Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons
Updated July 15, 2021
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
RL32572

Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons

Summary
Recent debates about U.S. nuclear weapons have questioned what role weapons with shorter
ranges and lower yields can play in addressing emerging threats in Europe and Asia. These
weapons, often referred to as nonstrategic nuclear weapons, have not been limited by past U.S.-
Russian arms control agreements. Some analysts argue such limits would be of value, particularly
in addressing Russia’s greater numbers of these types of weapons. Others have argued that the
United States should expand its deployments of these weapons, in both Europe and Asia, to
address new risks of war conducted under a nuclear shadow. The Trump Administration
addressed these questions in the Nuclear Posture Review released in February 2018, and
determined that the United States should acquire two new types of nuclear weapons: a new low-
yield warhead for submarine-launched bal istic missiles and a new sea-launched cruise missile.
The Biden Administration may reconsider these weapons when it conducts its Nuclear Posture
Review in the latter half of 2021.
During the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union both deployed nonstrategic nuclear
weapons for use in the field during a conflict. While there are several ways to distinguish between
strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons, most analysts consider nonstrategic weapons to be
shorter-range delivery systems with lower-yield warheads that might attack troops or facilities on
the battlefield. They have included nuclear mines; artil ery; short-, medium-, and long-range
bal istic missiles; cruise missiles; and gravity bombs. In contrast with the longer-range “strategic”
nuclear weapons, these weapons had a lower profile in policy debates and arms control
negotiations, possibly because they did not pose a direct threat to the continental United States. At
the end of the 1980s, each nation stil had thousands of these weapons deployed with their troops
in the field, aboard naval vessels, and on aircraft.
In 1991, the United States and Soviet Union both withdrew from deployment most and eliminated
from their arsenals many of their nonstrategic nuclear weapons. The United States now has,
according to unclassified estimates, approximately 230 nonstrategic nuclear weapons, with
around 100 deployed with aircraft in Europe and the remaining stored in the United States.
Estimates vary, but experts believe Russia stil has between 1,000 and 2,000 warheads for
nonstrategic nuclear weapons in its arsenal. Some experts argue, however that Russia seems to
have increased its reliance on nuclear weapons in its national security concept.
Analysts have identified a number of issues with the continued deployment of U.S. and Russian
nonstrategic nuclear weapons. In the past, these have included questions about the safety and
security of Russia’s weapons and the possibility that some might be lost, stolen, or used without
authorization. Analysts have also questioned the role of these weapons in U.S. and Russian
security policy; the role they play in NATO policy and whether there is a continuing need for the
United States to deploy them at bases overseas; possible implications of the disparity in numbers
between U.S. and Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons; and the relationship between
nonstrategic nuclear weapons and U.S. nonproliferation policy.
Some argue that these weapons do not create any problems and the United States should not alter
its policy. Others argue that the United States should expand its deployments in response to
chal enges from Russia, China, and North Korea. Some believe the United States should reduce
its reliance on these weapons and encourage Russia to do the same. Many have suggested that the
United States and Russia expand efforts to cooperate on ensuring the safe and secure storage and
elimination of these weapons; others have suggested that they negotiate an arms control treaty
that would limit these weapons and al ow for increased transparency in monitoring their
deployment and elimination. The 117th Congress may review some of these proposals.
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Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons

Introduction
The Trump Administration’s Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), released on February 2, 2018,
included plans for the United States to deploy two new types of nuclear weapons “to enhance the
flexibility and responsiveness of U.S. nuclear forces.”1 These included a new low-yield nuclear
warhead deployed on U.S. long-range, strategic submarine-launched bal istic missiles2 and a new
nonstrategic sea-launched cruise missile that the Navy could deploy on Navy ships or attack
submarines. The NPR asserted that these weapons would represent a response to Russia’s
deployment of a much larger stockpile of lower-yield nonstrategic nuclear weapons and to
Russia’s apparent belief “that limited nuclear first use, potential y including low yield weapons”
can provide “a coercive advantage in crises and at lower levels of conflict.” The NPR stated that
the United States did not need to deploy “non-strategic nuclear capabilities that quantitatively
match or mimic Russia’s more expansive arsenal,” but indicated that “expanding flexible U.S.
nuclear options now, to include low yield options, is important for the preservation of credible
deterrence against regional aggression.”
The NPR’s recommended deployment of U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons followed growing
concerns, both in Congress and among analysts outside of government, about new nuclear
chal enges facing the United States. Specifical y, some have called for the deployment of greater
numbers and/or types of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe in response to Russia’s continuing
aggression in Ukraine and its apparent increased reliance on nuclear weapons3 and in Asia, in
response to chal enges from China and North Korea. Others, however, have argued the
deployment of more nuclear weapons would do little to enhance U.S. and al ied security and that
NATO, in particular, would be better served by enhancing its conventional capabilities.4
This interest in possible new deployments of U.S. nonstrategic, or shorter-range, nuclear weapons
differs sharply from previous years, when Members of Congress, while concerned about Russia’s
larger stockpile of such weapons, seemed more interested in limiting these weapons through arms
control than expanding U.S. deployments. During the Senate debate on the 2010 U.S.-Russian
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), many Members noted that this treaty did not
impose any limits on nonstrategic nuclear weapons and that Russia possessed a far greater
number of these systems than did the United States. Some expressed particular concerns about the
threat that Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons might pose to U.S. al ies in Europe; others
argued that these weapons might be vulnerable to theft or sale to nations or groups seeking their
own nuclear weapons. The Senate, in its Resolution of Ratification on New START, stated that
the United States should seek to initiate within one year, “negotiations with the Russian
Federation on an agreement to address the disparity between the non-strategic (tactical) nuclear
weapons stockpiles of the Russian Federation and of the United States and to secure and reduce

1 Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, Washington, DC, February 2, 2018, pp. 52-53,
https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POST URE-REVIEW-FINAL-
REPORT .PDF.
2 T he Navy began to deploy small numbers of these warheads in late 2019. For details, see CRS In Focus IF11143, A
Low-Yield, Subm arine-Launched Nuclear Warhead: Overview of the Expert Debate, by Amy F. Woolf.
3 Matthew Kroenig, The Renewed Russian Nuclear Threat and NATO Nuclear Deterrence Posture, T he Atlantic
Council, Issue Brief, Washington, DC, February 2016, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/
Russian_Nuclear_T hreat_0203_web.pdf.
4 Steven Pifer, “Russia’s Rising Military: Should the U.S. Send More Nuclear Weapons to Europe?,” The National
Interest, July 21, 2015. http://nationalinterest.org/feature/russias-rising-military-should-the-us-send-more-nuclear-
13381.
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tactical nuclear weapons in a verifiable manner.”5 In addition, in the FY2013 Defense
Authorization Act (H.R. 4310, §1037), Congress again indicated that “the United States should
pursue negotiations with the Russian Federation aimed at the reduction of Russian deployed and
nondeployed nonstrategic nuclear forces.”
The United States did raise the issue of negotiations on nonstrategic nuclear weapons with Russia
within the year after New START entered into force, but the two nations did not move forward
with efforts to negotiate limits on these weapons. Russia expressed little interest in such a
negotiation, and stated that it would not even begin the process until the United States removed
its nonstrategic nuclear weapons from bases in Europe. According to U.S. officials, the United
States and NATO tried for several years to identify and evaluate possible transparency measures
and limits that might apply to these weapons.
The issue remains on the arms control agenda. Press reports from April 2019 indicate that
President Trump tasked his staff with developing a new approach to arms control that would
capture al types of nuclear weapons, including the nonstrategic nuclear weapons omitted from
New START.6 There was, however, little evidence that Russia had changed its views; it did not
directly reject talks on nonstrategic nuclear weapons, but continued to insist that a broader treaty
framework address its concerns with U.S. capabilities as wel as U.S. concerns with its forces.
The Trump Administration addressed the issue again, during 2020, when it pursued discussions
with Russia about the extension of the New START Treaty. As these talks advanced, the United
States and Russia discussed pairing a one-year freeze on the numbers of warheads in their nuclear
arsenals with a one-year extension of New START. The Trump Administration noted that this was
the first time Russia agreed to include warheads for nonstrategic nuclear weapons in arms control
talks. However, the two sides did not finalize this agreement because the United States insisted
that it include a monitoring regime to verify compliance with the freeze and Russia rejected this
approach.7
The United States and Russia agreed to extend the New START Treaty on February 3, 2021. The
Biden Administration did not link its support for this extension to an agreement limiting
nonstrategic nuclear weapons or freezing the numbers of warheads in their nuclear arsenals.
However, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken noted, in a statement released after the extension,
that “the United States wil use the time provided by a five-year extension of the New START
Treaty to pursue with the Russian Federation ... arms control that addresses al of its nuclear
weapons.”8 Thus, the two sides might address nonstrategic weapons in the “integrated bilateral
Strategic Stability Dialogue” that Presidents Biden and Putin agreed to pursue during their
summit in June, 2021.9

5 T he full text of the Resolution of Ratificat ion can be found on page S10982 of the Congressional Record from
December 22, 2010, http://www.congress.gov/cgi-lis/query/z?r111:S22DE0-0012.
6 Paul Sonne and John Hudson, “T rump orders staff to prepare arms-control push with Russia and China,” Washington
Post, April 25, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-orders-staff-to-prepare-arms-
control-push-with-russia-and-china/2019/04/25/c7f05e04-6076-11e9-9412-
daf3d2e67c6d_story.html?utm_term=.3e294ce0a8e9.
7 For details, see CRS Insight IN11520, Status of U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Control Talks, by Amy F. Woolf.
8 Anthony J. Blinken, U.S. Secretary of State, On the Extension of the New ST ART T reaty with the Russian
Federation, U.S. Department of State, press statement, Washington, DC, February 3, 2021,
https://www.state.gov/onthe-extension-of-the-new-start-treaty-with-the-russian-federation/.
9 White House, U.S.-Russia Presidential Joint Statement on Strategic Stability, June 16, 2021,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/06/16/u-s-russia-presidential-joint-statement-on-
strategic-stability/.
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This report provides basic information about U.S. and Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons. It
begins with a brief discussion of how these weapons have appeared in public debates in the past
few decades, then summarizes the differences between strategic and nonstrategic nuclear
weapons. It then provides some historical background, describing the numbers and types of
nonstrategic nuclear weapons deployed by both nations during the Cold War and in the past
decade; the policies that guided the deployment and prospective use of these weapons; measures
that the two sides have taken to reduce and contain their forces, and the 2018 NPR’s
recommendation for the deployment of new U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons. The report
reviews the issues that have been raised with regard to U.S. and Russian nonstrategic nuclear
weapons, and summarizes a number of policy options that might be explored by Congress, the
United States, Russia, and other nations to address these issues.
Background
During the Cold War, nuclear weapons were central to the U.S. strategy of deterring Soviet
aggression against the United States and U.S. al ies. Toward this end, the United States deployed
a wide variety of systems that could carry nuclear warheads. These included nuclear mines;
artil ery; short-, medium-, and long-range bal istic missiles; cruise missiles; and gravity bombs.
The United States deployed these weapons with its troops in the field, aboard aircraft, on surface
ships, on submarines, and in fixed, land-based launchers. The United States articulated a complex
strategy, and developed detailed operational plans, that would guide the use of these weapons in
the event of a conflict with the Soviet Union and its al ies.
Most public discussions about U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons—including discussions about
perceived imbalances between the two nations’ forces and discussions about the possible use of
arms control measures to reduce the risk of nuclear war and limit or reduce the numbers of
nuclear weapons—focused on long-range, or strategic, nuclear weapons. These include long-
range land-based intercontinental bal istic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched bal istic
missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers that carry cruise missiles or gravity bombs. These were
the weapons that the United States and Soviet Union deployed so that they could threaten
destruction of central military, industrial, and leadership facilities in the other country—the
weapons of global nuclear war. But both nations also deployed thousands of nuclear weapons
outside their own territories with their troops in the field. These weapons usual y had less
explosive power and were deployed with launchers that would deliver them across shorter ranges
than strategic nuclear weapons. They were intended for use by troops on the battlefield or within
the theater of battle to achieve more limited, or tactical, objectives.
These “nonstrategic” nuclear weapons did not completely escape public discussion or arms
control debates. Their profile rose in the early 1980s when U.S. plans to deploy new cruise
missiles and intermediate-range bal istic missiles in Europe, as a part of NATO’s nuclear strategy,
ignited large public protests in many NATO nations. Their high profile returned later in the
decade when the United States and Soviet Union signed the 1987 Intermediate Range Nuclear
Forces (INF) Treaty and eliminated medium- and intermediate-range bal istic and cruise missiles.
Then, in 1991, President George Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev each announced
that they would withdraw from deployment most of their nonstrategic nuclear weapons and
eliminate many of them.
These 1991 announcements, coming after the abortive coup in Moscow in August 1991, but
months before the December 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, responded to growing concerns
about the safety and security of Soviet nuclear weapons at a time of growing political and
economic upheaval in that nation. They also al owed the United States to alter its forces in
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response to easing tensions and the changing international security environment. Consequently,
for many in the general public, these initiatives appeared to resolve the problems associated with
nonstrategic nuclear weapons. As a result, although the United States and Russia included these
weapons in some of their arms control discussions, most of their arms control efforts during the
rest of that decade focused on strategic weapons, with efforts made to implement the 1991
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and negotiate deeper reductions in strategic nuclear
weapons.
The lack of public attention did not, however, reflect a total absence of questions or concerns
about nonstrategic nuclear weapons. In 1997, President Clinton and Russia’s President Boris
Yeltsin signed a framework agreement that stated they would address measures related to
nonstrategic nuclear weapons in a potential START III Treaty. Further, during the 1990s, outside
analysts, officials in the U.S. government, and many Members of Congress raised continuing
questions about the safety and security of Russia’s remaining nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
Congress sought a more detailed accounting of Russia’s weapons in legislation passed in the late
1990s. Analysts also questioned the role that these weapons might play in Russia’s evolving
national security strategy, the rationale for their continued deployment in the U.S. nuclear arsenal,
and their relationship to U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy. The terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001, also reminded people of the catastrophic consequences that might ensue if terrorists
were to acquire and use nuclear weapons, with continuing attention focused on the potential y
insecure stock of Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
The George W. Bush Administration did not adopt an explicit policy of reducing or eliminating
nonstrategic nuclear weapons. When it announced the results of its Nuclear Posture Review
(NPR) in early 2002, it did not outline any changes to the U.S. deployment of nonstrategic
nuclear weapons at bases in Europe; it stated that NATO would address the future of those
weapons. Although there was little public discussion of this issue during the Bush Administration,
reports indicate that the United States did redeploy and withdraw some of its nonstrategic nuclear
weapons from bases in Europe.10 It made these changes quietly and unilateral y, in response to
U.S. and NATO security requirements, without requesting or requiring reciprocity from Russia.
The Bush Administration also did not discuss these weapons with Russia during arms control
negotiations in 2002. Instead, the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (Moscow Treaty), signed
in June 2002, limited only the number of operational y deployed warheads on strategic nuclear
weapons. When asked about the absence of these weapons in the Moscow Treaty, then-Secretary
of State Colin Powel noted that the treaty was not intended to address these weapons, although
the parties could address questions about the safety and security of these weapons during less
formal discussions.11 These discussions, however, never occurred.
Nevertheless, Congress remained concerned about the potential risks associated with Russia’s
continuing deployment of nonstrategic nuclear weapons. The FY2006 Defense Authorization Act
(P.L. 109-163) contained two provisions that cal ed for further study on these weapons. Section
1212 mandated that the Secretary of Defense submit a report that would determine whether
increased transparency and further reductions in U.S. and Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons
were in the U.S. national security interest; Section 3115 cal ed on the Secretary of Energy to
submit a report on what steps the United States might take to bring about progress in improving

10 Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “U.S. T actical Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 2011,” Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, January 2011, http://bos.sagepub.com/content/67/1/64.full.
11 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions: The Moscow
Treaty, Hearings, 107th Cong., Second sess., July and September 2002, S. Hrg. 107 -622 (Washington: GPO, 2002),
p. 12.
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the accounting for and security of Russia’s nonstrategic nuclear weapons. In the 109th Congress,
H.R. 5017, a bil to ensure implementation of the 9/11 Commission Report recommendations,
included a provision (§334) that cal ed on the Secretary of Defense to submit a report that
detailed U.S. efforts to encourage Russia to provide a detailed accounting of its force of
nonstrategic nuclear weapons. It also would have authorized $5 mil ion for the United States to
assist Russia in completing an inventory of these weapons. The 109th Congress did not address
this bil or its components in any detail. In the 110th Congress, H.R. 1 sought to ensure the
implementation of the 9/11 Commission Report recommendations. However, in its final form
(P.L. 110-53), it did not include any references to Russia’s nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
Several events have since 2007 continued to elevate the profile of nonstrategic nuclear weapons
in debates about the future of U.S. nuclear weapons and arms control policy. First, in January
2007, four senior statesmen published an article in the Wall Street Journal that highlighted the
continuing threat posed by the existence, and proliferation, of nuclear weapons.12 They cal ed on
leaders in nations with nuclear weapons to adopt the goal of seeking a world free of nuclear
weapons. After acknowledging that that this was a long-term enterprise, they identified a number
of urgent, near-term steps that these nations might take. They included among these steps a cal
for nations to eliminate “short-range nuclear weapons designed to be forward-deployed.” In a
subsequent article published in January 2008, they elaborated on this step, cal ing for “a dialogue,
including within NATO and with Russia, on consolidating the nuclear weapons designed for
forward deployment to enhance their security, as a first step toward careful accounting for them
and their eventual elimination.” They noted, specifical y, that “these smal er and more portable
nuclear weapons are, given their characteristics, inviting acquisition targets for terrorist groups.”13
Second, as a part of its renewed interest in the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security
strategy, Congress established, in the FY2008 Defense Authorization Bil (P.L. 110-181 §1062), a
Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States. The Congressional
Commission, which issued its report in April 2009, briefly addressed the role of nonstrategic
nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy and noted that these weapons can help the
United States assure its al ies of the U.S. commitment to their security. It also noted concerns
about the imbalance in the numbers of U.S. and Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons and
mentioned that Russia had increased its reliance on these weapons to compensate for weaknesses
in its conventional forces.14
The 110th Congress also mandated (P.L. 110-181, §1070) that the next Administration conduct a
new Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). The Obama Administration completed this NPR in early
April 2010. This study identified a number of steps the United States would take to reduce the
roles and numbers of nuclear weapons in the U.S. arsenal. A few of these steps, including the
planned retirement of nuclear-armed, sea-launched cruise missiles, affected U.S. nonstrategic
nuclear weapons. At the same time, though, the NPR recognized the role that U.S. nonstrategic
nuclear weapons play in assuring U.S. al ies of the U.S. commitment to their security. It indicated
that the United States would “retain the capability to forward-deploy U.S. nuclear weapons on
tactical fighter-bombers” and that the United States would seek to “expand consultations with

