Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations
July 15, 2021
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is a key U.S. partner in the Middle East, and the two
countries have cooperated on a number of regional and international issues. Jordan
Jeremy M. Sharp
remains at peace with Israel and is a key interlocutor with the Palestinians. Jordan’s
Specialist in Middle
strategic importance to the United States is evident given ongoing instability in
Eastern Affairs
neighboring Syria and Iraq. Jordan also is a longtime U.S. partner in global

counterterrorism operations. U.S.-Jordanian military, intel igence, and diplomatic

cooperation seeks to empower political moderates, reduce sectarian conflict, and
eliminate terrorist threats.
U.S. officials frequently express their support for Jordan. U.S. support has helped Jordan address serious
vulnerabilities, both internal and external. Jordan’s smal size and lack of major economic resources have made it
dependent on aid from Western and various Arab sources. The Biden Administration has acknowledged Jordan’s
role as a key U.S. partner in promoting Middle East peace, as many U.S. policymakers advocate for continued
robust U.S. assistance to the kingdom.
Annual U.S. aid to Jordan has nearly quadrupled in historical terms over the last 15 years. The United States has
provided economic and military aid to Jordan since 1951 and 1957, respectively. Total bilateral U.S. aid (overseen
by the Departments of State and Defense) to Jordan through FY2018 amounted to approximately $22 bil ion.
Jordan also hosts nearly 3,000 U.S. troops. On June 18, 2021, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) announced
that several missile defense assets would be withdrawn from the Central Command (CENTCOM) region.
Presumably, that may include the Patriot Missile Battery that has been stationed at Jordan’s Shaheed Muwaffaq
al-Salti Air Base since the height of the Syrian Civil War.
To date, the impact of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) on Jordan has been significant in terms of human
and economic costs. As of early July 2021, Jordan has had over 750,000 cases and nearly 10,000 deaths according
to the World Health Organization. Real GDP contracted by -1.5% in 2020 and is expected to grow by only 1% in
2021. Losses in government revenue caused by fewer remittances and a weakened market for tourism are
expected to widen the budget deficit in the years ahead. As of July 12, 2021, just over 26% of Jordanians had
received at least one dose of a COVID-19 vaccine.
The President’s FY2022 budget request includes $1.275 bil ion for Jordan, which is in line with the current five-
year U.S.-Jordanian Memorandum of Understanding on Assistance. FY2022 marks the final year of the MOU,
and the Administration is expected to negotiate a new deal with the Jordanian government over the upcoming
months.
Congress may consider legislation pertaining to U.S. relations with Jordan. In the 117th Congress, the draft House
Foreign Operations appropriations bil would provide “not less than” $1.65 bil ion for assistance to Jordan,
including not less than $845.1 mil ion for budget support for the Government of Jordan, $425 mil ion in military
aid, and $1.2 bil ion in economic assistance. The act also includes authority for loan guarantees for Jordan and
authorizes Foreign Military Financing (FMF) direct loans for Jordan, not to exceed $4 bil ion. The draft House
Defense Appropriations bil would provide “not less than” $150 mil ion for border security in Jordan. S.Res. 154
and H.Res. 305 would congratulate the people of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on the centennial of the
founding of the Jordanian state.

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Overview
In the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (hereinafter referred to as “Jordan”), economic hardship
exacerbated by the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic is further straining the
political system. In recent months, the reign of 59-year-old monarch King Abdullah II bin Al
Hussein (hereinafter King Abdullah II), has been chal enged both from within the royal family
and by tribal elites that have formed the bedrock of the kingdom since its establishment a century
ago (see below). While as of July 2021 there is no imminent crisis endangering King Abdullah’s
rule, public infighting from within the royal family, periodic protests from economical y
disaffected Jordanians, and a recent resumption in Israeli-Palestinian violence may be cause for
concern among some U.S. policymakers.1 The United States considers Jordan a key partner in
promoting Middle East peace, countering terrorism, and promoting interfaith cooperation in a
volatile region. No other country in the world receives as much direct U.S. economic budgetary
aid on an annual basis as Jordan.
Before the pandemic, Jordan had already faced numerous systemic and regional chal enges not
entirely of its own making. Demographical y, the population has doubled since King Abdullah II
ascended the throne in 1999.2 Since 2011, Syrian refugees (666,000 registered with the United
Nations as of mid-2021) have resided in Jordan, where the kingdom and international aid
agencies have provided them with basic services. Water availability is approaching crisis levels;
according to the World Resources Institute, Jordan ranks as the fifth most water-stressed country
in the world.3 Economical y, Jordan has endured a decade of stagnation, in which per capita
incomes have declined and social unrest among young, educated workers has grown.4
International y, Jordan also finds itself more isolated. Its relationship with Israel has been
repeatedly characterized as strained throughout Benjamin Netanyahu’s recent 12 consecutive
years as prime minister (see below). Bilateral trade with the neighboring war-torn countries of
Syria and Iraq has declined, as the threat of infiltration from Islamic State terrorists has forced the
Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) to strengthen their border security. Jordan’s relationships with
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates also have been more distant. The kingdom broke
ranks with the Saudi and Emirati blockade of Qatar (2017-2021) by reestablishing diplomatic
relations in 2019. Final y, while Jordan did not publicly reject President Trump’s 2020 Middle
East peace plan, it quietly opposed it; Jordanian officials also may feel isolated by the Abraham
Accords for encouraging Israeli-Arab normalization without regard to a final settlement with the
Palestinians.5
One policy dilemma for the Biden Administration is how to strengthen Jordan in a regional
environment in which Israel and the Palestinians just endured another round of violence; the
Administration itself has not committed to restarting direct negotiations between Israel and the

