Global Economic Effects of COVID-19
June 15, 2021
The COVID-19 viral pandemic has been individually experienced, but globally shared. It
disrupted lives across all countries and communities and negatively affected global economic
James K. Jackson,
growth in 2020 beyond anything experienced in nearly a century. Estimates so far indicate the
Coordinator
virus reduced global economic growth to an annualized rate of -4.5% to -6.0% in 2020, with a
Specialist in International
partial recovery of 2.5% to 5.2% projected for 2021. Global trade is estimated to have fallen by
Trade and Finance
5.3% in 2020, but is projected to grow by 8.0% in 2021. According to a consensus of forecasts,

the economic downturn in 2020 was not as negative as initially estimated, due, at least in part, to
Martin A. Weiss
the fiscal and monetary policies governments adopted in 2020. Major advanced economies,
Specialist in International
which comprise 60% of global economic activity, are projected to operate below their potential
Trade and Finance
output level through at least 2024, which will negatively affect national and individual economic

welfare. Compared with the synchronized nature of the global economic slowdown in the first
half of 2020, the global economy showed signs of a two-track recovery that began in the third
Andres B. Schwarzenberg
quarter of 2020 with developed economies experiencing a nascent recovery, but economic
Analyst in International
growth in developing economies lagging behind. A resurgence in infectious cases in Europe,
Trade and Finance
Russia, the United States, Japan, Brazil, India, and various developing economies renewed calls

for lockdowns and curfews and threatened to weaken or delay a potential sustained economic
Rebecca M. Nelson
recovery into mid to late 2021.
Specialist in International
Trade and Finance
Since the beginning of 2021, developed economies have made strides in vaccinating growing

shares of their populations, raising prospects of a recovery in those economies and, in turn, the
Karen M. Sutter
broader global economy. However, a surge in diagnosed cases in large developing economies and
Specialist in Asian Trade
resistance to vaccinations among some populations in developed economies raise questions about
and Finance
the speed and the strength of an economic recovery over the near term. The economic fallout

from the pandemic could risk continued labor dislocations as a result of lingering high levels of
unemployment not experienced since the Great Depression of the 1930s and high levels of debt
Michael D. Sutherland
among developing economies. Job losses have been concentrated more intensively in the services
Analyst in International
sector where workers have been unable to work offsite.
Trade and Finance

The human costs in terms of lives lost will permanently affect global economic growth in

addition to the cost of elevated levels of poverty, lives upended, careers derailed, and increased
social unrest. Some estimates indicate that 95 million people may have entered into extreme
poverty in 2020 with 80 million more undernourished compared to pre-pandemic levels. In addition, some estimates indicate
that global trade could fall by an annual amount of 9.0% or slightly less in 2020 as a result of the global economic downturn,
exacting an especially heavy economic toll on trade-dependent developing and emerging economies. While the full economic
impact of the pandemic is coming more into focus in developed economies where vaccinations are facilitating a return to pre-
pandemic levels of economic activity, the global impact remains less certain as new viral outbreaks have worsened the
economic impact in some developing economies. This report provides an overview of the global economic costs to date and
the response by governments and international institutions to address these effects.
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Contents
Overview ......................................................................................................................................... 1
Impact on Workers .................................................................................................................... 5
Impact on Output...................................................................................................................... 11
Financial Markets.............................................................................................................. 14
Country Responses............................................................................................................ 16
Economic Policy Responses .......................................................................................................... 19
Industry Measures ................................................................................................................... 19
Fiscal Measures ....................................................................................................................... 21
Fiscal Deficits ................................................................................................................... 22
Worker Assistance Programs ............................................................................................ 23
Monetary and Prudential Measures ......................................................................................... 25
Economic Forecasts ....................................................................................................................... 27
Global Growth ......................................................................................................................... 27
The OECD Forecast .......................................................................................................... 30
The IMF Forecast .............................................................................................................. 36
The World Bank Forecast ................................................................................................. 38
Global Trade ............................................................................................................................ 39
Global Foreign Investment ...................................................................................................... 44
Economic Policy Challenges ......................................................................................................... 49
Major Economic Developments .................................................................................................... 50
Financial Markets .................................................................................................................... 51
International Role of the Dollar .............................................................................................. 58
Global Energy Markets ........................................................................................................... 63
Policy Responses ........................................................................................................................... 65
The United States .................................................................................................................... 66
Monetary Policy ................................................................................................................ 71
Fiscal Policy ...................................................................................................................... 73
Personal Income and Outlays ............................................................................................ 77
GDP Output “Gap” ........................................................................................................... 78
Federal Reserve Forecast .................................................................................................. 81
Other Developments ......................................................................................................... 83
Europe ..................................................................................................................................... 84
The United Kingdom ............................................................................................................... 92
Japan ........................................................................................................................................ 96
China ....................................................................................................................................... 97
Multilateral Response .................................................................................................................... 98
International Monetary Fund ................................................................................................... 98
World Bank and Regional Development Banks ............................................................................ 99
International Economic Cooperation .................................................................................... 100
Estimated Effects on Developed and Major Economies ............................................................. 101
Asian Development Bank 2020 Forecast ........................................................................ 102
Emerging Markets ....................................................................................................................... 103
International Economic Cooperation ........................................................................................... 105
Looming Debt Crises and Debt Relief Efforts ............................................................................ 106
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Other Affected Sectors ................................................................................................................ 108
Conclusions .................................................................................................................................. 110

Figures
Figure 1. Composition of Working-Hours Lost by Region, 2020 ................................................... 6
Figure 2. Initial U.S. Weekly Claims for Unemployment Insurance, 2020 and 2021 ..................... 9
Figure 3. IMF Projected Government Fiscal Deficits Relative to GDP ........................................ 22
Figure 4. Major Economic Forecasts by Region ........................................................................... 29
Figure 5. Unemployment Rates Among Major OECD Countries ................................................. 32
Figure 6. IMF Forecast, Gross Domestic Product ......................................................................... 38
Figure 7. WTO Estimates of Quarterly Global Exports and Imports, Volumes and Values .......... 41
Figure 8. Foreign Direct Investment Inflows by Major Country Groups ...................................... 47
Figure 9. Global Foreign Direct Investment Inflows .................................................................... 48
Figure 10. U.S. Direct Investment; Inflows and Outflows ............................................................ 48
Figure 11. Dow Jones Industrial Average ...................................................................................... 53
Figure 12. U.S. Dollar Trade-Weighted Broad Index, Goods and Services .................................. 59
Figure 13. International Role of the Dollar ................................................................................... 60
Figure 14. Quarterly Price and Quantity Indexes, U.S. Goods Exports and Imports .................... 61
Figure 15. Brent Crude Oil Price Per Barrel in Dollars ................................................................. 64
Figure 16. U.S. GDP, Percentage Change From Preceding Quarter.............................................. 67
Figure 17. Monthly U.S. Exports and Imports of Goods and Services 2020-2021 ....................... 68
Figure 18. Change in Total Monthly U.S. Nonfarm Employment ................................................ 69
Figure 19. Change in U.S. Employment by Major Industrial Sector ............................................ 70
Figure 20. U.S. Personal Income, Consumption, and Saving ....................................................... 78
Figure 21. Real and Potential U.S. GDP and the Output Gap ....................................................... 80
Figure 22. UK Month Over Month Quarterly Percentage Change in GDP ................................... 94
Figure 23. Asian Development Bank 2020 and 2021 GDP Forecasts ......................................... 103
Figure 24. Capital Flows to Emerging Markets in Global Shocks .............................................. 104
Figure 25.Depreciation Against the Dollar Since January 1, 2020.............................................. 105

Tables
Table 1. Seasonally Adjusted Weekly Unemployment Insurance Claims ....................................... 9
Table 2. Investment Policy Instruments Adopted at the National and International level to
Address the COVID-19 Pandemic ............................................................................................. 20
Table 3. Elements of Announced Fiscal Measures to Address COVID-19 ................................... 21
Table 4. Developed Economy Worker Support Programs During COVID-19 .............................. 24
Table 5. Selected Central Bank and Prudential Measures to Address COVID-19 ........................ 26
Table 6. Major Economic Forecasts .............................................................................................. 28
Table 7. OECD, IMF and World Bank Economic Forecasts ......................................................... 33
Table 8. WTO Forecast: Merchandise Trade Volume and Real GDP 2020-2021.......................... 41
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Table 9. Foreign Investment Screening Legislation Adopted During COVID-19 ........................ 45
Table 10. Investment Policy Instruments Adopted at the National and International Levels
to Address the COVID-19 Pandemic ......................................................................................... 46
Table 11. Dow Jones Industrial Average Market Changes by Month ............................................ 52
Table 12. U.S. Exports and Imports, Change in Quarterly Price and Quantity Indexes ................ 62
Table 13. IMF Forecast of Major Advanced Economy GDP Output Gap ..................................... 79
Table 14. Congressional Budget Office Projection of Major U.S. Economic Indicators,
2020 to 2031 ............................................................................................................................... 80
Table 15. Federal Reserve Economic Projections, March 2021 .................................................... 82
Table 16. European Commission Economic Forecast ................................................................... 85
Table 17. EU Real GDP Growth Rates 2020 ................................................................................. 86
Table 18. UK Major GDP Aggregates 2019-2020 ......................................................................... 94
Table 19. UK Forecast of Major Aggregate National Accounts, 2020-2023 ................................. 95

Appendixes
Appendix A. Fiscal and Monetary Policy Actions by National Governments: Monthly
Chronology ................................................................................................................................ 111
Appendix B. Table A-1. Select Measures Implemented and Announced by Major
Economies in Response to COVID-19 ..................................................................................... 124

Contacts
Author Information ...................................................................................................................... 152


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Global Economic Effects of COVID-19

Overview
The World Health Organization (WHO) first declared COVID-19 a world health emergency in
January 2020; on March 11 it announced the viral outbreak was officially a pandemic, the highest
level of health emergency.1 Since then, the emergency evolved into a global public health and
economic crisis that affected the $90 trillion global economy beyond anything experienced in
nearly a century. In a variance of John Donne’s poem, “No Man is an Island,” the viral infection
spread between and across countries and affected nearly every community, demonstrating the
highly interconnected nature of the global economy: the virus has been detected in over 200
countries and all U.S. states.2 By early March 2020, the focal point of infections shifted from
China to Europe, especially Italy, but by April, the focus had shifted to the United States, where
the number of infections had been accelerating. By April 2021, India and Brazil emerged as viral
hot spots with the number of infections and deaths reaching daily record levels in those countries.
Through various phases of the health crisis, governments adopted policies to lock down social
activities to contain the spread of the pandemic, inadvertently creating a global economic
recession. In response to the unprecedented drop in economic activity, governments adopted a
series of actions initially comprised of monetary policies aimed at stabilizing financial markets
and ensuring the flow of credit. In the second phase, policy actions shifted to fiscal measures
aimed at sustaining economic growth as governments adopted quarantines and social distancing
measures. In the third phase, government policies shifted to developing, purchasing and
distributing vaccines.
The infection has sickened over 174 million people globally with over 3.7 million fatalities. The
United States reported that by mid-June 2021, over 33 million Americans had been diagnosed and
nearly 600,000 had died from the virus. At one point, more than 80 countries had closed their
borders to arrivals from countries with infections, ordered businesses to close, instructed their
populations to self-quarantine, and closed schools to an estimated 1.5 billion children.3 On May 5,
2021, the Biden administration announced it would support international discussions to waive
intellectual property restrictions on COVID-19 vaccine production for developing economies.4
Prior to this announcement, developed economies, including Britain, Switzerland, the EU, and the
United States, had blocked a proposal by over 80 developing countries at the World Trade
Organization to suspend intellectual property rights restrictions on production of COVID-19
vaccines.5 The EU announced on June 4, 2021, that it would reject the U.S. proposal to drop IP
protections and offered a three-point plan of its own that included: 1) maintaining export
restrictions; 2) encouraging vaccine manufacturers to negotiate agreements with producers in

1 Bill Chappell, “COVID-19: COVID-19 Is Now Officially a Pandemic, WHO Says,” National Public Radio, March
11, 2020. https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2020/03/11/814474930/COVID-19-COVID-19-is-now-officially-
a-pandemic-who-says.
2 “Mapping the Spread of the COVID-19 in the U.S. and Worldwide,” Washington Post Staff, Washington Post, March
4, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/01/22/mapping-spread-new-COVID-19/?arc404=true.
3 “The Day the World Stopped: How Governments Are Still Struggling to Get Ahead of the COVID-19,” The
Economist
, March 17, 2020. https://www.economist.com/international/2020/03/17/governments-are-still-struggling-to-
get-ahead-of-the-COVID-19.
4 Diamond, Dan, Tyler Pager, and Jeff Stein, Biden Commits to Waiving Vaccine Patents, Driving Wedge With
Pharmaceutical Companies, The Washington Post, May 5, 2021.
5 Rich, Developing Economies Wrangle Over COVID Patents, Reuters, March 10, 2021.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-wto/rich-developing-nations-wrangle-over-covid-vaccine-
patents-idUSKBN2B21V9.

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developing economies and increasing vaccine supplies to vulnerable countries; and 3) using
existing WTO rules to grant licenses to producers without the consent of the patent-holder.6
During the G-7 summit in England on June 11, 2021, the United States and the other G-7 leaders
announced they would provide a combined total of one billion doses of the COVID-19 vaccine in
addition to lifesaving medical supplies, oxygen, diagnostics, therapeutics, and personal protective
equipment (PPE) to low and middle income developing countries.7
Through the various stages of the pandemic-related health and economic crises pandemic,
governments responded with a number of policy initiatives that often attempted to balance
competing policy objectives. As the health crisis subsides and economic activity resumes,
policymakers may consider evaluating the various policy approaches for lessons learned and for
best practices to employ in addressing similar crises, should they arise. Such an evaluation could
include:
 Assessing the short and long-term costs and benefits of fiscal policies that were
adopted during the crisis to address employment dislocations and support social
safety nets, compared with the potential long-term impact of deficit spending on
the rate of inflation and the long-term financial stability of the economy.
 Evaluating the costs and benefits of economy-wide business and social
lockdowns compared with the impact and effectiveness of targeted closures or
other types of restrictions.
 Reviewing the effectiveness of broad monetary and fiscal policies that were
adopted to support credit markets and sustain economic activity broadly during
the initial stages of the crisis, compared with policies targeted to assist specific
sectors and businesses as they came under financial distress.
 Assessing the effectiveness of transfer payments that were directed at supporting
the most heavily affected households, the impact of such payments on household
saving rates and consumption, the necessary conditions and timing for tapering
off the support, and the impact on the rate of long-term rate of growth between
public versus private debt.
 Assessing the impact that central banks and monetary authorities had on financial
markets and market liquidity by intervening in sovereign debt and corporate bond
markets during the early stages of the health and economic crisis and the impact,
if any, on the ability of the markets to perform their traditional functions of
pricing risk and allocating capital.
 Assessing the optimal combination and impact of fiscal policies during a national
or global economic crisis between assisting households, firms, or state and local
governments.
 Evaluating the effectiveness of unemployment insurance systems that provide
short-term unemployment insurance to sustain workers incomes, compared with
European-style job retention programs that maintain pre-crisis employment, even
as those jobs could disappear once the support ends.8

6 Blenkinsop, Phillip, Resisting Patent Waiver, EU Submits Vaccine Plan to WTO, Reuters, June 4, 2021.
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eu-executive-submits-vaccine-access-proposal-wto-2021-06-04/.
7 Scott, Eugene, G-7 Leaders Commit to Making 1 Billion Coronavirus Vaccines Available Starting This Summer, The
Washington Post
, June 11, 2021.
8 Job Retention Schemes During the COVID-19 Lockdown and Beyond, Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, August 3, 2020.
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Through early June 2021, various key economic and financial indicators had rebounded from the
depths of the pandemic-related economic recession, although not all parts of the global economy
had recovered to the levels that preceded the pre-COVID-19 pandemic.9 Although vaccination
rates had increased in various countries, particularly the United States, a long list of countries
struggled to get their populations vaccinated and their economies operating at or above pre-
pandemic levels. By mid-2021, financial market indices had largely recovered from the losses
experienced in March and April 2020, international oil prices had surpassed their pre-pandemic
levels, pressure on the dollar had eased, and labor markets appeared to be stabilizing. Over the
long run, however, damage to labor markets could be more problematic with a large share of the
labor force unable to return to pre-pandemic jobs. Similarly, economies could face long-term
costs as a result of children who were held out of in-person education for over a year that could
result in lower academic performance and graduation rates and delayed entry into the labor
market. On March 31, 2021, Kristalina Georgieva, Managing Director of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), warned that an emerging market debt crisis could unfold as the global
economy begins recovering and interest rates rise, which could cause a capital outflow from
developing economies.10
The U.S. and European economies experienced the beginnings of a recovery in the third quarter
of 2020 with the U.S. economy growing by 33.4%, or at an annual rate of 5.0%, largely matching
an equally sharp decline in growth in the second quarter. The Eurozone economy grew by 12.5%
during the quarter and -7.4% at an annual rate. During the third quarter of 2020, however, the
recovery was weakened by renewed quarantines and business lockdowns in response to a
resurgence of infectious cases and the emergence of more contagious variants of the virus that
began in September. The annual U.S. economic growth rate slipped to -3.5% in 2020, but was
estimated to have grown at an annualized rate of growth of 6.4% during the first quarter of
2021.11
On June 14, 2021, UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson announced a four-week extension in social
restrictions and business lockdowns in response to a rise in viral infections, further delaying the
return of the UK economy pre-pandemic activity.12 On March 3, 2021, UK Chancellor of the
Exchequer Sunak announced a £65 billion stimulus package over two years to revive the UK
economy that is comprised of various business incentives and worker income support measures to
be followed by tax increases starting in 2023.13 The U.S. Congress passed a $1.9 trillion
economic stimulus bill, designated the American Rescue Plan Act (P.L. 117-2), that was signed by
President Biden on March 11, 2021.
The WHO indicated in early January 2021, that 230 million Europeans were living under
lockdown restrictions and that 26 million Europeans had contracted COVID-19 in 2020.14 On
April 13, 2021, the WHO estimated that 1 million Europeans had died from the disease, nearly
twice as many as in the United States. In an attempt to stop the spread of new variant strains of

9 Mapping the Spread of the COVID-19.
10 Giles, Chris, Prepare for Emerging Markets Debt Crisis, Warns IMF Head, Financial Times, March 31, 2021.
https://www.ft.com/content/487c30f4-7f21-4787-b519-dde52264d141.
11 Gross Domestic Product, First Quarter 2021 (Advance Estimate), Bureau of Economic Analysis, April 29, 2021.
12 Payne, Sebastian, Jim Pickard and Daniel Thomas, Four-week Extension to England’s Lockdown Dashes Business
Hopes, Financial Times, June 14, 2021. https://www.ft.com/content/2d00de1a-92d7-4b63-a151-53a6ae064368.
13 Pickard, Jim, Chris Giles, and George Parker, Rishi Sunak Delivers Spend Now, Tax Later Budget to Kickstart UK
Economy, Financial Times, March 3, 2021. https://www.ft.com/content/da66ce9a-6dfc-4a3a-bde7-d4f4faed6c4a.
14 Clarfelt, Harriet, Pandemic at ‘tipping point’, Says WHO Europe Official, Financial Times, January 7, 2021.
https://www.ft.com/content/9b42e8fa-dde1-3663-a4ad-7d6605121866.
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the virus, the UK, Ireland, Germany, Denmark, and some northern Italian regions closed schools
in January 2021 for several weeks.15 Reportedly, disputes over vaccine distribution within and
among European countries and with Britain and the spread of more virulent strains of the
COVID-19 virus increased public criticism of government leaders in some EU countries and
prompted renewed business lockdowns and school closures.16 COVID-19 infections were rising
in Russia in June 2021, reportedly due to the unwillingness of the populace to receive the
Russian-developed Sputnik V vaccine.
On March 31, 2021, French President Macron announced a four-week country-wide business
lockdown to curb a resurgence in viral cases that were overwhelming French hospitals and
extending by one week a planned two week closure of schools.17 The EU also blocked shipments
to Britain of the AstraZeneca vaccine produced in Belgium and the Netherlands until
commitments made to supply the EU had been met, or until other countries showed reciprocity in
their distribution of vaccines.18At the same time, 16 European countries, including Germany,
France, Italy, and Spain, temporarily suspended use of the AstraZeneca vaccine over concerns of
possible negative side-effects, despite assurances by EU drug regulators that the benefits of the
vaccine outweighed any risks.19
India announced on March 25, 2021, that it was temporarily halting exports of COVID-19
vaccines and prioritizing local vaccinations in response to a resurgence in viral cases.20 In early
April 2021, India and Brazil were designated global viral infection hot spots due to a resurgence
in cases. On May 6, India reported a single-day total of 412,000 new cases.21 Brazil reportedly
has had over 350,000 viral-related deaths: in some cities in Brazil, COVID-related daily deaths
have outnumbered daily births.22
On April 15, 2021, the Director-General of the WTO called on WTO members and vaccine
manufacturers to increase production, reduce export restrictions, and suspend intellectual property
rights on COVID-19 vaccines to increase immunizations.23 The WHO also reported that new
COVID-19 cases had nearly doubled around the world over the preceding two months,

15 Hall, Ben, Bethan Staton, Joshua Chaffin, Guy Chazan, European Capitals Follow UK With School Closures as
Virus Surges, Financial Times, January 7, 2021. https://www.ft.com/content/8121ca0a-4d96-4cf5-b5df-a73adc16a606.
16 Chazan, Guy, We Are a Laughing Stock’: Covid-19 and Germany’s Political Malaise, Financial Times, April 1,
2021. https://www.ft.com/content/bc5a3b02-a90d-4206-a441-1bada29feba2.
17 Mallet, Victor, Macron Extends Lockdown Across France to Combat Covid Surge, Financial Times, April 1, 2021.
https://www.ft.com/content/731ec423-03dc-405c-9ff4-f8670b953f2d.
18 Fleming, Sam, Michael Peel, and George Parker, EU Warns ‘zero’ Jabs Shipped to UK Until AstraZeneca Meets
Bloc’s Targets, Financial Times, April 1, 2021. https://www.ft.com/content/28158bed-5f07-4504-9a00-2f3d8f7519df.
19 Paolo Mancini, Donato, Miles Johnson, Michael Peel, David Keohane, Richard Milne, and Sarah Neville, European
Capitals Coordinated Suspension of Oxford/AstraZeneca Covid Jab, Financial Times, April 1, 2021.
https://www.ft.com/content/a046e340-892b-4e68-bfae-4f5c40a5506a.
20 Findlay, Stephanie, Michael Peel, Donato Paolo Mancini, Andres Schipani and Jasmine Cameron-Chileshe, India
Blocks Vaccine Exports in Blow to Dozens of Nations Financial Times, March 25, 2021.
https://www.ft.com/content/5349389c-8313-41e0-9a67-58274e24a019.
21 Slater, Joanna, India Announces Record Number of Deaths and New Cases as Outbreak Rages on, The Washington
Post
, May 6, 2021; Parker, Claire, Paul Schemm, Sean Sullivan, India Sets Another Daily Coronavirus Case Record:
U.S. Pledges Help, The Washington Post, April 26, 2021. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/india-
coronavirus-deaths-pandemic/2021/04/25/ec0f208a-a51c-11eb-b314-2e993bd83e31_story.html.
22 Caverni, Alexandre, Brazil Sees 1,803 COVID-19 Deaths; Chinese Vaccine Found 50.7% Effective Against Variant,
Reuters, April 11, 2021; Hassan, Jennifer, In Many Brazilian Cities, Deaths Have Overtaken Births, The Washington
Post,
April 15, 2021.
23 Cunnigham, Erin, New African WTO Head Urges Members to Take Action on Vaccine Inequity, The Washington
Post
, April 15, 2021.
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approaching the highest rates of infection since the start of the pandemic. Reportedly, new case
numbers had spiked in every region of the world, with the largest outbreaks occurring in India,
Brazil, Poland, Turkey and some other countries.24 Also on April 15, 2021, a group of 175 former
world leaders and Nobel laureates called on the United States to suspend intellectual property
rights for COVID-19 vaccines to facilitate the international production and distribution of
vaccines by allowing developing countries the ability to manufacture their own vaccines. The
group warned that, “….inequitable vaccine access would impact the global economy and prevent
it from recovering.”25
On April 16, the WHO announced that it would develop one or more COVID-19 technology hubs
to transfer a “comprehensive technology package and provide appropriate technology to
interested manufacturers” in developing economies.26 Reportedly, the initiative’s goal is to make
the technology either free of intellectual property constraints in developing economies, or that
such rights are made available through non-exclusive licenses.
Japan’s Prime Minister Suga announced on January 5, 2021, that Tokyo and three surrounding
prefectures would initiate a voluntary “soft” state of emergency on January 8 that stressed
teleworking, restricting unnecessary travel, and reducing sporting and cultural events.27 On April
23, 2021, Japan announced new two-week lockdown protocols for Tokyo, Osaka, and two other
large cities as Japan faced a rise in viral infections. The lockdowns were intended to encourage
workers to work from home, to close all venues that serve alcohol and supermarkets, but not close
schools.28 In April and May, Japan again experienced a resurgence of cases, reportedly raising the
total number of diagnosed case to 700,000. Foreign travel to Japan was limited and concerns
increased that Japan may be required to delay again or scrap entirely the summer Olympics
scheduled to begin July 23, 2021.29 On March 9, 2021, the government announced that Japan’s
GDP grew by 2.8% in the fourth quarter of 2020, down from a third quarter rate of 5.3%. On an
annualized rate, the economy is projected to have declined by 4.8% year over year in 2020. A
decline in business investment and personal consumption in the fourth quarter led forecasters to
downgrade their estimates for fourth quarter 2020 and forecasts for first quarter 2021 GDP.30
Impact on Workers
In a report prepared for the January 25-29, 2021, World Economic Forum, the International Labor
Organization (ILO) estimated that 93% of the world’s workers were living under some form of
workplace restrictions as a result of the global pandemic and that 8.8% of global working hours
were lost in 2020 relative to the fourth quarter of 2019, an amount equivalent to 255 million full-
time jobs. The ILO estimated that the loss in working hours was comprised of (1) workers who

24 Cunningham, Erin and Siobhan O’Grady, New Global Coronavirus Cases Nearly Double in Two Months, The
Washington Post
, April 16, 2021. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/04/16/global-coronavirus-cases-surge-
who/.
25 Williams, Aime, Former World Leaders Call on Biden to Suspend Covid-19 Vaccine Patents, Financial Times, April
15, 2021. https://www.ft.com/content/43fd53f5-2b82-4e41-981c-8544a6ce996b.
26 World Health Organization, Establishment of a COVID-19 mRNA Vaccine Technology Transfer Hub to Scale Up
Global Manufacturing, April 16, 2021.
27 Harding, Robin and Kana Inagaki, Japan Declares State of Emergency in Tokyo as Coronavirus Cases Surge,
Financial Times, January 5, 2021. https://www.ft.com/content/72ceb064-2231-4d17-bd8f-92bd7f99f33c.
28 Harding, Robin, Japan to Impose New State of Emergency as COVID-19 Cases Rise, Financial Times, April 23,
2021. https://www.ft.com/content/a3d3a8bc-6d0e-4b2b-9e09-3310db13222e.
29 Inside Japan, Latest Coronavirus New From Japan, June 10, 2021.
30 Obe, Mitsuru, Japan Revises Q4 GDP Growth Down to Annualized 11.7%, Nikkei Asia, March 9, 2021.
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were unemployed, but actively seeking employment, (2) workers who were employed, but had
their working hours reduced, and (3) workers who were unemployed and not actively seeking
employment. Based on this approach, the ILO estimated that unemployment globally was
equivalent to 0.9% of total working hours lost in 2020, while inactivity and reduced hours
accounted for 7.9% of total working hours lost, as indicated in Figure 1.
Total working hours lost in 2020 compared with 2019 were highest in Europe (14.6%) and the
Americas (13.7%), where quarantines and lockdowns had been extensive, followed by lower-
middle income economies. The ILO also estimated that global job losses totaled 114 million jobs
in 2020 relative to 2019. The share of lost worker hours due to higher rates of unemployment
were highest in Europe (6.0%), the Americas (2.7%), including the United States, and Arab States
(1.7%).31 The ILO also estimated that an increase in global economic activity through part of the
fourth quarter was equal to an increase of 130 million full-time jobs.
Figure 1. Composition of Working-Hours Lost by Region, 2020

Source: ILO Monitor: COVID-19 and the World of Work, International Labor Organization, 2021
A number of economists and others estimated that pandemic-related disruptions to labor markets
in developed and developing economies could have long-lasting effects. One group of economists
estimated that even after the pandemic recedes and economic activity ramps up, firms may not
abandon the labor-saving lessons they learned, with fewer jobs created in retail stores, restaurants,
auto dealerships, and meat-packing facilities, among other places.32 Other analysts estimated the
pandemic could affect the structure of work in three main areas by:
1. Creating a permanent presence of telework, which could account for 20% to 25%
of workers in developed economies and 20% in developing economies working
from home three to five times per week, which could reduce demand for public
transportation, restaurants, and retail stores;
2. Increasing the level of e-commerce that could disrupt jobs in travel and leisure,
low-wage jobs in brick-and-mortar stores and restaurants, and increase jobs in
distribution centers.

31 ILO Monitor: COVID-19 and the World of Work, Seventh Edition, International Labor Organization, January 15,
2021, p. 2.
32 Autor, David, and Elizabeth Reynolds, The Nature of Work After the COVID Crisis: Too Few Low-Wage Jobs, The
Hamilton Project, Brookings Institution, July 2020, p. 2
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3. Accelerating the adoption of artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics.33
Analysts with the Pew Research Center surveyed American workers in January 2021 who were
unemployed and looking for work. The results indicated that half of those surveyed were
pessimistic about finding another job in the near future and two-thirds had considered changing
their occupations, a sentiment shared across income levels. The other third indicated they had
already engaged in re-skilling through job retraining programs or educational activities.34
In the United States, labor markets are recovering, but the overall rate of unemployment has
exceeded pre-pandemic rates. In testimony before the Senate Banking Committee on February 23,
2021, Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell indicated that although new COVID-19 cases
and hospitalizations had fallen and offered hope for an economic recovery later in 2021, the
recovery so far remained, “uneven and far from complete, and the path ahead is highly
uncertain.”35 In addition, Powell argued that a resurgence in viral cases, hospitalizations, and
deaths was “causing great hardship for millions of Americans and is weighing on economic
activity and job creation.”
The Federal Reserve also indicated in an accompanying monetary policy report the pandemic-
related economic recession was disproportionately affecting certain groups in the economy:
lower-wage and less-educated workers, racial and ethnic minorities, and women.36 Powell also
indicated that published unemployment rates “dramatically understated” the deterioration in the
U.S. labor market. Instead of the announced unemployment rate of 6.5% in January, 2021, Powell
argued that the actual rate likely was closer to 10%, reflecting discouraged workers who have
stopped looking for work and, therefore, are not counted as part of the labor force.37 He stated,
however, that, “even those grim statistics understate the decline in labor market conditions for the
most economically vulnerable Americans.”38
According to the Census Bureau, between March 2020 and February 2021, 115 million
Americans experienced a loss in employment income and 37 million qualified for and received
unemployment insurance. In addition, an estimated 26 million households reported receiving
Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program (SNAP) in February 2021, while nearly 12 million
households with children were estimated not to have had enough to eat.39
Additional Census Bureau data indicate the stimulus checks appropriated under the COVID-19
Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (P.L. 116-136) were used by households to cover usual
expenses such as food, housing, and gas. The Census Bureau also reported that:
 By late summer 2020, 76.5 million American adults reported that it was
somewhat or very difficult for them to pay usual expenses: that number rose to
89.7 million by December 2020.

33 McKinsey Global Institute, The Future of Work After COVID-19, February 18, 2021.
34 Parker, Kim, Ruth Igielnik, and Rakesh Kochhar Unemployed Americans are Feeling the Emotional Strain of Job
Loss; Most Have Considered Changing Occupations
, Pew Research Center. February 10, 2021.
35 Powell, Jerome, H., Testimony before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, February 23,
2021, and Powell, Jerome H., Getting Back to a Strong Labor Market, Speech before The Economic Club of New
York, February 10, 2021.
36 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Monetary Policy Report February 19, 2021, February 19, 2021.
37 Powell, Jerome H., Getting Back to a Strong Labor Market, p. 4.
38 Ibid, p. 4.
39 Monte M., Lindsay, Historical Look at Unemployment, Sectors Shows Magnitude of COVID-19 Impact on
Economy, Census Bureau, March 15, 2021, https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2021/03/putting-economic-impact-
of-pandemic-in-context.html.
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 Households accumulated debt to meet their usual expenses with roughly 30% of
adults using credit cards, taking out loans or borrowing from family and friends
between June and December 2020 to pay for usual expenses.
 In June 2020, 33.7 million adults were using debt but not income to pay their
expenses. By late December, that number had increased to 43.7 million adults.
 Households used the second stimulus check under the Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 2021 (P.L. 116-260) to cover usual expenses and reduced
the number of all adults in households struggling to cover usual costs to 80.5
million. Households also used the second stimulus check to pay down debt.40
During the 65-week period from mid-March 2020 to early June, 2021, 88 million Americans (half
of the 160 million civilian work force) had filed for unemployment insurance at some point
during the preceding year, as indicated in Table 1.41 On a seasonally adjusted basis, the number of
insured unemployed individuals was 3.5 million on May 29, 2021, down from a peak of 25
million in mid-May, 2020. As indicated in Figure 2, weekly claims have fallen from the sharp
increases recorded in April and May, 2020. On a week-over-week basis, new claims totaled
376,000 in the week ending June 5 2021, falling by 9,000 from the previous week’s total of
385,000, and representing the smallest weekly increase in unemployment filings since the start of
the pandemic. This number is still nearly twice the average number of weekly claims recorded
prior to the pandemic of about 200,000. In the week ending May 22, 2021, 15.3 million people
claimed benefits in all programs, down 95,000 from the previous week’s total.
The insured unemployment rate for the week ending May 29, 2021, was 2.5%, down 0.2% from
the previous week. As workers have approached the traditional 26-week maximum for receiving
standard unemployment benefits they have applied for benefits under the extended Pandemic
Emergency Unemployment Compensation (PEUC) program or the Pandemic Unemployment
Assistance (PUA) program.42 Between May 15, 2021, and May 22, 2021, claims under the PEUC
program fell by 70,000 to 5.2 million, while claims under the PUA program decreased by 12,700
to 6.3 million. Benefits were extended by P.L. 116-260, signed by President Trump on December
27, 2020. Benefits were further extended through September 6, 2021, by the American Rescue
Plan Act of 2021, P.L. 117-2, signed by President Biden on March 11, 2021.

40 Perez-Lopez, Daniel J. and Lindsay M. Monte, Household Pulse Survey Shows Stimulus Payments Have Eased
Financial Hardship, Census Bureau, March 24, 2021. https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2021/03/many-american-
households-use-stimulus-payments-to-pay-down-debt.html.
41 Unemployment Insurance Weekly Claims, Department of Labor, June 10, 2021. https://www.dol.gov/; Romm, Tony
and Jeff Stein, 2.4 Million Americans Filed Jobless Claims Last Week, Bringing Nine Week Total to 38.6 Million,
Washington Post, May 21, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/05/21/unemployment-claims-
coronavirus/
42 Both programs were authorized under P.L. 116-136, March 27, 2020, the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic
Security (CARES) Act, with benefits ending by December 31, 2020. The PUA program provided 39 weeks of
unemployment assistance, including $600 weekly benefits (expired in August 2020), under certain conditions, for
workers who had exhausted regular unemployment benefits, were not eligible for regular benefits, or were not eligible
for benefits under the PEUC program. On December 27, 2020, President Trump signed the Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 2021 (P.L. 116-260), extending PUA benefits for 11 weeks. The PEUC program provided 13
weeks of additional benefits to individuals who had exhausted standard unemployment assistance and met other
eligibility requirements. Benefits were further extended through September 6, 2021, by the American Rescue Plan Act
of 2021, P.L. 117-2, signed by President Biden on March 11, 2021. DOL, Unemployment Insurance Program Letter
No. 14-21
, March 15, 2021; DOL, Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 16-20, February 25, 2021.
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Figure 2. Initial U.S. Weekly Claims for Unemployment Insurance, 2020 and 2021
In millions of individual claims

Source: Department of Labor. Created by CRS.
At the beginning of the pandemic-related economic recession, the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) reported on May 8, 2020, that 20 million Americans lost their jobs in April 2020 as a
consequence of business lockdowns, pushing the total number of unemployed Americans to 23
million,43 out of a total civilian labor force of 158 million. The increase pushed the national
unemployment rate to 14.7% (with some caveats), the highest since the Great Depression of the
1930s.44 In contrast, on June 4, 2021, BLS reported that: nonfarm employment rose by 589,000 in
May to reach 151.6 million, up from the previous month’s increase of 278,000; the total number
of unemployed Americans was 9.3 million, down from the previous month’s total of 9.8 million;45
and the unemployment rate dropped to 5.8%, again with some caveats.46
Table 1. Seasonally Adjusted Weekly Unemployment Insurance Claims
In thousands
Insured
Change from
Insured
Unemployment
Week Ending
Initial Claims
Prior Week
Unemployment
Rate
Total Claims
21-Mar-20
3,307
3,025
3,059
2.1%
3,307
28-Mar-20
6,867
3,560
7,446
5.1
10,174
4-Apr-20
6,615
-252
11,914
8.2
16,789
11-Apr-20
5,237
-1,378
15,819
10.9
22,026
18-Apr-20
4,442
-795
18,011
12.4
26,468
25-Apr-20
3,867
-575
22,377
15.4
30,335

43 This total did not include 10.9 million workers who were working part time not by choice and 9.9 million individuals
who were seeking employment.
44 The Employment Situation-May 2020, Bureau of Labor Statistics, June 10, 2020. https://www.bls.gov/.
45 This total does not include 5.8 million workers who were working part time not by choice and 6.6 million individuals
who were seeking employment.
46 The Employment Situation-May 2021, Bureau of Labor Statistics, June 4, 2021, https://www.bls.gov/. BLS indicated
that some individuals had been misclassified in previous months. Instead of being classified as unemployed, they were
misclassified as employed, but absent from work due to coronavirus-related business closures. If such individuals had
been classified as unemployed, the unemployment rate would have been 5 percentage points higher in April 2020.
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Insured
Change from
Insured
Unemployment
Week Ending
Initial Claims
Prior Week
Unemployment
Rate
Total Claims
2-May-20
3,176
-691
22,548
15.5
33,511
9-May-20
2,687
-489
24,912
17.1
36,198
16-May-20
2,446
-241
20,841
14.3
38,644
23-May-20
2,123
-323
21,268
14.6
40,767
30-May-20
1,897
-226
20,606
14.1
42,664
6-Jun-20
1,566
-331
20,544
14.1
44,230
13-Jun-20
1,540
-26
19,231
13.2
45,770
20-Jun-20
1,482
-58
19,290
13.2
47,252
27-Jun-20
1,408
-74
17,760
12.2
48,660
4-Jul-20
1,310
-98
17,304
11.8
49,970
11-Jul-20
1,308
-2
16,151
11.1
51,278
18-Jul-20
1,422
114
16,951
11.6
52,700
25-Jul-20
1,435
13
16,090
11.0
54,135
1-Aug-20
1,191
-244
15,480
10.6
55,326
8-Aug-20
971
-220
14,759
10.1
56,297
15-Aug-20
1,104
133
14,492
9.9
57,401
22-Aug-20
1,011
-98
13,254
9.1
58,412
29-Aug-20
884
-127
13,544
9.3
59,296
5-Sep-20
893
9
12,747
8.7
60,189
12-Sep-20
866
-27
12,747
8.7
61,055
19-Sep-20
873
7
11,979
8.2
61,928
26-Sep-20
849
-24
10,594
7.2
62,777
3-Oct-20
767
-82
9,398
6.4
63,544
10-Oct-20
842
75
8,472
5.8
64,386
17-Oct-20
791
-45
7,823
5.3
65,183
24-Oct-20
758
-39
7,222
4.9
65,941
31-Oct-20
757
-1
6,801
4.6
66,698
7-Nov-20
711
-46
6,370
4.3
67,409
14-Nov-20
748
37
6,089
4.2
68,157
21-Nov-20
787
39
5,527
3.8
68,944
28-Nov-20
716
-71
5,781
3.9
69,660
5-Dec-20
853
134
5,614
3.8
70,513
12-Dec-20
873
20
5,433
3.7
71,386
19-Dec-20
803
-70
5,311
3.6
72,189
26-Dec-20
763
-40
5,180
3.5
72,952
2-Jan-21
781
18
5,240
3.7
73,733
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Insured
Change from
Insured
Unemployment
Week Ending
Initial Claims
Prior Week
Unemployment
Rate
Total Claims
9-Jan-21
904
123
5,061
3.6
74,637
16-Jan-21
886
-18
4,878
3.4
75,523
23-Jan 21
836
-50
4,791
3.4
76,359
30-Jan-21
837
1
4,655
3.3
77,196
6-Feb-21
863
26
4,592
3.2
78,059
13-Feb-21
847
-16
4,469
3.1
78,906
20-Feb-21
747
-100
4,383
3.1
79,653
27-Feb-21
761
14
4,157
2.9
80,414
6-March-21
734
-27
4,123
2.9
81,148
13-March-21
765
31
3,841
2.7
81,913
20-March-21
658
-107
3,750
2.6
82,571
27-March-21
729
71
3,717
2.6
83,300
3-April-21
742
13
3,708
2.7
84,042
10-April-21
586
-156
3,652
2.6
84,628
17-April-21
566
-20
3,653
2.6
85,194
24-April-21
590
24
3,680
2.6
85,784
1-May-21
507
-83
3,640
2.6
86,291
8-May-21
478
-29
3,738
2.7
86,769
15-May-21
444
-34
3,611
2.6
87,213
22-May-21
405
-39
3,757
2.7
87,619
29-May-21
385
-20
3,499
2.5
88,003
5-June-21
376
-9


88,379
Source: Department of Labor, CRS calculations.
Impact on Output
According to the April 2021 World Economic Outlook prepared by the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), the global economy is projected to experience a stronger recovery in 2021 and 2022
than indicated in previous forecasts, with global growth projected to increase at a rate of 6% in
2021 and 4.4% in 2022.47 The IMF also concluded the global economic recovery would occur at
different speeds across and within individual countries, reflecting differences in the pace of
vaccinations, the extent of policy support, and various structural conditions, such as the role of
tourism in the economy. Within countries, the employment and earnings of youth, women, and
the relatively lower-skilled workers has been affected the most.
In addition to the asynchronous recovery, the IMF also concluded that fiscal and financial support
provided by central banks may have unintended consequences by supporting equity valuations
that are misaligned with their model-estimated fundamentals and by increasing financial risks

47 World Economic Outlook, International Monetary Fund, April, 2021, p. xiii.
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overall that could become problematic should interest rates start rising.48 These risks could
increase for non-financial firms and households that had high levels of debt relative to income
prior to the pandemic crisis should interest rates rise. Accommodative monetary and fiscal
policies intended to limit the economic impact of the crisis may have aided non-financial firms
and households, but such support may also have come at the expense of higher debt levels for
most countries and the prospect of a lower rate of economic growth in the future.49
The staggered economic recovery is projected to widen gaps in living standards between
developing countries and others. Such differences in living standards are estimated to reflect
differences in cumulative per capital income with losses in 2020 to 2022 projected to be
equivalent to 20% of 2019 global GDP, or about $18 trillion. The heaviest losses are estimated to
fall disproportionately on low-income and emerging market economies. In addition, the IMF
estimated that 95 million people may have entered into extreme poverty in 2020 with 80 million
more people being undernourished compared to pre-pandemic levels, as (1) per capita incomes
would remain below the pre-pandemic levels for several years, adversely affecting productivity;
(2) the demands placed on national health systems to address the pandemic could hinder the
treatment of other diseases; (3) business bankruptcies could reduce productivity; and (4) rising
debt levels could crowd out potential borrowing and investment.50
The IMF urged G-20 leaders to maintain monetary and fiscal policies to lessen the economic
impact of the global recession, In particular, the IMF recommended a combination of
accommodative monetary policies characterized by low interest rates and central bank programs
to facilitate credit availability, a continuation of fiscal support for individuals and firms, and
engagement in a synchronized infrastructure investment program to promote growth. According
to an IMF analysis, all other things being equal, an increase in infrastructure spending by G-20
countries of one-half percent of their GDP in 2021 and 1% in 2022 through 2025 would increase
global GDP by 2% in 2025, compared with under 1.2% growth for an unsynchronized approach.51
In contrast to remarks by Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell in early December 2020 that
the outlook was “extraordinarily uncertain,” and that, “….significant challenges and uncertainties
remain,”52 his assessment on March 23, 2021, before the House Financial Services Committee
was more upbeat.53 He stated that, “The recovery has progressed more quickly than generally
expected and looks to be strengthening.” He cautioned, however, that, “…. the sectors of the
economy most adversely affected by the resurgence of the virus, and by greater social distancing,
remain weak, and the unemployment rate—still elevated at 6.2 percent—underestimates the
shortfall, particularly as labor market participation remains notably below pre-pandemic levels.”
At the same hearing, Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen stated:
We are meeting at a hopeful moment for the economy – but still a daunting one. While
we’re seeing signs of recovery, we should be clear-eyed about the hole we’re digging out
of: The country is still down nearly 10 million jobs from its pre-pandemic peak.

48 Global Financial Stability Report, International Monetary Fund, April, 2021, p. x.
49 Ibid, p. 36.
50 G-20 Surveillance Note, International Monetary Fund, November, 2020, p. 6.
51 Ibid., p. 10.
52 Powell, Jerome H., Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, December 1 and 2, 2020.
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/powell20201201a.htm.
53 Powell, Jerome H., Statement before the Financial Services Committee, House of Representatives, March 23, 2021,
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One-in-ten homeowners with a mortgage are behind on their payments, and almost one-in-
five renters are behind on their rent. There are 22 million people who say they don’t have
enough food to eat. One-in-ten adults is hungry in America.
We know that when the foundations of someone’s life fall apart – when they lose the roof
over their head or the ability to eat dinner every night – the pain can weigh on them for
years. Their earning potential is permanently lowered. I worried about this happening on a
mass scale.54
On December 2, IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva indicated the global financial
system had been resilient enough to withstand the impact of the global pandemic, but she urged
policymakers to “act quickly” to return economic growth to its re-pandemic levels and avoid
widespread financial distress.55 The Director reportedly also urged policymakers to take “urgent,
coordinated steps” to deliver investment in digital technology, infrastructure and the environment.
She also indicated the IMF had projected that the loss of global economic output between 2020
and 2025 as a consequence of the pandemic would total $28 trillion and that 120 million jobs
would be lost permanently in the tourism industry alone. The pandemic-related economic
recession has raised concerns over the growing debt problems in developing economies, where
the IMF projected that as much as 40% of banks assets were in danger of becoming distressed.
Since early 2021, the global pandemic has affected a broad swath of international economic and
trade activities, from services generally to tourism and hospitality, medical supplies and other
global value chains, consumer electronics, and financial markets to energy, transportation, food,
and a range of social activities, to name a few. In addition, the health crisis disproportionately
negatively affected developing economies that are constrained by limited financial resources and
where health systems have been overloaded. The IMF estimated in April 2021 the economic
fallout from the pandemic could push 95 million people in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia
into extreme poverty, reversing a decades-long trend.56 However, the IMF also concluded that
spending on social programs to limit the impact of the pandemic could reduce the number of
people falling into extreme poverty to 80 to 90 million.
The two-track nature of the economic recovery between developed and developing economies
combined with new variants of the virus and viral outbreaks in some major developing economies
increase the cost of the crisis on the global economy and complicate economic forecasts.
Similarly, estimates of when a sustained recovery might begin and the speed of the recovery are
speculative. Forecasts have been updated several times since the global recession began in April
2020 to incorporate additional data, initially reflecting worsening global and national economic
growth estimates, but also reflecting more positive data in third quarter 2020 and first quarter
2021.
Although individually experienced, the pandemic-related economic effects have been globally
shared as national efforts to reduce social interaction to contain the spread of the virus disrupted
the daily lives of most Americans and added to the economic costs. Increased rates of
unemployment raised the prospects of social unrest in developed economies where lost incomes
and health insurance threaten living standards and in developing economies where populations
reportedly are concerned over access to basic necessities and the prospects of rising levels of

54 Yellen, Janet, L., Testimony before the Financial Services Committee, House of Representatives March 23, 2021, p.
1.
55 Wheatley, Jonathan, IMF Chief Warns Against Complacency on Global Economy, Financial Times, December 2,
2020. https://www.ft.com/content/fda34b47-33d2-457e-a0b6-45be6001920d.
56 Fiscal Monitor, International Monetary Fund, April 2021, p. 31.
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poverty.57 U.N. Secretary General Antonio Guterres argued in a video conference before the U.N.
Security Council on April 10, 2020, that
[T]he pandemic also poses a significant threat to the maintenance of international peace
and security—potentially leading to an increase in social unrest and violence that would
greatly undermine our ability to fight the disease.58
Financial Markets
Policymakers and financial and commodity market participants had generally estimated that a
global economic recovery would take hold in the third quarter of 2020. A resurgence in infectious
cases in developed and developing countries starting in September, however, shifted more of the
projected recovery to 2021. Various indicators in the third quarter suggested the worst of the
economic crisis had passed, although the extent and strength of any global economic recovery
remained difficult to predict. Estimates indicated that China’s economy grew by 4.9% in the third
quarter, driven by an increase in industrial production and consumer demand, marking it as one of
the few economies likely to post an overall positive rate of growth for 2020.59 At the same time,
an economic recovery stalled in Europe and the United States. The emergence of more infectious
strains of the COVID-19 virus pushed governments to re-impose lockdowns and curtail social
and economic activity during the fourth quarter. Updated forecasts indicate the pandemic could
negatively affect global economic growth in 2020 less negatively than had been forecasted in the
spring, but that the effects could last longer with a slower rate of growth in 2021 and 2022.
As one indicator of the economic impact of the pandemic, the Dow Jones Industrial Average
Index (DJIA), along with other market indices, rose nearly three percentage points on Monday,
November 9, 2020, reportedly on news that a COVID-19 vaccine had been developed.60 During
the period November 3 through 24, the DJIA rose over 9%. On November 24, 2020, the DJIA,
along with global equities markets, increased by 1.5%, and reached an index milestone of 30,000
for the first time and surpassed the previous high value recorded on February 14, 2020, prior to
the pandemic-related economic shutdown. Reportedly, the rise in market indices reflected a
positive assessment by investors of announcements of effective vaccines against COVID-19,
political developments in the United States, potential additional fiscal measures by governments
to stimulate economic activity, and prospects of stronger economic growth in 2021.61
Prospects of a vaccine initially signaled an eventual end to the business lockdowns and social
restrictions and reduced demands on policymakers to implement additional fiscal and monetary
policies. Until a vaccine can be broadly distributed, however, policymakers may have to weigh

57 Sly, Liz, “Stirrings of Unrest Around the World Could Portend Turmoil as Economies Collapse,” Washington Post,
April 19, 2020; Ingraham, Christopher, “Coronavirus Recession Could Plunge Tens of Millions Into Poverty, New
Report Warns,” Washington Post, April 20, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/04/20/coronavirus-
recession-could-plunge-tens-millions-into-poverty-new-report-warns/.
58 Secretary-General’s Remarks to the Security Council on the COVID-19 Pandemic, United Nations, April 9, 2020.
https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2020-04-09/secretary-generals-remarks-the-security-council-the-covid-
19-pandemic-delivered.
59 Hale, Thomas, Tom Mitchell, Christian Shepherd, and Emma Zhou, “Chinese Economy Expands 4.9% in Third
Quarter,” Financial Times, October 19, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/22108ddd-3280-4013-bcd8-1adc9e6ae13d.
60 Telford, Taylor, and Hamza Shaban, “Dow Climbs More Than 800 Points as Vaccine News, Biden Victory Rev Up
Markets,” Washington Post, November 9, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/11/09/stocks-
markets-biden-trump-coronavirus/.
61 Smith, Colby, Camilla Hodgson, and Hudson Lockett, US Stocks Set Record High as Investors Look to New
Administration, Financial Times, November 24, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/433048a5-c489-4ddd-aebd-
d56fb8f3edfc.
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continuing efforts that balance the competing requirements of households, firms, and state and
local governments. Also, the impact of the currently available vaccines on new strains of the
COVID-19 virus are being evaluated.62 Various U.S. states reversed course in late June to impose
or re-impose social distancing guidelines and close businesses that had begun opening as a result
of a rise in new confirmed cases of COVID-19, raising the prospect of a delayed recovery. A
prolonged recovery could also increase the financial strains on small and medium-sized firms that
face liquidity constraints and the prospects of insolvency.63
Differences in policy approaches between countries initially slowed a coordinated response. This
lack of response may have inflicted longer-term damage to the global economy by impairing
international political, trade, and economic relations, particularly between countries that
promoted nationalism and those that argued for a coordinated international response to the
pandemic. Policy differences also strained relations between developed and developing
economies and between northern and southern members of the Eurozone, challenging alliances
and conventional concepts of national security, and raising questions about the future of global
leadership.
In some countries, the pandemic elevated the importance of public health as a national security
issue and as a national economic priority on a par with traditional national security concerns such
as terrorism, cyberattacks, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.64 The pandemic-
related economic and human costs could have long-term repercussions for economies through the
tragic loss of life and job losses that derail careers and permanently shutter businesses. Fiscal and
monetary measures implemented to prevent a financial crisis and sustain economic activity may
have inadvertently worsened income and wealth disparities that were being affected by the
disproportionate impact of quarantines and lockdowns on services sector workers. Within some
countries, the economic fallout may have widened racial and socio-economic cleavages and
increased social unrest. In speaking about these costs for Americans, Federal Reserve Chairman
Powell said on May 19, 2020,
Since the pandemic arrived in force just two months ago, more than 20 million people have
lost their jobs, reversing nearly 10 years of job gains. This precipitous drop in economic
activity has caused a level of pain that is hard to capture in words, as lives are upended
amid great uncertainty about the future.65
BEA reported that U.S. GDP fell by 9.0% in the second quarter of 2020 compared with the
previous quarter, or at an annualized rate of -31%, the largest quarterly decline in U.S. GDP
recorded over the past 70 years.66 Additional data, however, indicated that U.S. GDP grew by
7.5% in the third quarter, or at an annualized rate of 33%, based primarily on gains in personal
consumption, reflecting an increase in income and continued government income support.67