12 George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” Wall
Street Journal, January 4, 2007, p. A15.
13 George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, “T oward a Nuclear -Free World,” Wall
Street Journal, January 15, 2008, p. A13.
14 William J. Perry, Chairman and James R. Schlesinger, Vice Chairman, America’s Strategic Posture, T he Final
Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, Washington, DC, April 2009,
pp. 12-13, 21. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/strat_posture_report_adv_copy.pdf.
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al ies and partners to address how to ensure the credibility and effectiveness of the U.S. extended
deterrent. No changes in U.S. extended deterrence capabilities wil be made without close
consultations with our al ies and partners.”15
Discussions about the presence of U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons at bases in Europe and their
role in NATO’s strategy also increased in 2009 and 2010 during the drafting of NATO’s strategic
concept.16 Officials in some NATO nations cal ed for the removal of U.S. nonstrategic weapons
from bases on the continent, noting that they had no military significance for NATO’s security.
Others cal ed for the retention of these weapons, arguing that they played a political role in
NATO, with shared rights and responsibilities, and that they helped balance Russia’s deployment
of greater numbers of nonstrategic nuclear weapons. When it was published, the 2010 Strategic
Concept did not cal for the removal of U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons. It stated that
“deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, remains a core
element of our overal strategy.” It also indicated that “the circumstances in which any use of
nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated are extremely remote,” but indicated that “as
long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO wil remain a nuclear al iance.” It then concluded that
NATO would “maintain an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces.”17 NATO nations
continue to share responsibility for basing and delivery of the weapons and would weigh in on
decisions about their possible use.
NATO recognized that the Strategic Concept would not be the last word on the role or presence of
nonstrategic nuclear weapons in NATO. In the declaration released at the conclusion of the
November 2010 Lisbon Summit, the al ies agreed that they would continue to review NATO’s
overal posture in deterring and defending against the full range of threats to the Al iance. They
commissioned a comprehensive Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR) that would
examine the range of capabilities required for defense and deterrence, including nuclear weapons,
missile defense, and other means of strategic deterrence and defense.18 The DDPR was presented
at the May 2012 NATO summit in Chicago. It did not, however, recommend any changes in
NATO’s nuclear posture. Instead, it noted that “nuclear weapons are a core component of
NATO’s overal capabilities for deterrence and defence,” and that “the Al iance’s nuclear force
posture currently meets the criteria for an effective deterrence and defence posture.”19 NATO
reaffirmed this conclusion after its summit in Wales in September 2014, noting that “deterrence,
based on an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile defence capabilities, remains a
core element of our overal strategy.”20
NATO addressed this issue again during its summit in Warsaw in July 2016 and did not alter this
conclusion about the value of nuclear weapons to the al iance. Moreover, although the al iance
did not cal for the deployment of additional nuclear weapons in Europe, the communique

15 Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, Washington, DC, April 6, 2010, pp. 26-27,
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/NPR/2010_Nuclear_Posture_Review_Report.pdf .
16 NAT O released this document in November 2010.
17 North Atlantic T reaty Organization (NATO), Active Engagement, Modern Defence, Strategic Concept For the
Defence and Security of T he Members of the North Atlantic T reaty Organization, Lisbon, Portugal, November 29,
2010, pp. 4-5, http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf.
18 North Atlantic T reaty Organization (NATO), Lisbon Summit Declaration, Lisbon, Portugal, November 20, 2010,
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm.
19 North Atlantic T reaty Organization (NATO), Deterrence and Defense Posture Review, Press Release, Chicago, IL,
May 20, 2012, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87597.htm?mode=pressrelease.
20 North Atlantic T reaty Organization, Wales Summit Declaration, September 5, 2014, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/
natohq/official_texts_112964.htm?selectedLocale=en.
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released at the end of the summit highlighted the continuing importance of U.S. nuclear weapons
deployed in Europe and the nuclear sharing arrangements among the al ies. Specifical y, the al ies
reiterated that “as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO wil remain a nuclear al iance” and that
“the strategic forces of the Al iance, particularly those of the United States, are the supreme
guarantee of the security of the Al ies.” At the same time, they noted that “NATO’s nuclear
deterrence posture also relies, in part, on United States’ nuclear weapons forward-deployed in
Europe and on capabilities and infrastructure provided by Al ies concerned.”21 At the same time,
NATO began to implement numerous initiatives in response to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine
and aggressive posture toward Europe. While some of these initiatives may strengthen NATO’s
planning and exercise capabilities, they are unlikely to result in changes in the numbers of
deployed nuclear weapons.22
The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review echoed many of the themes highlighted in documents
published in the preceding decade. Like the Strategic Posture Commission Report published in
2009, the NPR highlighted the imbalance in the numbers of U.S. and Russian nonstrategic
nuclear weapons and stated that Russia had increased its reliance on these weapons in its national
security strategy.23 It argued that Russia believed it could use these weapons to coerce the United
States and its NATO al ies to back down during a conventional conflict in Europe.24 The 2018
NPR also echoed the Obama Administration’s NPR, indicating that the United States would
maintain “the capability to forward deploy nuclear bombers and DCA around the world.” It also
stated that the United States would continue Obama-era programs to communicate with and
consult al ies “on policy, strategy and capabilities.”25 The 2018 NPR also supported recent
changes in NATO’s approach to nuclear modernization and planning, indicating that the United
States is “committed to upgrading DCA [dual capable aircraft] with the nuclear-capable F-35
aircraft” and that the United States would “work with NATO to best ensure—and improve where
needed—the readiness, survivability, and operational effectiveness of DCA based in Europe.”26
However, while the 2010 NPR cal ed for the retirement of U.S. Tomahawk nuclear-armed sea-
launched cruise missiles (TLAMN), the 2018 NPR cal ed for the development of a new sea-
launched cruise missile (SLCM). The 2010 NPR argued that “this system serves a redundant
purpose in the U.S. nuclear stockpile” and, although the United States “remains committed to
providing a credible extended deterrence posture and capabilities,” the “deterrence and assurance
roles of TLAMN can be adequately substituted by these other means.”27 The 2018 NPR disputed

21 North Atlantic T reaty Organization, Warsaw Summit Communique, Warsaw, Poland, July 9, 2016, para. 53,
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm?selectedLocale=en.
22 James Stravridis, “Are We Entering a New Cold War?,” Foreign Policy, February 17, 2016,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/17/are-we-entering-a-new-cold-war-russia-europe/. See also Aaron Mehta, “ At
NAT O, A Focus on Modern Deterrence,” Defense News, February 10, 2016, http://www.defensenews.com/story/
defense/international/europe/2016/02/10/nato-focus-modern-deterrence/80164930/.
23 Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, Washington, D.C., February 2, 2018, pp. 52-53,
https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POST URE-REVIEW-FINAL-
REPORT .PDF.
24 Other analysts dispute this interpretation of Russia’s nuclear doctrine. See, for example, Olya Oliker, Russia’s
Nuclear Doctrine; What We Know, What We Don’t, and What Th at Means, CSIS, Washington, DC, May 5, 2016,
https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia%E2%80%99s-nuclear-doctrine.
25 Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, Washington, DC, February 2, 2018, p. 35,
https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POST URE-REVIEW-FINAL-
REPORT .PDF.
26 Ibid. p. 36.
27 Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, Washington, DC, April 6, 2010, p. 28,
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/NPR/2010_Nuclear_Posture_Review_Report.pdf .
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this conclusion. It stated that “the rapid development of a modern SLCM” wil address “the
increasing need for flexible and low-yield options to strengthen deterrence and assurance” and
“wil strengthen the effectiveness of the sea-based nuclear deterrence force.”28 While the Navy
has begun to study the options for the new SLCM in an Analysis of Alternatives, it did not request
any funding for FY2021 and it is not clear, at this time, whether the Biden Administration wil
support this program in the Pentagon’s budget request for FY2022.
The Distinction Between Strategic and Nonstrategic
Nuclear Weapons
The distinction between strategic and nonstrategic (also known as tactical) nuclear weapons
reflects the military definitions of, on the one hand, a strategic mission and, on the other hand, the
tactical use of nuclear weapons. According to the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military
Terms,29 a strategic mission is
Directed against one or more of a selected series of enemy targets with the purpose of
progressive destruction and disintegration of the enemy’s warmaking capacity and will to
make war. Targets include key manufacturing systems, sources of raw material, critical
material, stockpiles, power systems, transportation systems, communication facilities, and
other such target systems. As opposed to tactical operations, strategic operations are
designed to have a long-range rather than immediate effect on the enemy and its military
forces.
In contrast, the tactical use of nuclear weapons is defined as “the use of nuclear weapons by land,
sea, or air forces against opposing forces, supporting instal ations or facilities, in support of
operations that contribute to the accomplishment of a military mission of limited scope, or in
support of the military commander’s scheme of maneuver, usual y limited to the area of military
operations.”
Definition by Observable Capabilities
During the Cold War, it was relatively easy to distinguish between strategic and nonstrategic
nuclear weapons because each type had different capabilities that were better suited to the
different missions.
Definition by Range of Delivery Vehicles
The long-range missiles and heavy bombers deployed on U.S. territory and missiles deployed in
bal istic missile submarines had the range and destructive power to attack and destroy military,
industrial, and leadership targets central to the Soviet Union’s ability to prosecute the war. At the
same time, with their large warheads and relatively limited accuracies (at least during the earlier
years of the Cold War), these weapons were not suited for attacks associated with tactical or
battlefield operations. Nonstrategic nuclear weapons, in contrast, were not suited for strategic
missions because they lacked the range to reach targets inside the Soviet Union (or, for Soviet
weapons, targets inside the United States). But, because they were often smal enough to be

28 Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, Washingto n, DC, February 2, 2018, p. 55,
https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POST URE-REVIEW-FINAL-
REPORT .PDF.
29 T his dictionary and these definitions can be found on the DOD website at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/
index.html.
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deployed with troops in the field or at forward bases, the United States and Soviet Union could
have used them to attack targets in the theater of the conflict, or on the battlefield itself, to support
more limited military missions.
Even during the Cold War, however, the United States and Russia deployed nuclear weapons that
defied the standard understanding of the difference between strategic and nonstrategic nuclear
weapons. For example, both nations considered weapons based on their own territories that could
deliver warheads to the territory of the other nation to be “strategic” because they had the range
needed to reach targets inside the other nation’s territory. But some early Soviet submarine-
launched bal istic missiles had relatively short (i.e., 500 mile) ranges, and the submarines
patrolled close to U.S. shores to ensure that the weapons could reach their strategic targets.
Conversely, in the 1980s the United States considered sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs)
deployed on submarines or surface ships to be nonstrategic nuclear weapons. But, if these vessels
were deployed close to Soviet borders, these weapons could have destroyed many of the same
targets as U.S. strategic nuclear weapons. Similarly, U.S. intermediate-range missiles that were
deployed in Europe, which were considered nonstrategic by the United States, could reach
central, strategic targets in the Soviet Union.
Furthermore, some weapons that had the range to reach “strategic” targets on the territory of the
other nations could also deliver tactical nuclear weapons in support of battlefield or tactical
operations. Soviet bombers could be equipped with nuclear-armed anti-ship missiles; U.S.
bombers could also carry anti-ship weapons and nuclear mines. Hence, the range of the delivery
vehicle does not always correlate with the types of targets or objectives associated with the
warhead carried on that system. This relationship between range and mission has become even
more clouded since the end of the Cold War because the United States and Russia have retired
many of the shorter- and medium-range delivery systems considered to be nonstrategic nuclear
weapons. Further, both nations could use their longer-range “strategic” systems to deliver
warheads to a full range of strategic and tactical targets, even if long-standing traditions and arms
control definitions weigh against this change.
Definition by Yield of Warheads
During the Cold War, the longer-range strategic delivery vehicles also tended to carry warheads
with greater yields, or destructive power, than nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Smal er warheads
were better suited to nonstrategic weapons because they sought to achieve more limited, discrete
objectives on the battlefield than did the larger, strategic nuclear weapons. But this distinction has
also dissolved in more modern systems. Many U.S. and Russian heavy bombers can carry
weapons of lower yields, and, as accuracies improved for bombs and missiles, warheads with
lower yields could achieve the same expected level of destruction that had required larger
warheads in early generations of strategic weapons systems.
Definition by Exclusion
The observable capabilities that al owed analysts to distinguish between strategic and
nonstrategic nuclear weapons during the Cold War have not always been precise, and may not
prove to be relevant or appropriate in the future. On the other hand, the “strategic” weapons
identified by these capabilities—ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers—are the only systems
covered by the limits in strategic offensive arms control agreements—the SALT agreements
signed in the 1970s, the START agreements signed in the 1990s, the Moscow Treaty signed in
2002, and the New START Treaty signed in 2010. Consequently, an “easy” dividing line is one
that would consider al weapons not covered by strategic arms control treaties as nonstrategic
nuclear weapons. This report takes this approach when reviewing the history of U.S. and
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Soviet/Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons, and in some cases when discussing remaining
stocks of nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
Hybrid Definitions
The definition by exclusion, although the most common form used in recent discussions, may not
prove sufficient when discussing current and future issues associated with these weapons. Since
the early 1990s, the United States and Russia have withdrawn from deployment most of their
nonstrategic nuclear weapons and eliminated many of the shorter- and medium-range launchers
for these weapons (these changes are discussed in more detail below). Nevertheless, both nations
maintain roles for these weapons in their national security strategies. Russia has enunciated a
national security strategy that al ows for the possible use of nuclear weapons in regional
contingencies and conflicts near the periphery of Russia. The United States also maintains these
capabilities in its nuclear arsenal and does not rule out the possibility that it might need them to
deter or defeat potential adversaries.
Moreover, the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, with its plans for the deployment new nonstrategic
weapons, further complicates efforts to identify a single definition. The sea-launched cruise
missile clearly meets several definitions of nonstrategic nuclear weapons—it would not have the
long range of a strategic system, it would likely have a relatively low-yield warhead, and it would
not count under existing treaties limiting strategic offensive weapons. But a new low-yield
warhead for submarine-launched bal istic missiles is more complicated. If yield were the
distinguishing characteristic, this might be characterized as a nonstrategic weapon. But the
delivery system—a submarine-launched bal istic missile—is clearly a strategic system. However,
it has the long range of a strategic delivery vehicle and it is counted within the limits of the New
START Treaty. Moreover, missiles with low-yield warheads could be deployed on the same
submarines as missiles with higher yield, or strategic, warheads, complicating efforts to
distinguish between strategic and nonstrategic SLBMs.
Then-Secretary of Defense James Mattis further complicated the discussion during his testimony
before the House Armed Services Committee on February 6, 2018, when he stated that he does
not believe “there is any such thing as a tactical nuclear weapon. Any nuclear weapon used any
time is a strategic game changer.” He also resisted using the phrase “nonstrategic” to describe
U.S. capabilities, and instead referred to the U.S. ability to deliver a “low-yield” response.30
While his resistance to the phrases “tactical” and “nonstrategic” seemed to contradict the NPR’s
widespread use of the phrase “non-strategic nuclear weapons,” his response likely reflected a
different definition of the dividing line between strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons. His
comments reflected the view that any use of nuclear weapons would have “strategic effect,”
possibly meaning that it would expand and escalate the conflict beyond the immediate battlefield.
The distinction, therefore, between a strategic and a nonstrategic nuclear weapon could wel
reflect the nature of the target or the implications for the conflict, not the yield or delivery vehicle
of the attacking warhead.