1 According to the readout of a recent call between Vice President Kamala Harris and King Abdullah II, “ T he Vice
President and the King also discussed the economic challenges that Jordan faces, which have been exacerbated by the
COVID-19 pandemic, and the Vice President highlighted the importance of impactful, high -quality economic reforms.”
See White House, Readout of Vice President Harris Call with King Abdullah II of Jordan, May 20, 2021.
2 For demographic estimates, see T he United Nations, 2019 Revision of World Population Prospects.
3 Hannah Dormido, “T hese Countries are the Most at Risk from a Water Crisis,” Bloomberg, August 6, 2019.
4 See United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Jordan, Economic Development, available at
https://www.usaid.gov/jordan/economic-growth-and-trade.
5 Nicolai Due-Gundersen, “How the Israel-UAE Deal Could Leave Jordan Out in the Cold,” Middle East Eye,
September 2, 2020.
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Palestinians. With Israeli-Arab tensions stil lingering over East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip, the
Administration could rely on Jordan to play a more active diplomatic role in the months ahead.
COVID-19 and the Economic Crisis in Jordan
To date, the impact of COVID-19 on Jordan has been significant in terms of the human and
economic costs. As of early July 2021, Jordan has had over 750,000 cases and nearly 10,000
deaths, peaking in March 2021, according to the World Health Organization.6 In late May 2021,
the Jordanian government announced plans to return to normal activity as the kingdom recovers
from the COVID-19 pandemic. Currently, the kingdom is in the second phase of reopening,
which includes shortened curfew hours and measures to stimulate the tourism sector. By
September, al curfew restrictions wil be lifted, and schools wil resume lessons in classrooms.
As of July 12, 2021, just over 26% of Jordanians had received at least one dose of a COVID-19
vaccine.
Jordan’s fiscal situation is extremely difficult. Real GDP contracted by -1.5% in 2020 and is
expected to grow by only 1% in 2021. The official unemployment rate is close to 25%, but
probably much higher amongst youth and particularly women (see textbox below).7 In November
2020, Minister of Finance Mohamad al-Ississ projected a $2.89 bil ion annual budget deficit, with
public debt forecast to be 117% of GDP. Of the government’s FY2021 budget of $11.1 bil ion,
65% wil be al ocated for salaries and pensions, including for retired military personnel.8
In May 2021, the World Bank approved additional financing of more than $1.1 bil ion for Jordan
to cope with the pandemic. In July, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) made available
another $206 mil ion in lending to Jordan, bringing total IMF disbursements to Jordan since the
start of 2020 to $900 mil ion.9 According to the IMF, “successive COVID-19 waves and the sharp
decline in tourism have taken a significant human and economic toll, with unemployment
reaching record high levels, and the recovery delayed.”10
Country Background
Jordan is arguably one of the closest U.S. Arab partners in the Middle East. The kingdom depends
on its strong relations with global powers and its standing in the international community, where
it has played an outsized role in leading international organizations.11 Jordan’s smal size and lack
of major economic resources have made it dependent on aid from Western and various Arab
sources. U.S. support, in particular, has helped Jordan deal with serious vulnerabilities, both
internal and external. Jordan’s geographic position—wedged between Israel, Syria, Iraq, and
Saudi Arabia—has made it vulnerable to the strategic designs of its powerful neighbors but has

6 Available online at https://covid19.who.int/region/emro/country/jo.
7 “Data Reveal Soaring Unemployment in Jordan in 2020,” Economist Intelligence Unit, July 2, 2021.
8 Osama Al Sharif, “Jordan’s 2021 Budget is a Harbinger of Worse T hings to Come,” Al Monitor, December 7, 2020.
9 International Monetary Fund, IMF Executive Board Concludes Second Review Under Jordan’s Extended
Arrangement and Request for Augmentation of Access to Address the Impact of COVID-19, July 1, 2021.
10 Op. cit.
11 For example, Prince Zeid Ra'ad Zeid Al Hussein, a member of the Hashemite dynasty (from the branch of the royal
family that had ruled Iraq), served as the former United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights from 2014 to
2018.
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also given Jordan an important role as a buffer between these countries in their largely adversarial
relations with one another.
Jordan, created by colonial powers after World War I, initial y consisted of desert or semidesert
territory east of the Jordan River, inhabited largely by people of Bedouin tribal background, the
original “East Bank” Jordanians.12 The establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 brought large
numbers of Palestinian refugees to Jordan, which subsequently unilateral y annexed a Palestinian
enclave west of the Jordan River known as the West Bank.13 The “East Bank” Jordanians, though
probably no longer a majority in Jordan, remain predominant in the country’s political and
military establishments and form the bedrock of support for the Jordanian monarchy. Jordanians
of Palestinian origin make up an estimated 55% to 70% of the population. They tend to gravitate
toward employment in the private sector, most likely due to their al eged general exclusion from
certain public-sector and military positions.14
Figure 1. Jordan at a Glance

Area: 89,342 sq. km. (34,495 sq. mi., slightly smal er than Indiana).
Population: 10,458,413 (July 2018); Amman (capital): 4.008 mil ion (2015).
Ethnic Groups: Arabs 97%; other 2.6% (includes Armenians, Circassians) (2015).
Religion: Sunni Muslim 97.2%; Christian 2.2%; Buddhist 0.4%; Hindu 0.1%.
Percent of Population Under Age 25: 54% (2018).

12 For historical background, see Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, Country Profile: Jordan, September
2006.
13 T hough there was little international recognition of Jordan’s annexation of the West Bank, Jordan maintained control
of it (including East Jerusalem) until Israel took military control of it during the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War, and
maintained its claim to it until relinquishing the claim to the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1988.
14 Speculation over the ratio of East Bankers to Palestinians (those who arrived as refugees and immigrants since 1948)
in Jordanian society is a sensitive domestic issue. Jordan last conducted a national census in 2015, and it is unclear
whether or not the government maintains such national-origin statistics. Over time, intermarriage has made it more
difficult to discern distinct differences between the two communities, though divisions do persist.
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Literacy: 95.4% (2015).
Youth Unemployment (ages 15-24): 40.1% (2019).
Source: Graphic created by CRS; facts from CIA World Factbook and World Bank.
The Hashemite Royal Family
Jordan is a hereditary constitutional monarchy under the prestigious Hashemite family, which
claims descent from the Prophet Muhammad. King Abdullah II (age 59) has ruled the country
since 1999, when he succeeded to the throne upon the death of his father, the late King Hussein,
who had ruled for 47 years. Educated largely in Britain and the United States, King Abdullah II
had earlier pursued a military career, ultimately serving as commander of Jordan’s Special
Operations Forces with the rank of major general. The king’s son, Prince Hussein bin Abdullah
(born in 1994), is the designated crown prince.15
The king appoints a prime minister to head the government and the Council of Ministers
(cabinet). On average, Jordanian governments last no more than 15 months before they are
dissolved by royal decree. The king also appoints al judges and is commander of the armed
forces.
Dispute Within the Royal Family
In early April 2021, Jordan was thrown into disarray after reports surfaced of a plot to overthrow
King Abdullah II. On April 3, 2021, Jordanian authorities detained 41-year-old Prince Hamzah
bin Hussein, the king’s half-brother and former crown prince, and accused him of conspiring
against the throne. In his defense, Prince Hamzah released two videotaped statements (one in
English and the other in Arabic) filmed on the day of his arrest denying any participation in a
conspiracy, while criticizing the country’s ruling system for its corruption, nepotism, and lack of
reform. The Jordanian government then claimed that Prince Hamzah had collaborated with
former Chief of the Royal Court Bassem Awadal ah and unnamed “foreign entities” to destabilize
the kingdom.16 Awadal ah, who was an advisor to Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman,
was arrested along with 17 other prominent Jordanians on April 3.17 On April 4, Prince Hamzah
escalated his confrontation with the government, vowing to disobey orders to remain silent.
On April 5, King Abdullah II entrusted his uncle, Prince Hassan bin Abdullah, to serve as
mediator between the Royal Court and Prince Hamzah, who subsequently signed a letter that
same day pledging support for the king. A day later, a new audio recording surfaced, in which the
Jordanian Military’s Chief of Staff, General Yousef Huneiti, told Prince Hamzah that he had been
detained for meeting with government critics, who “started talking more than they should.”
Weeks earlier, Prince Hamzah had attended several tribal meetings where grievances against the

