Section 232 Investigations: Overview and
May 18, 2021
Issues for Congress
Rachel F. Fefer,
Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. §1862) provides the
Coordinator
President with the ability to impose restrictions on certain imports based on an
Analyst in International
affirmative determination by the Department of Commerce (Commerce) that the
Trade and Finance
product(s) under investigation “is being imported into the United States in such

quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security.”
Keigh E. Hammond
President Trump used Section 232 authority to apply new tariffs to steel and aluminum
Senior Research Librarian
imports and to create negotiating leverage by suggesting tariffs on certain other goods

such as automobiles and automobile parts. The Biden Administration may consider how
Vivian C. Jones
to address the existing Section 232 tariffs. Prior to the Trump Administration, the last
Specialist in International
Section 232 investigation was in 2001 and a president arguably last acted under Section
Trade and Finance
232 in 1986. Congress has interest in Section 232 actions because they are a delegation

of its constitutional authority over tariffs and commerce with foreign nations, and raise a
Brandon J. Murrill
number of economic and policy issues. Some Members have introduced legislation to
Legislative Attorney
revise Section 232 authorities.

Effective March 23, 2018, President Trump applied 25% and 10% tariffs, respectively,
Michaela D. Platzer
Specialist in Industrial
on certain steel and aluminum imports and, in February 2020, expanded the scope of
Organization and Business
products subject to the additional tariffs. Permanent tariff exemptions in exchange for

quantitative limitations on U.S. imports were negotiated covering steel for Brazil and
South Korea, and both steel and aluminum for Argentina. Australia was permanently
Brock R. Williams
Specialist in International
exempted from both tariffs, with no quantitative restrictions. The Trump Administration
Trade and Finance
removed tariffs on steel and aluminum imports from Mexico and Canada, in part to

secure congressional support for the new United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement
(USMCA), and after the three countries agreed to establish an import monitoring

mechanism. U.S. tariffs on steel and aluminum under Section 232 currently affect $13.1
bil ion of U.S. annual imports, excluding countries currently exempted. The tariffs wil remain in place unless the
Biden Administration removes or amends them.
Commerce is managing a process for Section 232 tariff exclusions of steel and aluminum products in order to
limit the tariffs’ potential negative domestic effects on U.S. businesses and consumers. As of February 7, 2021,
Commerce received 288,021 exclusion requests, 260,450 for steel and 27,571 for aluminum. Of those requests,
the agency granted 170,084 exclusions and denied 59,134, with 44,325 exclusion requests rejected or withdrawn.
The remaining requests were pending. Several Members of Congress and the Commerce Inspector General have
raised issues and concerns about the exclusion process. Commerce has made multiple updates intended to clarify
and simplify the exclusion process and decrease the overal volume of requests.
Global overcapacity in steel and aluminum production, mainly driven by China, has been an ongoing concern of
Congress. While the United States has extensive antidumping and countervailing duties on Chinese steel imports
to counter China’s unfair trade practices, steel industry and other experts argue that the magnitude of Chinese
production acts to depress prices global y. The George W. Bush, Obama, Trump, and Biden Administrations each
engaged in multilateral discussions to address global steel capacity reduction, including through the Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and other international forums.
Several U.S. trading partners are chal enging the steel and aluminum tariffs under World Trade Organization
(WTO) dispute settlement rules and have threatened or enacted retaliatory measures. Some analysts view the U.S.
unilateral actions as potential y undermining WTO rules, which general y prohibit parties from acting unilateral y,
but provide exceptions, including when parties act to protect “essential security interests.” In turn, the United
States has initiated cases against other countries’ retaliatory measures under WTO rules. Some U.S. firms are also
chal enging the Trump Administration’s actions domestical y.
Congressional Research Service

Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

Congress enacted Section 232 during the Cold War when national security issues were at the forefront of national
debate. The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 sets clear steps and timelines for Section 232 investigations and actions,
and al ows the President to make a final determination over the appropriate action to take following an affirmative
finding by Commerce that the relevant imports threaten to impair national security.
After imposing the steel and aluminum tariffs, the Trump Administration opened six additional Section 232
investigations, intensifying debate over potential legislation to revise the authority. The investigations covered
imports of:
 automobile and automobile parts, initiated May 23, 2018;
 uranium ore and related products, initiated July 18, 2018;
 titanium sponge, initiated March 4, 2019;
 transformers and certain grain-oriented electrical steel parts, initiated May 4, 2020;
 mobile cranes, initiated May 6, 2020; and
 vanadium, initiated June 3, 2020.
The Department of Commerce determined imports of autos, uranium, and titanium sponge threaten to impair
national security, but President Trump did not impose tariffs or quotas on these imports and did not release the
Commerce reports. Commerce also completed and submitted its reports on transformers and vanadium; the
findings have not been disclosed and no further trade enforcement action has been taken. The mobile crane
investigation was withdrawn by the petitioner.
The Biden Administration may consider whether to sustain, withdraw, or amend the existing steel and aluminum
tariffs; if and how to change the product exclusion process; and whether to make public the other completed
investigations.
President Trump’s Section 232 tariff actions and investigations continue to raise a number of potential issues for
Congress. The focus on imports from traditional U.S. al ies has prompted some policymakers to raise questions
about the proper interpretation of threats to national security on which Section 232 investigations are based. The
tariffs’ economic effects—relatively higher domestic steel and aluminum prices, expansion in domestic
production in those sectors, and higher costs for consumers and many end users (e.g., auto manufacturing and
construction)—have also prompted reactions from several Members, some in support of the measures and others
voicing concerns. Previously, Congress held hearings on the potential economic and broader policy effects of the
tariffs. Legislation has been introduced during the 116th and 117th Congress to override the tariffs that have already
been imposed, or to revise or potential y limit the President’s trade enforcement authority.

Congressional Research Service

link to page 63 Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

Introduction
Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 authorizes the President to impose restrictions on
certain imports based on an affirmative determination by the Department of Commerce
(Commerce) that the targeted products are being imported into the United States “in such
quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security.” The Trump
Administration conducted eight investigations, two of which led to presidential proclamations
imposing tariffs on U.S. imports of certain steel and aluminum products using Section 232
powers.1 The Constitution gives Congress primary authority over international trade matters.2 In
the case of Section 232, Congress has delegated to the President broad authority to impose limits
on imports in the interest of U.S. national security. The statute does not require congressional
approval of any presidential actions that fal within its scope.3
Section 232 is one of several tools the United States has at its disposal to address trade barriers
and other foreign trade practices. Additional tools include (1) investigations and actions to
address import surges that are or threaten to be a “substantial cause of serious injury” to a U.S.
industry (Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974); (2) those that address violations or denial of U.S.
benefits under trade agreements (Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974); and (3) antidumping and
countervailing duty laws (Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930) to counter injurious unfair trade
practices.
The Biden Administration has stated it wil review President Trump’s Section 232 actions and
make determinations on how to handle the existing tariffs, exclusion process, and outstanding
investigations for which the reports have not been made public. Investigations initiated and
import restrictions imposed by the Executive Branch under Section 232 potential y raise a
number of economic and policy issues for Congress. Such issues may include, among others: the
effects of Section 232 tariffs on industries, workers, farmers, and consumers in congressional
districts and states; the Executive Branch’s adherence to congressional requirements in its
implementation of Section 232 actions, including transparency and time limitations; the tariff
exclusion processes; and the potential impact of unilateral tariff actions on the multilateral trading
system, U.S. trading relationships, and U.S. al iances
This report provides an overview of Section 232, analyzes the Trump Administration’s Section
232 investigations and actions, steps the Biden Administration may take, and considers select
policy and economic implications and issues for Congress. To provide context for the current
debate, the report also includes a discussion of previous Section 232 investigations and a brief
legislative history of the statute.
Overview of Section 232
Following an investigation by the Department of Commerce, Section 232 of the Trade Act of
1962 authorizes the President to impose imports restrictions on products, imported into the United
States “in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national
security.” The Trade Act of 1962, including Section 232, was enacted during the Cold War when