62 Didion, Timothy, COVID-19 Vaccine Likely to be Effective Against New Virus Strain, Experts Say, ABC News,
December 26, 2020. https://abc7news.com/covid-uk-new-strain-of-vaccine-effectiveness-stain/8988644/.
63 Global Financial Stability Report, International Monetary Fund, October 2020, p. 1.
64 Harris, Shane and Missy Ryan, To Prepare for the Next Pandemic, the U.S. Needs to Change its National Security
Priorities, Experts Say, Washington Post, June 16, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/to-
prepare-for-the-next-pandemic-the-us-needs-to-change-its-national-security-priorities-experts-say/2020/06/16/
b99807c0-aa9a-11ea-9063-e69bd6520940_story.html.
65 Powell, Jerome H. Coronavirus and CARES Act, Testimony before the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, U.S. Senate, May 19, 2020.
66 Gross Domestic Product, 2nd Quarter 2020 (Advance Estimate) and Annual Update, Bureau of Economic Analysis,
July 30, 2020. https://www.bea.gov/news/2020/gross-domestic-product-2nd-quarter-2020-advance-estimate-and-
annual-update.
67 Gross Domestic Product, Third Quarter 2020 (Advance Estimate), Bureau of Economic Analysis, October 29, 2020.
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Fourth quarter 2020 data indicate the U.S. economy grew by 1.0% over the third quarter, or at an
annualized rate of 4.0%. On a year-over-year basis, U.S. real GDP is estimated to have declined
by 3.5% in 2020 compared with 2019.68
In its December 2, 2020, Beige Book analysis, the Federal Reserve (Fed) reported that economic
activity had increased modestly in each of the 12 Federal Reserve districts during the third
quarter, although economic activity remained below average levels. Four of the Districts reported
little or no growth, while five indicated that economic activity remained below pre-pandemic
levels for at least some sectors. The manufacturing, distribution and logistics, residential housing,
and homebuilding sectors reported positive increases in economic activity. Businesses, however,
raised concerns over renewed infections, actual and prospective restrictions, and expiring
unemployment benefits and evictions or foreclosures.69
Similarly, in its February 2021 Beige Book, the Federal Reserve determined that economic
activity overall had increased modestly from January to mid-February and that most businesses
expected an economic recovery by summer. Of the 12 districts, 10 experienced modest increases
in economic growth, while the New York District recorded mixed performance and the St. Louis
District recorded little change in economic activity during the period.70
The June 2, 2021, Beige Book analysis reported that economic activity had improved at least
moderately in all 12 Districts during the April to late May period. The rise in economic activity
reflected additional stimulus payments, an increase in the number of vaccinations that prompted
policymakers to relax social distancing rules, which, in turn, stimulated consumer activity and
spending for leisure travel and at restaurants. Shortages of workers in some industries and
disruptions to supply chains reportedly curtailed production in several sectors and created low
inventories of supplies and goods.71
Country Responses
In Europe, governments attempted a phased reopening of businesses over the summer of 2020.72
As a result of these efforts, the Eurozone experienced a 12.5% increase in GDP in the third
quarter of 2020. Initial estimates indicate the EU economic rate of growth nearly stalled in the
fourth quarter, falling by 0.5% due to a resumption of lockdown measures. After several months
of data indicating an economic rebound had begun in the Eurozone, surveys of business activity
in August indicated the recovery had slowed amid an increase in new COVID-19 cases after
countries had begun re-imposing new quarantines and lockdowns in various parts of the Euro
area, although most lockdowns did not include schools or some manufacturing firms.73 Such

68 Gross Domestic Product, Fourth Quarter and Year 2020 (Advance Estimate), Bureau of Economic Analysis, January
28, 2021.
69 The Beige Book: Summary of Commentary on Current Economic Conditions by Federal Reserve District, the Federal
Reserve System, December 2, 2020. https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/beige-book-default.htm.
70 The Beige Book: Summary of Commentary on Current Economic Conditions by Federal Reserve District, the Federal
Reserve System, March 3, 2021. https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/beige-book-default.htm.
71 The Beige Book: Summary of Commentary on Current Economic Conditions by Federal Reserve District, the Federal
Reserve System, June 2, 2021. https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/beige-book-default.htm.
72 Stott, Michael, Coronavirus Set to Push 29m Latin Americans Into Poverty, Financial Times, April 24, 2020.
https://www.ft.com/content/3bf48b80-8fba-410c-9bb8-31e33fffc3b8; Hall, Benjamin, Coronavirus Pandemic
Threatens Livelihoods of 59m European Workers, Financial Times, April 19, 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/
36239c82-84ae-4cc9-89bc-8e71e53d6649, Romei, Valentina and Martin Arnold, Eurozone Economy Shrinks by
Fastest Rate on Record, Financial Times, April 30, 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/dd6cfafa-a56d-48f3-a9fd-
aa71d17d49a8.
73 Arnold, Martin, Eurozone Economic Rebound is Losing Steam, Surveys Suggest, Financial Times, August 21, 2020.
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lockdowns became more widespread in September and October as infections cases began rising
in Germany, France, the United Kingdom, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Spain, and
Poland.74 By mid-October, Greece and Belgium also had begun implementing business
lockdowns and social distancing measures. Germany reportedly closed bars, restaurants, and most
public entertainment, France closed bars and restaurants and imposed travel restrictions, and on
October 31, UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson announced a month-long lockdown across the
UK.75
The European Commission’s (EC) February 2021 forecast projected that EU economic growth in
2020 could have contracted by 7.4% and may partially recover in 2021 with a projected rate of
growth of 4.1%.76 The EC forecast indicated a smaller drop in gross domestic product (GDP) in
2020 among European economies than it had forecasted in its summer report, as a result of a third
quarter rebound in growth before an anticipated slow-down in the fourth quarter as a result of the
resumption of business lockdowns. The autumn forecast was published prior to the announcement
of potential COVID-19 vaccines and incorporated assumptions of lockdowns extending into
2021. The forecast also concluded that the speed of an economic recovery in 2021 likely would
vary across the EU members, reflecting differences in the severity of the pandemic and the extent
of containment measures, but also differences in economic structures and policy responses.77
Fourth quarter data indicate that economic growth in the EU decreased by 0.7% from the third
quarter of 2020, but was down by 4.8% compared with the same quarter in 2019.78 The decline in
economic activity primarily reflected a drop in consumer spending of 3.0% from the previous
quarter. Fourth quarter data also indicated the UK economy grew by 1.3%, compared with a rate
of growth of 16.9% in the third quarter and a decline of 19.5% in the second quarter, the largest
quarterly decline on record. Eurostat, the statistical office of the European Commission, released
data indicating the Eurozone experienced price inflation in the fourth quarter of about 0.2%.
After protracted talks, European leaders agreed on July 21,2020, to a €750 billion (about $859
billion) pandemic economic assistance package to support European economies. Draft budget
estimates submitted by Eurozone governments in the fall of 2020 indicated the countries could
experience a combined budget deficit of nearly €1 trillion, or equivalent to about 9% of their
annual GDP.79 The rise in budget deficits reflects the growing cost to governments of supporting
their economies to sustain economic activity and a marked change in attitudes toward budget
deficits also reflected in statements by the IMF and World Bank. Second quarter data also
indicated that employment among EU countries fell by 2.6%, or 5.5 million jobs in 2020. The
jobs data, however, do not include roughly 45 million people, or a third of the workforce in

https://www.ft.com/content/cc4fa3df-40e7-4e19-be9f-9d01efb74f69. Chazan, Guy and Anna Gross, Europe Battles to
Contain Surge in Coronavirus Cases. Financial Times, July 29, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/bcddc297-b7f2-444d-
908f-54e8ce6f4f98.
74 Lockdown 2.0: Europe Imposes Painful Curbs as Infections Surge, Financial Times, October 16, 2020.
https://www.ft.com/content/b1a7d1e8-4bb9-41cf-be5b-2f7f04bdb9bb.
75 Peel, Michael, European Countries Impose Shutdowns as Covid-19 Cases Rise, Financial Times, October 30, 2020.
https://www.ft.com/content/a89f89ba-08be-44e2-8d21-3e9ada605e17; Packard, Jim, Boris Johnson Announces Second
Lockdown for England, Financial Times, October 31, 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/8c2ede22-9dcf-4d31-81ef-
82ae4ee76e10.
76 European Economic Forecast Winter 2020, European Commission, February 2021.
77 Ibid., p. 2.
78 Newsrelease, Eurostat, February 2, 2020.
79 Arnold, Martin and Sam Fleming, Eurozone Budget Deficits Rise Nearly Tenfold to Counter Pandemic, Financial
Times
, October 19, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/5579361f-5aac-4cd3-9e93-190fffdc0baf.
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Germany, France, Britain, Italy, and Spain, that were covered by employment protection
programs.80
Similarly, Japan reported that its economy contracted by 8.2% in the second quarter of 2020,
compared with the previous quarter, or at an annual rate of 32%.81 In the third quarter, however,
the economy grew at a positive rate of 5.3%, while the economy grew by a rate of 2.8% in the
fourth quarter on a quarter over quarter basis. On an annual basis, however, Japan’s economic
growth rate fell to 4.8%, the first negative annual rate of growth experienced since 2009.
On September 10, 2020, European Central Bank (ECB) President Christine Lagarde indicated the
Eurozone economy could contract by 8% in 2020, but the rate of growth was projected to
partially recover in 2021 by growing at an annual rate of 5.0%.82 In the early stages of the
pandemic, foreign investors pulled an estimated $26 billion out of developing Asian economies
not including more than $16 billion out of India, increasing concerns about a major economic
recession in Asia. Some estimates indicate that 29 million people in Latin America could fall into
poverty, reversing a decade of efforts to narrow income inequality. Some analysts also expressed
concern that Africa, after escaping the initial spread of infections, could face a sharp increase in
rates of infection outside South Africa, Egypt, Nigeria, Algeria, and Ghana, where most of the
initial infections had occurred.83
In October 2020, the Bank of Canada indicated that Canada’s quarterly rate of growth declined by
13.0% in the second quarter of 2020, but by 4.4% in the third quarter as business and other
restrictions were relaxed and by a rebound in home sales. The Bank also estimated that growth
for 2020 would decline at an annual rate of 4.3% in 2020, but could increase by about 3.8% in
2021. On December 1, the Canadian government adopted a C$1 trillion spending package to
support economic growth, reportedly the largest such fiscal stimulus package adopted in the post-
World War II period.84 The package provided relief to provinces and territories to improve
infection in long-term care facilities, industries hard hit by the pandemic, such as tourism, travel
and arts, and provide loans to eligible businesses and to lower and middle income families.
In April 2021, India reported that in the second quarter its GDP growth rate fell by 25.8%
compared with the first quarter, raising concerns that the country could experience its most severe
economic contraction on record.85 Subsequent forecasts indicate that India’s economy grew by
23.7% in the third quarter of 2020, reportedly reflecting higher levels of consumer activity, and
by 7.9% in the fourth quarter.86 On an annual basis, India’s economy reportedly grew at a rate of
-3.5%. On November 12, India’s finance minister announced a new package of fiscal measures
totaling $35 billion to increase consumer spending and to assist manufacturing, agriculture, and
exports. The move followed an announcement by India’s cabinet that it had approved a spending

80 Ben Hall, Ben, Delphine Strauss, and Daniel Dombey, Millions of European Jobs at Risk When Furlough Support
Ends, Financial Times, August 14, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/0f01a9ed-5b15-4e2d-921c-6eed7a80d0bd.
81 Quarterly Estimates of GDP for April - June 2020 (First Preliminary Estimates), Cabinet Office, August 17, 2020.
82 Remarks by ECB President Christine Lagarde, press conference, September 10, 2020.
83 Pilling, David, The Pandemic is Getting Worse: Africa Prepares for Surge in Infections, Financial Times, July 20,
2020. https://www.ft.com/content/1b3274ce-de3b-411d-8544-a024e64c3542.
84 Canada Unveils Largest Economic Relief Package Since WW2, BBC News, December 1, 2020.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-55139229.
85 Slater, Joanna, India’s Economy Contracts by Nearly 24%, It’s Sharpest Drop On Record, Washington Post, August
31, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/indias-economy-contracts-by-nearly-24-percent-amid-
pandemic/2020/08/31/92318fbe-eb70-11ea-bd08-1b10132b458f_story.html?hpid=hp_world-right-4-0_world-latest-
feed%3Ahomepage%2Fstory-ans.
86 RBI Bulletin – November 2020, Reserve Bank of India, November 2020.
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package of $27 billion to provide incentives over five years to manufacturing firms, including
automobiles, auto parts, pharmaceuticals, textiles, and food products.87
As a consequence of the resurgence in cases and renewed lockdowns in economies, the IMF
argued that advanced economies needed to sustain fiscal support for consumers and businesses as
the most effective means of stimulating their economies. The IMF argued this support was
necessary because the global economy was experiencing what economists term a Keynesian
liquidity trap, named after economist John Maynard Keynes. In theoretical terms, a liquidity trap
exists when central banks’ key interest rates are so low they have little impact through traditional
means to affect business and consumer activity. According to the IMF, in 60% of the global
economy, central banks have pushed key interest rates below 1% and in one-fifth of the global
economy, interest rates are below zero. In these circumstances, adjusting fiscal policy, or
government taxing and spending, is more effective in raising the rate of economic growth.88 The
IMF concluded that, “Fiscal policy must play a leading role in the recovery.”
Economic Policy Responses
After a delayed response, central banks and monetary authorities in developed and emerging
market economies have engaged in an ongoing series of interventions in financial markets and
national governments have adopted an array of fiscal policy initiatives to stimulate their
economies. The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) characterized the pandemic as fully
global in nature, eliciting a fiscal, monetary, and prudential response that has surpassed that of the
global financial crisis of 2008-2009. In addition, the BIS argues the evolving nature of the health
crisis is causing the financial crisis to evolve as well, changing from a liquidity crisis in the initial
stages to a solvency crisis that could worsen if the economic recovery is delayed. As a result of
the potential damage to the global economy arising from the pandemic, the BIS stated that future
economic historians may describe the pandemic as, “the defining moment of the 21st century.”89
Industry Measures
During 2020, governments adopted a range of measures at both the national and international
level to address the health and economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, as indicated
in Table 2.90 These measure include incentives to increase domestic production of vaccines and
personal protective equipment (PPE) and direct state intervention through nationalization or
through directives to increase output at facilities that currently produced PPE materials or to
initiate production at other facilities. In some cases, policy changes include enhanced foreign
investment screening of foreign investment for “public interest” reasons that may remain after the
pandemic crisis.91
The shift in approach toward the national security dimensions of foreign investment, especially
by developed economies, has tended to blur the distinction between foreign investment, trade, and
national security and reflects the evolving nature of the concept of national security relative to

87 Sharma, Ashok, India Announces $35 Billion Economic Stimulus Package, ABCNews, November 12, 2020.
https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/india-announces-35-billion-economic-stimulus-package-74165709.
88 Gopinath, Gita, Global Liquidity Trap Requires a Big Fiscal Response, Financial Times, November 3, 2020,
https://www.ft.com/content/2e1c0555-d65b-48d1-9af3-825d187eec58.
89 Annual Economic Report 2020, Bank for International Settlements, June 2020, p. ix.
90 Countries include Australia, Canada, the European Union, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, India, Japan, Poland,
and Spain, among others. World Investment Report 2020, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 2020,
p. 93.
91 World Investment Report 2020, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, June 16, 2020, p. 96.
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foreign investment. Conceivably, changes in technology and the global economy have made it
more difficult to assess the economic costs and benefits of changes in foreign investment policies
taken on national security grounds.
Table 2. Investment Policy Instruments Adopted at the National and International
level to Address the COVID-19 Pandemic
Investment policy areas
Policy measures
Policy actions at the national level
Investment facilitation
Alleviate administrative burdens and bureaucratic
obstacles for firms.

Use of online tools and e-platforms.
Investment retention and aftercare by investment
COVID-19-related information services.
promotion agencies (IPAs)

Administrative and operational support during the
crisis.

Move to online services.
Investment incentives
Financial or fiscal incentives to produce COVID-19-
related medical equipment.

Incentives for conversion of production lines.

Incentives for enhancement of contracted economic
activities.
State participation in crisis-affected industries
Acquisition of equity in companies, including
nationalization.
Local small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and supply
Financial or fiscal support for domestic suppliers (such
chains
as SMEs).
National security and public health
Application and potential reinforcement of FDI
screening in pandemic-relevant industries.
Other State intervention in the health industry
Mandatory production.

Export bans.

Import facilitation.
Intellectual property (IP)
General authorization of non-voluntary licensing, to
speed up research and development (R&D).

IP holder-specific non-voluntary licensing, to enable
imports of medication.
Policy actions at the international level
International support measures for investment
International pledges in support of cross-border
investment.
IIAs
Reform International Investment Agreements (IIAs) to
support public health policies and to minimize investor–
State dispute risks.
Intellectual property (IP)
General authorization of non-voluntary licensing, to
speed up research and development (R&D).
Source: World Investment Report 2020, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, June 16, 2020,
p. 89.
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Fiscal Measures
As indicated in Table 3, central governments adopted various fiscal measures to provide financial
support to the health sector, households, and firms, although the size and scope of the programs
vary by country.92 These measures broadly include tax cuts and tax deferrals for individuals and
businesses, wage and income supplements to individuals, including expanding unemployment
insurance, and other payments to businesses. The U.S. Congress also approved historic fiscal
spending packages. In other countries, governments abandoned traditional borrowing caps to
increase fiscal spending in order to sustain economic growth. In some emerging economies,
governments reportedly adopted special programs to provide financial assistance to “informal”
workers, or workers outside traditional labor markets such as family businesses.93
In developed economies, however, as governments adopted fiscal packages to assist households,
consumers sharply increased their savings as they faced limited spending opportunities, or a form
of involuntary saving, and concerns over lost jobs, incomes, and the course of their economies, or
precautionary saving. (For additional countries and measures, see Appendix A of this report.)
International organizations also took steps to provide loans and other financial assistance to
countries in need. These and other actions have been labeled “unprecedented,” a term that has
been used frequently to describe the pandemic and the policy responses.
Table 3. Elements of Announced Fiscal Measures to Address COVID-19

Advanced Economies
Emerging Market Economies
Measures
US
JP
DE
FR
IT
ES
GB
BR
CN
ID
IN
KR
MX
RU
ZA
Measures supporting the health sector

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Measures supporting households
Targeted
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
transfersa
Other
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
labor
income
supportb
Wage
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x

x
x
subsidies
Tax cuts
x
x
x
x

x


x
x
x
x

x
x
Tax deferral x
x
x

x
x
x



x
x
x

x
Measures supporting firms
Tax deferral x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Liquidity
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
supportc
Tax cuts
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x

Targeted

x
x
x
x

x

x
x



x
x
transfers

92 Ibid.
93 Ibid., p. 25.
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Source: Annual Economic Report 2020, Bank for International Settlements, June 2020, p. 24, based on data
col ected by the International Monetary Fund and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development.
Notes:
a. Includes cash and in-kind transfers to affected households.
b. Extended unemployment and sick leave benefits.
c. Non-budgetary measures such as equity injections, asset purchases, loans and debt assumptions or
government guarantees and contingent liabilities, US: United States; JP: Japan; DE: Germany; FR: France; IT:
Italy; ES: Spain; GB: Great Britain; BR: Brazil; CN: China; ID: Indonesia; IN: India; KR: South Korea; MX:
Mexico; RU: Russia; ZA: South Africa.
Fiscal Deficits
As one measure of the global fiscal and monetary responses, the IMF estimated that government
spending and revenue measures to sustain economic activity adopted through mid-March 2021
amounted to $16 trillion.94 The IMF also updated its estimate of the increase in borrowing by
governments globally to rise from 3.9% of global gross domestic product (GDP) in 2019 to
10.8% in 2020, as indicated in Figure 3. Other estimates indicate that central banks have
committed $17 trillion to support their economies to counter pandemic-related economic effects.95
Figure 3. IMF Projected Government Fiscal Deficits Relative to GDP
In percentage shares of Gross Domestic Product

Source: Fiscal Monitor, International Monetary Fund, April 2021. Created by CRS.
Notes: Data for 2021 and 2022 are estimates.
Among developed economies, the fiscal deficit to GDP ratio is projected to rise from 2.9% in
2019 to 11.7% in 2020; the ratio for the United States is projected to rise from 5.7% to 15.8%,
respectively, the highest ratio for any country or region.96 For most areas and countries, the IMF
forecasts that debt to GDP rations will fall some in 2021, but fall more substantially as percentage
shares of GDP in 2022 as the economic recovery is projected to take hold. Some economists and

94 Fiscal Monitor, International Monetary Fund, April 2021. p. 1.
95 Wigglesworth, Robin, Long Live Jay Powell, the New Monarch of the Bond Market, Financial Times, June 23,
2020. https://www.ft.com/content/5db9d0f1-3742-49f0-a6cd-16c471875b5e.
96 Fiscal Monitor, Table 1.1.
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others have raised concerns that fiscal deficits financed through borrowing in a low-interest rate
environment could substantially increase the debt servicing costs on government budgets under
certain conditions, particularly if national economic growth rates rise, which tend to push up
central banks’ interest rates, and if the accumulated debt is refinanced at those higher rates,
thereby increasing debt servicing costs.97
According to the IMF, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom have each
announced public sector support measures that total more than 10% of their annual GDP.98 For
developing economies, the fiscal deficit to GDP ratio is projected to rise from 4.9% in 2019 to
9.8% in 2021, significantly increasing their debt burden and raising prospects of defaults or debt
rescheduling.99 According to some estimates, the most fiscally vulnerable countries are Argentina,
Venezuela, Lebanon, Jordan, Iran, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa.100 The IMF concluded
that among low-income developing countries high debt levels could near-term debt vulnerabilities
remain high.101
The IMF has argued there is a growing disconnect between the pricing of risk in financial markets
and projected economic prospects, because investors apparently expect a quick recovery based on
continued and unprecedented central bank intervention. However, a perceived or real shift in
central bank intervention in financial markets could negatively affect investors’ concept of risk
and, in turn, negatively affect asset markets and the economic recovery.102 In addition to central
banks’ actions, the IMF concludes that a number of preexisting vulnerabilities could affect the
timing and the rate of the economic recovery. These vulnerabilities include corporate and
household debt levels in developed and some emerging market economies that could become
unmanageable in a prolonged recession; a rising number of insolvencies that could test the
resilience of the banking sector; additional stresses that could affect nonbank financial
institutions; and the prospect of some developing economies facing high external financing
requirements.103
Worker Assistance Programs
As part of their fiscal policy measures, governments in advanced economies either enhanced
existing worker support programs, or adopted new programs. As indicated in Table 4, the OECD
categorized the various job retention programs into six major groups, which the OECD estimated
had supported 50 million workers in developed economies. The programs consisted of short-term
support that subsidized hours not worked, or wage subsidies that also subsidized hours worked.
Some countries also eased qualification requirements to facilitate workers or businesses gaining
access to support funds.

97 Hagaman, Chase, Fiscal, Monetary, and Economic Challenges of the Post-Pandemic Economy, The Concord
Coalition, February 18, 2021, Edelberg, Wendy, and Louise Sheiner, The Macroeconomic Implications of Biden’s $1.9
Trillion Fiscal Package,
The Hamilton Project, Brookings Institution, January 28, 2021.
98 Global Financial Stability Report Update. International Monetary Fund, April 2021, p. 3.
99 Ibid, p. 3
100 Wheatley, Jonathan, Tommy Stubbington, Michael Stott, Andrew England, and Joseph Cotterill, Debt Relief: Which
Countries Are Most Vulnerable? Financial Times, May 6, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/31ac88a1-9131-4531-
99be-7bfd8394e8b9.
101 Global Financial Stability Report, April 2021, p. 8
102 Global Financial Stability Report Update. International Monetary Fund, December 2020, p. 4.
103 Ibid., pp. 6-7.
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Programs to assist workers varied across countries, but they generally comprised subsidies to
support workers for work hours lost or extended wage subsidies to maintain pre-pandemic
employment levels. Other programs assisted individual firms in retaining workers with the
objective of facilitating a quick return to full activity once pandemic-related restrictions are
lifted.104 In some cases, benefits were increased by extending the length of time benefits are
available and benefits were extended to workers in non-standard jobs such as temporary and self-
employed workers. New programs adopted by some OECD members were designed to assist
some temporary and non-standard workers quickly gain access to support funds.105
Beyond the pandemic, the OECD encouraged governments to:
 Increase the contribution of firms to the cost of hours not worked to strengthen
incentives to use subsidies for jobs that will be viable after the pandemic crisis;
 Set time limits on the extent of job support programs, although with the ability to
adjust the limits depending on circumstances;
 More closely align short-time work and unemployment benefits;
 Provide assistance for job searches and career guidance, and promote training.106

Table 4. Developed Economy Worker Support Programs During COVID-19
Increased
access for
Preexisting
workers in
short-time
Increased
Increased
non-
New short-
New wage
work
access and
benefit
standard
time work
subsidy
scheme
coverage
generosity
jobs
scheme
scheme

Australia
x





Austria
x
x
x



Belgium
x
x
x



Canada
x
x




Chile
x
x
x
x


Czech Republic
x
x
x



Denmark
x
x
x



Estonia
x





Finland
x
x
x
x


France
x
x
x
x


Germany
x
x
x
x


Greece
x





Hungary
x





Iceland
x





Ireland
x
x





104 Job Retention Schemes During the COVID-19 Lockdown and Beyond, Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, October 7, 2020, p. 2.
105 Ibid, pp. 5-6.
106 Ibid, pp. 2-3.
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Increased
access for
Preexisting
workers in
short-time
Increased
Increased
non-
New short-
New wage
work
access and
benefit
standard
time work
subsidy
scheme
coverage
generosity
jobs
scheme
scheme

Italy
x
x
x



Japan
x
x
x
x


Korea
x
x
x



Latvia
x





Lithuania
x





Luxembourg
x
x
x



Netherlands
x
x




New Zealand
x




Norway
x
x
x



Poland
x





Portugal
x
x
x



Slovak Republic
x
x
x



Slovenia
x





Spain
x
x
x
x


Sweden
x
x
x



Switzerland
x
x
x



Turkey
x
x
x



United Kingdom




x

United States
x
x
x



Source: Job Retention Schemes During the COVID-19 Lockdown and Beyond, Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, October 12, 2020, p. 7.
Monetary and Prudential Measures
Among central banks, the Federal Reserve initiated extraordinary steps not experienced since the
2008-2009 global financial crisis to address the economic effects of COVID-19. Simultaneously,
as indicated in Table 5, various central banks and monetary authorities adopted an array of
measures to address the potential economic effects of the pandemic, including lowering interest
rates and reserve requirements, announcing new lending and financing facilities, asset purchases,
foreign exchange swaps, prudential measures, and relaxed capital buffers and, in some cases,
countercyclical capital buffers,107 adopted after the 2008-2009 financial crisis, potentially freeing
up an estimated $5 trillion in funds.108

107 Countercyclical capital buffers require banks to increase their capital buffers during periods of rapid growth in
assets (when they are making a lot of loans), to ensure they have sufficient capital to absorb losses during a recession.
Countercyclical Capital Buffers, Bank for International Settlements, April 3, 2020. https://www.bis.org/bcbs/ccyb/.
108 Arnold, Martin, “Regulators Free up $500bn Capital for Lenders to Fight Virus Storm,” Financial Times, April 7,
2020. https://www.ft.com/content/9a677506-a44e-4f69-b852-4f34018bc45f.
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Central banks not only filled the role of lender of last resort through large purchases of
government debt, but also the buyers or lenders of last resort for private sector securities, in many
cases engaging in activities that previously had been considered off-limits.109 As a result of these
activities, the BIS argued that central banks effectively managed the initial liquidity crisis, the
first of three phases often identified with financial crises. The second and third phases, insolvency
and recovery, are being navigated in some cases and could become more challenging should the
pandemic-related economic crisis be prolonged. Capital buffers were raised after the financial
crisis to assist banks in absorbing losses and staying solvent during financial crises. Some
governments have directed banks to freeze dividend payments and halt pay bonuses. The
Financial Stability Board (FSB) argued in its July 15, 2020, report to the G-20 Finance Ministers
and Governors that the actions taken to date to support the functioning of the global financial
system appeared to have effectively worked to contain the financial and economic impact of the
pandemic so far, although the crisis is not over.110
Table 5. Selected Central Bank and Prudential Measures to Address COVID-19


Advanced economies
Emerging market economies
Type of
Measures
U
E
J
G
C
A
C
B
C
I
I
K
M
T
Z
tool
S
A
P
B
A
U
H
R
N
D
N
R
X
H
A
Interest
Policy rate
x


x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
rate
cut
Lending
Gen.
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
liquidity
liquidity
provisiona
Specialized
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x

lending
Asset
Governme
x
x
x
x
x
x



x
x
x

x
x
purchase
nt bonds
s/ sales
Commercia
x
x
x
x
x






x



l paper
Corporate
x
x
x
x
x






x

x

bonds
Other

x
x

x










private
securitiesb
FX swap/
USD swap

x
x
x
x
x
x
x



x
x


interven-
line
tion
FX






x
x

x
x
x
x


interven-
tion
Pruden-
Capital
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
tial rules
require-
and
ments

109 For a review of monetary policies of the Federal Reserve, the ECB, the Bank of Japan, and the Bank of England,
see: Haas, Jacob, Christopher J. Neely, William B. Emmons, Responses of International Central Banks to the COVID-
19 Crisis, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, Fourth Quarter 2020.
110 COVID-19 Pandemic: Financial Stability Implications and Policy Measures Taken: Report Submitted to the G-20
Finance Ministers and Governors
, Financial Stability Board, July 15, 2020.
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Advanced economies
Emerging market economies
Type of
Measures
U
E
J
G
C
A
C
B
C
I
I
K
M
T
Z
tool
S
A
P
B
A
U
H
R
N
D
N
R
X
H
A
Regula-
Liquidity
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
tions
require-
ments
Payout

x

x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
restrictions
Market

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
functioningc
Source: Annual Economic Report 2020, Bank for International Settlements, June 2020, p. 23.
Notes:
a. Repo and reverse repo operations, standing facilities, modified discount window and lower reserve
requirement ratio.
b. Asset- and mortgage-backed securities, covered bonds and exchange-traded funds.
c. Shortsel ing bans and circuit breakers. US: United States; EA: Euro Area; JP: Japan; GB: Great Britain; CA:
Canada; AU: Australia; CH: Switzerland; BR: Brazil; CN: China; ID: Indonesia; IN: India; KR: South Korea;
MX: Mexico; TH: Thailand; ZA: South Africa.
Economic Forecasts
Global Growth
Although prospects have brightened for renewed rates of growth, the economic situation remains
highly fluid globally and for most countries and regions. Uncertainty about the length and depth
of the health crisis-related economic effects continue to drive perceptions of risk and volatility in
financial markets and corporate decision-making. In addition, uncertainties concerning the global
pandemic and the effectiveness of public policies intended to contain its spread and prevent a
subsequent rounds of infections have added to market volatility. At various times, corporations
postponed investment decisions, laid off workers who previously had been furloughed, and in
some cases filed for bankruptcy. Progress in producing and administering vaccines through the
first half of 2021 raised prospects that social distancing rules could be relaxed or removed, which
could improve economic activity. Most forecasts indicate that 2021 GDP growth rates for most
countries could outpace pre-pandemic forecasts; while economic growth in 2022 could return to
more historical rates.
In the early months of the economic recession, the economic situation was compounded by a
historic drop in the price of crude oil. Since then, oil prices have recovered from the low of nearly
$20 per barrel in April 2020. Through the end of 2020, oil prices moved in the range of $40 to
$45 per barrel, in part reflecting the decline in global economic activity. By early June 2021, the
international price of Brent crude oil crossed the $70 per barrel threshold not reached since before
the pandemic-related recession began.
On April 29, 2020, Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell stated that the Federal Reserve
would use its “full range of tools” to support economic activity as the U.S. economic growth rate
dropped by 33.0% at an annual rate in the second quarter of 2020. In assessing the state of the
U.S. economy, the Federal Open Market Committee released a statement indicating that, “The
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ongoing public health crisis will weigh heavily on economic activity, employment, and inflation
in the near term, and poses considerable risks to the economic outlook over the medium term.”111
Before the COVID-19 outbreak, the global economy was struggling to regain a broad-based
recovery as a result of a number of issues, including the lingering impact of growing trade
protectionism; trade disputes among major trading partners; falling commodity and energy prices;
and economic uncertainties in Europe over the impact of the UK withdrawal from the European
Union. Individually, each of these issues presented a solvable challenge for the global economy.
Collectively, however, the issues weakened the global economy and reduced the available policy
flexibility of many national leaders, especially among the leading developed economies. While
the level of economic effects has become clearer, the response to the pandemic potentially has
had a significant and enduring impact on the way businesses organize their work forces, on global
supply chains, and how governments respond to a global health crisis.112 As a result of the rapidly
spreading virus and its compounding effects on global and national rates of economic growth,
forecasting the impact of the virus has been especially challenging.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), and The World Bank all revised their forecasts downward between late
2019 and mid-2020, reflecting the rapidly deteriorating state of the global economy and a marked
decline in projected rates of growth. Between October 2019 and January 2021, for instance, the
IMF lowered its global economic growth forecast for 2020 from a positive 3.4% to a negative
3.5%. In its June 2020 forecast, the OECD forecasted the effects of a single and double wave of
infections, with the projections for a single wave reflected in Table 6. By late 2020 and early
2021, most forecasts were revised upward to reflect assessments the recession would be less
severe than had been forecasted for 2021, as indicated in Figure 4. The OECD estimated in May
2021 that global GDP had declined by 3.5% in 2020, compared with a December forecast of -
4.2%, and would experience a stronger recovery in 2021 of 5.8% instead of a March forecast of
5.6%.113 Between January 2020 and January 2021, the World Bank also lowered its forecast of
global growth from 2.5% to a negative 4.3%. In most forecasts, advanced economies were
projected to experience the steepest declines in economic growth from 2019 to mid-June 2020.
Table 6. Major Economic Forecasts
Percentage changes at annual rates
World
Advanced economies Developing economies
United States


2020 2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
International Monetary Fund
October 2019
3.4%
3.6%
1.7%
1.6%
4.6%
4.8%
2.1%
1.7%
April 2020
–3.0
5.8
–6.1
4.5
–1.0
6.6
–5.9
4.7
June 2020
-4.9
5.4
-8.0
4.8
-3.0
5.9
-8.0
4.5
October 2020
–4.4
5.2
–5.8
3.9
–3.3
6.0
–4.3
3.1

111 Federal Reserve Issues FOMC Statement, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, April 29, 2020.
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20200429a.htm.
112 Rowland, Christopher and Peter Whoriskey, “U.S. Health System is Showing Why It’s Not Ready for a COVID-19
Pandemic,” Washington Post, March 4, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/the-us-health-
system-is-showing-why-its-not-ready-for-a-COVID-19-pandemic/2020/03/04/7c307bb4-5d61-11ea-b29b-
9db42f7803a7_story.html.
113 OECD Economic Outlook, Interim Report March 2021, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
March, 2021.
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World
Advanced economies Developing economies
United States


2020 2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
January 2021
-3.5
5.5
-4.9
4.3
-2.4
6.3
-3.4
5.1
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
Nov 2019
2.9
3.0
1.6
1.7
4.0
4.0
2.0
2.0
March 2020
2.4
3.3
0.8
1.2
NA
NA
1.9
2.1
June 2020 single
-6.0
5.2
-7.5
4.8
-4.6
5.6
-7.3
4.1
June 2020 double
-7.6
2.8
-9.3
2.2
-6.1
3.2
-8.5
1.9
Sept. 2020
-7.6
2.8
-9.3
2,2
-6.1
3.2
-8.5
1.9
Dec. 2020
-4.2
4.2
-5.5
3,2
-3.0
5.1
-3.7
3.2
March 2021
-3.4
5.6
NA
NA
NA
NA
-3.5
6.5
May 2021
-3.5
5.8
-4.8
5.3
-2.3
6.2
-3.5
6.9
World Bank
January 2020
2.5
2.6
1.4
1.5
4.1
4.3
1.8
1.7
June 2020
-5.2
4.2
-7.0
3.9
-2.5
4.6
-6.1
4.0
January 2021
-4.3
4.0
-5.4
3.3
-2.6
5.0
-3.6
3.5
Source: World Economic Outlook, various issues, International Monetary Fund; OECD Economic Outlook, various
issues, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; Global Economic Prospects, various issues,
World Bank.
Figure 4. Major Economic Forecasts by Region

Source: OECD Economic Outlook, March 2021, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
March 2021; World Economic Outlook, Update, International Monetary Fund, January 26, 2021; Global Economic
Prospects
, World Bank Group, January 2021, Created by CRS.
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Notes: The OECD estimated rates of growth as a result of two scenarios, indicated as OECD1 and OECD2.
The first scenario assumes there is a single wave of infections from COVID-19, while the second scenario
estimates the effect of a two-wave scenario.
The OECD Forecast
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) released an updated
forecast in May 2021 that estimates that global economic growth declined by 3.5% in 2020,
compared with a June 2020 forecast of a 6.9% decline under a single-wave scenario in 2020 and a
7.6% decline under a second wave scenario.114 In the updated estimate, the rate of GDP growth in
developed economies declined by 4.8% in 2020 and by 2.3% in developing economies. The
updated forecast projects the global economy could grow by 5.8% in 2021 and 4.4% in 2022;
developed economies could grow by 5.5% in 2021 and 3.8% in 2022, while developing
economies could grow by 6.2% in 2021 and 4.9% in 2022. Despite the improvement in economic
growth rates, the OECD concluded that living standards in “too many” developed economies by
the end of 2022 would not met levels that had been projected prior to the pandemic.115
The OECD also concluded that an economic recovery would take place over the next two years,
but “the recovery would be uneven across countries, potentially leading to lasting changes in the
world economy.”116 In addition, the OECD argued that the pandemic is fragmenting the global
economy through a growing number of trade and investment restrictions and diverging policy
approaches that are being implemented on a country-by-country basis. The OECD concluded
further that:
….as long as the vast majority of the global population is not vaccinated, all of us remain
vulnerable to the emergence of new variants. Confidence could be seriously eroded by
further lockdowns, and a stop-and-go of economic activities. Firms, so far well protected
but often with higher debt than before the pandemic, could go bankrupt. The most
vulnerable members of society would risk further suffering from prolonged spells of
inactivity or reduced income, exacerbating inequalities, across and within countries, and
potentially destabilizing economies.117
As a consequence of the slowdown in economic activity in the fourth quarter of 2020 and
projected slow, but partial recovery in 2021, the OECD estimated there would be long-lasting
effects on the global economy, including
 Output was projected to remain around 5% below pre-crisis expectations in many
countries in 2022, raising the specter of substantial permanent costs,
disproportionately affecting vulnerable populations.
 Smaller firms and entrepreneurs are more likely to go out of business.
 Many low wage earners who lost their jobs and are only covered by
unemployment insurance, at best, with poor prospects of finding new jobs
quickly.

114 OECD Economic Outlook, Interim Report: Coronavirus (COVID-19): Living With Uncertainty, Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development, September 2020.
115 OECD Economic Outlook May 2021, Preliminary Version, Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, June 2021.
116 OECD Economic Outlook, Interim Report March 2021, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
March 2021, p. 4. http://www.oecd.org/economic-outlook/#resources.
117 OECD Economic Outlook May 2021, Preliminary Version, p. 9.
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 People living in poverty and usually less well covered by social safety nets
experienced a deterioration in their living standards.
 Children and youth from less well-off backgrounds, and less qualified adult
workers struggled to learn and work from home, with potentially long lasting
damage.118
Uncertainty concerning the course of the global economy over the remainder of 2020 led the
OECD to produce two estimates in its June 2020 outlook that it determined were “equally likely
scenarios:” one that assumed containment measures that existed at the time would be successful
in curtailing infections, and another that assumed there would be a second wave of rapid
contagion.119 Under both scenarios, the OECD estimated the global economic recovery would be
slow and gradual.120 The OECD also estimated that the average unemployment rate among OECD
countries could rise to 9.2% under a single wave scenario and 10.0% under the second wave
scenario.
Through the third and fourth quarters of 2020 and the first quarter of 2021, however, most OECD
countries had not experienced extended periods of high rates of unemployment, in part due to
national income and wage maintenance programs, as indicated in Figure 5. The main exceptions
were the United States and Canada, where unemployment rates spiked starting at the end of the
first quarter and into the second quarter of 2020. By April 2021, most OECD economies had
unemployment rates in the 6.5% to 9.0% range with some exceptions: Japan (2.9%) and Germany
(4.5%) had rates below the OECD average of 6.5%, while Colombia (15.0%), Spain (15.4%), and
Italy (10.7%) had rates that were higher than the OECD average. In a major difference between
U.S. and EU data, EU workers absent from work due to temporary layoff are counted as
employed, whereas, in the United States, they are counted as unemployed.

118 Ibid, p. 8.
119 Ibid, p. 13.
120 OECD Economic Outlook, June 2020, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. June 2020, p. 23.
http://www.oecd.org/economic-outlook/#resources.
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Figure 5. Unemployment Rates Among Major OECD Countries
In percentage terms

Source: OECD Dataset: Short-term Labor Market Statistics, Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development. Created by CRS.
Global trade was projected to contract by 9.5% or 11.4% in 2020 under the single or second wave
scenarios, respectively. The OECD projections in Table 7 reflect the single wave scenario.121
According to this scenario, global economic growth was projected to fall by 6.0% in 2020, but
rise by 5.2% in 2021. In contrast, the OECD’s second wave scenario projected a global economic
contraction of 7.6% in 2020 and a growth rate of 2.8% in 2021, delaying a return to full recovery
until 2022.
The OECD May 2021 forecast projects that economic growth among developed economies would
be weak in Europe, where the growth rate was projected to fall by 6.7% in 2020, compared with
the March 2020 forecast of an increase of 0.8% in 2020 and by 1.2% in 2021. Similarly, U.S.
economic growth was projected to contract in 2020 by 3.5%, but rebound by 6.9% in 2021. The
UK was projected to experience a contraction in GDP growth in 2020 of 9.8%, slightly less than
the earlier forecast of a decline of 10.1%. World trade was also projected to decline by 8.5% in
2020, before rising by 8.2% in 2021 and 5.8% in 2022, estimates that are higher than earlier
forecasts.


121 Ibid., p. 13.
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Table 7. OECD, IMF and World Bank Economic Forecasts
Percentage change in Real GDP Growth
OECD May 2021
IMF Apr. 2021
World Bank Jan.


Projections


Projections


2021 Projections
2020
2021
2022
2020
2021
2022

2019
2020
2021


World
-3.5%
5.8%
4.4%
World
–3.5%
5.5%
4.2%
World
2.3%
-4.3%
4.0%
Adv. Economies
-4.8
5.3
3.8
Adv. Economies
–4.9
4.3
3.1
Adv. Economies
1.6
-5.4
3.3
Australia
-2.5
5.1
3.4
United States
–3.4
5.1
2.5
United States
2.2
-3.6
3.5
Canada
-5.4
8,1
3.8
Euro Area
–7.2
4.2
3.6
Euro Area
1.3
-7.4
3.6
Euro area
-6.7
4.3
4.4
Germany
–5.4
3.5
3.1
Japan
0.3
-5.3
2.5
Germany
-5.1
3.3
4.4
France
–9.0
5.5
4.1
Emerging
3.6
-2.6
5.0
France
-8.2
5.8
4.0
Italy
–9.2
3.0
3.6
E. Asia
5.8
0.9
7.4
Italy
-8.9
4.5
4.4
Spain
–11.1
5.9
4.7
China
6.1
2.0
7.9
Spain
-10.8
5.9
6.3
Japan
–5.1
3.1
2.4
Indonesia
5.0
-2.2
4.4
Japan
-4.7
2.6
2.0
United Kingdom
–10.0
4.5
5.0
Thailand
2.4
-6.5
4.0
Korea
-0.9
3.8
2.8
Canada
–5.5
3.6
4.1
Cen. Asia
2.3
-2.9
3.3
Mexico
-8.2
5.0
3.2
China
2.3
8.1
5.6
Russia
1.3
-4.0
2.6
Turkey
1.8
5.7
3.4
India
–8.0
11.5
6.8
Turkey
0.9
0.5
4.5
United
-9.8
7.2
5.5
–3.6
3.0
3.9
4.5
-3.4
3.5
Kingdom
Russia
Poland
United States
-3.5
6.9
3.6
Latin America
–7.4
4.1
2.9
Brazil
1.4
-4.5
3.0
Argentina
-9.9
6.1
1,8
Brazil
–4.5
3.6
2.6
Mexico
-0.1
-9.0
3.7
Brazil
-4.1
3.7
2.5
Mexico
–8.5
4.3
2.5
Argentina
-2.1
-10.6
4.9
China
2.3
8.5
5.8
Mid. East
–3.2
3.0
4.2
Mid. East
0.1
-5.0
2.1
India
-7.7
9.9
8.2
Saudi Arabia
–3.9
2.6
4.0
Saudi Arabia
0.3
-5.4
2.0
Indonesia
-2.1
4.7
5.1
Africa
–2.6
3.2
3.9
Iran
-6.8
-3.7
1.5
CRS-33


OECD May 2021
IMF Apr. 2021
World Bank Jan.


Projections


Projections


2021 Projections
2020
2021
2022
2020
2021
2022

2019
2020
2021


S. Africa
=7.0
3.8
2.5
Nigeria
–3.2
1.5
2.5
Egypt
5.6
3.6
2.7




S. Africa
–7.5
2.8
1.4
S. Asia
4.4
-6.7
3.3




World Trade
–9.6
8.1
6.3
Volume
India
4.2
-9.6
5.4




Oil prices ($)
–32.7
21.2
–2.4
Pakistan
1.9
-1.5
0.5








Bangladesh
8.2
2.0
1.6








Africa
2.4
-3.7
2.7








Nigeria
2.2
-4.1
1.1








S. Africa
0.2
-7.8
3.3








Angola
-0.9
-4.0
0.9
Sources: OECD Economic Outlook, Interim Report March 2021, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. December 2020; World Economic Outlook,
International Monetary Fund, April, 2021; Global Economic Prospects, World Bank Group, January 2021,
Note: The OECD forecast includes a single-wave scenario and a double-wave scenario in which the pandemic remains under control and recedes and another in which
there is a second wave of the pandemic, The OECD forecast numbers is this table reflect the single-wave scenario.

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Global Economic Effects of COVID-19

Among developing and emerging economies, the economic downturn is projected to most
negatively affect countries that rely on commodity exports to support annual economic growth. In
addition to lower prices for commodity exports and reduced global demand for exports,
developing countries are projected to be negatively affected by reduced remittances, weaker
currencies and tighter financial conditions.
The OECD also concluded that
 Real per capita income in 2020 was projected to decline by 8% and 9.5%,
respectively, depending on a one- or two-wave contagion, with substantial
declines in all economies. Even with an economic recovery in 2021, real per
capita income was projected to rise to only that of 2013.
 Unemployment was projected to rise to its highest level in more than 25 years,
while the average unemployment rate was projected to rise to 7.4% in 2021and
6.9% in 2022. The OECD concludes that, “scarring effects from job losses are
likely to be felt particularly by younger workers and lower-skilled workers, with
attendant risks of many people becoming trapped in joblessness for an extended
period.”
 Net productive investment (business and government) was weak prior to the
pandemic, falling behind the average rate of investment during the previous
decade. Investment was forecast to contract by half as a percent of real GDP,
falling from 4.7% to 2.3% and 2.0%, respectively for the one-wave and two-
wave scenarios and increasing the risk of entrenched weak economic growth.
Investment is also expected to be negatively affected by bankruptcies and
insolvencies among corporations and financial institutions.122
The OECD estimated in its March 2020 forecast that increased direct and indirect economic costs
through global supply chains, reduced demand for goods and services, and declines in tourism
and business travel mean that, “the adverse consequences of these developments for other
countries (non-OECD) are significant.”123 Global trade, measured by trade volumes, slowed in the
last quarter of 2019 and had been expected to decline further in 2020, as a result of weaker global
economic activity associated with the pandemic, which is negatively affecting economic activity
in various sectors, including airlines, hospitality, ports, and the shipping industry.124
According to the OECD’s forecast
 The greatest impact of the containment restrictions has been on retail and
wholesale trade, and in professional and real estate services, although there are
notable differences between countries.
 Business closures may have reduced economic output in advanced and major
emerging economies by 15% or more; other emerging economies could have
experienced a decline in output of 25%.
 Countries dependent on tourism have been affected more severely, while
countries with large agricultural and mining sectors experienced less severe
effects.

122 Ibid, p. 31.
123 OECD Interim Economic Assessment: COVID-19: The World Economy at Risk, Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development. March 2, 2020, p. 2.
124 Ibid, p. 4.
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 Economic effects likely varied across countries reflecting differences in the
timing and degree of containment measures.125
In addition, the OECD argued that China’s emergence as a global economic actor marked a
significant departure from previous global health episodes. China’s growth, in combination with
globalization and the interconnected nature of economies through capital flows, supply chains,
and foreign investment, magnify the cost of containing the spread of the virus through
quarantines and restrictions on labor mobility and travel.126 China’s global economic role and
globalization mean that trade has played a role in spreading the economic effects of COVID-19.
More broadly, the economic effects of the pandemic were spread through three trade channels: (1)
directly through supply chains as reduced economic activity spread from intermediate goods
producers to finished goods producers; (2) as a result of a drop overall in economic activity,
which reduced demand for goods in general, including imports; and (3) through reduced trade
with commodity exporters that supplied producers, which, in turn, reduced their imports and
negatively affected trade and economic activity of exporters.
The IMF Forecast
Having labeled the projected decline in global economic activity as the “Great Lockdown,” the
IMF released an updated forecast in April 2021. The IMF concluded in its revised forecast that
the global economy was improving, but cautioned that renewed waves of infections and new
variants of the virus could “pose concerns for the outlook.”127 In addition, the IMF estimated in
its baseline projection that the global economy could decline by 3.5% in 2020, slightly less
negative than its October forecast of -4.4%, before growing by 5.5% in 2021, revised up from its
previous forecast of 5.2%; global trade was projected to fall in 2020 by 8.5% and oil prices were
projected to fall by 32.7%. For 2021, the IMF forecast indicates that global trade could grow by
8.4% and that oil prices could rebound by 21.2%. The forecast also indicates the economic
recovery will be uneven across countries depending on, “access to medical interventions,
effectiveness of policy support, exposure to cross-country spillovers, and structural characteristics
entering the crisis.” India and China, in particular, are projected to outpace the rate of global
economic growth, experiencing a rate of growth in 2021 of 12.5% and 8.4%, respectively.
The IMF’s forecasts reflect the impact of policy measures on the U.S. economy in the first half of
2020 that are larger than it had assumed in its earlier forecasts, a slower recovery in the second
half of 2020, and the impact of U.S. spending measures adopted in 2021. Also, the IMF forecast
reflects an estimated larger decline in consumption than previously assumed as consumers
curtailed spending to increase their savings and the effects of social distancing on economic
activity. The IMF also stated that many countries have faced a multi-layered crisis that included a
health crisis, a domestic economic crisis, falling external demand, capital outflows, and a collapse
in commodity prices. In combination, these various effects have interacted in ways that made
forecasting difficult. As a result, the IMF indicated the forecast depend on a number of factors,
including
 The length of the pandemic and required lockdowns.
 Voluntary social distancing, which affects consumer spending.