15 In July 2009, King Abdullah II named his son, Prince Hussein (then 15 years old), as crown prince. T he position had
been vacant since 2004, when King Abdullah II removed the title from his half -brother, Prince Hamzah. Crown Prince
al Hussein bin Abdullah II, now 27, is a graduate of Georgetown University and the Royal Military Academy
Sandhurst (UK). He holds the rank of second lieutenant in the Jordan Armed Forces.
16 Jassar al T ahat and Richard Spencer, “Family Feud and Jealousy behind Split in Arab Royal Family Loved by the
West,” The Times (UK), April 14, 2021.
17 On April 5, the Washington Post reported that during a surprise Saudi delegation visit to Amman led by Foreign
Minister Faisal bin Farhan, the Saudi government requested the release of Bassem Awadallah. Shira Rubin, Sarah
Dadouch, and Joby Warrick, “Jordan’s Prince Hamzeh, under House Arrest after Alleged Coup Attempt, Appears to
Affirm Loyalty to the King,” Washington Post, April 5, 2021. Originally born in east Jerusalem, Bassem Awadallah
was a former minister of international cooperation and planning and finance. He also served as h ead of the King’s royal
court. He later worked for Arab Bank and served on the board of a banking group in Bahrain.
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king and his government had been expressed. He also had met with relatives of victims of an
oxygen outage at a coronavirus ward in a Jordanian hospital, an incident that had brought
widespread public condemnation of the government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic.18
Prince Hamzah: Anti-Corruption Champion or Disgruntled Prince?
Prince Hamzah, who is 41 years old, is one of King Abdul ah’s half-brothers. He is the oldest son of Queen Noor,
the late King Hussein’s fourth wife. In 1999, when King Hussein named Abdul ah crown prince just a few weeks
before his death, he asked that Abdul ah appoint Hamzah as his crown prince. Prince Hamzah served in this role
until King Abdul ah II rescinded it in 2004. Five years later, King Abdul ah II appointed his own son, Hussein, as
crown prince. According to one account, the decision to strip the title of crown prince devastated Hamzah, who
had been considered “a favorite of King Hussein’s, a more polished orator with a more academic mind than King
Abdul ah II, and had been groomed as a teenager for the throne. Suddenly he [Hamzah] was ejected from the
circle of influence, and cast around for a new role.”19 In 2013, King Abdul ah II rejected Prince Hamzah’s proposal
to consolidate the kingdom’s intel igence agencies into one and make the prince intel igence chief.20
Lacking a prominent role in government, in recent years, Prince Hamzah cultivated close ties to the various heads
of Jordan’s elite tribal families, the core constituency of the Jordanian state. Some of these families had become
disil usioned with Jordan’s unspoken social compact, in which the state provides wel -paying jobs in the civil
service, military, and state-owned enterprises to “East Bank” Jordanians (see above) in return for their continued
loyalty. According to one account, “Hamzah, with a physical likeness to his father, has since grown into a
romanticized figure by tribal Jordanians pining for the ‘golden years’ of Hussein’s patriarchal reign, when the state
was the main provider and employer, life was affordable, and inequality minimal.”21
As discontent simmered within certain East Bank political circles and youth tribal protest movements, Prince
Hamzah received attention for publicly speaking out against government corruption.22 As previously mentioned,
Prince Hamzah’s March 2021 visit to a hospital where nine Jordanians infected with COVID-19 died from a lack of
oxygen—a visit that occurred just hours after King Abdul ah II met with the bereaved families and days before the
crown prince visited—had been perceived by the king as a major slight to the crown prince.23
On April 11, King Abdullah II and Prince Hamzah appeared side-by-side at a public ceremony
marking the kingdom’s independence centennial. A day later, Jordanian Prime Minister Bisher al
Khasawneh told a closed session of parliament that Prince Hamzah would not stand trial for
sedition and that there had been no attempt to overthrow the king, only one to destabilize the
country. On April 14, the government announced that the other prominent Jordanians who were
arrested wil stand trial for sedition before Jordan’s State Security Court.24
Since then, 16 of the original 18 individuals who were arrested in April have been released;
Awadal ah (who holds U.S., Saudi, and Jordanian citizenship) and Sharif Hassan bin Zaid al
Nasser (a distant member of the royal family with business ties to Saudi Arabia) stood trial for
sedition. The trial, though it was closed to the public, became a major source of speculation inside
Jordan, which some analysts warned may be further dividing society between those who support

18 Patrick Kingsley, Rana F. Sweis and Eric Schmitt , “Royal Rivalry Bares Social T ensions Behind Jordan’s Stable
Veneer,” New York Tim es, April 10, 2021.
19 Ibid.
20 Mehul Srivastava and Andrew England, “Inside Jordan’s Royal Crisis: Why the Prince T urned to T ribal Leaders for
Support ,” Financial Tim es, April 18, 2021.
21 T aylor Luck, “It Doesn’t Happen Here: Why ‘coup plot’ in Jordan sent Shock Waves,” Christian Science Monitor,
April 5, 2021.
22 “Leading Jordanian Royal blasts Kingdom’s Corruption Problem,” The New Arab, September 26, 2018.
23 Suleiman Al-Khalidi, “T he Sudden Visit to COVID Victims’ Families that Sparked Jordan’s Royal Rift,” Reuters,
April 8, 2021.
24 T he State Security Court has jurisdiction over the crimes of treason and espionage. George Sadek, “Jordan: Former
Crown Prince and Others Accused of Destabilizing State Security to Be Referred to State Security Court,” Global
Legal Monitor, Law Library, Library of Congress, April 12, 2021.
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the king and those who are sympathetic to Prince Hamzah.25 Both defendants pleaded not guilty.
On July 12, the court pronounced them guilty and sentenced Awadal ah and Sharif Hassan to 15
years in prison; a higher court has 30 days to confirm or overturn the verdict. Awadal ah’s
attorney in the United States, Michael J. Sullivan, issued a statement after the verdict claiming
that his client had been mistreated while in custody.26
Political System and Key Institutions
The Jordanian constitution, most recently amended in 2016, gives the king broad executive
powers. The king appoints the prime minister and may dismiss him or accept his resignation. He
also has the sole power to appoint the crown prince, senior military leaders, justices of the
constitutional court, and al 75 members of the senate, as wel as cabinet ministers. The
constitution enables the king to dissolve both houses of parliament and postpone lower house
elections for two years.27 The king can circumvent parliament through a constitutional mechanism
that al ows the cabinet to issue provisional legislation when parliament is not sitting or has been
dissolved.28 The king also must approve laws before they can take effect, although a two-thirds
majority of both houses of parliament can modify legislation. The king also can issue royal
decrees, which are not subject to parliamentary scrutiny. The king commands the armed forces,
declares war, and ratifies treaties. Final y, Article 195 of the Jordanian Penal Code prohibits
insulting the dignity of the king (lèse-majesté), with criminal penalties of one to three years in
prison.
Jordan’s constitution provides for an independent judiciary. According to Article 97, “Judges are
independent, and in the exercise of their judicial functions they are subject to no authority other
than that of the law.” Jordan has three main types of courts: civil courts, special courts (some of
which are military/state security courts), and religious courts. State security courts administered
by military (and civilian) judges handle criminal cases involving espionage, bribery of public
officials, trafficking in narcotics or weapons, black marketeering, and “security offenses.”29
Religious courts for both Muslims and Christians adjudicate matters of personal status, including
marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance.30 The king may appoint and dismiss judges by
decree, though in practice a palace-appointed Higher Judicial Council manages court
appointments, promotions, transfers, and retirements.
King Abdullah II in 2013 laid out a vision of Jordan’s gradual transition from a constitutional
monarchy into a full-fledged parliamentary democracy,31 but in reality, successive Jordanian