1 P.L. 87-794; 19 U.S.C. §1862.
2 Article I, Section 8, of the Constit ution gives Congress the power “ T o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations ....”
and “T o lay and collect T axes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises ....”
3 In the Crude Oil Windfall Profit T ax Act of 1980, however, Congress amended Section 232 by creating a joint
disapproval resolution provision under which Congress can override presidential actions in the case of adjustments to
petroleum or petroleum product imports. P.L. 96-223, Section 402. For more information, see Appe ndix A.
Congressional Research Service
1

link to page 8 Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

national security issues were at the forefront. Section 232 has been used periodical y in response
to industry petitions, as wel as through self-initiation by the executive branch. The Trade
Expansion Act establishes a clear process and timelines for a Section 232 investigation, but the
executive branch’s interpretation of “national security” and the potential scope of any
investigation can be expansive.
Key Provisions and Process
Upon request by the head of any U.S. department or agency, by petition by an interested party, or
by self-initiation, the Secretary of Commerce must commence a Section 232 investigation. The
Secretary of Commerce conducts the investigation in consultation with the Secretary of Defense
and other U.S. officials, as appropriate, to determine the effects of the specified imports on
national security. Public hearings and consultations may also be held in the course of the
investigation. Commerce has 270 days from the initiation date to prepare a report advising the
President as to whether or not the targeted product(s) is being imported “in such quantities or
under such circumstances as to threaten to impair” U.S. national security, and to provide
recommendations for action or inaction based on the findings. According to the statute, any
portion of the report that does not contain classified or proprietary information must be published
in the Federal Register. See Figure 1 for the Section 232 process and timeline.
While there is no specific definition of national security in the statute, it states that the
investigation must consider certain factors, such as domestic production needed for projected
national defense requirements; domestic capacity; the availability of human resources and
supplies essential to the national defense; and potential unemployment, loss of skil s or
investment, or decline in government revenues resulting from displacement of any domestic
products by excessive imports.4
Once the President receives the report, he has 90 days to decide whether or not he concurs with
the Commerce Department’s findings and recommendations, and to determine the nature and
duration of the action he views as necessary to adjust the imports so they no longer threaten to
impair the national security (general y, imposition of some trade-restrictive measure). The
President may implement the recommendations suggested in the Commerce report, take other
actions, or decide to take no action. After making a decision, the President has 15 days to
implement the action and 30 days to submit a written statement to Congress explaining the action
or inaction; he must also publish his findings in the Federal Register. Presidential actions may
stay in place “for such time, as he deems necessary to adjust the imports of such article and its
derivatives so that such imports wil not so threaten to impair the national security.”5 Congress
does not have to approve of a Section 232 determination or action.6

4 19 U.S.C. §1862(d). T he Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) at Commerce conducts the investigation in
accordance with federal regulations codified in 15 C.F.R. part 705 (Effect of Imported Articles on the National
Security).
5 Section 232(b).
6 For more information on T PA, see CRS In Focus IF10038, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), by Ian F. Fergusson.
Congressional Research Service
2

link to page 65 link to page 10 link to page 65

Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

Figure 1. Section 232 Investigation Process

Source: CRS graphic based on 19 U.S.C. §1862.
Section 232 Investigations to Date
The Commerce Department (or the Department of the Treasury before it) initiated a total of 31
Section 232 investigations between 1962 and 2020 (see Table B-1). In 16 of these cases,
Commerce determined that the targeted imports did not threaten to impair national security. In 14
cases, Commerce determined that the targeted imports threatened to impair national security and
made recommendations to the President (see Figure 2). The President took action nine times.
One case was terminated at the petitioner’s request before Commerce completed its investigation.
Prior to the Trump Administration, 10 Section 232 investigations were self-initiated by the
Administration. (For a full list of cases to date, see Appendix B.)
In eight investigations dealing with crude oil and petroleum products, Commerce decided that the
imports threatened to impair national security. The President took action in five of these cases. In
the first three cases on petroleum imports (1973-1978), the President imposed licensing fees and
additional supplemental fees on imports, which are no longer in effect, rather than adjusting
tariffs or instituting quotas. In two cases, the President imposed oil embargoes, once in 1979
(Iran) and once in 1982 (Libya). Both were superseded by broader economic sanctions in the
following years.7

7 T he Section 232 petroleum embargo against Iran was revoked by Executive Order 12282 of January 19, 1981,
“Prohibitions Against T ransactions Involving Japan, Revocation,” 46 Federal Register 7925, which established broader
sanctions against Iran.
T he petroleum embargo against Libya was superseded by (1) Proclamation 5141 of December 22, 1983, “ Imports of
Petroleum and Petroleum Products,” 48 Federal Register 56929, and (2) Executive Order 12538, “Imports of Refined
Petroleum Products from Libya,” 50 Federal Register 47527, November 15, 1985; and then was effectively revoked by
Executive Order 13357, “Termination of Emergency Declared in Executive Order 12543 With Respect to the Policies
and Actions of the Government of Libya and Revocation of Related Execut ive Order,” 69 Federal Register 56665,
September 20, 2004, and the corresponding T reasury regulation, Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets
Control, “Libyan Sanctions Regulations, Angola (UNIT A) Sanctions Regulations, Rough Diamonds (Liberia )
Congressional Research Service
3

Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

In the three most recent crude oil and petroleum investigations (from 1987 to 1999), Commerce
determined that the imports threatened to impair national security, but did not recommend
presidential action to adjust imports. In the first of these reports (1987), Commerce recommended
a series of steps to increase domestic energy production and ensure adequate oil supplies rather
than imposing quotas, fees, or tariffs because any such actions would not be “cost beneficial and,
in the long run, impair rather than enhance national security.”8 In the latter two investigations
(1994 and 1999), Commerce found that existing government programs and activities related to
energy security would be more appropriate and cost effective than import adjustments. By not
acting, the President in effect followed Commerce’s recommendation.
Prior to the Trump Administration, a president arguably last acted under Section 232 in 1986. In
that case, Commerce determined that imports of metal-cutting and metal-forming machine tools
threatened to impair national security. In this case, the President sought voluntary export restraint
agreements with leading foreign exporters, and developed domestic programs to revitalize the
U.S. industry.9 These agreements predate the founding of the World Trade Organization (WTO),
which established multilateral rules prohibiting voluntary export restraints.10
The Trump Administration initiated eight Section 232 investigations into the imports of: steel;
aluminum; automobiles, including sport utility vehicles, vans and light trucks, and automotive
parts; uranium; titanium sponge; electrical transformers and certain grain-oriented electrical steel
components; mobile cranes; and vanadium imports.11 The latter two investigations were in
response to industry petitions.

Sanctions Regulations,” 61 Federal Register 16042, March 30, 2006.
8 Department of Commerce, The Effect of Crude Oil and Refined Petroleum Product Imports on the National Security,
January 1989.
9 U.S. President (R. Reagan), “Statement on the Revitalization of the Machine Tool Industry” Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Docum ents, vol. 22 (December 16, 1986), p. 1654.
10 Article 11 of the WT O Agreement on Safeguards stipulates that “a Member shall not seek, take or maintain any
voluntary export restraints, orderly marketing arrangements or any other similar measure s on the export or the import
side. T hese include actions taken by a single Member as well as actions under agreements, arrangements and
understandings entered into by two or more Members.” T here are exceptions to this prohibition, including for “[a]n
import quota applied as a safeguard measure in conformity with the relevant provisions of GAT T 1994 and this
Agreement.” For more information, see https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/25-safeg_e.htm#fnt-3.
11 U.S. Department of Commerce, “ U.S. Department of Commerce Initiates Section 232 Investigation into Auto
Imports,” press release, May 23, 2018.
U.S. Department of Commerce, “ U.S. Department of Commerce Initiates Section 232 Investigation into Uranium
Imports,” press release, July 18, 2018.
U.S. Department of Commerce, March 2019, “ U.S. Department of Commerce Initiates Section 232 Investigation into
T itanium Sponge Imports,” press release, March 2019.
U.S. Department of Commerce, “ U.S. Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross to Initiate Section 232 Investigation into
Imports of Laminations and Wound Cores for Incorporation into Transformers, Electrical T ransformers, and
T ransformer Regulators,” press release, May 4, 2020.
U.S. Department of Commerce, “ U.S. Department of Commerce to Initiate Section 232 Investigation into Mobile
Crane Imports,” press release, May 6, 2020.
U.S. Department of Commerce, “ U.S. Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross Initiates Section 232 Investigation into
Imports of Vanadium,” press release, June 2, 2020.
Congressional Research Service
4

link to page 65 link to page 46

Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

Figure 2. Section 232 Investigations

Source: CRS Graphic based on BIS data (https://www.bis.doc.gov/).
Notes: * indicates investigation complete but results have not been made public. For a detailed list of cases, see
Appendix B
Relationship to WTO
While unilateral trade restrictions may appear to be counter to U.S. trade liberalization
commitments under the WTO agreements, Article XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT), which was one of the foundational agreements of the WTO, al ows WTO
members to take measures to protect “essential security interests.” Broad national security
exceptions are also included in international trade obligations at the bilateral and regional levels,
and could potential y limit the ability of countries to chal enge such actions by trade partners.
Historical y, exceptions for national security have been rarely invoked and multiple trading
partners have chal enged recent U.S. actions under the WTO agreements (see “WTO Cases ”).
Section 232 Actions on Steel and Aluminum
In April 2017, in two presidential memoranda, President Trump instructed Commerce to give
priority to two self-initiated investigations into the national security threats posed by imports of
steel and aluminum.12 In conducting its investigation, Commerce held public hearings and
solicited public comments via the Federal Register and consulted with the Secretary of Defense
and other agencies, as required by the statute.13 In addition to the hearings, stakeholders submit ed
approximately 300 comments regarding the Section 232 investigation and potential actions. Some