125 Evaluating the Initial Impact of COVID Containment Measures on Activity, Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development, March 27, 2020.
126 Goldin, Ian, “COVID-19 Shows How Globalization Spreads Contagion of All Kinds,” Financial Times, March 2,
2020. https://www.ft.com/content/70300682-5d33-11ea-ac5e-df00963c20e6.
127 World Economic Outlook, Update, International Monetary Fund, January 26, 2021.
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 The ability of displaced workers to secure employment, possibly in different
sectors.
 The long-term impact of firm closures and unemployed workers leaving the
workforce, compounding the ability of the economy to recover.
 The impact of changes to strengthen workplace safety—such as staggered work
shifts, enhanced hygiene and cleaning between shifts, new workplace practices
relating to proximity of personnel on production lines—which incur business
costs.
 Global supply chain reconfigurations that affect productivity as companies try to
enhance their resilience to supply disruptions.
 The extent of cross-border spillovers from weaker external demand as well as
funding shortfalls.
 A resolution of the current disconnect between rising asset values, as reflected in
market indices, and forecasts of a synchronized downturn in global economic
activity.
The IMF also forecasted that advanced economies as a group could experience an economic
contraction in 2020 of 4.9% of GDP, with the U.S. economy also projected to decline by 3.4%,
greater than the rate of decline experienced in 2009 during the financial crisis, as indicated in
Figure 6. The rate of economic growth in Euro area GDP in 2020 was projected to decline by
7.2%, but growing by 4.2% in 2021. Most developing and emerging economies were projected to
experience a decline in the average rate of economic growth of 2.2% in 2020, reflecting
tightening global financial conditions and falling global trade and commodity prices. In contrast,
China was projected to experience small, but positive rate of growth in 2020 of 2.3% and by 8.4%
in 2021, while India’s rate of growth was projected to decline by 8.0% in 2020 and grow by
12.5% in 2021. The IMF also argued that recovery of the global economy could be weaker than
projected as a result of lingering uncertainty about possible contagion, lack of confidence, and
permanent closure of businesses and shifts in the behavior of firms and households.128
In an August 2020 analysis, the IMF indicated that fiscal and monetary actions by developed
economies provided developing and emerging market economies the ability to avoid tightening
monetary policy to stem capital outflows. Instead, the countries relied on movements in their
exchange rates to carry the brunt of the economic adjustment, while also following developed
economies in easing monetary policy, providing liquidity injections, and using unconventional
monetary policy measures such as purchases of government and corporate bonds. The IMF also
indicated that a prolonged health crisis could push developing economies to take such measures
as price controls, export restrictions, and unorthodox measures to ease credit and financial
regulation.129

128 Ibid, p. 9.
129 Mühleisen, Martin, Tryggvi Gudmundsson, and Hélène Poirson Ward, COVID-19 Response in Emerging Market
Economies: Conventional Policies and Beyond,
International Monetary Fund, August 6, 2020. https://blogs.imf.org/
2020/08/06/covid-19-response-in-emerging-market-economies-conventional-policies-and-beyond/?utm_medium=
email&utm_source=govdelivery.
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Figure 6. IMF Forecast, Gross Domestic Product
Percentage change

Source: World Economic Outlook, Update, International Monetary Fund, April 8, 2021. Created by CRS.
As a result of the various challenges, the IMF qualified its forecast by arguing that
A partial recovery is projected for 2021, with above trend growth rates, but the level of
GDP will remain below the pre-virus trend, with considerable uncertainty about the
strength of the rebound. Much worse growth outcomes are possible and maybe even likely.
This would follow if the pandemic and containment measures last longer, emerging and
developing economies are even more severely hit, tight financial conditions persist, or if
widespread scarring effects emerge due to firm closures and extended unemployment.130
The World Bank Forecast
In January 2021, the World Bank released its updated economic forecast, which indicated that
global economic growth would reach 4.3% in 2020 and 4.0% in 2021, compared with June 2020
projections of -5.2% for 2020 and 4.2% in 2021, but rise by a slower rate of 3.8% in 2022.131 The
assessment also concluded that absent “substantial and effective reforms,” the global economy
would experience a decade of “disappointing growth.” The Bank concluded that the forecast was
tilted toward downside risks. In particular, the Bank assessed that all regions of the world remain
vulnerable to renewed outbreaks of the virus, that there were logistical impediments to the
distribution of effective vaccines, that there are financial stresses in addition to elevated debt
levels and there is the possibility that the pandemic could have a more negative effect on incomes
and growth.132
An earlier forecast published on June 8, 2020 indicated the economic recession in 2020 would be
the deepest since World War II. It also estimated that the global economic recession would affect
90% of the world’s economies, a percentage that is greater than what was experienced during the
Great Depression.133 Similar to the OECD and the IMF forecasts, the World Bank argued that the

130 World Economic Outlook, p. v.
131 Global Economic Prospects, World Bank Group, January 2021, p. xvii.
132 Ibid, p. xviii.
133 Global Economic Prospects, World Bank Group, June 8, 2020, p. 15.
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economic impact of the global recession would fall most heavily on developing and emerging
economies that rely on global trade, tourism, or remittances from abroad, and those that depend
on commodity exports. In addition, the World Bank forecasted that most emerging and
developing economies could experience rates of growth in 2020 that could be the lowest overall
since the 1960s, with 90% of such economies expected to experience contractions in per capita
incomes and many millions of people falling back into poverty.
The World Bank also estimated that economic growth in advanced economies could decline by
5.4% in 2020 and recover to 3.3% in 2021, compared with the June forecast of 7.0% and 3.8%,
respectively. The United States, the Euro area and Japan were all estimated to experience a slower
rate of growth in 2020 and rise at a smaller rate in 2021 than the IMF forecast.
The global economic recession was projected to affect all regions in a type of synchronous
downturn, with some regions faring worse than others. Differences in the magnitude of regional
growth rates were attributed to the “scale of the domestic outbreak, vulnerability of the economy
to spillovers from global economic and financial stress the severity of preexisting challenges such
as widespread poverty, and the degree to which debt levels constrain the fiscal response.”134
According to the Bank’s baseline scenario, the projected economic recovery was expected to be
slow, reflecting shifts in consumption and work patterns as consumers attempted to rebuild
savings and businesses strengthen balance sheets. The World Bank also issued both a downside
and an upside scenario in which government lockdown policies were required to remain in effect
for a longer or a shorter period of time, respectively. The downside scenario projects a contraction
in global economic growth of 8% in 2020, as lockdown procedures are assumed to last an
additional three months, followed by a sluggish recovery. In contrast, the upside scenario projects
a decline in economic activity in 2020 of 4%, based on the assumption that economic activity
rebounds quickly in the third quarter of 2020.135
The Bank also concluded that global value chains (GVCs) had been important conduits through
which macroeconomic developments associated with the pandemic had been transmitted across
national borders. The economic effects of the pandemic were spread through trade linkages but
also amplified through quarantines, production shutdowns and border closures.136 Estimates by
the World Bank indicated that national policies adopted to blunt the spread of the virus affected
the global economy through four shocks: a decline in employment due to factory closures and
social distancing, a trade shock as a result of an increase in the cost of traded goods, a tourism
shock through a sharp contraction in international tourism, and a services shock. The magnitude
of the shocks varies by country depended on various factors, including the composition of output,
reliance on trade, and the level of GVC integration.
Global Trade
According to a March 31, 2021, forecast update, the World Trade Organization (WTO) estimated
that global trade volumes fell by 5.3% in 2020, nearly half as much as the drop of 9.2% the WTO
had forecasted in October 2020.137 The WTO concluded that the less negative outcome likely
resulted from strong monetary and fiscal policy actions of many governments. In particular, the

134 Global Economic Prospects June 8, 2020, p. 115.
135 Ibid, p. 33.
136 Ibid, p. 118.
137 World Trade Primed for Strong but Uneven Recovery After COVID-19 Pandemic Shock, World Trade Organization,
March 31, 2021.
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link to page 46 Global Economic Effects of COVID-19

WTO attributed the improved growth performance to fiscal policies that supported personal
incomes in advanced economies that, in turn, supported relatively higher levels of consumption
and global trade. Similarly, UNCTAD concluded in its May 2021 forecast that global trade
increased by about 10% in the first quarter of 2021 year-over-year and that the rebound in global
trade in 2021 would be faster than that experienced in the previous two recessions (2009, 2015).
The growth in merchandise trade was reportedly being driven by exports from East Asian
countries, while trade in services remained below recent averages. The forecast concluded that
global trade would increase by 16% in 2021 relative to the second and third quarters of 2020.138
WTO preliminary fourth quarter 2020 data indicate the decline in global trade in 2020 was not as
severe as it had estimated in its October 2020 forecast. Global trade volumes are projected to
partially recover in 2021 by increasing at an annual growth rate of 7.2%. This forecast reflects a
marked revision from the WTO’s April 8, 2020 forecast that global trade volumes could decline
between 13% and 32% in 2020 as a result of the economic impact of COVID-19, as indicated in
Table 8. The updated forecast also indicates that the recovery in global trade in 2021 could be
noticeably slower than the WTO had projected in April 2020, primarily reflecting expectations of
a slower recovery in global GDP in 2021.
In the first quarter of 2020, global exports and imports fell by 7.8% and 6.8%, respectively, in
volume terms and 10.6% and 8.6% in value terms, reflecting the global economic impact of the
pandemic, as indicated in Figure 7. In the second quarter, global exports and imports dropped by
11.6% and 11.1%, respectively, in volume and by 13.4% and 14.1%, in value terms. The WTO
also estimated that some trade sectors were affected more than others, particularly trade in fuels
and mineral products fell by 38%, while trade in agricultural products fell by 5%. In the third
quarter, however, export and import volumes rebounded, increasing by 15.7% and 12.9%,
respectively, while export and import values increased by 20.7% and 18.3%, respectively. In the
fourth quarter, global exports and imports increased by 6.1% and 7.2%, respectively, in volume
terms and by 9.7% and 9.6%, in value terms. Although the WTO has no comprehensive data on
trade in services, it concluded that the trend in trade in services likely matched that experienced in
trade in merchandise goods. The updated forecast also projected that global GDP could decline at
an annual rate of 4.8% in 2020, but recover in 2021 with an annual growth rate of 4.9%.
The WTO indicated in its forecast update that renewed economic lockdowns in response to a
resurgence of COVID-19 cases in the fall of 2020 could shave an additional 2% to 3% percentage
points off the annual global GDP growth rate in 2021 and negatively affect global trade. In
addition, the WTO estimated that uncertainty over additional fiscal measures and relatively high
rates of unemployment could reduce global merchandise trade growth by up to 4% in 2021. By
region, the WTO forecast indicated that Europe and North America could experience the largest
declines in the rate of growth of trade volumes, while Asia would experience the smallest decline
in the growth rate of trade volumes, primarily based on a projected increase in trade by China.
The WTO reported in its June 29, 2020 report on G-20 trade measures that during the mid-
October 2019 to mid-May 2020 period, countries had made “significant” progress in facilitating
imports, including products related to COVID-19.139 According to the report, various
governments initially responded to the pandemic by introducing new trade restrictive measures,
90% of which were export bans on medical products, such as surgical masks, gloves, medicine
and disinfectant. Since then, the WTO indicated that G20 economies have repealed 36% of the

138 Global Trade Update, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, May, 2021.
139 WTO Report on G20 Shows Moves to Facilitate Imports Even as Trade Restrictions Remain Widespread, World
Trade Organization,
June 29, 2020. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/trdev_29jun20_e.htm.
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restrictions and lowered barriers to imports of many pandemic-related products. As of mid-May
2020, the WTO reported that 65 of the 93 pandemic-related trade measures implemented during
the monitoring period were of a trade-facilitating measures, rather than trade-restricting
measures.140
Figure 7. WTO Estimates of Quarterly Global Exports and Imports,
Volumes and Values

Source: World Trade Organization, March 31, 2021. Created by CRS.
In its April 2020 forecast, the WTO presented two estimates of global growth, reflecting the high
degree of uncertainty concerning the length and economic impact of the pandemic. According to
the WTO, the more optimistic scenario assumed that trade volumes would recover quickly in the
second half of 2020 to their pre-pandemic trend, or that the global economy would experience a
V-shaped recovery. In comparison, the more pessimistic scenario assumed there would be a
partial recovery in global trade that lasted into 2021, or that global economic activity would
experience a U-shaped recovery. The updated forecast reflects the WTO’s estimate that global
trade volumes in 2020 will not fall by as much as it had projected under both of the scenarios in
its April 2020 forecast. The WTO concluded, however, that the impact on global trade volumes
could exceed the drop in global trade during the height of the 2008-2009 financial crisis.141
Table 8. WTO Forecast: Merchandise Trade Volume and Real GDP 2020-2021
Annual percentage change
Forecast

Optimistic
Pessimistic
scenario
Forecast scenario
scenario (April
scenario (April
(October

2020)
2020)
2020)
(March 2021

2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
2020
2021
2022
Volume of world
merchandise trade

-12.9%
21.3%
-31.9%
24.0%
-9.2%
7.2%
-5.3%
8.0%
4.0%
Exports










140 Report on G20 Trade Measures (Mid-October 2019 to Mid-May 2020), World Trade Organization, June 29, 2020.
141 Trade Set to Plunge as COVID-19 Pandemic Upends Global Economy, World Trade Organization, April 8, 2020.
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres20_e/pr855_e.htm.
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Forecast

Optimistic
Pessimistic
scenario
Forecast scenario
scenario (April
scenario (April
(October

2020)
2020)
2020)
(March 2021
North America
-17.1
23.7
-40.9
19.3
-14.7
10.7
-8.5
7.7
5.1
South and Central America
-12.9
18.6
-31.3
14.3
-7.7
5.4
-4.5
3.2
2.7
Europe
-12.2
20.5
-32.8
22.7
-11.7
8.2
-8.0
8.3
3.9
CIS






-3.9
4.4
1.9
Africa






-8.1
8.1
3
Middle East






-8.2
12.4
5.0
Asia
-13.5
24.9
-36.2
36.1
-4.5
5.7
0.3
8.4
3.5
Other regions
-8.0
8.6
-8.0
9.3
-9.5
6.1



Imports









North America
-14.5
27.3
-33.8
29.5
-8.7
6.7
-6.1
11.4
4.9
South and Central America
-22.2
23.2
-43.8
19.5
-13.5
6.5
-9.3
8.1
3.7
Europe
-10.3
19.9
-28.9
24.5
-10.3
8.7
-7.6
8.4
3.7
CIS






-4.7
5.7
2.7
Africa






-8.8
5.5
4
Middle East






-11.3
7.2
4.5
Asia
-11.8
23.1
-31.5
25.1
-4.4
6.2
-1.3
5.7
4.4
Other regions
-10
13.6
-22.6
18.0
-16.0
5.6



World Real GDP at
market exchange rates

-2.5
7.4
-8.8
5.9
-4.8
4.9
-3.8
5.1
3.8
North America
-3.3
7.2
-9.0
5.1
-4.4
3.9
-4.1
5.9
3.8
South and Central America
-4.3
6.5
-11
4.8
-7.5
3.8
-7.8
3.8
3.0
Europe
-3.5
6.6
-10.8
5.4
-7.3
5.2
-7.1
3.7
3.6
CIS






-0.5
1.0
1.2
Africa






-2.9
2.6
3.8
Middle East






-6.0
2.4
3.5
Asia
-0.7
8.7
-7.1
7.4
-2.4
5.9
-1.1
6.1
4.1
Other regions
-1.5
6.0
-6.7
5.2
-5.5
3.5



Source: World Trade Primed for Strong but Uneven Recovery After COVID-19 Pandemic Shock, World Trade
Organization, March 31, 2021.
Note: Data for 2021 and 2022 are projections; GDP projections are based on scenarios simulated with the
WTO Global Trade Model. In the April and October forecasts, the CIS countries, Africa, and the Middle East
were grouped together as “Other Regions.. CIS is the Commonwealth of Independent States: Azerbaijan,
Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and
Ukraine.
The WTO’s various forecasts indicate that all geographic regions could experience a rise in trade
volumes in 2021 and 2022 compared with 2020, while North America and Europe could
experience a percentage increase in trade volumes in 2021 comparable to the decline in volumes
in percentage terms experienced in 2020. The forecast also projected that sectors with extensive
value chains, such as automobile products and electronics, could experience the steepest declines
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in 2020. Although services were not included in the WTO forecast, this segment of the economy
could experience the largest disruption as a consequence of restrictions on travel and transport
and the closure of retail and hospitality establishments. Such services as information technology,
however, were growing to satisfy the demands of employees working from home.
The pandemic also raised questions about the costs and benefits of the global supply chains that
businesses have erected over the past three decades. Evidence indicates that growth in supply
chains had slowed prior to the pandemic, but there is little consensus on the long-term impact of
the crisis. According to a December 2020 report by DHL and the New York University Stern
Scholl of Business, global interconnectedness comprises four distinct types of transactions: trade,
capital, information, and people.142 This analysis concluded that the pandemic affected cross-
border movements of people in response to travel restrictions and in trade through a sharp
contraction in the global economy. Capital flows also dropped during 2020 as a result of lower
corporate earnings, business travel restrictions, negative business prospects, and concerns over
global supply chains.143
In some cases, businesses have been reassessing their exposure to the risks posed by extensive
supply chains that potentially are vulnerable to numerous points of disruption. Also, some
governments have been assessing the risks supply chains pose to national supplies of items
considered to be important to national security as a result of firms locating or shifting production
offshore. For multinational businesses, changing suppliers and shifting production locations can
be especially costly for some firms and can introduce additional risks.144 In addition, businesses
may be reluctant to relocate from production locations, such as China, that not only serve as
production platforms, but are also important markets for their output. For instance, the Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA) reports that 10% of the global sales of the majority-owned foreign
affiliates of U.S. parent companies is shipped back to the U.S. parent company. In contrast, 60%
of such sales take place in the foreign country where the affiliate is located and another 30% is
shipped to other foreign countries in close proximity. For China, about 6% of the sales of the
majority-owned foreign affiliates of U.S. parent companies are shipped to the U.S. parent, while
82% is sold in China and another 12% is shipped to other foreign countries.145
Beyond the current challenges the pandemic poses to global supply chains, a recent report
catalogues a number of risks that can disrupt supply chains.146 The report estimates that 16% to
26% of global goods exports, worth $2.9 trillion to $4.6 trillion, potentially could move to new
countries over the next five years “if companies restructure their supplier networks.” The report
concluded, however, that the pandemic so far had not reshaped global production networks in
dramatic ways, because the networks reflect, “economic logic, hundreds of billions of dollars’
worth of investment, and long-standing supplier relationships.”147 In addition, the report
concluded that although firms can shift production locations, the interconnected nature of these
chains “limits the economic case for making large-scale changes in their physical location.”148

142 Altman, Steven A. and Phillip Bastian, DHL Global Connectedness Index 2020, 2020
143 Ibid, p. 32.
144 Beattie, Alan, Will Coronavirus Pandemic Finally Kill Off Global Supply Chains?, Financial Times, May 28, 2020.
https://www.ft.com/content/4ee0817a-809f-11ea-b0fb-13524ae1056b.
145 Activities of U.S. Multinational Enterprises: U.S. Parent Companies and Their Foreign Affiliates, Preliminary 2017
Statistics
, Bureau of Economic Analysis, August 23, 2019, Table II.E.2. https://www.bea.gov/news/2019/activities-us-
multinational-enterprises-2017.
146 Risk, Resilience, and Rebalancing in Global Value Chains, McKinsey Global Institute, August 2020, p. 1
147 Ibid, p. 2.
148 Ibid, In Brief.
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Instead of shifting production locations, firms are considering a number of strategies to withstand
the challenges of a global economy by increasing sources of raw materials and critical materials,
expanding and diversifying supplier bases, investing in suppliers to upgrade their capabilities, and
regionalizing supply chains, among a number of possible actions.149
Amidst the decline in global trade, 15 countries, including Brunei, Colombia, Indonesia, Laos,
Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam. Australia, China, Japan, New
Zealand, and South Korea, signed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) on
November 15, 2020, to create potentially one of the largest free trade agreements.150 The
agreement needs to be ratified by at least six ASEAN countries and three non-ASEAN countries.
This agreement follows by two years the conclusion of negotiations over the Comprehensive and
Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) that replaced the proposed Trans-
Pacific Partnership agreement after the United States pulled out of the negotiations. The
agreement includes Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand,
Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam. The UK reportedly has applied to join the trade agreement.
Global Foreign Investment
Similar to the negative impact policy measures to control the spread of COVID-19 have had on
global trade, the measures negatively affected global foreign investment flows. In addition,
national governments have implemented new or expanded foreign investment policies related to
national security, while attempting to navigate between legitimate national security risks and
policies that some policymakers argue are fundamentally protectionist. During 2020, various
governments adopted measures at both the national and international level to address the health
and economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, as indicated in Table 9.151 According to
UNCTAD, these measure include incentives to increase domestic production of vaccines and
personal protective equipment (PPE) and direct state intervention through nationalization or
through directives to increase output at facilities that currently produced PPE materials or to
initiate production at other facilities. EU members are moving independently to amend current
legislation or adopt new rules to expand their review of foreign investments for national security
reasons, particularly rules related to acquisitions of firms involved in the production of medical
care and health. Also, Australia, Canada, and Japan expanded the range of foreign investments
they screen In some cases, policy changes include enhanced foreign investment screening of
foreign investment for “public interest” reasons that may remain after the pandemic crisis.152
The UN also reported that governments adopted new regulations across a spectrum of areas and
also supported joint international efforts to address public aspects of the pandemic, as indicated in
Table 10. State intervention has spanned policy approaches from investment incentives to
promote the production of medicines and medical equipment, assistance to affected firms and
industries, measures to circumvent intellectual property rights restrictions, and international
efforts to speed up vaccine production and cross-border sharing.
The shift in approach toward the national security dimensions of foreign investment, especially
by developed economies, has tended to blur the distinction between foreign investment, trade, and
national security and reflects the evolving nature of the concept of national security relative to

149 Risk, Resilience, and Rebalancing in Global Value Chains, p. 16.
150 Shih, Gerry, and Simon Denyer, As Trump Era Ends, Massive New Asian Trade Deal Leaves U.S. on the Sidelines,
Washington Post, November 16, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/trade-china-trump-obama-
asia/2020/11/16/f02f43e4-27b7-11eb-9c21-3cc501d0981f_story.html.
151 World Investment Report 2020, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2020, p. 93.
152 Ibid, p. 96.
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foreign investment. Conceivably, changes in technology and the global economy have made it
more difficult to assess the economic costs and benefits of changes in foreign investment policies
taken on national security grounds.
Table 9. Foreign Investment Screening Legislation Adopted During COVID-19
Country
Investment Measure
Spain
Adopted a Royal Decree to suspend its liberalization regime regarding listed and
unlisted Spanish companies and require authorization to acquire 10% or more of stock
in certain sectors, including critical infrastructure, critical technologies, media and food
security.
European Union
The EU Commission issued a Guidance to Member States concerning efforts by non-EU
investors to attempt to acquire health care capacities or related industries through
foreign investment during the pandemic and recommended that EU members make ful
use of FDI screening regimes or establish such regimes where they are not ful y
developed.
Australia
Temporarily lowered the monetary screening threshold to zero for all foreign
investments, requiring prior approval for all foreign investments and extended the
timeframe for screening procedures from 30 days to six months.
Italy
Expanded the scope of its FDI screening regime, including acquisitions from within the
EU, by adding finance, credit and insurance to its list of strategic sectors.
India
Introduced a requirement for prior governmental approval for all investment originating
from countries that share land borders with India.
Canada
Announced “enhanced security” reviews of foreign investments in Canadian firms to
prevent foreign firms from taking advantage of low stock valuations during the pandemic
to acquire any Canadian firm, but particularly those related to public health or involved
in the supply of critical goods and services to Canadians to protect Canadian’s health
and safety.
France
Added biotechnology to its list of critical sectors requiring prior governmental approval
for foreign acquisitions and temporarily lowered the voting rights threshold for listed
companies for FDI screening from 25% to 10%.
Germany
Amended its Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance to emphasize critical public health
sectors and require prior governmental approval for foreign acquisitions of 10% or
more of the stock of German companies involved in developing, manufacturing or
producing vaccines, medicines, protective medical equipment and other medical goods
for the treatment of highly infectious diseases. Also adopted measures to align German
reviews with EU rules.
Hungary
Adopted a foreign investment screening mechanism that requires approval for
investments in 21 industries, including health care, pharmaceuticals and medical device
manufacturing, and non-medical industries. An investment can be denied that violates or
threatens public security or order, particularly the security of supply of basic social
needs.
Japan
Amended its list of sectors considered critical to national security by adding the
production of vaccines, medicines and advanced medical equipment, including
ventilators.

Poland
Adopted a FDI screening regime for foreign acquisitions of 20 % or more in publicly
listed companies, companies control ing strategic infrastructure or developing critical IT
software, or companies active in 21 industries, including pharmaceuticals, manufacturing
of medical devices, food processing and utilities.

Source: World Investment Report 2020, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2020, p. 92-93.
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Table 10. Investment Policy Instruments Adopted at the National and International
Levels to Address the COVID-19 Pandemic
Investment policy areas
Policy measures
Policy actions at the national level
Investment facilitation
Alleviate administrative burdens and bureaucratic
obstacles for firms.

Use of online tools and e-platforms.
Investment retention and aftercare by investment
COVID-19-related information services.
promotion agencies (IPAs)

Administrative and operational support during the
crisis.

Move to online services.
Investment incentives
Financial or fiscal incentives to produce COVID-19-
related medical equipment.

Incentives for conversion of production lines.

Incentives for enhancement of contracted economic
activities.
State participation in crisis-affected industries
Acquisition of equity in companies, including
nationalization.
Local small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and supply
Financial or fiscal support for domestic suppliers (such
chains
as SMEs).
National security and public health
Application and potential reinforcement of FDI
screening in pandemic-relevant industries.
Other State intervention in the health industry
Mandatory production.

Export bans.

Import facilitation.
Intellectual property (IP)
General authorization of non-voluntary licensing, to
speed up research and development (R&D).

IP holder-specific non-voluntary licensing, to enable
imports of medication.
Policy actions at the international level
International support measures for investment
International pledges in support of cross-border
investment.
IIAs
Reform International Investment Agreements (IIAs) to
support public health policies and to minimize investor–
State dispute risks.
Intellectual property (IP)
General authorization of non-voluntary licensing, to
speed up research and development (R&D).
Source: World Investment Report 2020, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2020, p. 89.
According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), global
foreign direct investment inflows fell by 42% in 2020 compared with the same period in 2019,
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with continued weakness expected in 2021, as indicated in Figure 8.153 Global inflow totals were
driven in large part by the decline in foreign investment inflows to developed economies, which
fell by 69%. Inflows to Europe fell to -$4 billion, compared with inflows in 2019 of $344 billion.
In contrast, inflows to developing economies fell by 12% over the period, aided in large part by
positive inflows to China. Investment flows to developing Asia, at $476 billion, dropped by 4%
compared with 2019 and accounted for about half the total $859 billion global direct investment
inflows in 2020.
Figure 8. Foreign Direct Investment Inflows by Major Country Groups
Inflows in $ billions

Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Created by CRS.
As indicated in Figure 9, all major geographic areas except Asia experienced a drop in foreign
direct investment inflows in 2020 compared with 2019.154 This drop in foreign investment was
apparent in the three major types of foreign investment: cross-border investments; greenfield
investment, or investment in new business activity; and international project finance. In the three
types of investment activity, global activity fell by 10%, 35%, and 2%, respectively in 2020
compared with 2019. Cross-border merger and acquisition (M&A) activity increased by 31% and
147%, respectively, in Asia and Transition economies, but declined by 11% in developed
economies and 67% in Latin America. International project finance, reportedly an important
source of infrastructure finance, fell globally by 2%, but rose by 7% in developed economies,
primarily in Europe, and by 17% in Asia.

153 Investment Trends Monitor, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, January, 2021. Investment
Policy Instruments Adopted at the National and International level to Address the COVID-19 Pandemic
154 Investment Trends Monitor, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, January 24, 2021.
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Figure 9. Global Foreign Direct Investment Inflows
In billions of dollars and percentage change

Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Created by CRS.
For the United States, BEA reported that U.S. direct investment abroad (outflows) and foreign
direct investment in the United States (inflows) fell by 74% and 89%, respectively, in the first
half of 2020 compared with the first half of 2019, as indicated in Figure 10.155 The lower
investment numbers reflect, in part, the lower values for equity, mirroring the declines in major
equity markets in the first half of 2020. For 2020 as a whole, U.S. direct investment outflows fell
by 19%, while foreign direct investment inflows fell by 40%.
Figure 10. U.S. Direct Investment; Inflows and Outflows

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Created by CRS.

155 U.S. International Transactions, Fourth Quarter and Year 2020, Bureau of Economic Analysis, March 23, 2020.
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Notes: In the balance of payments, direct investment outflows are represented as a negative value, indicating an
outflow and direct investment inflows are represented as positive values. For presentation purposes, the signs
for direct investment abroad, or outflows, have been reversed.
Economic Policy Challenges
The challenge for policymakers has been one of implementing targeted policies that address what
had been expected to be short-term problems without creating distortions in economies that can
outlast the impact of the virus itself. Policymakers, however, have been overwhelmed by the
quickly changing nature of the global health crisis that turned into a global trade and economic
crisis. During the initial stages of the pandemic, policymakers weighed the impact of policies that
addressed the immediate economic effects at the expense of longer-term considerations such as
debt accumulation. As the pandemic persisted, however, policymakers adopting additional fiscal
or monetary measures, in particular, that could complicate the economic impact of the policies
after the pandemic resides. Initially, many policymakers felt constrained in their ability to respond
to the crisis as a result of limited flexibility for monetary and fiscal support within conventional
standards, given the broad-based synchronized slowdown in global economic growth, especially
in manufacturing and trade, that had developed prior to the viral outbreak. The pandemic has also
affected global politics as world leaders cancelled international meetings,156 nations began
competing for medical supplies, and some nations reportedly stoked conspiracy theories that
shifted blame to other countries.157
Initially, the economic effects of the virus were expected to be short-term supply issues as factory
output fell because workers were quarantined to reduce the spread of the virus through social
interaction. The drop in economic activity, initially in China, has had international repercussions
as firms experienced delays in supplies of intermediate and finished goods through supply chains.
Concerns grew, however, that virus-related supply shocks created more prolonged and wide-
ranging demand shocks as reduced activity by consumers and businesses leads to a lower rate of
economic growth. As demand shocks unfold, businesses experience reduced activity and profits
and potentially escalating and binding credit and liquidity constraints. While manufacturing firms
experienced supply chain shocks, reduced consumer activity through social distancing affected
the services sector of the economy, which accounts for two-thirds of annual U.S. economic
output. In this environment, manufacturing and services firms initially tended to hoard cash,
which affected market liquidity. In response, the Federal Reserve, along with other central banks,
lowered interest rates where possible and expanded lending facilities to provide liquidity to
financial markets and to firms potentially facing insolvency.
As the economic effects have persisted, their impact has spread through trade and financial
linkages to an ever-broadening group of countries, firms and households. These growing
economic effects potentially increased liquidity constraints and credit market tightening in global
financial markets as firms hoarded cash, with negative fallout effects on economic growth. At the
same time, financial markets had been factoring in an increase in government bond issuance in
the United States, Europe, and elsewhere as government debt levels began rising to meet
spending obligations during an expected economic recession and increased fiscal spending to
fight the effects of COVID-19. Unlike the 2008-2009 financial crisis, reduced demand by

156 Taylor, Adam, Teo Armus, and Rick Noak, “Live updates: COVID-19 Turmoil Widens as U.S. Death Toll Mounts;
Xi Cancels Japan Trip, Washington Post, March 5, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/03/05/COVID-
19-live-updates/.
157 Shih, Gerry, “China Is Subtly Stoking COVID-19 Conspiracy Theories That Blame the U.S. for Outbreak,”
Washington Post, March 5, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/03/05/COVID-19-live-updates/.
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consumers, labor market issues, and a reduced level of activity among businesses, rather than
risky trading by global banks, led to corporate credit issues and potential insolvency. These
market dynamics led some observers at the time to question if these events marked the beginning
of a full-scale global financial crisis.158
Liquidity and credit market issues presented policymakers with a different set of challenges than
addressing supply-side constraints. As a result, the focus of government policy expanded from a
health crisis to macroeconomic and financial market issues that were addressed through a
combination of monetary, fiscal, and other policies, including border closures, quarantines, and
restrictions on social interactions. Essentially, while businesses attempted to address worker and
output issues at the firm level, national leaders attempted to implement fiscal policies to prevent
economic growth from contracting sharply by assisting workers and businesses that faced
financial strains, and central bankers adjusted monetary policies to address mounting credit
market issues.
In the initial stages of the health crisis, households did not experience the same kind of wealth
losses they saw during the 2008-2009 financial crisis when the value of their primary residence
dropped sharply. However, as unemployment numbers rose, job losses resulted in defaults on
mortgages and delinquencies on rent payments, requiring some financial institutions to provide
loan forbearance or other mechanism to provide financial assistance. In turn, mortgage defaults
threatened to negatively affect the market for mortgage-backed securities, the availability of funds
for mortgages, and negatively affect the overall rate of economic growth. Losses in the value of
most equity markets in the U.S., Asia, and Europe also affect household wealth, especially that of
retirees living on a fixed income and others who own equities. Investors that trade in mortgage-
backed securities reportedly reduced their holdings while the Federal Reserve attempted to
support the market.159 In the initial stages of the crisis, even traditional policy tools, such as
monetary accommodation, apparently were not always processed by markets in a traditional
manner, with equity market indices displaying heightened, rather than lower, levels of uncertainty
following the Federal Reserve’s cut in interest rates. Such volatility added to uncertainties about
what governments could do to address weaknesses in the global economy.
Major Economic Developments
Between late February 2020 and January 2021, financial markets from the United States to Asia
and Europe were whipsawed as investors alternated between optimism and pessimism amid
concerns that COVID-19 would create a global economic and financial crisis with few metrics to
indicate how prolonged and extensive the economic effects could be.160 Investors searched for
safe-haven investments, such as the benchmark U.S. Treasury 10-year security, which
experienced a historic drop in yield to below 1% on March 3, 2020.161 In response to concerns
that the global economy was in a freefall, the Federal Reserve lowered key interest rates on

158 Foroohar, Rana, “How COVID-19 Became a Corporate Credit Run,” Financial Times, March 15, 2020.
https://www.ft.com/content/f1ea5096-6531-11ea-a6cd-df28cc3c6a68.
159 Armstrong, Robert, “Mortgage Investment Funds Become ‘Epicenter’ of Crisis,” Financial Times, March 24, 2020.
https://www.ft.com/content/18909cda-6d40-11ea-89df-41bea055720b.
160 Samson, Adam and Hudson Lockett, “Stocks Fall Again in Worst Week Since 2008 Crisis,” Financial Times,
February 28. https://www.ft.com/content/4b23a140-59d3-11ea-a528-dd0f971febbc.
161 The price and yield of a bond are inversely related; increased demand for Treasury securities raises their price,
which lowers their yield. Levisohn, Ben, “The 10-Year Treasury Yield Fell Below 1% for the First Time Ever. What
That Means,” Barrons, March 3, 2020. https://www.barrons.com/articles/the-10-year-treasury-yield-fell-below-1-for-
the-first-time-ever-what-that-means-51583267310.
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March 3, 2020, to shore up economic activity, while the Bank of Japan engaged in asset
purchases to provide short-term liquidity to Japanese banks; Japan’s government indicated it
would also assist workers with wage subsidies. The Bank of Canada also lowered its key interest
rate. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) announced that it was making about $50 billion
available through emergency financing facilities for low-income and emerging market countries
and through funds available in its Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust (CCRT).162
Financial Markets
Reflecting investors’ uncertainties, the DJIA lost about one-third of its value between February
14, 2020, and March 23, 2020, as indicated in Figure 11. Expectations that the U.S. Congress
would adopt a $2.0 trillion spending package moved the DJIA up by more than 11% on March 24,
2020. From March 23 to April 15, the DJIA moved higher by 18%, paring its initial losses by
half. Since then, the DJIA trended upward, but moved erratically at times as investors weighed
news about the human cost and economic impact of the pandemic and the prospects of various
medical treatments. Between March 23 and July 1, the DJIA regained 70% of the value lost
during the February to March decline. On Monday, November 9, the DJIA gained over 800
points, or nearly three percentage points, as markets responded positively to press reports that an
effective COVID-19 vaccine had been developed. On November 10, the DJIA rose above 29,400
for the first time since the index fell in February 2020. Between January 1, 2021, and February 4,
2021, the DJIA increased by about 3.0%, continuing a rise in the index of 17% since the end of
October 2020. Through April, 2021, the DJIA had gained more than 12% in value and was 16%
higher than the value on February 14, 2020.
As indicated in Table 11, the DJIA lost the largest part of its market valuation in trading during
February and March when the index lost nearly one-fourth of its value as more trading sessions
ended with overall market values lower than higher. Since March, the index has posted more
trading sessions that closed with positive gains than losses. By October 23, the DJIA had
recovered most of the value lost in February and March. During the final week of October, the
DJIA lost more than 1,800 points, the largest weekly loss since March 2020 as Germany, France
and other European countries reinstituted lockdowns in response to a resurgence of COVID-19
cases. In the first three days of November, however, the Index regained three-fourths of the value
it lost the previous week. During the first four months of 2021, the DJIA has gained 12% in value.
Announcements of vaccines portending a resurgence of economic activity boosted market
sentiment in November and December with the DJIA rising by over a combined 3,700 points or
by nearly 14%. In January 2021, the DJIA dropped by about 1% with more trading days ending
with the index down than days with the index up from the previous day. For some policymakers,
the drop in equity prices in February and March raised concerns that foreign investors might
attempt to exploit the situation by increasing their purchases of firms in sectors considered
important to national security. For instance, Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European
Commission, urged EU members to better screen foreign investments, especially in areas such as
health, medical research, and critical infrastructure.163

162 Georgieva, Kristalina, “Potential Impact of the COVID-19 Epidemic: What We Know and What We Can Do,”
International Monetary Fund, March 4, 2020. https://blogs.imf.org/2020/03/04/potential-impact-of-the-COVID-19-
epidemic-what-we-know-and-what-we-can-do/.
163 Chazan, Guy and Jim Brunsden, “COVID-19 Crisis Pushes Europe into Nationalist Economic Turn,” Financial
Times
, March 26, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/79c0ae80-6df1-11ea-89df-41bea055720b.
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Table 11. Dow Jones Industrial Average Market Changes by Month
Sessions up Sessions down
Open
Close
Change in index valuation

January
13
8
28,638.97
28,256.03
-382.94
-1.34%
February
8
11
28,319.65
25,409.36
-2,910.29
-10.28%
March
10
12
25,590.51
21,917.16
-3,673.35
-14.35%
April
12
9
21,227.38
24,345.72
3,118.34
14.69%
May
10
10
24,120.78
25,383.11
1,262.33
5.23%
June
14
8
25,342.99
25,812.88
469.89
1.85%
July
13
9
25,879.38
26,428.32
548.94
2.12%
August
14
7
26,542.32
28,430.05
1,887.73
7.11%
September
12
9
28,439.61
27,781.70
-657.91
-2.31%
October
10
12
27,816.90
26,501.60
-1,315.30
-4.73%
November
12
8
26,691.28
29,638.64
2,947.36
11.04%
December
14
8
29,707.50
30,606.48
808.98
2.71%
January 2021
8
11
30,223.89
29,981.10
-242.79
-0.80%
February
15
5
30,054.73
30,932.37
877.64
2.92%
March
13
10
31,065.90
32,981.55
1,915.65
6.17%
April
12
8
33,054.58
33,874.85
820.27
2.48%
May
13
7
33,904.89
34,529.45
624.56
1.84%
Source: Financial Times, calculations by CRS.
Similar to the 2008-2009 global financial crisis, central banks implemented a series of monetary
operations to provide liquidity to their economies. These actions, however, initially were not
viewed entirely positively by all financial market participants who questioned the use of policy
tools by central banks that were similar to those employed during the 2008-2009 financial crisis,
despite the fact that the COVID-19 and the previous crises were fundamentally different in origin.
During the previous financial crisis, central banks intervened to restart credit and spending by
banks that had engaged in risky assets. In the 2020 environment, central banks attempted to
address financial market volatility and prevent large-scale corporate insolvencies that reflected
the underlying economic uncertainty caused by the pandemic.
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Figure 11. Dow Jones Industrial Average
February 14, 2020, through June 10, 2021

Source: Financial Times. Created by CRS.
The yield on U.S. Treasury securities dropped to historic levels on March 6, 2020, and March 9,
2020, as investors moved out of stocks and into Treasury securities and other sovereign bonds,
including UK and German bonds, due in part to concerns over the impact the pandemic would
have on economic growth and expectations the Federal Reserve and other central banks would
lower short-term interest rates.164 On March 5, the U.S. Congress passed an $8 billion spending
bill to provide assistance for health care, sick leave, small business loans, and international
assistance. At the same time, commodity prices dropped sharply as a result of reduced economic
activity and disagreements among oil producers over production cuts in crude oil and lower
global demand for commodities, including crude oil.
The drop in some commodity prices raised concerns about corporate profits and led some
investors to sell equities and buy sovereign bonds. In overnight trading in various sessions
between March 8, and March 24, U.S. stock market indexes moved sharply (both higher and
lower), triggering automatic circuit breakers designed to halt trading if the indexes rise or fall by
more than 5% when markets are closed and 7% when markets are open.165 By early April, the
global mining industry had reduced production by an estimated 20% in response to falling
demand and labor quarantines and as a strategy for raising prices.166
Ahead of a March 12, 2020, scheduled meeting of the European Central Bank (ECB), the German
central bank (Deutsche Bundesbank) announced a package of measures to provide liquidity
support to German businesses and financial support for public infrastructure projects.167 At the

164 Smith, Colby, Richard Henderson, Philip Georgiadis, and Hudson Lockett, “Stocks Tumble and Government Bonds
Hit Highs on Virus Fears,” Financial Times, March 6, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/9f94d6f8-5f51-11ea-b0ab-
339c2307bcd4.
165 Georgiadis, Philip, Adam Samson, and Hudson Lockett, “Stocks Plummet as Oil Crash Shakes Financial Markets,”
Financial Times, March 9, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/8273a32a-61e4-11ea-a6cd-df28cc3c6a68.
166 Hume, Neil, “Mine Closures Bolster Metals Prices as Demand Collapses,” Financial Times, April 7, 2020.
https://www.ft.com/content/06ef38c9-18d8-427e-8675-a567227397c0.
167 Chazan, Guy, David Keohane, and Martin Arnold, “Europe’s Policymakers Search for Answers to Virus Crisis,”
Financial Times, March 9, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/d46467da-61e1-11ea-b3f3-fe4680ea68b5.
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same time, the Fed announced that it was expanding its repo market transactions (in the
repurchase market, investors borrow cash for short periods in exchange for high-quality collateral
like Treasury securities) after stock market indexes fell sharply, government bond yields fell to
record lows (reflecting increased demand), and demand for corporate bonds fell. Together these
developments raised concerns for some analysts that instability in stock markets could threaten
global financial conditions.168
On March 11, as the WHO designated COVID-19 a pandemic, governments and central banks
adopted additional monetary and fiscal policies to address the growing economic impact.
European Central Bank (ECB) President Christine Lagarde in a conference call to EU leaders
warned that without coordinated action, Europe could face a recession similar to the 2008-2009
financial crisis.169 The Bank of England lowered its key interest rate, reduced capital buffers for
UK banks, and provided a funding program for small and medium businesses. The UK
Chancellor of the Exchequer also proposed a budget that would appropriate £30 billion (about
$35 billion) for fiscal stimulus spending, including funds for sick pay for workers, guarantees for
loans to small businesses, and cuts in business taxes. The European Commission announced a €25
billion (about $28 billion) investment fund to assist EU countries and the Federal Reserve
announced that it would expand its repo market purchases to provide larger and longer-term
funding to provide added liquidity to financial markets.
President Trump imposed restrictions on travel from Europe to the United States on March 12,
2020, surprising European leaders and adding to financial market volatility.170 At its March 12
meeting, the ECB announced €27 billion (about $30 billion) in stimulus funding, combining
measures to expand low-cost loans to Eurozone banks and small and medium-sized businesses
and implement an asset purchase program to provide liquidity to firms. Germany indicated that it
would provide tax breaks for businesses and “unlimited” loans to affected businesses. The ECB’s
Largarde roiled markets by stating that it was not the ECB’s job to “close the spread” between
Italian and German government bond yields (a key risk indicator for Italy), a comment reportedly
interpreted as an indicator the ECB was preparing to abandon its support for Italy, a notion that
was denied by the ECB.171 The Fed also announced that it would increase its lending in the repo
market and its purchases of Treasury securities to provide liquidity. As a result of tight market
conditions for corporate bonds, firms turned to their revolving lines of credit with banks to build
up their cash reserves. The price of bank shares fell, reflecting sales by investors who reportedly
had grown concerned that banks would experience a rise in loan defaults.172 Despite the various
actions, the DJIA fell by nearly 10% on March 12, recording the worst one-day drop since 1987.
Between February 14 and March 12, the DJIA fell by more than 8,000 points, or 28% of its value.

168 Smith, Colby and Brendan Greeley, “Fed Pumps Extra Liquidity Into Overnight Lending Markets,” Financial
Times
, March 9, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/e8c7b5f0-6200-11ea-a6cd-df28cc3c6a68.
169 O’Brien, Fergal, “ECB’s Lagarde Warns of 2008-Style Crisis Unless Europe Acts,” Washington Post, March 11,
2020. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-11/ecb-s-lagarde-warns-of-2008-style-crisis-without-urgent-
action.
170 McAuley, James and Michael Birnbaum, “Europe Blindsided by Trump’s Travel Restrictions, with Many Seeing
Political Motive,” Washington Post, March 12, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/europe-
blindsided-by-trumps-travel-restrictions-with-many-seeing-political-motive/2020/03/12/42a279d0-6412-11ea-8a8e-
5c5336b32760_story.html.
171 Arnold, Martin, “ECB Enters Damage-Limitation Mode with Pledge of More Action,” Financial Times, March 13,
2020. https://www.ft.com/content/f1cbd4f8-650f-11ea-b3f3-fe4680ea68b5.
172 Morris, Stephen, Laura Noonan, Henny Sender, and Olaf Storbeck, “Banks Scramble as Companies Rush to Tap
Back-up Credit Lines,” Financial Times, March 12, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/a3513a54-6486-11ea-b3f3-
fe4680ea68b5.
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Credit rating agencies began reassessing corporate credit risk, including the risk of firms that had
been considered stable.173
On March 13, President Trump declared a national emergency, potentially releasing $50 billion in
disaster relief funds to state and local governments. The announcement moved financial markets
sharply higher, with the DJIA rising 10%.174 Financial markets also reportedly moved higher on
expectations the Fed would lower interest rates. House Democrats and President Trump agreed to
a $2 trillion spending package to provide paid sick leave, unemployment insurance, food stamps,
support for small businesses, and other measures.175 The EU indicated that it would relax budget
rules that restrict deficit spending by EU members. In other actions, the People’s Bank of China
cut its reserve requirements for Chinese banks, potentially easing borrowing costs for firms and
adding $79 billion in funds to stimulate the Chinese economy; Norway’s central bank reduced its
key interest rate; the Bank of Japan acquired billions of dollars of government securities (thereby
increasing liquidity); and the Reserve Bank of Australia injected nearly $6 billion into its
financial system.176 The Bank of Canada also lowered its overnight bank lending rate.
The Federal Reserve lowered its key interest rate to near zero on March 15, 2020, arguing that the
pandemic had “harmed communities and disrupted economic activity in many countries,
including the United States” and that it was prepared to use its “full range of tools.”177 It also
announced an additional $700 billion in asset purchases, including Treasury securities and
mortgage-backed securities, expanded repurchase operations, activated dollar swap lines with
Canada, Japan, Europe, the UK, and Switzerland, opened its discount window to commercial
banks to ease household and business lending, and urged banks to use their capital and liquidity
buffers to support lending.178
Despite the Fed’s actions the previous day to lower interest rates, interest rates in the U.S.
commercial paper market, where corporations raise cash by selling short-term debt, rose on
March 16, 2020, to their highest levels since the 2008-2009 financial crisis, prompting investors
to call on the Fed to intervene.179 The DJIA dropped nearly 3,000 points, or about 13%. Most
automobile manufacturers announced major declines in sales and production;180 similarly, most

173 Edgecliffe-Johnson, Andrew, Peggy Hollinger, Joe Rennison, and Robert Smith, “Will the COVID-19 Trigger a
Corporate Debt Crisis?” Financial Times, March 12, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/4455735a-63bc-11ea-b3f3-
fe4680ea68b5. Sectors most exposed to debt financing issues include automotive, insurance, capital goods, utilities, oil
and gas, technology, aerospace and defense, real estate, telecoms, consumer products, metals, mining and steel,
healthcare, retail/restaurants, chemicals, packaging, transportation, media and entertainment, and forest products.
174 Fritz, Angela and Meryl Kornfield, “President Trump Declares a National Emergency, Freeing $50 Billion in
Funding,” Washington Post, March 13, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/03/13/COVID-19-latest-
news.
175 Werner, Erica, Mike DeBonis, Paul Kane, Jeff Stein, “White House, House Democrats Reach Deal on COVID-19
Economic Relief Package, Pelosi Announces,” Washington Post, March 13, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/
us-policy/2020/03/13/paid-leave-democrats-trump-deal-COVID-19/.
176 Georgiadis, Philip, Hudson Lockett, and Leo Lewis, “European Stocks and US Futures Soar After Historic Rout,”
Financial Times, March 13, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/3bab76ac-64cd-11ea-a6cd-df28cc3c6a68.
177 Federal Reserve Releases FOMC Statement, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, March 15, 2020.
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20200315a.htm.
178 Greeley, Brendan, Colby Smith, Adam Samson, Joe Rennison, Katie Martin, and Jennifer Ablan, “Fed Cuts Rates to
Zero as Part of Sweeping Crisis Measures,” Financial Times, March 15, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/a9a28bc0-
66fb-11ea-a3c9-1fe6fedcca75.
179 Rennison, Joe Rennison and Colby Smith, “Investors Call for Fed Help in ‘Frozen’ Commercial Paper Market,”
Financial Times, March 16, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/34213560-677b-11ea-a3c9-1fe6fedcca75.
180 Campbell, Peter, Joe Miller, and David Keohane, “European Car Plants Close as Industry Crisis Deepens,”
Financial Times, March 16, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/dd76d42a-678b-11ea-a3c9-1fe6fedcca75.
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airlines reported they faced major cutbacks in flights and employee layoffs due to diminished
economic activity.181 Economic data from China indicated the economy would slow markedly in
the first quarter of 2020, potentially greater than that experienced during the global financial
crisis.182 The Bank of Japan announced that it would double its purchases of exchange traded
funds and the G-7 countries183 issued a joint statement promising “a strongly coordinated
international approach,” although no specific actions were mentioned. The IMF issued a
statement indicating its support for additional fiscal and monetary actions by governments and
that the IMF “stands ready to mobilize its $1 trillion lending capacity to help its membership.”
The World Bank also promised an additional $14 billion to assist governments and companies
address the pandemic.184
Following the drop in equity market indexes the previous day, the Federal Reserve unveiled a
number of facilities on March 17, 2020, in some cases reviving actions it had not taken since the
financial crisis. It announced that it would allow the 24 primary dealers in Treasury securities to
borrow cash collateralized against some stocks, municipal debt, and higher-rated corporate bonds;
revive a facility to buy commercial paper; and provide additional funding for the overnight repo
market.185 The UK government proposed government-backed loans to support businesses; a three-
month moratorium on mortgage payments for homeowners; a new lending facility with the Bank
of England to provide low-cost commercial paper to support lending; and loans for businesses.
In an emergency session on March 18, the ECB announced a temporary, nonstandard asset
purchase program, the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Program (PEPP), to acquire an additional
€750 billion (over $820 billion) in public and private sector bonds to counter the risks posed by
the pandemic crisis (as of May 5, the ECB had purchased about $180 billion in securities).186 The
ECB also broadened the types of assets it would accept as collateral to include nonfinancial
commercial paper, eased collateral standards for banks, and waived restrictions on acquiring
Greek government debt.187 The program was expected to end no later than yearend 2020.
The Federal Reserve broadened its central bank dollar swap lines to include Brazil, Mexico,
Australia, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. Automobile manufacturers announced they were
suspending production at an estimated 100 plants across North America, following similar plant
closures in Europe.188 Major U.S. banks announced a moratorium on share repurchases, or stock
buy-backs, denying equity markets a major source of support and potentially amplifying market

181 Smyth, Jamie Smyth, Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson, Peggy Hollinger, Myles McCormick, David Keohane, and
Richard Milne, “Most Airlines Face Bankruptcy by End of May, Industry Body Warns,” Financial Times, March 16,
2020. https://www.ft.com/content/30a3a26e-674f-11ea-800d-da70cff6e4d3.
182 Weinland, Don and Xinning Liu, “Chinese Economy Suffers Record Blow from COVID-19,” Financial Times,
March 16, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/318ae26c-6733-11ea-800d-da70cff6e4d3.
183 The G-7 comprises Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
184 Wheatley, Jonathan, “Surging Dollar, Coronavirus and Oil Slump Hit Emerging Economies,” Financial Times,
March 18, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/69fc6e2a-69d3-11ea-a3c9-1fe6fedcca75.
185 Politi, James, Brendan Greeley, Colby Smith, and Joe Rennison, “Fed to Lend Against Stocks and Bonds in Bid to
Stabilize Markets,” Financial Times, March 17, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/cf485398-689d-11ea-800d-
da70cff6e4d3.
186 “ECB Announces €750 Billion Pandemic Emergency Purchase Program (PEPP),” European Central Bank, March
18, 2020. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2020/html/ecb.pr200318_1~3949d6f266.en.html.
187 Arnold, Martin, “ECB to Launch €750 Billion Purchase Program in Response to Coronavirus,” Financial Times,
March 18, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/5919c6fb-1f5f-315d-8353-94f04afcf340.
188 Campbell, Peter and Claire Bushey, “Ford, General Motors and Fiat Chrysler Agree Widespread Shutdown,”
Financial Times, March 18, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/feae3808-6949-11ea-800d-da70cff6e4d3.
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volatility.189 During the week, more than 22 central banks in emerging economies, including
Brazil, Turkey, and Vietnam, lowered their key interest rates.
By March 19, 2020, investors were selling sovereign and other bonds as firms and other financial
institutions attempted to increase their cash holdings, although actions central banks took during
the week appeared to calm financial markets. Compared to previous financial market dislocations
in which stock market values declined while bond prices rose, stock and bond values fell at the
same time in March 2020 as investors reportedly adopted a “sell everything” mentality to build
up cash reserves.190 Senate Republicans introduced the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic
Security Act to provide $2 trillion in spending to support the U.S. economy.
On March 20, the Federal Reserve announced that it would expand a facility to support the
municipal bond market and Britain’s Finance Minister announced an “unprecedented” fiscal
package to pay up to 80% of an employee’s wages and deferring value added taxes by
businesses.191 The ECB’s Largarde justified actions by the Bank during the week to provide
liquidity by arguing that the “coronavirus pandemic is a public health emergency unprecedented
in recent history.” Market indexes fell again on March 23, 2020, as the Senate debated the
parameters of a new spending bill to support the economy. Oil prices also continued to fall as oil
producers appeared to be in a standoff over cuts to production.
Financial market indexes continued to fall on March 23, 2020, reaching their lowest point since
the start of the pandemic crisis. The Federal Reserve announced a number of new facilities to
provide an unlimited expansion in bond buying programs. The measures included additional
purchases of Treasury and mortgage-backed securities; additional funding for employers,
consumers, and businesses; establishing the Primary Market Corporate Credit Facility (PMCCF)
to support issuing new bonds and loans and the Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facility
(SMCCF) to provide liquidity for outstanding corporate bonds; establishing the Term Asset-
Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF), to support credit to consumers and businesses;
expanding the Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (MMLF) to provide credit to
municipalities; and expanding the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) to facilitate the
flow of credit to municipalities.192 The OECD released a statement encouraging its members to
support “immediate, large-scale and coordinated actions.” These actions included (1) more
international cooperation to address the health crisis; (2) coordinated government actions to
increase spending to support health care, individuals, and firms; (3) coordinated central bank
action to supervise and regulate financial markets; and (4) policies directed at restoring
confidence.193
Reacting to the Fed’s announcement, the DJIA closed up 11% on March 24, marking one of the
sharpest reversals in the market index since February 2020. European markets, however, did not
follow U.S. market indexes as various indicators signaled a decline in business activity in the
Eurozone that was greater than that during the financial crisis and indicated the growing potential

189 Henderson, Richard, “Bank-Led Freeze on Stock Buybacks Could Spread Across US Market,” Financial Times,
March 18, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/b1fa1688-68f6-11ea-a3c9-1fe6fedcca75.
190 Stubbington, Tommy and Colby Smith, “Investment Veterans Try to Get to Grips With ‘Broken’ Markets,”
Financial Times, March 20, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/97186440-6aa0-11ea-800d-da70cff6e4d3.
191 Parker, George Parker, Chris Giles, and Sebastian Payne, “Sunak Turns on Financial Firepower to Help Workers,”
Financial Times, March 20, 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/826d465a-6ac3-11ea-a3c9-1fe6fedcca75.
192 Federal Reserve Announces Extensive New Measures to Support the Economy, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, March 23, 2020. https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20200323b.htm.
193 Gurria, Angel, COVID-19: Joint Actions to Win the War, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
March 23, 2020. https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/#op-ed.
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for a severe economic recession.194 U.S. financial markets were buoyed on March 25 and 26 over
passage in Congress of a $2.2 trillion economic stimulus package.
On March 27, leaders of the G-20 countries announced through a video conference they had
agreed to inject $5 trillion into the global economy and to do “whatever it takes to overcome the
pandemic.” Also at the meeting, the OECD offered an updated forecast of the viral infection,
which projected that the global economy could shrink by as much as 2% a month. Nine Eurozone
countries, including France, Italy, and Spain called on the ECB to consider issuing
“coronabonds,” a common European debt instrument to assist Eurozone countries in fighting
COVID-19.195 The ECB announced that it was removing self-imposed limits that it had followed
in previous asset purchase programs that restricted its purchases of any one country’s bonds.196
Japan announced that it would adopt an emergency spending package worth $238 billion, or
equivalent to 10% of the country’s annual GDP.197 Despite the various actions, global financial
markets turned lower March 27 (the DJIA dropped by 900 points) reportedly over volatility in oil
markets and concerns that the economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic were worsening.198
By March 30, central banks in developing countries from Poland, Columbia, South Africa, the
Philippines, Brazil, and the Czech Republic reportedly had begun adopting monetary policies
similar to that of the Federal Reserve to stimulate their economies.199 In commodity markets,
Brent crude oil prices continued to fall, reaching a low of $22.76. Strong global demand for
dollars continued to put upward pressure on the international value of the dollar. In response, the
Federal Reserve introduced a new temporary facility that would work with its swap lines to allow
central banks and international monetary authorities to enter into repurchase agreements with the
Fed.200 From mid-March to mid-April, U.S. workers’ claims for unemployment benefits reached
over 17 million as firms faced a collapse in demand and requirements for employees to self-
quarantine caused them to begin furloughing or laying off employees. Financial markets began to
recover somewhat in early April in response to the accumulated monetary and fiscal policy
initiatives, but remained volatile as a result of uncertainty over efforts to reach an output
agreement among oil producers and the continued impact of the viral health effects.
International Role of the Dollar
Similar to conditions during the 2008-2009 financial crisis, the dollar emerged as the preferred
currency by investors, reinforcing its role as the dominant global reserve currency. As indicated in
Figure 12, the dollar appreciated more than 3.0% during the period between March 3 and March
13, 2020, reflecting increased international demand for the dollar and dollar-denominated assets.