25 T aylor Luck, “In Jordan, Coup T rial Shakes Public Confidence in Royal Family,” Christian Science Monitor, June
23, 2021.
26 Karin Laub and Omar Akour, “In Jordan Sedition T rial, U.S. Defendant Alleges T orture,” Associated Press, July 11,
2021.
27 T he king also may declare martial law. According to Article 125, “ In the event of an emergency of such a serious
nature that action under the preceding Article of the present Constitution will be considered insufficient for the defense
of the Kingdom, the King may by a Royal Decree, based on a decision of the Council of Ministers, declare martial law
in the whole or any part of the Kingdom.”
28 New amendments to Article 94 in 2011 have put some restrictions on when the executive is allowed to issue
temporary laws.
29 See U.S. Embassy in Jordan, Jordanian Legal System, available at https://jo.usembassy.gov/u-s-citizen-services/
local-resources-of-u-s-citizens/attorneys/jordanian-legal-system/.
30 In sharia courts, the testimony of one man equals that of two women, with exceptions in certain cases. U.S.
Department of State, 2020 Country reports on Hum an Rights Practices: Jordan , March 30, 2021.
31 See “Making Our Democratic System Work for All Jordanians,” Abdullah II ibn Al Hussein, January 16, 2013.
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parliaments have mostly complied with the policies laid out by the Royal Court. The legislative
branch’s independence has been curtailed not only by a legal system that rests authority largely in
the hands of the monarch, but also by electoral laws designed to produce pro-palace majorities
with each new election.32 Due to frequent gerrymandering in which electoral districts arguably are
drawn to favor more rural pro-government constituencies over densely populated urban areas,
parliamentary elections have produced large pro-government majorities dominated by
representatives of prominent tribal families.33 In addition, voter turnout tends to be much higher
in pro-government areas since many East Bank Jordanians depend on family/tribal connections as
a means to access patronage jobs.34
Gender Equality in Jordan
Jordan has consistently ranked among the bottom performers of the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender
Gap index (138 of 153 countries in 2020). Some have pointed to “traditional attitudes, discriminatory legislation, a
lack of access to public transportation and pay disparities” as barriers to women’s advancement in Jordan.35
Despite cal s from women and activists during the Arab Spring, amendments to the country’s constitution in 2011
did not include a provision for gender equality. Women’s involvement in the labor force and in politics is limited,
though female educational attainment in the country is high.
Effects of COVID-19. Before the pandemic, Jordan had the lowest rate of female labor force participation
among MENA countries not experiencing conflict (14.4% compared to the global average of 48%), and some
worry that the pandemic wil have further negative effects on women’s employment in Jordan.36 The pandemic has
increased the already substantial amount of unpaid work for women in Jordan, where “women spend 17.1 times
more time than men on unpaid work (vs. a global average of 3.2), while men spend 6.5 more time on paid work
than women (vs. a global average of 1.8).”37 As in other MENA countries, domestic violence reports have
increased during the pandemic: a recent Arab Barometer survey found the perceived increase of gender-based
violence in Jordan to be 27%.38
U.S. Assistance. Jordan has received funding through the USAID-administered Women’s Global Development
and Prosperity (W-GDP) Fund, launched in 2019, specifical y to support government efforts to amend the
country’s labor code to prohibit gender discrimination.39 The Biden Administration has requested $24 mil ion in
FY2022 for gender programs in Jordan, and its ESF funding request aims to “support the adoption of positive
social norms for gender equality and positive youth engagement and strengthen regulatory and institutional
frameworks to mitigate barriers to increase economic and political participation.”40

32 “How Jordan’s Election Revealed Enduring Weaknesses in Its Political System,” Washington Post, October 3, 2016.
33 Rachel Bessette, “Jordan’s Parliamentary Elections: Why T hey Do (and Don’t) Matter for the Kingdom’s Future,”
Lawfare, September 29, 2016.
34 Sean L. Yom, “T ribal Politics in Contemporary Jordan: T he Case of the Hirak Movement,” Middle East Journal,
Vol. 68, No. 2 (Spring 2014), pp. 229 -247.
35 Rana F. Sweis, “Women, 86 Percent Absent From Jordan’s Work Force, Are Left Behind,” New York Times, April 3,
2021.
36 CRS Report R46423, Women in the Middle East and North Africa: Issues for Congress, by Zoe Danon and Sarah R.
Collins; Valentine M. Moghadam, “ COVID-19 and Female Labor in the MENA Region ,” Middle East Institute, June 8,
2021.
37 U.N. Women, “ COVID-19 and Women’s Economic Empowerment: Policy Recommendations for Strengthening
Jordan’s Recovery,” September 1, 2020.
38 Aseel Alayli, “COVID-19 Magnifies Pre-Existing Gender Inequalities in MENA,” Arab Barometer, December 1,
2020.
39 U.S. Department of State, Women’s Global Development and Prosperity Annual Report 2020 -2021, January 2021.
40 U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Rela ted
Program s, FY2022, Appendix 2, June 2021, p. 249.
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2020 Parliamentary Elections
In November 2020, amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, the kingdom held parliamentary elections
for the 130-seat House of Deputies (lower chamber) without permitting either early or remote
voting. Due to the pandemic, the government curtailed campaign events, which usual y feature
festive public gatherings in smal towns and rural areas.41 Overal turnout (official y 30%) was
slightly lower than usual and noticeably lower in urban areas. Out of the 1,700 candidates (368 of
whom were women) who ran, no female candidate won a seat in any of the competitive races
under the open list proportional representation system.42 Jordan’s electoral system does reserve 15
parliamentary seats for women under its quota system.
Unlike in neighboring Egypt, the kingdom tolerates Muslim Brotherhood political activity, and
Brotherhood candidates sometimes compete in parliamentary elections. (The Brotherhood also
has boycotted previous elections in protest.) The Brotherhood is currently divided between
Islamists who are wil ing to participate in the political system and those who reject it. In 2020,
Brotherhood candidates ran together on a list cal ed the National Al iance Reform and won 10
seats (down from 16 in 2016 election), though of those 10, only 6 belonged to actual Islamist-
leaning candidates.43
Jordan, Israel, and the Palestinians
The Jordanian government has long described efforts to secure a lasting end to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict as one of its highest priorities. In 1994, Jordan and Israel signed a peace
treaty.44 Nearly 27 years after the signing of the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty, the persistence of
Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues to be a major chal enge for Jordan, as the issue of
Palestinian rights resonates with much of the population, and the conflict has soured attempts to
improve Jordanian-Israeli people-to-people relations.
With the recent formation of a new coalition government in Israel, Jordan and Israel may be
looking to turn the page in their bilateral relationship after an era of strained ties between the
King and former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.45 Over the past decade, there have
been numerous irritants and incidents both between the two leaders and in broader diplomatic

