. Data from any sensor should feed
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any defeat mechanism, and rapid data fusion and analysis should provide faster, more
precise solutions to all shooters. This architecture will facilitate high-tempo decision cycles
for agile, resilient, redundant, and joint command and control. By leveraging a cloud
architecture, big data analytics, edge computing, artificial intelligence, and machine
learning, this network should sense a threat from one node and engage it precisely and
expeditiously from another across vast distances and across all domains.
Finally, we require new defeat mechanisms for advance threat systems- to include the
advanced cruise missiles capable of striking the homeland from launch boxes in the Arctic.
As adversary threat systems, employment doctrine, and operational competencies become
more numerous, multi-modal, and complex, our current defeat mechanisms will become
increasingly challenged. Additionally, the cost ratio of adversary threat missiles to our
missile defeat mechanisms is not in our favor. We must flip the cost ratio back in our favor
with deep magazine, rapid fire, and low-cost defeat mechanisms.
While these capabilities will play a critical role throughout the USNORTHCOM and
NORAD areas of responsibility, they will be especially vital in our northern approaches.
As diminishing Arctic ice creates opportunities for increased international commercial and
military presence, our adversaries will continue their efforts to exploit the vast distances
and inherent complexity of operating in the high north. Our commands are working closely
with tech and defense industry partners to rapidly overcome our most pressing challenges
in the region.
Specifically, our commands are collaborating with large and small companies from the
commercial tech sector in order to leverage emerging technologies and digital-age
approaches with potential homeland defense applications. Under this iterative approach,
our commands and our commercial partners have developed a common understanding of
our shared challenges and opportunities over time. In tum, we are allowing our nation’s
innovators to apply their expertise and propose advanced, innovative solutions using new
but proven technology that can be rapidly incorporated into the homeland defense
ecosystem in order to improve our domain awareness, JADC2 architecture, and defeat
mechanisms.
We are also adapting and evolving how we work with traditional U.S. defense industry.
Rather than prescribing specific materiel solutions to the challenges facing our commands,
USNORTHCOM and NORAD are engaged in ongoing two -way dialogue with defense
industry innovators to share our perspective on the changing strategic environment,
emerging threats to the homeland, and operational requirements. We are working with our
industry partners to ensure they understand our specific challenges and needs. In tum, our
partners are identifying ways to bring new and existing systems into the homeland defense
architecture and provide tailored solutions to our unique challenges.
This approach has already shown game-changing potential. Over the last several months,
USNORTHCOM and NORAD have collaborated with the defense industry, commercial
tech partners, and the military Services on successful field demonstrations of emerging
sensor, information fusion, and satellite communications technologies. For example, the
same technology that is capable of delivering high -speed internet and voice
communications to remote indigenous communities for the first time has the clear potential
to bridge some of the gaps in military communications in the same region. I am excited
and encouraged by the results of these demonstrations, and we will continue to lead these
experiments and to solicit innovative proposals from established defense industry and
emerging tech partners.
There are no routine operations in the Arctic, but USNORTHCOM and NORAD are firmly
committed to defending our homeland. Thanks in no small measure to your support, the
innovative spirit of our industry and interagency partners, and the deep commitment of the
men and women I am proud to lead, I have no doubt that we will continue to deter and
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defeat the threats facing our homeland- to include those originating in the Arctic. We Have
the Watch.418
Coast Guard Testimony (December 8, 2020)
At a December 8, 2020, hearing before the Security subcommittee of the Senate Commerce,
Science, and Transportation Committee on Coast Guard Arctic operations, Admiral Charles Ray,
Vice Commandant of the Coast Guard, testified as follows:
Introduction
Good afternoon Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and distinguished Members of the
Subcommittee. It is my pleasure to be here today to discuss the Coast Guard’s role and
activities to advance national security priorities across the Arctic Region. This effort
includes safeguarding U.S. sovereignty and executing our national responsibilities wh ile
effecting safe, secure, and environmentally responsible maritime activity.
The U.S. Arctic remains particularly dynamic, evolving environmentally, operationaly,
and strategically. Environmental changes, combined with the tyranny of distance and
limited infrastructure, exacerbate the harshness of the operating environment. The types
and levels of commercial activity are also transforming, from a surge in oil and gas
exploration a few years ago to increases in vessel transits and expansion of environmental
tourism. These alterations in types and location of activity, along with the changes in the
physical environment, coincide with the reemergence of great power competition across
the globe which are exemplified in the Arctic. The importance of, and demand signal for,
Coast Guard’s services and leadership have never been greater as these dynamic challenges
magnify U.S. national security interests across the Arctic.
National Security Drivers Across the Arctic
The actions and intentions of Arctic and non-Arctic nation states continue to shape the
security environment and stability of the region. The geopolitical environment is evolving
as state and non-state actors seek to advance their own interests in the Arctic. Allies,
partners, and competitors increasingly contend for diplomatic, economic, and strategic
advantage and influence. Russia and China exemplify that competition. Both have declared
the Arctic a strategic priority; both have made significant investments in new or refurbished
capabilities; and both are exerting direct or indirect influence across the region.
Russia’s expansive Arctic has the potential to support naval fleets readily deployable
between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. This region also represents significant economic
opportunities, such as oil and gas extraction and development and attempted control of the
Northern Sea Route for trans -Arctic shipping. As such, Russia continues to plan and
expand its capabilities and capacity to influence and surge throughout the Arctic. This year,
Russia launched the first in a new class of nuclear-powered icebreakers, which they sailed
to the North Pole. In addition to continuing the expansion of its extensive icebreaker fleet,
its renewed capabilities include air bases, ports, weapons systems, domain awareness tools,
and search-and-rescue stations. Furthermore, Russia recently established an inter-agency
commission of the Russian Security Council focused on ensuring Russian national security
interests in the Arctic. Finally, Russia recently completed Exercise Ocean Shield 2020, a
multi-theater exercise involving participation by both its Pacific and Northern Fleets and
including maneuvers in the Northern Bering Sea and Arctic approaches. Through this
exercise, Russia extended its operations into the U.S. exclusive economic zone and