194 Arnold, Martin Arnold and Valentina Romei, “Business Activity Crashes to Record Low in Eurozone,” Financial
Times
, March 24, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/f5ebabd4-6dad-11ea-89df-41bea055720b.
195 Dombrey, Daniel, Guy Chazan, and Jim Brunsden, “Nine Eurozone Countries Issue Call for ‘Coronabonds,’”
Financial Times, March 26, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/258308f6-6e94-11ea-89df-41bea055720b.
196 Arnold, Martin and Tommy Stubbington, “ECB Shakes Off Limits on New €750bn Bond-Buying Plan,” Financial
Times
, March 27, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/d775a99e-13b2-444e-8de5-fd2ec6caf4bf.
197 Kajimoto, Tetsushi, Izumi Nakagawa, “Japan Plans Huge Stimulus Package to Cushion Blow from Coronavirus,”
Reuters, March 27, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-japan-stimulus/japan-plans-huge-
stimulus-package-to-cushion-blow-from-coronavirus-idUSKBN21E0UW.
198 Georgiadis, Philip, Hudson Lockett, and Leo Lewis, “Global Stocks Falter After Two Days of Big Gains,” Financial
Times
, March 27, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/bc33c31c-f019-4ef8-85df-0014a5406ac1.
199 Wheatley, Jonathan, “Emerging Market Central Banks Embark on Radical Stimulus Policies,” Financial Times,
March 30, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/70398316-3fd5-4428-88ab-6f898ee42fd5.
200 Politi, James, Brendan Greeley, and Colby Smith, “Fed Sets Up Scheme to Meet Booming Foreign Demand for
Dollars,” Financial Times, March 31, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/6c976586-a6ea-42ec-a369-9353186c05bb.
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Since the highs reached on March 23, the exchange value of the dollar has dropped between 1%
and 2% per month in a slow decline as financial strains have eased and demand for the dollar in
international financial markets has lessened.
Between mid-May and mid-June, the dollar lost about 3% of its value relative to the currencies of
other major trading partners and was equal to its value in mid-March. During July, the dollar lost
over 2% of its value against the currencies of major trading partners, about where it was in mid-
March. By mid-October, the trade-weighted value of the dollar had declined by 8% from the
highest values reached in March and nearly matched the value it recorded at the beginning of
2020. On November 5, the dollar index returned to the value reported on January 2, 2020 and has
remained below that value since. By the end of January 2021, the dollar had depreciated by more
than 11% from the highest value it reached in March 2020. The development of COVID-19
vaccines likely affects the value of the dollar in various ways, including factors that tend to
appreciate the dollar as a result of renewed economic growth in the United States and opposing
forces that tend to depreciate the dollar if demand declines for the dollar as a safe-haven currency.
Despite the appreciation and subsequent depreciation of the dollar through 2020 and 2021 by the
end of April, 2021, the dollar was down 2% compared with the value on January 2, 2020. In part,
the resolution of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU has strengthened both the Euro and the pound,
tending to depreciate the value of the dollar. The decline in the value of the dollar reportedly has
pushed some countries to consider intervening to weaken their currencies.201
Figure 12. U.S. Dollar Trade-Weighted Broad Index, Goods and Services
January 2, 2020, through June 11, 2021

Source: St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank. Created by CRS.
The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) emphasized the role of the dollar as a dominant
global currency in its 2019 triennial survey of currency markets.202 According to the survey, the
dollar accounts for 88% of global foreign exchange market turnover and is key in funding an
array of financial transactions, including serving as an invoicing currency to facilitate

201 Szalay, Eva, Central Banks Take Rare Step of Flagging Currency Sales in Advance, Financial Times, February 3,
2021. https://www.ft.com/content/0383f3a4-41a0-464a-b831-fd1a09a6b1b0.

202 Foreign Exchange Turnover in April 2019, Bank for International Settlements, September 16, 2019.
https://www.bis.org/statistics/rpfx19_fx.htm.
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international trade, as indicated in Figure 13. It also accounts for about 60% of central bank
foreign exchange holdings, half of non-U.S. banks foreign currency deposits, and two-thirds of
non-U.S. corporate borrowings from banks and the corporate bond market.203 In comparison, the
United States accounts for about one-fourth of global GDP and about one-fifth of global trade
(exports plus imports).
Figure 13. International Role of the Dollar

Source: U.S. Dollar Funding: An International Perspective, CGFS Papers No. 65, Bank for International Settlements,
June 2020. Created by CRS.
Notes: (1) Data refer to 2019. (2) Data refer to 2019. (3) US dol ar-denominated cross-border loans by banks
to counterparties in all countries; data refer to Q4 2019 (excluding interoffice claims but including interbank
claims on account of loans and deposits); loans comprise nonnegotiable debt instruments that are loaned by
creditors directly to a debtor or represented by evidence of a deposit. (4) US dol ar denominated international
debt securities by all issuers; data refer to Q4 2019; these securities are issued outside the local market of the
country where the borrower resides, and capture issues conventionally known as eurobonds and foreign bonds
and exclude negotiable loans; instruments such as bonds, medium-term notes and money market instruments are
included. (5) Data refer to 2019. (6) Data refer to Q4 2019. (7) As estimated in Gopinath (2015). (8) Data refer
to February 2020. Sources: Gopinath (2015); Federal Reserve; IMF; CPB World Trade Monitor; Bloomberg;
SWIFT; BIS Triennial Central Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange and Over-the-counter (OTC) Derivatives
Markets; BIS locational banking statistics (LBS).
As a result of dominant role of the dollar as a global reserve currency, disruptions in the smooth
functioning of the global dollar market can have wide-ranging repercussions on international
trade and financial transactions. A June 2020 report by BIS stresses the central role of the dollar
in the global economy. The report concludes that dollar funding activities are highly complex,
geographically dispersed, and interconnected in ways that provide benefits to the stability of the
global financial system. This also means, however, that strains in the system can easily be
transmitted across different financial markets and across regions.204
In addition, the dominant role of the dollar in international trade pricing and trade financing
means the dollar plays a key role in the global economic recovery and that it could amplify the
impact of the pandemic, according to the IMF.205 Traditionally, most economic models are based

203 See CRS In Focus IF10112, Introduction to Financial Services: The International Foreign Exchange Market.
204 Bank for International Settlements, U.S, Dollar Funding: An International Perspective, CGFS Papers, No. 65, June
2020, p. 52. https://www.bis.org/publ/cgfs65.htm.
205 Dominant Currencies and External Adjustment, IMF Staff Discussion Note 20/05, International Monetary Fund,
July 2020.
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on the assumption that countries set their prices in their home currencies. As a result,
domestically produced goods and services become cheaper for trading partners when the
domestic currency weakens, leading to increased demand from trading partners and more exports.
However, much international trade, including many commodities, is priced in dollars, which
means that trade volumes respond less than they would if goods were priced in exporters’ home
currencies. Limited evidence indicates that a significant share of bilateral trade between countries
other than the United States is invoiced in U.S. dollars.206 As a result, an appreciation of the dollar
against other currencies, or a weakening in other currencies, has a muted effect on exports by
other countries, at least in the short run, as has been evident in recent movements in exchange
rates and trade volumes of emerging market and developing economies. The IMF also concluded
that because countries other than the United States price much of their trade in dollars, an
appreciation in the value of the dollar, or a depreciation in the value of other currencies relative to
the dollar, reduces both exports and imports. As a result, a depreciation in other currencies
relative to the dollar provides less of a boost in their exports and, therefore, less of a
countercyclical support.
Together, these effects translate into movements in the exchange value of the dollar that at times
contrasts with traditional theory, since such movements do not affect trade volumes as might be
expected. For instance, after appreciating in March 2020, the trade-weighted value of the dollar
steadily depreciated through December. In standard models, the depreciation in the dollar would
be expected to lower export prices and, in turn, increase demand for U.S. exports, or increase the
volume of exports, while import volumes would be expected to decline along with the rising price
of foreign currencies relative to the dollar. GDP data through the third quarter indicate, however,
that U.S. trade dropped sharply in real, or index terms, in both the quantity of goods exported or
imported and in the value of those goods, as indicated in Figure 14.
Figure 14. Quarterly Price and Quantity Indexes, U.S. Goods Exports and Imports

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis. Created by CRS.
Notes: 2012 = 100.
BEA data show the sharp drop in U.S. trade volumes for both exports and imports in the first and
second quarters of 2020 compared with the previous quarters, largely reflecting the global
economic recession due to policy actions to contain the spread of the viral pandemic, as indicated
in Table 10. In quantity terms, U.S. export and import volumes fell by 24% and 16%,

206 Ibid, p. 8.
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respectively, in the second quarter, compared with the preceding quarter.207 In value terms, the
price of U.S. exports fell by 6.5%, while the price of imports fell by 3.8% in the second quarter
compared with the first quarter. In the third quarter, both export and import volumes increased by
about 20% in volume terms, while export and import prices rose by 3.7% and 2.3%, respectively,
despite a depreciation in the dollar. In the fourth quarter, U.S. export and import prices increased
slightly, while export and import volumes both increased by 7.0%. As a result, the overall value
of exports and imports rose slightly less than 5% in the fourth quarter of 2020. According to U.S.
balance of payments data, the overall annual value of U.S, goods exports and imports (the
combined changes in prices and volumes) dropped by 35% and 16%, respectively year-over-year
(2020 compared to 2019).
In the first quarter of 2021, U.S. export volumes fell slightly, while import volumes rose by1.4%.
Export and import price indexes both rose, reflecting an increase in petroleum export prices of
30% and a rise in petroleum import prices of 38%. Compared to the decline in exports and import
volumes in the second quarter of 2020, first quarter 2021 export and import volumes were up
28% and 31%, respectively, reflecting an increase in the global rate of economic growth.
Table 12. U.S. Exports and Imports, Change in Quarterly Price and Quantity Indexes
(percent change)

Year over Year % Change
Quarter over Quarter % Change

2019
2020
2020
2021

1q
2q
3q
4q
1q
Exports
Quantity
-0.1%
-3.6%
-0.7%
-24.1%
19.5%
7.0%
-0.2%
Price
-2.2
-2.6
-1.2
-6.5
3.7
1.7
6.0
Imports
Quantity
-2.9
5.3
-3.0
-15.7
20.4
7.0
1.4
Price
-2.5
-1.5
0.4
-3.8
2.3
0.5
3.6
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis. Quarterly GDP estimates, export and imports price and quantity indices.
Created by CRS.
Notes: Annual changes represent percent change in 4th quarter index values over the 4th quarter of the
preceding year; quarterly changes represent the change in quarterly index values over the previous quarter.
The international role of the dollar and the well-developed U.S. capital markets also provide the
United States with greater latitude in financing its trade deficit. For some trade specialists, the
widely accepted characterization of the current account as a product of a domestic saving-
investment relationship fails to distinguish between a country’s domestic saving-investment
balance, its ability to finance its trade deficit, and the role of cross-border capital flows. These
flows suggest that the ability of the United States to finance its trade imbalances through capital
inflows eases the constraint imposed by the domestic saving-investment balance.
The international role of the dollar also increases pressure on the Federal Reserve essentially to
assume the lead role as the global lender of last resort. Reminiscent of the financial crisis, the
global economy has experienced a period of dollar shortage, requiring the Federal Reserve to take
numerous steps to ensure the supply of dollars to the U.S. and global economies, including

207 Gross Domestic Product, First Quarter, 2021 (Advance Estimate), Bureau of Economic Analysis, April 29, 2021.
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activating existing currency swap arrangements, establishing such arrangements with additional
central banks, and creating new financial facilities to provide liquidity to central banks and
monetary authorities.208 Typically, banks lend long-term and borrow short-term and can only
borrow from their home central bank. In turn, central banks can only provide liquidity in their
own currency. Consequently, a bank can become illiquid in a panic, meaning it cannot borrow in
private markets to meet short-term cash flow needs. Swap lines are designed to allow foreign
central banks the funds necessary to provide needed liquidity to their country’s banks in dollars.
Global Energy Markets
By the close of trading on March 20, the DJIA index had fallen by 17% from March 13. At the
same time, the dollar gained in value against other major currencies, but generally trended lower
since May and the price of Brent crude oil dropped close to $20 per barrel on March 20, as
indicated in Figure 15. As a result of the steep drop in oil prices, oil producers agreed in April to
reduce global supply by 10%, or 9.6 million barrels per day. Since the low prices recorded in
April, the price of Brent crude oil generally moved within a range of $40 to $44 per barrel
through late November, when it began edging above $50 per barrel. In trading December 10, the
price of Brent crude oil breached the $50 per barrel mark for the first time since March 2020. As
energy demand showed some signs of recovering, the cuts in oil production that began in April
were trimmed to 7.7 million barrels per day and were expected to be trimmed by an additional 2
million barrels per day in January 2021. On February 23, 2021, the price of Brent crude oil rose
above $67 per barrel, the highest price since January 9, 2020. By March 3, 2021, the price of
Brent crude oil had dropped to $64 per barrel. On March 5, 2021, the Brent crude price of a barrel
of oil rose to $69 per barrel, the highest since January 2020, as OPEC and Russia decided against
increasing petroleum output.209
On December 3, OPEC and Russia agreed to increase oil production by 500,000 barrels per day
starting in January 2021, despite concerns over continued weak global demand.210 According to
the International Energy Agency (IEA), expectations about a COVID-19 vaccine tended to boost
markets prices in November and December, although oil market fundamentals—primarily weak
demand in Developed economies, slightly stronger demand in developing economies, and
production increases in Libya, Iraq, and the United States—raised questions about the viability of
oil price increases.211 The IEA also attributed the rise in oil prices since late spring to increased
demand in China and India as those economies regained strength.

208 Politi, James, Brendan Greeley, and Colby Smith, “Fed Sets Up Scheme to Meet Booming Foreign Demand for
Dollars,” Financial Times, March 31, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/6c976586-a6ea-42ec-a369-9353186c05bb.
209 Raval, Anjli, Oil Jumps as OPEC and Allies Decide Against Big Rise in Output, Financial Times, March 5, 2021.
https://www.ft.com/content/771ebf3a-cff0-4ff3-ab9a-0bbd01a33f55.
210 Raval, Anjli, OPEC and Russia Agree to Raise Oil Supply From January, Financial Times, December 3, 2020.
https://www.ft.com/content/18279043-f2ef-40a8-b65d-b68ea0bf21ba.
211 Oil Market Report June 2020, International Energy Agency, June 2020. https://www.iea.org/reports/oil-market-
report-november-2020.
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Figure 15. Brent Crude Oil Price Per Barrel in Dollars
January 9, 2020, through June 8, 2021

Source: Markets Insider. Created by CRS.

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Comparing the Current Crisis and the 2008 Crisis
Sharp declines in the stock market and broader financial sector turbulence; interest rate cuts and large-scale
Federal Reserve intervention; and discussions of massive government stimulus packages have led some observers
to compare the current market reaction to that experienced a little over a decade ago. There are similarities and
important differences between the current economic crisis and the global financial crisis of 2008/2009. Foremost,
the earlier crisis was rooted in structural weakness in the U.S. financial sector. Fol owing the col apse of the U.S.
housing bubble, it became impossible for firms to identify demand and hold inventories across many sectors
(construction, retail, etc.). This led to massive oversupply and sharp retail losses which extended to other sectors
of the U.S. economy and eventual y the global economy. Moreover, financial markets across countries were linked
together by credit default swaps. As the crisis unfolded, large numbers of banks and other financial institutions
were negatively affected, raising questions about capital sufficiency and reserves. The crisis then quickly engulfed
credit-rating agencies, mortgage lending companies, and the real estate industry broadly. Market resolution came
gradually with a range of monetary and fiscal policy measures that were closely coordinated at the global level.
These were focused on putting a floor under the falling markets, stabilizing banks, and shoring up investor
confidence to get spending started again. Starting in September 2007, the Federal Reserve cut interest rates from
over 5% in September 2007 to between 0 and 0.25% before the end of the 2008. Once interest rates approached
zero, the Fed turned to other so-called “unconventional measures,” including targeted assistance to financial
institutions, encouraging Congress to pass the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) to prevent the col apse of
the financial sector and boost consumer spending. Other measures included swap arrangements between the
Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank and smaller central banks, and so-called “quantitative easing” to
boost the money supply. On a global level, the United States and other countries tripled the resources of the IMF
(from $250 bil ion to $750 bil ion) and coordinated domestic stimulus efforts.
Unlike the 2008 crisis, the current crisis began as a supply shock. As the global economy has become more
interdependent in recent decades, most products are produced as part of a global value chain (GVC), where an
item such as a car or mobile device consists of parts manufactured all over the world, and involving multiple
border crossings before final assembly. The earliest implications of the current crisis came in January as plant
closures in China and other parts of Asia led to interruptions in the supply chain and concerns about dwindling
inventories. As the virus spread from Asia to Europe, the crisis switched from supply concerns to a broader
demand crisis as the measures being introduced to contain the spread of the virus (social distancing, travel
restrictions, cancelling sporting events, closing shops and restaurants, and mandatory quarantine measures)
prevent most forms of economic activity from occurring. Thus, unlike the 2008 crisis response, which involved
liquidity and solvency-related policy measures to get people spending again, the current crisis did not start as a
financial crisis, but could evolve into one if a recovery in economic activity is delayed. While larger firms may have
sufficient capital to wait out a crisis, many aspects of the economy (such as restaurants or retail operations)
operate on very tight margins and would likely not be able to pay employees after closures lasting more than a few
days. Many people wil also need to balance child care and work during quarantine or social distancing measures.
During this type of crisis, while monetary policy measures play a part—and the Federal Reserve has once again cut
rates to near zero—they cannot compensate for the physical interaction that the global economy is dependent
upon. As a result, fiscal stimulus wil likely play a relatively larger role in this crisis in order to prevent personal and
corporate bankruptcies during the peak crisis period. Efforts to coordinate U.S. and foreign economic policy
measures wil also have an important role in mitigating the scale and length of any global economic downtown.
Source: Prepared by Martin A. Weiss, CRS.
Policy Responses
In response to growing concerns over the global economic impact of the pandemic, G-7 finance
ministers and central bankers released a statement on March 3, 2020, indicating they would “use
all appropriate policy tools” to sustain economic growth.212 The Finance Ministers also pledged
fiscal support to ensure health systems can sustain efforts to fight the outbreak.213 In most cases,

212 Statement of G-7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, March 3, 2020. https://home.treasury.gov/news/
press-releases/sm927. Long, Heather, “G-7 Leaders Promise to Help Economy as COVID-19 Spreads, But They Don’t
Announce Any New Action,” Washington Post, March 3, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/03/
03/economy-COVID-19-rate-cuts/.
213 Giles et al., “Finance Ministers Ready to Take Action.”
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however, countries pursued their own divergent strategies, in some cases including banning
exports of medical equipment. Following the G-7 statement, the U.S. Federal Reserve (Fed)
lowered its federal funds rate by 50 basis points, or 0.5%, to a range of 1.0% to 1.25% due to
concerns about the “evolving risks to economic activity of the COVID-19.”214 At the time, the cut
was the largest one-time reduction in the interest rate by the Fed since the 2008-2009 global
financial crisis.
After a delayed response, other central banks followed the actions of the G-7 countries. Most
central banks lowered interest rates and acted to increase liquidity in their financial systems
through a combination of measures, including lowering capital buffers and reserve requirements,
creating temporary lending facilities for banks and businesses, and easing loan terms. In addition,
national governments adopted various fiscal measures to sustain economic activity. In general,
these measures included making payments directly to households, temporarily deferring tax
payments, extending unemployment insurance, and increasing guarantees and loans to businesses.
See Appendix B to this report for detailed information about the policy actions by individual
governments.215
The United States
Recognizing the growing impact the pandemic was having on financial markets and economic
growth, the Federal Reserve (Fed) took a number of steps to promote economic and financial
stability involving the Fed’s monetary policy and “lender of last resort” roles. Some of these
actions were intended to stimulate economic activity by reducing interest rates; other actions were
intended to provide liquidity to financial markets so firms would have access to needed funding.
In announcing its decisions, the Fed indicated that “[t]he COVID-19 outbreak has harmed
communities and disrupted economic activity in many countries, including the United States.
Global financial conditions have also been significantly affected.216” On March 31, 2020, the
Trump Administration announced that it was suspending for 90 days tariffs it had placed on
imports of apparel and light trucks from China, but not on other consumer goods and metals.217 In
October, Congress and the Trump Administration negotiated over the substance of an additional
spending package to support the U.S. economy.
On April 29, 2021, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) released updated data on U.S. GDP
growth for the first quarter of 2021 and updated data for 2020 that indicates the economy grew by
6.4% in the first quarter of 2020, outpacing the 4th quarter 2020 rate of 4.3%. In contrast, U.S.
GDP fell at an annual rate of 31.4% in the second quarter, after falling by 5.0% at an annual rate
in the first quarter, as indicated in Figure 16.218 On an annual basis, the 2020 rate of growth fell
by 3.5%, compared with a 2019 rate of 2.9%. In the second quarter, amidst a large decline overall
in U.S. economic activity in response to business lockdowns, some sectors experienced a decline
in activity of 80% or more, including recreation, food services and accommodation and
transportation sectors. In the third quarter, however, all sectors except mining experienced

214 Federal Reserve Releases FOMC Statement, March 3, 2020, https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
pressreleases/monetary20200303a.htm.
215 Stage Three Proposal, U.S. Department of the Treasury, March 17, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/context/
department-of-treasury-proposal-for-COVID-19-response/6c2d2ed5-a18b-43d2-8124-28d394fa51ff/?itid=
lk_inline_manual_3.
216 Federal Reserve Issues FOMC Statement, March 15, 2020. https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
pressreleases/monetary20200315a.htm.
217 Politi, James and Aime Williams, “Trump to Suspend Some Tariffs for 90 Days,” Financial Times, March 31, 2020.
https://www.ft.com/content/46add447-2048-4348-bd34-2088ad0e3bc8.
218 Gross Domestic Product, First Quarter 2021 (Advance Estimate), Bureau of Economic Analysis, April 29, 2021.
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positive rate of growth. Personal consumption increased by 41% in the third quarter, after falling
by 31.4% in the second quarter.
Figure 16. U.S. GDP, Percentage Change From Preceding Quarter
Seasonally adjusted at annual rate

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis. Created by CRS.
Notes: Exports and imports represent the combination of goods and services.
On June 8, 2021, the U.S. Census Bureau reported a decrease in the overall U.S. goods and
services trade deficit in April 2021, compared with March 2021, of $6 billion to reach a monthly
total of $68.9 billion. The decrease in the monthly deficit in goods and services primarily
reflected a 1.0% increase in goods exports and a 2.0% decrease in goods imports relative to the
previous month’s totals. Nominal values for services trade rose in small percentage terms for
exports and imports, as indicated in Figure 17.219 According to BEA data, goods exports
increased from $143.7 billion in March 2021 to $145.3 billion in April 2021 and goods imports
fell from $236.5 billion to $232.0 billion. On a year-over-basis, the overall goods and services
trade deficit in 2020 increased by $105 billion, or 18.2%, compared with 2019 and demonstrates

219 Monthly U.S. International Trade in Goods and Services, April 2021, Census Bureau, June 8, 2021.
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the impact that business lockdowns had on U.S. and global trade in the first quarter of 2020.
Relative to 2019, U.S. goods exports in 2020 fell by 13.2%, while goods imports fell by 6.6%,
accounting for the largest part of the increase in the annual U.S. trade balance. Services exports
declined by 21% in 2020 relative to 2019, while services imports fell by 22%, reflecting the drop
overall in services activities as a result of quarantines and business lockdowns.
Figure 17. Monthly U.S. Exports and Imports of Goods and Services 2020-2021

Source: Census Bureau, Bureau of Economic Analysis. Created by CRS.
On May 7, 2021, the BLS released data on the employment situation in April, which indicated
that nonfarm payroll rose by 266,000, down from the 770,000 jobs gained in March and kept the
rate of unemployment at 6.1%.220 The data also indicate that 9.4 million persons reported in April
they did not work at all or worked fewer hours at some point in the previous 4 weeks because
their employer closed or lost business due to the pandemic.
As indicated in Figure 18, with the exception of December, the U.S. economy experienced
monthly gains in jobs since the loss of more than 20 million jobs in April, 2020. In general, the
monthly gains in jobs has varied and by March 2021 had not equaled the number of jobs lost. The
number of unemployed workers was 9.7 million in March 2021, down from the previous month’s
total of 10.0 million. Over the eleven–month period from May 2020 through March 2021, job
gains were notable in the leisure and hospitality industry (particularly in food services and
drinking establishments), retail trade, public-sector education and health services, health care and
social assistance, professional and business services, and other services, while employment in
government (mostly state and local governments) fell.

220 The Employment Situation-April 2021, Bureau of Labor Statistics, May 7, 2021. https://www.bls.gov/. The
unemployment number does not include 5.2 million workers who were working part time not by choice and 6.6 million
individuals seeking employment. In addition, BLS indicated that some workers had been misclassified as employed,
but should have been classified as unemployed, which would have raised the rate of unemployment by 0.4 percentage
points.
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Figure 18. Change in Total Monthly U.S. Nonfarm Employment

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics. Created by CRS.
In the first stages of the pandemic, the Department of Labor reported on May 8, 2020, that the
U.S. nonfarm unemployment rate in April, 2020, increased by 20 million, which raised the total
number of unemployed Americans 23 million, or an unemployment rate of 14% of a total civilian
labor force of about 160 million. The unemployment rate did not include approximately 10
million workers who were involuntarily working part-time and another 9 million individuals who
were seeking employment. As indicated in Figure 19, the number of unemployed individuals
increased the most in the leisure and hospitality sector, reflecting national quarantining policies to
reduce the spread of COVID-19 through social contact. The employment losses were widely
spread across the economy, affecting every nonfarm sector and all labor groups. Between March
and Aril 2020, the number of U.S. non-farm civilian workers dropped from 150 million to 130
million. By May 2021, however, the non-farm civilian labor force had increased by 15 million to
reach 145 million.
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Figure 19. Change in U.S. Employment by Major Industrial Sector

Source: The Employment Situation, Bureau of Labor Statistics, various months 2020 and 2021. Created by CRS.
In a speech on May 13, 2020, Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell reported that Federal
Reserve analyses indicated that of individuals working in February, 2020, “almost 40 percent of
those in households making less than $40,000 a year had lost a job in March.”221 Chairman
Powell also indicated that given the extraordinary nature of the current economic downturn the
Fed would, “continue to use our tools to their fullest until the crisis has passed and the economic
recovery is well under way.”
In characterizing the monetary and fiscal response to the economic downturn, Chairman Powell
said in a speech on October 6, the monetary response included, “the full range of tools at our
disposal,” including cutting key interest rates, “unprecedented” asset purchases, establishing
emergency lending facilities to support households, businesses and state and local governments,
and implementing targeted and temporary measures for banks to support their customers.222 In
addition, the fiscal response accomplished three objectives, it provided support to households,
businesses through the Paycheck Protection Program, and financial markets. Chairman Powell
concluded his remarks arguing the necessity of continued fiscal support for the economy:
The expansion is still far from complete. At this early stage, I would argue that the risks of
policy intervention are still asymmetric. Too little support would lead to a weak recovery,
creating unnecessary hardship for households and businesses. Over time, household

221 Current Economic Issues; Speech at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, Jerome H. Powell, May 13,
2020.
222 Recent Economic Developments and the Challenges Ahead, Jerome H Powell, Remarks at the National Association
for Business Economists, October 6, 2020.
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insolvencies and business bankruptcies would rise, harming the productive capacity of the
economy, and holding back wage growth. By contrast, the risks of overdoing it seem, for
now, to be smaller. Even if policy actions ultimately prove to be greater than needed, they
will not go to waste.223
Monetary Policy224
Forward Guidance
Forward guidance
refers to Fed public communications on its future plans for short-term interest
rates, and it took many forms following the 2008 financial crisis. As monetary policy returned to
normal in recent years, forward guidance was phased out. It is being used again today. For
example, when the Fed reduced short-term rates to zero on March 15, it announced that it
“expects to maintain this target range until it is confident that the economy has weathered recent
events and is on track to achieve its maximum employment and price stability goals.”
Quantitative Easing
Large-scale asset purchases, popularly referred to as quantitative easing or QE, were also used
during the financial crisis. Under QE, the Fed expanded its balance sheet by purchasing
securities. Three rounds of QE from 2009 to 2014 increased the Fed’s securities holdings by $3.7
trillion.
On March 23, the Fed announced that it would increase its purchases of Treasury securities and
mortgage-backed securities (MBS)—including commercial MBS—issued by government
agencies or government-sponsored enterprises to “the amounts needed to support smooth market
functioning and effective transmission of monetary policy.... ” These would be undertaken at the
unprecedented rate of up to $125 billion daily during the week of March 23. As a result, the value
of the Fed’s balance sheet is projected to exceed its post-financial crisis peak of $4.5 trillion. One
notable difference from previous rounds of QE is that the Fed is purchasing securities of different
maturities, so the effect likely will not be concentrated on long-term rates.
Actions to Provide Liquidity
Reserve Requirements
On March 15, the Fed announced that it was reducing reserve requirements—the amount of vault
cash or deposits at the Fed that banks must hold against deposits—to zero for the first time ever.
As the Fed noted in its announcement, because bank reserves are currently so abundant, reserve
requirements “do not play a significant role” in monetary policy.
Term Repos
The Fed can temporarily provide liquidity to financial markets by lending cash through
repurchase agreements (repos) with primary dealers (i.e., large government securities dealers who
are market makers). Before the financial crisis, this was the Fed’s routine method for targeting the
federal funds rate. Following the financial crisis, the Fed’s large balance sheet meant that repos
were no longer needed, until they were revived in September 2019. On March 12, the Fed

223 Ibid., p. 7.
224 This section was prepared by Marc Labonte, Specialist in Macroeconomic Policy, Government and Finance
Division, CRS. CRS Insight IN11259, Federal Reserve: Recent Actions in Response to COVID-19, by Marc Labonte.
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announced it would offer a three-month repo of $500 billion and a one-month repo of $500
billion on a weekly basis through the end of the month in addition to the shorter-term repos it had
already been offering. These repos would be larger and longer than those offered since
September. On March 31, the Fed announced the Foreign and International Monetary Authorities
(FIMA) Repo Facility, which works like the foreign repo pool in reverse. This facility allows
foreign central banks to convert their U.S. Treasury holdings into U.S. dollars on an overnight
basis. The Fed will charge a (typically) above market interest rate of 0.25 percentage points above
the interest rate paid on bank reserves. The facility is intended to work in tandem with currency
swap lines to provide additional dollars to meet global demand and is available to a broader group
of central banks than the swap lines.
Discount Window
In its March 15 announcement, the Fed encouraged banks (insured depository institutions) to
borrow from the Fed’s discount window to meet their liquidity needs. This is the Fed’s traditional
tool in its “lender of last resort” function. The Fed also encouraged banks to use intraday credit
available through the Fed’s payment systems as a source of liquidity.
Foreign Central Bank Swap Lines
Both domestic and foreign commercial banks rely on short-term borrowing markets to access
U.S. dollars needed to fund their operations and meet their cash flow needs. But in an
environment of strained liquidity, only banks operating in the United States can access the
discount window. Therefore, the Fed has standing “swap lines” with major foreign central banks
to provide central banks with U.S. dollar funding that they can in turn lend to private banks in
their jurisdictions. On March 15, the Fed reduced the cost of using those swap lines and on March
19 it extended swap lines to nine more central banks. On March 31, 2020, the Fed set up a new
temporary facility to work in tandem with the swap lines to provide additional dollars to meet
global demand. The new facility allows central banks and international monetary authorities to
exchange their U.S. Treasury securities held with the Federal Reserve for U.S. dollars, which can
then be made available to institutions in their jurisdictions.225
Emergency Credit Facilities for the Nonbank Financial System
In 2008, the Fed created a series of emergency credit facilities to support liquidity in the nonbank
financial system. This extended the Fed’s traditional role as lender of last resort from the banking
system to the overall financial system for the first time since the Great Depression. To create
these facilities, the Fed relied on its emergency lending authority (Section 13(3) of the Federal
Reserve Act). To date, the Fed has created six facilities—some new, and some reviving 2008
facilities—in response to COVID-19.
 On March 17, the Fed revived the commercial paper funding facility to purchase
commercial paper, which is an important source of short-term funding for
financial firms, nonfinancial firms, and asset-backed securities (ABS).
 Like banks, primary dealers are heavily reliant on short-term lending markets in
their role as securities market makers. Unlike banks, they cannot access the
discount window. On March 17, the Fed revived the primary dealer credit facility,

225 For additional information about swap lines, see CRS In Focus IF11489, Federal Executive Agencies: Selected Pay
Flexibilities for COVID-19 Response
, by Barbara L. Schwemle.
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which is akin to a discount window for primary dealers. Like the discount
window, it provides short-term, fully collateralized loans to primary dealers.
 On March 19, the Fed created the Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility
(MMLF), similar to a facility created during the 2008 financial crisis. The
MMLF makes loans to financial institutions to purchase assets that money
market funds are selling to meet redemptions.
 On March 23, the Fed created two facilities to support corporate bond markets—
the Primary Market Corporate Credit Facility to purchase newly issued corporate
debt and the Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facility to purchase existing
corporate debt on secondary markets.
 On March 23, the Fed revived the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility to
make nonrecourse loans to private investors to purchase ABS backed by various
nonmortgage consumer loans.
 On April 6, the Fed announced the Payroll Protection Program Lending Facility
(PPPLF) to provide credit to depository institutions (e.g., banks) making loans
under the CARES Act (H.R. 748/P.L. 116-136) Payroll Protection Program.
Because banks are not required to hold capital against these loans, this facility
increases lending capacity for banks facing high demand to originate these loans.
The PPP provides low-cost loans to small businesses to pay employees. These
loans do not pose credit risk to the Fed because they are guaranteed by the Small
Business Administration.
 On April 9, the Fed announced the Main Street Lending Program (MSLP), which
purchases loans from depository institutions to businesses with up to 10,000
employees or up to $2.5 billion in revenues. The loans to businesses would defer
principal and interest repayment for one year, and the businesses would have to
make a “reasonable effort” to retain employees.
 On April 9, the Fed announced the Municipal Liquidity Facility (MLF) to
purchase state and municipal debt in response to higher yields and reduced
liquidity in that market. The facility will only purchase debt of larger counties
and cities.
Many of these facilities are structured as special purpose vehicles controlled by the Fed because
of restrictions on the types of securities that the Fed can purchase. Although there were no losses
from these facilities during the financial crisis, assets of the Treasury’s Exchange Stabilization
Fund have been pledged to backstop any losses on several of the facilities today.
Fiscal Policy
In terms of a fiscal stimulus, Congress adopted H.R. 6074 on March 5, 2020 (P.L. 116-123), to
appropriate $8.3 billion in emergency funding to support efforts to fight COVID-19; President
Trump signed the measure on March 6, 2020. President Trump also signed on March 18, H.R.
6201 (P.L. 116-127), the Families First COVID-19 Response Act, that provides paid sick leave
and free COVID-19 testing, expands food assistance and unemployment benefits, and requires
employers to provide additional protections for health care workers. Other countries have
indicated they will also provide assistance to workers and to some businesses. Congress also
considered other possible measures, including contingency plans for agencies to implement
offsite telework for employees, financial assistance to the shale oil industry, a reduction in the
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payroll tax,226 and extended of the tax filing deadline.227 President Trump took additional actions,
including
 Announcing on March 11, 2020, restrictions on all travel from Europe to the
United States for 30 days, directing the Small Business Administration (SBA) to
offer low-interest loans to small businesses, and directing the Treasury
Department to defer tax payments penalty-free for affected businesses.228
 Declaring on March 13, a state of emergency that freed up disaster relief funding
to assist state and local governments to address the effects of the pandemic. The
President also announced additional testing for the virus, a website to help
individuals identify symptoms, increased oil purchases for the Strategic Oil
Reserve, and a waiver on interest payments on student loans.229
 Invoking on March 18, 2020, the Defense Production Act (DPA) that gave him
the authority to require some U.S. businesses to increase production of medical
equipment and supplies that were in short supply.230
On March 25, 2020, the Senate adopted the COVID-19 Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act
(S. 3548) to formally implement President Trump’s proposal by providing direct payments to
taxpayers, loans and guarantees to airlines and other industries, and assistance for small
businesses, actions similar to those of various foreign governments. The House adopted the
measure as H.R. 748 on March 27, and President Trump signed the measure (P.L. 116-136) on
March 27. The law
 Provided funding for $1,200 tax rebates to individuals, with additional $500
payments per qualifying child. The rebate begins phasing out when incomes
exceed $75,000 (or $150,000 for joint filers).
 Assisted small businesses by providing funding forgivable bridge loans; and
additional funding for grants and technical assistance; authorized emergency
loans to distressed businesses, including air carriers; and suspended certain
aviation excise taxes.
 Created a $367 billion loan program for small businesses, established a $500
billion lending fund for industries, cities and states, $150 billion for state and
local stimulus funds, and $130 billion for hospitals.

226 Armus, Theo, “Federal, State Officials Attempt to Fight Virus Through Social Distancing, Stimulus Package,”
Washington Post, March 11, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/03/11/Covid-19-live-updates/.
227 Sevastopulo, Demetri, “US Treasury Considers Tax Filing Extension to Ease Virus Impact,” Financial Times,
March 11, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/c65a6e40-639f-11ea-b3f3-fe4680ea68b5.
228 McAuley, James, and Michael Birnbaum, “Europe Blindsided by Trump’s Travel Restrictions, with Many Seeing
Political Motive,” Washington Post, March 12, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/europe-
blindsided-by-trumps-travel-restrictions-with-many-seeing-political-motive/2020/03/12/42a279d0-6412-11ea-8a8e-
5c5336b32760_story.html.
229 Fritz, Angela and Meryl Kornfield, “President Trump Declares a National Emergency, Freeing $50 Billion in
Funding,” Washington Post, March 13, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/03/13/Covid-19-latest-
news/.
230 Hellmann, Jessie, “Trump Invokes Defense Production Act as Covid-19 Response,” The Hill, March 18, 2020.
https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/488226-trump-invokes-defense-production-act-as-Covid-19-response.
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 Increased unemployment insurance benefits, expanded eligibility and offered
workers an additional $600 a week for four month, in addition to state
unemployment programs.231
 Established special rules for certain tax-favored withdrawals from retirement
plans; delayed due dates for employer payroll taxes and estimated tax payments
for corporations; and revised other provisions, including those related to losses,
charitable deductions, and business interest.
 Provided additional funding for the prevention, diagnosis, and treatment of
COVID-19; limited liability for volunteer health care professionals; prioritized
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) review of certain drugs; allowed
emergency use of certain diagnostic tests that had not been approved by the FDA;
expanded health-insurance coverage for diagnostic testing and required coverage
for preventative services and vaccines; and revised other provisions, including
those regarding the medical supply chain, the national stockpile, the health care
workforce, the Healthy Start program, telehealth services, nutrition services,
Medicare, and Medicaid.
 Temporarily suspended payments for federal student loans and revised provisions
related to campus-based aid, supplemental educational-opportunity grants,
federal work-study, subsidized loans, Pell grants, and foreign institutions.
 Authorized the Department of the Treasury temporarily to guarantee money-
market funds.
On April 23, 2020, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 266 (P.L. 116-139), the Paycheck
Protection Program and Health Care Enhancement Act, following similar actions by the Senate
the previous day. The measure provided $484 billion for small business loans, health care
providers, and COVID-19 testing. In particular, the law
 Provided additional lending authority for certain Small Business Administration
(SBA) programs in response to COVID-19, increased the authority for: (1) the
Paycheck Protection Program, under which the SBA may guarantee certain loans
to small businesses during the COVID-19 pandemic; and (2) advanced on
emergency economic injury disaster loans made in response to COVID-19. The
provision also expanded eligibility for disaster loans and advances to include
agricultural enterprises.
 Provided $100 billion in FY2020 supplemental appropriations to HHS for the
Public Health and Social Services Emergency Fund, including $75 billion to
reimburse health care providers for health care related expenses or lost revenues
that were attributable to the coronavirus outbreak; and $25 billion for expenses to
research, develop, validate, manufacture, purchase, administer, and expand
capacity for COVID-19 tests to effectively monitor and suppress COVID-19.
 Allocated specified portions of the $25 billion for COVID-19 testing to states,
localities, territories, and tribes; the Centers for Diseases Control and Prevention;
the National Institutes of Health; the Biomedical Advanced Research and
Development Authority; the Food and Drug Administration; community health
centers; rural health clinics; and testing for the uninsured.

231 For additional information about unemployment and sick leave provisions, see CRS Insight IN11249, H.R. 6201:
Paid Leave and Unemployment Insurance Responses to COVID-19
, by Sarah A. Donovan, Katelin P. Isaacs, and Julie
M. Whittaker, and CRS In Focus IF11487, The Families First Coronavirus Response Act Leave Provisions, by Sarah
A. Donovan and Jon O. Shimabukuro.
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On May 12, House Democrats introduced H.R. 6800, the Heroes Act, to provide a $3 trillion
supplemental spending bill for additional financial resources to state and local governments. The
measure passed the House on May 15 and was sent to the Senate for consideration. Among other
provisions, the bill would have:
 Appropriated $200 billion in hazard pay to essential workers.
 Extended additional payments to individuals, for nutrition and housing
assistance, and provide funding for additional testing and contact tracing.
 Restored the tax deduction for state and local taxes.
 Provided FY2020 emergency supplemental appropriations to federal agencies.
 Provided payments and other assistance to state, local, tribal, and territorial
governments.
 Provided additional direct payments of up to $1,200 per individual.
 Expanded paid sick days, family and medical leave, unemployment
compensation, nutrition and food assistance programs, housing assistance, and
payments to farmers.
 Modified and expanded the Paycheck Protection Program, which provides loans
and grants to small businesses and nonprofit organizations.
 Expanded several tax credits and deductions.
 Provided funding and establish requirements for COVID-19 testing and contact
tracing.
 Eliminated cost-sharing for COVID-19 treatments;
 Extended and expanded the moratorium on certain evictions and foreclosures;
and
 Required employers to develop and implement infectious disease exposure
control plans.
On December 2, the Federal Reserve released its “Beige Book”—a mostly qualitative assessment
of the U.S. economy produced 8 times a year by the 12 regional Federal Reserve banks—that
provides an assessment of economic activity across the various regions of the country. The
assessment indicated that economic activity in November had improved modestly, although was
negligible in some Districts.232
On December 27, 2020, President Trump signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021
(P.L. 116-260) that provided funding for government operations and $900 billion in additional
funding for COVID-19 related programs and a $1.4 trillion budget that comprised 12
appropriations bills. In general, the measure provided:
 $600 in stimulus checks to qualifying individuals, including adults and children.
 Extended unemployment benefits of up to $300 per week through at least March
14, 2021, and Pandemic Unemployment Assistance for qualifying individuals up
to 11 weeks.
 Financial assistance to businesses, including forgivable Paycheck Protection
Program loans, extensions of the PPP program to churches and the entertainment
industry, and grants through the Economic Injury Disaster Loans program.

232 The Beige Book: Summary of Commentary on Current Economic Conditions by Federal Reserve District, December
2, 2020, the Federal Reserve System.
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 A moratorium on rental evictions through January 31, 2021, and emergency
funding for renters.
 Funds to support vaccine production, distribution, and testing.
 Funds for schools, colleges, and child-care assistance.
 Assistance to the transportation industry through funds for busses, roads, airports,
and Amtrak and assistance to the airline workers through the Payroll Support
Program.
On March 11, 2021, President Biden signed the American Rescue Plan Act (P.L. 117-2) that
appropriated $1.9 trillion to stimulating the U.S. economy. The major features of the Act include:
 Extended expanded unemployment benefits with a $300 weekly supplement
through September 6, 2021.
 Provided $1,400 in direct payments to individuals making up to $75,000,
$112,500 for single parents, and $150,000 for couples.
 Provided emergency paid leave, expanded child tax credit up to $3,600 per child,
expanded child and dependent care credit, and earned income tax credit.
 Provided over $50 billion in grants and other payments to small businesses.
 $350 billion in assistance to state, local, and tribal governments.
 Education funding: $130 billion for schools; $40 billion to colleges and
universities.
 Nearly $50 billion in housing assistance, emergency rental assistance,
homeowner assistance, and other housing programs.
 Over $160 billion in health care-related programs, including COVID-19
vaccines, testing, contact tracing and other health-care related funding.
 $50 billion for transportation provisions, including funding for airports, airlines,
Amtrak and other commuter rail services.
 $10.4 billion for agriculture, including debt relief for farmers.
 $1.9 billion to improve cybersecurity.
 Changes to other health care provisions.
Personal Income and Outlays
Another metric for assessing the impact of the pandemic on the U.S. economy is provided
through changes in personal income, consumption, and saving. Also, given the role transfer
payments from the federal government to individuals played in supporting household income,
these transfers provided an additional measure of the impact of lockdowns on business and
consumer activity. On May 29, 2020, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) reported that U.S.
personal income rose by 12.0% in April, primarily reflecting a 100% increase in government
transfer payments to individuals from federal economic recovery programs, as indicated in
Figure 20.233 During the same period, personal consumption fell by 13% as consumers curtailed
spending. The lower level of spending combined with income transfers, a portion of which
households apparently deposited into saving accounts, raised the personal savings rate to 33.7%
in April at an annual rate, compared to an annual rate of 8.2% in February 2020.

233 Personal Income and Outlays, April 2020, Bureau of Economic Analysis, May 29, 2020.
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On May 28, 2021, BEA reported that personal income and consumption in March and April 2021
followed a pattern similar to that of the previous year, again demonstrating the role that transfer
payments played during the pandemic-related economic recession. Personal income rose by 21%
in March 2021 to reach $24.4 trillion, but then fell by 13% in April to $21 trillion. The change in
income reflected little change in wages and salaries, generally one of the major sources of
income. On the other hand, government transfer payments increased by 95% in March to reach
$8.2 trillion, while such payments fell by 41% in April to $4.8 trillion.234 Household consumption
increased by 4.7% in March, likely reflecting the increase in transfer payments, but increased by
0.5% in April. Household consumption apparently was sustained by a drop in personal saving,
which increased by 133% in March, but fell by 54% in April. The use of saving reduced the
personal saving rate from 28% in March to 15% in April.
Figure 20. U.S. Personal Income, Consumption, and Saving

Source: Personal Income and Outlays, April 2021, Bureau of Economic Analysis, May 28, 2021. Created by CRS.
GDP Output “Gap”
Another measure of the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the global economy is
represented by the difference between actual economic performance, measured by gross domestic
product (GDP), and potential output, or the maximum amount an economy can produce at full

234 Personal Income and Outlays, April 2021, Bureau of Economic Analysis, May 28, 2021.
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employment, referred to as the output gap.235 The IMF estimated that the loss in economic output
represented by the GDP output gap among major advanced economies, which as a group account
for about 60% of global GDP, would be -3.6% in 2020, or that the economies operated at a rate
that was 3.6% below their combined potential, as indicated in Table 11.236 According to the
IMF’s assessment, not only would the major advanced economies as a group operate below their
full potential through 2025, but none of the individual economies was projected to operate above
potential during the 2020-2025 forecasting period. The Euro are as a whole, and France and Italy
in particular, were projected to experience the largest output gap through 2022. At 3.2% the U.S.
output gap was among the smallest of the major advanced economies.
Table 13. IMF Forecast of Major Advanced Economy GDP Output Gap
(in percentage terms)




Projected

2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
Major Advanced
–0.5%
0.2%
0.4%
-3.6%
-2.2%
-1.0%
-0.4%
-0.2%
-0.1%
Economies
United States
–1.0
0.4
1.0
-3.2
-1.5
-0.5
-0.2
-0.1
-0.1
Euro Area
–0.4
0.2
0.1
-5.1
-3.2
-1.6
-0.6
-0.2
0.0
Germany
1.0
1.2
0.4
-3.5
-1.8
-0.7
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
France
–1.3
–0.5
0.0
-5.6
-4.0
-2.5
-1.4
-0.6
0.0
Italy
–1.2
–0.7
–0.7
-5.4
-5.4
-2.6
-0.9
-0.6
-0.5
Japan
–0.3
–0.8
–0.7
-3.0
-2.1
-1.0
-0.4
0.0
0.0
United Kingdom
0.3
0.0
0.0
-3.9
-3.5
-1.7
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
Canada
0.4
0.6
0.4
-3.8
-1.4
-0.3
-0.1
0.0
0.0
Source: International Monetary Fund.
Notes: The output gap is the difference between GDP and potential GDP, expressed as a percentage of
potential GDP. A positive value indicates that GDP exceeds potential GDP; a negative value indicates that GDP
falls short of potential GDP.
On February 1, 2021, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) issued an estimate of the impact of
the COVID-19 pandemic on the U.S. GDP output gap and on other major indicators. 237 In the
forecast, the U.S. output gap in 2020 was estimated at 3.3%, the largest difference between the
actual and potential output in the U.S. economy since the period following the 2008-2009
financial crisis, as indicated in Figure 21. The CBO also estimated that the output gap following
the financial crisis persisted from 2009-2016, reflecting the lengthy period of the recovery. In the
current context, the CBO estimates that
 a rise in vaccinations will lead to reductions in social distancing and an economic
recovery;
 real GDP will expand in 2021 and reach its pre-pandemic peak in mid-2021;

235 According to the Congressional Budget Office, The output gap is the difference between GDP and potential GDP,
expressed as a percentage of potential GDP. A positive value indicates that GDP exceeds potential GDP; a negative
value indicates that GDP falls short of potential GDP. Values for the output gap are for the fourth quarter of each year.
236 World Economic Outlook, International Monetary Fund, October 2020, Table A.8.
237 An Overview of the Economic Outlook: 2021 to 2031, Congressional Budget Office, February 2021.
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 the labor force participation rate will recover, but lag behind the pre-pandemic
rate through the estimation period.238
Figure 21. Real and Potential U.S. GDP and the Output Gap

Source: Congressional Budget Office, February 2021. Created by CRS.
Notes: The output gap is the difference between GDP and potential GDP, expressed as a percentage of
potential GDP. A positive value indicates that GDP exceeds potential GDP; a negative value indicates that GDP
falls short of potential GDP. Values for the output gap are for the fourth quarter of each year.
CBO also estimated that U.S. GDP would grow at an annual rate of 4.6% in 2021, but then
generally trend downward to pre-pandemic rates in the 2024-2031 period, as indicated in Table
12
. The unemployment rate was also projected to peak in 2020 at 8.1%, but trend downward and
reach the pre-pandemic rate in the 2024 to 2025 period. Similarly, the growth rates of exports and
imports were projected fall by 13% and 10%, respectively, in 2020, before growing at positive
rates through the forecast period. The CBO indicated, however, that its forecast was subject to a
“high degree of uncertainty,” due to the uncertain course of the pandemic, the effectiveness of
monetary and fiscal policies, and the response of global financial markets to increases in public
deficits and debt.239
Table 14. Congressional Budget Office Projection of Major U.S. Economic Indicators,
2020 to 2031
(annual percentage changes)








Average annual

2024-
2026-
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2025
2031









Projected
Gross Domestic
2.3%
3.0%
2.2%
-3.4%
4.6%
2.9%
2.2%
2.1%
1.6%
Product (GDP)
Potential GDP
1.6
1.8
1.9
1.9
1.9
1.9
1.9
1.8
1.7

238 Ibid, p. 2.
239 Ibid, p. 4.
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Average annual

2024-
2026-
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2025
2031









Projected
Output Gap
0.0
0.6
1.0
-3.3
-1.3
-0.8
-0.4
0.4
-0.1
Civilian Unemp.
4.4
3.9
3.7
8.1
5.7
5.0
4.7
4.0
4.1
Rate
Labor Force
62.9
62.9
63.1
61.7
61.9
62.1
62.0
61.7
61.1
Participation Rate
Exports
3.9
3.0
-0.1
-13.1
11.3
5.4
2.5
2.0
1.6
Imports
4.7
4.1
1.1
-10.0
13.9
1.6
0.5
2.9
2.1
Source: An Overview of the Economic Outlook: 2021 to 2031, Congressional Budget Office, February 2021.
Federal Reserve Forecast
On March 17, 2021, the Federal Open Market Committee released a statement reiterating
previous assessments that, “The path of the economy will depend significantly on the course of
the virus, including vaccinations. The ongoing public health crisis will continue to weigh on
economic activity, employment, and inflation in the near term, and poses considerable risks to the
economic outlook over the medium term.”240 The statement also indicated that, “Following a
moderation in the pace of the recovery, indicators of economic activity and employment have
turned up recently, although the sectors most adversely affected by the pandemic remain weak.”
The Fed’s March 2021 forecast was more positive than that released in December 2020 with the
annual rate of growth for 2021 forecasted at 6.5% compared with the December forecast of 4.2%,
as indicated in Table 15.
In its forecast, the Federal Open Market Committee made three projections for such major
economic variables as GDP, the unemployment rate, and the personal consumption expenditure
(PCE) measure of inflation compared with its December 2020 projections of the same variables.
The three measures include (1) the median projected change; (2) the central tendency, which
excludes the highest and lowest three projections; and (3) the range, which indicates forecasts
from the highest to the lowest values.
According to the March median forecast, U.S. GDP between 2021 and 2023 was projected grow
at a faster rate than in the previous forecast; the unemployment rate could fall to 4.5%, compared
with a rate of 5.0%; the rate of inflation could rise by 0.6% above the rate forecasted in
December. The possible range for GDP, however could vary between 5.0% and 7.3% in 2021,
with a possible rate of unemployment between 4.0% and 6.8%. The Fed also indicated its
intentions to continue purchasing Treasury securities at $80 billion per month and its purchases of
mortgage-backed securities of at least $40 billion a month, “until substantial further progress has
been made toward the Committee's (Federal Open Market Committee) maximum employment
and price stability goals.241
In previous statements, the FOMC has stated that the range of estimates is necessary to represent
the “extremely elevated” uncertainty related to the economic effects of the pandemic and the

240 Summary of Economic Projections, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, March 17, 2020.
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20201216a.htm
241 Federal Reserve Issues FOMC Statement, Board of Governors of the Federal System, March 17, 2021.
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limited historical response of the U.S. economy to past economic shocks. As a result of the
“significant uncertainty and downside risks associated with the pandemic, including how much
the economy would weaken and how long it would take to recover,” the assessment of a more
pessimistic projection was judged to be no less pessimistic than the baseline scenario (median).
Another member of the Fed recently stated the pandemic-related economic crisis should be used
to distill lessons and “institute reforms so our system is more resilient and better able to withstand
a variety of possible shocks in the future, including those emanating from outside the financial
system.242
Table 15. Federal Reserve Economic Projections, March 2021
Percentage change, fourth quarter over previous year fourth quarter