41 T aylor Luck, “Pandemic Politics? In Jordan, it has Leveled the Playing Field,” Christian Science Monitor, November
2, 2020.
42 According to one analysis of Jordan’s electoral system, “ Candidates must enter into joint electoral lists with a
minimum of three candidates on the ballot. Voters then select a list and their preferred candidates within this list. T he
2016 elections showed that this system makes it difficult for any single list to win more than one seat per district. Since
only the top candidate is likely to win, list members have incentives to discourage their voters from supporting their li st
allies.” See, Kristen Kao and E.J. Karmel, “ T he Pandemic Compromised Jordan’s Parliamentary Elections,”
Washington Post, November 20, 2020.
43 Suha Ma’ayeh and Rana F. Sweis, “Jordan’s 2020 Parliamentary Election: Settling for the Status Quo,” Konrad
Adenauer Stiftung, February 2021.
44 Jordan and Israel signed the peace treaty on October 26, 1994. Later, the two countries exchanged ambassadors,
Israel returned approximately 131 square miles of territory near the Rift Valley to Jordan, the parliament repealed laws
banning contacts with Israel, and the two countries signed a number of bilateral agreements between 1994 and 1996 to
normalize economic and cultural links. Water sharing, a recurring problem, was partially resolved in May 1997 when
the two countries reached an interim arrangement under which Israel began pumping 72,000 cubic meters of water
from Lake T iberias (the Sea of Galilee) to Jordan per day (equivalent to 26.3 million cubic meters per year —a little
over half the target amount envisioned in an annex to the peace treaty). See Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs statement on Water Agreement with Jordan, May 27, 1997.
45 “Lapid Vows to Rebuild International T ies after ‘Reckless’ Last Government,” The Times of Israel, June 14, 2021.
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ties.46 The Biden Administration has attempted to heal the rift by encouraging smal steps toward
improved relations. In spring 2021, Israel approved a Jordanian request for additional water
supplies. Israel had initial y denied this request in retaliation over a dispute with Jordan centered
around a royal visit to holy sites in Jerusalem; however, after some intervention by the U.S. State
Department, Israel acceded to the request, which it had customarily approved in previous years.47
Jordan played several different roles during spring 2021 clashes in and around Jerusalem and the
May 2021 conflict in Gaza. On the one hand, Jordan has tried to portray itself as a defender of
Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem and a supporter of the Palestinian national cause. After a violent
standoff between Israeli police and Palestinian protestors who had encamped at the Al Aqsa
Mosque compound on the Temple Mount, the Jordanian government issued an official statement
saying, “What the Israeli police and special forces are doing, from violations against the mosque
to attacks on worshippers, is barbaric (behavior) that is rejected and condemned.”48 Days later,
after further hostilities erupted between Israel and Palestinian terrorist groups in Gaza, Jordan
attempted to play a supportive role in joining Egypt, France, the United States, and others in
cal ing for a cease-fire.49 During the outbreak of violence, U.S. and Jordanian officials spoke and
agreed on the “urgency of de-escalation and the importance of preserving the historic status quo
at the holy sites in Jerusalem as wel as Jordan’s role there.”50
Holy Sites in Jerusalem51
Per arrangements with Israel dating back to 1967 (when the Israeli military seized East Jerusalem—including its
Old City—from Jordan) and then subsequently confirmed in the 1994 Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty, Israel
acknowledges a continuing role for Jordan vis-à-vis Jerusalem’s historic Muslim shrines.52 A Jordanian waqf (or
Islamic custodial trust) has long administered the Temple Mount (known by Muslims as the Haram al Sharif or
Noble Sanctuary) and its holy sites, and this role is key to bolstering the religious legitimacy of the Jordanian royal
family’s rule.53 Jordanian monarchs trace their lineage to the Prophet Muhammad. Disputes over Jerusalem that
appear to circumscribe King Abdul ah II’s role as guardian of the Islamic holy sites create a domestic political
problem for the King. Jewish worship on the Mount/Haram is prohibited under a long-standing “status quo”
arrangement that dates back to the era of Ottoman control before World War I.

46 David Schenker and Ghaith al-Omari, “Getting the Israel-Jordan Relationship back on T rack,” Policy Alert, T he
Washington Institut e for Near East Policy, March 12, 2021.
47 Barak Ravid, “Israel Agrees to Send More Water to Jordan after Push from Biden,” Axios, April 12, 2021.
48 “Jordan Warns Israel against ‘Barbaric’ Attacks on Mosque,” Reuters, May 9, 2021.
49 “France’s Macron Says to Work with Jordan, Egypt Leaders on Israel-Gaza Ceasefire,” Reuters, May 17, 2021.
50 U.S. Department of State, Secretary Blinken’s Meeting with Jordanian Foreign Minister Safadi, May 10, 2021.
51 For more information on Jerusalem and its holy sites, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S.
Relations, by Jim Zanotti.
52 Article 9, Clause 2, of the peace treaty says that “Israel respects the present special role of the Hashemite Kingdom
of Jordan in Muslim Holy shrines in Jerusalem. When negotiations on the permanent status will take place, Israel will
give high priority to the Jordanian historic role in these shrines.” In 2013, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
reaffirmed in a bilateral agreement with Jordan that the King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan will continue to
serve as the “ Custodian of the Holy Sites in Jerusalem,” a title that successive Jordanian monarchs have used since
1924 (see footnote below).
53 After the Ottoman conquest of the Mamluk Sultanate in 1517, the Muslim holy cities of Mecca and Medina, which
had long been under the custodianship of the Hashemite family, became nominally part of the Ottoman Empire.
Ottoman leaders also assumed the title of “ Caliph,” or leader of the Muslim world. In practice, successive Ottoman
Caliphs recognized the role of the Hashemite family in sharing custodianship over Mecca and Medina. T his dual
arrangement lasted until 1924, when the Ottoman Caliphate was abolished by the nascent republic of T urkey. Hussei n
bin Ali, then Sharif of Mecca and head of the Hashemite family, declared himself Caliph over all Muslims, but his
claim was not universally recognized, and the Hashemites soon lost control over Mecca and Medina to Ibn Saud,
founder of modern Saudi Arabia. However, in 1924 Arab religious authorities (the Grand Muftī of Jerusalem and
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Water Scarcity and the Israeli-Jordanian-Palestinian Water Deal
Jordan is a water-poor nation and, according to the World Resources Institute, is one of the top-
five most water-stressed countries in the world.54 Jordan’s increase in water scarcity over the past
75 years is attributable to population growth, a decrease in the flow of the Yarmouk River due to
the building of dams upstream in Syria, gradual declines in rainfal , and depleting groundwater
resources due to overuse.55 The il egal construction of thousands of private wel s also has led to
unsustainable groundwater extraction. The large influx of Syrian refugees has heightened water
demand in the north. A Stanford University study predicts that dwindling water supplies and
continued population growth wil , without intervention, halve per capita water use in Jordan by
the end of this century. 56
As of July 2021, Jordan is experiencing a severe drought. During the last rainy season (October
2020-April 2021), the kingdom received 60% of normal rainfal .57 In the spring of 2021, water
authorities announced that the state would reduce water availability hours for specific regions of
the country during the summer. An infestation of desert locusts also has plagued Jordan this
spring, leading to significant crop losses in certain regions.58
To secure new sources of fresh water, Jordan has pursued cooperative water projects with its
neighbors. In 2013, Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority signed a regional water
agreement (official y known as the Memorandum of Understanding on the Red-Dead Sea
Conveyance Project) to pave the way for the Red-Dead Canal, a multibil ion-dollar project to
address declining water levels in the Dead Sea and provide desalinated water to the parties to the
agreement.59 Congress had supported the Red-Dead Sea Conveyance Project. P.L. 114-113, the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, specified that $100 mil ion in Economic Support Funds
(ESF) was to be set aside for water sector support for Jordan, to support the Red Sea-Dead Sea
water project. However, after several years of delays, financing concerns, and Israeli uncertainty
owing both to environmentalist objections and lack of a functioning government, Jordan decided