30 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, National Defense Strategy and the Nuclear Posture Review,
Hearing, 115th Cong., 2nd sess., February 6, 2018.
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U.S. and Soviet Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons
U.S. Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons During the Cold War
Throughout the Cold War, the United States deployed thousands of shorter-range nuclear
weapons with U.S. forces based in Europe and Asia and on ships around the world. The United
States maintained these deployments to extend deterrence and to defend its al ies. Not only did
the presence of these weapons (and the presence of U.S. forces, in general) increase the likelihood
that the United States would come to the defense of its al ies if they were attacked, the weapons
also could have been used on the battlefield to slow or stop the advance of the adversaries’
conventional forces.
Strategy and Doctrine
In most cases, the United States deployed these weapons to defend U.S. al ies against aggression
by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact al ies, but the United States did not rule out their
possible use in contingencies with other adversaries. In Europe, these weapons were a part of
NATO’s strategy of “flexible response.” Under this strategy, NATO did not insist that it would
respond to any type of attack with nuclear weapons, but it maintained the capability to do so and
to control escalation if nuclear weapons were used. This approach was intended to convince the
Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact that any conflict, even one that began with conventional weapons,
could result in nuclear retaliation.31 As the Cold War drew to a close, NATO acknowledged that it
would no longer maintain nuclear weapons to deter or defeat a conventional attack from the
Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact because “the threat of a simultaneous, full-scale attack on al of
NATO’s European fronts has effectively been removed.”32 But NATO documents indicated that
these weapons would stil play an important political role in NATO’s strategy by ensuring
“uncertainty in the mind of any potential aggressor about the nature of the Al ies’ response to
military aggression.”33
Force Structure
Throughout the Cold War, the United States often altered the size and structure of its nonstrategic
nuclear forces in response to changing capabilities and changing threat assessments. It deployed
these weapons at U.S. bases in Asia, and at bases on the territories of several of the NATO al ies,
contributing to NATO’s sense of shared responsibility for the weapons. The United States began
to reduce these forces in the late 1970s, with the numbers of operational nonstrategic nuclear
warheads declining from more than 7,000 in the mid-1970s to below 6,000 in the 1980s, to fewer
than 1,000 by the middle of the 1990s.34 These reductions occurred, for the most part, because
U.S. and NATO officials believed they could maintain deterrence with fewer, but more modern,
weapons. For example, when the NATO al ies agreed in 1970 that the United States should

31 “T he United States retains substantial nuclear capabilities in Europe to counter Warsaw Pact conventional superiority
and to serve as a link to U.S. strategic nuclear forces.” National Security Strategy of the United States, White House,
January 1988, p. 16.
32 North Atlantic T reaty Organization, “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept,” NAT O Office of Information and Press,
Brussels, Belgium, 1991, para. 8.
33 Ibid., para. 55.
34 Toward a Nuclear Peace: The Future of Nuclear Weapons in U.S. Foreign and Defense Policy, Report of the CSIS
Nuclear Strategy Study Group, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1993. p. 27.
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deploy new intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe, they decided to remove 1,000 older
nuclear weapons from Europe. And in 1983, in the Montebel o Decision, when the NATO defense
ministers approved additional weapons modernization plans, they also cal ed for a further
reduction of 1,400 nonstrategic nuclear weapons.35
These modernization programs continued through the 1980s. In his 1988 Annual Report to
Congress, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger noted that the United States was completing
the deployment of Pershing II intermediate-range bal istic missiles and ground-launched cruise
missiles in Europe; modernizing two types of nuclear artil ery shel s; upgrading the Lance short-
range bal istic missile; continuing production of the nuclear-armed version of the Tomahawk sea-
launched cruise missile; and developing a new nuclear depth/strike bomb for U.S. naval forces.36
However, by the end of that decade, as the Warsaw Pact dissolved, the United States had canceled
or scaled back al planned modernization programs. In 1987, it also signed the Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which eliminated al U.S. and Soviet ground-launched
shorter and intermediate-range bal istic and cruise missiles.37
Soviet Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons During the Cold War
Strategy and Doctrine
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union also considered nuclear weapons to be instrumental to its
military strategy.38 Although the Soviet Union had pledged that it would not be the first to use
nuclear weapons, most Western observers doubted that it would actual y observe this pledge in a
conflict. Instead, analysts argue that the Soviet Union had integrated nuclear weapons into its
warfighting plans to a much greater degree than the United States. Soviet analysts stressed that
these weapons would be useful for both surprise attack and preemptive attack. According to one
Russian analyst, the Soviet Union would have used nonstrategic nuclear weapons to conduct
strategic operations in the theater of war and to reinforce conventional units in large scale land
and sea operations.39 This would have helped the Soviet Union achieve success in these theaters
of war and would have diverted forces of the enemy from Soviet territory.
The Soviet Union reportedly began to reduce its emphasis on nuclear warfighting strategies in the
mid-1980s, under Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. He reportedly believed that the use of
nuclear weapons would be catastrophic. Nevertheless, they remained a key tool of deterring and
fighting a large-scale conflict with the United States and NATO.

35 T he text of the Montebello decision can be found in Larson, Jeffrey A. and Kurt J. Klingenberger, editors.
Controlling Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons. Obstacles and Opportunities, United States Air Force, Institute for
National Security Studies, July 2001, pp. 265-266.
36 Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1988, January 1987,
pp. 217-218.
37 For a description of the terms and implications of this treaty see, CRS Report RL30033, Arms Control and
Disarm am ent Activities: A Catalog of Recent Events, by Amy F. Woolf, coordinator. (Out of print. For copies,
congressional clients may contact Amy Woolf.)
38 For a more detailed review of Soviet and Russian nuclear strategy see CRS Report 97-586, Russia's Nuclear Forces:
Doctrine and Force Structure Issues, by Amy F. Woolf and Kara Wilson (Out of print. For copies, congressional
clients may contact Amy Woolf.)
39 Ivan Safranchuk, “T actical Nuclear Weapons in the Modern World: A Russian Perspective,” in Alexander, Brian and
Alistair Millar, editors, Tactical Nuclear Weapons (Washington, DC: Brassey’s Inc., 2003), p. 53.
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Force Structure
The Soviet Union produced and deployed a wide range of delivery vehicles for nonstrategic
nuclear weapons. At different times during the period, it deployed devices that were smal enough
to fit into a suitcase-sized container, nuclear mines, shel s for artil ery, short-, medium-, and
intermediate-range bal istic missiles, short-range air-delivered missiles, and gravity bombs. The
Soviet Union deployed these weapons at nearly 600 bases, with some located in Warsaw Pact
nations in Eastern Europe, some in the non-Russian republics on the western and southern
perimeter of the nation, and throughout Russia. Estimates vary, but many analysts believe that, in
1991, the Soviet Union had more than 20,000 of these weapons. The numbers may have been
higher, in the range of 25,000 weapons in earlier years, before the collapse of the Warsaw Pact.40
The 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives
In September and October 1991, U.S. President George H. W. Bush and Soviet President Mikhail
Gorbachev sharply altered their nations’ deployments of nonstrategic nuclear weapons.41 Each
announced unilateral, but reciprocal initiatives that marked the end of many elements of their
Cold War nuclear arsenals.
U.S. Initiative
On September 27, 1991, U.S. President George H. W. Bush announced that the United States
would withdraw al land-based tactical nuclear weapons (those that could travel less than 300
miles) from overseas bases and al sea-based tactical nuclear weapons from U.S. surface ships,
submarines, and naval aircraft.42 Under these measures the United States began dismantling
approximately 2,150 warheads from the land-based delivery systems, including 850 warheads for
Lance missiles and 1,300 artil ery shel s. It also withdrew about 500 weapons normal y deployed
aboard surface ships and submarines, and planned to eliminate around 900 B-57 depth bombs,43
which had been deployed on land and at sea, and the weapons for land-based naval aircraft.44
Furthermore, in late 1991, NATO decided to reduce by about half the number of weapons for
nuclear-capable aircraft based in Europe, which led to the withdrawal of an additional 700 U.S.
air-delivered nuclear weapons.
The United States implemented these measures very quickly. The United States removed its
nonstrategic nuclear weapons from bases around the world by mid-1992. The Navy had
withdrawn nuclear weapons from its surface ships, submarines, and forward bases by mid-1992.45
The warhead dismantlement process has moved more slowly, taking most of the 1990s to

40 Joshua Handler, “T he 1991-1992 PNIs and the Elimination, Storage and Security of T actical Nuclear Weapons,” in
Alexander, Brian and Alistair Millar, editors, Tactical Nuclear Weapons (Washington, DC: Brassey’s Inc., 2003),
p. 31.
41 T he speeches outlining these initiatives can be found in Larson, Jeffrey A. and Kurt J. Klingenberger, editors,
Controlling Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons. Obstacles and Opportunities, United States Air Force, Institute for
National Security Studies, July 2001, pp. 273 -283.
42 President Bush also announced that he would remove from alert all U.S. strategic bombers and 450 Minuteman II
ICBMs that were to be eliminated under the ST ART T reaty. He also cancelled several moder nization programs for
strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
43 Joshua Handler, in Alexander and Millar, Tactical Nuclear Weapons, pp. 21-22.
44 T he United States maintained the capability to return sea-based nuclear weapons to aircraft carriers and submarines
until this policy was changed through the Nuclear Posture Reviews of 1994 and 2001.
45 Joshua Handler, in Alexander and Millar, Tactical Nuclear Weapons, p. 22.
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complete for some weapons, but this was due to the limits on capacity at the Pantex Plant in
Texas, where dismantlement occurs.
The first Bush Administration decided to withdraw these weapons for several reasons. First, the
threat the weapons were to deter—Soviet and Warsaw Pact attacks in Europe—had diminished
with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact in 1989. Further, the military utility of the land-based
weapons had declined as the Soviet Union pulled its forces eastward, beyond the range of these
weapons. The utility of the sea-based weapons had also declined as a result of changes in U.S.
warfighting concepts that accompanied the end of the Cold War. Moreover, the withdrawal of the
sea-based weapons helped ease a source of tensions between the United States and some al ies,
such as New Zealand and Japan, who had been uncomfortable with the possible presence of
nuclear weapons during port visits by U.S. naval forces.46
The President’s announcement also responded to growing concerns among analysts about the
safety and security of Soviet nonstrategic nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union had deployed
thousands of these weapons at bases in remote areas of its territory and at bases outside Soviet
territory in Eastern Europe. The demise of the Warsaw Pact and political upheaval in Eastern
Europe generated concerns about the safety of these weapons. The abortive coup in Moscow in
August 1991 had also caused alarms about the strength of central control over nuclear weapons
inside the Soviet Union. The U.S. initiative was not contingent on a Soviet response, and the
Bush Administration did not consult with Soviet leadership prior to its public announcement, but
many hoped that the U.S. initiative would provide President Gorbachev with the incentive to take
similar steps to withdraw and eliminate many of his nation’s nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
Soviet and Russian Initiatives
On October 5, 1991, Russia’s President Gorbachev replied that he, too, would withdraw and
eliminate nonstrategic nuclear weapons.47 He stated that the Soviet Union would destroy al
nuclear artil ery ammunition and warheads for tactical missiles; remove warheads for nuclear
antiaircraft missiles and destroy some of them; destroy al nuclear land mines; and remove al
naval nonstrategic weapons from submarines and surface ships and ground-based naval aviation,
destroying some of them. Estimates of the numbers of nonstrategic nuclear weapons deployed by
the Soviet Union varied, with a range as great as 15,000-21,700 nonstrategic nuclear weapons in
the Soviet arsenal in 1991.48 Consequently, analysts expected these measures to affect several
thousand weapons.
Russia’s President Boris Yeltsin pledged to continue implementing these measures after the
Soviet Union collapsed at the end of 1991. He also stated that Russia would destroy many of the
warheads removed from nonstrategic nuclear weapons.49 These included al warheads from short-
range missiles, artil ery, and atomic demolition devices; one-third of the warheads from sea-based
nonstrategic weapons; half of the warheads from air-defense interceptors; and half of the
warheads from the Air Force’s nonstrategic nuclear weapons.

46 See, for example, CRS Report 85-92 Crisis in U.S.-New Zealand Relations, by Robert G. Sutter, (Out of print. For
copies, congressional clients may contact Amy Woolf.)
47 President Gorbachev also addressed strategic nuclear weapons in his initiative, announcing that he would remove
bombers and more than 500 ballistic missiles from alert an d cancelling many modernization programs.
48 Joshua Handler, in Alexander and Millar, Tactical Nuclear Weapons, p. 31.
49 For the text of President Yeltsin’s statement, see Larsen and Klingenberger, pp. 284-289.
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Reports indicate that the Soviet Union had begun removing nonstrategic nuclear weapons from
bases outside Soviet territory after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, and had probably removed al
of them from Eastern Europe and the Transcaucasus prior to the 1991 announcements.
Nevertheless, President Gorbachev’s pledge to withdraw and eliminate many of these weapons
spurred their removal from other former Soviet states after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Reports indicate that they had al been removed from the Baltic States and Central Asian
republics by the end of 1991, and from Ukraine and Belarus by mid-late spring 1992.50
The status of nonstrategic nuclear weapons deployed on Russian territory is far less certain.
According to some estimates, Russia removed the naval systems from deployment by the end of
1993, but the Army and Air Force systems remained in the field until 1996 and 1997.51
Furthermore, Russia has been far slower to eliminate the warheads from these systems than has
the United States. Some analysts and experts in the United States have expressed concerns about
the slow pace of eliminations in Russia. They note that the continuing existence of these
warheads, along with the increasing reliance on nuclear weapons in Russia’s national security
strategy, indicate that Russia may reverse its pledges and reintroduce nonstrategic nuclear
weapons into its deployed forces. Others note that financial constraints could have slowed the
elimination of these warheads, or that Russia decided to coordinate the elimination effort with the
previously scheduled retirement of older weapons.52
U.S. Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons after the Cold War
Strategy and Doctrine
NATO Policy
In U.S. and NATO policy, nonstrategic nuclear weapons have served not only as a deterrent to a
wide range of potential aggressors, but also as an important element in NATO’s cohesion as an
al iance. Even after the demise of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, NATO reaffirmed the
importance of nonstrategic nuclear weapons for deterrence and al iance cohesion several times. In
the press communiqué released after their November 1995 meeting, the members of NATO’s
Defense Planning Committee and Nuclear Planning Group stated that “Al iance Solidarity,
common commitment, and strategic unity are demonstrated through the current basing of
deployable sub-strategic [nuclear] forces in Europe.”53 In 1997, in the Founding Act on Mutual
Relations, Cooperation, and Security Between the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, NATO members assured Russia that it had “no intention, no plan, and no
reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members.” But NATO also stated that it
had no need “to change any aspect of NATO’s nuclear policy—and do not foresee any future need
to do so [emphasis added].”54 Final y, the “New Strategic Concept” signed in April 1999 stated

50 Joshua Handler, in Alexander and Millar, Tactical Nuclear Weapons, p. 22.
51 Joshua Handler, “T he September 1991 PNIs and the Elimination, Storage and Security Aspects of T NWs, ”
Presentation for seminar at the United Nations, New York, September 24, 2001.
52 For details on current concerns with Russia’s nonstrategic nuclear weapons, see Miles Pomper, William Potter, and
Nikolai Sokov, Reducing and Regulating Tactical (Nonstrategic) Nuclear Weapons in Europe , T he James Martin
Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, CA, December 2009.
53 NAT O Press Communique M-DPC/NPG-2(95)117, November 29, 1995, para. 21.
54 “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security Between the Russian Federation and the North
Atlantic T reaty Organization,” signed at Paris, May 27, 1997.
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that “to protect peace and to prevent war or any kind of coercion, the Al iance wil maintain for
the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces. Nuclear weapons
make a unique contribution in rendering the risks of aggression against the Al iance incalculable
and unacceptable.”55
NATO completed the next review of its Strategic Concept in November 2010. In this document,
the al ies indicated that “deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional
capabilities, remains a core element of our overal strategy.” The document went on to indicate
that NATO would remain a nuclear al iance as long as nuclear weapons continued to exist. It also
noted that the al iance would “maintain an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces” to
ensure that “NATO has the full range of capabilities to deter and defend against any threat.”
However, the Strategic Concept did not refer, specifical y, to the U.S. nuclear weapons based in
Europe, as had the communiqué released in 1995. Instead, the Strategic Concept noted that the
“supreme guarantee of the security of the Al ies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the
Al iance, particularly those of the United States [emphasis added].” It went on to indicate that
“the independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a
deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overal deterrence and security of the Al ies.”56
Moreover, the 2010 Strategic Concept al uded to the possibility of further reductions in nuclear
weapons, both within the al iance and global y, in the future. The document noted that the al ies
are “resolved to seek a safer world for al and to create the conditions for a world without nuclear
weapons in accordance with the goals of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in a way that
promotes international stability, and is based on the principle of undiminished security for al .” It
also noted that the al iance had “dramatical y reduced the number of nuclear weapons stationed in
Europe” and had reduced the role of nuclear weapons in NATO strategy.” The al ies pledged to
“seek to create the conditions for further reductions in the future.” The Strategic Concept
indicated that the goal in these reductions should be to “seek Russian agreement to increase
transparency on its nuclear weapons in Europe and relocate these weapons away from the
territory of NATO members.” Moreover, the document noted that this arms control process “must
take into account the disparity with the greater Russian stockpiles of short-range nuclear
weapons.”57 Hence, even though NATO no longer viewed Russia as an adversary, the al ies
apparently agreed that the disparity in nonstrategic nuclear weapons could create security
concerns for some members of the al iance.
In recognition of different views about the role or nuclear weapons in al iance policy, the al ies
agreed that they would continue to review NATO’s deterrence and defense posture in a study
completed in time for NATO’s May 2012 summit in Chicago. They agreed that the Deterrence
and Defense Posture Review (DDPR) would examine the full range of capabilities required,
including nuclear weapons, missile defense, and other means of strategic deterrence and
defense.58 However, the completed DDPR did not recommend any changes in NATO’s nuclear
posture. Instead, it noted that “nuclear weapons are a core component of NATO’s overal
capabilities for deterrence and defence,” and that “the Al iance’s nuclear force posture currently

55 The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the
North Atlantic Council in Washington, DC, April 23-24, 1999.
56 North Atlantic T reaty Organization (NATO), Active Engagement, Modern Defence, Strategic Concept For the
Defence and Security of T he Members of the North Atlantic T reaty Organization, Lisbon, Portugal, November 29,
2010, pp. 4-5, http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf.
57 Ibid., pp. 7-8.
58 North Atlantic T reaty Organization (NATO), Lisbon Summit Declaration, Lisbon, Portugal, November 20, 2010,
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm.
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meets the criteria for an effective deterrence and defence posture.”59 This force posture includes
shared rights and responsibilities, with nuclear weapons stored at bases on the territories of five
NATO nations, and al NATO nations (except France, which has chosen not to participate in
nuclear decisionmaking or operations) participating in nuclear planning and policymaking.
Specifical y, NATO cal s for “the broadest possible participation of Al ies in collective defence
planning on nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces, and in command, control and
consultation arrangements.”
The DDPR reiterated the al iance’s interest in pursuing arms control measures with Russia to
address concerns with these weapons. It noted that the al ies “look forward to continuing to
develop and exchange transparency and confidence-building ideas with the Russian Federation in
the NATO-Russia Council, with the goal of developing detailed proposals on and increasing
mutual understanding of NATO’s and Russia’s non-strategic nuclear force postures in Europe.” It
also indicated that NATO would “consider, in the context of the broader security environment,
what [it] would expect to see in the way of reciprocal Russian actions to al ow for significant
reductions in forward-based non-strategic nuclear weapons assigned to NATO.”60 In other words,
NATO would link any further changes in its nuclear posture to reciprocal changes in Russia’s
nonstrategic nuclear weapons posture.
NATO continued to review and revise its statements about nuclear weapons during its summits in
Wales (2014), Warsaw (2016), Brussels (2018) and Brussels (2021). These summits occurred
after Russia’s annexation of Crimea and in the shadow of Russia’s continuing aggressive
behavior in Europe. While most of the efforts announced after these summits sought to bolster
NATO’s conventional capabilities and demonstrate an enduring commitment to the defense of al
NATO al ies, some also addressed the role of nuclear weapons and arms control in NATO
strategy. For example, Paragraph 51 of the Warsaw Summit Communique confirms that “the
greatest responsibility of the Al iance is to protect and defend our territory and our populations
against attack ...” and that “no one should doubt NATO’s resolve if the security of any of its
members were to be threatened.”
As was noted above, the statement also reaffirmed the important role of nuclear deterrence in
al iance security. It indicated that “the strategic forces of the Al iance, particularly those of the
United States, are the supreme guarantee of the security of the Al ies” and that “the independent
strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France have a deterrent role of their own and
contribute to the overal security of the Al iance.” Moreover, the al ies reaffirmed that “NATO’s
nuclear deterrence posture also relies, in part, on United States’ nuclear weapons forward-
deployed in Europe and on capabilities and infrastructure provided by Al ies concerned.” In
addition, in response to concerns about Russian nuclear doctrine, the statement emphasized that
“any employment of nuclear weapons against NATO would fundamental y alter the nature of a
conflict” and, “if the fundamental security of any of its members were to be threatened however,
NATO has the capabilities and resolve to impose costs on an adversary that would be
unacceptable and far outweigh the benefits that an adversary could hope to achieve.”
On the other hand, the Warsaw Summit Communique recognized the strains on the arms control
relationship with Russia. Where the 2012 DDPR had cal ed for discussions with Russia on
transparency and confidence-building and indicated that NATO would consider negotiating
reductions in forward-based forces, the 2016 Warsaw statement simply noted that “arms control,