12 U.S. President (T rump), “Memorandum on Steel Imports and T hreats to National Security,” Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Docum ents, April 20, 2017, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201700259/pdf/DCPD-
201700259.pdf, and U.S. President (T rump), “ Memorandum on Aluminum Imports and T hreats to National Security,”
Weekly Com pilation of Presidential Docum ents, April 27, 2017, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201700284/
pdf/DCPD-201700284.pdf.
13 Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, “Notice of Request for Public Co mments and Public
Hearing on Section 232 National Security Investigation of Imports of Steel,” 82 Federal Register 19205, April 26,
2017, and Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, “Notice of Request for Public Comments and
Public Hearing on Section 232 National Security Investigation of Imports of Aluminum,” 82 Federal Register 21509,
May 9, 2017.
Congressional Research Service
5

Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

parties (mostly steel producers) supported broad actions to limit steel imports, while others
(mostly users and consuming industries such as automakers) opposed any additional tariffs or
quotas on imports. The U.S. aluminum industry held differing views of the global aluminum
tariff, with most parties opposing it.14 Some stakeholders in the steel and aluminum industries
sought a middle ground, endorsing limited actions to target the underlying issues of overcapacity
and unfair trade practices. Stil others focused on the process, voicing caution in the use of
Section 232 authority and warning against an overly broad definition of “national security” for
protectionist purposes.15
The Commerce investigations analyzed the importance of certain steel and aluminum products to
national security, using a relatively broad definition of “national security,” defining it to include
“the general security and welfare of certain industries, beyond those necessary to satisfy national
defense requirements, which are critical for minimum operations of the economy and
government.”16 The scope of the investigations extended to current and future requirements for
national defense and to 16 specific critical infrastructure sectors, such as electric transmission,
transportation systems, food and agriculture, and critical manufacturing, including domestic
production of primary metals (e.g., production of iron and steel and aluminum) machinery,
transportation equipment, and electrical equipment.17 The reports also examined domestic
production capacity and utilization, industry requirements, current quantities and circumstances
of imports, international markets, and global overcapacity. Commerce based its definition of
national security on a 2001 investigation on iron ore and semi-finished steel.18 Section 232
investigations prior to 2001 general y used a narrower definition considering U.S. national
defense needs or overreliance on foreign suppliers. Commerce continued to use the broader
definition for national security for the other Section 232 investigations under the Trump
Administration. If the Biden Administration were to initiate a new Section 232 investigation,
Commerce could adjust the definition of national security and scope of such as investigation.
Commerce Findings and Recommendations
The final reports, submitted to President Trump on January 11 and January 22, 2018, respectively,
concluded that imports of certain steel mil products19 and certain types of primary aluminum and
unwrought aluminum20 “threaten to impair the national security” of the United States. The

14 CRS In Focus IF10998, Effects of U.S. Tariff Action on U.S. Aluminum Manufacturing , by Michaela D. Platzer.
15 “T he case for and against 232 action on steel: T hree principal positions,” Inside U.S. Trade, June 12, 2017, and
“Awaiting an aluminum decision: some key comment takeaways,” Inside U.S. Trade, July 3, 2017.
16 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, “T he Effect of Imports of Steel on the National
Security,” p. 1, January 11, 2018, https://www.commerce.gov/sites/commerce.gov/files/
the_effect_of_imports_of_steel_on_the_national_security_-_with_redactions_-_20180111.pdf. (hereinafter, Steel
Report).
17 In addition to being labeled as one of the “critical infrastructure sectors,” both steel and aluminum industry
organizations seek designation as an “essential industry” to allow continuation of operations in the event of federal
emergencies such as during the Covid-19 pandemic. See American Iron and Steel Institute, “ AISI Urges
Administration to Designate Steel as Essential Industry ,” March 20, 2020, and Aluminum Association, “ American
Aluminum an Essential Industry in a Moment of National Emergency,” March 19, 2020.
18 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Export Administration, “The Effect of Imports of Iron Ore and Semi -
Finished Steel on the National Security,” October 2001.
19 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, “T he Effect of Imports of Ste el on the National
Security,” January 11, 2018, https://www.commerce.gov/section-232-investigation-effect-imports-steel-us-national-
security.
20 U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security, “T he Effect of Imports of Aluminum on the
Congressional Research Service
6

Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

Secretary of Commerce asserted that “the only effective means of removing the threat of
impairment is to reduce imports to a level that should ... enable U.S. steel mil s to operate at 80
percent or more of their rated production capacity” (the minimum rate the report found necessary
for the long-term viability of the U.S. steel industry and, separately, for the aluminum industry).
The Secretary further recommended the President “take immediate action to adjust the level of
these imports through quotas or tariffs” and identified three potential courses of action for both
steel and aluminum imports, including tariffs or quotas on al or some steel imports from specific
countries.
The then-Secretary of Defense, while concurring with Commerce’s “conclusion that imports of
foreign steel and aluminum based on unfair trading practices impair the national security,”
recommended targeted tariffs and that “an inter-agency group further refine the targeted tariffs, so
as to create incentives for trade partners to work with the U.S. on addressing the underlying issue
of Chinese transshipment” in which Chinese producers ship goods to another country to re-
export.21 He also noted, however, that “the U.S. military requirements for steel and aluminum
each only represent about three percent of U.S. production.”22
President Trump’s Actions
On March 8, 2018, President Trump issued two proclamations imposing duties on U.S. imports of
certain steel and aluminum products, based on the Secretary of Commerce’s findings.23 The
proclamations outlined the President’s decisions to impose tariffs of 25% on steel and 10% on
aluminum imports effective March 23, 2018, but provided for flexibility in regard to country and
product applicability of the tariffs (see below). The new tariffs were to be imposed in addition to
any duties already in place, including antidumping and countervailing duties (AD/CVD).
In the proclamations, the President established a bifurcated approach, instructing Commerce to
establish a process for domestic parties to request individual product exclusions and a U.S. Trade
Representative (USTR)-led process to discuss “alternative ways” through diplomatic negotiations
to address the threat with countries having a “security relationship” with the United States.
President Trump official y notified Congress of his actions in a letter dated April 6, 2018. Several
Members voiced their views since the investigations were launched, including through hearings
and letters to President Trump.24
On January 24, 2020, after the steel and aluminum tariffs had been in effect for over 22 months,
President Trump expanded the scope of products covered to include “derivative” products,
effective February 8, 2020.25 The President’s proclamation stated that the additional tariffs were

National Security,” January 17, 2018, https://www.commerce.gov/sites/commerce.gov/files/
the_effect_of_imports_of_aluminum_on_the_national_security_-_with_redactions_-_20180117.pdf (hereinafter,
Aluminum Report).
21 Letter from James N. Mattis, Secret ary of Defense, to Wilbur L. Ross Jr., Secretary of Commerce, 2018,
https://www.commerce.gov/sites/commerce.gov/files/
department_of_defense_memo_response_to_steel_and_aluminum_policy_recommendations.pdf .
22 Ibid.
23 Presidential Proclamation 9704 of March 8, 2018, “Adjusting Imports of Aluminum into the United States,” 83
Federal Register 11619, March 15, 2018, and Proclamation 9705 of March 8, 2018, “ Adjusting Imports of Steel Into
the United States,” 83 Federal Register 11625, March 15, 2018.
24 U.S. President (T rump), “Letter to Congressional Leaders on Requests for Exclusions from United States T ariffs on
Aluminum and Steel Imports,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, April 6, 2018.
25 T he White House, “ Proclamation on Adjusting Imports of Derivative Aluminum Articles and Derivative Steel
Congressional Research Service
7

link to page 46 link to page 46 link to page 21 Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