Supreme Muslim Council) in British-controlled mandatory Palestine, did recognize Hussein bin Ali’s custodianship
over holy sites in Jerusalem, which is considered the third holiest city in Islam after Mecca and Medina. Reflecting
military and political ties developed between the United Kingdom and the Hashemites during World War 1, Hussein’s
son Abdullah ruled Jordan after its creation (as T ransjordan under British mandatory con trol) in the 1920s under the
post -Ottoman settlement of World War I. When Abdullah became Jordan’s first king (Abdullah I) in 1946, the West
Bank remained under the British Mandate for Palestine. During Abdullah’s kingship, Jordan invaded the West Bank
and gained control of East Jerusalem and its holy sites in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. King Abdullah I was assassinated
in 1951 on the Mount/Haram (during a visit to the Al Aqsa Mosque for Friday prayers) by a Palestinian supposedly
concerned about possible Jordan-Israel peace talks. For background, see Victor Kattan, “ T he Special Role of the
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in the Muslim Holy Shrines in Jerusalem,” Arab Law Quarterly, July 13, 2020.
54 Rutger Willem Hofste, Paul Reig and Leah Schleifer, “17 Countries, Home to One-Quarter of the World’s
Population, Face Extremely High Water Stress,” World Resources Institute, August 6, 2019.
55 Deepthi Rajsekhar and Steven M. Gorelick, “Increasing drought in Jordan: Climate Change and Cascading Syrian
Land-Use Impacts on Reducing T ransboundary Flow,” Science Advances, August 30, 2017: vol. 3, no. 8.
56 Josie Garthwaite, “Stanford Study Reveals a Deepening Water Crisis in Jordan – and a Way Forward,” Stanford
University News, March 29, 2021.
57 “Jordan Facing ‘One of the most Severe’ Droughts in its History,” Al Jazeera, May 6, 2021.
58 Jack Kennedy, “Jordan’s Drought and Locust Infestation expected to Increase Unrest, but Protests unlikely to
Remove Prime Minister, Jane’s Country Risk Daily Report, May 27, 2021.
59 On February 26, 2015, Israel and Jordan signed a bilateral agreement (“Seas Canal” Agreement) on the
implementation of the Red-Dead Sea Conveyance Project, specifically on the construction of a desalination plant north
of Aqaba that would supply water to the Aravah region in Israel and to Aqaba in Jordan.
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in the summer of 2021 to cancel the project and wil instead build its own desalination plant along
the Red Sea.60
Syria
Jordanian-Syrian relations have been strained since 2011. King Abdullah II was the first Arab
leader to openly cal for Syrian President Bashar al Asad’s resignation in November 2011, and
Jordan supported moderate Syrian rebel groups operating in southwestern Syria until the Asad
government largely defeated these groups in 2018.61 Since the Asad regime reclaimed control of
southern Syria (with the help of Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah), Jordan has sought to return to
normal bilateral ties. Along the kingdom’s northern border with Syria, many Jordanian residents
share familial ties with Syrian families. While Jordan and Syria opened the Nasib/Jaber border
crossing to facilitate greater bilateral trade, economic relations have not returned to pre-2011
levels, arguably because of trade barriers, sanctions, and security impediments.62
Syria remains a primary problem for Jordan’s security. The kingdom shares security concerns
with Israel over the presence of Iranian and Hezbollah forces operating near Jordan’s borders.
According to one account, “Former Free Syrian Army rebels who have returned to their
hometowns in southern Syria after an amnesty agreement with the regime say Hezbollah is
effectively ‘governing’ several towns and vil ages. Hezbollah and Shiite militias patrol areas
dressed as uniformed Syrian regime forces in order to avoid being hit by Israeli airstrikes, they
say, or, more frequently, deploy former rebel fighters to patrol areas and provide intel igence
directly to the Iran-backed paramilitary group.”63
The kingdom also continues to host hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees, many of whom are
reluctant to return to their homes for fear of Syrian regime retribution against them.64 As of June
2021, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that there are
668,332 registered Syrian refugees in Jordan. Since 2011, the influx of Syrian refugees has placed
tremendous strain on Jordan’s government and local economies, especial y in the northern
governorates of Mafraq, Irbid, Ar Ramtha, and Zarqa.
Due to the Syrian civil war and the continued presence of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq,
Jordan has had to more carefully monitor its borders and its citizens, some of whom may have
joined terrorist groups abroad. According to the State Department, “There were many Jordanian
nationals among FTFs [foreign terrorist fighters] in Iraq and Syria, and the threat of domestic
radicalization, especial y online, remains. Returning FTFs are an ongoing concern for Jordan’s
security services.”65 Congress has contributed funding to Jordan’s border security efforts in recent
defense appropriations legislation (see below).

