Joint All-Domain Command and Control:
July 8, 2021
Background and Issues for Congress
John R. Hoehn
The Department of Defense (DOD) is in the process of a once-in-a-generation modernization of
Analyst in Military
its approach to commanding military forces. Senior DOD leaders have stated that the
Capabilities and Programs
department’s existing command and control architecture is insufficient to meet the demands of

the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS). Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) is
DOD’s concept to connect sensors from all of the military services—Air Force, Army, Marine

Corps, Navy, and Space Force—into a single network.
DOD points to ride-sharing service Uber as an analogy to describe its desired end state for JADC2. Uber combines two
different apps—one for riders and a second for drivers. Using the respective users’ positions, the Uber algorithm determines
the optimal match based on distance, travel time, and passengers (among other variables). In the case of JADC2, that logic
would find the optimal platform to attack a given target, or the unit best able to address an emerging threat. For JADC2 to
work effectively, DOD is pursuing two emerging technologies: automation and artificial intelligence, and new
communications methods.
Several agencies and organizations within DOD are involved in JADC2-related efforts. The following list highlights selected
organizations and projects associated with JADC2 development:
 DOD Chief Information Officer: Fifth Generation (5G) Information Communications Technologies.
 Office of the Secretary of Defense (Research & Engineering): Fully Networked Command, Control, and
Communications (FNC3).
 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency: Mosaic Warfare.
 Air Force: Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS).
 Army: Project Convergence.
 Navy: Project Overmatch.
As DOD develops new methods to command and control military forces, Congress may consider several potential issues:
 How can Congress consider JADC2-related activities in advance of validated requirements or cost
estimates?
 How can DOD ensure interoperability among each of the military services’ and allies’ communications
systems?
 How should DOD prioritize competing communications requirements for its future network?
 What role will artificial intelligence play in future command and control decisionmaking systems?
 What potential force structure changes will be necessary to meet JADC2 requirements?
 How should DOD manage JADC2-related efforts?

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Contacts
Author Information ....................................................................................................... 23

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Joint All-Domain Command and Control: Background and Issues for Congress

What Is JADC2?1
Joint Al -Domain Command and Control (JADC2) is the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s)
concept to connect sensors from al of the military services—Air Force, Army, Marine Corps,
Navy, and Space Force—into a single network. Traditional y, each of the military services
developed its own tactical network, which was incompatible with those of other services (e.g.,
Army networks were unable to interface with Navy or Air Force networks). With JADC2, DOD
envisions creating an “internet of things” network that would connect numerous sensors with
weapons systems, using artificial intel igence algorithms to help improve decisionmaking.2
DOD officials have argued that future conflicts may require leaders to make decisions within
hours, minutes, or potential y seconds, compared with the current multiday process for analyzing
the operating environment and issuing commands.3 The unclassified summary of the National
Defense Strategy (NDS) Commission’s report states that current C2 systems have “deteriorated”
against potential peer competitors.4 Similarly, the NDS identifies command and control systems
as a modernization priority.5 Congress may be interested in the JADC2 concept because it is
being used to develop many high-profile procurement programs, as wel as determining how
effective and competitive the U.S. military could be against potential adversaries.
Figure 1. Conceptual Vision of JADC2

Source: https://www.monch.com/mpg/news/ew-c4i-channel/7334-saic-and-usaf-partner-for-jadc2.html.

1 For a summary of JADC2 see CRS In Focus IF11493, Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2), by John R.
Hoehn.
2 Jim Garamone, “Joint All-Domain Command, Control Framework Belongs to Warfighters,” DOD News, November
30, 2020, at https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2427998/joint -all-domain-command-control-
framework-belongs-to-warfighters/. For a broader discussion of DOD’s efforts for Artificial Intelligence, see CRS
Report R45178, Artificial Intelligence and National Security, by Kelley M. Sayler.
3 For example, according to joint operational doctrine, military commanders plan air operations between 72 and 96
hours in advance. See Department of Defense, Joint Air Operations, JP 3-30, Washington, DC, July 25, 2019,
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_30.pdf.
4 See Gary Roughead, Eric Edelman, et al., Providing for the Common Defense, National Defense Strategy
Com m ission, The Assessm ent and Recom m endations of the National Defense Strategy Com m ission, 2018 , p. 25,
https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2018-11/providing-for-the-common-defense.pdf.
5 James Mattis, Summary of the National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American
Military’s Competitive Edge, Department of Defense, January 2018, p. 6, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/
pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.
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JADC2 envisions providing a cloud-like environment for the joint force to share intel igence,
surveil ance, and reconnaissance data, transmitting across many communications networks, to
enable faster decisionmaking (see Figure 1).6 JADC2 intends to help commanders make better
decisions by collecting data from numerous sensors, processing the data using artificial
intel igence algorithms to identify targets, and then recommending the optimal weapon—both
kinetic and nonkinetic (e.g., cyber or electronic weapons)—to engage the target.
DOD points to ride-sharing service Uber as an analogy to describe its desired end-state for
JADC2.7 Uber combines two different apps—one for riders and a second for drivers. Using the
respective users’ positions, the Uber algorithm determines the optimal match based on distance,
travel time, and passengers (among other variables). The application then provides directions for
drivers to follow to deliver passengers to their destination. Uber relies on cel ular and Wi-Fi
networks to transmit data to match riders and provide driving instructions.
Some analysts take a more skeptical approach to JADC2. They raise questions about its technical
maturity and affordability, and whether it is possible to field a network that can securely and
reliably connect sensors to shooters and support command and control in a lethal, electronic
warfare-rich environment.8 Analysts also ask who would have decisionmaking authority across
domains, given that, traditional y, command authorities are delegated within each domain rather
than from an overal campaign perspective.9 Some also question how much a human would be
needed for JADC2 to make decisions in real time, and whether it is appropriate to reduce the
amount of human involvement in military-related decisions.
What Is Command and Control:
Dimensionality of C2 and Implications of Artificial Intelligence
One can view command and control through the context of the five questions: who, what, when, where, and how.
Traditional y, Congress has focused on command and control through two different, yet related issues: authorities
(the “who”) versus technology (the “how”). The first issue that Congress has traditional y focused on reflects the
authority a commander has to execute an operation.10 This line of discussion focuses on the chain of command,
reflecting the differences between the military services—charged with organizing, training, and equipping U.S.
forces—and the combatant commands, who have the authority to employ forces abroad. This issue can be
summarized by the question: “who commands forces?”
The second issue represents the technical aspects that enable commanders to make these decisions and transmit
them to the field. Terms like command, control, communications (C3), C3 plus computers (C4), and intel igence,
surveil ance, and reconnaissance (ISR) enter the discussion.11 This technical issue of command and control looks at
the data (and method of col ection) that commanders use to make decisions (i.e., ISR is the data to enable
decisionmaking), the processing power to transform data into information, and the systems that enable

