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Updated June 2, 2021
Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV)
Background
According to the Army, the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle
JLTV CTV
(JLTV) Family of Vehicles (FoV) is an Army-led, joint-
Figure 1. JLTV Combat Tactical Vehicle Variant
service program designed to replace a portion of each
(CTV)
service’s light tactical wheeled vehicle fleets. The JLTV
FoV consists of two variants: the four-seat Combat Tactical
Vehicle (CTV) (Figure 1) and the two-seat Combat
Support Vehicle (CSV) (Figure 2). The CTV is to support
the General Purpose, Heavy Gun Carrier, and Close
Combat Weapon Carrier missions. The CSV is to support
the Utility/Shelter Carrier mission. The JLTV is
transportable by a range of lift assets, including rotary-wing
aircraft. Its maneuverability enables activities across the
spectrum of terrain, including urban areas, while providing
inherent and supplemental armor against direct fire and
improvised explosive device threats.
Current Program Status
The JLTV is currently being produced by Oshkosh
Defense, headquartered in Oshkosh, WI. In August 2015,

the Army awarded Oshkosh a $6.7 billion low-rate initial
Source: https://asc.army.mil/web/portfolio-item/cs-css-joint-light-
production (LRIP) contract to procure the initial 16,901
tactical-vehicle/, accessed December 30, 2020.
vehicles for the Army and Marines. In June 2019, the
JLTV CSV
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisitions, Logistics,
Figure 2. JLTV Combat Support Vehicle Variant
and Technology) approved Army JLTV full-rate production
(CSV)
(FRP). The Army plans for a follow-on full-rate production
contract to be awarded to a single vendor in the fourth
quarter of FY2022. It is planned to be a competitive five-
year contract with five one-year options, with an expected
value of $12.3 billion, for about 30,000 JLTVs and 10,000
JLTV trailers. The Army began fielding LRIP JLTVs to
units in April 2019, and Marine Corps units received their
first LRIP JLTVs in February 2019.
Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) is a programmatic
decision made when manufacturing development is completed
and there is an ability to produce a smal -quantity set of
articles. It also establishes an initial production base and sets
the stage for a gradual increase in production rate to al ow for
Ful -Rate Production (FRP) upon completion of Operational

Test and Evaluation (OT&E).
Source: https://asc.army.mil/web/portfolio-item/cs-css-joint-light-
tactical-vehicle/, accessed December 30, 2020.
Full-Rate Production (FRP) is a decision made that al ows
for government contracting for economic production
JLTV Service Procurement Objectives
quantities fol owing stabilization of the system design and
According to the Joint Program Office, as of December
validation of the production process.
2020, the JLTV Authorized Acquisition Objective for each
Service was
 Army: 88,811;
 Marine Corps: 15,390;
 Air Force: 408; and
 Navy: 120.
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV)
Budgetary Information
Some defense experts have speculated that the Marine
Table 1. FY2022 DOD JLTV Budget Request
Corps might cut its JLTV buy, as the JLTV might prove to
be too heavy for the Marines’ planned pivot to a more
Total
expeditionary form of warfare. If this becomes the case, and
Total Request
Request
the Army reduces its JLTV buy to fund modernization,
Funding Category
($M)
(Qty)
there could be appreciable programmatic impacts of interest
RDT&E USA
2.6
—
to policymakers.
RDT&E USMC
2.0
—
What Is the Future of JLTV Procurement?
Procurement USA
603.9
2,744
The Army’s current modernization strategy is primarily
Procurement USAF
97.4
158
focused on six modernization priorities that do not include
Procurement USN
27.4
14
the JLTV. With the Marine Corps downsizing per its March
Procurement USMC
322.0
883
2020 Force Design Initiative and adoption of a more
Source: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
expeditionary posture (possibly requiring fewer JLTVs),
(Comptrol er)/Chief Financial Officer, Program Acquisition Cost by
original JLTV procurement plans for the two major service
Weapon System: United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year
customers might no longer be relevant. Despite the Army’s
2022 Budget Request, May 2021, p. 3-2.
intent to lower costs by competing a follow-on contract
Notes: RDT&E = Research, Development, Test & Evaluation: $M =
with another vendor by FY2022, slowing production rates
U.S. Dol ars in Mil ions; Qty = FY2022 Procurement Quantities.
and extended procurement timelines can act to increase
costs. In addition, different versions of the JLTV produced
Foreign Military Sales
by another vendor could result in additional operations and
The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notes
maintenance costs that can result from a mixed fleet of
approved JLTV sales to the United Kingdom ($1.035
vehicles. Taken collectively, these issues might merit DOD
billion for 2,747 JLTVs) and Lithuania ($170.8 million for
and policymakers examining the future of JLTV
500 JLTVs).
procurement to help determine the current requirement for
JLTVs, as well as whether decisions to extend procurement
Potential Issues for Congress
and recompete future production will result in increased
programmatic costs.
Has the JLTV Become a Major Bill Payer for Army
Modernization?
For a more detailed historical discussion of the JLTV Program,
With the Army’s decision to reduce JLTV funding from
see CRS Report RS22942, Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV):
FY2021 by $336.6 million in FY2022 and corresponding
Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.
reductions in procurement quantities, some may question if
the JLTV has become a major bill payer for Army

modernization, by reducing its procurement objective
and/or by extending the overall procurement timeline,
Andrew Feickert, Specialist in Military Ground Forces
thereby pushing costs further into the future. As it stands at
IF11729
present, there appears to be a degree of program
uncertainty, as well as questions concerning the validity of
the Army’s original requirements and plans for the JLTV.


https://crsreports.congress.gov
Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV)


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11729 · VERSION 2 · UPDATED