59 North Atlantic T reaty Organization (NATO), Deterrence and Defense Posture Review, Press Release, Chicago, IL,
May 20, 2012, p. 2. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87597.htm?mode=pressrelease.
60 Ibid., p. 4.
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disarmament, and non-proliferation continue to play an important role in the achievement of the
Al iance’s security objectives.” It then stated that, “in this context, it is of paramount importance
that disarmament and non-proliferation commitments under existing treaties are honoured ... ”
and cal ed on “Russia to preserve the viability of the INF Treaty through ensuring full and
verifiable compliance.”61
The communique released after the Brussels summit in July 2018 reiterated many of the points
raised in previous communiques.62 In several places, the al ies noted that the changing security
environment necessitated efforts to bolster the deterrence “as a core element” of the al iance’s
collective defense and noted that credible deterrence “wil continue to be based on an appropriate
mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile defence capabilities.” It also stated that a “robust
deterrence and defence posture strengthens Al iance cohesion and provides an essential political
and military transatlantic link, through an equitable and sustainable distribution of roles,
responsibilities, and burdens.”
At the same time, the 2018 communique went further in highlighting the al ies’ concerns with
Russia’s violation of the INF Treaty. The communique noted that the INF Treaty “has been
crucial to Euro-Atlantic security” and pointed out that “full compliance with the INF Treaty is
essential.” It supported the U.S. position on Russian noncompliance, noting that the “al ies have
identified a Russian missile system, the 9M729, which raises serious concerns” and that “a
pattern of behaviour and information over many years has led to widespread doubts about
Russian compliance.”
These concerns reached a peak in late 2018, when the United States announced that it would
withdraw from the INF Treaty in response to Russia’s violation.63 After their meeting on
December 4, 2018, the NATO Foreign Ministers released a statement noting that the “al ies have
concluded that Russia has developed and fielded a missile system, the 9M729, which violates the
INF Treaty” and that they “strongly support the finding of the United States that Russia is in
material breach of its obligations under the INF Treaty.” At the same time, though, they noted that
the “al ies are firmly committed to the preservation of effective international arms control,
disarmament and non-proliferation” and therefore, “wil continue to uphold, support, and further
strengthen arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, as a key element of Euro-Atlantic
security, taking into account the prevailing security environment.”64
After the leadership meeting in London in December 2019, the NATO al ies reaffirmed many of
the themes outlined in communiques issued over the previous five years. The London Declaration
noted that the al ies “are addressing and wil continue to address in a measured and responsible
way Russia’s deployment of new intermediate-range missiles ... which pose significant risks to
Euro-Atlantic security.” They also affirmed that NATO would remain a nuclear al iance as long as
nuclear weapons exist and that the al ies would continue to strengthen “our ability to deter and
defend with an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile defence capabilities.” At
the same time, as they had in previous communiques, the noted that the al ies “are fully

61 North Atlantic T reaty Organization, Warsaw Summit Communique, Warsaw, Poland, July 9, 2016,
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm?selectedLocale=en.
62 https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_156624.htm.
63 T he United States formally notified Russia of its intent to withdraw from INF on February 2, 2019, with the formal
withdrawal completed on August 2, 2019.
64 North Atlantic T reaty Organization, Statement on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) T reaty, Brussels,
Belgium, December 4, 2018, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_161122.htm?selectedLocale=en .
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committed to the preservation and strengthening of effective arms control, disarmament, and non-
proliferation, taking into account the prevailing security environment.”65
In the communique issues after the Brussels summit in June 2021, the NATO al ies expanded on
their concerns about Russia’s nuclear capabilities.66 In paragraph 13, the communique noted that
“Russia has continued to diversify its nuclear arsenal, including by deploying a suite of short- and
intermediate-range missile systems that are intended to coerce NATO.” It also noted that Russia
was continuing to expand its “nuclear capabilities by pursuing novel and destabilising weapons
and a diverse array of dual-capable systems.” It went on to assert that “Russia’s nuclear strategy
and comprehensive nuclear weapon systems modernisation, diversification, and expansion ...
increasingly support a more aggressive posture of strategic intimidation.”
The Brussels communique also reaffirmed the role of nuclear weapons in NATO’s deterrence and
defense posture. The al ies noted, as they had in past years, that “as long as nuclear weapons
exist, NATO wil remain a nuclear al iance.” The communique indicated that “NATO has taken
steps to ensure its nuclear deterrent capabilities remain safe, secure, and effective.” It reiterated
that “the strategic forces of the Al iance, particularly those of the United States, are the supreme
guarantee of the security of Al ies.” Moreover in paragraph 41, the al ies noted that “any
employment of nuclear weapons against NATO would fundamental y alter the nature of a
conflict.”
Although this communique highlighted the growing threats to NATO and the enduring role of
nuclear weapons in securing Members of the al iance, it also reaffirmed NATO’s commitment to
arms control and nonproliferation measures. In paragraph 45, the communique noted that “arms
control, disarmament, and non-proliferation have made and should continue to make an essential
contribution to achieving the Al iance’s security objectives” and that the “al ies wil welcome
new strategic talks between the United States and Russia on future arms control measures.” In
paragraph 47, the communique stated that the al ies “remain strongly committed to the full
implementation of the NPT in al its aspects” but reiterated the al iance’s opposition to the Treaty
on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which it claimed “is at odds with the existing
non-proliferation and disarmament architecture, risks undermining the NPT, and does not take
into account the current security environment.”
Extended Deterrence
Recent discussions about the U.S. nuclear weapons policy have placed a renewed emphasis on the
role of U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons in extended deterrence and assurance. Extended
deterrence refers to the U.S. threat to use nuclear weapons in response to attacks, from Russia or
other adversaries, against al ies in NATO and some al ies in Asia.67 Assurance refers to the U.S.
promise, made to those same al ies, to come to their defense and assistance if they are threatened
or attacked. The weapons deployed in Europe are a visible reminder of that commitment; nuclear

65 North Atlantic T reaty Organization, London Declaration, London, UK. December 4, 2019,
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_171584.htm?selectedLocale=en .
66 North Atlantic T reaty Organization, Brussels Summit Commuique, Brussels, Belgium, June 14, 2021.
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_185000.htm.
67 T he United States extends nuclear deterrence to Japan, South Korea, and Australia. It may also assure other allies of
the U.S. commitment to their security, but these assurances do not necessarily include legally binding commitments to
retaliate with nuclear weapons, if necessary. See Clark A. Murdock and Jessica M. Yeats, Exploring the Nuclear
Posture Im plications of Extended Deterrence and Assurance, CSIS, Workshop Proceeding and Key T akeaways,
Washington, DC, November 2009, http://csis.org/publication/exploring-nuclear-posture-implications-extended-
deterrence-and-assurance.
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capable bombers that were based in Guam served a similar purpose for U.S. al ies in Asia.68 Some
debates, however, have focused on the question of whether a credible U.S. extended deterrent
requires that the United States maintain weapons deployed in Europe, and the ability to deploy
them in the Pacific, or whether other U.S. military capabilities, including strategic nuclear
weapons and conventional forces, may be sufficient.69
In the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, the Obama Administration stated that the United States “wil
continue to assure our al ies and partners of our commitment to their security and to demonstrate
this commitment not only through words, but also through deeds.”70 The NPR indicated that a
wide range of U.S. military capabilities would support this goal, but also indicated that U.S.
commitments would “retain a nuclear dimension as long as nuclear threats to U.S. al ies and
partners remain.” The Administration did not, however, specify that the nuclear dimension would
be met with nonstrategic nuclear weapons; the full range of U.S. capabilities would likely be
available to support and defend U.S. al ies. In addition, the Administration announced that the
United States would retire the nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles that had helped provide
assurances to U.S. al ies in Asia. In essence, the Administration concluded that the United States
could reassure U.S. al ies in Asia, and deter threats to their security, without deploying sea-based
cruise missiles to the region in a crisis.
Moreover, the possible use of nuclear weapons, and extended nuclear deterrence, were a part of a
broader concept that the Obama Administration referred to as “regional security architectures.”
The 2010 NPR indicated that regional security architectures were a key part of “the U.S. strategy
for strengthening regional deterrence while reducing the role and numbers of nuclear weapons.”
As a result, these architectures would “include effective missile defense, counter-WMD
capabilities, conventional power-projection capabilities, and integrated command and control—
al underwritten by strong political commitments.”71 In other words, although the United States
would continue to extend deterrence to its al ies and seek to assure them of the U.S. commitment
to their security, it would draw on political commitments and a range of military capabilities to
achieve these goals.
During the presidential campaign in 2016, President Trump questioned the value of U.S. al iance
relationships in general and the relevance of NATO in particular. He argued that the United States
was overextended around the world and that U.S. al ies should contribute more toward their own
defense or at least pay more for U.S. security guarantees. Moreover, he suggested that some U.S.
al ies would be better served if they acquired their own nuclear weapons rather than relying on
U.S. nuclear weapons for their defense.
These ideas did not translate into policy in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. To the contrary, the
NPR asserted that the U.S. commitment to NATO and to al ies and partners in the Asia-Pacific
region “is unwavering.”72 Concerns about the regional threats to U.S. al ies in Europe and Asia

68 T he Air Force rotated B-1, B-2, and B-52 bombers through Guam for 16 years. During that time, it occasionally
conducted missions with the bombers flying over the Korean Penin sula in a show of support to the Republic of Korea.
It recently ended this mission and now plans to fly bombers into the region on a less regular schedule. Brian W.
Everstine, “AFGSC’s New Plan to Deploy Bombers Across the Globe,” Air Force Magazine, April 29, 2020,
https://www.airforcemag.com/afgscs-new-plan-to-deploy-bombers-across-the-globe/.
69 For see a discussion of these issues, see several essays in In the Eyes of the Experts: Analysis and Comments on
Am erica’s Strategic Posture, ed. T aylor Bolz (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2009).
70 Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, Washington, DC, April 6, 2010, p. 31,
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/NPR/2010_Nuclear_Posture_Review_Report.pdf .
71 Ibid., p. 32.
72 Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, Washington, DC, February 2, 2018, pp. 35-36,
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and about the credibility of U.S. assurances to these al ies dominated the analysis in the NPR.
However, while the 2010 NPR cal ed for a strengthening of U.S. conventional capabilities and
missile defenses as a part of its effort to strengthen extended deterrence, the 2018 NPR focused
almost exclusively on enhancements to U.S. nuclear capabilities. It did not completely dismiss the
value of U.S. conventional capabilities, but asserted that “conventional forces alone are
inadequate to assure many al ies who rightly place enormous value on U.S. extended nuclear
deterrence for their security.”73 According to the 2018 NPR, these concerns were central to the
recommendation that the United States develop two new types of nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
Regional Contingencies
In the past, U.S. discussions about nonstrategic nuclear weapons have also addressed questions
about the role they might play in deterring or responding to regional contingencies that involved
threats from nations that did not possess nuclear weapons. For example, former Secretary of
Defense Perry stated, during the Clinton Administration, that “maintaining U.S. nuclear
commitments with NATO, and retaining the ability to deploy nuclear capabilities to meet various
regional contingencies, continues to be an important means for deterring aggression, protecting
and promoting U.S. interests, reassuring al ies and friends, and preventing proliferation (emphasis
added).”74
Specifical y, both during the Cold War and after the demise of the Soviet Union, the United States
maintained the option to use nuclear weapons in response to attacks with conventional, chemical,
or biological weapons. For example, in 1999, Assistant Secretary of Defense Edward Warner
testified that “the U.S. capability to deliver an overwhelming, rapid, and devastating military
response with the full range of military capabilities wil remain the cornerstone of our strategy for
deterring rogue nation bal istic missile and WMD proliferation threats. The very existence of U.S.
strategic and theater nuclear forces, backed by highly capable conventional forces, should
certainly give pause to any rogue leader contemplating the use of WMD against the United States,
its overseas deployed forces, or its al ies.”75 These statements do not indicate whether
nonstrategic nuclear weapons would be used to achieve battlefield or tactical objectives, or
whether they would contribute to strategic missions, but it remained evident, throughout the
1990s, that the United States continued to view these weapons as a part of its national security
strategy.
The George W. Bush Administration also emphasized the possible use of nuclear weapons in
regional contingencies in its 2001 Nuclear Posture Review. The Bush Administration appeared to
shift toward a somewhat more explicit approach when acknowledging that the United States
might use nuclear weapons in response to attacks by nations armed with chemical, biological, and
conventional weapons, stating that the United States would develop and deploy those nuclear
capabilities that it would need to defeat the capabilities of any potential adversary whether or not
it possessed nuclear weapons.76 This does not, by itself, indicate that the United States would plan
to use nonstrategic nuclear weapons. However, many analysts concluded from these and other
comments by Bush Administration officials that the United States was planning for the tactical,

https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/20018728 86/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POST URE-REVIEW-FINAL-
REPORT .PDF.
73 Ibid., p. 17.
74 Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, February 1995, p. 84.
75 Statement of the Honorable Edward L. Warner, III, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and T hreat
Reduction, before the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, April 14, 1999.
76 See, for example, “Global Strike: A Chronology of the Pentagon’s New Offensive Strike Plan,” by Hans M.
Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, March 15, 2005, p. 108.
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first use of nuclear weapons. The Bush Administration never confirmed this view, and, instead,
indicated that it would not use nuclear weapons in anything other than the most grave of
circumstances.
The Obama Administration, on the other hand, seemed to foreclose the option of using nuclear
weapons in some regional contingencies. Specifical y, it stated, in the 2010 NPR, that “the United
States wil not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are
party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and in compliance with their nuclear non-
proliferation obligations.” Specifical y, if such a nation were to attack the United States with
conventional, chemical, or biological weapons, the United States would respond with
overwhelming conventional force, but it would not threaten to use nuclear weapons if the
attacking nation was in compliance with its nuclear nonproliferation obligations and it did not
have nuclear weapons of its own.77 At the same time, though, the NPR stated that any state that
used chemical or biological weapons “against the United States or its al ies and partners would
face the prospect of a devastating conventional military response—and that any individuals
responsible for the attack, whether national leaders or military commanders, would be held fully
accountable.”78
The 2018 NPR echoed some of the Obama Administration’s policy, but altered it to track more
closely with the policy of the Bush Administration. First, the 2018 NPR repeated the paragraph
from the 2010 NPR stating that “the United States wil not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons
against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear
non-proliferation obligations.”79 But it then stated that “the United States reserves the right to
make any adjustment in the assurance that may be warranted by the evolution and proliferation of
non-nuclear strategic attack technologies [emphasis added] and U.S. capabilities to counter that
threat.” Elsewhere in the document, the NPR indicated that non-nuclear strategic attacks could
include chemical, biological, cyber, and large-scale conventional aggression.80 Hence, where the
Obama Administration left open the possibility of nuclear retaliation in response to biological
attacks, but stated that other threats could be deterred by the prospect of a devastating
conventional response, the Trump Administration included a wider range of circumstances where
the United States might retaliate with nuclear weapons after an attack.
Force Structure
Through the late 1990s and early in George W. Bush Administration, the United States
maintained approximately 1,100 nonstrategic nuclear weapons in its active stockpile. Unclassified
reports indicate that, of this number, around 500 were air-delivered bombs deployed at bases in
Europe. The remainder, including some additional air-delivered bombs and around 320 nuclear-