6 Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Building JADC2: Data, AI & Warfighter Insight,” Breaking Defense, January 13, 2021,
https://breakingdefense.com/2021/01/building-jadc2-data-ai-warfighter-insight/.
7 Rachel S. Cohen, “Want to Understand MDC2? T hink About Uber, USAF Official Says,” Air Force Magazine,
September 23, 2019, https://www.airforcemag.com/want -to-understand-mdc2-think-about-uber-usaf-official-says/.
8 Bryan Clark and Dan Patt, “JADC2 May Be Built T o Fight T he Wrong War,” Breaking Defense, January 14, 2021,
https://breakingdefense.com/2021/01/jadc2-may-be-built-to-fight-the-wrong-war/.
9 See Department of Defense, Joint Operations, JP 3-0, Washington, DC, January 17, 2017, Incorporating Change 1
October 22, 2018, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_0ch1.pdf?ver=2018-11-27-160457-
910.
10 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10542, Defense Primer: Commanding U.S. Military Operations, by
Kathleen J. McInnis.
11 For detailed definitions of each of these terms, see Department of Defense, DOD Dictionary of Military and
Associated Term s, Washington, DC, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf.
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commanders to communicate their decisions to geographical y distributed forces. This technical approach to
command and control can be summarized as, “how do you command forces?”
Other dynamics of command and control answer other questions: which systems and units are being commanded
(what), the temporal aspect (when), and geography (where). Congress has historical y expressed interest in each
of these questions in the context of specific, rather than general, issues. For example, rather than considering
general purpose forces, Congress has focused on issues regarding nuclear forces and authorities associated with
special operations.12 Command and control topics associated with quick response to nuclear and cyber
operations,13 and to a limited extent in terms of electromagnetic spectrum operations,14 have been other areas
where the issue of timeliness has drawn congressional attention.
Regarding the “when,” Congress has expressed interest in command and control associated with quick response
to nuclear and cyber operations,15 and to a limited extent in terms of electromagnetic spectrum operations.16
However, the greatest sensitivity on “when” appears to be more tactical y focused (e.g., when to have aircraft on
target, when an assault on a building should begin); these decisions are often delegated to commanders. Final y, the
geographic component presents unique chal enges for commanding U.S. forces; as long as both the executive
branch and Congress continue to support a global national security strategy,17 geographic decisions largely
represent tactical issues that are often delegated to individual commanders.

12 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10521, Defense Primer: Command and Control of Nuclear Forces, by
Amy F. Woolf, and CRS Report RS21048, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for
Congress, by Andrew Feickert .
13 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10537, Defense Primer: Cyberspace Operations, by Catherine A.
T heohary.
14 Some analysts argue that spectrum management decisions will require increased speed to maintain communications
networks. T he presence of adversary electronic jamming, these analysts argue, will require split -second decisions to
allow bursts of communications to forces.
15 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10537, Defense Primer: Cyberspace Operations, by Catherine A.
T heohary.
16 Some analysts argue that spectrum management decisions will require increased speed to maintain communications
networks. T he presence of adversary electronic jamming, these analysts argue, will require split -second decisions to
allow bursts of communications to forces. For example see U.S. Army, “Artificial Intelligence impro ves Soldiers’
electronic warfare user interface,” press release, October 8, 2019, https://www.army.mil/article/218705/
artificial_intelligence_improves_soldiers_electronic_warfare_user_interface.
17 For a detailed discussion on this issue, see CRS Report R44891, U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for
Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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Figure 2. Dimensionality of Command and Control and Implications of
Artificial Intelligence

Source: Congressional Research Service.
Figure 2 depicts how these issues are beginning to intersect through the introduction of artificial intel igence (AI)
to optimize results among the various dimensions. As formations increase in complexity—particularly with
formations designed for Joint Al -Domain Operations—control ing these forces could potential y surpass the
ability of human cognition, with algorithms used to help manage these forces. The U.S. military has stated that it
intends to keep humans involved throughout the decisionmaking process,18 but as U.S. forces introduce more
artificial intel igence technologies into their decisionmaking apparatus, distinctions among the dimensions begin to
blur. For example, the “who” and “how” begin to look similar, particularly as computers or algorithms make
recommendations to commanders, who may not understand the information or the process that produced the
recommendation.
AI could also affect other aspects of command and control, including the “what,” “when,” and “where.” Combining
the “what” and “where” elements can chal enge adversaries’ ability to find and engage U.S. forces; doing so can
also chal enge commanders’ and their staffs’ ability to maintain control of forces without systems helping to
manage the complexity. From a “when” perspective, operations requiring quick decisionmaking, particularly
electromagnetic spectrum and/or cyber operations, could surpass humans’ decisionmaking ability. This raises a
significant question of how much commanders can trust AI and how wel human operators wil need to
understand why the AI system recommends a particular action.
Why Change Current C2 Structures?
DOD currently performs C2 using separate segments of the battle space—primarily along the
identified military domains: air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace. This structure exists because
traditional threats came from a single system, like aircraft and tank formations. In response, the
military developed highly sophisticated (but costly) sensors to surveil e the battle space,
providing information to a centralized command center (like an Air Operations Center or Army
Command Post). Systems such as the E-3 Advanced Warning and Command System (AWACS)
and the E-8 Joint Surveil ance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) were optimized to provide

18 Department of Defense, “DOD Adopts 5 Principles of Artificial Intelligence Ethics,” press release, February 25,
2020, https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2094085/dod-adopts-5-principles-of-artificial-
intelligence-ethics/.
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situational awareness to commanders at these centralized outposts, where they could then direct
military forces.19
The future operating environment articulated by the NDS, the NDS Commission that reviewed it,
and other sources describe how potential adversaries have developed sophisticated anti-
access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities (see Figure 3).20 These capabilities include electronic
warfare, cyber weapons, long-range missiles, and advanced air defenses.21 U.S. competitors have
pursued A2/AD capabilities as a means of countering traditional U.S. military advantages—such
as the ability to project power—and improving their ability to win quick, decisive engagements.22
Figure 3. Visualization of A2/AD Environment

Source: https://www.japcc.org/electronic-warfare-the-forgotten-discipline/.
Senior DOD leaders have stated that access to information wil be critical in the future operating
environment.23 In addition, these leaders have stated that to chal enge potential peer adversaries, a
multidomain approach is required (in which U.S. forces would use ground, air, naval, space, and

19 Concepts like AirLand Battle emerged from this thinking. T he theory behind AirLand Battle was that the United
States maintained an advantage in long-range reconnaissance and strike capabilities. DOD decided to invest in
platforms like AWACS and JST ARS (along with the long-range Army T actical Missile System [AT ACMS]) to engage
Soviet tank reinforcements. David E. Johnson, The Lessons of AirLand Battle and the 31 Initiatives for Multi-Dom ain
Battle, RAND Corporation, PE301, August 2018, https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE301.html.
20 See Gary Roughead, Eric Edelman, et al., Providing for the Common Defense, National Defense Strategy
Com m ission, The Assessm ent and Recom m endations of the National Defense Strategy Com m ission,
2018, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2018-11/providing-for-the-common-defense.pdf.
21 For more information on these systems, see CRS In Focus IF11118, Defense Primer: Electronic Warfare, by John R.
Hoehn; CRS In Focus IF10537, Defense Prim er: Cyberspace Operations, by Catherine A. T heohary; and CRS In
Focus IF11353, Defense Prim er: U.S. Precision-Guided Munitions, by John R. Hoehn.
22 Jan van T ol, Mark Gunzinger, Andrew F. Krepinevich, et al., AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational
Concept, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Washington, DC, May 18, 2010, https://csbaonline.org/
research/publications/airsea-battle-concept.
23 For example, see testimony of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen Joseph Dunford, in U.S. Congress, Senate
Committee on Appropriations – Defense Subcommittee, Departm ent of Defense Budget Hearing , 115th Cong., 2nd sess.,
May 9, 2018.
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cyber forces to chal enge an adversary’s targeting calculus).24 The Joint Al -Domain Operations
concept thus provides commanders access to information that can enable simultaneous and
sequential operations using surprise, and the rapid and continuous integration of capabilities
across al domains—thereby gaining physical and psychological advantages and influence and
control over the operational environment.
Technological advances since the development of the AirLand Battle concept, which envisioned
combining the Air Force and Army’s efforts into a single plan to counter the Soviet Union in the
1980s, have enabled DOD to continue developing concepts for joint all-domain operations. Such
technological advances include an increased number of methods to engage a target (including
electronic and cyber means), the proliferation of relatively low-cost sensors, and increased
processing power to transform data from these sensors into information.25 This increased
complexity is designed to offer options for military commanders and complicate adversary
decisionmaking. The challenge for maintaining control of al domain operations is that the U.S.
military C2 apparatus is not organized to make these types of decisions,26 and the complexity and
speed of the technology being used can exceed the ability of human cognition.
How Has Command and Control Evolved?
The U.S. military’s traditional concept for command and control derives from the German military’s
“auftragstaktik,” or mission-type orders.27 Recognizing that disorder and the “fog of war” are inevitable in military
operations, subordinate commanders were entrusted to operate semi-autonomously to achieve their
commander’s intent (i.e., the overarching goals of a mission) rather than having pre-scripted movements.
Information from intel igence sources and reconnaissance took a long time—hours or potential y days—to reach
commanders. To maintain control of forces, commanders relied on radio communications and paper
correspondence. The limited amount of information available al owed commanders to direct forces across two
dimensions—using a single domain responding to adversary actions.
At the height of the Cold War, Soviet forces presented a new problem for military forces: how to counter a
numerical y superior tank force. To counter this threat, the Army and Air Force proposed a novel approach that
combined air and land power by developing new technologies to identify reinforcement locations. This concept
was known as AirLand Battle. This three-dimensional approach sought to use advantages in intel igence,
surveil ance, and reconnaissance to “see deep” to direct firepower on reinforcements (i.e., “strike deep”).28 Deep
strikes would complement the ground forces’ ability to concentrate firepower at critical places, limiting the
adversary’s quantitative advantages. To support this vision of using deep strikes to prevent fol ow-on forces, the
U.S. military needed to improve command posts to increase the speed of decisionmaking to direct forces, while
stil maintaining the tradition of fol owing commander’s intent. This need resulted in the development of new
systems, like the JSTARS and ATACMS.29 These systems enabled commanders to gain a quicker understanding of
the battle space and to improve the response time to direct fires on enemy forces.