60 “After Years of Delays, Jordan Said to Nix Red Sea-Dead Sea Canal with Israel, PA,” The Times of Israel, June 17,
2021.
61 Steven Simon and James Fromson, “Jordan’s Pragmatism in Syria, How It Became a Reliable Partner to
Washington,” Foreign Affairs, June 22, 2016.
62 Nabih Bulos, “Sanctions on Syria Also Felt By U.S. Allies,” Los Angeles Times, September 13, 2019.
63 T aylor Luck, “What Russian Deal? Israel and Jordan Cast Wary Eye T oward Syria,” Christian Science Monitor,
August 12, 2019.
64 “T rapped in Jordan, Syrian Refugees See No Way Home,” Associated Press, September 11, 2019.
65 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2019: Jordan, June 24, 2020.
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U.S. Relations
U.S. officials frequently express their support for Jordan, citing its role in promoting Middle East
peace, upholding U.S. policy toward Syria, and having a moderating influence in the Arab world,
both in its regional outlook and internal politics.66 Many U.S. policymakers advocate for
continued robust U.S. assistance to the kingdom. Annual aid to Jordan has nearly quadrupled in
historical terms over the past 15 years (see below). According to the U.S. State Department, the
United States and Jordan have a 1996 Status of Forces Agreement, a 2006 Acquisition and Cross-
Servicing Agreement, and a 2021 Defense Cooperation Agreement.67
Jordan also hosts U.S. troops. According to President Biden’s June 2021 War Powers Resolution
Report to Congress, “At the request of the Government of Jordan, approximately 2,976 United
States military personnel are deployed to Jordan to support Defeat-ISIS operations, enhance
Jordan’s security, and promote regional stability.”68 In summer 2021, the U.S. Department of
Defense announced that equipment and materiel previously stored at a now-closed U.S. base in
Qatar would be moved to Jordan.69
The Case of Ahlam al Tamimi
Ahlam al Tamimi is a Jordanian national who participated in the 2001 suicide bombing of a
Jerusalem pizza restaurant that kil ed 15 people, including two Americans. In Israel, she had been
sentenced to life in prison but was released and returned to Jordan in 2011 as part of a prisoner
exchange deal between Israel and Hamas. The U.S. Justice Department filed criminal charges
against Al Tamimi in 2013, and those charges were unsealed in early 2017. Al Tamimi is on the
Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Most Wanted Terrorist List.70 The United States and Jordan
have an extradition treaty, which, according to the U.S. State Department, entered into force on
July 29, 1995.71 The United States requested Al Tamimi’s extradition in 2017, but Jordan’s Court
of Cassation ruled that the extradition treaty was invalid. In November 2019, the State
Department, said that “the United States regards the extradition treaty as valid.”
According to one recent report, one reason why the U.S. and Israeli governments have not applied
further pressure on the government of Jordan to extradite Tamimi is concern for the stability of
Jordan.72 One unnamed U.S. State Department official noted that “while [King] Abdullah has no
love for Tamimi, giving her up to America would put the king in a very difficult position with his
own people.”73

66 U.S. Embassy in Jordan, Secretary of State Blinken’s Meeting with His Majesty King Abdullah II, May 26, 2021.
67 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Security Cooperation With Jordan, Fact Sheet, May 21, 2021.
68 T he White House, Office of the Press Secretary, T ext of a Letter from the President to the Spe aker of the House of
Representatives and the President Pro T empore of the Senate Regarding the War Powers Report , June 8, 2021.
69 J.P. Lawrence, “US Military Shifts Army Basing from Qatar to Jordan in Move that Could Provide Leverage against
Iran,” Stars and Stripes, July 1, 2021.
70 https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/wanted_terrorists/ahlam-ahmad-al-tamimi/@@download.pdf.
T he kingdom’s courts have ruled that Al T amimi cannot be extradited until such a treaty is endorsed by the Jordanian
parliament.
72 Yonah Jeremy Bob, “Justice Ignored,” Jerusalem Post, April 30, 2021.
73 Op. cit.
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U.S. Foreign Assistance to Jordan
The United States has provided economic and military aid to Jordan since 1951 and 1957,
respectively. Total bilateral U.S. aid (overseen by the Departments of State and Defense) to
Jordan through FY2018 amounted to approximately $22 bil ion. Jordan also has received over 1
bil ion dollars in additional military aid since FY2014, channeled through the Defense
Department’s various security assistance accounts. Currently, Jordan is the third-largest recipient
of annual U.S. foreign aid global y, after Afghanistan and Israel.
Table 1. Bilateral Aid to Jordan
current U.S. dol ars in mil ions
FY2017
FY2018
FY2019
FY2020
FY2021
FY2022

actual
actual
actual
actual
enacted
request
DA
—
—
—
—
85.00
—
ESF
832.35
1,082.40
1,082.40
1,082.40
1,122.40
910.80
FMF
470.00
425.00
425.00
425.00
425.00
350.00
IMET
3.88
4.01
3.99
4.00
4.00
3.80
NADR
13.60
13.60
13.60
13.60
13.60
10.40
Total
1,319.83
1,525.01
1,524.99
1,525.00
1,650.00
1,275.00
Source: Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Congressional Budget Justifications
(FY2019-FY2022), P.L. 116-260, and CRS calculations and rounding.
Notes: Prior-year funds not included in this table: $125 mil ion in ESF in FY2020 (P.L. 116-93 ); $50 mil ion in
Relief and Recovery Fund (RRF) aid in FY2019 (P.L. 116-6).
U.S.-Jordanian Agreement on Foreign Assistance
On February 14, 2018, the United States and Jordan signed a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) on U.S. foreign assistance to Jordan. The MOU, the third such agreement between the
United and Jordan, commits the United States to providing $1.275 bil ion per year in bilateral
foreign assistance over a five-year period for a total of $6.375 bil ion (FY2018-FY2022). This
latest MOU represents a 27% increase in the U.S. commitment to Jordan above the previous
iteration and is the first five-year MOU with the kingdom. The previous two MOU agreements
had each been in effect for three years.
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Figure 2. State Department and USAID Assistance to Jordan, FY2011-FY2021
Executive branch requests vs. actual al ocations in mil ions of current dol ars

Source: Created by CRS using data from annual State Department Congressional Budget Justifications,
legislation, and explanatory statements.
Notes: Economic aid from the fol owing accounts: Economic Support Fund (ESF), and Food for Peace Act, Title
II (P.L.480). Military aid from the fol owing accounts: Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military
Education and Training (IMET), International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE), and
Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR).
Economic Assistance
The United States provides economic aid to Jordan for (1) budgetary support (cash transfer), (2)
USAID programs in Jordan, and (3) loan guarantees. The cash transfer portion of U.S. economic
assistance to Jordan is the largest amount of budget support given to any U.S. foreign aid
recipient worldwide.74 U.S. cash assistance is provided to help the kingdom with foreign debt
payments, Syrian refugee support, and fuel import costs. (Jordan is almost entirely reliant on
imports for its domestic energy needs.) According to USAID, ESF cash transfer funds are
deposited in a single tranche into a U.S.-domiciled interest-bearing account and are not
commingled with other funds.75

74 Other budget support aid recipients include the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Palau.
75 USAID Congressional Notification, May 15, 2020.
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Figure 3. U.S. Cash Transfers to Jordan
Obligated funds since 2011 in mil ions of dol ars

Source: Created by CRS with data from USAID Foreign Aid Explorer.
USAID programs in Jordan focus on a variety of sectors, including democracy assistance, water
conservation, decentralization, health, and education (particularly building and renovating public
schools).
 In the democracy sector, U.S. assistance has supported capacity-building
programs for the parliament’s support offices, the Jordanian Judicial Council, the
Jordan Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission, and the Ministry of Justice.
The International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute also
have received U.S. grants to train, among other groups, the Jordanian
Independent Election Commission (IEC),76 Jordanian political parties, and
members of parliament.
 In the water sector, the bulk of U.S. economic assistance is devoted to
optimizing the management of scarce water resources. USAID helps improve the
capacity of the Ministry of Water and Irrigation, as wel as local water utilities,
such as Miyahuna, Aqaba Water Company, the Yarmouk Water Companies, the
Water Authority of Jordan, and the Jordan Val ey Authority.
 In the area of decentralization, Chemonics International is USAID’s primary
U.S. partner in implementing the Cities Implementing Transparent, Innovative,
and Effective Solutions (CITIES) project, which aims to improve how Jordanian
municipalities deliver core services.77 USAID also uses ESF to fund