77 T he NPR did include caveats to this declaration. T he Obama Administration stated that it would not use nuclear
weapons in response to chemical or biological attack, if the attacking nation were in compliance with its nuclear
nonproliferation obligations. T he possibility of a nuclear response remained, however, if a nation armed with nuclear
weapons uses nuclear, chemical, biological, or even conventional weapons against U.S. forces or allies. In addition, the
NPR stated that the United States might reconsider the pledge not to respond to biological weapons with nuclear
weapons in the future.
78 Nuclear Posture Review, p. 16,
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/NPR/2010_Nuclear_Posture_Review_Report.pdf .
79 Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, Washington, DC, February 2, 2018, p. 21,
https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POST URE-REVIEW-FINAL-
REPORT .PDF.
80 Ibid. p. 38.
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armed sea-launched cruise missiles, were held in storage areas in the United States.81 After the
Clinton Administration’s 1994 Nuclear Posture Review, the United States eliminated its ability to
return nuclear weapons to U.S. surface ships (it had retained this ability after removing the
weapons under the 1991 PNI). It retained, however, its ability to restore cruise missiles to attack
submarines, and it did not recommend any changes in the number of air-delivered weapons
deployed in Europe. During this time, the United States also consolidated its weapons storage
sites for nonstrategic nuclear weapons. It reportedly reduced the number of these facilities “by
over 75%” between 1988 and 1994. It eliminated two of its four storage sites for sea-launched
cruise missiles, retaining only one facility on each coast of the United States. It also reduced the
number of bases in Europe that store nuclear weapons from over 125 bases in the mid-1980s to
10 bases, in seven countries, by 2000.82
The Bush Administration did not recommend any changes for U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons
after completing its Nuclear Posture Review in 2001. Reports indicate that it decided to retain the
capability to restore cruise missiles to attack submarines because of their ability to deploy, in
secret, anywhere on the globe in time of crisis.83 The NPR also did not recommend any changes
to the deployment of nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Europe, leaving decisions about their status
to the members of the NATO al iance.
Nevertheless, according to unclassified reports, the United States did reduce the number of
nuclear weapons deployed in Europe and the number of facilities that house those weapons
during the George W. Bush Administration. Some reports indicate that most of the weapons were
withdrawn from Europe between 2001 and 2006. According to unclassified reports, some are
stored at U.S. bases and would be delivered by U.S. aircraft; others are stored at bases operated
by the “host nation” and would be delivered by that nation’s aircraft if NATO decided to employ
nuclear weapons.
The Obama Administration did not announce any further reductions to U.S. nuclear weapons in
Europe but it indicated that the United States would “consult with our al ies regarding the future
basing of nuclear weapons in Europe.” In the months prior to the completion of NATO’s 2010
Strategic Concept, some politicians in some European nations did propose that the United States
withdraw these weapons. For example, Guido Westerwel e, Germany’s foreign minister, stated
that he supported the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Germany.84 As was noted above,
NATO did not cal for the removal of these weapons in its new Strategic Concept, but did indicate
that it would be open to reducing them as a result of arms control negotiations with Russia.
Moreover, in the 2010 NPR, the Obama Administration indicated that it would take the steps
necessary to maintain the capability to deploy U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. It indicated that
the U.S. Air Force would retain the capability to deliver both nuclear and conventional weapons
as it replaced aging F-16 aircraft with the new F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. The NPR also indicated
that the United States would conduct a “full scope” life extension program for the B61 bomb, the
weapon that is currently deployed in Europe, “to ensure its functionality with the F-35.” This life
extension program wil consolidate four versions of the B61 bomb, including the B61-3 and B61-
4 that are currently deployed in Europe, into one version, the B61-12. Reports indicate that this

81 “NRDC Nuclear Notebook: U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2007,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February 2007.
See, also, U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 1954 -2004, by Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen. Bulletin of the
Atom ic Scientists, November/December 2004.
82 Joshua Handler, in Alexander and Millar, Tactical Nuclear Weapons, pp. 23-25.
83 Norris and Kristensen, op. cit.
84 Julian Borger, “Germans Press for Removal of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe,” The Guardian, November 7, 2009.
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new version wil reuse the nuclear components of the older bombs, but wil include enhanced
safety and security features and a new “tail kit” that wil increase the accuracy of the weapon.85
On the other hand, the 2010 NPR indicated that the U.S. Navy would retire its nuclear-armed,
sea-launched cruise missiles (TLAM-N). It indicated that “this system serves a redundant purpose
in the U.S. nuclear stockpile” because it is one of several weapons the United States could deploy
forward. The NPR also noted that “U.S. ICBMs and SLBMs are capable of striking any potential
adversary.” As a result, because “the deterrence and assurance roles of TLAM-N can be
adequately substituted by these other means,” the United States could continue to extend
deterrence and provide assurance to its al ies in Asia without maintaining the capability to
redeploy TLAM-N missiles.86
As was noted above, the Trump Administration’s NPR reaffirmed many of the policies and
programs the United States has pursued in recent years. It did not announce any changes to the
existing basing of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, although recent unclassified reports indicate
that it may have redeployed some of these weapons, leaving, perhaps around 100 warheads stored
at bases in Europe.87 The 2018 NPR also reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to upgrading U.S. dual-
capable aircraft (DCA) with the nuclear-capable F-35 aircraft. It indicated that the United States
would “maintain, and enhance as necessary, the capability to forward deploy nuclear bombers and
DCA around the world” and would “work with NATO to best ensure—and improve where
needed—the readiness, survivability, and operational effectiveness of DCA based in Europe.”88
The 2018 NPR also reinforced U.S. support for measures that NATO is taking to ensure that its
“overal deterrence and defense posture, including its nuclear forces, remain capable of
addressing any potential adversary’s doctrine and capabilities.” These measures include, among
other things, enhancing “the readiness and survivability of NATO DCA” and improving the
“capabilities required to increase their operational effectiveness”; promoting “the broadest
possible participation of Al ies in their agreed burden sharing arrangements”; and enhancing “the
realism of training and exercise programs to ensure the Al iance can effectively integrate nuclear
and non-nuclear operations.”89
On the other hand, the 2018 NPR reversed the Obama Administration’s decision to remove sea-
launched cruise missiles from the U.S. force structure. Where the 2010 NPR asserted that the
capabilities provided by a SLCM were redundant with those available on other forward-
deployable systems, the 2018 NPR argued that the SLCM would provide the United States with
“a needed non-strategic regional presence” that would address “the increasing need for flexible
and low-yield options.” According to the NPR, this would strengthen deterrence of regional

85 Hans M. Kristensen, Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons, Federation of American Scientists, Special Report No. 3,
Washington, DC, May 2012, p. 24, http://www.fas.org/_docs/Non_Strategic_Nuclear_Weapons.pdf.
86 Nuclear Posture Review, p. 28,
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/NPR/2010_Nuclear_Posture_Review_Report.pdf .
87 According to the Nuclear Notebook in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, “ T his number has declined since 2009
partly due to reduction of operational storage capacity ” at some European bases. T he authors note that the “ remaining
130 B61s stored in the United States are for backup and potential use by US fighter-bombers in support of allies outside
Europe, including northeast Asia.” Hans. M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, "United States Nuclear Weapons, 2021,"
Bulletin of the Atom ic Scientists, January 26, 2021. https://thebulletin.org/premium/2021-01/nuclear-notebook-united-
states-nuclear-weapons-2021/.
88 Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, Washington, DC, February 2, 2018, p. 54,
https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POST URE-REVIEW-FINAL-
REPORT .PDF.
89 Ibid., p. 36.
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adversaries and assure al ies of the U.S. commitment to their defense. The NPR also indicated
that a new SLCM program could serve as a response to Russia’s violation of the 1987
Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and a “necessary incentive for Russia to
negotiate seriously a reduction of its non-strategic nuclear weapons.”90
The Biden Administration included funding for the new SLCM program in its proposed budget
for FY2022. The Navy’s budget for FY2022 includes $5.2 mil ion for research and development,
while the FY2022 budget request for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
includes $10 mil ion for work on an alteration to the W80-4 warhead. At the same time, the
Administration may reconsider the decision to fund and deploy a new nuclear-armed SLCM
during its Nuclear Posture Review in the latter half of 2021. According to press reports from June
2021, the acting Secretary of the Navy had a memo that directed the Navy to cut funding for the
SLCM as it prepared its FY2023 budget. Several Members of Congress pushed back against this
initiative, noting that it was premature and inconsistent with possible arms control negotiations.91
In his responses to Advance Policy Questions from the Senate Armed Services Committee, Carlos
Del Toro, the nominee to be Secretary of the Navy, agreed to defer action “on any programmatic
decisions related to the nuclear sea launched cruise missile” until the Nuclear Posture Review is
completed.92
Russian Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons after the Cold War
Strategy and Doctrine
Russia has altered and adjusted the Soviet nuclear strategy to meet its new circumstances in a
post-Cold War world.93 It explicitly rejected the Soviet Union’s no-first-use pledge in 1993,
indicating that it viewed nuclear weapons as a central feature in its military and security
strategies. However, Russia did not maintain the Soviet Union’s view of the need for nuclear
weapons to conduct surprise attacks or preemptive attacks. Instead, it seems to view these
weapons as more defensive in nature, as a deterrent to conventional or nuclear attack and as a
means to retaliate and defend itself if an attack were to occur.
Russia has revised its national security and military strategy several times in the past 20 years,
with successive versions appearing to place a greater reliance on nuclear weapons.94 For example,
the military doctrine issued in 1997 al owed for the use of nuclear weapons “in case of a threat to
the existence of the Russian Federation.” The doctrine published in 2000 expanded the
circumstances when Russia might use nuclear weapons to include attacks using weapons of mass

90 Ibid. p. 55.
91 Caitlin M. Kenney, “Lawmakers Blast Acting Navy Secretary’s Defunding of Naval Nuclear Cruise Missile,”
Defense One, June 15, 2021, https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2021/06/lawmakers-blast-acting-navy-secretarys-
defunding-naval-nuclear-cruise-missile/174755/. See, also, Office of Senator James M. Inhofe, “ Inhofe, Rogers
Express Deep Concern Following Reports Navy Will Cancel Nuclear Sea Launched Cruise Missile,” June 8, 2021,
https://www.inhofe.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/inhofe-rogers-express-deep-concern-following-reports-navy-
will-cancel-nuclear-sea-launched-cruise-missile.
92 Senate Armed Services Committee, Advance Policy Questions for Mr. Carlos Del T oro, Nominee to be Secretary of
the Navy, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Del%20T oro%20APQ%20Responses.pdf .
93 For details on Russia’s nuclear strategy and nuclear forces, see CRS Report R45861, Russia’s Nuclear Weapons:
Doctrine, Forces, and Modernization, by Amy F. Woolf.
94 According to Alexander Pikayev, a Russian defense analyst, scenarios for the possible use of nuclear weapons
broadened since 1993 and 1997. See David Hoffman, “ New Russian Security Plan Criticizes West, Doctrine Broadens
Nuclear Use Policy,” Washington Post, January 15, 2000, p. 1.
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destruction against Russia or its al ies “as wel as in response to large-scale aggression utilizing
conventional weapons in situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation.”95
In mid-2009, when discussing the revision of Russia’s defense strategy that was expected late in
2009 or early 2010, Nikolai Patrushev, the head of Russia’s Presidential Security Council,
indicated that Russia would have the option to launch a “preemptive nuclear strike” against an
aggressor “using conventional weapons in an al -out, regional, or even local war.”96
However, when Russia published the final draft of the doctrine, in early 2010, it did not
specifical y authorize the preemptive use of nuclear weapons. Instead, it stated that “Russia
reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to a use of nuclear or other weapons of mass
destruction against her and (or) her al ies, and in a case of an aggression against her with
conventional weapons that would put in danger the very existence of the state.”97 Instead of
expanding the range of circumstances when Russia might use nuclear weapons, this actual y
seemed to narrow the range, from the 2000 version that al owed for nuclear use “in situations
critical to the national security of the Russian Federation” to the current form that states they
might be used in a case “that would put in danger the very existence of the state.”98
Hence, there was little indication that Russia plans to use nuclear weapons at the outset of a
conflict, before it engaged with conventional weapons, even though Russia could resort to the use
of nuclear weapons first, during an ongoing conventional conflict.99 This was not new, and has
been a part of Russian military doctrine for years.
Analysts have identified several factors that contributed to Russia’s increasing dependence on
nuclear weapons. First, with the demise of the Soviet Union and the economic upheavals of the
1990s, Russia no longer had the means to support a large and effective conventional army. The
conflicts in Chechnya and Georgia highlighted seeming weaknesses in Russia’s conventional
military forces. Russian analysts also saw emerging threats in other former Soviet states along
Russia’s periphery. Many analysts believed that by threatening, even implicitly, that it might
resort to nuclear weapons, Russia hoped it could enhance its ability to deter similar regional
conflicts. Russia’s sense of vulnerability, and its view that the threats to its security were
increasing, also stemmed from the debates over NATO enlargement. Russia has feared the
growing al iance would create a new chal enge to Russia’s security, particularly if NATO moved
nuclear weapons closer to Russia’s borders. These concerns contributed to the statement that
Russia might use nuclear weapons if its national survival were threatened.
For many in Russia, NATO’s air campaign in Kosovo in 1999 underlined Russia’s growing
weakness and NATO’s increasing wil ingness to threaten Russian interests. Its National Security
Concept published in 2000 noted that the level and scope of the military threat to Russia was
growing. It cited, specifical y, as a fundamental threat to its security, “the desire of some states
and international associations to diminish the role of existing mechanisms for ensuring
international security.” There are also threats in the border sphere. “A vital task of the Russian
Federation is to exercise deterrence to prevent aggression on any scale and nuclear or otherwise,
against Russia and its allies.” Consequently, Russia concluded that it “should possess nuclear

95 “Russia’s Military Doctrine,” Reprinted in Arms Control Today, May 2000.
96 David Nowak, “Report: Russia to allow Pre-emptive Nukes,” Associated Press, October 14, 2009.
97 T ext of the New Russian Military Doctrine, Available at Opensource.gov, February 5, 2010.
98 Nikolai Sokov, The new, 2010 Russian Military Doctrine: The Nuclear Angle, Center for Nonproliferation Studies,
CNS Feature Story, Monterey, CA, February 5, 2010.
99 Pavel Podvig, “New Russian Doctrine and Preventive Nuclear Strikes,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, October
14, 2009, http://russianforces.org/blog/2009/10/new_russian_doctrine_and_preve.shtml.
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forces that are capable of guaranteeing the infliction of the desired extent of damage against any
aggressor state or coalition of states in any conditions and circumstances.”100
The debate over the role of nuclear weapons in Russia’s national security strategy in the late
1990s considered both strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons. With concerns focused on
threats emerging around the borders of the former Soviet Union, analysts specifical y considered
whether nonstrategic nuclear weapons could substitute for conventional weaknesses in regional
conflicts. The government appeared to resolve this debate in favor of the modernization and
expansion of nonstrategic nuclear weapons in 1999, shortly after the conflict in Kosovo. During a
meeting of the Kremlin Security Council, Russia’s President Yeltsin and his security chiefs
reportedly agreed “that Moscow should develop and deploy tactical, as wel as, strategic nuclear
weapons.”101 Vladimir Putin, who was then chairman of the Security Council, stated that
President Yeltsin had endorsed “a blueprint for the development and use of nonstrategic nuclear
weapons.”102
Many analysts in the United States interpreted this development, along with questions about
Russia’s implementation of its obligations under the 1991 PNI, to mean that Russia was “walking
back” from its obligation to withdraw and eliminate nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Others drew a
different conclusion. One Russian analyst speculated that the documents approved in 1999
focused on the development of operations plans that would al ow Russia to conduct “limited
nuclear war with strategic means in order to deter the enemy, requiring the infliction of pre-
planned, but limited damage.”103 Specifical y, he argued that Russia planned to seek a new
generation of nonstrategic, or low-yield, warheads that could be to be delivered by strategic
launchers. Others believe Russia has also pursued the modernization of existing nonstrategic
nuclear weapons and development of new nuclear warheads for shorter-range nuclear missiles.
The potential threat from NATO remained a concern for Russia in its 2010 and 2014 military
doctrines.104 The 2010 doctrine stated that the main external military dangers to Russia are “the
desire to endow the force potential of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with global
functions carried out in violation of the norms of international law and to move the military
infrastructure of NATO member countries closer to the borders of the Russian Federation,
including by expanding the bloc.” It also noted that Russia was threatened by “the deployment of
troop contingents of foreign states (groups of states) on the territories of states contiguous with
the Russian Federation and its al ies and also in adjacent waters.” The 2014 doctrine repeated
these concerns. Hence, Russia views NATO troops in nations near Russia’s borders as a threat to
Russian security. This concern extends to U.S. missile defense assets that may be deployed on
land in Poland and Romania and at sea near Russian territory as a part of the European Phased
Adaptive Approach (EPAA). In an environment where Russia also has doubts about the
effectiveness of its conventional forces, its doctrine al ows for the possible use of nonstrategic
nuclear weapons during a local or regional conflict on its periphery. The doctrines do not say that

100 “2000 Russian National Security Concept,” Nezavisimoye Voennaye Obozreniye, January 14, 2000.
101 Martin Nesirky, “Focus: Nuclear-power Russia Wants T actical Weapons,” Reuters, April 29, 1999.
102 David Hoffman, “Kremlin to Bolster Nuclear Stockpile, Government Fears Short -Range Missiles May Be
Inadequate,” Washington Post, April 30, 1999, p. 19.
103 Ivan Safranchik, “T actical Nuclear Weapons in the Modern World: A Russian Perspective,” in Alexander and
Millar, Tactical Nuclear Weapons, p. 54.
104 T ext of the New Russian Military Doctrine, Available at Opensource.gov, February 5, 2010 . See, also, Dmitri
T renin, 2014: Russia's New Military Doctrine Tells All, Carnegie Moscow Center, Moscow, December 29, 2014,
https://carnegie.ru/commentary/57607.
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Russia would use nuclear weapons to preempt such an attack, but it does reserve the right to use
them in response.105
Although Russia does not use the phrase in any of these recent versions of its military doctrine,
analysts both inside and outside the U.S. government often refer to this approach as the “escalate
to de-escalate” doctrine.106 Russian statements, when combined with military exercises that
seemed to simulate the use of nuclear weapons against NATO members, led many to believe that
Russia might threaten to use its nonstrategic nuclear weapons to coerce or intimidate its
neighbors. These threats could occur prior to the start of a conflict, or within a conflict if Russia
believed that the threat to use nuclear weapons might lead its adversaries (including the United
States and its al ies) to back down.107 This doctrine, when combined with Russian statements
designed to remind others of the strength of Russia’s nuclear deterrent, seemed to indicate that
Russia had increased the role of nuclear weapons in its military strategy and military planning.108
In early June 2020, Russia released a new document titled “On Basic Principles of State Policy of
the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence” that outlined the threats and circumstances that
could lead to Russia’s use of nuclear weapons.109 This document stated that Russia’s nuclear
deterrence policy “is defensive by nature, it is aimed at maintaining the nuclear forces potential at
the level sufficient for nuclear deterrence.. ” It emphasized that Russia maintains forces that could
“inflict guaranteed unacceptable damage on a potential adversary … in any circumstances”110 As
with previous official statements, this document did not cal for the preemptive use of nuclear
weapons during conventional conflicts. But it did not completely resolve the question of whether
Russia would escalate to nuclear use if it were losing a conventional war. It notes that, “in the
event of a military conflict, this Policy provides for the prevention of an escalation of military
actions and their termination on conditions that are acceptable for the Russian Federation and/or
its al ies.” Analysts have assessed that this means Russia might threaten to escalate to nuclear use
as a way to deter a conflict that would threaten the existence of the state.111
The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review adhered to the view that Russia had adopted an escalate-to-
deescalate strategy and asserted that Russia “mistakenly assesses that the threat of nuclear
escalation or actual first use of nuclear weapons would serve to ‘de-escalate’ a conflict on terms
favorable to Russia.”112 This view underlines the NPR’s recommendations for the United States to