needed because the domestic steel and aluminum industries continued to be below the target
capacity utilization identified in the initial Commerce investigations, and imports of certain
finished, or derivative, products were undermining the purpose of the original proclamations.
With the increased costs of steel and aluminum inputs because of the Section 232 tariffs, some
U.S. manufacturers had trouble competing with importers of finished, or derivative, products
(e.g., steel wheels or metal filing cabinets). U.S. industries manufacturing similar products have
sought AD/CVD protection from import competition. Thus, there has been a noticeable increase
in AD/CVD investigations on finished products containing steel or aluminum. The additional
AD/CVD cases as a result of the Section 232 tariffs are in addition to any AD/CVD duties already
in place. Some economists have cal ed this phenomenon “cascading protection.”26
According to the January 2020 proclamation, the countries that successfully negotiated
exemptions from each of the steel and aluminum tariffs (see below) are also exempt from the
additional tariffs on derivative products. The Commerce process for requesting product
exclusions applies to derivative products (see below).
Some analysts have raised questions about the President’s authority to impose the additional
tariffs and some U.S. manufacturers have chal enged the action (see “Proclamation Imposing
Tariffs on Steel-Derivative Products”). President Trump’s actions under the 2020 proclamation
relies on the 2018 Section 232 investigations, although those investigations did not cover steel
and aluminum derivative products. House Ways and Means Committee Member Representative
Jackie Walorski sent a letter to Commerce questioning why a new investigation was not needed
for the change in product scope, and how the change would help increase domestic industry
capacity utilization, among other issues.27 The Section 232 statute does not specifical y al ow for
additional actions after the initial timeline or provide an expiration date of an investigation.
Similar questions as to whether the President’s authority to act is time-limited have been raised in
relation to the Section 232 auto investigation (see “Automobiles and Parts”). In April 2021, the
Court of International Trade (CIT) ruled that President Trump’s proclamation imposing tariffs on
steel-derivative products was untimely and thus “invalid as contrary to law.”28
Country Exemptions
Although tariffs were initial y imposed on most trading partners, including many al ies and FTA
partners, President Trump expressed a wil ingness to consider exceptions to individual countries,
specifical y stating that countries with which the United States has a “security relationship” may
discuss “alternative ways” to address the national security threat and gain an exemption from the
tariffs. Initial y, President Trump temporarily excluded imports of steel and aluminum products
from Mexico and Canada from the new tariffs, and the Trump Administration implicitly and
explicitly linked a successful outcome of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)

Articles into the United States,” 85 Federal Register 5281, January 24, 2020. For a full list of derivative products
covered, see https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/01/29/2020 -01806/adjusting-imports-of-derivative-
aluminum-articles-and-derivative-steel-articles-into-the-united. Steel and aluminum derivative products are defined
according to certain criteria and the specific covered products are specified in annexes of the presidential proclamation .
26 Chad P. Bown, “T rump’s steel and aluminum tariffs are cascading out of control,” Peterson Institute for
International Econom ics, February 4, 2020.
27 Letter from Rep. Jackie Walorski to Wilbur L. Ross Jr., Secretary of Commerce, March 3, 2020.
28 PrimeSource Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. United States, 2021 Ct. Intl. T rade LEXIS 36, *12-13 (Ct. Int’l T rade Apr. 5,
2021).
Congressional Research Service
8

Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

renegotiation to maintaining the exemptions. With regard to other countries, President Trump
charged the USTR with negotiating bilateral y with trading partners on potential exemptions.
On March 22, 2018, after discussions with multiple countries, President Trump issued
proclamations temporarily excluding Australia, Argentina, Brazil, South Korea, the European
Union (EU), Canada and Mexico, from the Section 232 tariffs.29 President Trump gave a deadline
of May 1, 2018, by which time each trading partner had to negotiate “a satisfactory alternative
means to remove the threatened impairment to the national security by imports” for steel and
aluminum in order to maintain the exemption. On April 30, 2018, the White House extended
negotiations and tariff exemptions with Canada, Mexico, and the EU for an additional 30 days,
until June 1, 2018, and exempted Argentina, Australia, and Brazil from the tariffs indefinitely
pending final agreements.30 South Korea, which pursued a resolution over the tariffs in the
context of discussions to modify the U.S.-South Korea (KORUS) Free Trade Agreement, agreed
to an absolute annual quota for 54 separate subcategories of steel and was exempted from the
steel tariffs.31 South Korea did not negotiate an agreement on aluminum and its exports to the
United States have been subject to the aluminum tariffs since May 1, 2018.
On May 31, 2018, President Trump proclaimed Argentina and Brazil, in addition to South Korea,
permanently exempt from the steel tariffs, having reached final quota agreements with the United
States on steel imports.32 Brazil, like South Korea, did not negotiate an agreement on aluminum
and is subject to the aluminum tariffs. The Trump Administration also proclaimed aluminum
imports from Argentina permanently exempt from the aluminum tariffs subject to an absolute
quota.33 The Trump Administration proclaimed imports of steel and aluminum from Australia
permanently exempt from the tariffs as wel , but did not set any quantitative restrictions on
Australian imports.
As of June 1, 2018, imports of steel and aluminum from al other countries were subject to the
Section 232 tariffs. The imposition of tariffs on major trading partners such as Canada, Mexico,
and the EU increased the economic significance of the tariffs and prompted criticism from several
Members of Congress, including the chairs of the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance
Committees.34
The Trump Administration completed negotiations on the United States-Mexico-Canada
Agreement (USMCA) on September 30, 2018, to replace the NAFTA. The USMCA did not
resolve or address the Section 232 tariffs on imported steel and aluminum from Canada and

29 Proclamation 9710 of March 22, 2018 “Adjusting Imports of Aluminum into the United States,” 83 Federal Register
13355, March 28, 2018; and Proclamation 9711 of March 22, 2018, “Adjusting Imports of Steel into the United
States,” 83 Federal Register 13361, March 28, 2018.
30 Executive Office of the President, “President Donald J. T rump Approves Section 232 T ariff Modifications,” press
release, April 30, 2018, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-approves-
section-232-tariff-modifications/.
31 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, QB 18-118 Steel Mill Articles (AMENDED), May 1, 2018,
https://www.cbp.gov/trade/quota/bulletins/qb-18-118-steel-mill-articles.
32 Proclamation 9759 of May 31, 2018, “Adjusting Imports of Steel into the United States,” 83 Federal Register 25857,
June 5, 2018.
33 Proclamation 9758 of May 31, 2018 “Adjusting Imports of Aluminum into the United States,” 83 Federal Register
25849, June 5, 2018.
34 Chairman Kevin Brady, “Brady Statement on Administration’s Action on Steel and Aluminum T ariffs,” press
release, May 31, 2018; Chairman Orrin Hatch, “ Hatch Statement on Administration Aluminum, Steel T ariff
Announcement,” press release, May 31, 2018, https://www.finance.senate.gov/chairmans-news/hatch-statement-on-
administration-aluminum-steel-tariff-announcement.
Congressional Research Service
9

Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

Mexico, but included a requirement that motor vehicles contain 70% or more of North American
steel and aluminum content to qualify for duty-free treatment.35 The parties also signed side
letters in case of Section 232 action on autos and auto parts, to exclude certain amounts of
Canadian and Mexican exports of these products and provide a 60-day period to reach a
negotiated outcome.36 Separately, on May 17, 2019, the three parties announced a new monitoring
mechanism to prevent surges in imports of steel and aluminum, and agreed to withdraw al
Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs and related retaliatory tariffs.37
A year later, in May 2020, the American Primary Aluminum Association, which represents U.S.
primary aluminum producers, al eged a surge in aluminum imports from Canada and cal ed for
the re-imposition of tariffs.38 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the National Foreign Trade
Council, and Aluminum Association opposed the proposal.39 After consultations with Canada, the
Trump Administration re-imposed tariffs on imports of non-al oyed unwrought aluminum from
Canada, effective August 16, 2020.40 Canada cal ed the new tariffs “absurd” and issued a list of
products targeted for retaliatory tariffs.41 The day before Canada’s retaliatory tariffs were to go
into effect, the Trump Administration withdrew its tariffs but set monthly quotas for imports
which Canada denied agreeing to.42
A day before leaving office, President Trump exempted aluminum imports from the United Arab
Emirates (UAE) from the tariffs, citing “an important security relationship” between the two
countries.43 A quota was negotiated. Analysts raised concerns that the action was linked to the
UAE’s signing of the “Abraham Accords” with Israel and not to the aluminum industry. President