418 Statement of General T errence J. O'Shaughnessy, United States Air Force, Commander, United States Northern
Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command, before the Senate Armed Services Committee
Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support, March 3, 2020, 7 pp.
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interferred with the safety and sovereignty of the U.S. fishing fleet, indicating a willingness
to push the boundaries of acceptable, responsible behavior and governance.
China continues to aspire to assert influence across the Arctic including pursuit of
economic investments in key strategic areas such as rare-earth elements, oil and gas
development, air and sea ports, railways, and infrastructure to further its strategic
objectives. Last year, China launched its first domestically-built icebreaking vessel, the
Motor Vessel XUE LONG 2, which operated in the Arctic this year, including taking a
sediment core sample while operating on the waters over the United States’ extended
continental shelf. China is also designing an even more powerful polar icebreaker expected
to have twice the icebreaking capability of XUE LONG 2. With three icebreakers, China
could outpace U.S. icebreaker capacity and polar access by 2024. The primary concern
with Chinese activities in the Arctic is the potential to disrupt the cooperation, stability,
and governance in the region for both Arctic and non -Arctic states.
Coast Guard Leadership in the Arctic
The Coast Guard has shaped and influenced national security in the Arctic for over 150
years. This effort includes asserting the Nation’s sovereign rights, upholding our sovereign
responsibilities from the strategic to the tactical level, and countering malign influence that
is contrary to U.S. values and international rules and norms. The Service’s missions have
evolved along with the evolution of the physical, operational, and strategic environments.
As the only U.S. Armed Force with both military and law enforcement authorities,
combined with membership in the Intelligence Community, the Coast Guard seamlessly
shifts between mission sets utilizing multi-mission personnel and assets. Specifically, the
Coast Guard’s constabulary functions and broad authorities serve as a critical bridge
between the hard-power lethality of the Department of Defense (DoD) and soft-power
diplomacy of the State Department. These characteristics enable the Service to cultivate
strong international relationships and build coalitions among Arctic partners based on
mutual interests and values that strengthen national security and regional stability while
enhancing safety, maritime governance, and prosperity across the region.
Where strategic goals align, the Coast Guard works closely with the DoD to ensure efficient
operations. The Coast Guard is a member of the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable, a
EUCOM-sponsored multi-national group concerned with Arctic security issues, including
maritime domain awareness. We work closely with NORTHCOM through the Arctic
Capabilities Assessment Working Group, which was created to identify pot ential
collaborative efforts to enhance Arctic capabilities in communications, maritime domain
awareness, and presence. The Service’s role as a member of the Intelligence Community
offers a natural nexus for broad intelligence and information sharing, as appropriate, to
counter nefarious actions in the Arctic and throughout the world. These efforts are only a
few examples of partnerships between the Coast Guard and DoD.
This year, Arctic operations and engagements have faced unique challenges and
interruptions, mostly due to the global pandemic of COVID-19. However, because of these
challenges and the growing strategic imperatives across the Arctic, the Service has adapted
operations to meet the Nation’s mission demands. The following highlights some of these
initiatives that have particular impacts on the Nation’s readiness as well as national and
international security.
Advancing Safety and Security in the U.S. Arctic
Operation ARCTIC SHIELD is the Coast Guard’s year-round planning and operations
effort that incorporates an expeditionary approach for deploying resources and conducting
integrated operations to meet statutory mission demands, buys-down maritime risk, and
advances national security objectives through maritime operations in the United States
Arctic. ARCTIC SHIELD 2020 objectives included advancing national and Coast Guard
strategic goals; enhancing capabilities to operate effectively in a dynamic Arctic;
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strengthening the rules -based order; and innovating and adapting to promote safety,
resilience, and prosperity. An emergent priority was to protect Arctic residents by not
transmitting or contracting COVID-19 while conducting missions. The pandemic imposed
challenges on engagements and presence, both in communities and across the maritime
domain, but has also presented other opportunities to broaden Arctic experience, training,
and operational readiness to safeguard the U.S. Arctic.
The Coast Guard conducted additional, unscheduled patrols in Arctic waters this season
with CGC HEALY, CGC ALEX HALEY, and CGC MUNRO. With these patrols, the
Service monitored foreign maritime activity, including the Arctic deployment of the XUE
LONG 2; enhanced monitoring and enforcement of maritime activities including
commercial fishing in the United States exclusive economic zone and along the maritime
boundary line with Russia; supported other U.S. marine scientific research; and protected
U.S. sovereign interests. This activity included a joint patrol with a Russian Border Guard
vessel along the U.S. / Russian maritime border that highlighted the Coast Guard's
continued focus on regional cooperation to combat trans -Arctic threats such as illegal
fisheries. Additionally, aircrews trained with CGC HEALY and CGC MUNRO as they
patrolled in the Chukchi Sea and Bering Strait region, recertifying aircrews in shipboard
landings in order to extend the operational reach of the Coast Guard into the higher
latitudes.
As in the past few seasons, the Coast Guard deployed two MH-60 helicopters to Kotzebue,
Alaska for four months to enhance response capabilities and provide direct support to
communities in the U.S. Arctic region.
These helicopters have flown over 390 flight hours, and executed eight long range search
and rescue missions. Additionally, they provided critical support to the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the Office of Naval
Research, the Alaska Department of Fish and Game, and the University of Washington in
multiple missions to include assisting scientific research studying marine mammals plus
Arctic ice and environmental conditions. Coast Guard HC-130 and MH-60 aircrews also
conducted regular Maritime Domain Awareness flights, establishing a U.S. Government
presence over U.S. Arctic waters, protecting U.S. sovereign interests, and executing U.S.
responsibilities.
Because of pandemic concerns in Antarctica, the National Science Foundation informed
the Service that it will not use CGC POLAR STAR to support the McMurdo Station
resupply mission this year. This change affords the Coast Guard the unique opportunity to
conduct maritime operations in the U.S. Arctic during the winter. From December 2020 to
February 2021, POLAR STAR will project power throughout the Arctic and defend
American sovereignty along the U.S. and Russia maritime boundary line. This opportunity
enhances Coast Guard readiness by increasing Arctic ice navigation proficiency and
informs operations of the future Polar Security Cutters.
Building Arctic Capacity
The ability for the U.S. to lead in the Arctic, both strategically and operationally, hinges
on physical presence to protect U.S. national sovereignty and safeguard our homeland
security interests. The foundation of the Coast Guard’s operational presence and influence
is U.S. icebreakers, whose purpose is to provide assured, year-round access to the polar
regions for executing not only Coast Guard missions but also national missions in the high
latitudes.
I’d like to take this opportunity to thank Congress for its continued support of the Coast
Guard’s Polar Security Cutter program, which awarded a contract for the detail design and
construction of the first ship in 2019. This program is efficiently managed through the joint
Navy-Coast Guard Integrated Program Office, which was established to accelerate the
project and leverage best practices from each Services’ shipbuilding programs. Because of
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Congress’s support and this partnership, the Nation is as close as we have been in over 40
years to recapitalizing our icebreaking fleet. Continued investment is key to meeting our
Nation’s growing needs in the rapidly evolving and dynamic polar regions.
Until the delivery of Polar Security Cutters, the Coast Guard must maintain cutters POLAR
STAR and HEALY, the nation’s only operational icebreakers. Robust planning efforts for
a service life extension on POLAR STAR are already underway, and initial work for this
project will begin in 2021, with phased industrial work occurring annually through 2023.
The end goal of this process will be to extend the vessel’s service life until delivery of at
least the second new Polar Security Cutter. The recent casualty to CGC HEALY, our only
medium icebreaker, underscores the importance of this effort. It also highlights the
Nation’s limited bench strength for this particular mission set, and the importance of
devoting sufficient resources for maintenance and repair activities to aging assets.
On June 9th of this year, the Administration released a Presidential Memorandum on
Safeguarding U.S. National Interests in the Arctic and Antarctic Regions that directed a
review of requirements for a polar security icebreaking fleet acquisition program that
supports our national interests in the Arctic and Antarctic regions. This memorandum
highlights the Administration’s priority for securing national interests in the Arctic and for
recapitalizing the Nation’s icebreaker fleet. The Coast Guard will continue to work within
the Department of Homeland Security, with the Department of Defense, and with other
Departments in responding to the Nation’s need in the Arctic.
The Coast Guard must continue to evaluate options to advance U.S. interests in the region,
which extend beyond the provision of icebreakers. As outlined in the Coast Guard’s 2019
Arctic Strategic Outlook, in order to respond to crises in the Arctic, our Nation must also
muster adequate personnel, aviation, and logistics resources in the region. To meet the
challenges of the Arctic as a strategically competitive space, the Coast Guard must also
expand its means to shape the security environment and respond to, intercept, and collect
information on activities and intentions of those operating in the Arctic region.
Advancing Strategic Leadership and National Security Across the Arctic
As many nations and other stakeholders across the world aspire to expand their roles and
activities in the Arctic, the Coast Guard continues to be a leader across the region,
expanding collaboration, cooperation, and interoperability.
The Service exercises leadership through engagement in Arctic Council activities including
representation on a variety of working groups. As Chair of the Marine Environmental
Response Experts Group, the Coast Guard engaged with Russia during the response to the
June 2020 Arctic oil spill in Siberia, the worst ever in the region, and continues to work
with partners to identify and apply lessons-learned from the spill to reduce risks in the
United States. As a member of the Shipping Experts Group, the Coast Guard supports
projects such as mitigation of risks associated with the use and carriage of heavy fuel oil
by vessels in the Arctic. The Coast Guard also chairs the Council’s Search and Rescue
Experts Group, served on the Council’s Task Force on Arctic Marine Cooperation, and has
been active in other task forces that established the 2011 Arctic Search and Rescue
Agreement, the 2013 Oil Spill Prevention and Response Agreement, and the 2015
Framework for Oil Pollution Prevention.
Additionally, the Arctic Coast Guard Forum (ACGF) continues to be a bridge between
diplomacy and operations. Formally established in October 2015, the ACGF
operationalizes all of the elements of the Service’s Arctic strategy, as well as the objectives
of the Arctic Council. It is a unique, action-oriented maritime governance forum where the
Coast Guard and peer agencies from the other seven Arctic nations strengthen
relationships, identify lessons learned, share best practices, carry out exercises, conduct
combined operations, and coordinate emergency response missions. In April 2019, the
ACGF conducted its second live exercise, POLARIS, which incorporated six ships and
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five aircraft from ACGF member nations to respond to a simulated cruise ship in distress
near Finland.
The exercise was a successful demonstration of combined operations, and highlights the
criticality of coordination preparedness for maritime environmental response and search
and rescue. In April 2021, the ACGF will hold its third live exercise off the coast of Iceland.
When Russia assumes chairmanship of the Arctic Council and the ACGF in Summer 2021,
the Coast Guard will continue to encourage advancement of shared ACGF objectives,
including more collaboration with operational Arctic entities and increasing joint response
capability for both search and rescue and marine environmental response cases.
The Coast Guard has also supported Arctic safety through other international bodies such
as the International Maritime Organization (IMO). The Coast Guard was instrumental in
the IMO’s development and adoption of the International Code for Ships Operating in Polar
Waters (Polar Code), which is mandatory under both the International Convention for the
Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and the International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution of Ships (MARPOL).
The Polar Code covers the full range of design, construction, equipment, operational,
training, search and rescue, and environmental protection matters relevant to ships
operating in the inhospitable waters surrounding the two polar regions. Additionally, in
November 2017, the Coast Guard collaborated with the Russian Federation to jointly
develop and submit a proposal to the IMO to establish a system of two -way routes in the
Bering Strait and Bering Sea, with the objective of advancing the maritime transportation
system in the region; promoting the safe, responsible flow of commerce; and de-conflicting
commercial uses of the waterways with subsistence activities.
The Coast Guard continues to work to expand the Service’s influence across the Arctic.
From July through September of this year, the Coast Guard deployed CGC CAMPBELL
and CGC TAHOMA in the North Atlantic region to participate in joint military and Search
and Rescue exercises. This included engagements with the Danish Joint Arctic Command,
Canada, and France. These operations demonstrate the Service’s strong relationships with
international partners across the globe.
Improving Critical Communications in the U.S. Arctic
Perhaps one of the biggest challenges in the Arctic is simply communicating. Out of
necessity, the Coast Guard uses a variety of solutions to communicate in the Arctic, which
minimally satisfies current operational requirements. The Service is undertaking multiple
connectivity and communications efforts to support and improve operations in the Region
and will partner with the Department of Defense and other partners when possible. These
efforts include recapitalizing our military satellite communications terminals, upgrading
high-speed data “Cutter Connectivity” solutions with emerging polar satellite services,
replacing all Coast Guard cutter High Frequency (HF) radios, and reegineering the
terrestrial HF network. These efforts will dramatically improve the Service’s Arctic
communications and operations in the Arctic.
Additionally, the Coast Guard is working with the Department of Homeland Security
Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate to execute a comprehensive review of mariner
communications and connectivity needs with the broader Federal, State, local, and industry
communities of interest in the Arctic. We have also engaged the DHS S&T Arctic Domain
Awareness Center of Excellence (ADAC) at the University of Alaska, Anchorage, to
conduct relevant research. The intent is to identify areas of possible collaboration in a
whole of government approach and potential public-private partnerships to address shared
communication and connectivity gaps and needs.
Conclusion
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The Coast Guard’s value proposition in the Arctic includes upholding freedom of
navigation and the rules-based order by setting and enforcing standards of behavior in the
maritime domain. The Coast Guard’s role in our whole-of-government approach to
securing our national interests in the polar regions is using our experience, leadership, and
ability to both influence and compete below the level of armed conflict. Leve raging the
Service to set the example for maritime governance in the Arctic positions the United States
to be the preferred partner of other Arctic allies and stakeholders to positively shape the
security environment across the region. The Coast Guard, and the Nation, must remain
committed and agile in the rapidly evolving geopolitical and operational Arctic
environments.
The Administration’s and Congress’ continued support for a modernized and capable polar
fleet and Arctic infrastructure will posture not only the Coast Guard, but the Nation, to lead
across the national and international landscape to build a coalition of like-minded partners
in order to shape the Arctic domain as a continued area of low tension and great cooperation
while preserving our national interests and rights. We understand the significant investment
required to secure the Arctic, and we appreciate the trust the Nation has placed in the
Service. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today and for all you do for
the men and women of the Coast Guard. I look forward to answering your questions.419
Strategy Documents420
June 2019 DOD Arctic Strategy
In June 2019, DOD released an Arctic Strategy document as the successor to DOD’s 2013 and
2016 Arctic strategies. The June 2019 document states that it
articulates the Department of Defense’s (DoD) strategy for the Arctic region in an era of
strategic competition. It is informed by the 2017 National Security Strategy and anchored
in the priorities of the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) and its focus on competition
with China and Russia as the principal challenge to long-term U.S. security and prosperity.
This strategy supersedes the 2016 DoD Arctic strategy.
DoD’s desired end-state for the Arctic is a secure and stable region where U.S. national
interests are safeguarded, the U.S. homeland is defended, and nations work cooperatively
to address shared challenges. This strategy sets forth DoD’s assessment of the Arctic
security environment, risks posed to U.S. national security interests, DoD Arctic
objectives, and the strategic approach by which DoD will achieve these objectives.
A secure and stable Arctic region benefits the United States and necessitates a rules -based
order, reflecting Arctic nations’ respect for national sovereignty and constructive
engagement to address shared challenges. The network of U.S. allies and partners with
shared national interests in this rules -based order is the United States’ greatest strategic
advantage in the Arctic region, and thus the cornerstone of DoD’s Arctic strategy. DoD
cooperation with Arctic allies and partners strengthens our shared approach to regional
security and helps deter strategic competitors from seeking to unilaterally change the
existing rules-based order.
NDS goals and priorities guide DoD’s strategic approach to the Arctic. The Joint Force
must be able to deter, and if necessary, defeat great power aggression. DoD must prioritize
efforts to address the central problem the NDS identifies—i.e., the Joint Force’s eroding
competitive edge against China and Russia, and the NDS imperative to ensure favorable