76 USAID also has provided grant assistance to the IEC to improve the transparency of elections administration.
77 Chemonics International, Strengthening Municipal Governance in Jordan, at https://chemonics.com/projects/
strengthening-municipal-governance-jordan/.
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infrastructure development in Jordanian municipalities in order to help create
jobs for Syrian refugees and Jordanians.
 In the health sector, USAID grants support the Jordanian Ministry of Health in
responding to the COVID-19 pandemic. In addition, in conjunction with
implementing partners, such as Family Health International (FHI), Management
Systems International (MSI), and Abt Associates, USAID provides funding to
delivery improved reproductive, maternal, neonatal, and child health services.78
 In the education sector, USAID has supported the Jordan Compact Education
Fund, a multidonor funding mechanism that has enabled 134,121 Syrian children
to enroll in Jordanian schools.79
U.S. Sovereign Loan Guarantees (or LGs) al ow recipient governments (in this case, Jordan) to
issue debt securities that are fully guaranteed by the United States government in capital
markets,80 effectively subsidizing the cost for governments of accessing financing. Since 2013,
Congress has authorized81 LGs for Jordan and appropriated $413 mil ion in ESF (the “subsidy
cost”) to support three separate tranches, enabling Jordan to borrow a total of $3.75 bil ion at
concessional lending rates.82
Humanitarian Assistance for
Figure 4.U.S., Jordan Sign Aid Agreement
Syrian Refugees in Jordan
($340 mil ion assistance agreement signed May 2020)
The U.S. State Department estimates that,
since large-scale U.S. aid to Syrian refugees
began in FY2012, it has al ocated more than
$1.8 bil ion in humanitarian assistance from
global accounts for programs in Jordan to
meet the needs of Syrian refugees and,
indirectly, to ease the burden on Jordan.83
U.S. humanitarian assistance is provided both
as cash assistance to refugees and through
programs to meet their basic needs, such as

child health care, education, water, and
Source: U.S. Embassy Amman.
sanitation. To help prevent the spread of COVID-19 in Jordan, the United States has provided
$8.4 mil ion in aid, most of which is targeted toward Syrian refugees living in Jordan.84

78 USAID, Congressional Notification #59, FY2020 – Country Narrative, December 3, 2020.
79 Op. cit., Country Reports on T errorism 2019.
80 “A Helping Hand,” International Financial Law Review, April 2014.
81 Congress initially authorized additional economic assistance to Jordan in Section 7041 of P.L. 112-74, the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012. P.L. 113-6, the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act,
2013, specified that such assistance should take the form of a loan guarantee. Section 1706(j) of the same act also
appropriated $30 million (from FY2011) for the initial cost of sovereign loan guarantees. Congress reauthorized loan
guarantees for Jordan in Section 7034 in each of the past seven consolidated appropriations acts (FY2015 -FY2021).
82 For the latest Loan Guarantee Agreement between the United States and Jordan, see T reaties and other International
Acts Series 15-624, Loan Guarantee Agreement between the United States o f America and Jordan, Signed at Amman
May 31, 2015.
83 CRS Correspondence with the U.S. State Department, June 2021.
84 USAID, “ State Department: Update: T he United States Continues to Lead the Global Response to COVID-19,”
available at https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/coronavirus/fact-sheets/may-29-2020-update-united-states-
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Military Assistance
U.S.-Jordanian military cooperation is a key component in bilateral relations. U.S. military
assistance is primarily directed toward enabling the Jordanian military to procure and maintain
U.S.-origin conventional weapons systems.85 According to the State Department, Jordan receives
one of the largest al ocations of International Military Education and Training (IMET) funding
worldwide, and IMET graduates in Jordan include “King Abdullah II, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the Vice Chairman, the Air Force commander, the Special Forces commander, and
numerous other commanders.”86
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and DOD Security Assistance
FMF overseen by the State Department is designed to support the Jordanian armed forces’
multiyear (usual y five-year) procurement plans, while DOD-administered security assistance
supports ad hoc defense systems to respond to immediate threats and other contingencies. FMF
may be used to purchase new equipment (e.g., precision-guided munitions, night vision) or to
sustain previous acquisitions (e.g., Blackhawk helicopters, AT-802 fixed-wing aircraft). FMF
grants have enabled the Royal Jordanian Air Force to procure munitions for its F-16 fighter
aircraft and a fleet of 31 UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters.87
Figure 5. U.S.-Supplied Black Hawk Helicopters for Jordan

Source: Jane’s Defence Weekly.
As a result of the Syrian civil war and U.S. Operation Inherent Resolve against the Islamic State,
the United States has increased military aid to Jordan and channeled these increases through
DOD-managed accounts. Although Jordan stil receives the bulk of U.S. military aid through the
FMF account, Congress has authorized defense appropriations to strengthen Jordan’s border
security. U.S. assistance has helped finance the creation of the Jordan Border Security System, an

continues-lead-global-response-covid-19.
85 According to Jane’s Defence Procurement Budgets, Jordan’s 2020 defense budget is $2.07 billion. See Jane’s
Defence Budgets, Jordan, February 2, 2021.
86 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Jordan,” Fact Sheet, October 26, 2018.
87 Gareth Jennings, “US Contracts Black Hawk for Jordan’s Royal Squadron,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, October 21,
2020.
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integrated network of guard towers, surveil ance cameras, and radar to guard the kingdom’s
borders with Syria and Iraq.88 Since FY2015, total DOD security cooperation funding for Jordan
has amounted to $1.5 bil ion dollars.89
Excess Defense Articles
In 1996, the United States granted Jordan Major Non-NATO Al y (MNNA) status, a designation
that, among other things, makes Jordan eligible to receive excess U.S. defense articles, training,
and loans of equipment for cooperative research and development.90 In the past decade, the
United States has provided $83 mil ion (current $ value) in excess U.S. defense articles to Jordan,
including three AH-1 Cobra Helicopters, 45 Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles
(MRAPs), and M577A3 Tracked Command Post Carriers.91
Table 2. U.S. Foreign Aid Obligations to Jordan: 1946-2018
(in mil ions of current dol ars)
Total Economic Assistance
Total Military Assistance
Total
$13,846.400
$8,252.900
$22,099.300
Source: USAID Overseas Loans and Grants, July 1, 1945-September 30, 2018.

Author Information

Jeremy M. Sharp

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should n ot be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
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copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

88 Jeremy Binnie, “Jordan Planning Border Security Upgrade,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, April 17, 2019.
89 DOD congressional notifications to Congress.
90 See Designation of Jordan As Major Non-NAT O Ally, Determination of President of the United States, No. 97 -4,
November 12, 1996, 61 F.R. 59809.
91 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, EDA DataBase T ool, accessed July 2021.
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