105 Vladimir Dvorkin, Nuclear Weapons in Russia's Amended Military Doctrine, Carnegie Moscow Center, Moscow,
January 22, 2015, https://carnegie.ru/commentary/58774.
106 For a more detailed discussion of Russian nuclear doctrine, see CRS Report R45861, Russia’s Nuclear Weapons:
Doctrine, Forces, and Modernization, by Amy F. Woolf.
107 For a detailed description of Russia’s strategy, see Nikolai N. Sokov, “Why Russia calls a limited nuclear strike ‘de-
escalation,’” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 2014, http://thebulletin.org/why-russia-calls-limited-nuclear-
strike-de-escalation.
108 Robin Emmott, “Risk of Nuclear War in Europe Growing, warns Russian Ex -Minister,” Reuters, March 21, 2016.
See, also, Yasmin T adjdeh, “ State Dept. Official: Russian Nuclear Disarmament Must Continue,” National Defense,
March 23, 2016.
109 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, On Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian
Federation, Moscow, June 2, 2020.
file:///H:/Long%20reads/Basic%20Principles%20of%20State%20Policy%20of%20the%20Russian%20Federation %20
on%20Nuclear%20Deterrence%20-%20-
%20T he%20Ministry%20of%20Foreign%20Affairs%20of%20the%20Russian%20Federation.pdf .
110 Ibid. Paras 4, 5 and 10.
111 Nikolai Sokov, Russia Clarifies Its Nuclear Deterrence Policy, Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-
Proliferation, Vienna, Austria, June 3, 2020, https://vcdnp.org/russia-clarifies-its-nuclear-deterrence-policy/.
112 Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, Washingt on, DC, February 2, 2018, p. 8,
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develop new low-yield nonstrategic weapons that, it argues, would provide the United States with
a credible response, thereby “ensuring that the Russian leadership does not miscalculate regarding
the consequences of limited nuclear first use.”113
Force Structure
It is difficult to estimate the number of nonstrategic nuclear weapons in the Russian arsenal. This
uncertainty stems from several factors: uncertainty about the number of nonstrategic nuclear
weapons that the Soviet Union had stored and deployed in 1991, when President Gorbachev
announced his PNI; uncertainty about the pace of reductions in these systems and numbers of
warheads eliminated from the Russian arsenal; the addition of significant numbers of new dual-
capable delivery systems to Russia’s forces structure; and uncertainty about the numbers of
warheads for available for deployment on these dual-capable delivery systems.
Analysts estimate that the Soviet Union may have deployed 15,000-25,000 nonstrategic nuclear
weapons, or more, in the late 1980s and early 1990s. During the 1990s, Russian officials stated
publicly that they had completed the weapons withdrawals mandated by the PNIs and had
proceeded to eliminate warheads at a rate of 2,000 per year.114 However, many experts doubt
these statements, noting that Russia probably lacked the financial and technical means to proceed
this quickly. In addition, Russian officials have offered a moving deadline for this process in their
public statements. For example, at the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty review conference in
2000, Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov stated that Russia was about to finish implementing its
PNIs. But, at a follow-up meeting two years later, Russian officials stated that the elimination
process was continuing, and, with adequate funding, could be completed by the end of 2004.115 In
2007, an official from Russia’s Ministry of Defense stated that Russia had completed the
elimination of al of the warheads for its ground forces, 60% of its missile defense warheads, 50%
of its air force warheads, and 30% of its naval warheads.116 In 2010, the Russian government
revised this number and said it had reduced its nonstrategic nuclear weapons inventory by 75%.117
In 2003, General Yuri Baluyevsky, who was then the first deputy chief of staff of the Russian
General Staff, stated that Russia would not destroy al of its tactical nuclear weapons and that it
would, instead, “hold on to its stockpiles” in response to U.S. plans to develop new types of
nuclear warheads.118 General Nikolai Makarov, head of the Russian General Staff, made a similar
comment in 2008. He said that Russia would “keep nonstrategic nuclear forces as long as Europe
is unstable and packed with armaments.”119

https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POST URE-REVIEW-FINAL-
REPORT .PDF.
113 Ibid. p. 30.
114 Lewis Dunn, “Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons Control: What is the Problem?,” in Larsen, Jeffrey A. and Kurt J.
Klingenberger, editors, Controlling Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Obstacles and Opportunities, United States Air
Force, Institute for National Security Studies, July 2001, p. 17.
115 Joshua Handler, in Alexander and Millar, Tactical Nuclear Weapons, p. 29.
116 Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2010,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
January/February 2010, p. 79.
117 Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2011,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 67,
no. 3 (May/June 2011), p. 71.
118 Vladimir Isachenkov, “U.S. Nuke Development Concerns Russia,” Interfax, November 26, 2003.
119 “Russian Military Chief Defends Nonstrategic Nukes,” Global Security Newswire, December 17, 2008.
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Russia has also reportedly reduced the number of military bases that could deploy nonstrategic
nuclear weapons and has consolidated its storage areas for these weapons. According to
unclassified estimates, the Soviet Union may have had 500-600 storage sites for nuclear warheads
in 1991. By the end of the decade, this number may have declined to about 100. In the past 10
years, Russia may have further consolidated its storage sites for nuclear weapons, retaining
around 50 in operation.120
With consideration for the uncertainties in estimates of Russian nonstrategic nuclear forces, some
sources indicate Russia may have had up to 4,000 warheads for nonstrategic nuclear weapons
around ten years ago.121 In its 2009 report, the congressional y mandated Strategic Posture
Commission indicated that Russia may have had around 3,800 operational nonstrategic nuclear
weapons.122 A more recent estimate indicates that “Russia today has approximately 1,910
nonstrategic nuclear warheads assigned for delivery by air, naval, ground, and various defensive
forces.”123 The authors calculate that, within this total, Russia’s Navy maintains about 930
warheads for “cruise missiles, antisubmarine rockets, antiaircraft missiles, torpedoes, and depth
charges.” The Air Force may have “roughly 500” nuclear warheads available for delivery by
fighters and bombers. The Army may have 70 warheads for short-range missiles and artil ery,
along with, possibly, some additional warheads for the dual-capable 9M729 intermediate-range
missile. Some 380 of Russia’s nonstrategic nuclear warheads may be al ocated to Russia’s air and
missile defense forces, with “nearly 290 nuclear warheads” for air defense forces and “roughly 90
for the Moscow A-135 missile defense system and coastal defense units.”
Another source, using a different methodology, concluded that Russia may have half that amount,
or only 1,000 operational warheads for nonstrategic nuclear weapons.124 This estimate concluded
that Russia might retain up to 210 warheads for its ground forces, up to 166 warheads for its air
and missile defense forces, 334 warheads for its air force, and 330 warheads for its naval
forces.125 Where past studies calculated the number of operational warheads by combining
estimates of reductions from Cold War levels with assessments of the number of nuclear-capable
units and delivery systems remaining in Russia’s force structure, this author focused on the
number of operational units and the likely number of nuclear warheads needed to achieve their
assigned missions.
The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review affirmed that Russia maintains and is modernizing “an active
stockpile of up to 2,000 non-strategic nuclear weapons.”126 To this point, Lieutenant General
Robert P. Ashley, then the Director of the Defense Intel igence Agency, noted in a speech in May

120 Hans M. Kristensen, Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons, Federation of American Scientists, Special Report No. 3,
Washington, DC, May 2012, p. 68, http://www.fas.org/_docs/Non_Strategic_Nuclear_Weapons.pdf.
121 U.S. Congress, House Armed Services Committee Hearing. James Miller, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy, Prepared Statement, November 2, 2011, p. 2.
122 William J. Perry, Chairman and James R. Schlesinger, Vice Chairman, America’s Strategic Posture, T he Final
Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, Washington, DC, April 2009,
p. 111, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/strat_posture_report_adv_copy.pdf .
123 Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2021 ,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 15,
2021, https://thebulletin.org/premium/2021-03/nuclear-notebook-russian-nuclear-weapons-2021/.
124 See Igor Sutyagin, Atomic Accounting: A New Estimate of Russia’s Non-strategic Nuclear Forces, Royal United
Services Institute, Occasional Paper, London, November 2012, p. 3,
https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201211_op_atomic_accounting.pdf .
125 Ibid., p. 73.
126 U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, Report, Washington, DC, February 2018, p. 58,
https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POST URE-REVIEW-FINAL-
REPORT .PDF.
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2019 that Russia’s stockpile of nonstrategic nuclear weapons is “already large and diverse” and
“is being modernized with an eye towards greater accuracy, longer ranges, and lower yields to
suit their potential warfighting role.” He stated that Russia’s “overal nuclear stockpile is likely to
grow significantly over the next decade” with this growth “primarily driven by a significant
projected increase in the number of Russia’s non-strategic nuclear weapons.” He also noted that
Russia is adding new capabilities, “including those employable by ships, aircraft, and ground
forces.127
There is widespread agreement that Russia is pursuing a broad-based modernization program for
its nonstrategic nuclear weapons, although experts disagree on the pace, direction, and rationale
for this program. Some sources assert that this effort appears to “involve phasing out Soviet-era
weapons and replacing them with newer but fewer arms.”128 Some argue that Russia wil retire
more of these weapons than it acquires as it develops more capable advanced conventional
weapons. Others, however, see Russia’s modernization of its nonstrategic nuclear weapons as a
partner to its “escalate to de-escalate” nuclear doctrine and argue that Russia wil expand its
nonstrategic nuclear forces as it raises their profile in its doctrine and war-fighting plans. The
2018 Nuclear Posture Review notes that Russia is “building a large, diverse, and modern set of
non-strategic systems that .. may be armed with nuclear or conventional weapons.” The NPR
argues that Russia is “increasing the total number of such weapons in its arsenal, while
significantly improving its delivery capabilities.”129
The 2018 NPR also noted that one of Russia’s new nonstrategic nuclear weapons is a ground-
launched cruise missile with a range between 500 and 5,000 kilometers, which made it a violation
of the 1987 INF Treaty. The Obama Administration had first reported that Russia was in violation
of INF in 2014, in the State Department’s Report on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms
Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments.130 According to the
2017 report, Russia began deploying the missile, now known as the 9M729, in late 2016.131 The
United States cited this missile’s development and deployment when it withdrew from the INF
Treaty in 2019.
Changing the Focus of the Debate
The preceding sections of this report focus exclusively on U.S. and Soviet/Russian nonstrategic
nuclear weapons. These weapons were an integral part of the Cold War standoff between the two
nations. The strategy and doctrine that would have guided their use and the numbers of deployed
weapons both figured into calculations about the possibility that a conflict between the two
nations might escalate to a nuclear exchange. Other nations—including France, Great Britain, and

127 Lt. Gen. Robert P. Ashley Jr., “Russian and Chinese Nuclear Modernization T rends,” Remarks at the Hudson
Institute, May 29, 2019, https://www.dia.mil/News/Speeches-and-T estimonies/Article-
View/Article/1859890/russianand-chinese-nuclear-modernization-trends/.
128 Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2020,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 9,
2020, p. 111, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00963402.2020.1728985 .
129 Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, Washington, D.C., February 2, 2018, p. 9,
https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POST URE-REVIEW-FINAL-
REPORT .PDF.
130 U.S. Department of State, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament
Agreements and Commitments, Washington, DC, July 2014, pp. 8 -10,
http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/2014/230047.htm.
131 For details on Russia’s noncompliance with the INF T reaty, see CRS Report R43832, Russian Compliance with the
Interm ediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Background and Issues for Congress, by Amy F. Woolf.
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China—also had nuclear weapons, but these did not affect the central conflict of the Cold War in
the same way as U.S. and Soviet forces.
The end of the Cold War, however, and the changing international security environment during
the past 30 years, has rendered incomplete any discussion of nonstrategic nuclear weapons that is
limited to U.S. and Russian forces. Because both these nations maintain weapons and plans for
their use, the relationship between the two nations could stil affect the debate about these
weapons. In addition, Russian officials have turned to these weapons as a part of their response to
concerns about a range of U.S. and NATO policies. Nevertheless, both these nations have looked
beyond their mutual relationship when considering possible threats and responses that might
include the use of nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Both nations have highlighted the threat of the
possible use of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons by other potential adversaries or non-
state actors. Both have indicated that they might use nuclear weapons to deter or respond to
threats from other nations. This theme is evident in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, which cal s
for the deployment of a new sea-launched cruise missile to address the threat, at least in part, to
U.S. al ies from the missile and nuclear programs in North Korea.
In addition, a debate about nonstrategic nuclear weapons could cover more than just the U.S. and
Russian arsenals. For example, India and Pakistan might also resort to nuclear weapons use in the
event of a conflict. If measured by the range of delivery vehicles and the yield of the warheads,
these nations’ weapons could be considered to be nonstrategic. But each nation could plan to use
these weapons in either strategic or nonstrategic roles. Both nations continue to review and revise
their nuclear strategies, leaving many questions about the potential role for nuclear weapons in
future conflicts. Pakistan, in particular, has considered deploying short-range tactical nuclear
weapons with forward-deployed forces, with the intention of using them on the battlefield to
blunt a possible Indian attack. China also has nuclear weapons with ranges and missions that
could be considered nonstrategic. Many analysts have expressed concerns about the potential for
the use of nuclear weapons in a conflict over Taiwan or other areas of China’s interests. This
report does not review the nuclear weapons programs in these nations.132 However, when
reviewing the issues raised by, problems attributed to, and solutions proposed for nonstrategic
nuclear weapons, the report acknowledges the role played by the weapons of these other nations.
Issues for Congress
During the 2010 debate on the New START Treaty, many Senators expressed concerns about
Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons. They noted that these weapons were not covered by New
START, that Russia possessed a far greater number of these weapons than did the United States,
and that Russia’s nonstrategic nuclear weapons might be vulnerable to theft or sale to other
nations seeking nuclear weapons. In 2014, after Russia annexed Crimea, some Members also
raised concerns about the possibility that Russia might deploy these weapons in that region,
bringing them closer to the borders of some NATO al ies. Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei
Lavrov ignited these concerns in December 2014, when he noted that Russia had a right to put
nuclear weapons in Crimea because Crimea was now a part of Russia.133 The 2018 Nuclear

132 For a more detailed discussion of Indian, Pakistani, and Chinese nonstrategic nuclear weapons, see Alexander, Brian
and Alistair Millar, editors, Tactical Nuclear Weapons, op cit. See also, T oshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, eds.
Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012). See, also, Hans. M.
Kristensen and Matt Korda, “T actical Nuclear Weapons, 2019,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, August 30, 2019, pp.
259-260, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00963402.2019.1654273?needAccess=true .
133 Sergei L. Loiko, “Russia says it has a right to put nuclear weapons in Crimea,” Los Angeles Times, December 15,
2014.
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Posture Review continued to highlight concerns about Russia’s nonstrategic nuclear weapons and
linked proposed changes in U.S. nuclear forces—including the development of a new low-yield
warhead for submarine launched bal istic missiles and new sea-launched cruise missile—to
Russia’s apparent nuclear doctrine and the modernization of its nonstrategic nuclear forces. The
Trump Administration sought to link limits on Russia’s nonstrategic nuclear weapons to U.S.-
Russian discussions about the extension of New START in 2020. The Biden Administration
extended the treaty without that linkage but has indicated that it supports including discussions
about nonstrategic nuclear weapons in its strategic stability dialogue with Russia.
During the 2010 debates prior to the completion of NATO’s new Strategic Concept, analysts and
government officials also raised many issues about U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons. These
debates focused on questions about whether NATO should continue to rely on nuclear weapons to
ensure its security and whether the United States should continue to deploy nonstrategic nuclear
weapons at bases in Europe. Many of the discussions that focused on Russian nonstrategic
nuclear weapons and many of those that focused on U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons reached a
similar conclusion—there was widespread agreement about the need for further cooperation
between the United States and Russia in containing, controlling, and possibly reducing
nonstrategic nuclear weapons. The 112th Congress reiterated its support for this agenda, when in
the FY2013 Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4310, §1037) it indicated that “the United States
should pursue negotiations with the Russian Federation aimed at the reduction of Russian
deployed and nondeployed nonstrategic nuclear forces.”
The tone of the discussion has changed in recent years, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea,
its support for separatists in Ukraine, and its military maneuvers near NATO nations. There is
little discussion of possible reductions in U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe and declining interest
in pursuing transparency and confidence-building measures with Russia. Instead, while the
prospects for cooperation with Russia seem limited, particularly in light of its reported violation
of the INF Treaty and the demise of that treaty, NATO has taken steps to bolster its nuclear
capabilities and the United States is considering the deployment of new nonstrategic nuclear
weapons.
Safety and Security of Russian Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons
Russia’s continued deployment of nonstrategic nuclear weapons has, in past years, raised
concerns about their safety and security in storage areas and a possible lack of central control
over their use when deployed in the field. Russia deployed these weapons, and continues to store
many of them, at remote bases close to potential battlefields and far from the central command
authority in Moscow. The economic chaos in Russia during the 1990s raised questions about the
stability and reliability of the troops charged with monitoring and securing these weapons and
fostered concerns about the possibility that the weapons might be lost, stolen, or sold to other
nations or groups seeking nuclear weapons.134 Although economic conditions improved, these
concerns persisted a decade later. During comments made after a speech in October 2008,
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated that he was worried that the Russians did not know the
numbers or locations of “old land mines, nuclear artil ery shel s, and so on” that might be of
interest to rogue states or terrorists.135