Core
Change in December Unemploy-
December
PCE
December
PCE
December
real GDP
projection
ment rate
projection inflation projection
inflation
projection
Median1
2021
6.5
4.2
4.5
5.0
2.4
1.8
2.2
1.8
2022
3.3
3.2
3.9
4.2
2.0
1.9
2.0
1.9
2023
2.2
2.4
3.5
3.7
2.1
2.0
2.1
2.0
Longer
1.8
1.8
4
4.1
2.0
2.0


run
Central Tendency2
2021
5.8-6.6
3.7-5.0
4.2-4.7
4.7-5.4
2.2-2.4
1.7-1.9
2.0-2.3
1.7-1.8
2022
3.0-3.8
3.0-3.5
3.6-4.0
3.8-4.6
1.8-2.1
1.8-2.0
1.9-2.1
1.8-2.0
2023
2.0-2.5
2.2-2.7
3.2-3.8
3.5-4.3
2.0-2.2
1.9-2.1
2.0-2.2
1.9-2.1
Longer
1.8-2.0
1.7-2.0
3.8-4.3
3.9-4.3
2.0
2.0


run
Range3
2021
5.0-7.3
0.5-5.5
4.0-5.5
4.0-6.8
2.1-2.6
1.2-2.3
1.9-2.5
1.5-2.3
2022
2.5-4.4
2.5-4.0
3.2-4.2
3.5-5.8
1.8-2.3
1.5-2.2
1.8-2.3
1.6-2.2
2023
1.7-2.6
2.0-3.5
3.0-4.0
3.3-5.0
1.9-2.3
1.7-2.2
1.9-2.3
1.7-2.2
Source: Summary of Economic Projections, March 17, 2021.
Notes: (1) For each period, the median is the middle projection when the projections are arranged from lowest
to highest. (2) The central tendency excludes the three highest and three lowest projections for each variable in
each year. (3) The range for a variable in a given year includes all participants’ projections, from lowest to
highest, for that variable in that year. Projections for the unemployment rate represent the average civilian
unemployment rate in the fourth quarter of the year indicated.
On June 25, the Federal Reserve (Fed) announced the result of stress tests on 33 U.S. banks under
three scenarios243 to ascertain their capital sufficiency given the strains to the financial system

242 Brainard, Lael, Some Preliminary Financial Stability Lessons From the COVID -19 Shock, At the 2021 Annual
Washington Conference, Institute of International Bankers March 1, 2021.
243 The three scenarios include (1) a rapid, or “V”-shaped recovery; (2) a slower, or “U”-shaped recovery; and (3) a
“W”-shaped or double-dip recession with a short-lived recovery followed by a severe drop in activity later this year due
to a second COVID event. Assessment of Bank Capital During the Recent Coronavirus Event, Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, June 2020, p. 2.
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caused by COVID-19.244 The Fed reported that all large U.S. banks were “sufficiently
capitalized” to survive the three scenarios, but it determined that there is “material uncertainty”
about the trajectory for the economic recovery and corresponding uncertainty related to its effects
on the financial health of banking organizations. In addition, the Fed concluded that under the
first and second scenarios, all of the banks would remain well above their minimum capital ratios,
but under the third scenario (a double-dip recession), several banks would approach their
minimum capital ratios.245 As a result, the Fed announced that it will
 suspend share repurchases;
 cap the growth of dividends and impose a limit that does not exceed recent
income;
 require banks to reassess their capital needs and resubmit their capital plans later
this year; and
 conduct additional stress analyses later in 2020 as data from banks become
available and economic conditions evolve.246
Other Developments
On July 17, the Federal Reserve Board modified its Main Street Lending Program to provide
greater access to credit for nonprofit organizations such as educational institutions, hospitals, and
social service organizations.
On August 13, the Department of Labor announced that over the 21-week period from mid-March
to the beginning of August 2020, 56 million Americans filed for unemployment insurance.247 On
a seasonally adjusted basis, the number of insured unemployed workers was 15.5 million in early
August, down from a peak of 25 million in mid-May. The total number of people claiming
benefits in all programs in the week ending July 25, totaled 28.3 million, up from 1.7 million in
the comparable week in 2019. The insured unemployment rate was 10.6%, also down from the
peak reached in early May.
On August 20, the European Central, the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan, and the Swiss
National Bank jointly announced they would reduce their emergency dollar swap operations with
the Fed to once a week, down from three, as a result of reduced demand for dollars. On a broad
dollar trade weighted index for goods and services, the dollar has depreciated by 7.2% since the
high value reached on March 23 2020. Reportedly, the shift by the central banks reflects market
sentiment that the global financial system has recovered from the initial negative impact of the
pandemic experienced in the first quarter of 2020.248
On August 27, the DOL announced that over the 23-week period from mid-March to late August
2020, 58.4 million Americans filed for unemployment insurance.249 On a seasonally adjusted

244 Ibid.
245 Ibid., p. 2.
246 Ibid., pp. 1-2.
247 Unemployment Insurance Weekly Claims, Department of Labor, August 13, 2020. https://www.dol.gov/; Romm,
Tony and Jeff Stein, 2.4 Million Americans Filed Jobless Claims Last Week, Bringing Nine Week Total to 38.6
Million, Washington Post, May 21, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/05/21/unemployment-
claims-coronavirus/
248 Arnold, Martin and Eva Szalay, Central Banks Scale Back Dollar Lending Operation as Demand Drops, Financial
Times
, August 20, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/210ef737-2628-4431-bd6b-456aa65b2024.
249 Unemployment Insurance Weekly Claims, Department of Labor, August 27, 2020. https://www.dol.gov/; Romm,
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basis, the number of insured unemployed workers was 14.5 million in mid-August, down from a
peak of 25 million in mid-May. The total number of people claiming benefits in all programs in
the week ending August 8, totaled 27 million, up from 1.6 million in the comparable week in
2019. The insured unemployment rate was 9.9%, also down from the peak reached in early May.
For additional information about the impact of COVID-19 on the U.S. economy see CRS Insight
IN11235, COVID-19: Potential Economic Effects.250
Europe
In the early stages of the pandemic, European countries did not adopt a synchronized fiscal policy
response similar to the one they developed during the 2008-2009 global financial crisis. That
response changed with the adoption of the €750 billion pandemic economic recovery package,
termed the Next Generation EU (NGEU), in July 2020. For the most part, EU members have used
a combination of national fiscal policies and bond buying by the ECB to address the economic
impact of the pandemic. Individual countries have adopted quarantines and required business
closures, travel and border restrictions, tax holidays for businesses, extensions of certain
payments and loan guarantees, and subsidies for workers and businesses. The European
Commission has advocated for greater coordination among the EU members in developing and
implementing monetary and fiscal policies to address the economic fallout from the viral
pandemic.
In its February 2021 economic forecast, the European Commission projected that EU GDP
growth rate would rise by 3.7% in 2021, after falling by 6.3% in 2020, nearly a full percentage
point lower than it had estimated in its Autumn forecast of -7.4%, as indicated in Table 16. The
Commission indicated the EU economy was weaker in the fall of 2020 and weaker going into
2021 than its earlier forecast had indicated as a result of a resurgence of COVID-19 cases and the
emergence of new, more virulent strains of the virus in the fall that led countries to re-impose
restrictions. The Commission concluded, however, that the outlook for the EU economy had
improved since its November 2020 forecast due to the development of vaccines and the pace of
vaccinations. The economic impact of the renewed lockdowns was projected to be unequal across
EU members due to differences in the stringency of containment measures, the severity of the
infections and differences in economic institutions and policy responses.251
The Commission forecast assumes that trade activity in the EU and the UK will be negatively
affected beginning in January 2021 due to the UK withdrawal from the EU. By country, Spain,
France, Italy, Portugal, and Greece are forecasted to experience the largest declines in GDP in
2020 due to a number of factors, including a dependence on tourism, which is expected to
experience a slow economic recovery. Germany and other Northern European countries are
projected to experience a more modest decline in economic activity. Some analysts argue that this
disparity in economic effects may complicate efforts to coordinate economic policies.252

Tony and Jeff Stein, 2.4 Million Americans Filed Jobless Claims Last Week, Bringing Nine Week Total to 38.6
Million, Washington Post, May 21, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/05/21/unemployment-
claims-coronavirus/
250 CRS Insight IN11235, COVID-19: Potential Economic Effects, by Marc Labonte.
251 European Economic Forecast Winter 2021, European Commission, February 2021, p. 1.
252 Birnbaum, Michael, European Union Says That Pandemic Recession Will be Worst in its History, Washington Post,
May 6, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/european-union-says-pandemic-recession-will-be-worst-in-its-
history/2020/05/06/e787a70e-8f96-11ea-9322-a29e75effc93_story.html.
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In assessing the challenge of the crisis, the Commission argued that, “[t]he risk … is that the
crisis will lead to severe distortions within the Single Market and to entrenched economic,
financial and social divergences between euro area Member States that could ultimately threaten
the stability of the Economic and Monetary Union.”253 The Commission estimated that European
countries would emerge from the recession at different rates and different paths, reflecting
differences in the timing of when social distancing measures were introduced and removed,
dependency on tourism, and the magnitude and effectiveness of economic policies. The
Commission also noted the rise in saving among EU households that it argued is mostly
involuntary, rather than precautionary and was projected to revert to pre-crisis levels once
consumers resumed their regular spending patterns.
Table 16. European Commission Economic Forecast
Percentage change, real GDP

Winter Forecast 2021
Autumn Forecast 2020
Summer Forecast 2020
2021
2022
2020
2021
2022
2020
2021

EU
3.7
3.9
-7.4
4.1
3.0
-7.4
6.1
Euro area
3.8
3.8
-7.8
4.2
3.0
-7.7
6.3
Belgium
3.9
3.1
-8.4
4.1
3.5
-7.2
6.7
Germany
3.2
3.1
-5.6
3.5
2.6
-6.5
5.9
Ireland
3.4
3.5
-2.3
2.9
2.6
-7.9
6.1
Greece
3.5
5.0
-9.0
5.0
3.5
-9.7
7.9
Spain
5.6
5.3
-12.4
5.4
4.8
-9.4
7.0
France
5.5
4.4
-9.4
5.8
3.1
-8.2
7.4
Italy
3.4
3.5
-9.9
4.1
2.8
-9.5
6.5
Luxembourg
3.2
4.3
-4.5
3.9
2.7
-5.4
5.7
Malta
4.5
5.4
-7.3
3.0
6.2
-5.8
6.0
Netherlands
1.8
3.0
-5.3
2.2
1.9
-6.8
5.0
Austria
2.0
5.1
-7.1
4.1
2.5
-5.5
5.0
Portugal
4.1
4.3
-9.3
5.4
3.5
-6.8
5.8
Finland
2.8
2.0
-4.3
2.9
2.2
-6.3
3.7
Denmark
2.9
3.6
-3.9
3.5
2.4
-5.9
5.1
Sweden
2.7
4.0
-3.4
3.3
2.4
-6.1
4.3
World
5.2
3.8
-3.8
4.7
3.7
-3.9
4.9
Source: European Economic Forecast Autumn 2020, European Commission, November 2020.
Pandemic-related economic effects have had significant negative effects on business activity in
Europe, with some business activity indexes falling farther then they had during the height of the
financial crisis and others indicating that Europe experienced a deep economic recession in the
first half of 2020.254 EU countries issued travel warnings and banned all but essential travel across

253 European Economic Forecast Autumn 2020.
254 Arnold, Martin and Valentina Romei, “Business Activity Crashes to Record Low in Eurozone,” Financial Times,
March 24, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/f5ebabd4-6dad-11ea-89df-41bea055720b.
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borders, which raised concerns that even much-needed medical supplies could stall at borders
affected by traffic backups.255 The travel bans and border closures reportedly caused temporary
shortages of farm laborers in Germany, the UK, and Spain. In response, farm growers attempted
to recruit students and workers who had been laid off due to the pandemic.256
According to data released by Eurostat in April, 2021, the EU rate of GDP growth during the
second quarter of 2020 contracted by 11.2% in the EU and by 11.6% in the Euro area from the
previous quarter, reflecting negative rates of growth across all EU countries, as indicated in Table
15
. In contrast, the EU and the Euro area grew by 11.6% and 12.5%, respectively, in the third
quarter. Compared with growth during the third quarter in the previous year, however, EU and
Euro area growth rates were down 4.1% and 4.2%, respectively. During the fourth quarter, the
rate of economic growth declined by 0.5% in the EU and by 0.7% in the Euro area as a result of a
lessening in business lockdowns during the period that raises the prospects of positive rate of
growth across most EU countries in the first quarter of 2021. At 18.8%, the United Kingdom
experienced the largest contraction in its GDP growth rate in the second quarter compared with
the previous quarter among European countries, but third quarter growth rate rebounded by
16.6%, the third fastest rate behind France and Spain.
Table 17. EU Real GDP Growth Rates 2020
Seasonally adjusted data
Percentage change compared with
Percentage change compared with the same
the previous quarter
quarter of the previous year


2020Q1 2020Q2 2020Q3 2020Q4
2020Q1
2020Q2
2020Q3
2020Q4
EU
-3.3
-11.2
11.6
-0.5
-2.7
-13.8
-4.1
-4.6
Euro area
-3.8
-11.6
12.5
-0.7
-3.3
-14.6
-4.2
-4.9
Belgium
-3.4
-11.8
11.6
-0.1
-2.0
-13.9
-4.3
-5.1
Bulgaria
0.4
-10.1
4.3
2.2
2.3
-8.6
-5.2
-3.8
Czechnia
-3.1
-8.7
6.9
0.6
-1.8
-10.8
-5.1
-4.8
Denmark
-1.3
-6.7
6.3
0.7
0.2
-7.5
-2.2
-1.5
Germany
-2.0
-9.7
8.5
0.3
-2.2
-11.3
-4.0
-3.6
Estonia
-1.1
-5.2
2.5
2.1
0.2
-5.5
-3.5
-1.9
Ireland
-3.9
-2.1
11.8
-5.1
4.1
-2.7
8.9
-0.2
Greece
0.4
-13.4
3.1
2.7
0.1
-13.8
-10.5
-7.9
Spain
-5.4
-17.8
17.1
0.0
-4.3
-21.6
-8.6
-8.9
France
-5.9
-13.5
18.5
-1.4
-5.6
-18.6
-3.7
-4.9
Croatia
-1.1
-15.4
8.2
2.7
0.3
-15.7
-9.8
-7.1
Italy
-5.5
-13.0
15.9
-1.9
-5.8
-18.2
-5.2
-6.6
Cyprus
-0.5
-13.1
8.9
1.4
1.4
-12.6
-4.7
-4.5
Latvia
-2.3
-7.0
6.9
1.1
-1.2
-8.6
-2.8
-1.8

255 Birnbaum, Michael, “Europe Is Closing Borders amid Covid-19 Outbreak. They May be Hard to Reopen,”
Washington Post, March 17, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/europe-closing-borders-Covid-19/
2020/03/17/131a6f56-67c8-11ea-b199-3a9799c54512_story.html.
256 Evans, Judith Evans, Emiko Terazono, and Leila Abboud, “Farmers Warn over Food Supply with Harvest Workers
Shut Out,” Financial Times, March 27, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/e27a9395-db47-4e7b-b054-3ec6ba4cbba3.
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Percentage change compared with
Percentage change compared with the same
the previous quarter
quarter of the previous year


2020Q1 2020Q2 2020Q3 2020Q4
2020Q1
2020Q2
2020Q3
2020Q4
Lithuania
-0.3
-6.2
6.1
-0.2
2.5
-4.7
0.1
-1.0
Luxem-
-1.6
-7.3
9.3
1.6
1.3
-7.9
0.0
1.4
bourg
Hungary
-0.5
-14.3
11.0
1.3
1.8
-13.4
-4.8
-4.1
Malta
-2.4
-14.2
8.0
3.8
2.1
-14.6
-8.6
-6.2
Nether-
-1.6
-8.4
7.7
-0.1
-0.4
-9.1
-2.4
-3.0
lands
Austria
-3.0
-10.7
11.8
-2.7
-3.6
-13.6
-3.8
-5.9
Poland
-0.3
-9.0
7.9
-0.7
1.9
-8.0
-1.8
-2.7
Portugal
-4.0
-14.0
13.4
0.2
-2.2
-16.4
-5.6
-6.1
Romania
0.6
-11.8
5.6
4.8
2.7
-10.0
-5.4
-1.8
Slovenia
-4.8
-10.1
12.2
-1.0
-3.3
-13.0
-3.0
-5.0
Slovakia
-5.1
-8.3
11.6
0.2
-3.8
-12.1
-2.3
-2.6
Finland
-0.6
-4.7
3.3
0.4
-0.6
-6.1
-2.7
-1.7
Sweden
-0.3
-7.6
6.4
-0.2
0.1
-7.7
-2.2
-2.1
Other countries







United
-3.0
-18.8
16.0
:
-2.4
-20.8
-8.6
:
Kingdom
Iceland
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
Norway
-1.4
-4.6
4.5
0.6
0.4
-4.4
-0.1
-1.1
Switzer-
-1.9
-7.2
7.6
0.3
-0.6
-8.1
-1.6
-1.7
land
Source: Eurostat, April 13, 2021.
In previous actions, the European Commission announced that it would relax rules on
government debt to allow countries more flexibility in using fiscal policies. Also, the European
Central Bank (ECB) announced that it was ready to take “appropriate and targeted measures,” if
needed. France, Italy, Spain and six other Eurozone countries have argued for creating a
“coronabond,” a joint common European debt instrument. Similar attempts to create a common
Eurozone-wide debt instrument have been opposed by Germany and the Netherland, among other
Eurozone members.257 With interest rates already low, however, it indicated that it would expand
its program of providing loans to EU banks, or buying debt from EU firms, and possibly lowering
its deposit rate further into negative territory in an attempt to shore up the Euro’s exchange
rate.258 ECB President-designate Christine Lagarde called on EU leaders to take more urgent

257 Dombey, Daniel Dombey, Guy Chazan, and Jim Brunsden, “Nine Eurozone Countries Issue Call for
‘Coronabonds,’” Financial Times, March 26, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/258308f6-6e94-11ea-89df-
41bea055720b.
258 “US Fed’s Covid-19 Rate Cut Is First Move in a Dance with Markets,” Financial Times, March 4, 2020.
https://www.ft.com/content/83c07594-5e3a-11ea-b0ab-339c2307bcd4. Giles, Chris, Martin Arnold, Sam Jones, and
Jamie Smyth,Finance Ministers ‘Ready to Take Action’ on Covid-19,” Financial Times, March 3, 2020.
https://www.ft.com/content/b86f7d92-5d38-11ea-b0ab-339c2307bcd4.
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action to avoid the spread of COVID-19 from triggering a serious economic slowdown. The
European Commission indicated that it was creating a $30 billion investment fund to address
COVID-19 issues.259 In other actions
 On March 12, 2020, the ECB decided to (1) expand its longer-term refinance
operations (LTRO) to provide low-cost loans to Eurozone banks to increase bank
liquidity; (2) extend targeted longer-term refinance operations (TLTRO) to
provide loans at below-market rates to businesses, especially small and medium-
sized businesses, directly affected by COVID-19; (3) provide an additional €120
billion (about $130 billion) for the Bank’s asset purchase program to provide
liquidity to firms that was in addition to €20 billion a month it previously had
committed to purchasing.260
 On March 13, 2020, financial market regulators in the UK, Italy, and Spain
intervened in stock and bond markets to stabilize prices after historic swings in
indexes on March 12, 2020.261 In addition, the ECB announced that it would do
more to assist financial markets in distress, including altering self-imposed rules
on purchases of sovereign debt.262
 Germany’s Economic Minister announced on March 13, 2020, that Germany
would provide unlimited loans to businesses experiencing negative economic
activity (initially providing $555 billion), tax breaks for businesses,263 and export
credits and guarantees.264
 On March 18, the ECB indicated that it would: create a €750 billion (about $800
billion) Pandemic Emergency Purchase Program to purchase public and private
securities; expand the securities it will purchase to include nonfinancial
commercial paper; and ease some collateral standards.265 In announcing the
program, President-designate Lagarde indicated that the ECB would, “do
everything necessary.” In creating the program, the ECB removed or significantly
loosened almost all constraints that applied to previous asset-purchase programs,
including a self-imposed limit of buying no more than one-third of any one
country’s eligible bonds, a move that was expected to benefit Italy.
 The ECB also indicated that it would make available up to €3 trillion in liquidity
through refinancing operations.266 Britain ($400 billion) and France ($50 billion)

259 Arnold, Martin and Guy Chazan, “Christine Lagarde Calls on EU Leaders to Ramp up Covid-19 Response,”
Financial Times, March 11, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/44eac1f2-6386-11ea-a6cd-df28cc3c6a68.
260 Monetary Policy Decisions, The European Central Bank, March 12, 2020. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/
2020/html/ecb.mp200312~8d3aec3ff2.en.htm.
261 Stafford, Philip and Adam Samson, “European Regulators Intervene in Bid to Stabilize Stock and Bond Prices,”
Financial Times, March 13, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/77f57d4c-6509-11ea-a6cd-df28cc3c6a68.
262 Arnold, Martin, “ECB Enters Damage-Limitation Mode with Pledge of More Action,” Financial Times, March 13,
2020. https://www.ft.com/content/f1cbd4f8-650f-11ea-b3f3-fe4680ea68b5.
263 Loveday, Morris and Louisa Beck, “Germany Announces ‘Bazooka’ Economic Plan to Mitigate Covid-19 Hit,”
Washington Post, March 13, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/03/13/Covid-19-latest-news/.
264 Arnold, Martin, Guy Chazan, Victor Mallet, Miles Johnson, and Daniel Dombey, “How European Economies Are
Trying to Mitigate the Covid-19 Shock,” Financial Times, March 17, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/26af5520-
6793-11ea-800d-da70cff6e4d3.
265 ECB Announces €759 Billion Pandemic Emergency Purchase Program, the European Central Bank, March 18,
2020. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2020/html/ecb.pr200318_1~3949d6f266.en.html.
266 Lagarde, Christine, “The ECB Will Do Everything Necessary to Counter the Virus,” Financial Times, March 20,
2020. https://www.ft.com/content/281d600c-69f8-11ea-a6ac-9122541af204.
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also announced plans to increase spending to blunt the economic effects of the
virus. Recent forecasts indicate that the economic effect of COVID-19 could
push the Eurozone into an economic recession in 2020.267
 On March 23, 2020, Germany announced that it would adopt a €750 billion (over
$800 billion) package in economic stimulus funding.
 On April 15, Eurozone finance ministers announced a €500 billion (about $550
billion) emergency spending package to support governments, businesses, and
workers and will provide funds to the European Stability Mechanism, the
European Investment Bank, and for unemployment insurance.268
On May 5, 2020, Germany’s Constitutional Court issued a ruling challenging the legality of a
bond-buying program conducted by the ECB since 2015, the Public Sector Purchase Program
(PSPP). In its ruling, the court directed the German government to request clarification from the
ECB about various aspects of the PSPP program that the court argued might exceed the ECB’s
legal mandate. The German government has not yet indicated how it will formally respond to the
ruling, but many analysts contend that the ruling—and the challenge to the authority of the ECB
and the European Court of Justice—could have far-reaching implications for future ECB
activities. This could potentially include challenges to the ECB’s Pandemic Emergency Purchase
Program (PEPP) initiated in March. The PEPP is a temporary program that authorizes the ECB to
acquire up to €750 billion (about $820 billion) in private and public sector securities to address
the economic effects of the pandemic crisis.
The German court’s ruling has heightened tensions between the court and the European Court of
Justice. Following the 2008-2009 financial crisis and the subsequent Eurozone financial crisis, the
ECB launched four asset purchase programs in 2014 to provide assistance to financially strapped
Eurozone governments and to sustain financial liquidity in Eurozone banks. Those programs
included the Corporate Sector Purchase Program (CSPP), the Public Sector Purchase Program
(PSPP), the Asset-Backed Securities Purchase Program (ABSPP), and the Third Covered Bond
Purchase Program (CBPP3). The programs operated from 2014 to 2018; the PSPP was restarted
in November 2019. As of May 8, the PSPP program held €2.2 trillion (about $2.5 trillion) with
another €600 billion (about $700 billion) held under other asset purchase programs.269 Various
groups in Germany challenged the legality of the ECB bond-buying programs before the German
Constitutional Court arguing that the programs exceeded the ECB’s legal mandate. In turn, the
German court referred the case to the European Court of Justice, which ruled in December 2019
that the ECB’s actions were fully within the ECB’s authority.
In the German Constitutional Court’s May 5 ruling, the German judges characterized the ECJ’s
ruling as “incomprehensible,” and directly challenged the ECB and the European Court of Justice
and the primacy of the European Court of Justice ruling over national law. The German justices
argued that the ECB had exceeded its authority by not fully evaluating the economic costs and
benefits of previous bond-buying activities, including the impact on national budgets, property
values, stock markets, life insurance and other economic effects. The German court also argued
that the ECB’s lack of a strategy for reducing its holdings of sovereign debt of Eurozone
members increased risks for national governments that back up the ECB, and it challenged the

267 “Lagarde to Confront Covid-19 Crisis at ECB Policy Meeting,” Financial Times, March 8, 2020.
https://www.ft.com/content/79a280c6-5fb5-11ea-b0ab-339c2307bcd4.
268 Fleming, Sam and Mehreen Khan, “Eurozone Countries Strike Emergency Deal on Coronavirus Rescue,” Financial
Times
, April 9, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/b984101a-42b8-40db-9a92-6786aec2ba5c.
269 European Central Bank. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/pepp/html/pepp-qa.en.html.
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ECB’s strategy for reducing its holdings of sovereign debt. By the end of June, however, the
standoff appeared to be reaching a resolution. The ECB reportedly agreed to provide the German
court with the Bank’s analysis of the economic and fiscal policy impact of the ECB bond-buying
programs. The ECB reportedly will also provide the unpublished full minutes of the central
bank’s governing council monetary policy meetings, including the ECB’s discussions in March
2015 of its purchases of sovereign bonds.270
On March 26, 2021, Germany’s highest court stopped a law that would have ratified the PEPP
bond-buying program. The program requires ratification by each of the EU member’s national
parliaments. The legislation had been passed by both of Germany’s houses of Parliament and was
expected to be signed by German president, Frank-Walter Steinmeier when the court
intervened.271
On May 18, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron
proposed a €500 billion (about $620 billion) EU recovery fund in an effort to gain a coordinated
EU fiscal response to the pandemic.272 Reportedly, the funds would be raised by the European
Commission and used to fund EU spending through grants to individual members to ease the
economic strain in some of the southern EU members that have been the most negatively
affected. Austria, the Netherland, Denmark, and Sweden indicated they would only support
proposals that provided funds to members through loans that would be required to be repaid.
On May 27, ECB President Lagarde indicated that the ECB projected a drop in the EU economy
of 8% to 12% in 2020, twice as severe as the recession following the 2008 financial crisis, and
called for a €500 billion (about $620 billion) stimulus package.273 In addition, European
Commission President Ursula von der Leyen proposed a €750 billion (about $820 billion) EU
recovery fund, termed the “Next Generation Fund,” that would provide €500 billion ($550
billion) in grants in a Recovery and Resilience Facility and €250 billion ($270 billion) in loans.
The proposal would take the unprecedented step of allowing the EU to issues bonds
independently from the other EU central banks.274 Questions remain over the source and
distribution of the funds. The program may have limited appeal given various restrictions:
reportedly, the funds must be used to achieve certain EU goals, including increasing
competitiveness, shifting away from declining heavy industry, supporting a green economy, and
building the digital economy.275 Proposals for raising funds include issuing 30-year bonds and
raising taxes on large technology firms, such as Google and Facebook. In addition to the recovery
fund, von der Leyen proposed a revised EC seven-year budget, the Multiannual Financial
Framework (MFF), of €1.1trillion for 2021 to 2027.

270 Arnold, Martin, Berlin and ECB Signal End to Legal Impasse Over Bond-Buying, Financial Times, June 25, 2020.
https://www.ft.com/content/5f000a25-3d54-4610-8579-cab9b21759ee.
271 Chazan, Guy, Germany’s Highest Court Blocks Ratification of EU Recovery Fund, Financial Times, March 26,
2021. https://www.ft.com/content/74841ea6-4fbf-4c7a-b015-66ba191ffc9b.
272 Fleming, Sam, Victor Mallet, and Guy Chazan, Germany and France Unite in Call for €500 Billion Europe
Recovery Fund, Financial Times, May 18, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/c23ebc5e-cbf3-4ad8-85aa-032b574d0562.
273 Arnold, Martin, Coronavirus Hit to Eurozone Economy Set to Dwarf Financial Crisis, Financial Times, May 27,
2020. https://www.ft.com/content/a01424e8-089d-4618-babe-72f88184ac57.
274 Birnbaum, Michael, and Loveday Morris, E.U. Proposes $825 Billion Coronavirus Rescue Plan Giving Brussels
Power to Raise Money for First Time, Washington Post, May 27, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
europe/angela-merkel-economic-rescue/2020/05/27/9d21b998-9f7c-11ea-be06-af5514ee0385_story.html.
275 Brunsden, Jim and Sam Fleming, How Would Ursula von der Leyen’s Coronavirus Recovery Fund Work?,
Financial Times, May 27, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/ebaa7dcd-b6f7-418f-802b-7a8dbc9668f1.
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On May 28, several key political groups within the EU Parliament voiced their support for new
rules that would allow the EU to retaliate in such trade areas as services and intellectual property
protection without waiting for a WTO ruling. Some Parliamentarians reportedly argued that such
expanded authority, termed a “trade bazooka,” was necessary to respond to trade disputes,
because the United States had blocked the appointment of judges to the WTO’s appellate body.276
European leaders, reportedly interested in finalizing an investment agreement with China,
announced they would not follow President Trump in applying trade restrictions on China for
positioning itself to limit Hong Kong’s autonomy granted by the “one country two systems”
principle after the end of British rule in 1997.277
The European Central Bank announced on June 4 that it would double to $1.5 trillion its
Pandemic Emergency Purchase Program to stimulate the European economy; it also extended the
program to at least June 2021.278 At the same time, the German government announced a package
of fiscal measures, including tax cuts, aid to small businesses, cash payments to parent, and other
measures totaling €135 billion (about $150 billion). Austria, Denmark, the Netherland, and
Sweden have resisted payouts in grants instead of loans that require repayment. The German plan
reportedly would give households $336 per child, reduce value added taxes on daily items, and
reduce households’ utility bills. The plan also includes about $6 billion for the social security
system, $11 billion to assist cities cover housing and other costs, about $2 billion for cultural
institutions and nonprofit groups and incentives for purchases of electric vehicles.279
On June 25, Germany’s Minister for Economic Affairs and Energy announced that the German
government would provide more than €300 million (about $330 million), to acquire a 25% stake
in a privately owned German drug company that is conducting trials on a possible COVID-19
vaccine. Reportedly, the U.S. Government had attempted to acquire part of the company to secure
supplies of a potential vaccine. Germany has in place legal restrictions on foreign investments in
critical industries such as energy and telecoms, but the German Parliament amended Germany’s
Foreign Trade Act, set to become law in 2020, that broadens the scope of transactions that must
be approved by the Federal government to include “critical” technologies, including robotics,
biotech, and quantum computing.280
On July 17, the European Commission met to approve the proposed €750 billion support fund to
assist European countries address the economic effects of the pandemic. Initially, the Commission
was unable to agree on various aspects of the program, but talks continued over the weekend and
resumed on July 20. European leaders announced on July 21 they had approved a €750 billion
(about $859 billion) pandemic relief package and a multi-year EU budget, referred to as the
Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), with a combined value of over €2 trillion. The
pandemic plan is aimed at funding post-pandemic economic recovery with the European
Commission set to borrow an unprecedented amount of funds on European capital markets.281

276 Vela, Jakob Hanke, Trade Bazooka Gets Backing From Main Political Groups in EU Parliament, Politico Pro, May
28, 2020; Draft Report, 2019/10273(COD), European Parliament, Committee on International Trade, May 6, 2020.
277 Lau, Stuart Lau, Jakob Hanke Vela, Jacopo Barigazzi, and Finbarr Bermingham, EU Won't Follow Trump Into a
Trade War Over Hong Kong, Politico Pro, May 28, 2020.
278 Arnold, Martin, ECB Boosts Bond-Buying Stimulus Package by €600, Financial Times, June 4, 2020.
https://www.ft.com/content/c59ab92d-e614-4284-a028-46ee3bcf92f9.
279 Ewing, Jack, and Melissa Eddy, ‘Europe Finally Got the Message’: Leaders Act Together on Message, The New
York Times
, June 4, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/04/business/europe-coronavirus-economic-support.html?
action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage.
280 Miller, Joe, Germany Flexes its Muscles on Foreign Investment, Financial Times, June 25, 2020.
https://www.ft.com/content/54f92ca5-5380-466b-95f8-3e98b40ebc82.
281 Special Meeting of the European Council-Conclusions, EUCP 10/20, July 21, 2020.
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The €750 billion relief fund reportedly includes a Recovery and Resilience Facility of €672.5
billion, which includes €360 billion in loans and €312.5 billion in grants and half a dozen other
initiatives to assist economically weakened member states. The relief fund was coupled with
rebates on EU budget contributions for so-called “frugal” states, or EU members with stronger
fiscal balances. Austria, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden reportedly will receive such
budget rebates.282
On September 3, 2020, French Prime Minister Jean Castex announced that France would
implement a €100 billion (about $130 billion) spending plan to speed the economy’s recovery
from the economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. Reportedly, the plan includes funding for
green energy (including hydrogen energy), transportation (state railways), and industrial
innovation.283
The United Kingdom
The United Kingdom has taken a number of steps to support economic activity. These steps are
expected to limit the damage to the UK economy. The Bank of England (BOE) forecasted in May
2020 that the UK economy would contract by 30% in the first half of 2020, but then rebound
sharply in the second half of the year, exhibiting a “V” shaped recovery. The Bank of England has
announced a number of policy initiatives including
 On March 11, the BOE adopted a package of four measures to deal with any
economic disruptions associated with COVID-19. The measures included an
unscheduled cut in the benchmark interest rate by 50 basis points (0.5%) to a
historic low of 0.25%; the reintroduction of the Term Funding Scheme for Small
and Medium-sized Enterprises (TFSME) that provides banks with over $110
billion for loans at low interest rates; a lowering of banks’ countercyclical capital
buffer from 1% to zero, which is estimated to support over $200 billion of bank
lending to businesses; and a freeze in banks’ dividend payments.284
 On March 15, the BOE reinstituted U.S. dollar swap lines with the Federal
Reserve.
 On March 17, the BOE and the UK Treasury introduced the COVID Corporate
Financing Facility (CCFF) to provide assistance to UK firms to bridge through
Covid-19-related disruptions to their cash flow.
 On March 19, during a Special Monetary Policy Meeting, the Bank of England
reduced its main interest rate to 0.1%, increased the size of its TFSME fund, and
increased the stock of asset purchases by £200 billion to a total of £645 billion
financed by issuing UK government bonds and some additional nonfinancial
investment-grade corporate bonds.285

282 Fleming, Sam, Mehreen Khan and Jim Brunsden, EU Leaders Strike Deal on €750bn Recovery Fund After
Marathon Summit, Financial Times, July 21, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/713be467-ed19-4663-95ff-
66f775af55cc.
283 Mallet, Victor, France Launches €100 Billion Coronavirus Recovery Plan, Financial Times, September 3, 2020.
https://www.ft.com/content/0921c871-17b5-4e2e-bdea-aab78c2d0090.
284 Romei, Valentina, “Covid-19 Fallout: Bank of England Launches 4 Key Measures,” Financial Times.
https://www.ft.com/content/4e60c08e-6380-11ea-b3f3-fe4680ea68b5.
285 Johnson, Miles, Chris Giles, Martin Arnold, and James Politi, “Italy’s PM Urges Brussels to Unleash €500bn
Rescue Fund,” Financial Times, March 18, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/5b8205ac-6a06-11ea-800d-
da70cff6e4d3.
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 On March 20, the BOE participated in an internationally coordinated central bank
expansion of liquidity through U.S. standing dollar liquidity swap line
arrangements.
 On March, the BOE activated the Contingent Term Repo Facility (CTRF).
 On April 6, announced the activation of the TFSME ahead of schedule.
 On April 23, the Bank of England indicated it would quadruple its borrowing
over the second quarter of 2020, reflecting a contraction in the UK economy,
lower tax revenues, and increased financial demands to support fiscal policy
measures.286
In terms of fiscal policy, UK Chancellor of the Exchequer Rishi Sunak proposed a national
budget on March 11, 2020, that included nearly $3.5 billion in fiscal spending to counter adverse
economic effects of the pandemic and increased in statutory sick leave by about $2.5 billion in
funds to small and medium businesses to provide up to 14 days of sick leave for affected
employees. The plan provides affected workers up to 80% of their salary, or up to £2,500 a month
(about $2,800) if they are laid off. Some estimates indicate that UK spending to support its
economy could rise to about $60 billion in 2020.287 Identified as the Coronavirus Job Retention
Scheme (CJRS), the program was backdated to start on March 1 and had been expected to run
through May, but was extended to expire the end of June 2020. Prime Minister Johnson also
announced that all pubs, cafés, restaurants, theatres, cinemas, nightclubs, gyms and leisure centers
would be closed.288 Part of the fiscal spending package includes open-ended funding for the
National Health Service (NHS), $6 billion in emergency funds to the NHS, $600 million hardship
fund to assist vulnerable people, and tax cuts and tax holidays for small businesses in certain
affected sectors.289
On July 8, Chancellor Sunak proposed additional fiscal measures to support the UK economy.290
The measures include raising threshold tax levels on home purchases, reducing taxes for the
hospitality industry, and a “job retention bonus” of £1.000 (around $1,200) per worker to
companies that bring employees out of furlough, estimated at around 9 million workers, and a
subsidy of £2.000 for firms that hire new apprentices. In addition, the proposed plan includes a
50% discount on meals and nonalcoholic drinks eaten at restaurants and cafes during August,
with some restrictions.
On March 31, 2021, the UK Government announced that UK GDP in the fourth quarter of 2020
grew by 1.3%, after contracting by 19.5% (revised) in the second quarter and growing by 16.9%
in the third quarter based on market prices, as indicated in Figure 22.291

286 Giles, Chris, and Tommy Stubbington, UK Treasury to Quadruple Borrowing to £180bn Over Next Quarter,
Financial Times, April 23, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/8886e002-c260-4daa-8b7b-509b3f7e6edb.
287 Parker, George, Chris Giles, and Sebastian Payne, “Sunak Turns on Financial Firepower to Help Workers,”
Financial Times, March 20, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/826d465a-6ac3-11ea-a3c9-1fe6fedcca75.
288 Ibid.
289 Payne, Sebastian and Chris Giles, “Budget 2020: Sunak Unveils £30bn Stimulus to Counter UK Covid-19 Shock,”
Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/f7b27264-6384-11ea-a6cd-df28cc3c6a68.
290 Pickard, Jim and Chris Giles, Sunak’s Summer Statement: UK Government to Pay Companies to Bring Workers
Back From Furlough, Financial Times, July 7, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/ad1688ee-3d8d-4e52-9b16-
a3632eed8be9.
291 Giles, Chris and Valentina Romei, BoE Economist Warns Against Pessimism After Record Drop in GDP, Financial
Times,
September 30, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/fed4fe06-8c6a-4272-b0b3-a0759805eb64.
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Figure 22. UK Month Over Month Quarterly Percentage Change in GDP

Source: GDP Quarterly National Accounts, UK: October to December 2020, Office for National Statistics, March 31,
2021. Created by CRS.
Despite the growth in the 3rd and 4th quarters, the UK economy remained 7.3% below where it
was at the end of 2019. For the year as a whole, the rate of growth of the UK economic contracted
by 9.8%, as indicated in Table 16. The Q2 decline was driven by lower levels of activity in
services (-19.9%), production (16.9%)-primarily manufacturing, and construction (35%) and
constituted the largest quarterly decline since 1955.292 In contrast, the Q3 and Q4 expansion
occurred in services, industrial production, and construction.
In other areas
 Household consumption fell by 10.6% in 2020, primarily as a result of large
declines in the first and second quarters.
 Business investment (gross fixed capital formation) fell by 8.8% over the year,
despite growing by 19.0% in the third quarter;
 Government spending fell by 6.5% during the year, despite growing by 19.0% in
the third quarter and 4.4% in the fourth quarter reflecting increased spending on
health care;
 Imports (-11.8%) and exports (-15.8%) fell in 2020 compared with 2019,
reflecting large declines in the first and second quarters of 2020.
Table 18. UK Major GDP Aggregates 2019-2020
Percent change from preceding period

GDP
Households
Gross Fixed
Government
Exports
Imports
Capital
Formation
2019
1.4%
1.1%
1.5%
4.0%
2.7%
1.9%
Q1
0.6
0.0
2.1
1.4
-1.2
6.5
Q2
0.1
0.6
-1.1
2.3
-0.8
-9.0
Q3
0.5
0.1
1.3
-0.9
5.3
1.5

292 GDP Quarterly National Accounts, UK: October to December 2020, Office for National Statistics, March 31, 2021.
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GDP
Households
Gross Fixed
Government
Exports
Imports
Capital
Formation
Q4
0.0
-0.3
-1.6
0.0
3.8
-3.1
2020
-9.8
-10.6
-8.8
-6.5
-15.8
-11.8
Q1
-2.8
-2.6
-1.2
-1.8
-14.5
-7.4
Q2
-19.5
-20.8
-20.7
-17.3
-10.1
-21.1
Q3
16.9
19.7
19.0
15.8
-0.5
14.6
Q4
1.3
-1.7
4.4
6.7
6.1
11.0
Source: Office of National Statistics, GDP Quarterly National Accounts, UK; October to December 2020.
Notes: Chained volume measures.
The Bank of England’s February 2021 Monetary Policy Report indicated that its GDP forecast
remained “unusually” uncertain and depended on the evolving nature of the pandemic, the
measure that are taken to protect public health, and how households, businesses and financial
markets respond to these developments.293The forecast projected that UK GDP growth rate could
fall by 4% in the first quarter of 2021, or to about 12% below the level of the fourth quarter of
2019.294 The Bank assumed that social and business restrictions in January 2021 remained in
place through the first quarter.
The UK-EU trade arrangement, the Trade and Cooperation Agreement, which became effective
on December 24, 2020, is projected to raise some barriers on UK-EU trade and increase
administrative costs, which could reduce UK trade and GDP by 10.5% and 3.25%, respectively,
over the long run, compared with earlier forecasts. Trade during the first quarter was also
projected to be dampened as a consequence of UK firms adjusting to the new trade rules.295 As
lockdowns and restrictions are lessened or removed in the second half of 2021, the Bank forested
that consumer spending would revive with households spending the extra 5% of savings they
accumulated during 2020. As indicated in Table 17, the growth catch-up period is projected to
last through 2022, before slowing in 2023. The Bank of England also conducted stress tests on
UK banks in 2020 and concluded the banks had sufficient capital buffers to absorb the losses that
could arise under the Bank’s main projections.296 The Bank also concluded that UK businesses
had successfully raised the funds they needed to satisfy their cash-flow requirements. In addition,
the government extended three financing facilities for businesses – the Bounce Back Loan
Scheme (BBLS), the Coronavirus Business Interruption Loan Scheme and the Coronavirus Large
Business Interruption Loan Scheme -through to the end of January 2021.297 The forecast also
projects an increase in unemployment and business insolvencies in 2021.
Table 19. UK Forecast of Major Aggregate National Accounts, 2020-2023
Percent change from the preceding period

Averages
Projection

2010-2019
2021
2022
2023
GDP
1.75%
5.00%
7.25%
1.25%

293 Monetary Policy Report, Bank of England, February 2021, p. ii.
294 Ibid, p. 3.
295 Ibid, p. 4.
296 Financial Stability Report, Bank of England, December 2020, p. ii.
297 Ibid, p. 3.
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Households
1.75
4.25
11.75
1.00
Business
3.75
4.00
12.00
4.50
Exports
3.25
-3.00
5.25
4.25
Imports
3.50
5.25
12.75
3.50
Source: GDP Quarterly National Accounts, UK: October to December 2020, Office of National Statistics, March 31,
2021.
On November 5, 2020, the Bank of England announced that it anticipated the UK economy
would fall back into recession in the fourth quarter of 2020 as a result of a decline in consumer
spending and businesses investment due to social distancing requirements and business
lockdowns imposed in response to a resurgence of COVID-19 cases in October and November.
The Bank also announced an additional £150 billion in government bond purchases and increase
in quantities easing, or additional bond purchases, to provide monetary stimulus in 2021.298 In
addition, the Bank indicated that it estimated the pandemic would reduce UK GDP by 1.75
percentage points below where it had forecasted at the beginning of 2020.
On March 3, 2021, Chancellor of the Exchequer Sunak proposed a £65 billion financial assistance
package spread out over two-years to assist UK businesses and households recover from the
economic effects of the pandemic. The Chancellor argued the spending was necessary, because
the UK economy was projected to not fully recover for at least five years. With a continuation of
state supported measures into the summer, the total cost to the UK economy of addressing the
pandemic-related economic recession was estimated at £407 billion over two years. The spending
initiative is expected to be followed by large increases in corporate and individual taxes starting
in 2023.299 Given the announced planned tax increases in subsequent years, some economists
could argue the spending initiative could fall short of the estimated stimulative effects.
Japan
The Bank of Japan, with already-low interest rates, injected $4.6 billion in liquidity into Japanese
banks to provide short-term loans for purchases of corporate bonds and commercial paper and
twice that amount into exchange traded funds to aid Japanese businesses. The Japanese
government also pledged to provide wage subsidies for parents forced to take time off due to
school closures.300 On March 24, 2020, Japan announced that the Summer Olympics set to take
place in Tokyo would be postponed by a year, delaying a projected boost to the Japanese
economy that was expected from the event. Japan adopted an emergency fiscal package of about
$1.1 trillion, roughly equivalent to 10% of Japan’s annual gross domestic product (GDP). On
April 27, 2020, the Bank of Japan announced it would purchase unlimited amounts of
government bonds and quadruple its purchases of corporate debt to keep interest rates low and
stimulate the Japanese economy.301

298 Giles, Chris, Bank of England Launches £150bn Stimulus to Boost Consumer Spending, Financial Times,
November 5, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/18ade542-d2a9-438a-ba5c-37b51475993b.
299 Pickard, Jim, Chris Giles and George Parker, Rishi Sunak Delivers Spend Now, Tax Later Budget to Kickstart UK
Economy, Financial Times, March 3, 2021. https://www.ft.com/content/da66ce9a-6dfc-4a3a-bde7-d4f4faed6c4a.
300 Harding, Robin and Hudson Lockett, “BoJ Spurs Asia Markets Rebound with Vow to Fight Covid-19,” Financial
Times,
March 2, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/9fa91e06-5c3b-11ea-b0ab-339c2307bcd4.
301 Harding, Robin, Bank of Japan Steps up Coronavirus Stimulus With Bond-buying Pledge, Financial Times, April
27, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/7ba5c507-df9e-4107-87eb-73afa2c13e91.
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The Japanese Cabinet proposed a second supplemental appropriation measure that included $296
billion in spending and a total value of about $1.1 trillion in loans and guarantees, funded through
new bonds. This and a previous set of spending measures reportedly were comparable to 40% of
Japan’s GDP and included grants for businesses to pay rents through the Development Bank of
Japan and funds to small and medium-sized businesses through the Regional Economy
Vitalization Corporation of Japan, payments to assist furloughed workers, and a reserve fund to
provide capital injections to struggling firms through the Japan Investment Corporation.302
In terms of monetary policy, the Bank of Japan (BOJ) maintained its low interest rates policy of -
0.1%, even as it increased its coronavirus lending facility from $700 billion to $1 trillion and
stated it would continue purchasing commercial paper, corporate bonds, and exchange traded
funds at the rate of $12 trillion a year.303 The COVID-19 lending facility assisted banks in
providing zero interest rate loans to businesses. In a separate program, the BOJ provided about
$110 trillion to buy commercial paper and corporate bonds and provided dollars through swap
arrangements with the U.S. Federal Reserve. Japan reported on August 17 that its economy had
contracted by 7.8% in the second quarter of 2020, compared with the previous quarter, or at an
annual a rate of 27.8%. This drop in economic activity was precipitated by a drop in exports of
18.5% from the preceding quarter (56.0% at an annual rate) and a decline in personal
consumption of 8.6% (30.1% at an annual rate).304
On October 29, the Bank of Japan issued a revised forecast that indicated Japan’s GDP would
contract by 5.5% in the fiscal year ending March 2021. The economy was projected to grow by
3.6% in 2021 and by 1.6% the following year. The Bank indicated, however, that the outlook
remained, “highly uncertain,” with big downside risks.305
Japan also indicated on November 25 that its GDP grew by 4.7% in the third quarter, reportedly
better than government Ministers and economists had projected, but they remained cautious over
prospects for the fourth quarter rate of growth.306 The Bank of Japan announced on January 20,
2021, that the Japanese economy could grow at a slightly faster pace of 3.9% in 2021. An
increase in viral cases in January 2021, however, led to a renewed effort at quarantines and
lockdowns and raised questions about the timing of an economic recovery.307
China
According to a recent CRS In Focus,308 China emerged in June 2020 as the first major country to
announce a return to economic growth since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. The
government reported 3.2% gross domestic product (GDP) growth in the second quarter and 4.9%
GDP growth in the third quarter of 2020. China is still grappling with the economic effects of the
COVID-19 pandemic, however, including sluggish domestic consumption, slow recovery in its

302 Harding, Robin, Japan’s Cabinet Approves Extra $1.1 Trillion Budget to Counter Recession, Financial Times, May
27, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/ce7f3564-c997-339c-ad3d-c6d092fb7f1e.
303 Harding, Bank of Japan Pledges $1 trillion in Coronavirus Lending.
304 Quarterly Estimates of GDP for April - June 2020 (First Preliminary Estimates), Cabinet Office, August 17, 2020.
305 Bank of Japan Trims Growth Forecasts But Predicts Stronger Rebound in 2021, Financial Times, October 29,
2020. https://www.ft.com/content/6d01dee6-7de4-48bb-8d27-50d3d4e11d16.
306 Harding, Robin, Japan’s Economy Rebounds 5% in the Third Quarter, Financial Times, November 24, 2020.
https://www.ft.com/content/2ec0b9b3-ecc4-4056-bacf-cb45c83e4629.
307 Kihara, Leika, Tetsushi Kajimoto, Bank of Japan Lifts Next Year’s Growth Forecast, Saves Ammunition as Virus
Risks Linger, Reuters, January 20, 2021.
308 CRS In Focus IF11667, China’s Economy: Current Trends and Issues, by Karen M. Sutter and Michael D.
Sutherland.
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top export markets, and reliance on government spending and exports to boost initial growth.
China also is facing growing restrictions on its overseas commercial activities and access to
foreign technology and pressures for firms to diversify China-based supply chains. Against this
backdrop, China’s leadership is deliberating the country’s economic direction and national
industrial plans for the next 5 to 15 years.
To boost economic growth, China has provided an estimated $506 billion in stimulus since
February 2020 and increased the government’s budget deficit target to a record high of 3.6% of
GDP, up from 2.8% in 2019. China reduced the value-added tax (VAT) rate and introduced VAT
exemptions for certain goods and services. China’s central bank extended monetary support with
interest rate cuts, eased loan terms, and injected liquidity into banks. Shifting from efforts to
reduce debt, the government announced the issuance of $142.9 billion of special treasury bonds
for the first time since 2007; increased the quota for local government special bonds (a source of
infrastructure funding); and fast-tracked issuance of corporate bonds to cover pandemic costs but
with potential broader uses. The IMF estimates that the fiscal measures and financing plans
announced amounted to 4.1% of the China’s GDP, as of July 2020. The government says it seeks
to control credit risk but the need for additional fiscal and monetary support to boost growth may
undermine this goal.
Multilateral Response309
International Monetary Fund
Created in the aftermath of World War II, the IMF’s fundamental mission is to promote
international monetary stability. To advance this goal, one of the key functions of the IMF is
providing emergency loans to countries facing economic crises. The COVID-19 pandemic has
resulted in an unprecedented demand for IMF financial assistance. More than 100 of the IMF’s
189 member countries have requested IMF programs,310 and IMF Managing Director Kristalina
Georgieva stated the IMF stands ready to deploy the entirety of its current lending capacity—
approximately $1 trillion—in response to the pandemic and resulting economic crises.311 The
IMF has already approved several COVID-related programs, including for Bolivia, Chad, the
Democratic Republic of Congo, Kyrgyz Republic, Nigeria, Niger, Rwanda, Madagascar,
Mozambique, Pakistan, and Togo, among others, and additional programs are expected.312
In addition to loans, the IMF has taken a number of other policy steps to bolster its COVID-19
response. The IMF is tapping its Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust (CCRT), a donor
country trust fund at the IMF, to cover six months of debt payments owed by 29 low-income
countries to the IMF. The IMF also created a new a new Short-term Liquidity Line.313 It is a
revolving and renewable backstop for member countries with very strong economic policies in
need of short-term and moderate financial support, and intends to support a country’s liquidity

309 For more information, see CRS Report R46342, COVID-19: Role of the International Financial Institutions, by
Rebecca M. Nelson and Martin A. Weiss.
310 Remarks by IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva During the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank
Governors Meeting, International Monetary Fund, April 15, 2020.
311 IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva’s Statement Following a G20 Ministerial Call on the Coronavirus
Emergency, March 23, 2020. Some policy experts estimate the IMF’s current maximum lending capacity is about $787
billion.
312 IMF Lending Tracker, https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/COVID-Lending-Tracker.
313 “IMF Adds Liquidity Line to Strengthen COVID-19 Response,” International Monetary Fund, April 15, 2020.
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buffers. The IMF also adopted proposals to accelerate Board consideration of member financing
requests for emergency financing and doubled (to about $100 billion) access to IMF emergency
assistance. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is providing funding to poor and emerging
market economies that are short on financial resources.314 If the economic effects of the virus
persist, countries may need to be proactive in coordinating fiscal and monetary policy responses,
similar to actions taken by of the G-20 following the 2008-2009 global financial crisis.
For FY2021, the Administration had requested authorization for about $38 billion for a
supplemental fund at the IMF (the New Arrangements to Borrow [NAB]). In March 2020,
Congress enacted this authorization in the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act
(CARES Act, P.L. 116-136) as a way to bolster IMF resources available to support countries
during the pandemic. There is ongoing debate about whether member countries should contribute
additional resources to the IMF, whether the IMF should raise funds by selling a portion of its
gold holdings, and whether the IMF should enact policies to buffer member state reserves,
through a process called an SDR allocation.
World Bank and Regional Development Banks
The World Bank, which finances economic development projects in middle- and low-income
countries, among other activities, is mobilizing its resources to support developing countries
during the COVID-19 pandemic.315 As of June 1, 2020, the World Bank had approved, or was in
the process of approving, 150 COVID-19 projects, totaling $15 billion, in 99 countries.316
Examples of approved projects include $47 million for the Democratic Republic of Congo to
support containment strategies, train medical staff, and provide equipment for diagnostic testing
to ensure rapid case detection; $11.3 million for Tajikistan to expand intensive care capacity; $20
million for Haiti to support diagnostic testing, rapid response teams, and outbreak containment;
and $1 billion for India to support screening, contract tracing, and laboratory diagnostics, procure
personal protective equipment, and set up new isolation wards, among other projects.317
Over the next 15 months, the World Bank Group estimates it could deploy as much as $160
billion to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic, more than double the amount it committed in
FY2019. In April 2020, the World Bank also announced its plans to establish a new multi-donor
trust fund to help countries prepare for disease outbreaks, the Health Emergency Preparedness
and Response Multi-Donor Fund (HEPRF).318 The new fund is to complement, and augment, the
$160 billion of financing provided by the World Bank.
In addition to the World Bank, which has a near-global membership and operates in many sectors
in developing countries worldwide, a number of smaller and more specialized multilateral
development banks (MDBs) are also mobilizing resources in response to the COVID-19
pandemic. The United States is a member of a number of regionally focused MDBs, including the
African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction

314 Politi, James, “IMF Sets Aside $50bn for Covid-19-Hit Countries,” Financial Times, March 4, 2020,
https://www.ft.com/content/83c07594-5e3a-11ea-b0ab-339c2307bcd4.
315 Remarks by World Bank Group President David Malpass on G20 Finance Ministers Conference Call on COVID-19,
March 23, 2020.
316 https://maps.worldbank.org/. Accessed on June 1, 2020.
317 World Bank, “World Bank Group Launches First Operations for COVID-19 (Coronavirus) Emergency Health
Support, Strengthening Developing Country Response,” Press Release, April 2, 2020.
318 World Bank, “World Bank Group to Launch New Multi-donor Trust Fund to help Countries Prepare for Disease
Outbreaks,” Press Release, April 17, 2020.
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and Development, and the Inter-American Development Bank, as well as the functionally focused
International Fund for Agricultural Development. The United States does not belong to some
MDBs, including the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New
Development Bank created by the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South
Africa), the European Investment Bank, or the Islamic Development Bank.
In response to COVID-19, MDBs are reprogramming existing projects, establishing and funding
with existing resources lending facilities dedicated to the COVID-19 response, and streamlining
approval procedures. According to the President of the World Bank, other multilateral
development banks have committed roughly $80 billion over the next 15 months to respond to
COVID-19.319 Together with the World Bank’s commitment of $160 billion, $240 billion in
financing is to be made available to developing countries from the MDBs during this time
period.320
To support the MDB response to COVID-19, Congress accelerated authorizations requested by
the Administration for FY2021 for two lending facilities at the World Bank and two lending
facilities at the African Development Bank in the CARES Act (P.L. 116-136). Given the
unprecedented demand for MDB resources, discussions are underway about whether the MDBs
should pursue fiduciary reforms that would allow them to expand their lending based on existing
resources, particularly lending against donor country guarantees to the institutions (called
“callable” capital).
International Economic Cooperation
On March 16, 2020, the leaders of the G-7 countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
United Kingdom, and the United States) held an emergency summit by teleconference to discuss
and coordinate their policy responses to the economic fallout from the global spread of COVID-
19. In the joint statement released by the G-7 leaders after the emergency teleconference summit,
the leaders stressed they are committed to doing “whatever is necessary to ensure a strong global
response through closer cooperation and enhanced cooperation of efforts.”321 The countries
pledged to coordinate research efforts, increase the availability of medical equipment; mobilize
“the full range” of policy instruments, including monetary and fiscal measures as well as targeted
actions, to support workers, companies, and sectors most affected by the spread of COVID-19;
task the finance ministers to coordinate on a weekly basis, and direct the IMF and the World Bank
Group, as well as other international organizations, to support countries worldwide as part of a
coordinated global response.322
Saudi Arabia, the 2020 chair of the G-20, called an emergency G-20 summit on March 25 to
discuss a response to the pandemic.323 The G-20 is a broader group of economies, including the
G-7 countries and several major emerging markets.324 During the global financial crisis, world
leaders decided that henceforth the G-20 would be the premiere forum for international economic
cooperation. Some analysts have been surprised that the G-7 has been in front of the G-20 in

319 David Malpass, “Remarks to G20 Finance Ministers,” World Bank, April 15, 2020.
320 World Bank Group President David Malpass: Remarks to G20 Finance Ministers, April 15, 2020.
321 White House, G-7 Leaders’ Statement, March 16, 2020, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/g7-
leaders-statement/.
322 Ibid.
323 “Spain Says Saudi Arabia to Cal G-20 to Meet on Covid-19 in Coming Days,” Reuters, March 16, 2020.
324 The G-20 includes the G-7 countries plus Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia,
Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, and the European Union (EU).
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responding to COVID-19, while other analysts have questioned whether the larger size and
diversity of economies in the G-20 can make coordination more difficult.325
Analysts are hopeful that the recent G-7 summit, and a G-20 summit, will mark a shift towards
greater international cooperation at the highest (leader) levels in combatting the economic fallout
from the spread of COVID-19.326 An emergency meeting of G-7 finance ministers on March 3,
2020, fell short of the aggressive and concrete coordinated action that investors and economists
had been hoping for, and U.S. and European stock markets fell after the meeting.327 More
generally, governments have been divided over the appropriate response and in some cases have
acted unilaterally, particularly when closing borders and imposing export restrictions on medical
equipment and medicine. Some experts argue that a large, early, and coordinated response is
needed to address the economic fallout from COVID-19, but several concerns loom about the G-
20’s ability to deliver.328 Their concerns focus on the Trump Administration’s prioritization of an
“America First” foreign policy over one committed to multilateralism; the 2020 chair of the G-20,
Saudi Arabia, is embroiled in its own domestic political issues and oil price war; and U.S.-China
tensions make G-20 consensus more difficult.
Meanwhile, international organizations including the IMF and multilateral development banks,
have tried to forge ahead with economic support given their current resources. Additionally, the
Financial Stability Board (FSB), an international body including the United States that monitors
the global financial system and makes regulations to ensure stability, released a statement on
March 20, 2020, that its members are actively cooperating to maintain financial stability during
market stress related to COVID-19.329 The FSB is encouraging governments to use flexibility
within existing international standards to provide continued access to funding for market
participants and for businesses and households facing temporary difficulties from COVID-19,
while noting that many FSB members have already taken action to release available capital and
liquidity buffers.
Estimated Effects on Developed and Major
Economies
Among most developed and major developing economies, economic growth at the beginning of
2020 was tepid, but still was estimated to be positive. Countries highly dependent on trade—
Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, and South Korea—and commodity exporters are now
projected to be the most negatively affected by the slowdown in economic activity associated
with the pandemic.330 In addition, travel bans and quarantines continue to take heavy economic
toll on a broad range of countries. The OECD notes that production declines in China have
spillover effects around the world given China’s role in producing computers, electronics,

325 For more information about the G-20, see CRS Report R40977, International Economic Policy Coordination at the
G-7 and the G-20
, by Rebecca M. Nelson.
326 See for example, Jennifer Rankin, “EU Leaders Divided on How to Protect Economies after Covid-19,” The
Guardian
, March 14, 2020.
327 Jack Ewing and Jeanna Smialek, “Economic Powers Vow to Fight Crisis,” New York Times, March 3, 2020.
328 Matthew Goodman and Mark Sobel, “Time to Pull the G-20 Fire Bell,” Center for Strategic and International
Studies, March 18, 2020.
329 “FSB Coordinates Financial Sector Work to Buttress the Economy in Response to Covid-19,” Financial Stability
Board, Press Release 6/2020, March 20, 2020.
330 OECD Interim Economic Assessment, p. 7.
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pharmaceuticals and transport equipment, and as a primary source of demand for many
commodities.331 Across Asia, some forecasters argue that recent data indicate that Japan, South
Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam could experience an
economic recession in 2020.332
In early January 2020, before the COVID-19 outbreak, economic growth in developing
economies as a whole was projected by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to be slightly
more positive than in 2019. This outlook was based on progress being made in U.S.-China trade
talks that were expected to roll back some tariffs and an increase in India’s rate of growth.
Growth rates in Latin America and the Middle East were also projected to be positive in 2020.333
These projections likely will be revised downward due to the slowdown in global trade associated
with COVID-19, lower energy and commodity prices, an increase in the foreign exchange value
of the dollar, and other secondary effects that could curtail growth. Commodity exporting
countries, in particular, likely will experience a greater slowdown in growth than forecasted in
earlier projections as a result of a slowdown on trade with China and lower commodity prices.
Asian Development Bank 2020 Forecast
According to the Asian Development Bank’s (ADB) September 2020 forecast, GDP growth for
developing Asia is projected to contract by 0.7% in 2020, reportedly the first decline in economic
activity in the region in six decades, reflecting the slowdown in global trade and national
quarantines.334 Similar to other groups, the ADB’s forecasts indicate progressively more negative
rates of growth over the April through September period, while also forecasting a rebound in
growth rates in 2021, including a growth rate of 6.8% in developing Asia. Annual rates of growth
in three-fourths of the region’s economies are projected to decline in 2020.
ADB sub-regional forecasts indicate that East Asia is projected to experience an overall positive
rate of growth in 2020, primarily reflecting the dominating influence of the Chinese economy,
which is projected to grow by nearly 2% in 2020 and 7% in 2021 as indicated in Figure 23. In
contrast, Hong Kong, which had already experienced a slowing rate of growth primarily as a
result of domestic political turmoil and trade issues between the United States and China, was
projected to experience a 6.5% decline in economic growth in 2020, but rebound by 5.1% in
2021. South Asia, which includes India, is projected to experience a decline in its annual GDP
growth rate of 6.8% in 2020, but a positive rate of growth in 2021 by 7.1%, driven in part by a
turn-around in India’s growth rate from -9.0 in 2020 to a positive 8.0% in 2021. Countries in the
region have implemented different measures to contain the spread of the virus, reflecting
differences in the extent of viral infections. Across governments within the region, total fiscal
support totaled $3.6 trillion by the end of August 2020, divided between income support measures
and measures intended to support liquidity. Similar to other regions and countries, growth
prospects in developing Asia depend on the length and depth of the health crisis and the
protracted nature of trade tensions between the United States and China.

331 Ibid., p. 5.
332 Arnold, Martin Arnold and Valentina Romei, “European Factory Output Plummets as Covid-19 Shutdown Bites,”
Financial Times, April 1, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/8646c0ee-8fba-4e4c-a047-cf445ff41cf6.
333 Tentative Stabilization, Sluggish Recovery? World Economic Outlook Update, January 20, 2020, The International
Monetary Fund. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2020/01/20/weo-update-january2020.
334 Asian Development Outlook 2020 Update, Asian Development Bank, September 2020.
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Figure 23. Asian Development Bank 2020 and 2021 GDP Forecasts
In percentage change

Source: Asian Development Bank. Created by CRS.
Emerging Markets
The combined impact of COVID-19, an increase in the value of the dollar, and an oil price war
between Saudi Arabia and Russia are hitting developing and emerging economies hard. Not all of
these countries have the resources or policy flexibility to respond effectively. According to figures
compiled by the Institute for International Finance (IIF), cumulative capital outflows from
developing countries since January 2020 are double the level experienced during the 2008/2009
crisis and substantially higher than recent market events (Figure 24).335

335 These include concerns in 2015 over China’s renminbi devaluation and the so-called “Taper Tantrum” in 2013 when
the Federal Reserve announced that it would slow down the pace of its post global financial crisis asset purchases.
Sergei Lanau and Jonathan Fortun, “Economic Views—The COVID-19 Shock to EM Flows,” Institute for
International Finance, March 17, 2020.
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Figure 24. Capital Flows to Emerging Markets in Global Shocks

Source: Original graphic and data from International Institute for Finance using data from Haver. Edited by CRS
for clarification.
The impact of the price war and lower energy demand associated with a COVID-19-related
economic slowdown is especially hard on oil and gas exporters, some of whose currencies are at
record lows (Figure 25). Oil importers, such as South Africa and Turkey, have also been hit hard;
South Africa’s rand has fallen 18%336 against the dollar since the beginning of 2020 and the
Turkish lira has lost 8.5%.337 Some economists are concerned that the depreciation in currencies
could lead to rising rates of inflation by pushing up the prices of imports and negatively economic
growth rates in 2020.338
Depending on individual levels of foreign exchange reserves and the duration of the capital flow
slowdown, some countries may have sufficient buffers to weather the slowdown, while others
will likely need to make some form of current account adjustment (reduce spending, raise taxes,
etc.). Several countries, such as Iran and Venezuela, have already asked the IMF for financial
assistance and others are likely to follow.339 (Venezuela’s request was quickly rebuffed due to

336 Paul Wallace, “Here’s How the Oil Crash is Hitting Emerging Market Currencies,” Bloomberg, March 17, 2020,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-17/here-s-how-the-oil-crash-is-hitting-emerging-market-currencies.
337 Nevzat Devranoglu, “Turkish Lira Hits Weakest Level Since 2018 Currency Crisis Due to Covid-19,” Nasdaq,
March 17, 2020, https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/turkish-lira-hits-weakest-level-since-2018-currency-crisis-due-to-
Covid-19-2020-03-17.
338 Johnson, Steve, “Currency Sell-Off Threatens Emerging Market Response to Covid-19,” Financial Times, March 3,
2020. https://www.ft.com/content/94ad9d70-2ca2-4490-96fb-5b01b509ed37.
339 “COVID-19-Hit Iran Asks IMF for Aid amid US Sanctions,” Deutsche Walle, March 13, 2020,
https://www.dw.com/en/covid-19-hit-iran-asks-imf-for-aid-amid-us-sanctions/a-52763114. Iran is currently under U.S.
sanctions, which include, among other things, prohibitions on the ability of the United States to vote in favor of lending
IMF or World Bank assistance to Iran. The United States, however, cannot unilaterally block lending to a particular
country. Approving an IMF or World Bank loan requires a majority of the total voting power and the U.S. voting
power is 16.5% of the total voting power at the IMF and 15.4% at the World Bank. Iran has not borrowed from the IMF
since 1962, but did borrow from the World Bank between 2003 and 2005 over U.S. opposition.
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disagreement among the IMF membership over who is recognized as Venezuela’s legitimate
leader: Nicolás Maduro or Juan Guaidó.340)
Figure 25.Depreciation Against the Dollar Since January 1, 2020

Source: Created by CRS. Data from Bloomberg.
International Economic Cooperation
Initial efforts at coordinating the economic response to the COVID-19 pandemic across countries
have been uneven. Governments are divided over the appropriate response and in some cases
have acted unilaterally, particularly when closing borders and imposing export restrictions on
medical equipment and medicine. An emergency meeting of G-7 (Canada, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States) finance ministers on March 3, 2020, fell
short of the aggressive and concrete coordinated action that investors and economists had been
hoping for, and U.S. and European stock markets fell sharply after the meeting.341 However, on
March 16, 2020, the leaders of the G-7 countries held an emergency summit by teleconference to
discuss and coordinate their policy responses to the economic fallout from the global spread of
COVID-19. In the joint statement released by the G-7 leaders after the emergency teleconference
summit, the leaders stressed they are committed to doing “whatever is necessary to ensure a
strong global response through closer cooperation and enhanced cooperation of efforts.”342 The
countries pledged to coordinate research efforts, increase the availability of medical equipment;
mobilize “the full range” of policy instruments, including monetary and fiscal measures as well as
targeted actions, to support workers, companies, and sectors most affected by the spread of
COVID-19; task the finance ministers to coordinate on a weekly basis, and direct the IMF and the
World Bank Group, as well as other international organizations, to support countries worldwide
as part of a coordinated global response.343 G-7 coordination has not been unproblematic
however, including disagreement among G-7 foreign affairs ministers about how to refer to the
virus (coronavirus or the “Wuhan virus”) and concerns about collaboration on vaccine research.344

340 Joshua Goodman, “IMF Rejects Maduro’s Bid for Emergency Loan to Fight Virus,” StarTribune,
http://www.startribune.com/venezuela-seeks-emergency-5-billion-imf-loan-to-fight-virus/568868442/.
341 Jack Ewing and Jeanna Smialek, “Economic Powers Vow to Fight Crisis,” New York Times, March 3, 2020.
342 White House, G-7 Leaders’ Statement, March 16, 2020, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/g7-
leaders-statement/.
343 Ibid.
344 “Pompeo, G-7 Foreign Ministers Spar over ‘Wuhan Virus’,” Politico, March 25, 2020; Katrin Bennhold and David
E. Sanger, “U.S. Offered ‘Large Sum’ to German Company for Access to Coronavirus Vaccine Research, German
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The United States is chairing the G-7 in 2020, and while the June summit at Camp David had
been canceled due to concerns about COVID-19, on May 20, President Trump indicated that the
summit may be held after all.
The G-20, which has a broader membership of major advanced and emerging-market economies
representing 85% of world GDP, was slower to respond to the pandemic.345 Even though G-20
coordination is widely viewed as critical in the response to the global financial crisis of 2008-
2009, several factors may have complicated G-20 coordination in the current context: the Trump
Administration’s prioritization of an “America First” foreign policy over one committed to
multilateralism; the 2020 chair of the G-20, Saudi Arabia, is embroiled in its own domestic
political issues and oil price war; and U.S.-China tensions make G-20 consensus more difficult.346
The G-20 held a summit by teleconference on March 26, 2020, but the resulting communique was
criticized for failing to include concrete action items beyond what national governments were
already doing.347 However, G-20 coordination appears to be gaining momentum, most notably
with the G-20 agreement on debt relief for low-income countries (see “Looming Debt Crises and
Debt Relief Efforts”
).
Meanwhile, international organizations including the IMF and multilateral development banks,
have tried to forge ahead with economic support given their current resources. Additionally, the
Financial Stability Board (FSB), an international body including the United States that monitors
the global financial system and makes regulations to ensure stability, released a statement on
March 20, 2020, that its members are actively cooperating to maintain financial stability during
market stress related to COVID-19.348 The FSB is encouraging governments to use flexibility
within existing international standards to provide continued access to funding for market
participants and for businesses and households facing temporary difficulties from COVID-19,
while noting that many FSB members have already taken action to release available capital and
liquidity buffers.
Looming Debt Crises and Debt Relief Efforts
COVID-19 could trigger a wave of defaults around the world.349 In Q3 2019—before the
outbreak of COVID-19—global debt levels reached an all-time high of nearly $253 trillion, about
320% of global GDP.350 About 70% of global debt is held by advanced economies and about 30%
is held by emerging markets. Globally, most debt is held by nonfinancial corporations (29%),
governments (27%) and financial corporations (24%), followed by households (19%). Debt in

Officials Say,” New York Times, March 15, 2020.
345 The G-20 includes the G-7 countries plus Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia,
Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, and the European Union (EU).
346 Matthew Goodman and Mark Sobel, “Time to Pull the G-20 Fire Bell,” Center for Strategic and International
Studies, March 18, 2020.
347 Matthew Goodman, Stephanie Segal, and Mark Sobel, “Assessing the G20 Virtual Summit,” Center for Strategic
and International Studies, March 27, 2020.
348 “FSB Coordinates Financial Sector Work to Buttress the Economy in Response to Covid-19,” Financial Stability
Board, Press Release 6/2020, March 20, 2020.
349 John Plender, “The Seeds of the Next Debt Crisis,” Financial Times, March 4, 2020.
350 Emre Tiftik, Khadija Mahmood, Jadranka Poljak, and Sonja Gibbs, “Global Debt Monitor: Sustainability Matters,”
Institute for International Finance, January 13, 2020.This includes debt held by governments, financial institutions,
nonfinancial institutions, and households.
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emerging markets has nearly doubled since 2010, primarily driven by borrowing from state-
owned enterprises.
High debt levels make borrowers vulnerable to shocks that disrupt revenue and inflows of new
financing. The disruption in economic activity associated with COVID-19 is a wide-scale
exogenous shock that will make it significantly more difficult for many private borrowers
(corporations and households) and public borrowers (governments) around the world to repay
their debts. COVID-19 has hit the revenue of corporations in a range of industries: factories are
ceasing production, brick-and-mortar retail stores and restaurants are closing, commodity prices
have plunged (Bloomberg commodity price index—a basket of oil, metals, and food prices—has
dropped 27% since the start of the year and is now at its lowest level since 1986), and overseas
and in some cases domestic travel is being curtailed.351 Some governments, including Argentina
and Lebanon, were already experiencing debt pressures, which have been exacerbated by the
pandemic. Other countries are facing new debt pressures created by the pandemic, while some
countries, such as Abu Dhabi and Egypt, have completed successful sovereign bond sales since
the outbreak of the pandemic.352
Households are facing a rapid increase in unemployment and, in many developing countries, a
decline in remittances. With fewer resources, corporations and households may default on their
debts, absent government intervention. These defaults will result in a decline in bank assets,
making it difficult for banks to extend new loans during the crisis or, more severely, creating
solvency problems for banks. Meanwhile, many governments are dramatically increasing
spending to combat the pandemic, and are likely to face sharp reductions in revenue, putting
pressure on public finances and raising the likelihood of sovereign (government) defaults. Debt
dynamics are particularly problematic in emerging economies, where debt obligations
denominated in foreign currencies (usually U.S. dollars). Many emerging market currencies have
depreciated since the outbreak of the pandemic, raising the value of their debts in terms of local
currency.
Governments will face difficult choices if there is a widespread wave of defaults. Most
governments have signaled a commitment to or already implemented policies to support those
economically impacted by the pandemic. These governments face decisions about the type of
assistance to provide (loans versus direct payments), the amount of assistance to provide, how to
allocate rescue funds, and what conditions if any to attach to funds. Governments have
undertaken extraordinary fiscal and monetary measures to combat the crisis. However,
developing countries that are constrained by limited financial resources and where health systems
could quickly become overloaded are particularly vulnerable.
In terms of defaults by governments (sovereign defaults), emergency assistance is generally
provided by the IMF, and sometimes paired with additional rescue funds from other governments
on a bilateral basis. The IMF and other potential donor countries will need to consider whether
the IMF has adequate resources to respond to the crisis, how to allocate funding if the demand for
funding exceeds the amount available, what conditions should be attached to rescue funding, and
whether IMF programs should be paired with a restructuring of the government’s debt (“burden
sharing” with private investors).
International efforts are underway to help the most vulnerable developing countries grapple with
debt pressures. In mid-April 2020, the IMF tapped its Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust
(CRRT), funded by donor countries, to provide grants to cover the debt payments of 25 poor and

351 “Covid-19 Worsens Debt Crisis in Poor Countries,” Jubilee Debt Campaign, March 22, 2020.
352 Trieu Pham, “EM Sovereign Debt Issuance: Encouraging Signs but Not Yet Back to Business as Usual,” ING, May
26, 2020.
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vulnerable countries to the IMF for six months. The IMF hopes that additional donor
contributions will allow this debt service relief to be extended for two years. Additionally, the G-
20 finance ministers agreed to suspend debt service payments for the world’s poorest countries
through the end of 2020. The Institute for International Finance (IIF), which represents 450
banks, hedge funds, and other global financial funds, also announced that private creditors will
join the debt relief effort on a voluntary basis. This debt standstill will free up more than $20
billion for these countries to spend on improving their health systems and fighting the
pandemic.353 Private sector commitments were critical for official creditors, so that developing
countries could redirect funds to improving health systems rather than repaying private creditors.
However, the debt standstill is complicated. There is debate among creditor governments about
what debts should be included in the standstill, and how it can be enforced. On May 1, the IIF in a
letter laid out some of the obstacles facing private sector participation in the debt still, including
reliance on “voluntary” participation, each participating creditor will need to make its own
assessments, the standstill could require a lengthy contract-by-contract approach, and the
participating borrowing countries may face risks, such as rating downgrades and inability to
borrow from financial markets (often referred to as “loss of market access”). Some economists
have characterized the letter as a list of reasons private creditors may cite as justification for their
refusal to participate in the debt standstill.354 Reportedly, some African countries are opting to
negotiate debt relief individually with China and other creditor nations because of concerns they
will be blocked from financial markets if they participate in the G-20 debt standstill.355
Other Affected Sectors
Public concerns over the spread of the virus led to self-quarantines, reductions in airline and
cruise liner travel, the closing of such institutions as the Louvre, and the rescheduling of theatrical
releases of movies, including the sequel in the iconic James Bond series (titled, “No Time to
Die”).356 School closures have affected 1.5 billion children worldwide, challenging parental leave
policies.357 Other countries limited the size of public gatherings.
Some businesses are considering new approaches to managing their workforces and work
methods. These techniques build on, or in some places replace, such standard techniques as self-
quarantines and travel bans. Some firms are adopting an open-leave policy to ensure employees
receive sick pay if they are, or suspect they are, infected. Other firms are adopting paid sick leave
policies to encourage sick employees to stay home and are adopting remote working policies.358

353 Davide Barbuscia, Marwa Rashad, and Andrea Shalal, “G20 Countries Agree Debt Freeze for World’s Poorest
Countries,” Reuters, April 15, 2020
354 Patrick Bolton, Lee Buchheit, Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, et. al, “Sovereign Debt Standstills: An Update” VoxEU,
May 28, 2020.
355 Jevans Nyabiage, “All Eyes on China as Africa Spurns G20 Debt Relief Plan,” South China Morning Post, May 26,
2020.
356 Rosenberg, Alyssa, “Covid-19 Shut Down Mona Lisa and James Bond. We Can’t Let it Isolate Us,” Washington
Post,
March 4, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/03/04/Covid-19-shut-down-mona-lisa-james-
bond-we-cant-let-it-isolate-us/.
357 Taylor, Adam, Teo Armus, Rick Noak, “Covid-19 Turmoil Widens as U.S. Death Toll Mounts; Xi Cancels Japan
Trip,” Washington Post, March 5, 2020; Strauss, Valerie, “1.5 Billion Children Around Globe Affected by School
Closure. What Countries Are Doing to Keep Kids Learning During Pandemic,” Washington Post, March 27, 2020.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2020/03/26/nearly-14-billion-children-around-globe-are-out-school-heres-
what-countries-are-doing-keep-kids-learning-during-pandemic/.
358 Hill, Andrew and Emma Jacobs, “Covid-19 May Create Lasting Workplace Change,” Financial Times, February 27,
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Microsoft and Amazon initially instructed all of their Seattle-based employees to work from
home until the end of March 2020, but Microsoft indicated in October it would allow a large
share of its employees to work from home permanently.359
The drop in business and tourist travel caused a sharp drop in scheduled airline flights by as much
as 10%; airlines estimated they lost $113 billion in 2020 (an estimate that could prove optimistic
given the Trump Administration’s announced restrictions on flights from Europe to the United
States and the growing list of countries that are similarly restricting flights),360 while airports in
Europe estimated they lost $4.3 billion in revenue due to fewer flights.361 Industry experts
estimated that many airlines could face bankruptcy in 2020 under current conditions as a result of
travel restrictions imposed by a growing number of countries.362 The loss of Chinese tourists was
another economic blow to countries in Asia and elsewhere that benefitted from the growing
market for Chinese tourists and the stimulus such tourism provided.
The decline in industrial activity reduced demand for energy products such as crude oil, causing
prices to drop sharply, which negatively affects energy producers, renewable energy producers,
and electric vehicle manufacturers, but generally is positive for consumers and businesses. Saudi
Arabia pushed other OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) members
collectively to reduce output by 1.5 million barrels a day to raise market prices. U.S. shale oil
producers, who are not represented by OPEC, support the move to raise prices.363 An
unwillingness by Russia to agree to output reductions added to other downward pressures on oil
prices and caused Saudi Arabia to engage in a price war with Russia that drove oil prices below
$25 per barrel at times, half the estimated $50 per barrel break-even point for most oil producing
countries.364 Rising oil supplies and falling demand combined to create an estimated surplus of 25
million barrels a day and overwhelmed storage capacity at times and challenged the viability of
U.S. shale oil production.365 In 2019, low energy prices combined with high debt levels reportedly
caused U.S. energy producers to reduce their spending on capital equipment, reduced their profits
and, in some cases, led to bankruptcies.366 Reportedly, in late 2019 and early 2020, bond and

2020. https://www.ft.com/content/5801a710-597c-11ea-abe5-8e03987b7b20.
359 Armus, Teo, “Live Updates: Covid-19 Turmoil Widens as U.S. Death Toll Mounts; Xi Cancels Japan Trip,”
Washington Post
, March 5, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/03/05/Covid-19-live-updates/.
360 Taylor, Adam, “Airlines Could Suffer up to $113 Billion in Lost Revenue Due to Covid-19 Crisis, IATA Says,”
Washington Post
, March 5, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/03/05/Covid-19-live-updates/.
361 “Airlines Slash Flights to Cut Costs as Covid-19 Hits Travel Demand,” Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/
content/c28b5790-62c6-11ea-a6cd-df28cc3c6a68.
362 Smyth, Jamie Smyth, Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson, Peggy Hollinger, Myles McCormick, David Keohane, and
Richard Milne, “Most Airlines Face Bankruptcy by End of May, Industry Body Warns,” Financial Times, March 16,
2020.
363 Brower, Derek, “Cash-Strapped US Shale Producers Pray for OPEC Aid,” Financial Times, March 3, 2020.
https://www.ft.com/content/9161e62c-5cb1-11ea-b0ab-339c2307bcd4.
364 Strauss, Delphine, “Why There Are No Winners from the Oil Price Plunge This Time,” Financial Times, March 10,
2020. https://www.ft.com/content/da2b0700-622c-11ea-b3f3-fe4680ea68b5; Mufson, Steve and Will Englund, “Oil
Price War Threatens Widespread Collateral Damage,” Washington Post, March 10, 2020.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/oil-price-war-threatens-widespread-collateral-damage/2020/03/
09/3e42c9e2-6207-11ea-acca-80c22bbee96f_story.html.
365 Sheppard, David and Derek Brower, “U.S. Crude Oil Price Drops Below $20,” Financial Times, March 29, 2020.
https://www.ft.com/content/bc938195-82d3-43eb-b031-740028451382.
366 “Texas Oil Groups: Panhandling Ahead,” The Financial Times, January 20, 2020.
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equity investors, as well as banks, reduced their lending to shale oil producers and other energy
producers that typically use oil and gas reserves as collateral.367
Disruptions to industrial activity in China reportedly caused delays in shipments of computers,
cell phones, toys, and medical equipment.368 Factory output in China, the United States, Japan,
and South Korea all declined in the first months of 2020.369 Reduced Chinese agricultural exports,
including to Japan, are leading to shortages in some commodities. In addition, numerous auto
producers have faced shortages in parts and other supplies that have been sourced in China.
Reductions in international trade have also affected ocean freight prices. Some freight companies
argue they could be forced to shutter if prices did not rebound quickly.370 Disruptions in the
movements of goods and people reportedly caused some companies to reassess how international
they want their supply chains to be.371 According to some estimates, nearly every member of the
Fortune 1000 has been affected by disruptions in production in China.372
Conclusions
The quickly evolving nature of the COVID-19 crisis continues to raise a number of issues that
make it difficult to estimate the full cost to global economic activity. These issues include, but are
not limited to the following:
 How long will the crisis last?
 How many workers will be affected both temporarily and permanently?
 How many countries will be infected and how much economic activity will be
reduced?
 When will the economic effects peak?
 How much economic activity will be lost in the short run and over the long term
as a result of the viral outbreak?
 What have been the most effective monetary and fiscal policies at the national
and global level to address the crisis?
 Will the crisis have temporary or permanent effects on how businesses organize
their work forces?
 Many of the public health measures taken by countries such as Italy, Taiwan,
South Korea, Hong Kong, and China have sharply impacted their economies
(with plant closures, travel restrictions, and so forth). How are government and
policymakers weighing the tradeoffs between public health and the economic
impact of policies to contain the spread of the virus?

367 Ibid.
368 Hille, Kathrin, Alistair Gray, and Patrick McGee, “Covid-19 Delays PC and Smartphone Shipments for Weeks,”
Financial Times, March3, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/72742872-5c31-11ea-b0ab-339c2307bcd4.
369 Newmyer, Tory, “The Finance 202: Stocks Stage Major Comeback, but Manufacturing Report Points to Continued
Covid-19 Pain,” Washington Post, March 3, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-
finance-202/2020/03/03/the-finance-202-stocks-stage-major-comeback-but-manufacturing-report-points-to-continued-
Covid-19-pain/5e5d84a6602ff10d49ac081f/?itid=hp_hp-cards_hp-card-politics%3Ahomepage%2Fcard-ans.
370 Lynch, David J., “Economic Fallout from China’s Covid-19 Mounts Around the World,” Washington Post,
February 13, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/economic-fallout-from-chinas-Covid-19-
mounts-across-the-globe/2020/02/13/7bb69a12-4e8c-11ea-9b5c-eac5b16dafaa_story.html?itid=lk_inline_manual_12
371 Ibid.
372 Ibid.
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Appendix A. Fiscal and Monetary Policy Actions by
National Governments: Monthly Chronology

April 2020
The Federal Reserve announced on April 8 that it was establishing a facility to fund small
businesses through the Paycheck Protection Program. Japan also announced that it was preparing
to declare areas around Tokyo to be in a state of emergency and that it would adopt a $989 billion
funding package.373
On April 9, OPEC and Russia agreed to cut oil production by 10 million barrels per day.374 On
April 15, G-20 finance ministers and central bank governors announced their support for the
proposed agreement by Saudi Arabia and Russia to reduce oil production.375 They also announced
an agreement to freeze government loan payments until the end of the year to help low-income
developing countries address the pandemic and asked international financial institutions to do
likewise.376 G-7 finance ministers and central bank governors agreed to support the G-20 proposal
to suspend debt payments by developing countries.377 Eurozone finance ministers announced a
€500 billion (about $550 billion) emergency spending package to support governments,
businesses, and workers. Reportedly, the measure will provide funds to the European Stability
Mechanism, the European Investment Bank, and for unemployment insurance.378
In other policy areas, the IMF announced that it was doubling its emergency lending capability to
$100 billion, in response to requests from more than 100 countries for assistance.379 The Bank of
England announced that it would take the unprecedented move of temporarily directly financing
UK government emergency spending needs through monetary measures rather than through the
typical method of issuing securities to fight the effects of COVID-19.380 Secretary-General of the
United Nations Guterres declared on April 9, 2020, before the United Nations Security Council
that the pandemic posed a significant threat to the maintenance of international peace and security
and outlined eight specific risks, including the erosion of trust in public institutions, increased
risks from terrorism and bioterrorism, and worsening existing human rights abuses.381

373 Takeo, Yuko and Yoshiaki Nohara, “Japan’s Virus Stimulus Package to Come in Two Phases,” Bloomberg, April 5,
2020. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-06/japan-s-virus-stimulus-package-to-come-in-two-phases-
documents-k8nuj552.
374 Sheppard, David, Anjli Raval, Derek Brower, and Henry Foy, “G20 Ministers Meet to Endorse OPEC-Russia Deal
to Slash Oil Production,” Financial Times, April 10, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/c7a1e2e6-8c17-48d5-8c16-
edce911b5cbb.
375 Sheppard, David, Anjli Raval, Derek Brower. and Henry Foy, G20 Backs Largest Oil Supply Agreement in History,
Financial Times, April 15, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/16ac91d8-42bf-4190-88de-f3d89b2b36f4.
376 England, Andrew, Jonathan Wheatley and James Politi, G20 Agrees Debt Relief for Low Income Nations, Financial
Times
, April 15, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/5f296d54-d29e-4e87-ae7d-95ca6c0598d5.
377 Politi, James and Jonathan Wheatley, G7 Countries Back Debt Relief For Poorest Nations, Financial Times, April
14, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/c384ed59-1ca3-476f-9b89-eaf5cf31e42c.
378 Fleming, Sam and Mehreen Khan, “Eurozone Countries Strike Emergency Deal on Coronavirus Rescue,” Financial
Times
, April 9, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/b984101a-42b8-40db-9a92-6786aec2ba5c.
379 Politi, James, “IMF Boosts Emergency Lending Capacity to $100bn,” Financial Times, April 9, 2020.
https://www.ft.com/content/e46faadc-456b-4cf8-a2fd-2017702747ab.
380 Giles, Chris and Philip Georgiadis, “Bank of England to Directly Finance UK Government’s Extra Spending,”
Financial Times, April 9, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/664c575b-0f54-44e5-ab78-2fd30ef213cb.
381 Secretary-General’s Remarks to the Security Council on the COVID-19 Pandemic [as delivered], United Nations,
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Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell, stating that the U.S. economy was deteriorating “with
alarming speed,” announced on April 10 that the Fed would provide an additional $2.3 trillion in
loans, including a new financial facility to assist firms by acquiring shares in exchange traded
funds that own the debt of lower-rated, riskier firms that are among the most exposed to
deteriorating economic conditions associated with COVID-19 and low oil prices.382 On April 16,
the U.S. Labor Department reported that 5.2 million Americans filed for unemployment insurance
during the previous week, raising the total claims since mid-March to over 22 million.383
According to Chinese official statistics, the Chinese economy shrank by 6.8% on an annual basis
during the first quarter of 2020, reportedly the first such contraction in 40 years.384
Financial market indicators rose on April 17, reportedly on an upbeat sentiment that actions taken
by the Federal Reserve and other central banks would stabilize conditions in the corporate credit
market.385 The price of futures contracts for oil delivery in May 2020 for the U.S. West Texas
Intermediate (WTI) fell to $18 per barrel, the lowest it had been since 2002, reportedly reflecting
rising inventories and low global demand.386 Leaders of emerging economies in Latin America
and Africa argued that the G-20 call for suspension of interest payments fell short of what is
needed. National leaders from Columbia, Brazil, Mexico, and Chile encouraged the World Bank,
the InterAmerican Development Bank, and the IMF to double their net lending to Latin America,
arguing that, “The Covid-19 pandemic is a shock of unprecedented magnitude, uncertain duration
and catastrophic consequences that, if not properly addressed, could lead to one of the most tragic
episodes in the history of Latin America and the Caribbean.”387
The price of oil fell to its lowest level in two decades on April 19, reportedly reflecting a
significant drop in global demand for energy and rising inventories.388 Some Eurozone members
reportedly argued for the ECB to create a Eurozone “bad bank” to remove billions of euros in
nonperforming debts from banks’ balance sheets to provide more capacity for Eurozone banks at
a potentially critical time when banks could see an increase in nonperforming loans.389 The World
Bank confirmed that its “pandemic bonds” would pay out $133 billion to the poorest countries
affected by the pandemic.390

April 9, 2020. https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2020-04-09/secretary-generals-remarks-the-security-
council-the-covid-19-pandemic-delivered.
382 Rennison, Joe, Robin Wigglesworth, and Colby Smith, “Federal Reserve Enters New Territory with Support for
Risky Debt,” Financial Times, April 10, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/c0b78bc9-0ea8-461c-a5a2-89067ca94ea4.
Heather Long, “Fed Chair Powell Says U.S. Economy Deteriorating ‘With Alarming Speed,’” Washington Post, April
9, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/04/09/federal-reserve-unveils-over-2-trillion-new-lending-
small-businesses-city-governments-big-firms/.
383 Unemployment Insurance Weekly Claims, Department of Labor, April 16, 2020. https://www.dol.gov/ui/data.pdf.
384 Hale, Thomas, Xinning Liu, and Yuan Yang, China’s Economy Shrinks for First Time in Four Decades, Financial
Times,
April 17, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/8f941520-67ad-471a-815a-d6ba649d22ed.
385 Smith, Colby, Myles McCormick, Tommy Stubbington, and Hudson Lockett, US Stocks Extend Rally With Central
Bank Safety Net, Financial Times, April 17, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/5ebbc2d8-ade3-4d5c-86f5-
49b9478fe03d.
386 Sheppard, David, US Crude Tumbles to 18-year Low as Supply Overwhelms Demand, Financial Times, April 17,
2020. https://www.ft.com/content/d0a0cfc3-765c-4b55-ada7-11e0d378d406.
387 Wheatley, Jonathan, Michael Stott, and David Pilling, Emerging Economies Call for More Financial Help After G20
Deal, Financial Times, April 17, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/203ed8f5-6bb2-4016-80a9-dd99269bfa26.
388 Lockett, Hudson Lockett and David Sheppard, US Oil Price Plunges to 20-year Low as Coronavirus Hits Demand,
Financial Times, April 19, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/a5292644-958d-4065-92e8-ace55d766654.
389 Arnold, Martin and Javier Espinoza, ECB Pushes for Eurozone Bad Bank to Clean up Soured Loans, Financial
Times
, April 19, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/15d17d1d-8e1b-4f84-97b4-b62e6ae8f962.
390 Gross, Anna, World Bank Pandemic Bonds to Pay $133m to Poorest Virus-hit Nations, Financial Times, April 19,
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On April 21, Agricultural Ministers of the G-20 countries released a joint statement that supported
measures to “ensure the health, safety, welfare, and mobility of workers in agriculture and
throughout the food supply chain.” The joint statement also indicated that the G-20 countries
would adopt measures that are “targeted, proportionate, transparent, and temporary, and that they
do not create unnecessary barriers to trade or disruption to global food supply chains.” The
statement also indicated that the G-20 would, “guard against any unjustified restrictive measures
that could lead to excessive food price volatility in international markets and threaten the food
security and nutrition of large proportions of the world population, especially the most vulnerable
living in environments of low food security.”391
On April 23, the House passed H.R. 266 (P.L. 116-139), the Paycheck Protection Program and
Health Care Enhancement Act, following similar actions by the Senate the previous day. The
measure provided $484 billion for small business loans, health care providers, and COVID-19
testing. The U.S. Labor Department reported that 4.4 million Americans filed for unemployment
insurance in the previous week, raising the total that have applied to over 26 million.392 Indicators
of manufacturing and services activity in Europe dropped to their lowest level since 1990,
reflecting the impact of the pandemic on the European economy.393 The Bank of England
indicated that it would quadruple its borrowing over the second quarter of 2020, reflecting a
contraction in the UK economy, lower tax revenues, and increased financial demands to support
fiscal policy measures to fight the pandemic.394 The Saudi Presidency of the G-20 called on
international organizations on April 24 to fund an emergency response to the pandemic. The Bank
of Japan announced on April 27 that it would purchase unlimited amounts of government bonds
and quadruple its purchases of corporate debt to keep interest rates low and stimulate the
Japanese economy.395
At its April 29 scheduled meeting, the U.S. Federal Open Market Committee left its main interest
rates unchanged, but reiterated its commitment to use “its full range of tools to support the U.S.
economy.” The policy statement concluded that, “The ongoing public health crisis will weigh
heavily on economic activity, employment, and inflation in the near term, and poses considerable
risks to the economic outlook over the medium term.”396 The Federal Reserve also announced a
change in its eligibility requirements for a $500 billion lending program for municipalities. The
statement followed the release of the preliminary estimate of U.S. first quarter GDP, which
indicated that the economy had contracted by an annualized rate of 4.8% (revised to 5.0%).397
On April 30, the Department of Labor released its weekly data on applications for unemployment
insurance, which indicated that an additional 3.8 million people had filed for unemployment

2020. https://www.ft.com/content/c8556c9f-72f7-48b4-91bf-c9e32ddab6ff.
391 G20 Extraordinary Agriculture Ministers Meeting: Statement on COVID-19, G-20, April 21, 2020. https://g20.org/
en/media/Pages/pressroom.aspx.
392 Unemployment Insurance Weekly Claims, April 23, 2020. https://www.dol.gov/ui/data.pdf.
393 Arnold, Martin and Valentina Romei, European Business Activity Crashes Under Coronavirus Lockdowns,
Financial Times, April 23, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/8520895f-3249-4a8b-b0e5-881a64e77971.
394 Giles, Chris, and Tommy Stubbington, UK Treasury to Quadruple Borrowing to £180bn Over Next Quarter,
Financial Times, April 23, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/8886e002-c260-4daa-8b7b-509b3f7e6edb.
395 Harding, Robin, Bank of Japan Steps up Coronavirus Stimulus With Bond-buying Pledge, Financial Times, April
27, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/7ba5c507-df9e-4107-87eb-73afa2c13e91.
396 Federal Reserve Issues FOMC Statement, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, April 29, 2020.
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20200429a.htm.
397 Gross Domestic Product, First Quarter 2020 (Advance Estimate), Bureau of Economic Analysis, April 29, 2020.
https://www.bea.gov/.
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insurance during the week, raising the total number who had applied to 30 million.398 The Federal
Reserve also announced an expansion in its medium-size business loan program by allowing
firms with up to 15,000 employees or with revenues up to $5 billion to access a new $600 billion
program. In addition, the Fed lowered the minimum loan amount for small businesses and
announced a loan program to assist riskier businesses.399 At the same time, the ECB expanded a
record low-interest rate loan program for Eurozone banks to support economic activity, while
warning that the Eurozone economy could contract between 5% and 12% in 2020 as it faces, “an
economic contraction of a magnitude and speed that are unprecedented in peacetime.”400 The
ECB also announced a new nontargeted low-interest rate pandemic emergency longer-term
refinancing operation (PELTROs) to complement its Pandemic Emergency Refinance Operations
announced in March.401 House Speaker Pelosi stated that House Democrats were considering a $1
trillion spending bill to support state and local governments.402 In a development that seemed
incongruous with the broader economic situation, between April 1, 2020, and April 30, 2020, the
DJIA rose more than 3,400 points, or 16%, marking the strongest monthly increase since 1987.403
May 2020
On May 5, Germany’s Constitutional court issued a ruling that could prevent the German central
bank, the Bundesbank, from making additional bond purchases under the Pandemic Emergency
Purchase Program (PEPP). The ECB’s program is intended to ease borrowing costs across the
Eurozone to stimulate economic growth.
The U.S. Census Bureau reported on May 5 that U.S. exports and imports fell in March; exports
fell by a greater amount than imports, thereby increasing the monthly U.S. goods and services
trade deficit. The trade balance for March was -$44.5 billion, an increase of about $4.6 billion
over the trade deficit in February. The decline in export and import values reflected lower imports
and exports of both goods and services.
On May 6, the European Commission released its spring economic forecast, which indicated that
economic activity in the EU would decline by 7.4% in 2020 as a result of measures to contain the
pandemic. The Commission forecast that economic growth would advance by 6.0% in 2021,
assuming the containment measures can be lifted gradually, the viral effects remain contained,
and that the fiscal and monetary measures implemented by the EU members are effective in
blunting the negative effects on economies.404 On May 7, the Labor Department announced that

398 Unemployment Insurance Weekly Claims, April 30, 2020. https://www.dol.gov/ui/data.pdf.
399 Politi, James, Colby Smith and Robert Armstrong, Federal Reserve Extends $600bn Main Street Lending Program.
Financial Times, April 30, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/46fdc853-1d7d-49af-93e8-f12e0d006fc2.
400 Introductory Statement, European Central Bank, April 29, 2020. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2020/
html/ecb.is200430~ab3058e07f.en.html.
401 Arnold, Martin and Tommy Stubbington, ECB Launches Fresh Push to Lend to Banks at Ultra-low Rates, Financial
Times
, April 30, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/cef090d0-97dc-4e75-a4b1-deebfd4afacf.
402 Werner, Erica, Pelosi Points to $1 Trillion Need for State and Local Governments in Next Coronavirus Bill,
Washington Post, April 30, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2020/04/30/congress-coronavirus-
economy/.
403 Henderson, Richard Henderson, Robin Wigglesworth, and Katie Martin, U.S. Stocks Close Out Best Month Since
1987 in Global Rebound, Financial Times, April 30, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/88e57ec9-42d4-455d-a045-
293a6a54837d.
404 European Economic Forecast Spring 2020, European Commission, May 2020. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/
presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_799.
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2.7 million Americans had filed for unemployment insurance during the week, raising the total
that had filed over the previous seven weeks to 33 million.405
On May 8, the U.S. Department of Labor announced that 20.5 million Americans had lost their
jobs in April, pushing the national unemployment rate to 14.5%. Despite the rise in the
unemployment rate, the DJIA rose by 2.0%, reportedly based on optimism that the monetary
policy actions the Federal Reserve, the ECB, and the Bank of Japan had taken to support financial
markets would stabilize and stimulate the markets and optimism that the health crisis is ebbing.406
On May 12, House Democrats introduced H.R. 6800, the Heroes Act, to provide a $3 trillion
supplemental spending bill for additional financial resources to state and local governments and
for other purposes. The measure passed the House on May 15 and was sent to the Senate for
consideration. On May 13, the UK Office of National Statistics reported that UK GDP contracted
by 2.0% in the first quarter, the largest decline in the UK’s GDP since 2008 with all major
economic sector affected.407 On May 14, the U.S. Department of Labor announced that an
additional 2.4 million Americans had filed for unemployment insurance during the previous
week, increasing the total number filing for unemployment insurance over the previous eight
weeks to 36 million.408
On May 18, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron
proposed a €500 billion (about $620 billion) EU recovery fund in an effort to gain a coordinated
EU fiscal response to the pandemic.409
The Department of Labor announced on May 21 that an additional 2.4 million Americans had
filed for Unemployment Insurance, raising the total to 38.4 million over the previous nine
weeks.410
On May 27, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen proposed a €750 billion
(about $825 billion) coronavirus recovery plan to provide loans and grants to the hardest hit EU
economies and changes to the EU budget. The Japanese Cabinet proposed a second supplemental
appropriation measure that includes $296 billion in spending and a total value of about $1.1
trillion in loans and guarantees, funded through new bonds.411
On May 28, the Department of Labor announced that an additional 1.9 million (revised)
Americans filed for Unemployment Insurance, raising the ten-week total to 42.6 million.412
June 2020
On June 4, the U.S. Census Bureau reported that U.S. imports fell by 13.7% and exports fell by
20.5% in April, increasing the monthly current account deficit and registering the largest decline

405 Unemployment Insurance Weekly Claims, May 5, 2020. https://www.dol.gov/ui/data.pdf.
406 Platt, Eric, Colby Smith, Adam Samson, and Hudson Lockett, Wall Street closes higher despite dire US jobs data,
Financial Times, May 8, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/a9999ef1-1373-41b7-8d55-d780fd06825d.
407 GDP Monthly Estimate, UK: March 2020, Office for National Statistics, May 13, 2020. https://www.ons.gov.uk/
economy/grossdomesticproductgdp/bulletins/gdpmonthlyestimateuk/march2020.
408 Unemployment Insurance Weekly Claims, May 14, 2020. https://www.dol.gov/ui/data.pdf.
409 Fleming, Sam, Victor Mallet, and Guy Chazan, Germany and France Unite in Call for €500 Billion Europe
Recovery Fund, Financial Times, May 18, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/c23ebc5e-cbf3-4ad8-85aa-032b574d0562.
410 Unemployment Insurance Weekly Claims, May 21, 2020. https://www.dol.gov/ui/data.pdf.
411 Harding, Robin, Japan’s Cabinet Approves Extra $1.1 Trillion Budget to Counter Recession, Financial Times, May
27, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/ce7f3564-c997-339c-ad3d-c6d092fb7f1e.
412 Unemployment Insurance Weekly Claims, May 29, 2020. https://www.dol.gov/ui/data.pdf.
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in U.S. trade since the global financial crisis.413 In addition, the Labor Department announced that
an additional 1.9 million Americans filed for unemployment insurance, increasing the 11-week
total to 44 million.414 The European Central Bank announced that it would double to $1.5 trillion
its Pandemic Emergency Purchase Program to stimulate the European economy.415 The DJIA rose
by more than 800 points on June 5 as a positive jobs report, apparently signaling to some that the
U.S. economy would recover quickly from the pandemic-driven economic downturn.416 OPEC
and Russia reportedly agreed on June 7 to maintain their cuts in oil production for one additional
month in an effort to raise international oil prices.417
On June 8, the DJIA rose nearly 2% reportedly on positive jobs data, extending gains in the value
of the index and rising to its highest level since late February.418 Most foreign markets indices
similarly rose. The World Bank forecasted that emerging and developing economies would
contract in 2020 for the first time in 60 years.419
On June 11, the DJIA fell by more than 1,800 points, or 6.9% reportedly on fears that a spike in
new coronavirus cases signaled the pandemic was not contained and over concerns about U.S.
economic growth as a result of projections by the Federal Reserve that were interpreted as
gloomy.420 The Labor Department reported that an additional 1.57 million Americans filed for
unemployment insurance during the previous week, raising the 12-week total from mid-March to
44 million Americans.421 According to a report by Eurostat on June 12, industrial production in
the Eurozone fell by 17.1% in April, reportedly the largest decline in production recorded since
records began in 1991. The decline reflects lower levels of economic activity in manufacturing
and construction throughout the Eurozone.422 The Federal Reserve released its semi-annual
Monetary Policy Report.423
The Institute of International Finance reported on June 15, that capital outflows from developing
economies had reversed with funds flowing back into developing economies, primarily by bond
issuance through the international bond market, rather than by refinancing existing debt.424

413 Monthly U.S. International Trade in Goods and Services in April 2020, U.S. Census Bureau, June 4, 2020.
https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/data/index.html.
414 Unemployment Insurance Weekly Claims, June 4, 2020. https://www.dol.gov/ui/data.pdf.
415 Arnold, Martin, ECB Boosts Bond-Buying Stimulus Package by €600, Financial Times, June 4, 2020.
https://www.ft.com/content/c59ab92d-e614-4284-a028-46ee3bcf92f9.
416 Telford, Taylor, and Thomas Heath, Dow Soars 1,000 Points as Wall Street Closes in on Pre-Pandemic Levels,
Washington Post
, June 5, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/06/05/stocks-market-today-
coronavirus-economy/.
417 Sheppard, David, Anjli Raval, and Derek Brower, OPEC and Russia Agree to Extend Record Oil Supply Cuts,
Financial Times, June 7, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/88747416-0fc4-4808-999f-753793589ca7.
418 Dempsey, Harry, Bryce Elder, and Hudson Lockett, U.S. Stocks Erase Losses for the Year, Financial Times, June 8,
2020. https://www.ft.com/content/1dfaeb58-6d65-4f17-b710-b1ebc6622649.
419 Politi, James, Emerging Economies Forecast to Shrink for First Time in 60 Years, Financial Times, June 8, 2020.
https://www.ft.com/content/47998ee3-b2d3-4066-a914-edbf60b797b5.
420 Seigel, Rachel and Thomas Heath, Dow Slides More Than 1,800 Points on Fears of Coronavirus Resurgence, More
Economic Pain, Washington Post, June 11, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/06/11/markets-
today-fed-coronavirus/.
421 Unemployment Insurance Weekly Claims, Department of Labor, June 11, 2020. https://www.dol.gov/ui/data.pdf.
422 Arnold, Martin, Eurozone Industrial Production Falls by Record 17.1% in April, Financial Times, June 12, 2020.
https://www.ft.com/content/e3301cd6-27ce-35f0-829a-c6613849b378.
423 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Monetary Policy Report, June 12, 2020.
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/2020-06-mpr-summary.htm
424 Wheatley, Jonathan, Developing Economies Borrow More Despite Debt Relief Initiative, Financial Times, June 15,
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In testimony before the Senate Banking Committee on June 17, Federal Reserve Chairman
Powell stressed that although there were positive signs that U.S. economic growth was beginning
to rebound, there was “significant uncertainty” about the timing and strength of the recovery.425
On June 17, the Bank of Japan announced that it was maintaining its low interest rates even as it
increased its coronavirus lending facility to $1 trillion.426 The U.S. Energy Information
Administration reported that U.S. crude oil production fell to its lowest point since March 2018,
while stockpiles reached record highs. The price of Brent crude reached $41 per barrel,
encouraging some U.S. producers to consider restarting wells that were closed when prices
dropped to around $20 per barrel.427
On June 18, the Department of Labor announced that an additional 1.54 million Americans filed
for unemployment during the week, raising the 13-week total to 45.7 million Americans.428
During May, U.S. retail sales increased by 17.7% as some businesses began reopening and
increasing optimism in financial markets that economic activity was on course for a quick
recovery. Concerns over trade disputes and a rise in new coronavirus cases, however, reportedly
overcame the optimism of increased sales and were factors in DJIA losses on June 24 of more
than 700 points. In addition, the IMF issued its updated economic outlook, forecasting that global
economic growth would contract by 4.9% in 2020, compared with an April forecast of a decline
of 3.0%.429
On June 25, the ECB and the German government announced they had reached a tentative accord
to end the conflict over the ECB’s bond-buying program.430 Elsewhere, the Labor Department
reported that an additional 1.48 million Americans filed for unemployment insurance, raising the
14-week total from mid-March to over 47 million.431 Between June 1 and June 26, the DJIA
posted 13 days with gains and 7 days of declines, with the DJIA value at the end of the period
nearly the same as it was in early March 2020. On June 24 and 26, the DJIA index fell by more
than 700 points, reportedly over investors’ concerns over a spike in new coronavirus cases in
various U.S. States.432 Also on June 25, the Federal Reserve announced the result of stress tests
on 33 U.S. banks under 3 scenarios433 to ascertain their capital sufficiency given the strains to the
financial system caused by COVID-19.434 The Fed reported that all large U.S. banks are

2020. https://www.ft.com/content/54c545aa-01b5-4e95-8adc-e680f5d82be1.
425 Powell, Jerome H., Semiannual Monetary Report to the Congress, June 16, 2020. https://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/testimony/powell20200616a.htm.
426 Harding, Robin, Bank of Japan Pledges $1 Trillion in Coronavirus Lending, Financial Times, June 17, 2020.
https://www.ft.com/content/5d8e5df2-dfb6-44f1-a434-ab8a745d37ba.
427 Brower, Derek, U.S. Oil Production Drops to Lowest Point Since 2018, Financial Times, June 17, 2020.
https://www.ft.com/content/6b877160-28e4-4ddf-8959-2a7cd0acd4ba.
428 Unemployment Insurance Weekly Claims, Department of Labor, June 18, 2020. https://www.dol.gov/ui/data.pdf.
429 World Economic Outlook Update, p. 5.
430 Arnold, Martin, Berlin and ECB Signal End to Legal Impasse to Bond-Buying, Financial Times, June 22, 2020.
https://www.ft.com/content/5f000a25-3d54-4610-8579-cab9b21759ee.
431 Unemployment Insurance Weekly Claims, Department of Labor, June 25, 2020. https://www.dol.gov/ui/data.pdf.
432 Elder, Bryce, Sarah Provan, and Hudson Lockett, U.S. Stocks End Lower as States Roll Back Reopening Measures,
Financial Times, June 26, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/5013d097-c1bf-4ed9-979a-842749e5956a.
433 The three scenarios include (1) a rapid, or “V”-shaped recovery; (2) a slower, or “U”-shaped recovery; and (3) a
“W”-shaped or double-dip recession with a short-lived recovery followed by a severe drop in activity later this year due
to a second COVID event. Assessment of Bank Capital During the Recent Coronavirus Event, Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, June 2020, p. 2.
434 Ibid.
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“sufficiently capitalized” to survive the three scenarios.435 Both the IMF and the WTO released
forecasts indicating that global trade had declined sharply in the first quarter of 2020 and was
projected to post similarly sharp declines for the year. By the end of June, the international price
of crude had risen slightly above $40 per barrel, regaining about half the value it had lost during
the first quarter of 2020.
July 2020
The Department of Labor announced on July 2 that an additional 1.4 million Americans had filed
for Unemployment Insurance, raising the total to 48.7 million over the 15-week period from mid-
March.436 The insured seasonally adjusted unemployment rate in June was estimated at 13.2%,
unchanged from the revised rate in the previous week. On July 2, the BLS also released data on
the employment situation in June, indicating that nonfarm payroll rose by 4.8 million, lowering
the unemployment rate to 11.5%. The Census Bureau also released U.S. trade data for May
indicating that the U.S. merchandise trade deficit rose by nearly 10% over that recorded in April
as exports fell by more than imports.437
On July 9, the BLS reported that an additional 1.3 million Americans filed for Unemployment
Insurance, raising the 16-week total from mid-March to 50 million.438 On July 17, the European
Council met to approve a proposed plan to provide an additional €750 billion in pandemic
support funds to assist European economies. Negotiations failed to produce an agreement and
talks continued over the weekend and resumed on July 20. On July21, however, European leaders
announced they had agreed to a €750 billion (about $859 billion) pandemic economic relief
package.
On July 29, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) announced it was not changing key
interest rates. It also announced that it was extending foreign currency swap lines and a number
of its lending facilities. Federal Reserve Chairman Powell indicated “The ongoing public health
crisis will weigh heavily on economic activity, employment, and inflation in the near term, and
poses considerable risks to the economic outlook over the medium term.” On July 30, second
quarter GDP data indicated that U.S. economic output fell by 9.5% from the previous quarter, but
at an annualized rate of 33%. The Department of Labor also announced that an additional 1.4
million individuals applied for unemployment insurance during the previous week, raising the 19-
week total to 54 million.
August 2020
On August 20, the Department of Labor announced that an additional 1.1 million workers filed
for unemployment insurance during the previous week, raising the total over the 22-week period
from mid-March to mid-August 2020 to 56 million Americans who had filed for unemployment
insurance.439 On a seasonally adjusted basis, the number of insured unemployed workers was 14.8
million in mid-August, down from a peak of 25 million in mid-May. The total number of people
claiming benefits in all programs in the week ending August 1, totaled 28 million, up from 1.7

435 Ibid., pp. 1-2.
436 Unemployment Insurance Weekly Claims, July 1, 2020. https://www.dol.gov/ui/data.pdf.
437 Monthly U.S. International Trade in Goods and Services, May 2020, U.S. Census Bureau, July 2, 2020.
https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/data/index.html.
438 Unemployment Insurance Weekly Claims, July 9, 2020. https://www.dol.gov/ui/data.pdf.
439 Unemployment Insurance Weekly Claims, Department of Labor, August 20, 2020. https://www.dol.gov/.
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million in the comparable week in 2019. The insured unemployment rate was 10.2%, also down
from the peak reached in early May.
The Bank of England announced through its standard Monetary Policy Committee meeting that it
would maintain its key interest rate at 0.1% and continue its purchases of UK government bond
and nonfinancial investment-grade corporate bonds.440
September 2020
On September 17, the Department of Labor announced that over the 26-week period from mid-
March to mid-September 2020, 61 million Americans filed for unemployment insurance.441 On a
seasonally adjusted basis, the number of insured unemployed workers was 12.6 million in late
August, down from a peak of 25 million in mid-May. The total number of people claiming
benefits in all programs in the week ending August 29, totaled 29.7 million, up from 1.6 million
in the comparable week in 2019. The insured unemployment rate was 8.6%, also down from the
peak reached in early May. On September 4, BLS reported that nonfarm employment increased
by 1.4 million in August, reducing the total number of unemployed Americans to 13.6 million442
and pushing the unemployment rate down to 8.4%, again with some caveats.443
On September 29, 2021, global deaths from COVID-19 surpassed one million.
October 2020
On October 1, IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva warned there was a risk of a rise in
sovereign bankruptcies unless temporary debt relief measures adopted early in the year were
extended and sovereign debt contracts and processes are overhauled.444
On October 2, BLS reported that nonfarm employment increased by 661,000 in September,
reducing the total number of unemployed Americans to 13.6 million445 and pushing the
unemployment rate down to 7.9%, again with some caveats.446 President Trump announced that
he had tested positive for COVID-19.

