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Updated June 3, 2021
Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV)
Background
According to the Army, the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle
JLTV CTV
(JLTV) Family of Vehicles (FoV) is an Army-led, joint-
Figure 1. JLTV Combat Tactical Vehicle Variant
service program designed to replace a portion of each
(CTV)
service’s light tactical wheeled vehicle fleets. The JLTV
FoV consists of two variants: the four-seat Combat Tactical
Vehicle (CTV) (Figure 1) and the two-seat Combat
Support Vehicle (CSV) (Figure 2). The CTV is to support
the General Purpose, Heavy Gun Carrier, and Close
Combat Weapon Carrier missions. The CSV is to support
the Utility/Shelter Carrier mission. The JLTV is
transportable by a range of lift assets, including rotary-wing
aircraft. Its maneuverability enables activities across the
spectrum of terrain, including urban areas, while providing
inherent and supplemental armor against direct fire and
improvised explosive device threats.
Current Program Status
The JLTV is currently being produced by Oshkosh
Defense, headquartered in Oshkosh, WI. In August 2015,
the Army awarded Oshkosh a $6.7 billion low-rate initial
Source: https://asc.army.mil/web/portfolio-item/cs-css-joint-light-
production (LRIP) contract to procure the initial 16,901
tactical-vehicle/, accessed December 30, 2020.
vehicles for the Army and Marines. In June 2019, the
JLTV CSV
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisitions, Logistics,
Figure 2. JLTV Combat Support Vehicle Variant
and Technology) approved Army JLTV full-rate production
(CSV)
(FRP). The Army plans for a follow-on full-rate production
contract to be awarded to a single vendor in the fourth
quarter of FY2022. It is planned to be a competitive five-
year contract with five one-year options, with an expected
value of $12.3 billion, for about 30,000 JLTVs and 10,000
JLTV trailers. The Army began fielding LRIP JLTVs to
units in April 2019, and Marine Corps units received their
first LRIP JLTVs in February 2019.
Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) is a programmatic
decision made when manufacturing development is completed
and there is an ability to produce a smal -quantity set of
articles. It also establishes an initial production base and sets
the stage for a gradual increase in production rate to al ow for
Ful -Rate Production (FRP) upon completion of Operational
Test and Evaluation (OT&E).
Source: https://asc.army.mil/web/portfolio-item/cs-css-joint-light-
tactical-vehicle/, accessed December 30, 2020.
Full-Rate Production (FRP) is a decision made that al ows
for government contracting for economic production
quantities fol owing stabilization of the system design and
validation of the production process.
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV)
Budgetary Information
Potential Issues for Congress
Table 1. FY2022 DOD JLTV Budget Request
Has the JLTV Become a Major Bill Payer for Army
Total
Modernization?
Total Request
Request
Based on the aforementioned Army FY2022 JLTV
Funding Category
($M)
(Qty)
Unfunded Priorities List narrative justification, it can be
RDT&E USA
2.6
—
argued that the JLTV has become a major bill payer for
RDT&E USMC
2.0
—
other Army modernization efforts. This has resulted in
Procurement USA
603.9
2,744
extending fielding timelines and could also cause a vehicle
price increase and an overall program cost increase if the
Procurement USAF
97.4
158
Army is unable to recompete the JLTV contract as currently
Procurement USN
27.4
14
planned. In addition, there is an associated operational risk,
Procurement USMC
322.0
883
particularly for Army contingency units. As it stands, there
Source: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
appears to be a degree of programmatic uncertainty and risk
(Comptrol er)/Chief Financial Officer, Program Acquisition Cost by
associated with the Army’s decision to use JLTV as a bill
Weapon System: United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year
payer for other Army modernization priorities.
2022 Budget Request, May 2021, p. 3-2.
Notes: RDT&E = Research, Development, Test & Evaluation: $M =
Some defense experts have speculated that the Marine
U.S. Dol ars in Mil ions; Qty = FY2022 Procurement Quantities.
Corps might also cut its JLTV buy, as the JLTV might
prove to be too heavy for the Marines’ planned pivot to a
Army FY2022 Unfunded Priorities List
more expeditionary form of warfare. If this becomes the
The Army’s FY2022 Unfunded Priorities List to Congress
case, and the Army reduces or further delays its JLTV
reportedly includes a request for an additional $120 million
procurement to fund modernization, there could be
in JLTV funding to procure 340 additional vehicles, noting
appreciable joint programmatic impacts of interest to
the following:
policymakers.
The unfunded request of $120 million reduces
What Is the Future of JLTV Procurement?
JLTV fielding. Due to Army topline [budget]
The Army’s current modernization strategy is primarily
reductions, our plan to field approximately 3 to 5
focused on six modernization priorities that do not include
Brigade Combat Team’s worth of JLTVs each year
the JLTV. With the Marine Corps downsizing per its March
to FY2041 to reach the authorized procurement
2020 Force Design Initiative and adoption of a more
objective of 49,099 is in jeopardy. The $122 million
expeditionary posture (possibly requiring fewer JLTVs ),
reduction per year will delay the fielding of one
original JLTV procurement plans for the two major service
Armored Brigade Combat Team (approximately
customers might no longer be relevant. Despite the Army’s
340 vehicles) per year extending the authorized
intent to lower costs by competing a follow-on contract
procurement objective fulfillment to approximately
with another vendor by FY2022, slowing production rates
FY2045. From FY2019 to the current proposed
and extended procurement timelines can act to increase
costs. In addition, different versions of the JLTV produced
funding level, JLTV has seen a 54% reduction in
by another vendor could result in additional operations and
funding at a time when JLTV claimants (e.g.,
maintenance costs that can result from a mixed fleet of
military police, artillery, mission command
vehicles. Taken collectively, these issues might merit DOD
systems) continues to grow. Other impacts include
and policymakers examining the future of JLTV
a price increase for each vehicle as well as
procurement to help determine the current requirement for
jeopardizing the Army’s strategy of re-competing
JLTVs, as well as whether decisions to extend procurement
the JLTV contract, as continued reductions will
and recompete future production will result in increased
dissuade potential manufacturers from submitting
programmatic costs.
proposals ... Lack of funding puts future
production/fielding of JLTV at risk for sustained
For a more detailed historical discussion of the JLTV Program,
and unplanned contingency high-operational tempo
see CRS Report RS22942, Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV):
(OPTEMPO) units.
Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.
Foreign Military Sales
The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notes
approved JLTV sales to the United Kingdom ($1.035
Andrew Feickert, Specialist in Military Ground Forces
billion for 2,747 JLTVs) and Lithuania ($170.8 million for
IF11729
500 JLTVs).
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV)
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11729 · VERSION 3 · UPDATED