134 “Because of their size and forward basing, they are especially vulnerable to theft and unauthorized use. ” See
William C. Potter and Nikolai Sokov, “ Nuclear Weapons that People Forget,” International Herald Tribune, May 31,
2000.
135 Walter Pincus, “Gates Suggests New Arms Deal With Russia,” Washington Post, October 29, 2008, p. A9.
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Russian officials have denied that they might lose control over their nonstrategic nuclear weapons
and they contend that the problems of the 1990s were resolved as the weapons were withdrawn to
central storage areas.136 Moreover, there is no public evidence from Western sources about any
episodes of lost, sold, or stolen Russian nuclear weapons.
The Role of Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons in Russia’s National
Security Policy
As was noted above, many analysts argue that Russia’s nonstrategic nuclear weapons pose a risk
to the United States, its al ies, and others because Russia has altered its national security concept
and military strategies, increasing its reliance on nuclear weapons. Some fear that Russia might
resort to the early use of nuclear weapons in a conflict along its periphery, which could lead to a
wider conflict and the possible involvement of troops from NATO or other neighboring countries,
possibly drawing in new NATO members. Some also believe that Russia could threaten NATO
with its nonstrategic nuclear weapons because Russia sees NATO as a threat to its security.
Russian analysts and officials have argued that NATO enlargement—with the possible
deployment of nuclear weapons and missile defense capabilities on the territories of new NATO
members close to Russia’s borders—demonstrates how much NATO could threaten Russia.
The 2008 congressional y mandated Strategic Posture Commission expressed a measure of
concern about the military implications of Russia’s nonstrategic nuclear forces. It noted that
Russia “stores thousands of these weapons in apparent support of possible military operations
west of the Urals.” It further noted that the current imbalance between U.S. and Russian
nonstrategic nuclear warheads is “worrisome to some U.S. al ies in Central Europe.” It argued
that this imbalance, and the al ies’ worries, could become more pronounced in the future if the
United States and Russia continue to reduce their numbers of deployed strategic nuclear
weapons.137
Others have argued, however, that regardless of Russia’s rhetoric, “Russia’s theater nuclear
weapons are not ... destabilizing.” Even if modernized, these weapons wil not “give Moscow the
capability to alter the strategic landscape.”138 Further, Russian weapons, even with its new
military strategy, may not pose a threat to NATO or U.S. al ies. Russia’s doctrine indicates that it
would use these weapons in response to a weak performance by its conventional forces in an
ongoing conflict. Since it would be unlikely for NATO to be involved in a conventional conflict
with Russia, it would also be unlikely for Russian weapons to find targets in NATO nations. This
does not, however, preclude their use in other conflicts along Russia’s periphery. As Russian
documents indicate, Russia could use these weapons if its national survival were at stake.
This view, however, has been tempered, in recent years, by both Russia’s aggression in Ukraine
and its frequent “nuclear saber-rattling.” Not only have Russian officials reminded others of the
existence and relevance of Russian nuclear weapons, Russian military exercises, bomber flights,

136 Russia’s defense minister, Sergei Ivanov, has said that Russia’s nuclear arsenal is safe and militants could never
steal an atomic bomb from the country. He further noted that it is a myth that “ Russian nuclear weapons are guarded
badly and weakly.” See “ Russia Says No Militant T hreat to Nuclear Arsenal,” Reuters, August 3, 2004.
137 William J. Perry, Chairman and James R. Schlesinger, Vice Chairman, America’s Strategic Posture, T he Final
Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, Washington, DC, April 2009,
p. 21, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/strat_posture_report_adv_copy.pdf .
138 Robert Joseph, “Nuclear Weapons and Regional Deterrence,” in Larson, Jeffrey A. and Kurt J. Klingenberger,
editors, Controlling Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Obstacles and Opportunities, United States Air Force, Institute
for National Security Studies, July 2001. pp. 90 -92.
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and cruise missile launches have seemed designed to demonstrate Russia’s capabilities and,
possibly, its wil ingness to chal enge NATO’s eastern members. These actions have raised
concerns about the possibility that Russia might threaten to use nuclear weapons during a crisis
with NATO, in line with its apparent “escalate to de-escalate” strategy, to force a withdrawal by
NATO forces defending an exposed al y or to terminate a conflict on terms favorable to Russia.
While some analysts dispute this interpretation of Russia’s doctrine, most agree that nonstrategic
nuclear weapons appear to play a significant role in Russia’s doctrine and war plans.139
The Role of Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons in U.S. National
Security Policy
The Bush Administration argued, after the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, that the United States
had reduced its reliance on nuclear weapons by increasing the role of missile defenses and
precision conventional weapons in the U.S. deterrent posture. At the same time, though, the
Administration indicated that the United States would acquire and maintain those capabilities that
it needed to deter and defeat any nation with the potential to threaten the United States,
particularly if the potential adversary possessed weapons of mass destruction. It noted that these
new, threatening capabilities could include hardened and deeply buried targets and, possibly,
bunkers holding chemical or biological weapons. It indicated that the United States would seek to
develop the capabilities to destroy these types of facilities.
Using a similar construct, the Obama Administration, in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, also
indicated that the United States would reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. regional
deterrence strategies by increasing its reliance on missile defenses and precision conventional
weapons. Unlike the Bush Administration, however, the Obama Administration did not seek to
acquire new nuclear weapons capabilities or to extend U.S. nuclear deterrence to threats from
nations armed with chemical or biological weapons. It stated that it would not consider the use of
nuclear weapons in response to conventional, chemical, or biological attack if the attacking nation
were in compliance with its nuclear nonproliferation obligations. Instead, in such circumstances,
the United States would deter and respond to attacks with missile defenses and advanced
conventional weapons. In addition, the Administration announced that it planned to retire the
Navy’s nuclear-armed, sea-launched cruise missiles, which had been part of the U.S. extended
deterrent to al ies in Asia. Nevertheless, the Administration pledged to retain and modernize the
B-61 warheads, carried by U.S. tactical fighters and bombers; these are also a part of the U.S.
extended deterrent.
Some questioned the wisdom of this change in policy. They recognized that the United States
would only threaten the use of nuclear weapons in the most extreme circumstances, but they
argued that, by taking these weapons “off the table” in some contingencies, the United States
might al ow some adversaries to conclude that they could threaten the United States without fear
of an overwhelming response.140 The Obama Administration argued, however, that although it
was taking the nuclear option off the table in some cases, this change would not undermine the
U.S. ability to deter attacks from non-nuclear nations because the United States maintained the
capability to respond to attacks from these nations with overwhelming conventional force.
According to Under Secretary of State El en Tauscher, “we retain the prospect of using

139 Olya Oliker, Russia’s Nuclear Doctrine; What We Know, What We Don’t, and What That Means, CSIS,
Washington, DC, May 5, 2016, https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia%E2%80%99s-nuclear-doctrine.
140 Statement of Rep. Buck McKeon, ranking Member, U.S. Congress, House Armed Services, U.S. Nuclear Weapons
Policy, Hearing, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., April 14, 2010.
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devastating conventional force to deter and respond to any aggression, especial y if they were to
use chemical or biological weapons. No one should doubt our resolve to hold accountable those
responsible for such aggression, whether those giving the orders or carrying them out. Deterrence
depends on the credibility of response. A massive and potential conventional response to non-
nuclear aggression is highly credible.”141
Questions about the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in regional contingencies have resurfaced in
recent years, as analysts have sought to understand how these weapons might affect a conflict
with a regional al y armed with nuclear weapons.142 Some analysts doubt that U.S. nuclear
weapons would play any role in such a contingency, unless used in retaliation after an adversary
used a nuclear weapon against the United States or an al y, because U.S. conventional forces
should be sufficient to achieve most conceivable military objectives.143 Others, however, argue
that the United States might need to threaten the use of nuclear weapons, and possibly even
employ those weapons, when facing an adversary seeking to use its own nuclear capabilities to
intimidate the United States or coerce it to withdraw support for a regional al y. Some have
suggested, specifical y, that forward-deployed nuclear weapons with lower yields—in other
words, nonstrategic nuclear weapons—might serve as a more credible deterrent threat in these
circumstances.144
The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review adopted this perspective, and seemed to discount the approach,
taken in both the Bush and Obama NPRs, of reducing the role of nuclear weapons by expanding
the role and options available with advanced conventional weapons. It did not completely dismiss
the value of U.S. conventional capabilities, but asserted that “conventional forces alone are
inadequate to assure many al ies who rightly place enormous value on U.S. extended nuclear
deterrence for their security.”145 These concerns were central to the NPR’s recommendation that
the United States develop two new types of nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Where the two
previous NPRs sought to fil “gaps” in deterrence with bal istic missile defenses and advanced
conventional weapons, the 2018 NPR asserted that new nuclear weapons were needed for this
purpose.
The Role of Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons in NATO Policy and
Alliance Strategy
For years after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and demise of the Soviet Union, analysts
questioned whether the United States needed to continue to deploy nuclear weapons in Europe.
During the Cold War, these weapons were a part of NATO’s effort to offset the conventional
superiority of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact al ies. Some argued that this role was no
longer relevant following the collapse of the Soviet-era military and al iance structure. In

141 Statement of Ellen O. T auscher, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security. U.S.
Congress, Senate Armed Services, The Nuclear Posture Review, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., April 22, 2010.
142 For varied views on this issue, see Clark Murdock, et al. Project Atom: A Competitive Strategies Approach to
Defining U.S. Nuclear Strategy and Posture for 2025 -2050, CSIS, Washington, DC, May 2015, http://csis.org/files/
publication/150716_Murdock_ProjectAtom_Web_Rev2.pdf.
143 See, for example, Barry Blechman and Russell Rumbaugh, “Protecting U.S. Security by Minimizing the Role of
Nuclear Weapons: A New U.S. Nuclear Policy, in Clark Murdock, et al. Project Atom : A Com petitive Strategies
Approach to Defining U.S. Nuclear Strategy and Posture for 2025-2050, CSIS, Washington, DC, May 2015.
http://csis.org/files/publication/150716_Murdock_ProjectAtom_Web_Rev2.pdf.
144 Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “T he Nukes We Need: Preserving the American Deterrent,” Foreign Affairs,
November/December 2009. See also, Elbridge Colby, “America Must Prepare for “Limited War,” National Interest,
November/December 2015.
145 Ibid., p. 17.
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addition, analysts argued that NATO conventional forces were far superior to those of Russia, and
sufficient for NATO’s defense. However, NATO policy stil views nonstrategic nuclear weapons
as a deterrent to any potential adversary, and they also serve as a link among the NATO nations,
with bases in several nations and shared responsibility for nuclear policy planning and
decisionmaking. They also stil serve as a visible reminder of the U.S. extended deterrent and
assurance of its commitment to the defense of its al ies.
The United States, its al ies, and analysts outside government engaged in a heated debate over the
role of and need for U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons deployed in Europe in the months leading
up to the completion of NATO’s Strategic Concept in November 2010. In early 2010, political
leaders from several NATO nations—including Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, and Norway—cal ed for the United States to remove these weapons from Europe.
They argued that these weapons served no military purpose in Europe, and that their removal
would demonstrate NATO’s commitment to the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons, a
vision supported by President Obama in a speech he delivered in April 2009.146 Those who sought
the weapons’ removal also argued that NATO could meet the political goals of shared nuclear
responsibility in other ways, and that the United States could extend deterrence and ensure the
security of its al ies in Europe with conventional weapons, missile defenses, and longer-range
strategic nuclear weapons.147 Moreover, some argue, because these weapons play no military or
political role in Europe, they no longer serve as a symbol of al iance solidarity and cooperation.148
Others, however, including some officials in newer NATO nations, argued that U.S. nonstrategic
nuclear weapons in Europe not only remained relevant militarily, in some circumstances, but that
they were an essential indicator of the U.S. commitment to NATO security and solidarity. This
argument has gained credence as some of the newer NATO al ies, such as Poland and the Baltic
states, feel threatened by Russia and its arsenal of nonstrategic nuclear weapons. They would
view the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons as a change in the U.S. and NATO commitment to
their security.149
NATO foreign ministers addressed the issue of U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons during their
meeting in Tal inn, Estonia, in April 2010. At this meeting, the al ies sought to balance the views
of those nations who sought NATO agreement on the removal of the weapons and those who
argued that these weapons were stil relevant to their security and to NATO’s solidarity. At the
conclusion of the meeting, Secretary of State Hil ary Clinton said that the United States was not
opposed to reductions in the number of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, but that the removal of
these weapons should be linked to a reduction in the number of Russian nonstrategic nuclear
weapons.150 Moreover, according to a NATO spokesman, the foreign ministers had agreed that no
nuclear weapons would be removed from Europe unless al 28 member states of NATO agreed.

146 Kent Harris, “NAT O Allies Want U.S. Nuclear Weapons out of Europe,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition,
March 3, 2010. See, also, “ Allied Bid for Obama to Remove U.S. European Nuclear Stockpile,” AFP, February 20,
2010.
147 Oliver T hranert, U.S. Nuclear Forces In Europe to Zero? Yes, But Not Yet, Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, Proliferation Analysis, Washington, DC, December 10, 2008. See, also, Wolfgang Ischinger and Ulrich Weisser,
“ANT O and the Nuclear Umbrella,” New York Times, February 16, 2010.
148 Ian Davis and Oliver Meier, Don't Mention the Cold War: Lord Robertson’s Basil Fawlty Moment, NAT O Watch,
Berlin, February 12, 2010.
149 Franklin Miller, George Robertson, and Kori Schake, Germany Opens Pandora’s Box, Centre for European Reform,
Briefing Note, London, February 2010, p. 3.
150 “U.S. ties Removal of European Nukes to Russian Arms Cuts,” Global Security Newswire, April 23, 2010.
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Some also question whether the United States and NATO might benefit from the removal of these
weapons from bases in Europe for safety and security reasons. An Air Force review of nuclear
surety and security practices, released in early 2008, identified potential security concerns for
U.S. weapons stored at some bases in Europe.151 The problems were evident at some of the
national bases, where the United States stores nuclear weapons for use by the host nation’s own
aircraft, but not at U.S. air bases in Europe. The review noted that “host nation security at
nuclear-capable units varies from country to country” and that most bases do not meet DOD’s
security requirements.
Some in Congress thought the United States should consider expanding its deployment of dual-
capable aircraft and nuclear bombs into eastern NATO nations, in response to Russia’s aggression
in Ukraine. They argued that such moves would demonstrate that “Russian actions wil come at a
price.”152 Some have also suggested that the United States consider deploying new nuclear-armed
missiles in Europe, in response to Russia’s violation of the 1987 INF Treaty.153 There is little
evidence that NATO requested, or would welcome, such deployments, even after the United
States announced that it planned to withdraw from the INF Treaty. Some have argued that such
steps could ignite a new arms race that could further undermine security in Europe. Others have
noted that these weapons might be destabilizing if they were vulnerable to preemptive strikes.154
Moreover, NATO has adjusted its conventional force posture and operations in response to
Russia’s actions in Ukraine. According to NATO documents, these changes, when backed by the
strategic nuclear forces of the United States and United Kingdom, should help assure the eastern
al ies of NATO’s ability to defend them.155
The Relationship Between Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons and U.S.
Nonproliferation Policy
The George W. Bush Administration stated that the U.S. nuclear posture adopted after the 2002
NPR, along with the research into the development of new types of nuclear warheads, would
contribute to U.S. efforts to stem the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. It
argued that, by creating a more credible threat against the capabilities of nations that seek these
weapons, the U.S. policy would deter their acquisition or deployment. It also reinforced the value
of the U.S. extended deterrent to al ies in Europe and Japan, thus discouraging them from
acquiring their own nuclear weapons.156
Critics of the Bush Administration’s policy questioned whether the United States needed new
nuclear weapons to deter the acquisition or use of WMD by other nations; as noted above, they

151 Air Force Blue Ribbon Review of Nuclear Weapons Policies and Procedures, February 8, 2008.
152 John T . Bennett, “Turner: Putin's Act ions Must ‘Come With a Price,’” Defense News, January 22, 2015.
153 John Bolton and John Yoo, “An Obsolete Nuclear T reaty Even Before Russia Cheated,” Wall Street Journal,
September 9, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/john-bolton-and-john-yoo-an-obsolete-nuclear-treaty-even-before-
russia-cheated-1410304847.
154 Lt. Gen. Robert Gard and Greg T erryn, “The Wrong Move: Adding Nuclear Weapons to the Russia -Ukraine
Conflict,” Defense One, February 9, 2015, http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2015/02/wrong-move-adding-nuclear-
weapons-russia-ukraine-conflict/104940/.
155 North Atlantic T reaty Organization, NATO's Readiness Action Plan, Fact Sheet, February 2015,
http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2015_02/20150205_1502-Factsheet-RAP-en.pdf.
156 An Assessment of the Impact of Repeal of the Prohibition on Low Yield Warhead Development on the Ability of the
United States to Achieve its Nonproliferation Objectives, jointly submitted to the Congress by the Secretary of State,
Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of Energy, March 2004, p. 4.
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claim that U.S. conventional weapons can achieve this objective. Further, many analysts claimed
that the U.S. policy would actual y spur proliferation, encouraging other countries to acquire their
own WMD. Specifical y, they noted that U.S. plans and programs could reinforce the view that
nuclear weapons have military utility. If the world’s only conventional superpower needs more
nuclear weapons to maintain its security, then it would be difficult for the United States to argue
that other nations could not also benefit from these weapons. Such nations could also argue that
nuclear weapons would serve their security interests. Consequently, according to the Bush
Administration’s critics, the United States might ignite a new arms race if it pursued new types of
nuclear weapons to achieve newly defined battlefield objectives.157 The Bush Administration
countered this argument by noting that few nations acquire nuclear weapons in response to U.S.
nuclear programs. They do so either to address their own regional security chal enges, or to
counter U.S. conventional superiority.158
The Obama Administration, in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, set out a different relationship
between U.S. nuclear weapons policy and nonproliferation policy. The Bush Administration had
indicated that a policy where the United States argued that it might use nuclear weapons against
non-nuclear nations would discourage these nations from acquiring or using weapons of mass
destruction. In other words, they could be attacked with nuclear weapons whether or not they had
nuclear weapons of their own. The Obama Administration, however, argued that its adjustment to
the U.S. declaratory policy—where it indicated that it would not use U.S. nuclear weapons to
threaten or attack nations who did not have nuclear weapons and were in compliance with their
nonproliferation obligations—would discourage their acquisition of nuclear weapons. Nations
that did not yet have nuclear weapons would know that they could be added to the U.S. nuclear
target list if they acquired them. And others, like Iran and North Korea, who were already
pursuing nuclear weapons, would know that, if they disbanded their programs, they could be
removed from the U.S. nuclear target list.
The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review explicitly stated that “credible U.S. extended nuclear
deterrence wil continue to be a cornerstone of U.S. non-proliferation efforts.”159 Many analysts
have argued that, if al ies were not confident in the reliability and credibility of the U.S. nuclear
arsenal, they may feel compel ed to acquire their own nuclear weapons. Such calculations might
be evident in Japan and South Korea, as they face threats or intimidation from nuclear-armed
neighbors like China and North Korea. In recent years, some politicians in South Korea have
cal ed for the return of U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons to the peninsula, or even South Korea’s
development of its own nuclear capability, as a response to North Korea’s development and
testing of nuclear weapons.160 This view has not received the support of the current government in
South Korea, but it does demonstrate that some may see U.S. security guarantees as fragile. Many
analysts note, however, that extended deterrence rests on more than just U.S. nonstrategic nuclear