24 CRS In Focus IF11409, Defense Primer: Army Multi-Domain Operations (MDO), by Andrew Feickert .
25 For a discussion on the needs to process data for Joint All-Domain Operations, see CRS Report R46389, Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Design for Great Power Com petition , coordinated by John R. Hoehn.
26 For example, DOD doctrine states that military operations are controlled in each domain. T hus, a land commander,
an air commander, and a maritime commander each develops their own operational plan based on of a Combatant
Commander’s intent. T hese plans require substantial numbers of personnel, with minimal computer tools, and often
require a person communicating via telephone to coordinate effects. See Depar tment of Defense, Joint Air Operations,
JP 3-30, Washington, DC, July 25, 2019, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_30.pdf.
27 T homas J. Czerwinski, “Command and Control at the Crossroads,” U.S. Army War College Quarterly: Parameters,
vol. 26, no. 3 (Autumn 1996), pp. 121 -132, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1788&
context=parameters.
28 Maj T homas Gill, “T he Air Land Battle - T he Right Doctrine For T he Next War,” Global Security (1990),
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1990/GT J.htm.
29 David E. Johnson, The Lessons of AirLand Battle and the 31 Initiatives for Multi-Domain Battle, RAND
Corporation, PE301, August 2018, https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE301.html.
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Over the past 20 years, China and Russia have observed the United States’ method of war, identifying asymmetric
methods to chal enge U.S. advantages. China’s military modernization, in particular, focuses on preventing the
United States from building large amounts of combat power (limiting logistics), increasing risks for high-valued
aircraft (tankers, spy planes, command and control aircraft), and increasing its naval footprint (limiting U.S. naval
advantages).30 To counter these new threats, DOD initial y proposed the idea of using multidomain op erations
(which has since transitioned into the term al -domain operations). DOD contends that using one or even two
dimensions to attack an adversary is insufficient, and that chal enging an adversary’s targeting calculus thus requires
more complex formations (additional dimensions). The increasing complexity, combined with potential y
decreasing times to respond to threats from emerging technologies, DOD argues, requires new methods to
manage forces.
Figure 4. Changes in Complexity of Command and Control

Source: Congressional Research Service.
JADC2-Enabling Technologies
As DOD develops the JADC2 concept, two types of technologies play an integral role in this
approach to command and control military forces: automation and communications.
Automation and Artificial Intelligence
Many senior DOD leaders have articulated that JADC2 is a concept (or perhaps a vision) rather
than any specific program. In a January 2021 article, LtGen Michael Groen, director of the Joint
Artificial Intel igence Center, stated that “JADC2 is not an IT [information technology] system ..
it is a warfighting system…. Historical y, you would have a large defense program, and you
would spend years refining the requirements, and you would gather big, big bags of money, and
then you would go to a defense contractor and spend more years building, testing, and then final y
fielding something years and years later.”31 In this article, LtGen Groen described the role of
artificial intel igence (AI),32 and by extension the role of data and data structures, to enable these
algorithms to inform commanders. According to LtGen Dennis Cral (director of the Joint Staff’s

30 Jan van T ol, Mark Gunzinger, Andrew F. Krepinevich, et al., AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational
Concept, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Washington, DC, May 18, 2010, https://csbaonline.org/
research/publications/airsea-battle-concept.
31 Sydney J Freedberg Jr, “Building JADC2: Data, AI & Warfighter Insight,” Breaking Defense, January 13, 2021,
https://breakingdefense.com/2021/01/building-jadc2-data-ai-warfighter-insight/.
32 T his report uses the terms artificial intelligence and algorithm relatively interchangeably. Artificial intelligence
combines many technologies—primarily databases, processors, and the algorithms themselves. In the context of
JADC2, the primary technological advancement of artif icial intelligence, however, is its predictive nature, which is
derived from the algorithm, or the approach to analyzing the data.
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command, control, communications, and computers/cyber chief information officer [JS J6]),
artificial intel igence and machine learning are essential to enable JADC2.33 LtGen Kral stated
JADC2 is about automating all of it…. It is about taking advantage of that sensor-rich
environment—looking at things like data standards; making sure that we can move this
information into an area that, again, we can process it properly; bringing on cloud; bringing
on artificial intelligence, predictive analytics; and then undergirding this with a network
that can handle this, all domains and partners.34
Communications
According to DOD, developing JADC2 would require new communications methods. DOD’s
current communications network has been optimized for operations in the Middle East.35 As a
result, DOD uses satel ites as the primary method to communicate with forces abroad. These
systems face latency (time delay) issues and are not designed to operate effectively in the
presence of electronic warfare.36 These older architectures rely on satel ites in geosynchronous
orbits, which orbit approximately 22,200 miles (35,800 kilometers) above the earth. New
applications, like AI, wil potential y require additional data rates that current communications
networks might not be able to support—particularly as DOD increases the number of sensors to
provide additional data to improve algorithms. The introduction of autonomous systems, such as
the Navy’s Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles and those resulting from the Army’s
growing interest in robotic vehicles,37 could need both secure communications and short latency
to maintain control of these systems.
Current JADC2 Efforts
The Joint Staff is the DOD organization responsible for developing the Joint Al -Domain
Command and Control concept strategy. In addition, there are a number of ongoing studies and
efforts connected to the JADC2 concept. Each of the military departments (Army, Navy, Air
Force), along with DOD agencies like the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) and Office of the Undersecretary Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
(OSD [R&E]), are developing technologies and concepts. The following sections briefly describe
selected organizations’ efforts.