419 T estimony of Admiral Charles W. Ray, Coast Guard Vice Commandant, On “Coast Guard Arctic Operations”
Before the Senate Commerce, Science, & T ransportation Security Subcommittee, December 8, 2020, 7 pp.
420 See also Joshua T allis, “ Focusing the Military Services’ Arctic Strategies,” War on the Rocks, January 20, 2021.
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regional balances of power in the Indo-Pacific and Europe. Developing a more lethal,
resilient, agile, and ready Joint Force will ensure that our military sustains its competitive
advantages, not only for these key regions of strategic competition, but globally as well.
Maintaining a credible deterrent for the Arctic region requires DoD to understand and
shape the Arctic’s geo-strategic landscape for future operations and to respond effectively
to contingencies in the Arctic region, both independently and in cooperation with others.
DoD’s strategic approach seeks to do so by implementing three ways in support of the
desired Arctic end-state (each described in detail in this document):
• Building Arctic awareness;
• Enhancing Arctic operations; and
• Strengthening the rules-based order in the Arctic.421
January 2021 Army Arctic Strategy Document (Released March 2021)
The Army’s Arctic strategy document—dated January 19, 2021, and released March 16, 2021—
notes that the Army “has had a nearly continuous presence in Alaska since the United States
purchased the territory from Russia in 1867,”422 and states:
For the Army, the Arctic poses two challenges—as a place and an environment. It serves
as a place where the Army, as part of the joint force, confronts our adversaries around the
globe in competition. This requires us to adapt our posture to employ calibrated forces able
to conduct multi-domain operations. As an environment, it poses additional challenge from
extreme temperature and terrain.
The Army will regain cold-weather and high-altitude dominance by adapting how the
Army generates, postures, trains, and equips our forces to execute extended, multidomain
operations in extreme conditions. Restoring dominance also mandates an inherently multi-
component approach with significant contributions for the Army Reserve and National
Guard. The Army will implement integrated solutions that emphasis readiness for
operations in extreme cold and mountainous environments and bolsters the resiliency of
our people and our installations. The Army is committed to a Total Army approach to
meeting Joint warfighter requirements in Arctic conditions around the globe. This restored
dominance provides options to the Joint Force Commander to employ decisive land
capabilities in support of operations.
This strategy lays out a strategic and operational approach for Army forces operating in the
Arctic as part of the joint force and in conjunction with allies and partners. This is due to
the efforts of great power competitors to build their capabilities in a region that is
increasingly open for exploitation. However, reacting to challenges is not the only reason
for reexamining how Army forces operate in the Arctic. The adoption of multi-domain
operations provides an opportunity the Army needs to exploit.
The tenets of multi-domain operations are the start point for examining how Army forces
might operate in the Arctic in the future. Multidomain formations, particularly those with