157 “T he long term consequences of developing new nuclear weapons might well be to push Iran, North Korea, and
other states to work harder and faster in developing and manufacturing their own nukes. ” See William Arkin, “ New
Nukes? No Way,” Los Angeles Tim es, August 17, 2003.
158 An Assessment of the Impact of Repeal of the Prohibition on Low Yield Warhead Development on the Ability of the
United States to Achieve its Nonproliferation Objectives, jointly submitted to the Congress by the Secretary of State,
Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of Energy, March 2004, p. 4.
159 Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, Washington, DC, February 2, 2018, p. 70,
https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POST URE-REVIEW-FINAL-
REPORT .PDF.
160 Robert Marquand, “Amid Crisis, Influential South Korean politician wants to deploy US nukes,” Christian Science
Monitor, April 9, 2013. See, also CRS Report R44950, Redeploying U.S. Nuclear Weapons to South Korea:
Background and Im plications in Brief, by Amy F. Woolf and Emma Chanlett -Avery.
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weapons. For example, in recent years the United States and South Korea have participated in the
U.S.-ROK (Republic of Korea) Extended Deterrence Policy Committee and the United States and
Japan have pursued the U.S.-Japan Extended Deterrence Dialogue to discuss issues related to
regional security and to bolster the al ies’ confidence in the U.S. commitment to their security.
Moreover, the United States occasional y flies B-2 and B-52 bombers in joint exercises with
South Korea to demonstrate its ability to project power, if needed, into a conflict in the area.161
Arms Control Options
Concerns about the disparity between the numbers of U.S. and Russian nonstrategic nuclear
weapons have dominated discussions about possible arms control measures addressing
nonstrategic nuclear weapons. But the United States and Russia have never employed their
nonstrategic nuclear weapons to counter, or balance, the nonstrategic nuclear weapons of the
other side. For NATO during the Cold War and for Russia in more recent years, these weapons
have served to counter perceived weaknesses and an imbalance in conventional forces. As a
result, there has been little interest, until recently, in calculating or creating a balance in the
numbers of nonstrategic nuclear weapons.162
Some who have expressed a concern about the numerical imbalance in nonstrategic nuclear
weapons argue that this imbalance could become more important as the United States and Russia
reduce their numbers of strategic nuclear weapons. They fear that NATO nations located near
Russia’s borders may feel threatened or intimidated by Russia’s nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
They assert that Russia’s advantage in the numbers of these weapons, when combined with a
reduction in U.S. strategic forces, could convince these nations that Russia was the rising power
in the region, and that they should, therefore, accede to Russia’s political or economic pressure.
Others, however, have questioned this logic. They agree that Russia’s ability to intimidate, and
possibly attack, NATO nations on its periphery may be related to the capabilities of Russia’s
conventional forces and the existence of Russia’s nuclear forces. But this ability would exist
whether Russia had dozens or hundreds of nuclear weapons in the region. And NATO’s ability to
resist Russian pressure and support vulnerable al ies would be related more to its political
cohesion and overal military capabilities than to the precise number of nuclear weapons that
were deployed on European territory. Moreover, some note that, in spite of Russia’s advantage in
the aggregate number on nonstrategic nuclear weapons, many of Russia’s weapons may be
deployed at bases closer to its border with China than its borders with NATO nations, so many of
these weapons should not count in the balance at al .
Increase Transparency
Many analysts have argued that the United States and Russia should, at a minimum, provide each
other with information about their numbers of nonstrategic nuclear weapons and the status (i.e.,
deployed, stored, or awaiting dismantlement) of those weapons. According to one such article, “a
crucial first step ... would be to ... agree on total transparency, verification, and the right to
monitor changes and movement of the arsenal.”163 Such information might help each side to
monitor the other’s progress in complying with the PNIs; it could also help resolve questions and

161 Jay Solomon, Julian E. Barnes, and Alastair Gale, “North Korea Warned,” Wall Street Journal, March 29, 2013.
162 For a discussion of the possible politics of the concerns about this issue, see Hans M. Kristensen, Non-Strategic
Nuclear Weapons, Federation of American Scientists, Special Report No. 3, Washington, DC, May 2012, pp. 40 -41,
http://www.fas.org/_docs/Non_Strategic_Nuclear_Weapons.pdf.
163 Catherine M. Kelleher and Scott L. Warren, “Getting to Zero Starts Here: T actical Nuclear Weapons,” Arms Control
Today, October 2009, p. 11.
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concerns that might come up about the status of these weapons or their vulnerability to theft or
misuse. The United States and Russia have discussed transparency measures for nuclear weapons
in the past, in a separate forum in the early 1990s, and as a part of their discussions of the
framework for a START III Treaty in the late 1990s. They failed to reach agreement on either
occasion. Russia, in particular, has seemed unwil ing to provide even basic information about its
stockpile of nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Some in the United States resisted as wel , arguing
that public discussions about the numbers and locations of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe could
increase pressure on the United States to withdraw these weapons.
After NATO completed its new Strategic Concept in 2010 and Deterrence and Defense Posture
Review in 2012, many experts recognized that NATO was unlikely to approve reductions in U.S.
nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Europe unless Russia agreed to similar reductions. As a result, in
recent years, some again argued that NATO and Russia should focus on transparency and
confidence-building measures as a way to ease concerns and build cooperation, before they seek
to negotiate actual limits or reductions in nonstrategic nuclear weapons. They could begin, for
example, with discussions about which types of weapons to include in the negotiation and what
type of data to exchange on these weapons. Some have suggested, in addition, that the two
nations could exchange information on the locations of storage facilities that no longer house
these weapons, as a way to begin the process of building confidence and understanding. Those
who support this approach argue that it would serve wel as a first step, and could eventual y lead
to limits or reductions. Others, however, believe these talks might serve as a distraction, and, if
the United States and Russia get bogged down in these details, they may never negotiate limits or
reductions. Moreover, Russian officials seem equal y as uninterested in transparenc y negotiations
as they are in reductions at this time.
Negotiate a Formal Treaty
Over the years, some analysts have suggested that the United States and Russia negotiate a formal
treaty to put limits and restrictions on each nation’s nonstrategic nuclear weapons. This was a
central theme in the debate over the New START Treaty in late 2010. Not only did Members of
the Senate cal on the Obama Administration to pursue such negotiations, Administration officials
noted often that the New START Treaty was just a first step and that the United States and Russia
would pursue limits on nonstrategic nuclear weapons in talks on a subsequent agreement. This is
also a key theme in the Trump Administration’s approach to the future of arms control, with
Administration officials arguing that New START is insufficient because it does not limit
nonstrategic nuclear weapons. They noted that President Trump wanted to pursue an agreement
that would limit al the weapons that can threaten the United States and its al ies.164
The Biden Administration has also supported arms control as a way to address Russia’s
nonstrategic nuclear weapons. After agreeing with Russia to extend New START, Secretary of
State Blinen stated that the two sides could use the time provided by that extension “to pursue
with the Russian Federation, in consultation with Congress and U.S. al ies and partners, arms
control that addresses al of its nuclear weapons.”165

164 Kylie Atwood and Nicole Gaouette, “T rump admin aiming for major nuclear deal with Russia and China,” CNN,
April 26, 2019, https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/25/politics/trump -nuclear-deal-russia-china/index.html.
165 Anthony J. Blinken, Secretary of State, On the Extension of the New START Treaty with the Russian Federation,
U.S. Department of State, Press Statement, Washington, D.C., February 3, 2021, https://www.state.gov/on-the-
extension-of-the-new-start-treaty-with-the-russian-federation/.
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Negotiations on a treaty to limit nonstrategic nuclear weapons could be complex, difficult, and
very time-consuming.166 Given the large disparity in the numbers of U.S. and Russian
nonstrategic nuclear weapons, and given the different roles these weapons play in U.S. and
Russian security strategy, it may be difficult to craft an agreement that not only reduces the
numbers of weapons in an equitable way but also addresses the security concerns addressed by
the retention of these weapons. A treaty that imposed an equal ceiling on each sides’ numbers of
deployed nonstrategic weapons might appear equitable, but it would require sharp reductions in
Russia’s forces with little impact on U.S. forces. A treaty that required each side to reduce its
forces by an equal percentage would have a similar result, requiring far deeper reductions on
Russia’s part.167
Even if the United States and Russia could agree on the depth of reductions to impose on these
weapons, they may not be able to agree on which weapons would fal under the limit. For the
United States, it may be relatively straightforward to identify the affected weapons—the limit
could apply to the gravity bombs deployed in Europe and any spare weapons that may be stored
in the United States. Russia, however, has many different types of nonstrategic nuclear weapons,
including some that could be deployed on naval vessels, some that would be delivered by naval
aircraft, and some that would be deployed with ground forces. Moreover, while many of these
weapons might be deployed with units in western Russia, near Europe, others are located to the
east, and would deploy with troops in a possible conflict with China.
To address these problems, some analysts have suggested that the limits in the next arms control
treaty cover al types of nuclear warheads—warheads deployed on strategic-range delivery
vehicles, warheads deployed with tactical-range delivery vehicles, and nondeployed warheads
held in storage.168 The Obama Administration reportedly considered this approach, and studied
the contours of a treaty that would limit strategic, nonstrategic, and nondeployed nuclear
warheads.169 This type of agreement would al ow each side to determine, for itself, the size and
mix of its forces, within the limits on total warheads.170 The Trump Administration also
considered this approach in its discussions with Russia about New START extension in 2020.
While this type of comprehensive agreement may seem to provide a solution to the imbalance
between U.S. and Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons, it is not clear that, once the parties move
beyond limits on just their deployed strategic weapons, they wil be able to limit the scope of the
treaty in this way. Each side has its own list of weapons that it finds threatening; each may seek to
include these in a more comprehensive agreement. For example, Russian officials, including the
Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, have stated that a future arms control agreement should also
include limits on missile defenses, strategic-range weapons that carry conventional warheads, and
possibly weapons in space. Minister Lavrov stated, specifical y, that

166 Walter Pincus, “ST ART Has Passed, But T actical Arms Remain an Issue,” Washington Post, December 28, 2010, p.
11. See, also, Peter Baker, “ Smaller Arms Next for U.S. and Russia,” New York Tim es, December 25, 2010, p. 4.
167 A proposal of this type can be found in Franklin Miller, George Robertson, and Kori Schake, Germany Opens
Pandora’s Box, Centre for European Reform, Briefing Note, London , February 2010, p. 3.
168 See, for example, Steven Pifer, “After New ST ART : What Next?,” Arms Control Today, December 2010.
169 “New ST ART Follow-Up T alks Seen Addressing All U.S., Russian Nuclear Arms,” Global Security Newswire,
February 13, 2012.
170 “T he only way to get a real handle on NSNF security, and the relationship of these weapons to strategic arms control
and the real military threats they pose (while maintaining some capability) is the warhead control route. ” See Joseph F.
Pilat, “ Controlling Nonstrategic Nuclear Forces,” in Larson, Jeffrey A. and Kurt J. Klingenberger, editors, Controlling
Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Obstacles and Opportunities, United States Air Force, Institute for National Security
Studies, July 2001, p. 243.
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it is impossible to discuss only one aspect of the problem at strategic parity and stability
negotiations held in the modern world. It is impossible to ignore such aspects as non-
nuclear strategic armaments, on which the United States is actively working, plans to
deploy armaments in space, which we oppose actively, the wish to build global missile
defense systems, and the imbalance of conventional armaments. It is possible to hold
further negotiations only with due account of all these factors….”171
The United States has no interest in including these types of limits in the next agreement. Hence,
it is not clear that the two sides would be able to agree on which issues and what weapons
systems to include in a next round of arms control negotiations.
Moreover, although President Medvedev agreed, in April 2009, that the United States and Russia
should pursue more arms control reductions after completing New START, Russia may have little
interest in limits on nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Russian officials have denied that their
weapons pose a safety and security problem, and they stil consider these weapons essential to
Russian military strategy and national security.
Prospects for Arms Control
Most analysts question whether the United States and Russia are likely to make any progress on
either limits or transparency measures related to nonstrategic nuclear weapons in the current
environment. Russia’s annexation of Crimea, aggression against Ukraine, and violation of the
INF Treaty have altered the security atmosphere in Europe and quieted cal s among officials in
NATO nations for reductions in these weapons. According to Obama Administration officials, the
U.S. offer for further negotiations remained on the table through the end of the Administration,
but “progress requires a wil ing partner and a conducive strategic environment.”172
The Trump Administration reiterated this point in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, noting that
“progress in arms control is not an end in and of itself, and depends on the security environment
and the participation of wil ing partners.”173 It emphasized, further, that neither of these
conditions exist today, in light of Russia’s violation of numerous arms control agreements and its
efforts to “change borders and overturn existing norms” in Crimea and eastern Ukraine.
Nevertheless, the 2018 NPR suggested the contours of a possible future arms control agreement
between the United States and Russia. When discussing the need for a new sea-launched cruise
missile, the NPR notes that this missile would not only provide a “non-strategic regional
presence” and “an assured response capability” to bolster the U.S. commitment to its al ies’
defense, but would also provide “an INF-Treaty compliant response to Russia’s continuing Treaty
violation.” Moreover, it seems to view the SLCM as a bargaining chip for a future negotiation:
If Russia returns to compliance with its arms control obligations, reduces its non-strategic
nuclear arsenal, and corrects its other destabilizing behaviors, the United States may
reconsider the pursuit of a SLCM. Indeed, U.S. pursuit of a SLCM may provide the
necessary incentive for Russia to negotiate seriously a reduction of its non-strategic nuclear
weapons, just as the prior Western deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces in

171 “State Duma Passes New ST ART Ratification Bill in Second Reading,” Itar-Tass, January 14, 2010.
172 Rose Gottemoeller, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, U.S. Nuclear Arms Control
Policy, U.S. Department of State, Remarks at the Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, December 18, 2014,
https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/us/2014/235395.htm.
173 Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, Washington, D.C., February 2, 2018, p. 73,
https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POST URE-REVIEW-FINAL-
REPORT .PDF.
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Europe led to the 1987 INF Treaty. As then Secretary of State George P. Shultz stated, “If
the West did not deploy Pershing II and cruise missiles, there would be no incentive for
the Soviets to negotiate seriously for nuclear weapons reductions.
This last sentence is a reference to NATO’s 1979 Dual Track decision, which paved the way for
the negotiation of the INF Treaty. In the late 1970s, the Soviet Union began to deploy a new
intermediate-range bal istic missile—known as the SS-20—that threatened to upset stability in
Europe and raised questions about the cohesion of NATO. As a result, in December 1979, NATO
adopted a "dual-track" decision that sought to link the modernization of U.S. nuclear weapons in
Europe with an effort to spur the Soviets to negotiate reductions in INF systems.174
In the first track, the United States and its NATO partners agreed to replace aging medium-range
Pershing I bal istic missiles with a more accurate and longer-range Pershing II (P-II) while adding
new ground-launched cruise missiles. In the second track, NATO agreed that the United States
should attempt to negotiate limits with the Soviet Union on intermediate-range nuclear systems.
The al ies recognized that the Soviet Union was unlikely to negotiate limits on its missiles unless
it faced a similar threat from intermediate-range systems based in Western Europe. Initial y, the
United States sought an agreement that would impose equal limits on both sides' intermediate-
range missiles, but after several years of negotiations and significant changes in the global
security environment, both nations agreed to a global ban on al land-based intermediate-range
bal istic and cruise missiles.
This agreement serves as an imperfect model for the offer contained in the 2018 NPR. The “dual-
track” decision envisioned limits on similar systems—U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range
missiles. The NPR offered to forgo the new U.S. SLCM in exchange for a longer list of Russian
weapons and behaviors—it indicated that the United States might reconsider the SLCM program
if Russia “returns to compliance with its arms control obligations, reduces its non-strategic
nuclear arsenal, and corrects its other destabilizing behaviors.” In addition, the 1979 dual track
decision sought to deploy new U.S. missiles in Europe, to balance an emerging Soviet threat to
Europe. A U.S. offer to forgo the SLCM in negotiations with Russia could be inconsistent with
the NPR’s insistence that this missile is critical to extended deterrence in Asia. Even if the United
States sought to limit the agreement to missiles deployed in Europe, Russia might object by
noting that the United States could easily move sea-launched cruise missiles deployed in Asia to
locations closer to Russia (the INF Treaty addressed the problem of mobility by adopting a global
ban on these missiles). Final y, as the United States and Soviet Union discovered when they
negotiated the INF Treaty, the complexity of distinguishing between nuclear and conventional
cruise missiles could necessitate a ban on al cruise missiles of a designated range. This would
likely be inconsistent with the U.S. reliance on conventional SLCMs in conflicts around the
world.
Consequently, even with the potential opening for arms control in the 2018 NPR, the Trump
Administration’s reported interest in a broad-based agreement limiting al types of nuclear
weapons, and its effort to link a freeze on Russia’s nuclear arsenal to the extension of New
START, the Trump Administration was unable to capture nonstrategic nuclear weapons in an
arms control agreement.

174 For details on this decision and the negotiation of the INF T reaty see CRS Report R43832, Russian Compliance with
the Interm ediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Background and Issues for Congress, by Amy F. Woolf.
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Author Information

Amy F. Woolf

Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy

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