33 T heresa Hitchens, “Exclusive: J6 Says JADC2 Is A Strategy; Service Posture Reviews Coming,” Breaking Defense,
January 4, 2021, https://breakingdefense.com/2021/01/exclusive-j6-says-jadc2-is-a-strategy-service-posture-reviews-
coming/.
34 Ibid.
35 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Defense Satellite Communications: DOD Needs Additional Information to
Im prove Procurem ents, GAO-15-459, July 17, 2015, https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/671484.pdf.
36 T raditional satellite communications rely on satellites in geosynchronous orbit. Having satellites stay in the same
spot in the sky (relative to earth) facilitates communications because the satellite location is known. However, these
satellites orbit more than 22,000 miles above earth, increasing the amount of time (latency) for a radio transmission.
MAJ Andrew H. Boyd, Satellite and Ground Com m unications System s: Space and Electronic Warfare Threats to the
United States Arm y, Association of the U.S. Army, November 7, 2017, https://www.ausa.org/publications/satellite-and-
ground-communication-systems-space-and-electronic-warfare-threats-united.
37 For more information, see CRS Report R45757, Navy Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke, and CRS Report R45392, U.S. Ground Forces Robotics
and Autonom ous System s (RAS) and Artificial Intelligence (AI): Considerations for Congress, coordinated by Andrew
Feickert .
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Joint Staff J6: JADC2 Strategy
The lead DOD organization tasked to develop a JADC2 strategy is the Joint Staff J6 directorate
for command, control, communications, and computers/cyber.38 Original y envisioned to improve
the joint force’s interoperability (e.g., making sure radio systems can communicate with one
another), the JADC2 strategy expanded this focus, developing an information-sharing approach
that enables joint operations by providing data for decisionmaking.39 In addition to developing a
strategy, the J6 organizes a JADC2 cross-functional team, through which the services and DOD
agencies coordinate their experiments and programs.40 This aligns with both the DOD Data
Strategy and the Deputy Secretary of Defense’s efforts of creating a data advantage.41 The
strategy has identified five lines of effort to enable the JADC2 framework:42
1. Data enterprise
2. Human enterprise
3. Technical enterprise
4. Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3)
5. Mission partner information sharing
The Joint Staff J6 states that there wil be no single program or line item for JADC2.43 At a press
briefing on June 4, 2021, LtGen Cral stated Secretary of Defense Austin had approved the
JADC2 strategy.44
OUSD Research and Engineering (R&E): Fully Networked
Command, Control, and Communications (FNC3)
According to OUSD R&E “FNC3 identifies, initiates, and coordinates research, development,
and risk reduction activities for key enabling technologies [for command, control, and
communications]. These activities wil encompass distinct but interrelated efforts across the
defense enterprise, monitored and synchronized by FNC3 staff in OUSD(R&E).”45 Dr. Michael
Zatman, the Principal Director for FNC3, describes the overal vision of FNC3 consisting of three
layers—physical, networking, and application—which provide a tailored approach to developing

38 T heresa Hitchens, “Exclusive: J6 Says JADC2 Is A Strategy; Service Posture Reviews Coming,” Breaking Defense,
January 4, 2021, https://breakingdefense.com/2021/01/exclusive-j6-says-jadc2-is-a-strategy-service-posture-reviews-
coming/.
39 T heresa Hitchens, “EXCLUSIVE: ‘Do-Or-Die’ JADC2 Summit T o Crunch Common Data Standards,” Breaking
Defense, January 12, 2021, https://breakingdefense.com/2021/01/exclusive-do-or-die-jadc2-summit -to-crunch-
common-data-standards/.
40 T heresa Hitchens, “OSD & Joint Staff Grapple With Joint All-Domain Command,” Breaking Defense, November 14,
2019, https://breakingdefense.com/2019/11/osd-joint-staff-grapple-with-joint-all-domain-command/.
41 Department of Defense, Data Strategy: Unleashing Data to Advance the National Defense, September 30, 2020, at
https://media.defense.gov/2020/Oct/08/2002514180/-1/-1/0/DOD-DATA-ST RAT EGY.PDF, and Deputy Secretary of
Defense Kathleen Hicks memorandum, Creating Data Advantage, May 5, 2021, at https://media.defense.gov/2021/
May/10/2002638551/-1/-1/0/DEPUTY-SECRET ARY-OF-DEFENSE-MEMORANDUM.PDF.
42 T elephone conversation between the author and Joint Staff J6, April 30, 2021.
43 Ibid.
44 Department of Defense, “Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby Holds a Press Briefing,” press release, June 4,
2021, https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/T ranscripts/T ranscript/Article/2647056/pentagon-press-secretary-john-f-
kirby-holds-a-press-briefing/.
45 OUSD R&E FNC3 Information Paper, April 28, 2021.
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command, control and communications systems that aligns with the commercial sector’s best
practices.46 Both the physical and networking layers provide the communications infrastructure,
which connects a variety of applications. The physical layer represents the radios and transmitters
themselves, while the networking layer manages the applications’ access to the physical layer by
developing DOD-optimized versions of emerging commercial software defined networking
techniques such as network slicing.47 Al three layers are designed to increase interoperability and
resiliency (i.e., the ability to prevent the network from being jammed or disrupted) and provide
the appropriate quality of service for each application.48 Conceptual y, example applications could
be nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3); ISR; a fire control mission; and
logistics.
According to Dr. Zatman, FNC3 serves as the mid- and long-term technical vision of JADC2,49
while each of the services (outlined in the following sections) have high-profile efforts focused on
developing the near-term acquisition strategies. For example the Department of the Air Force’s
Advanced Battle Management program is designed to be deployed within the next three years by
focusing on mature technologies. OUSD R&E leverages less mature technologies across its
portfolio—including technologies developed by DARPA, the Defense Innovation Unit, the
Strategic Capabilities Office, the services, and others—to provide the longer term technical
means of implementing JADC2.
DOD CIO: 5G Technologies50
DOD has proposed that commercial advances in 5G wireless technologies provide the ability to
transfer more data (commonly cal ed data throughput) and lower latencies.51 DOD argues that it
requires these capabilities to process the increased amount of data from numerous sensors (e.g.,
satel ites, aircraft, ships, ground-based radars), and to process this information at the “edge” (at
the same site as the radio receiver). Another aspect of 5G technologies that could enable new
command and control concepts is dynamic spectrum sharing. As the electromagnetic spectrum
becomes more congested, the federal government has started al owing multiple users to operate
on the same frequency band (known as spectrum sharing). The DOD CIO argues that spectrum
sharing technology al ows for communications systems to transmit and receive data in the

46 T elephone conversation between the author and Michael Zatman, Principal Director Fully Networked Command,
Control, and Communications (FNC3), April 27, 2021. For more information on commercial best practices, see
ISO/IEC 7498-1:1994 Information Technology–Open System s Interconnection–Basic Reference Model: The Basic
Model, at https://www.iso.org/standard/20269.html.
47 OUSD R&E FNC3 Information Paper, April 28, 2021. For more information on network splicing see Peter Rost et
al., “Network Slicing to Enable Scalability and Flexibility in 5G Mobile Networks,” IEEE Communications Magazine,
May 2017. Rost et al. define network splicing “as a concept for running multiple logical networks as independent
business operations on a common physical infrastructure.” For DOD this represents being able to segment the network
for different applications.
48 Quality of service refers to measures affecting a network’s performance. T his includes metrics like packet loss, bit
rate, throughput, transmission delay, and availability. For more information see International T elecommunication
Union (IT U) “Series E: Overall Network Operation, T elephone Service, Service Operation, and Human Factors,”
September 2008, at https://www.itu.int/rec/T -REC-E.800-200809-I/en.
49 T elephone conversation between the author and Michael Zatman, Principal Director Fully Networked Command,
Control, and Communications (FNC3), April 27, 2021.
50 For an overview of DOD 5G initiatives, see CRS In Focus IF11251, National Security Implications of Fifth
Generation (5G) Mobile Technologies, by John R. Hoehn and Kelley M. Sayler.
51 CRS Report R45485, Fifth-Generation (5G) Telecommunications Technologies: Issues for Congress, by Jill C.
Gallagher and Michael E. DeVine.
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presence of interference. In September 2020, DOD CIO issued a request for information to
industry, on how to approach dynamic spectrum sharing. On January 21, 2021, 67 responses to
the request for information had been posted.52
DARPA: Mosaic Warfare
Mosaic Warfare represents a series of DARPA-sponsored projects designed to use AI to combine
systems and networks not traditional y designed to interoperate. Conceptual y (see Figure 5),
these projects would be able to take raw intel igence collected from a satel ite and turn that data
into targetable information passed to a “shooter”—in this case, a cyber-weapon, electronic
jammer, missile, aircraft, or any other weapon that might be able to affect the desired target.53 A
second aspect of this approach uses AI-generated software to enable different radios to
communicate with each other within an hour.54 A third aspect is a project devoted to airspace de-
confliction. Rather than relying on a number of specialized personnel to manual y identify the
location and status of air assets, for example, DARPA software automatical y tracks this
information and relays it to commanders.55 As analysts Bryan Clark and Dan Patt of the Hudson
Institute explain, Mosaic Warfare “seek[s] to impose multiple overlapping dilemmas on enemy
forces that disrupt their operations and thus prevent them from reaching their objectives in
time.”56