421 Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Report to Congress, Department of
Defense Arctic Strategy, As required by Section 1071 of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2019 (P.L. 115-232), June 2019, p. 2. For press reports regarding the document, see Connie Lee, “ Great
Power Competition Extends to Arctic,” National Defense Magazine, August 12, 2019; Hal Brands, “ America Is Losing
the Battle of the Arctic,” Bloomberg, July 30, 2019; Melody Schreiber, “U.S. Arctic Defense Strategy Ramps Up
Rhetoric Without Committing Resources, Experts Say,” Arctic Today, June 11, 2019; Malte Humpert, “ New U.S.
Department of Defense Arctic Strategy Sees Growing Uncertainty and T ension in Region,” High North News, June 7,
2019.
422 United States Army, Regaining Arctic Dominance, The U.S. Army in the Arctic, January 19, 2021 (released March
16, 2021), p. 5.
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extended ranges such as the Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF), have clear potential in the
Arctic—an area of operations characterized by vast distances and where air and naval
avenues of approach are critical. MDTFs have significant potential to create anti-access/
area denial challenges for competitors. For that potential to be realized, however,
multidomain formations must be able to converge their effects with the rest of the joint
force and allies and partners. This is particularly difficult in the Arctic for both
organizational and technical reasons. The Arctic and sub-arctic incorporates portions of
three combatant command areas of responsibility and network integration is difficult in
extreme cold environments, high latitudes, and areas with little commercial infrastructure.
Similarly, the exceptional logistical challenges posed by a remote, poorly developed, and
extreme environment make calibrated force posture essential. The Army’s decision to place
an MDTF in Alaska is the first step in setting the conditions for success. In Alaska, it will
have the ability to take advantage of world-class training facilities and the presence of
significant U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy forces to experiment and train multi-domain
operations….
The United States is an Arctic nation. As such, the Army is responsible for providing
Arctic-capable forces to support joint all-domain operations in defense from the region’s
threats. The Army must also be able to provide and sustain Arctic-capable forces for
employment outside of the region as necessary. The Army is an essential key to ensuring
land dominance in support of the joint force in the all-domain environment. The Army’s
ability to compete in the region delivers dilemmas to adversaries seeking an advantage in
the Arctic. Working together with allies and partners, the Army supports the region’s
stability to achieve the nation’s objectives.
The changes in the geopolitical environment and actions of great power competitors,
combined with the evolving physical environment, require the Army to refocus and analyze
options to rebuild our Arctic capabilities. This strategy, through identifying the strategic
and operational framework, focuses our efforts along lines of effort that will allow the
Army to regain our ability to generate Arctic-capable forces ready to win in the Arctic,
extreme cold weather, high-altitude, and mountainous environments.
This strategy communicates the need to support competition in the region while also
rapidly organizing and responding to conduct operational maneuver in support of strategic
movement. To do this, the Army will examine the posture, composition, and readiness of
the force and seek improvements. The first step is to develop a full DOTMILPF423
definition of what is required for a unit to be Arctic-capable.
Additionally, the Army will adapt in order to win in Arctic and other challenging
conditions. The actions and areas of analysis identified in this strategy lay out a plan to
begin that effort. The examination and implementation of this plan will allow leaders to
balance risk and make informed decisions to improve the Army’s ability to operate and
compete in the region.424

423 DOT MLPF is an acronym, usually pronounced “dot mil p f,” that stands for doctrine, organization, training,
materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities. It is usually spelled DOT MLPF, but is sometimes spelled
DOT MILPF. In another version, DOTMLPF-P, the final P stands for policy.
424 United States Army, Regaining Arctic Dominance, The U.S. Army in the Arctic, January 19, 2021 (released March
16, 2021), pp. 20-21, 47-48. See also Matthew Beinart , “ Army’s New Arctic Strategy Details Capability Needs For T he
Region,” Defense Daily, March 16, 2021; Jaspreet Gill, “ New Arctic Strategy Establishes MDT F in Alaska, Key Lines
of Effort ,” Inside Defense, March 16, 2021; Jen Judson, “ New Strategy Sets Up Army to Operate in Increasingly
Relevant Arctic,” Defense News, March 16, 2021; Caitlin M. Kenney, “ Army Focuses on Defending and Fighting in
Arctic Region with New Strategy,” Stars and Stripes, March 16, 2021; Meredith Roaten, “ Breaking: Army Releases
New Arctic Strategy,” National Defense, March 16, 2021; Kyle Rempfer, “ Army’s New Arctic Strategy Aims to Build
Expeditionary Capability,” Arm y Tim es, March 17, 2021; Liz Ruskin, “ Army Wants to Find Snow-Loving Soldiers as
It Commits to ‘Arctic dominance,’” Alaska Public Media, March 24, 2021; Melody Schreiber, “ US Army’s First Arctic
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January 2021 Navy-Marine Corps Strategic Blueprint for Arctic
The Navy in recent years has issued a series of strategy and roadmap documents for the Arctic.
The latest of these is a Department of the Navy (i.e., Navy and Marine Corps) strategic blueprint
for the Arctic released in January 2021, which states (emphasis as in original):
The United States is a maritime nation. We are also an Arctic nation. Our security,
prosperity, and vital interests in the Arctic are increasingly linked to those of other nations
in and out of the region. America’s interests are best served by fostering compliance with
existing rules to assure a peaceful and prosperous Arctic Region – stretching from Maine
in the North Atlantic across the Arctic Ocean through the Bering Strait and Alaska in the
North Pacific to the southern tip of the Aleutian Island chain.
In the decades ahead, rapidly melting sea ice and increasingly navigable Arctic waters –
a Blue Arctic – will create new challenges and opportunities off our northern shores.
Without sustained American naval presence and partnerships in the Arctic Region, peace
and prosperity will be increasingly challenged by Russia and China, whose interests and
values differ dramatically from ours.
Competing views of how to control increasingly accessible marine resources and sea
routes, unintended military accidents and conflict, and spill-over of major power
competition in the Arctic all have the potential to threaten U.S. interests and prosperity.
These challenges are compounded by increasing risk of environmental degradation and
disasters, accidents at sea, and displacement of people and wildlife as human activity
increases in the region.
Despite containing the world’s smallest ocean, the Arctic Region has the potential to
connect nearly 75% of the world’s population—as melting sea ice increases access to
shorter maritime trade routes linking Asia, Europe and North America. Today, 90% of all
trade travels across the world’s oceans – with seaborne trade expected to double over the
next 15 years. Arctic waters will see increasing transits of cargo and natural resources to
global markets along with military activity, regional maritime traffic, tourism, and
legitimate/illegitimate global fishing fleets. The Beaufort, Chukchi, and Bering Seas are
experiencing rapid sea ice loss, enabling greater access to waters off America’s Alaskan
shores. An opening Arctic brings the United States closer to our northern neighbors to
provide mutual assistance in times of need, while also enabling likeminded nations to
defend the homeland, deter aggression and coercion, and protect Sea Lines of
Communication.
The regional challenges facing the United States in the Arctic Region – from the changing
physical environment and greater access to sea routes and resources, to increased military
activity by China and Russia, including attempts to alter Arctic governance – have grown
more complex and more urgent, while the rapid advance of authoritarianism and
revisionists approaches in the maritime environment undermine our ability to collectively
meet them. Peace and prosperity in the Arctic requires enhanced naval presence and
partnerships.
U.S. Naval forces must operate more assertively across the Arctic Region to prevail in day-
to-day competition as we protect the homeland, keep Arctic seas free and open, and deter
coercive behavior and conventional aggression. Our challenge is to apply naval power
through day-to-day competition in a way that protects vital national interests and preserves
regional security without undermining trust and triggering conflict.