440 Monetary Policy Report August 2020, Bank of England, August 6, 2020.
441 Unemployment Insurance Weekly Claims, Department of Labor, September 17, 2020. https://www.dol.gov/; Romm,
Tony and Jeff Stein, 2.4 Million Americans Filed Jobless Claims Last Week, Bringing Nine Week Total to 38.6
Million, Washington Post, May 21, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/05/21/unemployment-
claims-coronavirus/
442 This total does not include 7.6 million workers who were working part time not by choice and 7.0 million
individuals who were seeking employment.
443 The Employment Situation-August 2020, Bureau of Labor Statistics, September 4, 2020, https://www.bls.gov/. BLS
indicated that some individuals were misclassified in previous months. Instead of being classified as unemployed, they
were misclassified as employed, but absent from work due to coronavirus-related business closures. If such individuals
had been classified as unemployed, the unemployment rate would have been 5 percentage points higher in April.
444 Smith, Colby, IMF Calls for Urgent Action to Prevent Debt Crisis in Emerging Economies, Financial Times,
October 1, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/b61c8dea-58bc-476d-ae9f-c2de104808de.
445 This total does not include 7.6 million workers who were working part time not by choice and 7.0 million
individuals who were seeking employment.
446 The Employment Situation-August 2020, Bureau of Labor Statistics, September 4, 2020, https://www.bls.gov/. BLS
indicated that some individuals were misclassified in previous months. Instead of being classified as unemployed, they
were misclassified as employed, but absent from work due to coronavirus-related business closures. If such individuals
had been classified as unemployed, the unemployment rate would have been 5 percentage points higher in April.
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On October 29, DOL reported that over the 32-week period from mid-March to late October
2020, about 66 million Americans filed for unemployment insurance.447 On a seasonally adjusted
basis, the number of insured unemployed individuals was 7.8 million in late October, down from
a peak of 25 million in mid-May. On October 30, UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson announced
the resurgence of coronavirus cases in the UK and called for another countrywide business
lockdown. In response the resurgence of coronavirus cases across Europe, financial markets lost
value; the Dow Jones Industrial Average lost more than 1.800 points in the last week of October,
or more than 4% of its value.
November 2020
In the first three days of November, the DJIA regained three-fourths of the value lost during the
previous week as congressional leaders and the Trump Administration signaled the possibility of
a new stimulus package to support the U.S. economy.
Preliminary forecasts indicate that India’s economy contracted by 8.6% in the third quarter of
2020, reportedly reflecting increased consumer activity.448 On November 12, India’s finance
minister announced a new package of fiscal measures totaling $35 billion to increase consumer
spending and to assist manufacturing, agriculture, and exports. The move followed an
announcement by India’s cabinet that it had approved a spending package of $27 billion to
provide in incentives over five years to manufacturing firms, including automobiles, auto parts,
pharmaceuticals, textiles, and food products.449
On November 12, the DOL reported that over the 35-week period from mid-March to the first
week of November 2020, about 67.4 million Americans had filed for unemployment insurance.450
On a seasonally adjusted basis, the number of insured unemployed individuals was 6.8 million in
late October, down from a peak of 25 million in mid-May. Weekly claims have fallen from the
sharp increases recorded in April and May, declining to 709,000 in the week ending November 7,
after totaling 751,00 the previous week, four times higher than the average number of weekly
claims of about 200,000 recorded prior to the COVID-19 pandemic.
On November 15, 15 countries, including Brunei, Colombia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia,
Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam. Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand,
and South Korea, signed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) to create
potentially one of the largest free trade agreements. The agreement will need to be ratified by the
signatory governments.
On November 19, 2020, the DOL reported that over the 36-week period from mid-March to mid-
November 2020, about 68.2 million Americans had filed for unemployment insurance. 451 Weekly

447 Unemployment Insurance Weekly Claims, Department of Labor, October 29, 2020. https://www.dol.gov/; Romm,
Tony and Jeff Stein, 2.4 Million Americans Filed Jobless Claims Last Week, Bringing Nine Week Total to 38.6
Million, Washington Post, May 21, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/05/21/unemployment-
claims-coronavirus/
448 RBI Bulletin – November 2020, Reserve Bank of India, November 2020.
449 Sharma, Ashok, India Announces $35 Billion Economic Stimulus Package, ABCNews, November 12, 2020.
https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/india-announces-35-billion-economic-stimulus-package-74165709.
450 Unemployment Insurance Weekly Claims, Department of Labor, November 12, 2020. https://www.dol.gov/; Romm,
Tony and Jeff Stein, 2.4 Million Americans Filed Jobless Claims Last Week, Bringing Nine Week Total to 38.6
Million, Washington Post, May 21, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/05/21/unemployment-
claims-coronavirus/
451 Unemployment Insurance Weekly Claims, Department of Labor, November 19, 2020. https://www.dol.gov/.
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claims rose to 742,000 in the week ending November 14, increasing from 711,000 the previous
week, marking the first increase in weekly claims since October 10, 2020.
December 2020
On December 3, OPEC and Russia agreed to increase oil output by 500,000 barrels per day
starting in January 2021, below a previously discussed increase of 2 million barrels per day, as
pandemic-related lags in global economic recovery curtail global oil demand.
On December 4, the BLS indicated that the U.S. economy added 245,000 jobs in November,
nearly half the 610,000 jobs added in October, raising concerns that the U.S. economic recovery
had stalled.452
The DOL reported on December 10 that over the 39-week period from mid-March to the
beginning of December 2020, over 70 million Americans had filed for unemployment
insurance.453 Week-over-week new claims totaled 863,000 in the week ending December 5,
increasing by 146,000 from the previous week’s total of 716,00, four times higher than the
average number of weekly claims of about 200,000 recorded prior to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Also, in trading December 10, the price of Brent crude oil breached the $50 per barrel mark for
the first time since March 2020.
On December 14, the United States began administering the COVID-19 vaccine. U.S. equity
market values fell as investors reportedly debated the prospects for a new stimulus package in the
United States and a resurgence in COVID-19 cases in New York, Boston, and London raised
concerns over a resumption of lockdowns.454
On December 17, the DOL announced that on a week-over-week basis, new claims for
unemployment insurance totaled 885,000 in the week ending December 12, increasing by 23,000
from the previous week’s total of 862,00. In the week ending November 28, 20.6 million people
claimed benefits in all programs. The insured unemployment rate for the week ending December
5 was 3.8%.
On December 22, BEA released updated data on U.S. GDP growth for the third quarter,
indicating the economy grew by 33.4%, outpacing the 31.4% decline recorded in the second
quarter.
January 2021
On January 8, 2021, BLS reported that U.S. nonfarm employment fell by 140,000 in December,
down from the previous month’s increase of 336,000: the total number of unemployed Americans

452 The Employment Situation-December 2020, Bureau of Labor Statistics, January 8, 2021, https://www.bls.gov/. BLS
453 Unemployment Insurance Weekly Claims, Department of Labor, January 21, 2021. https://www.dol.gov/; Romm,
Tony and Jeff Stein, 2.4 Million Americans Filed Jobless Claims Last Week, Bringing Nine Week Total to 38.6
Million, Washington Post, May 21, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/05/21/unemployment-
claims-coronavirus/
454 Platt, Eric, Naomi Rovnick, and Camilla Hodgson, S&P Slides for Fourth Straight Day, Financial Times, December
14, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/898ca316-9bbf-3c20-b137-2dbdba93c800; Rovnick, Naomi, and Camilla
Hodgson, Equities and Sterling Lifted by Extension to EU-UK Trade Talks, Financial Times, December 14, 2020,
https://www.ft.com/content/4f65ee35-9957-4bab-91c4-9f76c0a44a2b; Cameron-Chileshe, Jasmine, Alice Hancock,
Sebastian Payne, and George Parker, London to Enter Toughest Coronavirus Restrictions, Financial Times, December
14, 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/626f2e3a-ac8f-401d-818a-01120cab3284.
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was unchanged from the previous month at 10.7 million,455 the unemployment rate stayed
constant at 6.7%.
On January 13, the House of Representatives impeached President Donald Trump.
On January 15, the global number of deaths associated with COVID-19 surpassed two million.
On January 19, deaths in the United States associated with COVID-19 surpassed 400,000.
On January 28, the DOL indicated that during the 46-week period from mid-March 2020 to end-
January 2021, over 76 million Americans had filed for unemployment insurance. On a seasonally
adjusted basis, the number of insured unemployed individuals was 4.8 million in mid-January
2021, down from a peak of 25 million in mid-May. On a week-over-week basis, new claims
totaled 847,000 in the week ending January 23, 2021, decreasing by 67,000 from the previous
week’s total of 914,000; in the week ending January 9, 18.3 million people claimed benefits in all
programs.
The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) announced that during the fourth quarter of 2020, the
U.S. economy grew by 4.0% at an annual rate; the overall rate of growth for 2020 was estimated
at -3.5%, reflecting negative rates of growth in personal consumption (-3.9%), investment (-5.3),
and exports (-13.0%) and imports (-9.3); government consumption and investment (federal, state,
and local) grew by 1.1%.
February 2021
On February 4, 2021, the Department of Labor reported that new claims for unemployment
insurance totaled 779,000 in the week ending January 30, 2021, raising the total claims filed
during the 47-week period from mid-March 2020 to end-January 2021 to over 77 million
Americans. In the week ending January 16, 2021, 17.8 million people claimed benefits in all
programs; the insured unemployment rate was 3.2%.
On February 5, 2021, BLS reported that the total number of unemployed Americans in January
2021 declined to 10.1 million and that the unemployment rate had fallen to 6.3%.
The DOL reported on February 18 that during the 49-week period from mid-March 2020 to mid-
February 2021, nearly 79 million Americans had filed for unemployment insurance. On a
seasonally adjusted basis, the number of insured unemployed individuals was 4.5 million in early-
February 2021, down from a peak of 25 million in mid-May.
On February 22, 2021, the United States announced that it had surpassed 500,000 deaths caused
by COVID-19.
March 2021
On March 3, 2021, UK Chancellor of the Exchequer Sunak announced a £65 billion stimulus
package over two years to revive the UK economy, to be followed by tax increases starting in
2023. In the United States, the House of Representatives was set to pass a Senate-amended $1.9
trillion COVID-related economic stimulus bill during the week of March 8, 2021, with President
Biden prepared to sign the legislation.
On March 4, 2021, the Labor Department reported that over 80 million Americans (half of the
160 million civilian work force) had filed for unemployment insurance since mid-March 2020.

455 This total does not include 6.2 million workers who were working part time not by choice and 7.3 million
individuals who were seeking employment.
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On a seasonally adjusted basis, the number of insured unemployed individuals was 4.3 million;
and by the end of February 2021, 18 million people claimed benefits in all programs.
Developed economies, including Britain, Switzerland, the EU, and the United States, blocked a
proposal by over 80 developing countries at the World Trade Organization to suspend intellectual
property rights restrictions on production of COVID-19 vaccines.
On March 26, 2021, Germany’s highest court stopped a law that would have ratified the EU
Pandemic Emergency Purchase Program (PEPP) bond-buying program. The program requires
ratification by each of the EU member’s national parliaments. The legislation had been passed by
both of Germany’s houses of Parliament and was expected to be signed by German president,
Frank-Walter Steinmeier, when the court intervened.
April 2021
On April 25, India reported a single-day total of 350,000 new cases. Brazil reportedly has had
over 350,000 viral-related deaths: in some cities in Brazil, COVID-related daily deaths have
outnumbered daily births. A group of 175 former world leaders and Nobel laureates called on the
United States to suspend intellectual property rights for COVID-19 vaccines to facilitate the
international production and distribution by allowing developing countries the ability to
manufacture their own vaccines. The group warned that, “….inequitable vaccine access would
impact the global economy and prevent it from recovering.”
May 2021
On May 5, the Biden administration announced it would support international discussions to
waive intellectual property restrictions on COVID-19 vaccines.
June 2021
On June 1, OPEC ministers and other oil producers announced they would slowly increase oil
output in response to rising demand for energy as the global economy revives from the depths of
the pandemic-related economic recession. International oil market prices rose above $71 per
barrel for the first time since January 2018.456
Brazil’s first quarter rate of economic growth rose by over 1% from the previous quarter, besting
forecasts and raising expectations that economic growth could return to pre-pandemic rates
sooner than had been forecasted.457


456 Raval, Anjli, and David Sheppard, Oil Prices Rally as OPEC+ Producers Agree Slow Supply Increase, Financial
Times
, June 1, 2021. https://www.ft.com/content/e74a09b0-9ce3-46f0-95b9-5fa7f0792dce.
457 Harris, Bryan, Brazil’s GDP Surges Back to Pre-Pandemic Levels, Financial Times, June 1, 2021.
https://www.ft.com/content/9c930e22-6616-413b-a40e-3f21a2315010.
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Appendix B. Table A-1. Select Measures
Implemented and Announced by Major Economies
in Response to COVID-19

United States
U.S. Federal Reserve
March 3: Cut the target range for the federal funds rate by 0.5 percentage point.
March 12: Expanded reverse repo operations, adding $1.5 tril ion of liquidity to the
banking system.
March 15: Cut the target range for the federal funds rate by a ful percentage point
to a range of 0.00% to 0.25% and restarted quantitative easing with the purchase of at
least $500 bil ion in Treasury securities and $200 bil ion in mortgage-backed
securities.
March 16: Increased reverse repo operations by another $500 bil ion.
March 17: U.S. Treasury Secretary Mnuchin approved the Federal Reserve’s creation
of a “Commercial Paper Funding Facility," (CPFF) through March 17, 2021, which wil
allows the Fed to create a corporation which can purchase commercial paper, short-
term, unsecured loans made by businesses for everyday expenses and authorized up
to $10 bil ion from the Treasury to help cover loan losses incurred under this
program.
March 17: Relaunched the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) for at least six
months. Starting March 20, the PDCF wil offer short-term loans to banks secured by
col ateral such as municipal bonds or investment-grade corporate debt.
March 18: Launched the Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (MMLF)
through the end of September, a new program to lend money to banks so they can
purchase assets from money market funds. Treasury is offering up to $10 bil ion to
cover loan losses the Fed incurs from the program.
March 23: Announced a series of measures designed to stabilize markets, enhance
liquidity and stimulate growth. The measures included the rol out of 2 new facilities,
the Primary Market Corporate Credit Facility (PMCCF) for new bond and loan
issuance and the Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facility (SMCCF) to provide
liquidity for outstanding corporate bonds. The FOMC removed its caps on planned
QE purchases and wil now purchase Treasuries and agency mortgage-backed
securities “in the amounts needed to support smooth market functioning and
effective transmission of monetary policy to broader financial conditions and the
economy.”

U.S. Congress
March 5: Passed, and the President signed, a bil providing $8.3 bil ion in emergency
funding for federal agencies to respond to the COVID-19 outbreak (H.R. 6074:
COVID-19 Preparedness and Response Supplemental Appropriations Act 2020).
March 13: The House of Representatives passed a COVID-19 response package
(H.R. 6201; P.L. 116-127, Families First COVID-19 Response Act); measure was
signed by President Trump on March 18, 2020. The measure appropriates about $100
bil ion and includes tax credits for employers offering paid sick leave and increases to
unemployment benefits and food assistance.
March 19: The Senate introduced the COVID-19 Aid, Relief, and Economic Security
Act (S. 3548) to provide $2.0 tril ion in assistance to businesses and workers.
March 27: Passed, and the President signed, the COVID-19 Aid, Relief, and
Economic Security Act (CARES Act, H.R. 748, P.L. 116-136), a $2.1 tril ion fiscal
stimulus package. It includes $454 bil ion in loans for businesses, $349 bil ion in loans
for small businesses, $300 bil ion for direct payments of $1,200 each for lower- and
middle-income individual taxpayers (and $500 for each child), $250 bil ion for
unemployment insurance, and $221 bil ion in tax deferrals, among other measures.
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March 30: Some Members of the House of Representatives announced they had
begun work on a fourth COVID-19 bil targeting a number of issues, including short
supplies of medical equipment and protective gear to enhance worker protections,
infrastructure needs, and additional payments to individuals.

Trump Administration
March 13: President Trump declared a state of emergency, allowing the Federal
Government to distribute up to $50 bil ion in aid to states, cities, and territories.
March 17: The Internal Revenue Service postponed the April 15 tax-payment
deadline for 90 days and wil waive interest and penalties. (The extension and waiver
is available only to individuals and corporations that owe $1 mil ion or $10 mil ion or
less, respectively.)
March 17: Administration officials begin negotiations with Members of Congress on
a third stimulus package.
March 31: President Trump calls for $2 tril ion infrastructure spending, possibly as
part of fourth COVID-19 stimulus bil .
Albania
The Bank of Albania
March 25: Cut its benchmark interest rate to a record-low 0.5% and its one-day
lending rate to 0.9% on to help lending in the economy affected by the COVID-19
outbreak. It also announced that it would inject unlimited liquidity into the banking
sector, ensure the normal functioning of the electronic payments system, and that,
together with the government, it had agreed to postpone until the end of May all loan
repayments by businesses and individuals facing difficulties due to the outbreak.

Government of Albania
March 20: Passed measures totaling $370 mil ion in its budget to soften the impact
from the COVID-19 crisis, including $25 mil ion for the health sector; guarantees
worth $100 mil ion to companies unable to pay their employees; and $65 mil ion to
help the needy, small businesses, and those unable to work because of stay-at-home
orders. It also announced that it would write off penalties on delayed electricity bil
payments worth some $150 mil ion, postpone taxes on company profits, and cut the
wages of government ministers and lawmakers by half for the duration of the crisis.
Argentina
Central Bank of Argentina
March 19: Indicated that it would lower reserve requirements for banks that
extended special credit lines to small and medium-sized enterprises at a maximum
annual interest rate of 24% in a bid to offset the impact of COVID-19.

Government of Argentina
March 19: Announced a fiscal stimulus package of 700 bil ion pesos ($11.3 bil ion) to
mitigate the impact of the COVID-19 and support the economy. The main measures
include providing credit to productive activities (350 bil ion pesos), increasing public
investments (100 bil ion pesos), and waiving payrol taxes for firms affected by the
COVID-19.
Armenia
March 17: The Central Bank of Armenia cut its key refinancing rate by 25 basis
points to 5.25% from 5.5% due to the effects of the COVID-19 outbreak on the
economy.
Australia
Reserve Bank of Australia
March 3: Cut its benchmark interest rate by 25 basis points to 0.5% due to the
significant effect of the COVID-19 outbreak on the Australian economy.
March 19: Cut its cash rate by 25 basis points to 0.25% and and introduced a series
of measures: (1) targeting the 3-year government bond yield at 0.25% via purchases in
the secondary market, (2) providing a three-year term funding facility to authorized
deposit-taking institutions worth at least AU$90 bil ion at a fixed rate of 0.25%,
aiming to support credit to small and medium-sized enterprises, (3) fixing the
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exchange settle balances at the central bank at 10 basis points. It wil also continue to
provide liquidity by conducting one-month and three-month repo operations until
further notice. Longer-term repo operations of six-month maturity or longer would
be undertaken at least weekly. The central bank also set out forward guidance, saying
that it wil not increase the cash rate until progress is made towards ful employment
and confident that inflation is sustainably within its target band.
March 19: Through its daily money market operation, it has injected cash into the
banking system (through repurchasing agreements), aiming to ease liquidity
constraints in the stressed bond market: AU$12.7 bil ion (March 19), AU$10.7 bil ion
(March 18), AU$8.8 (March 17), AU$5.9 bil ion (March 16), and AU$8.8 (March 13).

Government of Australia
March 12: Announced a AU$17.6 bil ion ($11.4 bil ion) stimulus package that
includes support for business investment, cash flow assistance for small and medium
sized business and employees, and household stimulus payments.
March 16: The Australian Securities and Investments Commission ordered large
equity market participants to reduce their number of executed trades by 25% from
the levels executed on March 13, 2020, until further notice.
March 19: Announced that the Australian Office of Financial Management (AOFM)
wil be provided with an investment capacity of $15 bil ion to enable smaller lenders
to continue supporting Australian consumers and small businesses. (AOFM wil be
able to purchase residential mortgage backed securities and invest in a range of other
asset backed securities and warehouse facilities over the next 12 months.)
March 22: Announced an additional AU$66.4 bil ion ($38.5 bil ion) fiscal package,
which extends income support measures for existing welfare and newly unemployed
workers, and boosted previously announced measures for businesses such as cash
flow and wage subsidies. The government is also expected to give local businesses
AU$100,000 if the company has a turnover of less than AU$50 mil ion each year and
underwrite 50% of up AU$40 bil ion in loans offered by local lenders to small and
medium sized companies.
March 30: Unveiled an economic package of AU$130 bil ion ($79.85 bil ion) to
subsidize the wages of an estimated 6 mil ion people, marking a third tranche of
stimulus designed to limit the fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic on the country’s
economy. The “job keeper” allowance, which would bring the country’s COVID-19-
related stimulus so far to A$320 bil ion (about 15% of Australia’s gross domestic
product), wil provide eligible companies with AU$1,500 every fortnight for six
months for each employee. Any company that lost 30% of its revenue can apply for
the funds.
Austria
Government of Austria
March 14: Set up an initial 4 bil ion euro ($4.4 bil ion) “corona crisis fund” to cover,
among other things, benefits for affected workers, as well as bridge loans and credit
guarantees to shore up businesses’ liquidity.
March 18: Announced that it wil spend up to 38 bil ion euros ($42 bil ion) to secure
jobs and keep companies afloat, and it wil provide another 9 bil ion euros in
guarantees and warranties, 15 bil ion euros in emergency aid, and 10 bil ion euros in
tax deferrals.
Bosnia and
March 17: The prime minister met with the IMF Resident Representative in Bosnia
Herzegovina
to request assistance from the IMF. The IMF indicated that it may extend a 165
mil ion euros ($181 mil ion) loan to Bosnia under a Rapid Financing Instrument (RFI)
to finance the increasing costs sustained by the country’s health system in combating
COVID-19.
Brazil
Central Bank of Brazil
March 18: Cut its benchmark interest rate by 50 basis points to 3.75% to cushion
the economic blow of the COVID-19 pandemic. It also sold $830 mil ion in two
rounds of spot foreign exchange intervention and announced a repurchase program
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for dol ar-denominated sovereign bonds held by Brazilian banks, which wil be carried
out in conjunction with the Treasury.
March 23: Announced that it planned to inject 1.2 tril ion reais ($233.81 bil ion) into
the country’s financial system to counteract the effects of the COVID-19 outbreak,
with more than half that amount comprising loans to banks. Under the program,
lenders wil be able to package their loan portfolios into long-term deposits to be
acquired by the central bank in a move aimed at freeing up 670 bil ion reais for fresh
loans. It also (1) cut long-term reserve requirements to 17% from 25%, freeing up 68
bil ion reais currently in compulsory deposits with the central bank to banks, (2)
announced measures allowing small and mid-sized lenders to issue up to 2 bil ion
reais in special long-term bonds guaranteed by a privately held deposit insurance fund,
limited to an amount equivalent to its shareholders’ equity, and (3) wil extend loans
backed by corporate bonds to financial institutions between March 23 and April 30 to
add liquidity to their investment funds.

Government of Brazil
March 16: Announced a fiscal stimulus package of 147.1 bil ion reais ($28.6 bil ion)
to mitigate the impact of the COVID-19 and boost the economy. It does not contain
new money, but is a range of measures that aim to protect the most vulnerable
population through social assistance payments (83.4 bil ion reais), support domestic
companies and defer business taxes (59.4 bil ion reais), and increase investments in
healthcare to combat the COVID-19 (4.5 bil ion reais). The government also
announced a 3.1 bil ion reais boost to the “Bolsa Família” assistance for some of
Brazil’s poorest families.
March 16: The National Monetary Council (CMN) approved the measures that wil
allow banks to (1) increase loans and offer better terms to firms and households over
the next six months and (2) extend certain loan maturities for the next six months. It
also lowered capital requirements for banks.
April 1: Announced that it wil cut the IOF financial tax for 90 days. It wil be
temporary and cost 7 bil ion reais. It wil also extend the deadline for submitting the
2019 base year net income report to June 30 from April 30 and allow companies to
postpone payment of certain tax contributions for two months and reduce wages by
up to 70% (or the minimum wage) for three months, among other measures.
Bulgaria
Government of Bulgaria
March 30: Announced it wil spend more than 1 bil ion levs ($566 mil ion) to pay
part of workers’ salaries in companies whose operations have been hit by the
COVID-19 crisis, part of part of an overall 4.5 bil ion-lev package.
March 31: Announced plans to raise the ceiling on new debt it can raise to 10 bil ion
levs due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Cambodia
Government of Cambodia
March 5: Announced that it would allocate $30 mil ion to finance Cambodia’s
COVID-19 screening and monitoring efforts.
March 10: Al ocated between $800 mil ion to $2 bil ion to address the economic
impacts of the novel COVID-19 outbreak.
Canada
Bank of Canada
March 4: Lowered its target for the overnight rate by 50 basis points to 1.25%
(setting the bank rate to 1.5% and the deposit rate to 1%).
March 12: Announced that it wil broaden the scope of the current Government of
Canada bond buyback program and temporarily add new Term Repo operations.
March 13: Lowered its benchmark overnight rate to 1.25% from 1.75% in response
to the epidemic.
March 13: Announced its intention to launch the Bankers’ Acceptance Purchase
Facility (BAPF), starting the week of March 23, 2020, in an effort to support the
continuous functioning of financial markets; it wil conduct secondary market
purchases of one-month Bankers’ Acceptances issued and guaranteed by any
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Canadian bank and of sufficiently high quality. BAPF operations wil be conducted
weekly with the purchase amount and reserve rate being adjusted to reflect market
conditions. (For the first operation, the Bank of Canada will purchase up to $10
bil ion of one-month Bankers’ Acceptances with a reserve rate of the overnight index
swap rate plus 20 basis points.)
March 16: Announced that it wil broaden eligible col ateral for its term repo facility
and increase purchases of mortgage-backed securities (Canada Mortgage Bonds).
March 27: Cut its overnight interest rate by 50 basis points to 0.25%, its lowest level
since June 2010 and the third cut in March, to support an economy hit hard by the
outbreak of COVID-19. It also announced that it would begin purchases of CA$5
bil ion per week of Government of Canada securities in the secondary market.

Canadian Government
March 6: Announced an investment of CA$27 mil ion to fund COVID-19 research
and accelerate the development, testing, and implementation of measures to deal
with the COVID-19 outbreak.
March 11: Unveiled CA$1 bil ion ($750 mil ion) in funding for vaccine research and
health measures.
March 13: Established a Business Credit Availability Program (BCAP) to support
financing in the private sector through the Business Development Bank of Canada
(BDC) and Export Development Canada (EDC); it wil allow BDC and EDC to
provide more than $10 bil ion of additional support to businesses.
March 13: The Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) lowered
the Domestic Stability Buffer requirement for domestic systemically important banks
by 1.25% of risk weighted assets; it wil increase the lending capacity of Canada’s large
banks and support the supply of credit to the economy by more than CA$300 bil ion.
March 25: Almost doubled the value of an aid package previously announced to help
people and businesses deal with losses from the COVID-19 outbreak, from CA$27
bil ion to CA$52 bil ion ($36.6 bil ion). It wil give people affected by the outbreak
CA$2,000 a month, delay student loan repayments, and defer tax payments, among
other measures to boost the economy.
Chile
Central Bank of Chile
March 16: Cut its benchmark rate by 75 basis points to 1% and announced measures
to inject liquidity, including allocating $4 billion to purchase inflation-linked bank
bonds and providing additional credit to banks.
March 31: Cut its benchmark interest rate by 50 basis points to 0.50% amid the
COVID-19 pandemic.

Government of Chile
March 19: Announced a stimulus package of $11.75 bn to mitigate the negative
economic impact of the outbreak of COVID-19 and civil unrest. The measures
include extending unemployment insurance to those who are sick or unable to work
from home, delaying tax payments for small businesses, a cash bonus for
approximately 2 mil ion workers who lack formal employment, and emergency funds
for municipalities.
China
People’s Bank of China (PBOC)
February 3: Expanded reverse repo operations by $174 bil ion; added another $71
bil ion on February 4.
February 16: Cut the one-year medium-term lending facility rate by 10 basis points.
February 20: Cut the one-year and five-year prime rates by 10 and 5 basis points,
respectively.
March 13: Lowered bank reserve requirements, freeing up about $79 bil ion to be
loaned out.
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March 30: Lowered the interest rate on reverse repurchase agreements to 2.20%
from 2.40%, as authorities stepped up easing measures to relieve pressure on the
economy that has been hit hard by the epidemic.

PRC Government
February: Asked banks to extend the terms of business loans and commercial
landlords to reduce rents.
February 24: The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) contributed $1
mil ion in medical equipment to help China control the spread of COVID-19.
February 27: Announced a number of tax relief measures to tackle COVID-19
disruption, including a temporary reduction its value-added tax (VAT) and the
elimination of VAT on medical, catering, accommodation, hairdressing, and laundry
services as well as on masks and protective clothing.
March: Earmarked $15.9 bil ion to fight the epidemic.
March 21: Announced that it would cut fees on a large scale to stimulate private-
sector investment and also accelerate the development of “new infrastructure” to
help spur the economy.
March 19: Reportedly is considering a fiscal stimulus package worth tril ions of yuan
to revive the economy amid the COVID-19 pandemic. The ramped-up spending will
aim to spur infrastructure investment, backed by as much as 2.8 tril ion yuan ($394
bil ion) of local government special bonds.
March 27: The Communist Party’s Politburo announced that it would step up
macroeconomic policy changes and pursue more proactive fiscal policy. It called for
expanding the budget deficit, issuing more local and national bonds, guiding interest
rates lower, delaying loan repayments, reducing supply-chain bottlenecks and
boosting consumption.
Colombia
Central Bank of Colombia
March 18: Announced a $400 mil ion dol ar to peso swap to take place on March
19, and that it would increase the resources available to financial institutions and ease
rules on which institutions can have access to funds.
March 27: Cut its benchmark interest rate by 50 basis points to 3.75% in an effort to
boost economic growth amid fall-out from COVID-19.

Government of Colombia
March 18: Announced that it has 14.8 tril ion pesos ($3.65 bil ion) to spend on
emergency measures to ease the economic fallout from COVID-19, but it wil not
take on additional debt to finance the efforts (12.1 tril ion pesos wil come from the
country’s savings programs). It wil initially spend 1 tril ion pesos on the healthcare
system and 500 bil ion pesos on additional payments to social welfare programs for
families, young people and the elderly, accelerate a plan to return value added tax to
the neediest Colombians from April, and make 48 tril ion pesos available to give
credit guarantees to small and medium-sized businesses and households.
Congo-Kinshasa
March 24: The Central Bank of the Congo cut its base interest rate to 7.5% from
(Democratic Republic
9.0% in order to cushion the economic impact of the COVID-19 outbreak. It wil also
of the Congo)
cut mandatory reserve requirements and provide liquidity to banks.
Cyprus
Government of Cyprus
March 15: Unveiled a 700 mil ion euro support package for companies and workers
to deal with the impact of the spread of COVID-19, which includes a temporary VAT
reduction, support for individuals and companies affected, additional paid sick leave,
and 100 mil ion euro for the public health sector.
March 23: Announced that it is revising the economic package announced on March
15. It wil amount to at least 1.5 bil ion euro and include direct support, deferred
government income in the form of payment suspension of direct and indirect taxes
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and other fees, as well as government guarantees (which would not incur a fiscal
impact unless they materialize).
Czech Republic
Czech National Bank
March 16: The Czech National Bank lowered its main two-week repo rate by 50
basis points to 1.75%, reversing its February rate hike to combat the hit from the
virus outbreak. It also raised the number of repo operations that provide liquidity to
banks to three times a week from once, noting that bids would be met with zero
spread to the repo rate.
March 17: Revised the countercyclical capital buffer for exposures located in the
Czech Republic to 1.75 %.
March 26: Cut its main two-week repo rate by 75 basis points to 1.00% and
announced that it was ready to cut interest rates further if needed.

Government of the Czech Republic
March 9: Adopted a number of economic measures, which wil include providing 100
bil ion CZK ($3.9 bil ion) in direct support and 900 bil ion CZK ($34.8 bil ion) in
indirect in the form of guarantees to maintain the employment rate, paying out
(through the respective employers) 60% of the average contribution base to
employees affected by the quarantine, supporting employers who continue, despite
their businesses being shut down, to pay out 100% of the salary to affected
employees by covering 80% of salary costs (up to 1.2 bil ion CZK), and allocating 10
bil ion CZK ($390 mil ion) to the Czech-Moravian Guarantee and Development Bank
for immediate granting of interest-free loans with a one-year deferral with the
possibility of a two-year extension for businesses affected by the COVID-19
(“COVID Loans Program”). (On March 16, the government earmarked another 1
bil ion CZK to the COVID Loans Program.)
March 13: Extended the deadline for the filing of tax returns until 1 July and waived
fines stemming from the late submission of tax declarations or reports.
March 13: The Czech Banking Association (ČBA) wil allow banks to voluntarily
extend the deadlines on loan and mortgage payments.
March 23: Approved a five-fold rise in this year’s budget deficit, as it offers help to
businesses hit hard by the COVID-19 outbreak.
April 1: Announced that it had approved a scheme for a moratorium of up to six
months on consumer, company, and mortgage loan payments to help the country
through the COVID-19 crisis.
Denmark
Danmarks Nationalbank
March 12: Released banks’ emergency buffer and wil be offering low interest rate
loans to banks.
March 26: Injected $2.85 bil ion in loans to Danish banks and financial institutions by
auctioning off U.S. dol ars in two loans with a maturity date on April 8 and June 19
and a cut-off rate of 0.32 and 0.34, respectively.
April 1: Sold $750 mil ion worth of its mint 30-year government bonds in an auction
that was held a month early to expedite funding of aid packages due to COVID-19
that is expected to cost the state more than 60 bil ion Danish crowns ($8.8 bil ion).

Government of Denmark
March 10: Wil grant tax breaks to businesses affected by the COVID-19 as part of a
series of measures worth $20 bil ion. Large businesses wil be given an additional 30
days to pay value added tax, while all companies wil be granted four additional
months to pay their labor contributions. The government is also lifting the ceiling on
businesses’ tax accounts, so that corporations can avoid paying the negative interest
rates they are charged when placing cash in the bank.
March 12: Indicated that it would release banks’ counter-cyclical capital buffer,
freeing about 200 bil ion Danish crowns ($30 bil ion) for lending. Other fiscal
measures, worth 2.8 bil ion Danish crowns ($416 mil ion), include compensation to
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companies for salary payments to employees who have fallen il or been quarantined
due to the COVID-19.
March 18: Proposed an economic aid package worth 40 bil ion kroner ($5.8 bil ion)
to help small businesses cover (for three months) most of the losses in revenue and
some of their fixed expenses as a result of the COVID-19 outbreak. Under the
program, companies who have seen their revenues decline by 40% or more wil
receive government grants to help cover between 25% to 80% of their fixed costs,
and self-employed and small firms who see their revenues fall more than 30% wil also
be offered government compensation worth 75% of their normal monthly income.
March 31: Announced that it wil postpone by three months around 200,000
companies’ deadline of end-May to submit their annual reports in an effort to help
companies affected by the COVID-19 outbreak.
Egypt
Central Bank of Egypt
March 16: Cut by 300 basis points both the overnight lending rate (from 13.25% to
10.25%) and the overnight deposit rate (from 12.25% to 9.25%) in what it described
as a “preemptive” move to support the economy in the face of the COVID-19
outbreak.
March 23: Told commercial banks to cut interest on dol ar deposits to 1% above the
London Interbank Offered Rate (Libor) instead of 1.5% above Libor, starting March
23, in order to control the exchange market and reduce the expected dol arization
operations after cutting interest rates on March 16.
March 29: Instructed Egyptian banks to apply temporary limits on daily withdrawals
and deposits in a move seemingly designed to control inflation and hoarding during
the coronavirus’ spread, after 30 bil ion Egyptian pounds ($1.91 bil ion) were
withdrawn from banks in the past three weeks. The daily limit for individuals would
be 10,000 Egyptian pounds ($635) and 50,000 pounds for companies.

Government of Egypt
March 14: Indicated that the government wil allocate 100 bil ion Egyptian pounds
($6.4 bil ion) to finance a “comprehensive” state plan for combating the COVID-19
outbreak.
March 22: Announced that the government would allocate 20 bil ion Egyptian
pounds ($1.27 bil ion) to support the stock exchange.
March 30: Ordered relevant authorities to boost strategic reserves of staple goods,
as global concerns about food security rise amid the COVID-19 crisis.
Eswatini (Swaziland)
March 21: The Central Bank of Eswatini cut its main lending rate by 100 basis points
to 5.5%, citing global and domestic economic developments and the impact of
COVID-19. The reduction was to ensure the equal pegging of the local currency with
the South African rand after the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) cut its main
lending rate by 100 basis points to 5.25% on March 19.
European Union
European Central Bank (ECB)
March 12: Announced that it would provide banks with loans at a rate as low as
minus 0.75%, below the-0.5% deposit rate, increase bond purchases by 120 bil ion
euros ($135.28 bil ion) this year (with a focus on corporate debt), and allow euro
zone banks to fall short of some key capital and cash requirements (in order to keep
credit flowing to the economy).
March 18: Launched a new, 750 bil ion euro ($818 bil ion) temporary asset purchase
program of private and public sector securities to counter the risks posed by the
outbreak and escalating diffusion of COVID-19 (the Pandemic Emergency Purchase
Programme). Purchases wil be conducted until the end of 2020 and wil include all
the asset categories eligible under the existing asset purchase program. It wil also
support commercial debt markets by expanding the range of eligible assets under the
corporate sector purchase program to nonfinancial commercial paper of sufficient
credit quality, and by easing col ateral standards by expanding the scope of Additional
Credit Claims to include claims related to the financing of the corporate sector.
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March 26: Announced that under the new 750 bil ion euro ($818 bil ion) temporary
bond purchase Pandemic Emergency Purchase Program (PEPP), it would not apply
self-imposed limits on how many bonds it could buy from any single euro zone
country. Under its long-running asset purchase scheme, the ECB has capped bond
buys at 33% of each euro zone state’s debt.

European Commission
March 11: Announced a 37 bil ion euro ($41 bil ion) “Corona Investment Fund” that
would use “spare” money from the EU budget to help businesses, health-care
systems, and sectors in need; additionally, the EU’s own investment fund wil
guarantee 8 bil ion euros ($8.9 bil ion) of loans to 100,000 small- and medium-sized
enterprises and affected companies may be able to delay the payment of their existing
loans.
March 19: Adopted a Temporary Framework to enable Member States to use the
ful flexibility foreseen under state aid rules to support the economy in the context of
the COVID-19 outbreak. It provides for five types of aid: (1) direct grants, selective
tax advantages and advance payments (Member States wil be able to set up schemes
to grant up to 800,000 euros to a company to address its urgent liquidity needs); (2)
state guarantees for loans taken by companies from banks; (3) subsidized public loans
to companies; (4) safeguards for banks that channel state aid to the real economy;
and (5) short-term export credit insurance.
Fiji
March 18: The Reserve Bank of Fiji cut its Overnight Policy Rate by 25 basis points
to 0.25% in order to stimulate demand and cushion the blow to its important tourism
industry from the global spread of COVID-19.
France
Government of France
March 12: Pledged more generous guarantees on loans made to small businesses,
more cash for firms struggling to hold on to workers, and a solidarity fund to help
companies cushion the blow from the COVID-19 outbreak; it also announced that
the government would be ready to increase funds available to help companies reduce
workers’ hours, instead of laying them off.
March 16: Announced that the government would guarantee 300 bil ion euros in
bank loans for small and medium-sized businesses.
March 17: The Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF), France’s financial-markets
authority, stated that it would forbid short selling of stock in 92 companies during the
March 17 session.
March 17: Announced that it would spend 45 bil ion euros ($50 bil ion) to help small
businesses and employees struggling with the COVID-19 outbreak, including through
an expanded partial-unemployment package in which the state pays the salaries of
employees who are not needed during the crisis.
Gambia
February 28: The Central Bank of The Gambia lowered its policy rate by 50 basis
points to 12.0% amid risks from the COVID-19 outbreak and uncertainty surrounding
global food prices.
Georgia
April 1: The government announced that it wil put 2 bil ion lari ($606 mil ion) from
its state budget toward helping the economy through the COVID-19 pandemic, in
addition to 351 mil ion lari that wil be allocated for the healthcare system from the
state budget. The government wil fund three months’ payments for electricity and
gas consumption to Georgians who used less than 200 kilowatts of electricity and 200
cubic meters of gas a month in March, April, and May.
Germany
Government of Germany
March 13: Pledged to provide unlimited liquidity assistance to German companies hit
by the pandemic. (The measure envisages an expansion of loans provided by KfW, the
state development bank, and wil allow companies to defer bil ions of euros in tax
payments.) The Bundestag also expanded the Kurzarbeit or short-time work scheme,
under which companies that put their workers on reduced hours can receive state
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support. The government also indicated that it would boost investments by €3.1
bil ion per year (about $3.5 bil ion) between 2021 and 2024.
March 23: Agreed to a package worth more than 750 bil ion euros ($808 bil ion) to
mitigate the damage of the COVID-19 outbreak. It includes 156 bil ion euros in debt
to finance higher social spending, 50 bil ion-euro liquidity fund for self-employed
people, 600 bil ion-euro rescue fund (400 bil ion euros in guarantees,100 bil ion euros
in loans through state-run development bank KfW, and 100 bil ion euros earmarked
for equity stakes in companies). Additionally, the state’s KfW bank has 500 bil ion
euros available to boost liquidity of German companies.
March 30: Announced that, in response to COVID-19, it would expand export loan
guarantees on short-term payments to include transactions within the EU and with
Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, Britain, and the
United States.
Ghana
March 18: The Bank of Ghana (Ghana’s central bank) cut its interest rate to 14.5%
from 16% due to the negative economic impacts it anticipates from the spread of the
COVID-19.
Greece
Government of Greece
March 9: Wil suspend the payment of sales taxes due at the end of March (for four
months) of social security contributions by companies (until June 30).
March 17: Announced a package of up to 2 bil ion euros ($2.20 bil ion) to support
businesses fol owing the COVID-19 outbreak
March 17: The Hellenic Bank Association wil offer businesses hit by the COVID-19
crisis a six-month freeze on loan payments as part of relief efforts to help borrowers
deal with the economic shutdown.
March 30: Announced new tax breaks and economic assistance to thousands of
businesses and workers to buffer its economy from a national lockdown triggered by
the COVID-19 pandemic. The support measures include a one-off benefit for 1.7
mil ion, or 81% of private sector workers whose jobs are temporarily suspended and
payment of their social security contributions for 45 days, extend financial aid for the
self-employed, and suspend VAT and tax arrear payments for 800,000 businesses.
Guatemala
March 29: The government announced that it would use nearly $26 mil ion from an
emergency fund to help the country’s neediest families, as measures to combat the
spread of a COVID-19 impact on the economy and jobs, It plans to withdraw 200
mil ion quetzals ($25.8 mil ion) from the emergency fund and give families 1,000
quetzals ($129) to help pay for electricity, water and supplies.
Hong Kong
Hong Kong Monetary Authority
March 3: Lowered its base rate charged through the overnight discount window by
50 basis points to 1.5% after the U.S. Federal Reserve delivered a rate cut of the same
margin.
March 16: Lowered its base rate charged through the overnight discount window to
0.86%, after the U.S. Federal Reserve delivered a rate cut. It also cut the level of
capital buffers it requires financial institutions to hold to 1% from 2% of their risk-
weighted assets to help companies and lenders weather the impact of the COVID-19
outbreak.

Government of Hong Kong
February 26: Announced a HK$120 bil ion ($15.4 bil ion) relief package as part of
its 2020-2021 budget, including a payment of HK$10,000 ($1,200) to each permanent
resident of the city 18 or older, paying one month’s rent for people living in public
housing, cutting payrol , income, property, and business taxes, low-interest,
government-guaranteed loans for businesses, and an extra month’s worth of
payments to people col ecting old-age or disability benefits.
Hungary
Hungarian National Bank
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March 16: Announced emergency steps to help businesses, boosting the range of
col ateral it accepts from banks and calling on lenders to apply a loan repayment
moratorium for firms hit by the coronavirus economic fallout. (It said in a statement
that performing corporate loans in domestic banks’ balance sheets totaled close to
3.6 tril ion forints, and that it would apply a 30% haircut on those, boosting the range
of col aterals that can be used and thus also lifting banks’ lending potential by more
than 2.5 tril ion forints ($8.10 bil ion)). It also offered to inject forint liquidity into the
banking system via foreign exchange swaps.
March 18: Urged domestic banks to introduce a moratorium on household loan
repayments considering the “extraordinary situation” due to the coronavirus crisis,
and that if banks did not bring in the measure, the Bank would ask the government to
pass a decree enforcing it. It also announced that it was considering restarting its
mortgage note buying program to provide more long-term liquidity for the banking
system and reduce the financing costs of household loans.
March 24: Launched new measures to boost liquidity and flagged further steps if
needed to prevent long-term damage to the economy from the coronavirus
pandemic. It moved to pump more money into the banking system by introducing a
massive fixed-rate col ateralized loan instrument. Lending will be provided to banks at
a fixed interest rate in unlimited quantity, to support bank lending and also
government bond purchases. It also released domestic lenders from the requirement
to hold a certain level of cash as reserves.
April 1: Announced its col ateralized loan tenders, offering liquidity to banks at a
fixed rate of 0.9% on various maturities, and that it would offer them to domestic
open-ended investment funds, in order to support the government securities market
and the real estate market and help offset the fallout from the coronavirus pandemic.

Government of Hungary
April 4: Created a $2 bil ion special fund to aid the fight against COVID-19 and it wil
include contributions from banks and foreign retailers. Hungarian banks wil be
expected to pay 55 bil ion forints ($163 mil ion) in the fund this year, with
multinational retailers adding 36 bil ion forints. Local governments wil have to divert
vehicle taxes amounting to a total of 34 bil ion forints to the fund, while political
parties wil pay half of their central budget revenue to the fund for a total of 1.2
bil ion forints.
April 6: Announced a stimulus package, which includes subsidized loans to Hungarian
companies and funds to preserve jobs. It would amount to 18%-20% of gross
domestic product (GDP), including National Bank of Hungary programs. The prime
minister said that the government was ready to pay some of the wage costs of
companies forced to cut working hours, would support investments with 450 bil ion
forints ($1.3 bil ion), and would provide targeted support for sectors such as tourism,
the food industry, and construction. Subsidized loans to companies wil total more
than 2 tril ion forints, while pensioners wil get one month’s extra pension to be
disbursed in four tranches from early 2021.
Iceland
The Central Bank of Iceland
March 11: Cut its benchmark interest rate by 50 basis points to 2.25%, as it tries to
alleviate the potential impact of the COVID-19 on its tourism-dependent economy. It
wil also lower deposit institutions’ average reserve requirement to 0% from 1% to
ease banks’ liquidity positions.
March 18: Cut its key interest rate for the second time in a week by 50 basis points
to 1.75% and reduced the banks’ countercyclical capital buffer to 0% from 2%.
March 23: Announced that it would start buying up treasury bonds in order to boost
liquidity and support government plans to increase spending to help the economy
weather the COVID-19 outbreak.
Government of Iceland
March 10: Announced an action plan to respond to the economic impact of COVID-
19, which includes deferring taxes and levies, providing temporary relief to the
tourism industry, and accelerating ongoing and planned infrastructure projects.
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March 21: Announced a 230-bil ion-krona ($1.6 bil ion) package (8% of gross
domestic product) to cushion the impact of COVID-19 on the economy. It includes
state guarantees on bridge loans to businesses and the payment of as much as 75% of
an employee’s lost salaries over the next two-and-a-half months. In addition, public
projects worth 20 bil ion krona will be moved forward to this year and tax breaks for
banks wil be implemented sooner than originally planned.
India
Reserve Bank of India
March 12: Announced a $2 bil ion injection into the foreign-exchange market to
support the rupee.
March 13: Announced a plan to add liquidity through short-term repurchase
operations.
March 14: Plans to infuse 250 bil ion rupees ($3.4 bil ion) into the system through
short-term repurchase operation.
March 19: Announced that it wil buy bonds on the open market for a total of 100
bil ion Indian rupees ($1.35 bil ion) due to mature between 2022 and 2025 to try to
keep all market segments liquid and stable.
March 27: Lowered its benchmark repo rate by 75 basis points to 4.40% and
announced several other steps to tackle the impact of COVID-19 on various
industries from the lockdown, some of which include cutting banks’ cash reserve
ratio and targeted long term repos operations. The reverse repo rate was reduced by
90 basis points to 4%.