35 UST R, United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement T ext, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/united-states-mexico-canada-agreement . In a side letter on automobiles, the United States also agreed that,
in the event of Section 232 measure imposed on passenger vehicles and auto parts, that the United States would exclude
2.6 million passenger vehicles, all light trucks imported from Mexico, and up to $108 billion worth (in declared
customs value) of auto parts annually. For more informat ion, see CRS In Focus IF11387, USMCA: Motor Vehicle
Provisions and Issues, by M. Angeles Villarreal, Bill Canis, and Liana Wong. On USMCA, see CRS Report R44981,
The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreem ent (USMCA), by M. Angeles Villarreal and Ian F. Fergusson.
36 Side letters are available at https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/united-states-mexico-canada-
agreement/agreement -between.
37 UST R, “Joint Statement by the United States and Mexico on Section 232 Duties on Steel and Aluminum,” May 17,
2019, and “ Modification of Regulations Regarding the Steel Import Monitoring and Analysis System,” 85 Federal
Register 17515, March 30, 2020.
38 American Primary Aluminum Association letter to UST R, May 26, 2020, available at
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/apaa-calls-on-ambassador-lighthizer-to-restore-tariffs-on-surging-
canadian-aluminum-imports-301066198.html.
39 U.S. Chamber of Commerce, “U.S. Chamber Opposes Aluminum T ariffs on Canada,” June 23, 2020; “Business
groups oppose Section 232 tariffs on Canadian aluminum,” Inside U.S. Trade, June 24, 2020.
40 White House, “Proclamation on Adjusting Imports of Aluminum Into the United States,” press release, August 6,
2020, and “ Adjusting Imports of Aluminum Into the United States,” 85 Federal Register 49921, August 14, 2020.
41 Andy Blatchford, “ T rump’s ‘absurd decision’ to slap aluminum tariffs on Canada draws threat of C$3.6B in
retaliatory duties,” PolticoPro, August 7, 2020, and Government of Canada, “ Notice of intent to impose
countermeasures action against the United States in response to tariffs on Canadian aluminum products,” August 7,
2020, https://www.canada.ca/en/department -finance/programs/consultations/2020/notice-intent-impose-
countermeasures-action-against -united-states-response-tariffs-canadian-aluminum-products.html.
42 Proclamation 10106 of October 27, 2020, “Adjusting Imports of Alum inum Into the United States,” 85 Federal
Register 68709-68713, October 27, 2020; Lauren Gardner, “ Canada drops retaliation plans after U.S. ends aluminum
levies,” Politico Pro, September 15, 2020.
43 Executive Office of the President, “Adjusting Imports of Aluminum Into the United States,” 85 Federal Register
6825-6831, January 25, 2021.
Congressional Research Service
10

link to page 43 Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

Biden nullified Trump’s action before it took effect noting that “imports from the UAE may stil
displace domestic production.”44
Regarding the EU, on October 16, 2018, the Trump Administration notified Congress under TPA
of new broad-based U.S. trade agreement negotiations with the EU to address ongoing trade
frictions including Section 232 tariffs. The Trump Administration was seeking a “fairer, more
balanced” U.S.-EU relationship. The TPA notification followed the July 2018 Joint Statement
(agreed between President Trump and European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker) that
aimed to de-escalate trade tensions in which the two sides agreed to not impose further tariffs on
each other’s trade products while negotiations are active.45 The negotiations did not started
formal y under the Trump Administration, largely due to lack of U.S.-EU consensus on their
scope. President Biden has stated he does not want to start new trade agreement negotiations at
this time but has not ruled out addressing specific bilateral trade issues. When asked about the
steel and aluminum tariffs, Commerce Secretary Raimundo stated “the 232 tariffs on steel and
aluminum have in fact helped save American jobs in the steel and aluminum industries.”46 Since
then, the Biden Administration and EU announced they wil enter into “discussions on the mutual
resolution of concerns in this area that addresses steel and aluminum excess… to find solutions
before the end of the year that wil demonstrate how the U.S. and EU can address excess capacity,
ensure the long-term viability of our steel and aluminum industries, and strengthen our
democratic al iance.”47 The parties agreed not to further increase tariffs while the discussions
continue.
Additional Tariff Increases on Steel Imports from Turkey

President Trump raised steel tariffs to 50% on Turkish imports in August 2018, and then lowered them to 25% in
May 2019. The President cited trade reasons for the increased tariffs, however some analysts have suggested
other foreign policy objectives may have also played a part. U.S. importers contested the August 2018 increase in
steel tariffs on Turkey in the Court of International Trade (CIT), claiming that the action did not fol ow Section
232’s procedural mandates. In a July 2020 final opinion, CIT judges agreed.
See “Domestic Court Chal enges”, and CRS In Focus IF10961, U.S.-Turkey Trade Relations, by Shayerah I. Akhtar.
Product Exclusions
In 2018, to limit potential negative domestic impacts of the tariffs on U.S. consumers and
consuming industries, Commerce published an interim final rule establishing a methodology for
parties located in the United States to request exclusions for items that are not “produced in the
United States in a sufficient and reasonably available amount or of a satisfactory quality.”48
Requests for exclusions and objections to requests were initial y posted on the regulations.gov

44 White House, “ A Proclamation on Adjusting Imports of Aluminum Into the United States,” February 1, 2021.
45 White House Factsheet , “President Donald J. T rump Launches a New Reciprocal T rade Relat ionship with the
European Union,” July 27, 2018.
46 Senator Pat T oomey, Twitter for iPhone, April 7, 2021, 4:21 PM.
47 U.S. T rade Representative, “ Joint United States-European Union Statement on Addressing Global Steel and
Aluminum Excess Capacity,” May 17, 2021.
48 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, “Requirements for Submissions Requesting
Exclusions From the Remedies Instituted in Presidential Proclamations Adjusting Imports of Steel Into the United
States and Adjusting Imports of Aluminum into the United States,” 83 Federal Register 12106, March 19, 2018.
Congressional Research Service
11

link to page 17

Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

website, creating a cumbersome process as the number of requests grew.49 The rule went into
effect the same day as publication to al ow for immediate submissions.
Commerce reviews exclusion requests and makes determinations based upon national security
considerations. To minimize the impact of any single exclusion on the Section 232 action, the rule
only al owed “individuals or organizations using steel articles ... in business activities ... in the
United States to submit exclusion requests,” eliminating the ability of larger umbrel a groups or
trade associations to submit petitions on behalf of member companies.50 Any approved product
exclusion was initial y limited to the individual or organization that submitted the specific
exclusion request. Parties may also submit objections to any exclusion within 30 days after the
exclusion request is posted. The review of exclusion requests and objections is not to exceed 90
days, creating a period of uncertainty for petitioners. Exclusions wil general y last for one year
from the date of signature.51
As of February 7, 2021, Commerce received 288,021 exclusion requests (ERs), 260,450 for steel
and 27,571 for aluminum. Of those requests, the agency granted 170,084 exclusions and denied
59,134; 44,325 ERs were rejected or withdrawn. The remaining requests were pending (see
Figure 3).52 Some Members have advocated for or against specific exclusions in support of
constituents that represent different parts of the supply chain, in some cases putting Members on
opposing sides of an exclusion request.53
Figure 3. Section 232 Exclusion Requests as of February 7, 2021

Source: CRS based on data from Department of Commerce.

49 Docket Number BIS-2018-0006 (Steel); Docket Number BIS-2018-0002, (Aluminum).
50 A parallel requirement applies for aluminum requests.
51 Bureau of Industry and Security, Requirements for Submissions Requesting Exclusions from the Remedies Instituted
in Presidential Proclam ations Adjusting Im ports of Steel into the United States and Adjusting Im ports of Alum inum into
the United States; and the Filing of Objections to Subm itted Exclusion Requests for Steel and Alum inum , Docket BIS-
2018-0006, https://www.regulations.gov/.
52 Data obtained by CRS from Bureau of Industry and Security, Department of Commerce, February 9, 2021.
53 For example, see letters from Reps. H. Rogers, Kaptur, Guthrie, Comer, M. Rogers, Barr, Aderholt, Johnson,
Gonzalez and Gibbs to President T rump, February 7, 2020, and from Sen. T oomey to Secretary Ross, February 5,
2020, related to exclusion requests from Allegheny T echnologies Incorporated (AT I).
Congressional Research Service
12

Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

Multiple companies raised strong concerns about the intensive, time-consuming process to submit
exclusion requests; the lengthy waiting period to hear back from Commerce, which has exceeded
90 days in some cases; what some view as an arbitrary nature of acceptances and denials; and that
al exclusion requests to date have been rejected when a U.S. steel or aluminum producer has
objected.54 Some steel companies who expected to benefit from the tariffs and whose exclusion
requests have been denied are experiencing financial difficulty.55
Several Members of Congress raised concerns about the exclusion process. A bipartisan group of
House Members, for example, noted the slowness of the review process and the significant
burden it places on manufacturers, especial y smal businesses.56 The Members included specific
recommendations, such as al owing for broader product ranges to be included in a single request,
al owing trade associations to petition, grandfathering in existing contracts to avoid disruptions,
and regularly reviewing the tariffs’ effects and sunsetting them if they have a “significant negative
impact.”57
Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is the lead agency involved in making final
decisions regarding whether the requests are granted or denied. Rulemaking for products
exclusions has been an evolving process. Commerce asserts it has taken several steps to improve
the exclusion process, including increasing and organizing its staff “to efficiently process
exclusion requests,” and “expediting the grant of properly filed exclusion requests that receive no
objections.” The agency’s International Trade Administration (ITA) also became involved in the
exclusion process by analyzing exclusion requests and objections to determine whether there is
sufficient domestic production available to meet the requestor’s product needs.58
On September 6, 2018, Commerce announced a new rule to al ow companies to rebut objections
to petitions.59 The rule, published on September 11, 2018, included new rebuttal and counter-
rebuttal procedures, more information about the exclusion submission requirements and process,
the criteria Commerce uses in deciding whether to grant an exclusion request, and revised
estimates of the total number of exclusion requests and objections that Commerce expects to
receive.60 In June 2019, Commerce launched an online 232 Exclusions Portal for submitting and
processing of steel and exclusion requests, objections, rebuttals, and sur-rebuttals.61 The portal is
for al submissions on or after June 13, 2019, while al prior submissions reside on