Strategy Looks to “ Regain Dominance” in Extreme Cold Conditions,” Arctic Today, March 26, 2021; Christopher
Woody, “ T he US Army Wants to Regain ‘Dominance’ in the Arctic, and It’s Looking All over the World for Help,”
Business Insider, April 27, 2021.
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These challenges create a unique – but limited – window of opportunity to chart a new
course for American naval power in the Arctic Region. A Blue Arctic requires a new
approach by the Navy-Marine Corps team to modernize the future naval force to preserve
our advantage at sea and advance U.S. interests in the region.
To do so, we will build on our long history of presence and partnerships in the Arc tic
Region. Over 150 years ago, USS Jamestown stood our northern watch as the U.S. flag was
raised over Alaska. Since then, our Sailors and submarines were the first to reach the North
Pole, departing from our shores and those of our allies and partners. Our Marines have long
trained and operated in the Arctic. During the Aleutian campaign in World War II, our
naval forces bravely fought alongside our joint and allied partners to repel the enemy’s
attack. It was the proficiency and forward presence of American naval power in the Arctic
Region that helped bring a peaceful end to the Cold War.
This regional blueprint is guided by the objectives articulated in the National Security
Strategy, National Defense Strategy, Department of Defense Arctic Strategy, and
Advantage at Sea: Prevailing in Integrated All-Domain Naval Power; supported by the
U.S. Navy Strategic Outlook for the Arctic and informed by the U.S. Coast Guard’s Arctic
Strategic Outlook. Our naval forces will operate across the full range of military missions
to deter aggression and discourage malign behavior; ensure strategic access and freedom
of the seas; strengthen existing and emerging alliances and partnerships; and defend the
United States from attack.
Naval forces will preserve peace and build confidence among nations through collective
deterrence and security efforts that focus on common threats and mutual interests in a Blue
Arctic. This requires an unprecedented level of critical thinking, planning, integration, and
interoperability among our joint forces and international partners, along with greater
cooperation among U.S. interagency, state, local, and indigenous communities.
In the decades ahead, the Department will maintain enhanced presence, strengthen
cooperative partnerships, and adapt our naval forces for a Blue Arctic. We will work
closely with partners – especially the U.S. Coast Guard, while building new partnerships,
particularly in our Alaskan Arctic and the shores of our northern states. In doing so, we
will provide our Sailors, Marines, and Civilians with the education, training, and equipment
necessary to preserve peace and respond to crises in the region.
The United States will always seek peace in the Arctic. History, however, demonstrates
that peace comes through strength. In this new era, the Navy-Marine Corps team, steadfast
with our joint forces, interagency teammates, allies and partners, will be that strength….
An increasingly accessible and navigable Arctic operating environment will place new
demands on our naval forces. The scope and pace of our competitors’ and adversaries’
ambitions and capabilities in a Blue Arctic requires new ways of applying naval power.
The Arctic Region is a vast maneuver space and this regional blueprint recognizes the
rising importance of enhanced naval presence and partnerships in the region. Flexible,
scalable, and agile naval forces provide an inherent advantage in a Blue Arctic, but it is
necessary to enhance our presence, cooperation, and capabilities. Concurrently, we will
find new ways to integrate and apply naval power with existing forces while investing in
new capabilities that may not be fully realized and integrated into the force for at least a
decade.
We will achieve our enduring national security interests in a Blue Arctic by pursuing these
objectives:
» Maintain Enhanced Presence;
» Strengthen Cooperative Partnerships; and
» Build a More Capable Arctic Naval Force.
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Maintain Enhanced Presence
This regional blueprint underscores the use of naval power to influence actions and events
at sea and ashore. Left uncontested, incremental gains from increased aggression and
malign activities could result in a fait accompli, with long-term strategic benefits for our
competitors. The U.S. Navy currently has routine presence on, under, and above Arctic
waters, and we will continue to train and exercise to maximize this capability. The
Department will maintain an enhanced presence in the Arctic Region by regionally
posturing our forces, conducting exercises and operations, integrating Navy-Marine
Corps-Coast Guard capabilities, and synchronizing our Fleets….
Strengthen Cooperative Partnerships
Mutually beneficial alliances and partnerships, are foundational to this regional blueprint.
Competitors seeking to disrupt the international rules -based order in the Arctic must be
met with a firm commitment of likeminded naval forces and nations to address shared
challenges and uphold regional interests and responsibilities. When we pool resources,
leverage our comparative advantage, and share responsibility for our common defense, our
collective security burden becomes lighter. We will cooperatively identify ways to generate
synergies from each other’s postures and capabilities to confront shared regional threats.
Allied and partner naval forces must jointly assess threats, define roles and missions,
deepen defense industrial cooperation, and develop and exercise new concepts of
operations for the Arctic Region. Equitable burden sharing is necessary and will take time,
but the process of doing so will strengthen our collective capabilities.
We will strengthen existing partnerships and attract new partners to meet shared
challenges, opportunities, and responsibilities in the Arctic. Together we will enhance our
awareness, expand collaborative planning, and improve interoperability. In doing so,
enhanced and predictable cooperative activities enable naval forces to maintain credible
presence and deter malicious activity. Naval forces are stronger when we operate jointly
and together with allies and partners….
Build a More Capable Arctic Naval Force
Following the Cold War, the Navy-Marine Corps capabilities and operational expertise in
the Arctic diminished. Recent efforts to increase our capabilities have improved
operational readiness, which is required regardless of ice conditions and time of year.
Though we routinely patrol on, above, and below Arctic waters, the Department must be
prepared and postured to meet the demands of an increasingly accessible Arctic operating
environment.425

425 Department of the Navy, A Blue Arctic: A Strategic Blueprint for the Arctic, undated, released January 5, 2021, pp.
2-6, 10-11, 14. See also Megan Eckstein, “ New Arctic Strategy Calls for Regular Presence as a Way to Compete With
Russia, China,” USNI News, January 5, 2021; Caitlin M. Kenney, “ New Arctic Strategy Calls for More Navy Activity
in the Region as Competition from Russia, China Increases,” Stars and Stripes, January 5, 2021; Paul McLeary, “ Navy
Secretary: US Plans Patrols Near Russian Arctic Bases,” Breaking Defense, January 5, 2021; Associated Press, “ Navy
Rolls Out New Strategy for Expanding Arctic Operations,” Associated Press, January 11, 2021. For an article
providing one observer’s perspective on the document, see Joshua T allis, “ A New Arctic Strategy for an Emerging
Maritime Domain,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), January 13, 2021; Mia Bennett, “ Breaking
Down the US Navy’s Blueprint for a Blue Arctic,” Maritime Executive, February 5, 2021; Katarzyna Zysk,
“Predictable Unpredictability? U.S. Arctic Strategy and Ways of Doing Business in the Region,” War on the Rocks,
March 11, 2021.
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July 2020 Air Force Strategy for Arctic
On July 21, 2020, the Air Force released an Arctic strategy document.426 The executive summary
of the document states in part:
The Arctic’s increasing strategic importance, coupled with the Services’ significant
regional investment, requires the Department [of the Air Force] to have a unified,
deliberate, and forward-looking approach, ensuring the Air and Space Forces can compete
and defend the nation’s interests in the Arctic region.
Residing at the intersection between the U.S. homeland and two critical theaters, Indo-
Pacific and Europe, the Arctic is an increasingly vital region for U.S. national security
interests. The Arctic’s capacity as a strategic buffer is eroding, making it an avenue of
threat to the homeland, due to advancements by great power competitors. Additionally, it
hosts critical launch points for global power projection and increasingly accessible natural
resources. While the DoD analyzes the immediate prospect of conflict in the Arctic as low,
the confluence of activities in the region by great power competitors with increased
physical access due to receding land ice and sea ice, yields the potential for intensified
regional competition as well as opportunities for cooperative endeavors with allies and
partners.
The Department of the Air Force contributions to U.S. national security in the Arctic are
large, but relatively unknown. Given the Arctic’s vast distances and challenges to surface
operations, air and space capabilities have long been essential to gain rapid access and
provide all-domain awareness, early warning, satellite command and control, and effective
deterrence. Offering a solid foundation on which to build and project power across the
region, the Department of the Air Force is the most active and invested U.S. military
department in the Arctic.
The strategy identifies the Arctic as a region of strategic opportunity for the Air and Space
Forces, Joint Force, allies, and partners.…
The Department approaches the Arctic with four main lines of effort: Vigilance, Power
Projection, Cooperation, and Preparation….
First, through investments in missile warning and defense, as well as command, control,
communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C3ISR), the Air and
Space Forces will defend the homeland by maintaining vigilance.
Second, the Air and Space Forces will utilize unique positioning afforded by bases in
locations like Alaska and Greenland to project combat-credible, all-domain air and space
power. Infrastructure, focused on thermal efficiency and durability, will be combined with
fifth generation aircraft and lethal capabilities to ensure the Air and Space Forces remain
agile and capable in the future.
Third, strong alliances and partnerships in the Arctic are a strategic advantage for the
United States. The strategy outlines ways to enhance cooperation as well as
interoperability, operations, and exercises between the United States and its Arctic
partners. To uphold the international rules -based order in the Arctic, the Air and Space
Forces must leverage the strong defense relationships among Arctic nations and work
closely with regional and joint partners.
Finally, the strategy outlines essential training and preparation for operations within this
unique environment. To meet this challenge, the Department will renew focus on training,

426 Department of the Air Force, Arctic Strategy, Ensuring a Stable Arctic Through Vigilance, Power Projection,
Cooperation, and Preparation, undated, with transmission letter dated July 21, 2020, 14 pp.
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research, and development for Arctic operations, while leveraging the Arctic expertise of
the Total Force.427
April 2019 Coast Guard Arctic Strategic Outlook428
The Coast Guard, like the Navy, has released a series of Arctic-related studies and strategy
documents in recent years. In April 2019, the Coast Guard released an Arctic strategic outlook
document as the successor to its previous 2013 Arctic strategy document. The April 2019
strategic outlook document states
The United States is an Arctic Nation, and the United States Coast Guard has served as the
lead federal agency for homeland security, safety, and environmental stewardship in the
Arctic region for over 150 years. Since Revenue Cutters first sailed to Alaska in 1867 to
establish U.S. sovereignty, the Service’s role has expanded, including representing
American interests as a leader in the international bodies governing navigation, search and
rescue, vessel safety, fisheries enforcement, and pollution response across the entire Arctic.
As the region continues to open and strategic competition drives more actors to look to the
Arctic for economic and geopolitical advantages, the demand for Coast Guard leadership
and presence will continue to grow.
Since the release of the Coast Guard Arctic Strategy in 2013, the resurgence of nation-state
competition has coincided with dramatic changes in the physical environment of the Arctic,
which has elevated the region’s prominence as a strategically competitive space. America’s
two nearest-peer powers, Russia and China, have both declared the region a national
priority and made corresponding investments in capability and capacity to expand their
influence in the region. Russia and China’s persistent challenges to the rules -based
international order around the globe cause concern of similar infringement to the continued
peaceful stability of the Arctic region. As the only U.S. Service that combines both military
and civil authorities, the Coast Guard is uniquely suited to address the interjurisdictional
challenges of today’s strategic environment by modeling acceptable behavior, building
regional capacity, and strengthening organizations that foster transparency and good
governance across the Arctic.
The Arctic’s role in geostrategic competition is growing, in large part because reductions
in permanent sea ice have exposed coastal borders and facilitated increased human and
economic activity. The warming of the Arctic has led to longer and larger windows of
reduced ice conditions. From 2006 to 2018, satellite imagery observed the 12 lowest Arctic
ice extents on record. This has led to greater access through Arctic shipping routes. While