52 “Defense Spectrum Sharing Request for Information,” Defense Information System Agency, updated January 21,
2021, https://beta.sam.gov/opp/8f3f0321da074e75a588c8833265791d/view.
53 T elephone conversation between the author and T imothy Grayson, Director, Strategic T echnology Office, November
20, 2020.
54 Currently, the only way for radio protocols not designed to communicate with one another to do so is to use a radio
gateway. T his new method would replace physical infrastructure with software. Sydney J. Freedberg Jr, “ DARPA AI
Builds New Networks On T he Fly,” October 28, 2020, https://breakingdefense.com/2020/10/darpa-builds-ai-to-
reorganize-machines-humans-on-the-fly/.
55 Sydney J. Freedberg Jr, “DARPA AI Builds New Networks On T he Fly,” October 28, 2020,
https://breakingdefense.com/2020/10/darpa-builds-ai-to-reorganize-machines-humans-on-the-fly/.
56 Bryan Clark and Dan Patt, “JADC2 May Be Built T o Fight T he Wrong War,” Breaking Defense, January 14, 2021,
https://breakingdefense.com/2021/01/jadc2-may-be-built-to-fight-the-wrong-war/.
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Figure 5. DARPA’s Vision of Mosaic Warfare

Source: https://www.darpa.mil/work-with-us/darpa-tiles-together-a-vision-of-mosiac-warfare.
Department of the Air Force: Advanced Battle Management
System (ABMS)57
The Advanced Battle Management System was original y envisioned to replace the E-8 Joint
Surveil ance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS).58 The Air Force transitioned the ABMS
program in 2019 from developing things—like aircraft or radars—to a “Digital Network
Environment that connects warfighting capabilities across al domain, and every echelon, to
achieve global decision advantage.”59 In other words, the Air Force pivoted from building a
platform to support commanders and decisionmaking (like the E-8 JSTARS) to building a secure,
“cloud-like” environment that provides commanders with near real-time data using AI and
predictive analysis. According to the Air Force, the ABMS program wil develop capabilities
along six product lines: sensor integration, data, secure processing, connectivity, applications, and
effects integration.
The Air Force has held three “on-ramps” (a term the Air Force uses to describe a demonstration)
to demonstrate its approach to ABMS.60 The first on-ramp, held in December 2019, demonstrated
the service’s ability to transmit data from secure communications used by F-22s to Army and
Navy systems. The second on-ramp enabled an Army howitzer to shoot down a surrogate cruise
missile. In addition, the Air Force provided this “cloud-like” Zero Trust tablet—a security feature

57 For more information on ABMS, see CRS In Focus IF11866, Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS), by John
R. Hoehn.
58 T he E-8 JST ARS was developed in the 1980s to counter Soviet tank threats, particularly the so -called second
echelon (i.e., Soviet reinforcements). T his aircraft uses a synthetic aperture (with radar operators onboard) to identify
potential targets. Operators onboard the aircraft then direct U.S. and allied aircraft to engage these targets.
59 “Department of the Air Force Requirements Decision Memoran dum for the Advance Battle Management System
Strategic Requirements Document,” Department of the Air Force, DAFRDM 09 -20-02, signed October 14, 2020, by
General John W. Raymond, U.S. Space Force, and General Charles Q. Brown, U.S. Air Force.
60 U.S. Air Force, “ABMS Fact Sheet,” press release, November 6, 2020.
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where no sensitive data are stored on a device—to U.S. Northern Command to assist in its
response to the COVID pandemic during the spring of 2020.
In November 2020, the Department of the Air Force identified the Chief Architect Office in
charge of evaluating architecture on-ramps and integrating enterprise digital architecture. At the
same time, the Air Force identified the Department of the Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office as
the ABMS Integrating Program Executive Office. The Rapid Capabilities Office focuses on
quickly delivering programs to the field, and its involvement may be seen as moving ABMS from
experimentation to system development.
Department of the Army: Project Convergence61
According to the Army, “Project Convergence is the Army’s new campaign of learning organized
around a continuous, structured series of demonstrations and experiments” designed to meet the
chal enges posed by JADC2.62 Project Convergence comprises five components:
1. ensuring the Army has the right people and talent;
2. linking current Army modernization efforts with Army Futures Command cross -
functional teams aligned to the six Army modernization priorities;63
3. having the right command and control to meet increasingly fast-paced threats;
4. using AI to analyze and categorize information and transmitted across the Army
network; and
5. testing capabilities in the “most unforgiving terrain.”
Project Convergence 2020 utilized approximately 750 soldiers, civilians, and contractors across
three military instal ations, culminating in two live capstone demonstrations at Yuma Proving
Ground, AZ.64 During this exercise, the Army demonstrated several technologies, including
artificial intel igence, autonomy, and robotics, to test new methods to command and control
geographical y dispersed forces.65 The Army plans to integrate Air Force and Navy systems as
part of Project Convergence 2021, and intends to incorporate foreign militaries in Project
Convergence 2022.66 The Army has requested a total of $106.8 mil ion for Project Convergence
activities in FY2022.67 This breaks down to $33.7 mil ion requested for Operations and
Maintenance, Army appropriations, and $73.1 mil ion for Research, Development, Test and
Evaluation, Army appropriations.68