Government of India
March 15: Pledged $10 mil ion towards South Asian Association for Regional
Cooperation (SAARC) “COVID-19 emergency fund.”
March 15: Is reportedly “pushing” state-run banks to approve new loans amounting
to 500 bil ion-600 bil ion rupees by the end of March.
March 26: Announced a 1.7-tril ion-rupee ($22.6 bil ion) economic stimulus plan
providing direct cash transfers and food security measures to give relief to mil ions of
poor people hit by a nationwide lockdown over COVID-19. It wil provide direct cash
transfers to 200 mil ion women and the elderly, hand out free cooking gas cylinders
to 83 mil ion poor families, and help feed about 800 mil ion poor people over the
next three months by distributing 5 kilograms of staple food-grains wheat or rice for
each person free of cost, with a kilogram of pulses for every low-income family. The
government outlined plans for medical insurance cover of 5 mil ion rupees ($66,000)
for every frontline health worker, from doctors, nurses and paramedics to those
involved in sanitary services.
Indonesia
Bank Indonesia (Bank Sentral Republik Indonesia)
February 20: Cut the seven-day reverse repurchase rate by 25 basis points to
4.75%.
March 19: Cut the seven-day reverse repurchase rate by 25 basis points to 4.50%
and indicated that it wil intensify intervention to ensure market confidence and
liquidity. It has purchased government bonds to combat capital outflows amid the
COVID-19 epidemic, including 27 tril ion rupiah ($2 bil ion) on February 20 and 6
tril ion rupiah ($405 mil ion) on March 13, adding to 8 tril ion rupiah of bonds
purchased March 12.
March 25:
Announced with the country’s financial regulator that currency market
and stock trading hours wil be limited next week as part of efforts to contain the
spread of COVID-19.

Government of Indonesia
February 25: Announced a stimulus package worth 10.3 tril ion rupiah ($742.6
mil ion) to protect its economy from the impact of the COVID-19 outbreak. It
includes 4.6 tril ion rupiah in subsidies for basic needs for poor households, 1.5
tril ion rupiah for the state property financing program, 443.4 bil ion rupiah for
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airlines and travel agents, 298.5 bil ion rupiah to bring in foreign tourists, 3.3 tril ion
rupiah cover for shortfalls in regional budgets, and fiscal transfers (147 bil ion rupiah).
March 13: Announced a 120 tril ion rupiah ($8.1 bil ion) stimulus package to support
the economy, of which 22.9 tril ion rupiah wil be tax breaks, lasting six months
starting in April. The government is also exempting companies in 19 manufacturing
sectors from having to pay import taxes, while giving them a 30% corporate tax
discount, relaxing rules for exports (e.g., fisheries and forestry products) and imports
(e.g., steel, sugar, flour and salt), and easing rules on loan restructuring for small- and
medium-sized companies.
March 17: Ordered the Finance Minister to divert 40 tril ion rupiah ($2.7 bil ion)
from the non-urgent government budget to increase spending in programs that could
provide direct support to household consumption or increase people’s purchasing
power.
March 31: Announced a national public health emergency and that it would spend
405.1 tril ion rupiah ($24.85 bil ion) more on COVID-19 response, social welfare
programs, and economic stimulus, including a 3 percentage point cut in corporate tax
rates to 22%.
Iran
Central Bank of Iran
February/March: Indicated that it would help small businesses affected by the
COVID-19 outbreak by providing tax breaks and allowing defaults on bank loans for
several months.
March 12: Requested $5 bil ion emergency funding from the International Monetary
Fund’s Rapid Financing Instrument to help Iran fight the COVID-19 outbreak.
March 17: Allocated at least 250 mil ion euro to import medicine and medical
equipment required to fight COVID-19.

Government of Iran
March 12: Asked the United Nations to allocate resources to help it tackle COVID-
19 and facilitate imports as a way of boosting the country’s sanctions-hit healthcare
system.
March 15: Announced a series of banking, welfare and tax relief measures to
support businesses and families as the COVID-19 outbreak puts severe strain on the
economy. Employees wil be able to defer health insurance, tax and utility bil
payments for the next three months, while the 3 mil ion poorest Iranians wil receive
an additional cash subsidy starting March 17, 2020.
March 23: The European Union’s High Representative of the Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy (Josep Borrell) announced that the EU would provide 20
mil ion euros in humanitarian aid to Iran to help alleviate the COVID-19 and support
Iran’s request for IMF financial help.
March 26: President Hassan Rouhani wrote to Supreme Leader Ayatol ah Ali
Khamenei requesting permission to withdraw $1 bil ion from the country’s sovereign
wealth fund (the National Development Fund) to support the healthcare system,
which is overstretched by the COVID-19 outbreak.
March 28: Announced that it would allocate 20% of its annual state budget to
fighting the pandemic in the country. The budget al ocation, amounting to about 1,000
tril ion rials, would include grants and low-interest loans to those affected by COVID-
19, Rouhani said. While the allocated amount is worth some $6.3 bil ion at the rial’s
free market exchange rate of about 160,000 rials per dol ar, the government may
decide to allocate some of the funds at the official rate of 42,000 (which is used to
subsidize food and medicine).
Ireland
March 9: The government announced that it wil set aside 3 bil ion euros ($3.44
bil ion) to provide additional funding to the health service (435 mil ion euros), boost
workers’ sick pay and benefits (2.4 bil ion euros), and offer liquidity assistance to
businesses affected (200 mil ion euros).
Israel
Bank of Israel
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March 18: Announced it would allocate up to $15 bil ion for swap transactions
between currencies for domestic banks, part of a move aimed at shoring up the
Israeli economy amid the COVID-19 pandemic.
April 6: Cut its benchmark interest rate to 0.1% from 0.25%, its first rate cut in five
years, expanded its repo transactions so that the agreements can include corporate
bonds—in addition to government bonds—as security, and wil provide loans to
banks for a term of three years (with a fixed interest rate of 0.1%) with the goal of
increasing the supply of bank credit to small businesses. The size of the plan wil be 5
bil ion shekels.

Government of Israel
March 9: The Finance Ministry announced that it was opening a 4 bil ion-shekel
credit line for banks to lend money to small and medium-sized businesses facing a
cash crisis with a high-level government guarantee.
March 11: Wil expand an aid package (for a second time) to help the country deal
with the COVID-19 outbreak by 6 bil ion shekels to a total of 10 bil ion shekels ($2.8
bil ion). Of that, 8 bil ion shekels wil be in a fund to provide cheap loans to
businesses, 1 bil ion shekels wil boost the health system by increasing medicine
stocks and preparing hospitals to receive a larger number of patients, and 1 bil ion wil
be earmarked for needs such as the police force.
March 16: Wil expand its aid package (for a third time) to help businesses hurt by
the COVID-19 crisis by another 5 bil ion shekels ($1.3 bil ion).
March 30: Announced that it wil spend 80 bil ion shekels ($22 bil ion) to help the
economy weather the COVID-19 crisis—70 bil ion shekels in addition to 10 bil ion
already promised to boost welfare services for those who have lost their jobs or are
on unpaid leave and to assist the private sector. It includes a 20-bil ion-shekel social
safety net, with stipends for those who lost income; 40 bil ion shekels earmarked to
assist businesses with tax breaks, loans, and other services; about 10 bil ion for the
healthcare system; and nearly 8 bil ion wil be spent to speed up the recovery.
Italy
Government of Italy
March 11: Announced two packages worth 25 bil ion euros ($28.3 bil ion): A
package worth 12 bil ion euros wil provide extra funding for the health system as
well as a mix of measures to help companies and households, including freezing tax
and loan payments and boosting unemployment benefits to ensure no jobs were lost.
The remainder wil be a reserve to pay for any further measures. The government
also indicated that payments on mortgages wil be suspended across Italy. ABI, Italy’s
banking lobby, said lenders would offer debt moratoriums to small firms and
households grappling with the economic fallout from the virus.
April 6: Announced a new emergency decree aimed at granting liquidity and bank
loans worth more than 400 bil ion euros to companies hit by COVID-19. The new
legislation, combined with a previous stimulus package in March, would allow banks
to offer credit totaling over 750 bil ion euros ($809.78 bil ion).
Japan
Bank of Japan
March 16: Announced that it would (1) double its upper limit of annual purchases of
exchange traded funds to 12 tril ion yen ($112.46 bil ion) and of real-estate
investment trusts to 180 bil ion yen ($1.7 bil ion) per year, (2) expand its upper limit
of its corporate bond balance and commercial paper balance by 1 tril ion yen ($9.5
bil ion) each, and (3) start a lending program for commercial banks, providing them
with one-year loans in exchange for corporate col ateral worth 8 tril ion yen ($75.6
bil ion).
Government of Japan
February 13: Unveiled a set of measures worth 15.3 bil ion yen ($140 mil ion) to
fight the spread of COVID-19; secured 500 bil ion yen ($4.7 bil ion) for emergency
lending and loan guarantees at the Japan Finance Corporation and other institutions
for small businesses hit hard by the virus outbreak.
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March 10: Unveiled a second package of measures totaling 430.8 bil ion yen ($4.1
bil ion) in spending to cope with the fallout of the COVID-19 outbreak (focusing on
support to small and mid-sized firms) and boosted to 1.6 tril ion yen ($15.1 bil ion) its
special financing for small- and mid-size firms hit by the virus, up from 500 bil ion yen.
March 23: Announced that it is working on a package of measures to combat the
widening economic fallout from the COVID-19 that wil involve direct fiscal spending
exceeding 15 tril ion yen ($137 bil ion). Including loans and other steps that does not
include direct spending, the size of the package may exceed 30 tril ion yen.
April 6: Announced a 108 tril ion yen ($989 bil ion, equivalent to 20% of gross
domestic product) stimulus package, Japan’s largest ever, to rescue the COVID-19-hit
economy. It wil include cash handouts worth 6 tril ion yen for households and small
businesses hit by the virus and offers businesses deferrals on tax and social service
costs worth 26 tril ion yen. The first phase of the package aims to stop job losses and
bankruptcies, while a second round of aid, after the virus is contained, wil try to
support a V-shaped economic recovery.
Kazakhstan
National Bank of Kazakhstan
April 3: Cut its policy rate to 9.5% from 12.0% in an unscheduled move aimed at
boosting economic growth.

Government of Kazakhstan
March 23: The president ordered state-owned companies to start selling part of
their foreign currency revenue on the domestic market to support the local tenge
currency (and to pay out up to 100% of last year’s profits in dividends) in order to
soften the impact of the oil price crash and the COVID-19 outbreak on the economy.
He also ordered a standstil on bank loan repayments by individuals and small- and
medium-sized businesses for the duration of the state of emergency, announced that
the government would pay 42,500 tenge ($95) per month to people who have lost
their source of income, was delaying tax payments for small businesses, and stood
ready to more than triple spending on a program to provide temporary employment
through infrastructure maintenance and construction projects. Together with soft
loan program and other spending, the volume of the stimulus package is expected to
reach $10 bil ion.
April 2: Announced that it plans to borrow $3 bil ion on foreign capital markets to
finance its budget deficit this year, due to the col apse in energy prices and the
additional stimulus spending amid the COVID-19 outbreak.
Kenya
Central Bank of Kenya
March 23: Cut its benchmark lending rate by 100 basis points to 7.25% and lowered
the cash reserve ratio for commercial banks to 4.25% from 5.25%. The move to
lower the cash ratio is expected to release an extra 35.2 bil ion shil ings ($330.83
mil ion) for banks to lend to customers trying to deal with the outbreak.

Government of Kenya
March 16: The World Bank announced that it is making $60 mil ion available to
Kenya’s health sector to help it deal with the COVID-19 outbreak.
March 24: Announced that it wil seek emergency assistance from the IMF of up to
$350 mil ion, and $750 mil ion from the World Bank, release 49 bil ion shil ings ($460
mil ion) to pay pending bil s to suppliers, and expedite the payment of close to 10
bil ion ($94 mil ion) shil ings in value-added tax refunds to businesses in the next two
to three months.
March 25: Announced that the value-added tax rate would be cut to 14% from 16%
and corporation tax would be reduced to 25% from 30% under plans scheduled to
come into force by April, and that there would be 100% tax relief for Kenyans
earning a monthly income of up to 24,000 Kenyan Shil ings ($226) to increase their
disposable income.
Kuwait
Central Bank of Kuwait
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March 16: Cut by 100 basis points its deposit rate to 1.5% and its overnight, one-
week, and one-month repo rates to 1%, 1.25%, and 1.75%, respectively.
April 2: Announced a stimulus package to support vital sectors and small and
medium enterprises (SMEs) amid the fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic. It cut
capital adequacy requirements by 2.5%, eased the risk weighting for SMEs to 25%
from 75%, raised the maximum lending limit to 100% from 90%, and increased the
maximum financing for residential real estate developments to the value of the
property or the cost of development. The measures are expected to raise banks’
lending capacity by 5 bil ion dinars ($16 bil ion).

Government of Kuwait
April 1: Announced measures aimed at shoring up its economy against the pandemic,
including soft long-term loans from local banks to provide liquidity for small and
medium-sized enterprises and directing government agencies to pay obligations to the
private sector as soon as possible.
Malaysia
Government of Malaysia
February 27: Announced the “Economic Stimulus Package 2020” to mitigate the
economic impact of COVID-19, improve the cash flow of affected businesses,
stimulate private consumption, and accelerate domestic investment activities. It
includes exempting accommodation services from services tax, providing sales tax
exemptions, and lifting duties on certain imports.
March 27: Announced a stimulus package worth 250 bil ion ringgit ($58.28 bil ion),
its second in a month, to help cushion the economic blow from the pandemic. It
includes a 25 bil ion ringgit direct fiscal injection by the government aimed at helping
families and business owners; one-off payments and discounts on utilities for people
whose livelihoods have been affected; 1 bil ion ringgit for a food security fund; and a
50 bil ion ringgit loan scheme for larger companies, which wil offer guarantees of up
to 80% of the sum borrowed to shore up working capital in the corporate sector.
Mauritius
March 10: The Bank of Mauritius cut its key repo rate by 50 basis points to 2.85%
amid the COVID-19 outbreak, which is expected to have a significant impact on the
domestic economy.
Mexico
Banxico (Bank of Mexico)
February 13: Cut its key rate by 25 basis points to 7.0%.
March 19: Lowered its benchmark interest rate by 50 basis points to 6.50% in an
out-of-cycle cut in a bid to support the country’s financial markets, reduced the rates
on its additional ordinary liquidity facility, and cut by 50 bil ion pesos ($2.06 bil ion)
the monetary regulation deposit that private banks must observe.
Moldova
National Bank of Moldova
March 4: Cut its main interest rate by 100 basis points to 4.50%, citing the domestic
disinflationary trend and global economic concerns related to the COVID-19
outbreak.
March 20: Cut its main interest rate for the second time in March to 3.25% from
4.50% in order to support banking system amid markets volatility due to the COVID-
19 spread.
Mongolia
March 11: The Central Bank of Mongolia cut its policy rate 100 basis points to
10.0% in response to increased uncertainties in connection with the spread of
COVID-19. It also lowered the reserve requirement on banks.
Morocco
March 15: Morocco’s King Mohammed VI ordered the creation of a 10 bil ion-
dirham ($1 bil ion) fund to upgrade health infrastructure, help vulnerable economic
sectors such as tourism, maintain jobs, and mitigate the social repercussions of the
outbreak.
March 17: Bank Al-Maghrib (Central Bank of the Kingdom of Morocco) cut its
benchmark interest rate by 25 basis points to 2% in order to help shore up economic
activity fol owing a drought and the outbreak of COVID-19.
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Netherlands
Government of the Netherlands
March 12: Announced that it would expand loan guarantees for small and medium
sized enterprises, from 50% to 75%.
March 12: The Tax Authority wil al ow companies affected by COVID-19 to defer
income, corporate, turnover, and wage taxes for the time being.
March 17: Announced measures to support companies, ranging from tax
exemptions to having up to 90% of wages lost for work hour reductions paid by the
government.
New Zealand
Reserve Bank of New Zealand
March 16: Cut the official cash rate by 75 basis points to a record low of 0.25%, and
pledged to keep it at this level for at least 12 months.
March 22: Announced that it wil purchase up NZ$30 bil ion ($17 bil ion) of
government bonds in the secondary market over the next 12 months. It wil seek to
buy NZ$750 mil ion bonds a week across a range of maturities, via an auction
process.
March 24: Reduced banks’ core funding ratios to 50% from 75% to help banks make
credit available.
March 30: Announced that it was deploying more tools to provide additional
liquidity to the corporate sector and support market functioning to offset the impact
of the pandemic. A new weekly Open Market Operation—to be held each Tuesday—
wil provide liquidity in exchange for eligible corporate and asset-backed securities by
offering up to NZ$500 mil ion ($300 mil ion) for terms out to approximately three
months, starting on March 31. The bank also wil offer to purchase government bonds
maturing on May 15, 2021, for liquidity management purposes.

Government of New Zealand
March 16: Announced a spending package of NZ$12.1 bil ion ($7.3 bil ion),
equivalent to 4% of GDP in an attempt to fight the effects of COVID-19 on the
economy; approximately NZ$5 bil ion wil go toward wage subsidies for businesses,
NZ$2.8 bil ion toward income support, NZ$2.8 bil ion in business tax relief, and
NZ$600 mil ion toward the airline industry.
March 24: Announced that retail banks wil offer a six-month principal and interest
payment holiday for mortgage holders and small business customers whose incomes
have been affected by the economic disruption from COVID-19. The government and
the banks wil also implement a NZ$6.25 bil ion ($3.62 bil ion) Business Finance
Guarantee Scheme for small and medium-sized businesses. It wil include a limit of
NZ$500,000 per loan and wil apply to firms with a turnover of between
NZ$250,000 and NZ$80 mil ion per annum (the government wil carry 80% of the
credit risk, with the other 20% to be carried by the banks).
Norway
Norges Bank
March 13: Cut its key interest rate to 1% from 1.5%, as it seeks to counter the
economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. It indicated that it would offer funding
to banks to help counter the volatility in financial markets and announced that banks’
countercyclical capital buffer would be reduced from 2.5% to 1%, to help banks
continue to lend money.
March 20: Cut its key policy rate by 75 basis points to 0.25% from 1.0% in a bid to
alleviate the economic impact from the COVID-19 outbreak. It also offered a third
batch of extraordinary loans to the banking industry to ensure it has enough for the
months ahead.
March 30: Increased its planned issuance of government bonds this year to between
70 bil ion and 85 bil ion Norwegian crowns ($6.68 bil ion-$8.11 bil ion) from an
original plan of 55 bil ion crowns, fol owing the government’s decision to offer loans
worth tens of bil ions of crowns in emergency funding to companies hurt by the
coronavirus outbreak.
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March 31: Wil increase further its daily purchase of Norwegian currency to 2 bil ion
crowns ($190 mil ion) per day from 1.6 bil ion crowns in order to make funds
available for the government’s fiscal budget. (On March 18, it announced that it would
increase it to 1.6 bil ion Norwegian crowns per day from 500 mil ion crowns.)

Government of Norway
March 13: Announced that it would pay a greater part of the bil for all companies
seeking to make temporary layoffs, suspended all airport fees for the first six months
of 2020, and lifted for a period of 10 months the tax charged for each passenger.
March 15: Announced that it would offer companies at least 100 bil ion Norwegian
crowns ($9.7 bil ion) in funding in the form of loan guarantees (50 bil ion crowns to
small and medium sized companies seeking bank loans) and bond issues (50 bil ion
crowns to large firms issuing corporate bonds). In addition, payments of payrol taxes
wil be postponed.
March 20: Presented legislation that would temporarily reduce the value-added tax,
postpone tax filing deadlines and add worker and business protections under a 280
bil ion kroner ($24 bil ion) plan to boost the economy amid the pandemic. Along with
the tax provisions, the legislative package includes two previously announced lending
programs that the government said would provide up to 100 bil ion kroner in support
for Norwegian businesses, improving their access to credit to ensure liquidity.
March 27: Proposed new measures to support businesses hit by the viral outbreak
and a sharp fall in the price of oil. They include, among other things, covering fixed
costs for companies affected by the coronavirus outbreak at a cost of 10 bil ion to 20
bil ion Norwegian crowns ($958 mil ion to $1.92 bil ion) per month for two months.
Oman
March 18: The Central Bank of Oman announced that it wil provide about 8 bil ion
Omani rials ($20.8 bil ion) in extra liquidity to banks as one of several measures
aimed at supporting the economy. It also asked banks to cut banking fees, adjust
capital and credit ratios, allow repayment postponements for up to six months, and
facilitate lending, particularly in sectors affected by the COVID-19, including
healthcare, travel and tourism.
Pakistan
State Bank of Pakistan
March 17: Cut its key interest rate by 75 basis points to 12.50% in response to the
anticipated slowdown due to COVID-19, provided additional support to investment,
offering a new package of 100 bil ion rupees ($630.5 mil ion) for investment in the
manufacturing sector to fund investors at 7% for 10 years., and announced that it
would refinance banks to provide 5 bil ion rupees ($31.5 mil ion) at a maximum of 3%
for the purchasing of equipment used to fight the COVID-19.
March 24: Cut its benchmark interest rate for the second time in a week, lowering
it by 150 basis points to 11% amid considerable uncertainty about how the COVID-
19 outbreak would impact the global economy and Pakistan.

Government of Pakistan
March 24: Announced a financial-relief package of more than 1 tril ion rupees ($6.3
bil ion) to support the economy and poorer workers. It wil include help to the
export and industry sectors, tax breaks, procurement of medical and other
equipment required to fight the pandemic, and the distribution of a monthly cash
stipend among the poor.
Paraguay
Central Bank of Paraguay
March 13: Cut its benchmark interest rate by 25 basis points to 3.75%, as part of a
series of measures aimed at dealing with the impact of the COVID-19 outbreak.
Banks’ reserve requirements wil also be reduced to help the financial sector
refinance debts.

Government of Paraguay
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March 13: Announced tax relief measures, as well as $150 mil ion of credit lines in
state banks and loans from multilateral agencies.
Peru
Central Reserve Bank of Peru
March 19: Cut its benchmark interest rate by 100 basis points to 1.25%, from 2.25%
to counter the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and announced that, if
necessary, could employ other additional liquidity injection instruments to alleviate
the crisis.
March 29: Announced that that as part of the 90 bil ion soles stimulus plan
announced on March 29, the Bank would inject 30 bil ion soles into banks for loans to
mainly smaller companies to help cover their working capital.
April 2: Announced that it is preparing a major bond issuance to help underwrite an
unprecedented stimulus package to counter the economic impact of the fast-
spreading pandemic.

Government of Peru
March 29: Announced that it is planning an economic stimulus package worth
around 90 bil ion soles ($26.41 bil ion or 12% of gross domestic product) to support
citizens and the key mining sector that have been impacted by COVID-19. It wil have
three phases of 30 bil ion soles each: containing the disease, ensuring companies’
payment chains by granting credit guarantees, and reactivating production, particularly
in the copper industry.
Philippines
Central Bank of the Philippines (Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas)
March 19: Cut the rate on its overnight reverse repurchase facility by 50 basis
points to 3.25%, authorized a temporary relaxation of regulations on compliance
reporting by banks, calculations of penalties on required reserves and single borrower
limits, and approved a temporary reduction to zero of the term spread on
rediscounting loans relative to the overnight lending rate.
March 23: Revealed it would purchase up to 300 bil ion Philippine peso ($5.9 bil ion)
worth of short-term securities under a repurchase agreement with the Bureau of the
Treasury in a bid to inject a fresh round of liquidity into the market and to keep a lid
on interest rates in the process.
March 24: Announced a 200 basis points reduction in the reserve requirement ratio
(RRR) to calm financial markets and boost lending. The cut, effective March 30, wil
bring the ratio to 12% and ensure there is sufficient liquidity to counter the economic
impact of the COVID-19 outbreak.

Government of the Philippines
March 13: Instructed the Government Service Insurance System and the Social
Security System “to take advantage of the low stock prices" and "support the stock
market by at least doubling their daily average purchase volumes" from 2019.
March 16: The government announced a 27.1-bil ion peso package to help fight the
COVID-19 pandemic and provide economic relief to affected sectors.
March 17: The Philippine Stock Exchange halted all stock, bond and currency trading
until further notice, after President Rodrigo Duterte placed Luzon, the country’s
economic powerhouse, under “enhanced community quarantine”.
March 22: The Philippine Congress is reportedly drafting a stimulus package of at
least 200 bil ion pesos ($3.9 bil ion) as part of a supplemental budget to shore up the
economy from the impact of the COVID-19 outbreak.
March 19: The Philippine Stock Exchange reopened with shortened hours.
Poland
National Bank of Poland
March 17: Cut its benchmark interest rate by 50 basis points to 1.0% from 1.5% in
response to the COVID-19 pandemic; it also lowered its lombard rate to 1.50% from
2.50% and the rediscount rate to 1.05% from 1.75%, reduced banks’ required reserve
ratios to 0.5% from 3.5%, announced plans to boost banking sector liquidity (through
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the extension of repo operations), and offered “large-scale” purchases of government
bonds as part of its open-market operations.

Government of Poland
March 18: Announced an economic stimulus package of 212 bil ion zloty ($52 bil ion,
or approximately 9% of gross domestic product) to assist entrepreneurs and
employees during the COVID-19 crisis. It consists of 5 pil ars: employee safety,
company financing, health protection, strengthening the financial system, and a public
investment program. Specific measures include holidays in debt repayments and social
contributions, loan guarantees, as well as payments of salaries to those unable to
work.
March 26: Announced that the state bank BGK wil issue bonds worth around 16
bil ion zlotys ($3.9 bil ion) in 2020-2021 as part of a wider plan to combat the
coronavirus impact on the economy. The state wil buy the bonds back in 2021-2025,
spending around 2.5 bil ion zlotys a year in the first year and then around 3.7 bil ion
zlotys annually.
Portugal
Government of Portugal
March 13: Announced a 2.3 bil ion-euro package that wil include delaying some tax
payments and granting soft loans. Companies wil be allowed to suspend social
security payments and maintain employees’ contracts with payments equal to two-
thirds of salaries, funded largely by the state, and workers who have to stay at home
to care for school children of up to 12 years of age wil receive 66% of their base
salaries.
March 18: Announced a 9.2 bil ion-euro package to support workers and provide
liquidity for companies affected by the COVID-19 outbreak. It consists of 5.2 bil ion
euros in fiscal stimulus, 3 bil ion in state-backed credit guarantees, and 1 bil ion
related to social security payments. (Just over half of the 3 bil ion euros in credit lines
announced is aimed at companies working in tourism, hotels and restaurants. The
other half goes to industries like textiles, clothing and wood. Around a third is set
aside for micro and small enterprises.)
Qatar
Qatar Central Bank
March 16: Cut the deposit rate by 50 basis points to 1%, lending rate by 100 basis
points to 2.50%, and repurchase rate (repo) by 50 basis points to 1%.

Government of Qatar
March 15: The Emir of Qatar announced several measures to shield the economic
and financial sectors in the country from the impact of the COVID-19, including (1)
allocating 75 bil ion Qatari riyals ($20.6 bil ion) to support and provide financial and
economic incentives in the private sector, (2) directing the Central Bank of Qatar to
provide additional liquidity to banks operating in the country and putting in place the
appropriate mechanism to encourage banks to postpone loan installments and
obligations of the private sector with a grace period of six months, (3) directing the
Qatar Development Bank to postpone the installments for all borrowers for a period
of six months, (4) directing the government to increase its investments in the stock
exchange by 10 bil ion Qatari riyals ($2.75 bil ion), (5) exempting food and medical
goods from customs duties for a period of six months, and (6) exempting the various
sectors of the economy from electricity and water fees for a period of 6 months.
Romania
March 20: The National bank of Romania cut its benchmark interest rate by 50 basis
points to 2.0% in order to curb the economic fallout from the COVID-19 outbreak. It
also cut its lending rate facility to 2.50% from 3.50% and wil provide liquidity to banks
via repo transactions and purchase leu-denominated debt on the secondary market.
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority
March 15: Announced that it had prepared a 50 bil ion riyal ($13.32 bil ion) package
to help small and medium-sized enterprises cope with the economic impacts of
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COVID-19; it also lowered by 75 basis points both its repo rate to 1%, and its
reverse repo rate to 0.5%.

Government of Saudi Arabia
March 20: Introduced an additional stimulus package worth 120 bil ion riyals ($32
bil ion) to aid businesses, including the postponement of value-added tax (VAT),
excise tax, and income tax payments for a period of three months and exemptions of
various government levies and fees.
March 30: Announced that it wil finance treatment for anyone infected with
COVID-19 in the country, and took steps to boost wheat and livestock supplies amid
global fears of a food shortage.
Serbia
National Bank of Serbia
March 11: Cut its reference interest rate by 50 basis points to 1.75% to help
minimize economic disruption caused by the COVID-19 outbreak.

Government of Serbia
March 29: Announced that it plans to offer about 5 bil ion euros ($5.54 bil ion) in
loans and subsidies to businesses to help them cope with the economic impact of
COVID-19 and make a one-time payment of 100 euros to every citizen older than
18. The president indicated that the state would use 700 mil ion euros to pay
minimum wages of 30,367 dinars ($288.58) and allow tax delays for micro and small
enterprises for the three months after the end of the state of emergency to avoid job
loss.
Seychelles
March 24: The Central Bank of Seychelles cut its monetary policy rate by 100 basis
points to 4.0%, indicating that this was the first phase of its response to the challenge
from the spread of the COVID-19, which is expected to lower this year’s earnings
from tourism by 70% and trigger a double-digit drop in economic growth.
Singapore
Monetary Authority of Singapore
March 30: Announced that it would adopt a 0% per annum rate of appreciation of
the policy band starting at the prevailing level of the Singapore Dol ar Nominal
Effective Exchange Rate (S$NEER), currently slightly below the mid-point of the
policy band.

Government of Singapore
February 18: Announced around $4.5 bil ion in financial packages to help contain
the COVID-19 outbreak, including $575 mil ion to fight and contain the disease,
mainly through healthcare funding, and 4 bil ion in economic stimulus measures to
manage its impact on businesses, jobs and households.
March 26: Unveiled stimulus plan worth around S$48 bil ion ($33.7 bil ion) to deal
with the economic fallout from COVID-19 (of which S$17 bil ion wil be drawn from
the national reserves). A key part of the stimulus package involves ramping up a jobs
support scheme first announced in February. The government wil now offset up to
25% of the first S$4,600 of workers’ monthly wages for a nine-month period (up from
the 8% quantum and S$3,600 cap announced in February), while self-employed
workers wil be eligible to receive monthly payments of S$1,000 for nine months.
Some hard-hit sectors wil receive additional support: the government would offset
up to 50% of wages in the food services sector and up to 75% of wages in the aviation
and tourism sectors. A previously announced cash payout to all adult Singaporeans
would be tripled and low-income families wil also receive grocery vouchers.
Slovakia
Government of the Slovak Republic
March 29: Announced plans for an aid package of up to 1 bil ion euros a month to
help firms and employees hurt by the pandemic. Under the plan, the state would (1)
pay 80% of wages for employees at firms forced to shut, (2) help self-employed
people and employees in firms that suffer falling revenue, with payments linked to the
size of the revenue drop, (3) allow employers to postpone their contributions to
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state social and health systems and delay some tax payments if they suffer a 40% drop
in revenue; (4) allow firms to offset accumulated losses from past years going back to
2014 against corporate income tax, and (5) offer firms bank guarantees of up to 500
mil ion euros a month.
South Africa
South African Reserve Bank
March 19: Cut its main lending rate by 100 basis points to 5.25% as it sought to
offset the drag from the COVID-19 outbreak and the plunge in oil prices.
March 20: Announced measures to inject liquidity into local markets, including
intraday overnight supplementary repos to provide liquidity support to clearing banks,
lowering the standing facilities’ borrowing rate by 100 basis points to 200 basis point
below the benchmark repo rate, and lowering the standing facilities’ lending rate to
the repo rate from the previous rate of repo plus 100 basis points.
March 25: Announced that it would begin buying an unspecified amount of
government bonds as part of additional emergency policy measures aimed at easing a
severe liquidity crunch triggered by the COVID-19.
South Korea
Bank of Korea
March 16: Cut the seven-day repurchase rate by 50 basis points to 0.75% in an
effort to soften the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the Korean economy. It
also lowered borrowing costs for the bank’s low interest rate loan programs and
relaxed col ateral rules of its repurchasing operations, to ensure companies can easily
and cheaply access credit.
March 19: Announced that it wil buy government bonds worth 1.5 tril ion won
($1.2 bil ion) to bolster liquidity in the bond market and back short-term liquidity in
banks under increased loan demand due to fallout from COVID-19.

Government of the Republic of Korea
March 3: Announced a 11.7 tril ion won ($9.8 bil ion) stimulus package that includes
funding for medical institutions and quarantine efforts, assistance to small- to
medium-sized businesses struggling to pay wages to their workers, and subsidies for
child care.
March 17: The National Assembly approved a supplementary budget worth 11.7
tril ion won ($9.4 bil ion) to help contain COVID-19 and cushion the economic
fallout. The government has indicated that it plans to execute at least 75% of its
spending within the next two months.
March 18: Pledged 50 tril ion won ($40 bil ion) in emergency financing for small
businesses and other stimulus measures to help the economy. Some highlights of the
package include 12 tril ion won in low-interest financing for small firms, 5.5 tril ion
won in loan guarantees, easing loan terms and suspending interest payments for small
businesses. The Bank of Korea reportedly wil actively provide liquidity support for
around half of the new package.
March 20: South Korea’s financial authorities and local banks agreed to set up a
bond market stabilization fund worth more than 10 tril ion won ($7.9 bil ion) as part
of the country’s efforts to calm financial markets roiled by the spread of COVID-19.
March 24: Announced that it would double the planned economic rescue package
announced on March 18 to 100 tril ion won ($80 bil ion) to save companies hit by the
COVID-19 and put a floor under crashing stocks and bond markets. It includes 29.1
tril ion won in loans to small- and medium-sized companies and 20 tril ion won wil be
used to buy corporate bonds and commercial paper of companies facing a credit
crunch. As part of the rescue package, the Financial Services Commission wil
establish a 10.7 tril ion won facility set up to stabilize stock markets. It wil also
commence a bond buying facility in April that wil be funded by 84 institutions,
including the Bank of Korea, commercial banks and insurers.
March 29: Announced that an “emergency disaster relief payment” of up to 1 mil ion
won ($820) would be made to all households (except the top 30% by income),
totaling some 9.1 tril ion won ($7.44 bil ion). It is also preparing another extra budget
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worth 7.1 tril ion won ($5.80 bil ion) for parliamentary approval in April, and wil
exempt some small and medium-sized companies from paying utility bil s.
Spain
Government of Spain
March 12: Approved the creation of a 2.8 bil ion euro ($3 bil ion) aid package to
help regional authorities mitigate the economic impact from COVID-19, and
announced a 1 bil ion euro contribution to the health ministry’s budget and 14 bil ion
euros ($15.1 bil ion) in liquidity for small and medium companies (e.g., small
businesses affected by the outbreak would be exempt from paying taxes for six
months). It also announced that it would open a 400 mil ion euro credit line to aid
the tourism industry.
March 17: Unveiled a package of 200 bil ion euros ($219 bil ion) to mitigate the
effects of COVID-19 (117 bil ion euros wil be mobilized by the state, with the rest
coming from private companies). It wil include state-backed credit guarantees for
companies, loans and aid for vulnerable people, a moratorium on mortgage payments
and evictions; the government wil also guarantee water, electricity and internet to
for people adversely affected.
Sri Lanka
March 16: The Central Bank of Sri Lanka cut the Standing Deposit Facility Rate
(SDFR) and the Standing Lending Facility Rate (SLFR) by 25 basis points to 6.25% and
7.25%, respectively, and the Statutory Reserve Ratio (SRR) on all rupee deposit
liabilities of licensed commercial banks was reduced by 1 percentage point to 4%
March 16: The Colombo Stock Exchange was closed until March 19, as the
government extended the public holiday in a bid to halt the spread of COVID-19 in
the country.
April 3: The Central Bank of Sri Lanka cut by a further 25 basis points its benchmark
interest rates (the Standing Deposit Facility Rate and Standing Lending Facility Rate to
6.00% and 7.00%, respectively), its second such reduction in three weeks, in a move
to support the economy amid the coronavirus pandemic.
Sweden
Sveriges Riksbank
March 13: Stated that it would lend up to 500 bil ion crowns ($51 bil ion) to
Swedish companies via banks to shore up credit flows as the epidemic wreaks havoc
on financial markets.
March 16: Announced that it would buy securities for up to an additional 300 bil ion
Swedish crowns ($31 bil ion) in 2020 to facilitate credit supply and mitigate the
downturn in the economy caused by the COVID-19, reduced the overnight lending
rate to banks to 0.2 percentage point above its repo rate (from 0.75 percentage
point), and indicated that it would be flexible with the col ateral banks can use when
they borrow money from the Riksbank, giving lenders more scope to use mortgage
bonds as col ateral.

Government of Sweden
March 16: Presented a package worth more than 300 bil ion Swedish crowns ($31
bil ion) to support the economy in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic. It included
measures such as the central government assuming the ful cost for sick leave from
companies through the months of April and May 2020 and for temporary
redundancies due to the crisis, and allowing companies to put off paying tax and VAT
for up to a year (retroactive to the start of 2020).
Switzerland
Swiss National Bank
March 23: Hiked its foreign currency interventions to their highest level since the
Brexit referendum in 2016 in an effort to stem the rise in the franc, which has
appreciated as investors sought safe assets while stock markets have plunged during
the coronavirus pandemic.

Government of Switzerland
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March 13: Unveiled an emergency economic-aid package of roughly 10 bil ion francs
($10.5 bil ion) for workers and small businesses. It includes 8 bil ion francs for
“Kurzarbeit,” or short-time work, and 580 mil ion francs in guaranteed bank loans.
March 20: Announced a new 32 bil ion franc ($32.56 bil ion) aid package to support
companies and workers hit by the widening COVID-19 outbreak. The bulk of the
cash (20 bil ion francs) wil go into guarantees for bank loans to companies at “very
modest” interest rates. Firms wil be able to get loans worth up to 10% of their
revenue, to a maximum of 20 mil ion francs. Amounts of 500,000 francs wil be paid
out immediately and guaranteed by the government. The government’s short-time
working scheme would also be extended to fixed-term, temporary workers, and
trainees. The package fol ows one worth 10 bil ion francs announced on March 13,
bringing the total stimulus to 42 bil ion francs ($42.8 bil ion).
March 31: Announced that it is stepping up its funding plans in response to
government measures to cushion the economic impact of the pandemic, doubling the
volume of outstanding short-term money market instruments. The Federal Finance
Administration (FFA) wil increase the outstanding volume of short-term money
market instruments, from around 6 bil ion francs ($6.24 bil ion) to 12 bil ion francs,
and wil once again step up sales of its own Confederation bond holdings.
Taiwan
Central Bank of the Republic of China (Taiwan)

March 19: Cut its benchmark rate by 25 basis points to 1.125%, and announced that
it would expand the scope of repurchase facility operations and provide banks with
T$200 bil ion ($6.6 bil ion) of financing to support small and medium sized companies
which have been hard hit by the COVID-19 outbreak.

Government of Taiwan
February 25: Approved a T$60 bil ion ($2 bil ion) package to help cushion the
impact of the COVID-19 outbreak on its export-reliant economy, including loans for
small businesses, subsidies for hard-hit tour agencies, tax cuts for tour bus drivers,
and vouchers to spend on food in night markets.
March 12: Announced that an additional T$40 bil ion ($1.33 bil ion) from the
Employment Stabilization Fund and the Tourism Development Fund would be
available to stimulate Taiwanese economy.
March 19: The president said that the government would help its hard-hit airline
industry access T$50 bil ion in financing, and did not rule out further economic
stimulus.
March 19: Authorized its National Stabilisation Fund to intervene and buy stocks on
the market, as the island’s bourse continues to fall on COVID-19 worries.
Thailand
Bank of Thailand
March 20: Cut its key interest rate by 25 basis points to 0.75%, as the spread of
COVID-19 exerted further pressure on the Thai economy.
March 22: Together with the Ministry of Finance and the Securities and Exchange
Commission, announced three measures to address liquidity concerns and ensure the
functioning of local financial markets: (1) setting up a special facility that allows
commercial banks that purchase units in high-quality money market funds or daily
fixed-income funds to use them as col ateral for liquidity support (initial estimate is 1
tril ion baht); (2) creation of a 70-100 bil ion baht “Corporate Bond Stabilization
Fund” that invests in high-quality, newly issued bonds by corporates that cannot ful y
rol over maturing corporate bonds, and (3) Bank of Thailand wil continue to
purchase government bonds to provide liquidity to the market.

Government of Thailand
March 10: Approved a stimulus package worth an estimated 400 bil ion baht ($12.74
bil ion) to help alleviate the impact of the COVID-19 outbreak. It includes 150 bil ion
baht of soft loans, a 20 bil ion baht fund to help firms and workers affected, and tax
benefits and support for utilities costs.
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March 24: Approved a package of stimulus measures worth at least 117 bil ion baht
($3.56 bil ion) to try to mitigate the impact of the coronavirus outbreak. The
measures include cash handouts worth 45 bil ion baht for 3 mil ion workers outside
the social security system; soft loans worth 60 bil ion baht; and tax breaks. Separately,
small firms wil be offered 10 bil ion baht of loans and business tax payments wil be
delayed.
March 30: Announced that it is preparing a third stimulus package, worth more than
500 bil ion baht ($15.3 bil ion), to alleviate the impact of the coronavirus crisis.
March 31: Agreed to triple the number of workers receiving cash handouts to nine
mil ion to help ease the impact of the spreading coronavirus. It had previously planned
to provide cash handouts of 15,000 baht ($458) each to 3 mil ion workers, taking the
total to 45 bil ion baht ($1.38 bil ion). Now its total handout wil reach 135 bil ion
baht ($4.13 bil ion).
Tunisia
Central Bank of Tunisia
March 17: Cut its key interest rate by 100 basis points to 6.75%, as it responded to
the negative impact of the COVID-19 on the global growth outlook.
April 1: Asked banks and financial institutions to suspend the distribution of 2019
dividends and allow customers to defer loan payments for three months as part of a
package to ease the social and economic effects of the coronavirus.

Government of Tunisia
March 21: Announced that it would allocate 2.5 bil ion dinars ($850 mil ion) to
combat the economic and social effects of the COVID-19 health crisis. Among new
measures, the government wil delay tax debts, postpone taxes on small- and
medium-sized businesses, delay repayment of low-income employee loans, and
provide financial assistance to poor families and those who have lost their jobs due to
the crisis and loans and aid to help companies affected.
March 23: The finance minister announced that the International Monetary Fund wil
disburse $400 mil ion to help the country face the effects of COVID-19.
March 28: The European Union granted Tunisia 250 mil ion euros in aid to help it
cope with the economic and social effects of the viral outbreak.
Turkey
Central Bank of Turkey
March 17: Lowered its benchmark one-week repo rate by 100 basis points to 9.75%,
as it responded to the negative impact of the COVID-19 on the global growth
outlook.
March 31: Announced emergency measures to stem the fallout from a growing
pandemic. It would (1) allow primary dealers to sell to the Bank (for a temporary
period) debt they purchased from the Unemployment Insurance Fund, (2) extend 60
bil ion lira ($9 bil ion) worth of rediscount credits, (3) add more lending options well
below its 9.75% policy rate, (4) hold swap auctions with six-month maturities for lira
against dol ars, euros, or gold at an interest rate 125 basis points lower than the
policy rate, and (5) allow lenders to use mortgage- and asset-backed securities as
col ateral for foreign exchange operations.

Government of Turkey
March 18: Unveiled a 100 bil ion-lira ($15.4 bil ion) plan to help businesses affected
by the COVID-19 pandemic. It includes measures from tax cuts and payment
deferrals for businesses to an increase in minimum pension payouts.
Ukraine
March 19: The government published a new law that wil exempt taxpayers from
paying the land and property taxes from March 1 to April 30, introduced a
moratorium on tax audits from March 18 to May 31, and suspended some tax-related
penalties from March 1 to May 31.
Uganda
Bank of Uganda
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March 24: Sold dol ars in the interbank market to support the local currency, which
has been experiencing sharp depreciation due to COVID-19-related disruptions.
April 6: Cut its policy rate by 100 basis points to 8.0% to support the economy
which has been hit by the impact of COVID-19. It also announced that it had
“directed” commercial banks to defer all discretionary payments, such as dividends
and bonus payments, for at least 90 days from March.
United Arab Emirates
Central Bank of the UAE
(UAE)
March 15: Announced a 100 bil ion dirham ($27 bil ion) stimulus package to deal
with the economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic; it cut the rate on one-week
certificates of deposit by 75 basis points and wil also ease regulatory limits on loans.
April 5: Announced new measures to guarantee liquidity in the banking system in the
face of the pandemic, boosting its stimulus to a total of 256 bil ion dirhams ($70
bil ion) from a previously announced 100 bil ion dirhams ($27 bil ion) package. It also
halved banks’ reserve requirements for demand deposits to 7% from 14%, which wil
inject about 61 bil ion dirhams of liquidity to support banks’ lending and liquidity
management, extended the duration of a previously announced deferral of loan
principal and interest payments for customers until the end of the year, and said
banks participating in the scheme can benefit from a capital buffer relief of 50 bil ion
dirhams until December 2021, among other measures.

Government of the UAE
March 30: Announced that it would inject funding into state-owned Emirates
Airlines to help it deal with the impact of COVID-19 on its business.
April 5: Announced that it would reinforce its stockpile of strategic goods and waive
residency visa fines for the rest of the year in response to the viral outbreak.
United Kingdom
Bank of England
March 11: Cut its benchmark interest rate by half a percentage point, to 0.25%,
revived a program to support lending to small and midsize businesses, and reduced
bank capital requirements to further boost credit.
March 19: Cut its benchmark rate by 15 basis points to 0.1% to try to mitigate the
impact of COVID-19 on the British economy, added 200 bil ion pounds ($232 bil ion)
to its asset purchase program (including sovereign and private debt), increased its
banks’ borrowing allowance under the Term Funding Scheme for Small and Medium
Enterprises from 5% to 10% of participants’ stock of real economy lending, and
cancelled its 2020 stress test of the 8 major UK banks.
April 2: Announced that it wil double the size of its corporate bond purchase
program to at least 20 bil ion pounds ($24.7 bil ion), part of a previously announced
stimulus package to help the economy. It wil begin ramping up its corporate bond
purchases through a series of reverse auctions starting on April 7, holding three a
week, and it wil be able to buy 20 mil ion pounds of any single bond—double the
previous amount.
UK Government
March 11: Announced a stimulus package totaling 30 bil ion pounds ($39 bil ion). It
wil include 7 bil ion pounds ($8.6 bil ion) available to support the labor market, 5
bil ion pounds ($6.1 bil ion) to help the health-care system, and 18 bil ion pounds ($22
bil ion) to support the UK economy, bringing the total fiscal stimulus to 30 bil ion
pounds ($39 bil ion). (Among the specific measures, there wil be a tax cut for
retailers, cash grants to small businesses, a mandate to provide sick pay for people
who need to self-isolate, subsidies to cover the costs of sick pay for small businesses,
and expanded access to government benefits for the self-employed and unemployed.)
March 17: Unveiled a package of 350 bil ion pounds ($424 bil ion) to support the
economy; it includes 330 bil ion pounds of guaranteed loans for businesses that need
cash to pay rent or suppliers, 20 bil ion pounds of tax cuts and grants for businesses
in 2020, a three-month mortgage payment holiday for borrowers affected by the
virus, and a one-year “business rates” holiday for businesses in the retail, leisure, and
hospitality industry.
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March 28: Wil ease regulations for affected businesses, including simplifying the
insolvency system to keep companies trading, easing administrative requirements and
barriers to the import of personal protective equipment, and helping new companies
produce and distribute hand sanitizer within a matter of days.
Vietnam
State Bank of Vietnam
February 24: Ordered commercial banks to eliminate, cut, or delay interest
payments on loans to companies facing losses due to the coronavirus outbreak.
March 16: Cut by 100 basis points both its refinance rate (to 5%) and the overnight
lending rate in the inter-bank market (to 6%), and by 50 basis points its discount rate
(to 3.5%).

Government of Vietnam
March 3: Announced measures worth 27 tril ion dong ($1.16 bil ion) to help
businesses cope with the coronavirus epidemic and help the economy stick to its
6.8% growth target this year. They include tax breaks, delayed tax payments, and a
reduction in land lease fees. The government will also speed up state spending on
infrastructure projects.
Zimbabwe
Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe
March 26: Cut its main lending rate to 25% from 35% and set a fixed exchange rate
(at 25 Zimbabwe dol ars to the U.S. dol ar) as part of measures to support the
economy. It indicated that it had suspended the managed floating exchange rate
system to provide for greater certainty in the pricing of goods and services in the
economy.

Government of Zimbabwe
March 29: Published new exchange control regulations making it legal for
Zimbabweans to use electronic and cash foreign currencies in domestic transactions,
as the country readies for a 21-day lockdown to prevent the spread of COVID-19.
Multi-Country and
March 4: The International Monetary Fund (IMF) made $50 bil ion in loans
International
available to deal with the COVID-19 through its rapid-disbursing emergency financing
Institutions’
facilities, including $10 bil ion of zero-interest loans to the poorest IMF member
Responses
countries. On March 16, the IMF announced that it “stands ready to mobilize its $1
tril ion lending capacity to help our membership" and that it has “40 ongoing
arrangements—both disbursing and precautionary—with combined commitments of
about $200 bil ion,” some of which could be used for this crisis, and that it is aiming
to boost its debt relief fund to $1 bil ion from its current level of $400 mil ion.
March 3: The World Bank announced an initial package of up to $12 bil ion in
loans for countries to help countries cope with the effects of the COVID-19
outbreak. Specifically, it comprises up to $2.7 bil ion new financing from IBRD, $1.3
bil ion from IDA, complemented by reprioritization of $2 bil ion of the Bank’s existing
portfolio, and $6 bil ion from IFC, as well as policy advice and technical assistance ($8
bil ion is new funding and the remaining $4 bil ion is redirected from current lines of
credit).
March 11: The Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) announced that it
has up to $2 bil ion in resources that can be programmed to countries requesting
support for disease monitoring, testing and public health services, and that it could
work with countries that have undisbursed loan balances to redirect resources to
pandemic-response efforts.
March 13: The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(EBRD)
unveiled an emergency €1 bil ion “Solidarity Package” of measures to help
companies across its regions deal with the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Under
the emergency program, the EBRD wil set up a “resilience framework” to provide
financing for existing EBRD clients with strong business fundamentals experiencing
temporary credit difficulties, comprising emergency liquidity, working capital and
trade finance.
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March 15: The Bank of Canada, the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan, the
European Central Bank, the U.S. Federal Reserve, and the Swiss National Bank
agreed to lower the pricing on the standing US dol ar liquidity swap arrangements by
25 basis points, so that the new rate wil be the US dol ar overnight index swap (OIS)
rate plus 25 basis points.
March 16: The European Investment Bank Group (EIBG) proposed a 40
bil ion euro financing package consists of dedicated guarantee schemes to banks based
on existing program for immediate deployment (20 bil ion euros), liquidity lines to
banks to ensure additional working capital support for SMEs and mid-caps (10 bil ion
euros), and asset-backed securities purchasing programs to allow banks to transfer
risk on portfolios of SME loans (10 bil ion euros).
March 16: The Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) Group announced that it is
setting-up a special “Strategic Preparedness and Response Facility” of $730 mil ion to
mitigate the negative health and socio-economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.
It wil include $280 mil ion from the Bank and Islamic Solidarity Fund for
Development (ISFD) for sovereign projects and programs, $300 mil ion from
International Islamic Trade finance Corporation (ITFC) for trade finance and $150
mil ion from the Islamic Corporation for the Insurance of Investment and Export
Credit (ICIEC) for insurance coverage.
March 16: The Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI)
granted a nonreimbursable financial package worth $8 mil ion to the eight countries
of the Central American Integration System in order to combat the widening
economic fallout from the COVID-19 (Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua,
Costa Rica, Panama, Belize, and the Dominican Republic wil each receive $1 mil ion).
March 18: The Asian Development Bank (ADB) announced a $6.5 bil ion initial
package to address the immediate needs of its developing member countries (DMCs)
as they respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. The initial package includes
approximately $3.6 bil ion in sovereign operations for a range of responses to the
health and economic consequences of the pandemic, $1.6 bil ion in non-sovereign
operations for micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises, domestic and regional
trade, and firms directly impacted, about $1 bil ion in concessional resources through
reallocations from ongoing projects and assessing possible needs for contingencies,
and $40 mil ion in technical assistance and quick-disbursing grants. (Since February
2020, ADB has provided more than $225 mil ion to meet urgent needs of both
governments and businesses in DMCs.)
March 19: The U.S. Federal Reserve announced the establishment of temporary
U.S. dol ar liquidity arrangements (swap lines) with 9 central banks to help lessen
strains in global U.S. dol ar funding markets. These new facilities wil support the
provision of U.S. dol ar liquidity in amounts up to $60 bil ion each for the Reserve
Bank of Australia, the Banco Central do Brasil, the Bank of Korea, the Banco de
Mexico, the Monetary Authority of Singapore, and the Sveriges Riksbank, and $30
bil ion each for the Danmarks Nationalbank, the Norges Bank, and the Reserve Bank
of New Zealand.
March 19: The Board of Directors of the New Development Bank approved
RMB 7 bil ion ($1 bil ion) Emergency Assistance Program Loan to the People’s
Republic of China. The Program wil help finance urgent and unexpected public health
expenditures in Hubei, Guangdong, and Henan.
March 20: The Development Bank of Latin America (CAF) announced that it
has opened an additional $2.5 bil ion line of credit to support the measures that
member countries are taking to mitigate the effects of COVID-19. On March 3, it
approved a credit line worth $300 mil ion to manage emergencies related to COVID-
19 and the possibility of granting technical help of up to $5 mil ion for initiatives
related to the outbreak in countries across the region.
March 26: The Group of 20 (G20) announced that it would inject “over $5 tril ion
into the global economy, as part of targeted fiscal policy, economic measures, and
guarantee schemes to counteract the social, economic and financial impacts” of
COVID-19.
Source: Congressional Research Service based on information from news articles and press releases.
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Author Information

James K. Jackson, Coordinator
Rebecca M. Nelson
Specialist in International Trade and Finance
Specialist in International Trade and Finance


Martin A. Weiss
Karen M. Sutter
Specialist in International Trade and Finance
Specialist in Asian Trade and Finance


Andres B. Schwarzenberg
Michael D. Sutherland
Analyst in International Trade and Finance
Analyst in International Trade and Finance



Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank and acknowledge the expert assistance provided by Amber Wilhelm,
Visual Information Specialist, CRS, in the preparation of this report.

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Congressional Research Service
R46270 · VERSION 71 · UPDATED
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