427 Department of the Air Force, Arctic Strategy, Ensuring a Stable Arctic Through Vigilance, Power Pro jection,
Cooperation, and Preparation, undated, with transmission letter dated July 21, 2020, pp. 2 -3. See also C. T odd Lopez,
“Air Force Reveals Cold Facts on New Arctic Strategy,” DOD News, July 21, 2020; Secretary of the Air Force Public
Affairs, “Department of the Air Force introduces Arctic Strategy,” Air Force News Service, July 21, 2020; Barbara
Barrett, Dave Goldfein and John W. Raymond, “ US Air Force, Space Force: Here Is Your New Arctic Strategy ,”
Defense One, July 21, 2020; Sandra Erwin, “ Raymond: Space Force to Play Key Role in Military Operations in the
Arctic,” Space News, July 21, 2020; T heresa Hitchens, “ New Air Force Arctic Strategy May Update Planes For Polar
Ops,” Breaking Defense, July 21, 2020; Valerie Insinna, “ Armed with a New Arctic Strategy, the Air Force Seeks
Increased Connectivity in the Region,” Defense News, July 21, 2020; Oriana Pawlyk, “ T he Air Force Is Gearing Up for
More Action in the Arctic,” Military.com , July 22, 2020; Patrick T ucker, “ Expect More Wargames, Attention & Allies
in the Arctic, Say Air and Space Force Chiefs,” Defense One, July 21, 2020; James Holmes, “ Grading the U.S. Air
Force’s Arctic Strategy,” National Interest, August 2, 2020.
428 In addition to the April 2019 Coast Guard Arctic Strategic Outlook document, the Department of Homeland
Security (the Coast Guard’s parent department in mid-January 2021—that is, in the final days of the T rump
Administration) released an Arctic Strategy Document that mentions the Coast Guard several times: Departm ent of
Hom eland Security, Strategic Approach for Arctic Homeland Security, foreword dated January 11, 2021, 24 pp. See
also Hilde-Gunn Bye, “ T he DHS’ First -Ever Arctic Strategy Emphasizes the Strategic Environment in the Region,”
High North News, January 15, 2021.
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the near-term future of these routes is uncertain, a polar route has the potential to reduce
transit times of traditional shipping routes by up to two weeks. Russia’s establishment of a
Northern Sea Route Administration, along with the use of high ice-class Liquefied Natural
Gas (LNG) tankers built specifically to export natural gas from its Yamal LNG facility,
have contributed significantly to the increase in commercial shipping traffic in the Arctic.
In addition, opportunities for potential resource extraction and expanding Arctic tourism
offer new prospects for some of the Nation’s most isolated communities and broader
benefits to America. However, changing terrain and subsistence food patterns, as wel as
the impacts of increasingly frequent and intense winter storms, continue to challenge the
communities and increase risk in the maritime domain.
The Coast Guard will adhere to the following principles as it manages these risks and seizes
the opportunities created by these changes:
Partnership. The Arctic is an exceptional place that demands collaboration across national
boundaries. The Coast Guard will partner with the Arctic Nations, as well as partners and
allies with Arctic interests, to contribute to keeping the Arctic a conflict-free region. The
Service will continue to dedicate resources to forums, such as the Arctic Council, and to
combined operations and exercises to safeguard and secure the Arctic domain.
The unique and valuable relationship the Coast Guard has established with tribal entities
builds mutual trust and improves mission capacity and readiness. We will continue to
incorporate lessons-learned from engagements with Alaska Native communities, as wel
as industry and other Arctic residents, in the development and implementation of policy
and strategy.
Unity of Effort. The Coast Guard will advance the Nation’s strategic goals and priorities
in the Arctic and exercise leadership across the Arctic community of federal, state, and
local agencies. As a military Service, the Coast Guard will strengthen interoperability with
the Department of Defense and complement the capabilities of the other military services
to support the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy.
A Culture of Continuous Innovation. The Coast Guard cannot meet the challenges of
tomorrow’s Arctic with today’s paradigms. Rapid technological advancements within the
maritime industry, combined with robust investments by strategic competitors, have raised
the stakes. The Service must take this opportunity to leverage transformative technology
and lead the employment of innovative policies to solve complex problems.
While the strategic context has changed, Coast Guard missions in the Arctic are enduring.
The Coast Guard will protect the Nation’s vital interests by upholding the rules-based order
in the maritime domain while cooperating to reduce conflict and risk. We will help
safeguard the Nation’s Arctic communities, environment, and economy. The Service will
pursue these ends through three complementary lines of effort:
Line of Effort 1: Enhance Capability to Operate Effectively in a Dynamic Arctic
In order to prosecute its missions in the Arctic, the Coast Guard must fully understand and
operate freely in this vast and unforgiving environment. Effective capability requires
sufficient heavy icebreaking vessels, reliable high -latitude communications, and
comprehensive Maritime Domain Awareness. In order to respond to crises in the Arctic,
our Nation must also muster adequate personnel, aviation, and logistics resources in the
region. The Coast Guard is the sole provider and operator of the U.S. polar capable fleet
but currently does not have the capability or capacity to assure access in the high latitudes.
Closing the gap requires persistent investment in capabilities and capacity for polar
operations, including the Polar Security Cutter. The Coast Guard will pursue this line of
effort through three sub-objectives.
• Fill Gaps in the Coast Guard’s Arctic Operational Capability and Capacity
• Establish Persistent Awareness and Understanding of the Arctic Domain
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• Close the Critical Communications Gap in the Arctic
Line of Effort 2: Strengthen the Rules -Based Order
Actions by strategic competitors will challenge the long-standing norms that have made
the Arctic an area of peace and low tension. The institutions contributing to a conflict -free
Arctic will face new challenges requiring active and committed American leadership. The
Coast Guard is uniquely positioned to provide this leadership in the maritime domain. The
Coast Guard is dedicated to strengthening institutions–such as the Arctic Council, the
Arctic Coast Guard Forum (ACGF), and the International Maritime Organization (IMO)–
and partnerships which reinforce the rules-based order and foster transparency.
Rules and norms endure when nations demonstrate a commitment to upholding them.
Working closely with allies and partners, the Coast Guard will deter threats to international
maritime norms and America’s national interests by conducting operations and exercises
along the full spectrum of competition. Working in partnership with the Department of
Defense, the Coast Guard will continue to support to the Nation’s defense priorities in the
Arctic. The Coast Guard will work closely with joint and international partners to build
capability and demonstrate resolve in the Arctic.
The Coast Guard will pursue this line of effort through two sub-objectives.
• Strengthen Partnerships and Lead International Forums
• Counter Challenges to the International Rules-Based Order in the Maritime Domain
Line of Effort 3: Innovate and Adapt to Promote Resilience and Prosperity
The tyranny of distance and the harsh Arctic climate pose significant challenges to agencies
charged with providing maritime safety and security to all Americans, including the
hundreds of villages and thousands of seasonal workers in the U.S. Arctic. Search and
rescue, law enforcement, marine safety, waterways management, and other Coast Guard
missions are complicated by the Arctic’s dynamic and remote operating environment. The
Coast Guard will collaborate with stakeholders to develop new practices and technology
to serve the maritime community and manage risk in the region.
As the Nation’s maritime first responder, the Coast Guard will lead and participate in
planning and exercises that include federal, state, tribal, local, international, non-
governmental and industry partners to test preparedness and adaptability. During a crisis
in the Arctic’s maritime domain, the Service will lead an effective, unified response. The
Coast Guard will pursue this line of effort through three sub-objectives.
• Support Regional Resilience and Lead in Crisis Response
• Address Emerging Demands in the Maritime Law Enforcement Mission
• Advance and Modernize the Arctic Marine Transportation System
Conclusion. Increased accessibility and activity will create more demand for Coast Guard
services in the Arctic maritime domain. While long-term trends point to a more consistently
navigable and competitive region, other environmental and economic factors make it
difficult to predict the scope and pace of change. Near-term variability in the physical
environment exposes mariners and communities to unpredictable levels of risk. As the
region attracts increasing attention from both partner and competitor states, America’s
economic and security interests will become even more closely tied to the Arctic. Each
development is significant on its own, but in combination, these trends create a new risk
landscape for the Nation and the Coast Guard. This updated strategic outlook reflects a
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recognition of these realities and outlines the Service’s lines of effort to succeed in the new
Arctic.429

