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Updated July 14, 2021
Crisis in Mali
Once seen as a democratic leader, Mali has become an
Figure 1. Mali at a Glance
epicenter of regional conflict and instability over the past
decade. The military’s ouster of the elected president in
August 2020 highlighted governance failings and deepened
political uncertainty. In May 2021, the same soldiers
overthrew the transitional civilian leaders whom they had
put in place, after chafing at Transition President Bah
N’Daw’s effort to replace two junta members as cabinet
ministers. The leader of both coups, Colonel Assimi Goïta,
has replaced N’Daw as Transition President; allied officers
hold four cabinet posts and lead the transitional legislature.
Under regional pressure, Goïta has promised elections in
February 2022 in which he will not be a candidate, but
observers question his commitment. Transitional leaders
also have pledged a constitutional referendum to advance
the government’s 2015 peace deal with northern rebels.
In 2020, many in Bamako (Figure 1) welcomed the coup,
following weeks of street protests against then-President
Ibrahim Boubacar Kéïta. Reactions to the May 2021 events
Source: CRS graphic. Data from CIA World Factbook, IMF.
were more muted, even as Goïta named a leader in the 2020
protest movement, Choguel Maïga, as Transition Prime
Background. Mali has been mired in crisis since 2012,
Minister. Authorities may struggle to meet expectations of
when a northern separatist rebellion led by members of the
improvements in security and socioeconomic conditions,
minority ethnic Tuareg community prompted a military
both of which have deteriorated in recent years. Islamist
coup and Islamist insurgent advance, all during a regional
insurgents and other armed groups control much of Mali’s
drought. The coup contributed to the military’s collapse in
territory. Ethnic militias, some of which appear to enjoy
northern Mali, which the Tuareg-led National Movement
state backing, have massacred civilians in rural areas, and
for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA)—bolstered by arms
state security forces have been implicated in killings and
from Libya and fighters with ties to Al Qaeda in the Islamic
abuses. Rebel, terrorist, communal, and criminal networks
Maghreb (AQIM)—then declared an independent state. By
often overlap. Although relatively secure, Bamako has seen
mid-2012, however, AQIM and two loosely aligned groups
several terrorist attacks, including a 2015 assault at a hotel
had outmaneuvered the MNLA to assert control over most
that killed 19 civilians (one of them American).
of the north. France deployed its military against the
Islamist groups in early 2013, at which point the MNLA
These complex threats and security dynamics have impeded
and other factions (re-)asserted control in some areas.
development and humanitarian relief for Mali, a poor and
MINUSMA deployed in mid-2013, and President Kéïta
landlocked country with limited arable land. The
won elections later that year, leading the United States to
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has
lift coup-related aid restrictions (discussed below).
compounded challenges. As of mid-2021, U.N. agencies
estimated that 5.9 million Malians (29%) required
President Kéïta was reelected in 2018, but opposition
humanitarian aid, over 372,000 were displaced internally,
mounted over his administration’s apparent interference in
and nearly 47,000 were refugees in neighboring countries.
legislative election results, corruption scandals, worsening
insecurity, militia violence, and economic hardships. In
Foreign troops have deployed to stabilize Mali and counter
June and July 2020, a loose alliance of politicians, civil
terrorism. The U.N. peacekeeping operation in Mali,
society actors, and supporters of an influential Bamako
MINUSMA, is one of the world’s largest and most
religious leader convened large protests and called for Kéïta
dangerous. Some 5,100 French troops serve in Operation
to resign. A violent state crackdown further discredited
Barkhane, a counterterrorism mission that receives U.S.
Kéïta’s leadership, and regional mediation efforts failed.
logistical and intelligence support, although France has
The August 2020 coup d’état followed. Criminal
announced plans to close Barkhane bases in northern Mali
proceedings against the 2012 coup leader, Captain Amadou
and gradually draw down its forces. France has called for
Sanogo, were dropped in early 2021.
the European Union, which has trained Mali’s military and
law enforcement entities, to take on a greater role in
Stalled Peace Accord
regional security. Donors, including the United States, have
In 2015, President Kéïta’s administration signed a peace
also sought to build the capacity of a “joint force”
deal with two northern armed coalitions: one led by ex-
established by the G5 Sahel (Mali, Mauritania, Niger,
separatists including the MNLA, the other by pro-unity
Burkina Faso, and Chad) to coordinate military operations.
groups with ties to Bamako. Mediated by Algeria with
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Crisis in Mali
broad international backing, the “Algiers Accord” aims to
U.N. Peacekeeping Operation
address northern (and specifically Tuareg) political
Authorized at up to 13,289 military and 1,920 police
grievances, reestablish state authority and promote
personnel, MINUSMA is mandated to prioritize support for
development in the north, and isolate designated terrorist
implementation of the 2015 peace accord, followed by
groups, which were not party to the talks. Implementation
support for stabilizing and restoring state authority in
lagged, however, while conflicts multiplied and spread.
central Mali, protecting civilians, and other tasks.