61 For more information see CRS In Focus IF11654, The Army’s Project Convergence, by Andrew Feickert.
62 Army Futures Command Information Paper on Project Convergence 2020 provided to CRS on October 15, 2020.
63 For more information on Army modernization priorities see CRS Report R46216, The Army’s Modernization
Strategy: Congressional Oversight Considerations, by Andrew Feickert and Brendan W. McGarry .
64 Army Futures Command Information Paper on Project Convergence 2020 provided to CRS on October 15, 2020.
65 Jen Judson, “Inside Project Convergence: How the US Army is preparing for war in the next decade,” Defense News,
September 10, 2020, https://www.defensenews.com/smr/defense-news-conference/2020/09/10/army-conducting-
digital-louisiana-maneuvers-in-arizona-desert/.
66 CRS In Focus IF11654, The Army’s Project Convergence, by Andrew Feickert.
67 Email correspondence between the author and Army Futures Command, June 3, 2021.
68 $43.7 million of the RDT &E request is allocated for All Domain Convergence Applied Research (Program Element
0602181A) and All Domain Convergence Advanced T echnology (Program Element 0603041A). Email correspondence
between the author and Army Futures Command, July 7, 2021.
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Department of the Navy: Project Overmatch
Project Overmatch is the Navy’s effort to create a “Naval Operational Architecture” to link ships
to Army and Air Force assets. On October 1, 2020, Admiral Gilday, the Chief of Naval
Operations, tasked a 2-star admiral to lead the Navy’s Project Overmatch effort.69 In his
memorandum, Admiral Gilday directed that Project Overmatch take an engineering and
development approach similar to the Navy’s effort to develop nuclear power and the AEGIS
system. The primary goal is “to enable a Navy that swarms the sea, delivering synchronized lethal
and nonlethal effects from near-and-far, every axis, and every domain. Specifical y, you [RADM
Smal ] are to develop the networks, infrastructure, data architecture tools, and analytics.” In a
paral el effort, Admiral Gilday tasked Vice Admiral Kilby, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
for Warfighting Requirements and Capabilities, to develop a plan to incorporate unmanned
systems, including ships and aircraft,70 into the naval operational architecture.71 According to
press statements, the Navy intends to reach initial operating capabilities (i.e., being capable to
field the initial systems) in 2023.72 The Navy requested funding for Project Overmatch in three
classified program elements in FY2022.73
At the AFCEA West Conference 2021 in June 2021, Admiral Gilday discussed Project
Overmatch’s current efforts. At the event, Gilday stated that Project Overmatch had completed
three spiral development cycles since the program’s inception in October 2020.74 Gilday further
explained “[w]e’re actual y experimenting in a way that al ows us to essential y pass any data on
any network to the warfighter... It’s a software-defined communication system that al ows us to
essential y unpack al of our networks in a way we never have before.”75 According to news
coverage, Gilday stated that he anticipated scaling Project Overmatch testing to a carrier strike
group either in late 2022 or early 2023.76
Potential Issues for Congress
The following sections discuss potential issues for Congress, including requirements and cost
estimates, interoperability chal enges, balancing communications capabilities, the role of AI in
decisionmaking, and potential force structure changes needed to implement JADC2.

69 Memorandum from Admiral Gilday to Read Admiral Douglas Small, Project Overmatch, October 1, 2020.
70 For more information on the Navy’s approach to unmanned ships, see CRS Report R45757, Navy Large Unmanned
Surface and Undersea Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
71 Memorandum from Admiral Michael Gilday to Vice Admiral James Kilby, “ A Novel Force,” October 1, 2020.
72 Jason Sherman, “Navy eyes 2023 for initial delivery of Project Overmatch capability to fleet,” Inside Defense,
January 29, 2021, https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/navy-eyes-2023-initial-delivery-project -overmatch-capability-
fleet.
73 Mark Pomerleau, “Classified Navy JADC2 budget plan has a few spending hints,” C4ISRNet, June 15, 2021,
https://www.c4isrnet.com/c2-comms/2021/06/15/part-4-classified-navy-jadc2-budget-plan-has-a-few-spending-hints/.
74 Aidan Quigley, “Gilday: Project Overmatch progressing well toward strike group testing,” Inside Defense, June 30,
2021, https://insidedefense.com/insider/gilday-project -overmatch-progressing-well-toward-strike-group-testing.
75 Ibid.
76 Adian Quigley, “Gilday: Project Overmatch progressing well toward strike group testing,” Inside Defense, June 30,
2021, https://insidedefense.com/insider/gilday-project -overmatch-progressing-well-toward-strike-group-testing.
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Requirements and Cost Estimates
DOD has requested funding for JADC2-related efforts for several fiscal years, in particular during
the concept’s early stages of development. DOD is actively developing a JADC2 strategy, which
is expected to be released by the spring of 2021.77 Some in Congress have expressed concern that
DOD has not provided cost estimates or validated requirements in the manner that a traditional
acquisition program might.78 As a result, the armed services committees and the appropriations
committees have reduced the requested funding for these efforts, especial y for ABMS and 5G
research and development.79 The FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) required
DOD to produce requirements for JADC2 by April 2021.80
Interoperability Challenges
As DOD envisions using JADC2 to command forces in multiple domains simultaneously, the
need to connect different types of forces increases. DOD owns and operates many
communications systems, each using different radio frequencies, standards, and datalinks.81 These
systems are often unable to “talk” with each other and therefore require a gateway to “translate”
from one radio protocol to another. The inclusion of al ies and partners increases interoperability
chal enges. Former Undersecretary of Defense Michael Griffin, in his March 2020 testimony to
the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Intel igence, Emerging Threats, and Capabilities,
identified this issue as justification to continue pursuing the OSD R&E efforts for FNC3.82
The chal enge of enabling DOD to share information from different services and units could be
solved by three approaches to interoperability:
 Procure gateways. Communications gateways (perhaps more aptly cal ed
“translators”) can receive multiple protocols, security levels, et cetera, and
rebroadcast this information to the rest of the force.83 The ABMS program has
developed such gateways (see Figure 6) to enable communications.84 This
approach al ows for information sharing, potential y reducing the cost of
development because the gateway can be a subsystem of an aircraft/ship/ground
system, potential y capable of being fielded relatively quickly. The chal enge
with this approach is that such gateways may not be using the most advanced,
and therefore protected, waveforms to rebroadcast to the force.

77 T heresa Hitchens, “CJCS Gen. Milley Reviews JADC2 Strategy While Industry Jostles For Position,” February 24,
2021, https://breakingdefense.com/2021/02/cjcs-gen-milley-reviews-jadc2-strategy-while-industry-jostles-for-position/.
78 P.L. 116-283 §157.
79 P.L. 116-283.
80 P.L. 116-283 §157.
81 For more discussion on this issue, see CRS Report R46564, Overview of Department of Defense Use of the
Electrom agnetic Spectrum , by John R. Hoehn, Jill C. Gallagher, and Kelley M. Sayler .
82 T estimony of Undersecretary of Defense Michael Griffin, in U.S. Congress, House Armed Services Subcommittee
for Intelligence, Emerging T hreats, and Capabilities, FY2020 Science and Technology Posture Hearing , 116th Cong.,
2nd sess., March 11, 2020, https://www.congress.gov/116/meeting/house/110655/witnesses/HHRG-116-AS26-Wstate-
GriffinM-20200311.pdf.
83 T his capability is best demonstrated by the U.S. Air Force’s Battlefield Airborne Communications Node (BACN).
84 U.S. Air Force, “ABMS Fact Sheet,” press release, November 6, 2020.
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Figure 6. E-11 Battlefield Airborne Communications Node (BACN)

Source: https://www.janes.com/amp/usaf-to-buy-more-bacn/ZnlJK3dHVU9mZ28xajRJVkc5dVI5VFp1cVMwPQ2.
 Procure new communications equipment. This approach uses a “top-down”
approach (i.e., where either OSD or the Joint Staff identifies the solution and then
requires the military services to adopt it). Using a similar model to the Joint
Tactical Radio System (JTRS) development,85 this option would purchase a new
communications architecture focusing on interoperability. For example, the
FNC3 effort appears to use this approach. Although this approach could ensure
that the joint force develops communications systems that can share information
seamlessly, and potential y in a secure fashion, it could require large investments
and might encounter schedule delays. Another possible disadvantage of this
approach is that as systems are fielded, they may not be as effective against
adversary technologies.
 Develop software to create networks. A third approach is to use software that
enables users to create customized networks. DARPA’s Mosaic Warfare and
some aspects of the ABMS program are examples of this approach.86 More
modular than other interoperability solutions, this approach enables units and
systems tailored to a specific operation to communicate with one another. A
primary risk to this approach is the technical immaturity, specifical y advances in
software, used to create these networks. Another risk concerns the amount and
classification of information shared with different systems certified for different
levels of classification (e.g., Secret Releasable, Secret Nonreleasable, Top
Secret).
DOD and Congress may select one or more of these approaches. One particular approach may
offer short-term benefits while DOD pursues a longer-term approach to solve the interoperability
chal enge.