429 Coast Guard, Arctic Strategic Outlook, April 2019, Executive Summary (pp. 4-7). For press reports about the
strategy, see, for example, Ragnhild Grønning, “ Strategic Competition in Focus in US Coast Guard Arctic Strategy,”
High North News, May 2, 2019; Dermot Cole, “ T he Coast Guard’s New Arctic Strategic Vision Downplays a Big
Problem: Budget Constraints,” Arctic Today, April 29, 2019; Kyle Rempfer, “Great Powers on Ice: Coast Guard Drops
Arctic Manifesto,” Military Times, April 25, 2019; Dan Lamothe, “New Coast Guard Strategy for the Arctic Calls for
‘Projecting Sovereignty’ to Contest China and Russia,” Washington Post, April 22, 2019.
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Appendix H. Extended Continental Shelf
Submissions, Territorial Disputes, and Sovereignty
Issues430
This appendix presents background information on extended continental shelf submissions,
territorial disputes, and sovereignty issues.
Extended Continental Shelf Submissions
Motivated in part by a desire to exercise sovereign control over the Arctic region’s increasingly
accessible oil and gas reserves (see “Oil, Gas, and Mineral Exploration”), the four Arctic coastal
states other than the United States—Canada, Russia, Norway, and Denmark (of which Greenland
is a territory)—have filed submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
regarding the outer limits of their extended continental shelves.431 A fifth country, Iceland, though
not an Arctic coastal state, has filed a submission regarding waters in the vicinity of the Arctic
Circle. The submissions are as follows:
 Norway filed a submission regarding the Northeast Atlantic and the Arctic on
November 27, 2006. The Commission adopted its recommendations regarding
this submission on March 27, 2009.
 Denmark filed a submission regarding an area north of the Faroe Islands on April
29, 2009. The Commission adopted its recommendations regarding this
submission on March 11, 2014.
 Iceland filed a submission regarding the Ægir Basin area to the east and northeast
of Iceland, and the western and southern parts of Reykjanes Ridge to southwest
of Iceland, on April 29, 2009. The Commission adopted its recommendations
regarding this submission on March 10, 2016.
 Denmark filed a submission regarding the southern continental shelf of
Greenland on June 14, 2012, a submission regarding the northeastern continental
shelf of Greenland on November 26, 2013, and submission regarding the
northern continental shelf of Greenland on December 15, 2014.
 Russia filed a partial revised submission regarding the Arctic Ocean on August 3,
2015. (Russia’s December 20, 2001, submission regarding the Arctic and Pacific
Oceans was rejected by the Commission as insufficiently documented.)
 Canada filed a submission regarding the Arctic Ocean on May 23, 2019.432

430 T his section was prepared by Carl Ek, who was a Specialist in International Relations, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and
T rade Division, until his retirement on April 30, 2014. It was revised to include the information about the submissions
made to the Commission by Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and T rade
Division. For questions relating to this section, congressional clients may contact Derek E. Mix, Analyst in European
Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and T rade Division.
431 For a discussion of extended continental shelf process, see Cornell Overfield, “An Off-the-Shelf Guide to Extended
Continental Shelves and the Arctic,” Lawfare, April 21, 2021.
432 Source for dates of submissions and Commission actions: United Nations, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law
of the Sea, “ Submissions, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf, pursuant to article 76, paragraph 8, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10
December 1982,” updated April 1, 2021, accessed April 8, 2021, at https://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/
commission_submissions.htm.
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An April 4, 2021, press report stated:
Russia has formally enlarged its claim to the seabed in the Arctic Ocean all the way to
Canada’s and Greenland’s exclusive economic zones. The claim is enlarged by two
extensions that were filed on Wednesday, stretching from points near the North Pole to
Greenland’s and Canada’s exclusive economic zones.
Noticeably, Russia has not extended its claim into waters north of Alaska that are known
to be part of the U.S. sphere of interests, even though Russian vessels appear to have
collected data about the seabed in these waters in 2020.
Philip Steinberg, professor of political geography and director of the Centre for Border
Research at the University of Durham in the U.K., estimated on Saturday that Russia is
enlarging its claim by approximately 705,000 square kilometers.
The Russian claim now covers some 70 percent of the seabed in the central p arts of the
Arctic Ocean outside the EEZs of the Arctic coastal states, Steinberg explained.
The Russian enlargement will significantly increase the overlap between Russia’s claim to
the Arctic seabed and the claims filed by Canada and the Kingdom of Denmark.
Those three claims already overlap at the North Pole. The Russian claim now overlaps with
the Danish claim with approximately 800,000 square kilometers, up from some 600,000
square kilometers, according to one expert in Denmark, speaking on condition of
anonymity because the estimate is unofficial.
Russia filed its enlargement to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
in New York in the form of two so-called addenda. According to the rules of the UN
Convention of the Law of the Sea, the enlargement described by the two documents wil
be dealt with as part of Russia’s existing claim and is not expected to delay the process….
According to the publicly available summary of the two documents, the enlargement is
based on new data collected after 2015. Most recently, between August and October last
year, a Russian nuclear icebreaker 50 Let Pobedy broke sea ice between the North Pole
and Greenland and Canada, including at points only about 60 nautical miles from
Greenland’s EEZ.…
The icebreaker cleared tracks for the Akademik Fedorov, a research vessel with a
multibeam echosounder embedded in the hull. This vessel has previously been used by
Russia to collect data about the seabed in the Arctic Ocean….
Most experts expect the process to continue peacefully, as the states involved seem
determined to follow the rules of the UN. The two Russian documents are written in strict
accordance with established procedures and no comments from either Ottawa, Copenhagen
or Nuuk have been forthcoming since Wednesday [March 31]….
When I spoke to various experts in January, before the expanded claimed was filed, most
suggested that such an expansion didn’t run the risk of inflaming tensions between Russia
and other Arctic states, so long as the process continued to play out under UNCLOS
rules….
According to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea the claims, formally known as
submissions, can be extended if new data becomes available.433
In support of its submissions to the Commission, Russia has been charting the Arctic Ocean’s
enormous underwater Lomonosov Ridge, which runs across the middle of the Arctic Ocean,

433 Martin Breum, “ Russia Extends Its Claim to the Arctic Ocean Seabed,” Arctic Today, April 4, 2021. See also Emma
T ranter, “‘You Cannot Claim Any More:’ Russia Seeks Bigger Piece of Arctic,” CBC News, April 12, 2021. See also
Martin Breum, “ Russia Considers Extended Claim to the Arctic Seabed,” High North News, February 1 (updated
February 8), 2021.
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somewhat like the seam of a basebal , from a location north of Russia’s New Siberian Islands to a
location north of Greenland’s northern coast, passing about midpoint almost directly through the
North Pole. Russia is attempting to show that this ridge is connected to Russia’s known extended
continental shelf. A determination that the ridge is part of Russia’s extended continental shelf
could create an extension of Russia’s extended continental shelf running across the central part of
the Arctic Ocean to an area north of Greenland. Canada views a portion of the ridge as part of its
own continental shelf,434 and Denmark’s December 15, 2014, submission regarding the northern
continental shelf of Greenland may include part of the ridge.435
In August 2007, a Russian submersible on a research expedition deposited an encased Russian
Federation flag on the seabed of the presumed site of the North Pole. The action captured
worldwide attention, but analysts noted that it did not constitute an official claim to the Arctic
seabed or the waters above it, that it has no legal effect, and that it therefore was a purely
symbolic act.
At a May 2008 meeting in Ilulissat, Greenland, the five Arctic coastal states reaffirmed their
commitment to the UNCLOS legal framework for the establishment of extended continental shelf
limits in the Arctic.436 (For further discussion, see “Extent of the Continental Margin” in “Oil,
Gas, and Mineral Exploration.”)
Territorial Disputes and Sovereignty Issues
Aside from the extended continental shelf process, there are four unresolved Arctic territorial
disputes:
 Canada maintains that the part of the Northwest Passage that runs through the
Canadian archipelago is an inland waterway, and therefore sovereign Canadian
territory subject to Ottawa’s surveil ance, regulation, and control. The United
States, the European Union, and others maintain that these waters constitute an
international strait between two high seas.
 The United States and Canada have differing positions regarding their mutual
maritime boundary in the Beaufort Sea part of the Arctic Ocean, north of the land
border separating Alaska from Canada.437
 In June 1990, the United States and Soviet Union (now Russia) signed an
agreement—the U.S./USSR Maritime Boundary Agreement—regarding the
delimitation of the U.S.-Soviet (now U.S.-Russian) maritime boundary in the
Bering Sea. The U.S. Senate consented to the ratification of the pact on
December 16, 1991.438 The Russian Duma has yet to approve the accord. The
United States and Russia are applying the treaty on a provisional basis, pending
its ratification by Russia.439