MINUSMA is not authorized to pursue counterterrorism
Today, state actors remain absent from much of the north—
operations but can provide reimbursed logistical support to
and, increasingly, from central Mali, which is outside the
G5 forces. The mission has struggled with logistical and
scope of the accord. Signatory armed groups have not
force protection challenges, despite aircraft and troop
disarmed and maintain parallel administrative structures in
contributions from European militaries. African forces have
some areas. Islamist insurgents have acted as spoilers, and
borne the brunt of mission fatalities. As of mid-2021, nine
maintain ties to some signatory groups. U.N. sanctions
U.S. staff officers were serving in MINUSMA.
monitors have reported the involvement of signatory group
members in drug trafficking, ethnic violence, and cooption
U.S. Policy and Aid
of humanitarian aid and have alleged official involvement
The State Department characterizes U.S.-Mali relations as
in protection rackets and obstruction of the peace process.
“based on shared goals of improving stability and reducing
Various new armed factions have emerged since 2015.
poverty.” Since 2015, successive U.S. Administrations have
emphasized implementation of the 2015 peace accord as the
The design and process behind the 2015 accord may have
cornerstone of U.S. diplomatic engagement. The Trump
contained the seeds of Mali’s further destabilization. While
Administration appointed the first ever U.S. Special Envoy
the accord is structured as a deal between Bamako and the
for the Sahel in 2020; the Biden Administration has not
north, there is an armed struggle within the north motivated
named a successor to date.
by territory, trafficking routes, patronage, and revenge. The
talks granted concessions to a relatively small number of
Following the 2020 coup, the United States suspended
actors who had taken up arms, alienating others (in the
certain aid to Mali’s government—including all military aid
north and elsewhere) who felt victimized by the state and/or
and some development programs—under Section 7008
by signatory groups. The mediators ruled out discussion of
(“coups d’état”) of annual State, Foreign Operations and
federalism or altering the secular nature of Mali’s political
Related Programs appropriations legislation. Aid for
system, both issues that resonate in and beyond the north.
humanitarian, democracy, and certain internal security
purposes, among others, is exempted or otherwise not
Islamist Insurgency
subject to the provision. Once imposed, restrictions under
In 2017, AQIM’s Sahel branch merged with an offshoot
Section 7008 can be lifted only if the State Department
and two local affiliates to form the Union for Supporting
certifies that “a democratically elected government has
Islam and Muslims (aka JNIM), under the leadership of
taken office.” Certain U.S. security assistance and arms
Iyad Ag Ghaly, a Malian Tuareg. JNIM has claimed attacks
transfers are subject to additional restrictions due to Mali’s
on U.N., French, and state targets in Mali and Burkina
designation under the Child Soldiers Prevention Act of
Faso. In 2018, JNIM attacked the G5 Sahel joint force
2008 (CSPA, Title IV of P.L. 110-457), as amended. Mali
headquarters in central Mali, forcing it to relocate to
has not been a top recipient of U.S. security aid in the
Bamako. A separate AQIM offshoot has affiliated with the
region since 2012; recent programs have focused on
Islamic State and claimed the 2017 deadly ambush of U.S.
counterterrorism, professionalization, and security sector
soldiers in Niger; it remains active in border areas.
reforms.
These groups have proven resilient, withstanding frequent
U.S. bilateral aid for Mali totaled $144 million in FY2020
French military strikes on top leaders and ably exploiting
appropriations, emphasizing health, basic education, and
local grievances and communal tensions. In recent years,
agriculture. The United States provided an additional $140
they have enlarged their areas of operation, expanded
million in emergency humanitarian aid in FY2020. In
recruitment, carried out complex attacks on local and U.N.
recent years, additional funds have been allocated for Mali
military outposts, and forced the retreat of state and rival
under regional and global initiatives, including global
actors by targeting civilian officials, traditional leaders, and
COVID-19 relief and the State Department-led Trans-
individuals accused of colluding with Bamako and/or
Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP); some
France. Human rights abuses by state and militia forces
TSCTP assistance is subject to coup-related and/or CSPA
may have helped fuel recruitment.
restrictions. The Biden Administration has requested $124
Prominent Malian politicians, civil society figures, and
million in bilateral aid in FY2022, proposing to reduce
religious leaders have urged peace talks with Malian-led
some rule-of-law, HIV/AIDS, water, and education funds.
jihadist groups. The idea gained further steam in October
The United States has helped shape MINUSMA’s mandate,
2020 with the negotiated release from JNIM custody of a
and the State Department allocated $356 million for the
top Malian opposition politician and three European
mission in FY2020; separate U.S. aid programs also support
hostages. Bamako freed some 200 terrorism suspects in
troop and police contributors. In line with U.N. Security
exchange for the hostage releases, and a large ransom was
Council actions, the United States has designated five
reportedly paid. France opposes the notion of talks with
individuals for sanctions under Executive Order 13882
Islamist insurgent leaders, sparking some local pushback.
(2019), pertaining to Mali. Other Malian individuals and
entities are subject to U.S. and U.N. terrorism sanctions.
Alexis Arieff, Specialist in African Affairs
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Crisis in Mali
IF10116
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