54 Ed Crooks and Fan Fei, “T rade war winners and losers grapple with T rump tariff chaos,” The Financial Times, July
23, 2018 and. Christine McDaniel and Joe Brunk, “ Section 232 Steel and Aluminum T ariff Exclusion Requests
Continue Apace,” Mercatus The Bridge, January 21, 2020.
55 Bryan Gruley and Joe Deaux, “T he Biggest Fan of T rump’s Steel T ariffs is Suing Over T hem,” Bloomberg, February
13, 2020.
56 MIL OSI - ForeignAffairs.co.nz, “MIL-OSI USA: Walorski Calls for Changes to T ariff Product Exclusion Process
for Manufacturers,” ForeignAffairs.co.nz, May 8, 2018.
57 Ibid.
58 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, “Interim Final Rule. Submissions of Exclusion
Requests and Objections to Submitted Requests for Steel and Aluminum,” 83 Federal Register 46026, September 11,
2018.
59 T estimony by Department of Commerce Assistant Secretary For Export Administration Bureau of Industry and
Security Richard Ashooh at Senate Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies hearing on
Conduct Oversight of Bureau of Industry & Security, International Trade Adm inistration, & US International Trade
Com m ission, September 6, 2018, https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/hearings/conduct -oversight -of-bureau-of-
industry-and-security-international-trade-administration_us-international-trade-commission.
60 Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, "Submissions of Exclusion Requests and Objections to
Submitted Requests for Steel and Aluminum," 83 Federal Register 46026, September 11, 2018.
61 Portal is available at https://www.commerce.gov/page/section-232-investigations.
Congressional Research Service
13

Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

regulations.gov. The portal may provide greater transparency of 232 submission documents, but
does not necessarily impact Commerce’s decision-making process.
Some Members have questioned the executive branch’s processes and ability to pick winners and
losers through granting or denying exclusion requests. For example, Members have requested that
Commerce provide specific statistics and information on the exclusion requests and have sought
greater transparency on the exclusion process. Legislation introduced in the 116th Congress to
revise Section 232 would have addressed the process for excluding products such as having the
U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) administer the process or establishing specific
timelines (e.g., 116th- S. 287, H.R. 940, S. 2362).
On October 29, 2018, the Commerce Inspector General’s office (IG) initiated an audit of the
agency’s processes and procedures for reviewing and adjudicating product exclusion requests.62
In July 2019, the Commerce IG determined that BIS had a large backlog of exclusion requests
and that requests with objections had lower completion rates.63 In October 2019, the IG issued a
Management Alert regarding “a lack of transparency that contributes to the appearance of
improper influence in decision-making for tariff exclusion requests.”64 The IG recommended that
BIS take specific actions to ensure transparency. Commerce did not announce any new changes to
the exemption process or policy to further address the concerns noted in the IG report and by
some Members.65
In May 2020, Commerce issued a Federal Register notice requesting feedback on the exclusion
process and “the appropriateness of the factors considered, and the efficiency and transparency of
the process employed, in rendering decisions on requests for exclusions from the tariffs and
quotas imposed on imports of steel and aluminum articles.”66 The notice also solicited comments
on potential revisions to the process.
In December 2020, Commerce announced further changes through the rule-making process.67
Commerce al owed for General Approved Exclusions (GAEs) that may be used by any importing
entity, eliminating the need for every entity to apply for an exclusion for the same product as wel
as quantity limits. Al owing GAEs are intended in part to reduce the burden on SMEs and on
Commerce, who should receive fewer exclusion requests as a result. In addition, Commerce
clarified language so that the same time standard would be applied to U.S. objectors and foreign
suppliers.
To ensure that Commerce follows through with improving the exclusion process, in the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6), signed on February 15, 2019, Congress
provided funding for “contractor support to implement the product exclusion process for articles

62 Letter from Carol Rice, Assistant Inspector General for Audit and Evaluation, to Daniel O. Hill, Acting Under
Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security, Bureau of Industry and Security, Oc tober 29, 2018.
63 Letter from Carol Rice, Assistant Inspector General for Audit and Evaluation, to Nazak Nikakhtar, Assistant
Secretary for Industry and Analysis, Performing the Non-Exclusive Duties of the Under Secretary of Commerce for
Industry and Security, Bureau of Indust ry and Security, July 1, 2019.
64 Letter from Carol Rice, Assistant Inspector General for Audit and Evaluation, to Secretary Ross, Management Alert:
Certain Communications by Department Officials Suggest Improper Influence in the Sectio n 232 Exclusion Request
Review Process Final Memorandum No. OIG-20-003-M, October 28, 2019.
65 For example, see Rep. Walorski Statement on Commerce OIG Finding “Improper Influence” in Section 232
Exclusion Process, October 30, 2019.
66 Bureau of Industry and Security, Commerce, "Notice of Inquiry Regarding the Exclusion Process for Section 232
Steel and Aluminum Import T ariffs and Quotas," 85 Federal Register 31441, May 26, 2020.
67 Bureau of Industry and Security, "Section 232 Steel and Aluminum T ariff Exclusions Process," 85 Federal Register
81060-81084, December 14, 2020.
Congressional Research Service
14

Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

covered by actions taken under section 232.”68 To help ensure improvements to the exclusion
process, Congress indicated that the additional money is to be “devoted to an effective Section
232 exclusion process” and required that Commerce submit quarterly reports to Congress.69
Congress mandated that the reports identify:
 the number of exclusion requests received;
 the number of exclusion requests approved and denied;
 the status of efforts to assist smal - and medium-sized businesses in navigating
the exclusion process;
 Commerce-wide staffing levels for the exclusion process, including information
on any staff detailed to complete this task; and
 Commerce-wide funding by source appropriation and object class for costs
undertaken to process the exclusions.
In the Fiscal year 2022 Budget Request hearing, Secretary Raimundo stated that Commerce has
reduced the time for companies to receive exclusions.70
Tariffs Collected to Date
As of April 14, 2021, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) assessed $7.7 bil ion in steel
tariffs and $2.4 bil ion in aluminum tariffs. About 63% of steel tariffs ($4.5 bil ion) and 68% of
aluminum tariffs ($1.5 bil ion) were collected the first year the tariffs were in effect, highlighting
the fact that revenue from these two Section 232 actions has been declining. This could reflect (1)
the exemptions to Canada and Mexico in May 2019 (top suppliers of both metals), (2) the effect
of exemptions granted to U.S. importers, and (3) declining imports in response to the relatively
higher import prices, an objective of the Trump Administration’s actions.71 Re-imposed tariffs on
Canadian aluminum could impact the trend in the future.
In addition, CBP has assessed $18.8 mil ion and $1 mil ion from the tariffs on steel and
aluminum derivative products, respectively. The increased tariffs on these products reflects a
January 24, 2020 Presidential proclamation that also placed tariffs on imports of products such as
steel nails, tacks, and drawing pins; as wel as aluminum stranded wire, cables, and plaited bands
and other like products.72
The tariffs collected are put in the general fund of the U.S. Treasury and are not al ocated to a
specific fund.