434 “Russia, Canada Make Competing Claims T o Arctic Resources,” The Canadian Press, September 16, 2010.
435 See, for example, Martha Henriques, “T he Rush to Claim An Undersea Mountain Range,” BBC News, July 22,
2020.
436 “5 Countries Agree T o T alk, Not Compete, Over the Arctic,” New York Times, May 29, 2008.
437 For additional (but unofficial and unverified) information on this issue, see the section entitled “Border Dispute” in
“Beaufort Sea,” Wikipedia, accessed April 8, 2021, at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beaufort_Sea.
438 T reaty Document 101-22, see https://www.congress.gov/treaty-document/101st-congress/22.
439 T he State Department states:
No negotiations regarding the U.S.-Russia maritime boundary have occurred since 1990, when the
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 Denmark and Canada in 2018 agreed to begin working to resolve a disagreement
between the two countries over the status of Hans Island, a tiny, barren piece of
rock between Greenland and Canada’s El esmere Island.440

U.S.-USSR Maritime Boundary Agreement was signed. T he negotiations that led to that agreement
did not address the status of Wrangel Island, Herald Island, Bennett Island, Jeannette Island, or
Henrietta Island, all of which lie off Russia’s Arctic coast, or Mednyy (Copper) Island or rocks off
the coast of Mednyy Island in the Bering Sea. None of the islands or rocks above were included in
the U.S. purchase of Alaska from Russia in 1867, and they have never been claimed by the United
States, although Americans were involved in the discovery and exploration of some of them.
T he U.S.-USSR Maritime Boundary Agreement, signed by the United States and the Soviet Union
on June 1, 1990, defines our maritime boundary in the Arctic Ocean, Bering Sea, and northern
Pacific Ocean. T he U.S.-USSR Maritime Boundary Agreement is a treaty that requires ratification
by both parties before it formally enters into force. T he treaty was made public at the time of its
signing. In a separate exchange of diplomatic notes, the two countries agreed to apply the
agreement provisionally. T he United States Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification of the
U.S.-USSR Maritime Boundary Agreement on September 16, 1991.
T he Russian Federation informed the United States Government by diplomatic note dated January
13, 1992, that it “continues to perform the rights and fulfill the obligations flowing from the
international agreements” signed by the Soviet Union. T he United States and the Russian
Federation, which is considered to be the sole successor state to the treaty rights and obligations of
the former Soviet Union for the purposes of the U.S.-USSR Maritime Boundary Agreement, are
applying the treaty on a provisional basis, pending its ratification by the Russian Federation.
T he United States regularly holds discussions with Russia on Bering Sea issues, but these
discussions do not affect the placement of the U.S.-Russia boundary or the jurisdiction over any
territory or the sovereignty of any territory. The U.S. has no intention of reopening discussion of
the 1990 Maritime Boundary T reaty.
(U.S. Department of State, Archives, “ Status of Wrangel and Other Arctic Islands,” Fact Sheet,
Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, May 20, 2003, accessed April 8, 2021, at https://2001-
2009.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/20922.htm.)
440 A May 24, 2018, press report states:
A long-standing dispute over what is essentially a large rock between Nunavut and Greenland may
soon find its end after representatives from Denmark and Canada announced on Wednesday [May
23, 2018] that they would begin looking into ways to resolve their out standing border issues in the
Arctic.
T he status of T artupaluk Island (known as Hans Island in English and Hans Ø in Danish) has been
unresolved since 1973, when Danish and Greenlandic officials drew up the 1,670 -mile (2,685-
kilometer) maritime border Greenland and Umingmak Nuna (Ellesmere Island).
While determining the location of most of the border was a simple matter of identifying a center
line, agreeing to the status of T artupaluk has proved more difficult, given its position in middle of
the Kennedy Channel, part of a system of waterways linking Baffin Bay to the Arctic Ocean.
T hat has led both countries to steadfastly lay claim to the 320 -acre (1.3-square kilometer) bean-
shaped island.
Although most exchanges over T artupaluk are in keeping with the fr iendly relations between
Canada and Denmark—including occasional tit -for-tat visits beginning in the 1980s that are most
memorable for involving cabinet members from both countries leaving bottles of alcohol for each
other—when it comes to seeking a solution to the dispute, there has been little room for
compromise.
T he announcement of the renewed efforts to resolve the status of T artupaluk, which was likely first
used by the Inuit as hunting grounds and as a landmark when navigating, comes after the two
countries agreed in 2005 to base a resolution on the island’s status on geological surveys and, if
necessary, by asking the International Court of Justice to resolve the claims.
It also comes after Danish and Canadian academics, in 2016, called for the islan d to be shared
equally between the two countries, with the border drawn down the middle, connecting the borders
that exist on either end.
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In addition to these disputes, Norway and Russia had been at odds for decades over the boundary
between the two in the so-cal ed “Grey Zone” in the Barents Sea, an area believed to hold rich
undersea deposits of petroleum. On September 15, 2010, Norwegian Prime Minister Jens
Stoltenberg and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed an agreement in Murmansk, a
Russian city near the Norwegian border. The accord awards roughly half of the 175,000-square-
kilometer area to each country; it spel s out fishing rights, and provides for the joint development
of future oil and gas finds that straddle the boundary line. Some observers believe it is noteworthy
that Russia would concede sovereignty over such a large, resource-rich area to a smal ,
neighboring country. But others have noted that Moscow may be hoping for Norwegian
cooperation in developing offshore resources, and eventual y in winning approval when Russia
makes its Article 76 UNCLOS submission.441
In August 2010, Canadian Foreign Minister Lawrence Cannon announced a new “Statement of
Canada’s Arctic Policy,” which reaffirmed the government’s commitment to Canada’s
sovereignty in the region, to economic and social development, to environmental protection, and
to empowerment of the peoples in the north. The statement also emphasized the government’s
intention to negotiate settlements to its disputes with the United States over the Beaufort Sea
boundary, and with Denmark over Hans Island. Minister Cannon declared that “making progress
on outstanding boundary issues wil be a top priority.”442 Also, despite their dispute over Hans
Island, Canada and Denmark have been working together on Arctic issues. In May 2010, the two
countries’ military chiefs of staffs signed a memorandum of understanding on Arctic Defense,
Security, and Operational Cooperation, committing the two countries to “enhanced consultation,
information exchange, visits, and exercises.”443

In addition to the status of T artupaluk, the Danish -Canadian task-force on boundary issues
established on Wednesday will seek to resolve a disagreement over the maritime border between
the two countries in the Lincoln Sea, as well as overlapping their overlapping continental-shelf
claims in the Labrador Sea.
(Kevin McGwin, “ Denmark, Canada Agree to Settle Hans Island Dispute,” Arctic Today, May 24,
2018.)
For earlier press reports, see Dan Levin, “ Canada and Denmark Fight Over Island With Whisky and
Schnapps,” New York Tim es, November 7, 2016; and Jeremy Bender, “ 2 Countries Have Been Fighting Over
An Uninhabited Island by Leaving Each Other Bottles of Alcohol for Over 3 Decades,” Business Insider,
January 10,l 2016.
441 “Russia, Norway Sign Deal On Barents Sea Border, Seek More Development in Mineral-rich Arctic,” Associated
Press, September 15, 2010.
442 Cannon quoted in “Canada Seeks T o Settle Arctic Borders,” Agence France Presse, August 20, 2010. For additional
information concerning Canada’s August statement on Arctic policy, see “Statement on Canada’ s Arctic foreign policy:
Exercising sovereignty and promoting Canada’s Northern Strategy abroad,” Foreign Affairs and International T rade
Canada website, http://www.international.gc.ca/polar-polaire/canada_arctic_foreign_policy-
la_politique_etrangere_du_canada_pour_arctique.aspx?lang=eng.
443 “Canada and Denmark Sign Arctic Cooperation Arrangement,” Targeted News Service, May 17, 2010.
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Author Information

Ronald O'Rourke, Coordinator
Jane A. Leggett
Specialist in Naval Affairs
Specialist in Energy and Environmental Policy

Laura B. Comay
Jonathan L. Ramseur
Analyst in Natural Resources
Specialist in Environmental Policy

Peter Folger
Pervaze A. Sheikh
Specialist in Energy and Natural Resources Policy
Specialist in Natural Resources Policy

John Frittelli
Harold F. Upton
Specialist in Transportation Policy
Analyst in Natural Resources Policy

Marc Humphries

Specialist in Energy Policy

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