85 JT RS was a radio program intended to replace all of the radio systems used by the Department of Defense. For more
information, see the Appe ndix.
86 U.S. Air Force, “ABMS Fact Sheet,” press release, November 6, 2020, and Sydney J. Freedberg Jr, “DARPA AI
Builds New Networks On T he Fly,” October 28, 2020, https://breakingdefense.com/2020/10/darpa-builds-ai-to-
reorganize-machines-humans-on-the-fly/.
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Balancing Communications Capabilities in a Degraded
Environment
DOD’s approach to developing communications networks to meet JADC2 requirements
incorporates three competing capabilities:
 data throughput (i.e., the rate at which data can be transported),
 latency (i.e., the time delay in receiving a message/data), and
 resiliency (the ability to maintain a communications signal in the event of
disruption by natural or intentional sources).87
The rise of new technologies for military operations, such as artificial intel igence, tactical
datalinks (like Link 16 and Multifunction Advanced Data Link [MADL]), and adversary
electronic warfare capabilities, presents distinct chal enges in balancing these capabilities for
future communications systems like 5G and FNC3. AI and information operations could
potential y require substantial data to enable predictive analytics and give commanders an
accurate picture of the battle space. Datalinks, which share data with al available users, do not
necessarily require high data rates; however, datalinks do need low latency to ensure that sensors
can prove “target-level data,” particularly for fast-moving systems like cruise missiles and
aircraft. Final y, the proliferation of electronic jammers requires resilience (or anti-jam properties)
to maintain communications while being actively jammed. Figure 7 il ustrates how these three
competing requirements must be balanced to develop a new waveform (regardless if the
waveform is designed for civilian or military applications).88 Radio signals are able to offer each
capability; however, prioritizing one requirement means that the other two requirements may
suffer, potential y creating a dilemma for policymakers in terms of which capabilities to prioritize
in acquisition.
Figure 7. Balancing Communications Requirements

Source: Congressional Research Service.

87 For example, see Department of Homeland Security, “First Responder Electronic Jamming Exercise,” press release,
2017, https://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/first-responder-electronic-jamming-exercise#:~:text=
DHS%20S%26T %20works%20to%20combat,jamming%20threats%20and%20reporting%20channels; Youness
Arjoune and Saleh Faruque, “ Smart Jamming Attacks in 5G New Radio: A Review,” Las Vegas, NV, January 8, 2020,
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9031175; and Hossein Pirayesh and Huacheng Zeng, “ Jamm ing Attacks and Anti-
Jamming Strategies in Wireless Networks: A Comprehensive Survey,” January 1, 2021, https://arxiv.org/abs/
2101.00292.
88 Waveforms are defined as software applications that determine the total functionality of the radio from the user’s
perspective.
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As DOD modernizes its communications systems, it may consider technology features and
limitations to select requirements that advance mission goals while protecting the security of its
networks. For example, technologies like 5G can offer high data capacity and low latency, but it
is unclear how these signals may be affected by adversary jamming. FNC3, on the other hand,
appears to be designed to provide resiliency with high data rates; however, because it relies on
satel ites, latency wil increase.
Role of Artificial Intelligence in Decisionmaking89
AI represents a potential y critical component to enabling JADC2. As AI is introduced into
military decisionmaking, several potential issues arise. First, to what degree should artificial
intel igence play in decisionmaking? At what appropriate level is human judgement required
when using lethal weapons?90
Second, how does DOD ensure the security of the data being used for AI algorithms to assist
decisionmaking? Although DOD has focused on the data structures,91 it has not discussed how it
plans to ensure data validity and security for JADC2 specifical y. Erroneous data could cause
commanders to select options that compromise mission objectives (such as algorithms
recommending targets that might waste high-value munitions). Relatedly, how does DOD intend
to secure these data in cloud environments to prevent adversaries from manipulating them? Are
these security plans sufficient to prevent adversary manipulation?
Potential Force Structure Changes
Because JADC2 potential y requires different types of forces and weapons systems, each of the
military services may look to change how it trains, organizes, and equips its forces. For example,
the Marine Corps, in its force redesign, announced that it would eliminate units it determines are
not aligned with National Defense Strategy guidance, and would reinvest the funding into other
programs that better fit the future operating environment.92 Similarly, the Navy’s Project
Overmatch looks to potential y change the number and types of ships the service fields.
The balance of capabilities that reside in the active and reserve components is another aspect of
force structure changes. For instance, the Army historical y has decided to transfer logistics
capabilities from the active component to the reserve components.93 Thus, if the United States
were to go to war, the Army would presumably need to activate reserve forces to enable
operations. As DOD and military services prepare to meet the chal enges presented by JADC2,
how would these organizations choose to balance capabilities and force structures between active
and reserve components?

89 For a broader discussion of artificial intelligence and its role in national security, see CRS Report R45178, Artificial
Intelligence and National Security, by Kelley M. Sayler.
90 Department of Defense, “DOD Adopts 5 Principles of Artificial Intelligence Ethics,” press release, February 25,
2020, https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2094085/dod-adopts-5-principles-of-artificial-
intelligence-ethics/.
91 T heresa Hitchens, “OSD, Joint Staff Double Down On DoD-Wide Data Standards,” Breaking Defense, February 10,
2021, https://breakingdefense.com/2021/02/exclusive-jadc2-data-summits-will-drive-dod-standards-requirements/.
92 CRS Insight IN11281, New U.S. Marine Corps Force Design Initiatives, by Andrew Feickert .
93 CRS Report R43808, Army Active Component (AC)/Reserve Component (RC) Force Mix: Considerations and
Options for Congress, by Andrew Feickert and Lawrence Kapp .
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Management of JADC2 Efforts
The Joint Staff J6 is the lead coordinator for DOD’s JADC2 efforts, with each of the services and
a number of DOD agencies performing various activities. Some in Congress, in the past, have
expressed an interest in creating DOD-wide program offices (such as the F-35 Joint Program
Office) to centralize management of large-scale efforts.94 It appears that DOD research and
development efforts wil increase over time, and that, as a result, managing these efforts may
become more chal enging. Congress may, in the future, seek to identify or create an organization
charged with program management, development of network architecture, and financial
management.

94 For more information on the background of the F-35 program, see CRS Report RL30563, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
(JSF) Program , by Jeremiah Gertler. For an example of a joint communications program intended to achieve similar
results to JADC2, see the Appe ndix.
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Appendix. Historical Example of Joint
Interoperability: Joint Tactical Radio System95
The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) was a communications program intended to improve
communications interoperability by fielding radios across al of the military services. The
program was started in the mid-1990s and was ultimately canceled in 2011 by former Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Frank Kendall.96 In his
justification notification, Under Secretary Kendal noted that “the technical chal enges of mobile
ad hoc networks and scalability were not wel understood due to the immaturity of technology at
the time ... it is unlikely that products resulting from the JTRS GMR [Ground Mobile Radio]
development program affordably meet Service requirements.” Over the course of the 15-year
development effort, DOD spent approximately $15 bil ion, requiring an additional $13 bil ion at
termination.97
The JTRS program was intended to replace the 25 to 30 families of radio systems used by the
military—many of which could not communicate with each other—with software-based radios
that could operate across much of the radio frequency spectrum.98 JTRS was envisioned to enable
the services to operate together, along with selected al ied nations, in a “seamless” manner via
wireless voice, video, and data communications through al levels of command, including direct
access to near real-time information from airborne and battlefield sensors.99 Described as a
“software-defined radio,” JTRS would have functioned more like a computer than a conventional
radio; for example, it would have been upgraded and modified to operate with other
communications systems by the addition of software, as opposed to redesigning hardware—a
more costly and time-consuming process. DOD asserted that in “many cases, a single JTRS radio
with multiple waveforms can replace many separate radios, simplifying maintenance” and that
because JTRS is “software programmable, they wil also provide a longer functional life,” with
both features offering potential long-term cost savings.100 The JTRS program was original y
broken into five “clusters,” with each cluster having a particular service “lead” (see Table A-1)
and a Joint Program Office managing the overal architecture.