68 P.L. 116-6 Division C, T itle I.
69 H.J.Res. 31, p. 609.
70 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related
Agencies, Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request for The Departm ent of Com m erce, 117th Cong., May 6, 2022.
71 See CBP website (https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/trade) for statistics. According to the President’s
proclamations implementing the Section 232 tariffs, one of the objectives of the tariffs is to “reduce imports to a level
that the Secretary assessed would enable domestic steel (and aluminum) producers to use approximately 80 percent of
existing domestic production capacity and thereby achieve long-term economic viability through increased
production.” Presidential Proclamation 9704 of March 8, 2018, “Adjusting Imports of Aluminum into the United
States,” 83 Federal Register 11619, March 15, 2018, and Proclamation 9705 of March 8, 2018, “Adjusting Imports of
Steel Into the United States,” 83 Federal Register 11625, March 15, 2018.
72 Proclamation 9980 of January 24, 2020, "Adjusting imports of Derivative Aluminum Articles and Derivative Steel
Articles into the United States," 85 Federal Register 5281, January 24, 2020.
Congressional Research Service
15

Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

Additional Trump Administration Investigations
Automobiles and Parts73
Subsequent to the steel and aluminum investigations, the Trump Administration in May 2018
initiated a third Section 232 investigation into the import of passenger cars, sport utility vehicles,
vans, light trucks, and automotive parts.74 Commerce held a public hearing to hear from
stakeholders on the potential impact of these imports on national security, identifying a broad set
of factors related to national defense and the national economy for consideration.75 As many
foreign auto manufacturers have established facilities in the United States—accounting for 45%
of employment in U.S. auto assembly and parts plants76—Commerce specifical y requested
information on how the impact of auto imports on U.S. national security may differ when “U.S.
production by majority U.S.-owned firms is considered separately from U.S. production by
majority foreign-owned firms.”77
Some Members and auto industry representatives spoke out in opposition to any tariffs during the
auto industry Section 232 investigation. Three groups voiced support for at least limited measures
to specifical y address auto imports: the United Automobile Workers, the United Steelworkers,
and the Forging Industry Association.78 Commerce submitted the final Section 232 report to
President Trump on February 17, 2019; the report has not been publicly released.79 Some
Members have asked for the report to be made public, and the Cause of Action Institute sued
Commerce to release the report after an unsuccessful Freedom of Information Act request.80 On
March 6, 2020, Senator Toomey and other Members of Congress filed an amicus brief with the
district court arguing, among other things, that (1) Congress needed the report in order to exercise
oversight over the authority it had granted to the executive branch in Section 232; and (2) the
President could not invoke executive privilege to withhold disclosure of the document.81 The
court has not issued a decision in the case. Some analysts viewed the use of the Section 232

73 CRS Specialist Bill Canis contributed to this section.
74 For a further discussion of the Section 232 auto industry investigation, see CRS In Focus IF10971, Section 232 Auto
Investigation, coordinated by Rachel F. Fefer.
75 U.S. Department of Commerce, “Notice on Section 232 National Investigation of Imports of Automobiles and
Automotive Parts,” 83 Federal Register 24735, May 30, 2018.
76 In 2017, employment in manufacture of motor vehicles, bodies and trailers, and vehicle parts was 972,000; of those,
431,000 worked in foreign-owned plants in the United States, according to the latest data from the U.S. Department of
Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), Activities of U.S. Affiliates of Foreign Multinational Enterprises,
viewed on July 31, 2020, https://www.bea.gov/data/intl-trade-investment/activities-us-affiliates-foreign-mnes, and
BEA, National Incom e and Product Accounts, T able 6.4D. Full-time and Part -T ime Employees by Industry, viewed
February 20, 2020, https://apps.bea.gov/iT able/iTable.cfm?reqid=19&step=3&isuri=1&nipa_table_list=193&
categories=survey.
77 U.S. Department of Commerce, “Notice on Section 232 National Investigation of Imports of Automobiles and
Automotive Parts,” 83 Federal Register 24735, May 30, 2018.
78 Doug Palmer and Megan Cassella, “ U.S. allies warn of retaliation if T rump imposes auto tariffs,” PoliticoPro, July
19, 2018.
79 U.S. Department of Commerce, “ Statement from the Department of Commerce on Submission of Automobiles and
Automobile Parts Section 232 Report to the President ,” Press Releases, February 17, 2019.
80 Eliana Johnson and Andrew Restuccia, “T rump Administration withholds report justifying ‘shock’ auto tariffs,”
PoliticoPro, March 20, 2019; Doug Palmer, “ Watchdog group sues for release of Commerce auto tariff report ,”
PoliticoPro, March 21, 2019.
81 Senator T oomey, “ Toomey Leading Bipartisan Amicus Brief Supporting Lawsuit Seeking Release of Commerce
Department’s 232 Auto Report ,” March 7, 2020, https://www.toomey.senate.gov/?p=op_ed&id=2591.
Congressional Research Service
16

Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

investigation and potential tariffs as a tactical move by the Trump Administration to pressure
trade negotiating partners.
To compel the Trump Administration to release the report, Congress included an amendment in
the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-93) mandating that Commerce publish the
report in the Federal Register and that it submit to Congress any portion of the report that
contains classified information.82 The Trump Administration did not comply, citing executive
privilege and asserting that disclosure of the report “would risk impairing ongoing diplomatic
efforts to address a national-security threat and would risk interfering with executive branch
deliberations,” in apparent reference to negotiations with the EU and others ongoing at that
time.83 Several Members, including then-Senate Finance Chair Senator Grassley, objected to the
Trump Administration’s refusal to release the report.84 The Biden Administration has yet to
release the report.
Bil s introduced in the 116th Congress would have required a report by the USITC on the
economic importance of domestic automotive manufacturing before the President could impose
import restrictions on the sector (S. 121, H.R. 1710).
Implications of a 232 Action for U.S Automakers
The value of U.S. imports potential y covered under the Trump Administration investigation
would have been significantly greater than that of steel and aluminum imports. In 2020, the
United States imported more than 6.6 mil ion vehicles, with a value of $159 bil ion, and more
than $131 bil ion in auto parts. With complex global supply chains, industry dynamics such as
the large number of foreign-owned auto manufacturing facilities in the United States, and the
potential for further retaliation by trading partners if tariffs were to be imposed as a result of
the investigation, the economic consequences could have been substantial. For example, the
1.5 mil ion vehicles exported from the United States in 2020—with a value of $47 bil ion—
and $67 bil ion in parts exports could have been targeted for retaliation by some trading
partners, as could have the vehicle assembly plants of U.S.-controlled companies in overseas
markets such as China and Europe. The Center for Automotive Research (CAR), a research
and analysis group that studies issues affecting the automotive industry, estimated that a 25%
tariff added to al imported vehicles and parts (including from Canada and Mexico) could raise
the cost of U.S. vehicle assembly by 6%; if levied only against the post-Brexit EU, those costs
would increase by less than 1%.
In its 2019 annual report, Ford Motor Company asserted that “steps taken by the U.S.
government to apply or consider applying tariffs on automobiles, parts, and other products and
materials have the potential to disrupt existing supply chains, impose additional costs on our
business, affect the demand for our products, and make us less competitive. Further, other
countries attempting to retaliate by imposing tariffs would increase the cost for us to import
our vehicles into such countries.”
The automotive supply chain has been affected by steel and aluminum tariffs. According to
CAR, U.S. vehicles and parts manufacturers account for 26% of U.S. steel consumption and

82 P.L. 116-93, Sec. 112.
83 Steven A. Engel, Assistant Attorney General Office Legal Counsel, “Publication of a Report to the President on the
Effect of Automobile and Automobile-Part Imports on the National Security,” January 17, 2020.
84 “Grassley says he intends to ‘pursue’ release of Section 232 autos report ,” Inside U.S. Trade, February 11, 2020;
Doug Palmer, “ T oomey blasts Commerce decision not to release auto report ,” PoliticoPro, January 21, 2020; letter
from New Democrat Coalition to Pres. T rump dated February 13, 2020.
Congressional Research Service
17

Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

31% of aluminum consumption. The American Automotive Policy Council, an industry trade
group that represents the policy interests of Chrysler (a subsidiary of Stel antis N.V. since
January 2021), Ford, and General Motors, has estimated that the Section 232 steel and
aluminum tariffs added $400 to the price of a new vehicle.
Notes: Mexico, Japan, Canada, South Korea, and Germany accounted for 90% of vehicles imported by the
United States in 2020; nearly 40% of automotive parts were imported from Mexico, with China, Canada,
Japan, Germany, and South Korea accounting for an additional 40% of imports. EU members alone (not
including United Kingdom) in 2020 purchased 256,569 U.S-made vehicles, worth $10.8 bil ion. More than
two-thirds of U.S. automotive parts exports were to Mexico and Canada. To il ustrate the complexity of auto
negotiations, see CRS In Focus IF10835, NAFTA Motor Vehicle Talks Reopen Old Trade Debate, by Bil Canis.
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Automotive Trade Data.
Michael Schultz, et al., U.S. Consumer & Economic Impacts of U.S. Automotive trade Policies, Center for
Automotive Research, February 2019, p. 26, https://www.cargroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/US-
Consumer-Economic-Impacts-of-US-Automotive-Trade-Policies-.pdf.
https://shareholder.ford.com/investors/financials/annual-reports/default.aspx. Michael Schultz, et al., U.S.
Consumer & Economic Impacts of U.S. Automotive trade Policies, Center for Automotive Research,
February 2019, pp. 24-25. Ryan Beene, “Auto industry unites to oppose Trump import tariffs,” Automotive
News, March 29, 2019, https://www.autonews.com/automakers-suppliers/auto-industry-unites-oppose-trump-
import-tariffs. Ford Motor Company, 2019 Annual Report, Form 10-K, For the Year Ended December 31, 2019, p.
15.
Uranium85
Unlike the self-initiated investigations into steel, aluminum, and auto imports, the Trump
Administration opened two additional Section 232 investigations in response to industry
petitions. In July 2018, Commerce launched a Section 232 investigation into uranium imports in
response to a petition from two uranium producers (uranium mining and mil ing companies), and
after consulting with industry, government officials, and a public comment period.86 The
petitioners, the uranium producers Energy Fuels and Ur-Energy, requested limiting imports to
guarantee 25% of the U.S. nuclear fuel market for U.S. uranium producers, and “Buy American”
provisions for government purchases of uranium to bolster the industry.87
Compared to historical production, current uranium mining has become a relatively smal -scale
industry in the United States. The Energy Information Administration (EIA) reports U.S.
production of uranium shrank to 1.6 mil ion pounds in 2018, 33% less than 2017, and declined to
173,875 pounds in 2019.88 For the fourth quarter of 2020, EIA reported it “could not publicly
release data for U.S. production of uranium concentrate (U3O8) in the fourth quarter of 2020.
Domestic uranium production has declined considerably in recent years, and activity did not
reach a threshold where a specific production figure could be published without violating the
protections that EIA has committed to provide.”89