95 T his section is derived from CRS Report RL33161, The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) and the Army’s Future
Com bat System (FCS): Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert .
96 Memorandum from Undersecretary of Defense Frank Kendell to Representative Howard P. “Buck” McKeon, JTRS
Cancellation Notification, October 13, 2011, https://www.govexec.com/pdfs/101411bb1.pdf.
97 Bob Brewin, “Pentagon shutters Joint T actical Radio System program office,” Nextgov, August 1, 2012,
https://www.nextgov.com/it-modernization/2012/08/pentagon-shutters-joint-tactical-radio-system-program-office/
57173/.
98 Peter A. Buxbaum, “Jitters Over JT RS,” Armed Forces Journal, July 2005, p. 31.
99 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Report to the Chairman, Committee on Appropriations, House of
Representatives, “ Defense Acquisitions: Resolving Developmental Risks in the Army ’s Networked Communications
Capabilities is Key to Fielding Future Force,” GAO-05-669, June 2005, p. 9. Peter A. Buxbaum, “ Jitters Over JT RS,”
Arm ed Forces Journal, July 2005, pp. 31-33.
100 DOD pamphlet on JT RS published by the JT RS Joint Program Office, undated.
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Table A-1. JTRS Clusters
Cluster
One
Two
Three
Four
Five
Description
Ground
Hand-held
Fixed-site
High-
Handheld,
vehicle and
radios
and maritime
performance
dismounted,
helicopter
radios
aircraft (fixed and Smal
radios
wing) radios
Form Factora
radios
Service
U.S. Army
U.S. Special
U.S. Navy
U.S. Air
U.S. Army
Lead
Operations
Force
Command
(USSOCOM)
Source: Reproduced from CRS Report RL33161, The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) and the Army’s Future
Combat System (FCS): Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.
Note: Form factor radios are essential y miniaturized radios that soldiers would carry, as wel as radios for
weight- and power-constrained platforms.
As discussed below, JTRS experienced a number of difficulties during development. These issues
may be relevant for future JADC2 development.
Size and Weight Constraints and Limited Range
According to a 2005 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report
To realize the full capabilities of the Wideband Networking Waveform,101 including
transmission range, the Cluster One radio requires significant amounts of memory and
processing power, which add to the size, weight, and power consumption of the radio. The
added size and weight are the results of efforts to ensure the electronic parts in the radio
are not overheated by the electricity needed to power the additional memory and
processing. Thus far, the program has not been able to develop radios that meet size,
weight, and power requirements, and the current projected transmission range is only three
kilometers—well short of the 10-kilometer range required for the Wideband Networking
Waveform…. The Cluster One radio’s size, weight, and peak power consumption exceeds
helicopter platform requirements by as much as 80 percent.102
The inability to meet these fundamental design and performance standards raised concerns that
Cluster One may not have been able to accommodate additional waveforms as intended (the plan
was for Cluster One to have four to eight stored waveforms) and that it may be too bulky or
heavy to fit into the stringently weight- and size-constrained Future Combat System (FCS)
Manned Ground Vehicles (MGVs),103 as wel as the Army’s helicopter fleet. Some observers were
concerned that to meet these physical requirements, the Army would significantly “dumb down”

101 T he Wideband Networking Waveform is described as the core of th e JT RS networking capability and is intended to
operate across a wide range of the radio frequency spectrum , from 2 megahertz (MHZ) to 2 gigahertz (GHz), and
would provide increased routing and networking capability —as much as a hundred times more than existing
communications systems.
102 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Report to the Chairman, Committee on Appropriations, House of
Representatives, “ Defense Acquisitions: Resolving Developmental Risks in the Army ’s Networked Communications
Capabilities is Key to Fielding Future Force,” GAO-05-669, June 2005, p. 15.
103 FCS Manned Ground Vehicles (MGVs) are envisioned as a family of eight different combat vehicles—with some
having more than one variation—based on a common platform and designed to be transported by U.S. Air Force
transport aircraft and deployed directly into combat with little or no post -flight reconfiguration. MGVs would be
equipped with various passive and active protection systems and sensors that the Army hopes will offer them the sa me
survivability as the current heavy armor force.
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Cluster One performance specifications.104 According to the Army, however, it made progress in
terms of reducing Cluster One’s weight and size and in increasing its transmission range;
however, incorporating al of the desired waveforms into Cluster One proved to be difficult.105
Cluster Five radios also reportedly experienced similar size, weight, and power difficulties; these
difficulties were more pronounced because some Cluster Five versions were supposed to weigh
no more than 1 pound.106
Security
Security for JTRS emerged as a significant developmental difficulty. According to one expert, one
of the program’s biggest problems was security, “namely encryption, as JTRS encryption is
software-based and is, therefore, vulnerable to hacking.”107 Computer security experts general y
agree that software used for any purpose is vulnerable, as no current form of computer security
offers absolute security or information assurance. According to GAO, JTRS required applications
to operate at multiple levels of security; in order to meet this requirement, developers had to
account not only for traditional radio security measures but also for computer and network
security measures.108 In addition, National Security Agency (NSA)109 security concerns about
JTRS interface with radio systems of U.S. al ies posed developmental chal enges.110
Interoperability with Legacy Radio Systems
Some analysts expressed concerns that the goal of making JTRS “backward compatible” with
legacy radios may have been technological y infeasible.111 Reportedly, early program attempts at
cross-banding112 to synchronize incompatible legacy radio signals proved to be too complex.
Current Army efforts are focusing on using the Wideband Networking Waveform to link with
legacy radio frequencies.113 One report suggested that while the Wideband Networking Waveform
could receive signals from legacy radios, legacy radios cannot receive signals from JTRS. To
rectify this situation, the Army considered using 19 different waveforms to facilitate JTRS

104 Sandra I. Erwin, “Military Sets Less Ambitious Goals for New T actical Radio,” National Defense, National Defense
Industrial Association (NDIA), Washington, DC, August 2005.
105 Meeting between CRS and the Army Staff’s G-8 (Force Development) Section’s Directorate of Integration FCS
Office, September 15, 2005.
106 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Report to the Chairman, Committee on Appropriations, House of
Representatives, “ Defense Acquisitions: Resolving Developmental Risks in the Army ’s Networked Communications
Capabilities is Key to Fielding Future Force,” GAO-05-669, June 2005, p. 19.
107 Buxbaum, p. 32.
108 Buxbaum, p. 32.
109 T he National Security Agency is the U.S. government ’s cryptologic organization. It coordinates, directs, and
performs highly specialized activities to protect U.S. government information systems and produce foreign si gnals
intelligence information.
110 Buxbaum, p. 32.
111 Sandra I. Erwin, “Military Sets Less Ambitious Goals for New T actical Radio,” National Defense, National Defense
Industrial Association (NDIA), Washington, DC, August 2005.
112 Cross-banding is a technique of receiving a number of incompatible frequencies and then retransmitting them on
previously designated channels, thereby allowing communications systems operating on different bands to
communicate with one another.
113 Sandra I. Erwin, “Military Sets Less Ambitious Goals for New T actical Radio,” National Defense, National Defense
Industrial Association (NDIA), Washington, DC, August 2005.
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transmissions to legacy systems.114 Incorporating this number of different waveforms into a JTRS
radio would have significantly increased memory and processing power requirements which, in
turn, would have increased JTRS size, weight, and power requirements.

Author Information

John R. Hoehn

Analyst in Military Capabilities and Programs

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This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
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under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should n ot be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
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114 Jen DiMascio, “JT RS Cluster One to Play Role, Execs Say: Exercise to T est Mettle of Early FCS T echnologies Will
Begin this Year,” Inside the Arm y, vol. 17, no. 25, June 27, 2005, p. 7.
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