85 CRS Analyst Lance Larson contributed to this section.
86 Bureau of Industry and Security, Office of T echnology Evaluation, U.S. Department of Commerce, “Notice of
Request for Public Comments on Section 232 National Security Investigation of Imports of Uranium, ” 83 Federal
Register 35204, July 25, 2018.
87 Energy Fuels, “Energy Fuels and Ur-Energy Jointly File Section 232 Petition with U.S. Commerce Department to
Investigate Effects of Uranium Imports on U.S. National Security,” press release, January 16, 2018.
88 Energy Information Administration (EIA), Domestic Uranium Production Report - Quarterly, February 13, 2020.
89 Energy Information Administration (EIA), Domestic Uranium Production Report - Quarterly, February 22, 2021.
Congressional Research Service
18

Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

Kazakhstan accounted for approximately 42% of the world’s production of uranium; Canada and
Australia together supplied roughly a quarter of the world’s production in 2019.90 China made up
3.5% of worldwide uranium production in 2018.91
In April 2019, Commerce submitted its report to President Trump, determining affirmatively that
uranium imports threaten to impair U.S. national security.92 In July, the President expressed
concerns regarding national security, cal ing for a “fuller analysis of national security
considerations with respect to the entire nuclear fuel supply chain.” The White House
memorandum established a Nuclear Fuel Working Group, co-chaired by the Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy,
with representatives from other executive branch agencies. The working group was directed to
“examine the current state of domestic nuclear fuel production to reinvigorate the entire nuclear
fuel supply chain.”93 In April 2020, the Department of Energy (DOE) released a report titled
“Strategy to Restore American Nuclear Energy Leadership” containing policy recommendations
to revive the domestic uranium industry and drive U.S. exports, among other recommendations.94
Titanium Sponge
In March 2019, Commerce launched another Section 232 investigation in response to a petition
from a U.S. titanium firm.95 In explaining the investigation, the Commerce Secretary stated,
“Titanium sponge has uses in a wide range of defense applications, from helicopter blades and
tank armor to fighter jet airframes and engines.”96
Titanium Metals Corporation (known as Timet) indefinitely idled production of titanium sponge
at its Nevada facility in 2020, though it is unclear whether the company has permanently ceased
sponge production in the United States.97 Timet cited declining sales due to the COVID-19
pandemic as a reason.98 The United Steelworkers urged Congress and the Trump Administration
in 2020 to save the Timet facility from permanent closure, arguing that without capacity to
produce titanium sponge domestical y the national defense and critical infrastructure of the

90 World Nuclear Association, World Uranium Mining Production, December 2020, http://www.world-nuclear.org/
information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/mining-of-uranium/world-uranium-mining-production.aspx.
91 Ad Hoc Utilities Group, “Domestic Uranium Quotas T hreaten America’s Economy, Energy, and Security”.
92 T he White House, Memorandum on the Effect of Uranium Imports on the National Security and Establishment of the
United States Nuclear Fuel Working Group, Presidential Memorandum , July 12, 2019,
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/memorandum-effect -uranium-imports-national-security-
establishment -united-states-nuclear-fuel-working-group/ .
93 Ibid.
94 U.S. Department of Energy, “ Strategy to Restore American Nuclear Energy Leadership,” April 23, 2020,
https://www.energy.gov/strategy-restore-american-nuclear-energy-leadership. For more information on uranium
enrichment, see CRS Report R45753, The Front End of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Current Issues, by Lance N. Larson
and CRS In Focus IF11505, Uranium Reserve Program Proposal: Policy Im plications, by Lance N. Larson .
95 U.S. Department of Commerce, “Notice of Request for Public Comments on Section 232 National Security
Investigation of Imports of T itanium Sponge,” 84 Federal Register 8503, March 8, 2019.
96 U.S. Department of Commerce press release, March 2019, https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2019/03/
us-department-commerce-initiates-section-232-investigation-titanium.
97 Orla O'Sullivan, “Last U.S. T itanium Sponge Maker Exits: T imet Cites Covid-19, not Section 232 Denial,” Metal
Bulletin Daily, September 15, 2020. Note that producers idle facilities so that they can be started if supported by market
conditions.
98 Gary Martin and Jonathan Ng, “Henderson T IMET Plan Workers Seeking Federal Help to Prevent Closure,” The Las
Vegas Review Journal, August 3, 2020, https://www.reviewjournal.com/local/henderson/henderson -timet -plant-
workers-seeking-federal-help-to-prevent-closure-2087819/.
Congressional Research Service
19

Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

United States would be compromised.99 Timet was the sole producer in the United States after
Al egheny Technologies, Inc (ATI) idled its titanium sponge production plant in Utah in 2016.100
The United States Geological Survey (USGS) estimates that titanium sponge manufacturing
employed 150 workers in 2020.101 For 2019 and 2020, the United States was more than 50%
import-reliant for titanium sponge, down from 73% in 2018.102 In 2019, Japan was the biggest
supplier of titanium sponge to the United States, accounting for 89% of sponge imports;
Kazakhstan was the second-leading supplier, making up 10% of imported titanium sponge.103
Although China was the world’s largest producer of titanium sponge, producing 110 thousand
tons in 2020, it is general y not considered an important source of sponge imports for the United
States.104 In its Section 232 petition, Timet voiced concern that without protection, the U.S.
defense and aerospace industries could become dependent on titanium sponge imports from
“risky” sources such as China or Russia. Furthermore, the company noted that China is not
certified as a producer of premium grade titanium sponge used in rotating parts of jet engines.105
Commerce submitted its report to President Trump in November 2019, but has not released it to
Congress or to the public.106 On February 27, 2020, President Trump announced that he agreed
with the Commerce finding that titanium sponge imports threaten to impair national security and
also with the Commerce recommendation not to adjust imports.107 Similar to the uranium case,
the White House memorandum established a working group, the Titanium Sponge Working
Group (TSWG), in this case co-chaired by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of
Commerce with heads from other executive branch agencies.108 The TSWG is to develop
recommendations to help ensure access to titanium sponge in the United States for use for
national defense and in critical industries during an emergency. In December 2020, the TSWG
issued a Federal Register notice seeking public comment to inform its deliberations.109 The

99 Letter from T homas Conway, International President, United Steelworkers, to Honorable Donald J. T rump, President
of the United States, September 21, 2020, https://www.usw.org/blog/2021/march/20-09-21-USW-urges-administrative-
action-to-protect-US-titanium-supply-chain.pdf.
100 Katie Benchina Olsen, “AT I Idles Utah T itanium Sponge Facility,” MetalMiner, September 7, 2017; also see,
USGS, Titanium Minerals Yearbook, January 2020, T able 2, p. 79.7., https://prd-wret.s3-us-west-
2.amazonaws.com/assets/palladium/production/atoms/files/myb1-2016-titan.pdf.
101 USGS, Titanium and Titanium Dioxide Mineral Commodity Summaries, January 2021, https://minerals.usgs.gov/
minerals/pubs/commodity/titanium/.
102 USGS, Titanium and Titanium Dioxide Mineral Commodity Summaries, January 2021,
https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2021/mcs2021 -titanium.pdf.
103 USGS, Titanium Mineral Industry Surveys, Fourth Quarter 2019, https://www.usgs.gov/centers/nmic/titanium-
statistics-and-information.
104 USGS, Titanium and Titanium Dioxide Mineral Commodity Summaries, January 2021, https://minerals.usgs.gov/
minerals/pubs/commodity/titanium/.
105 Petition of the Titanium Metals Corporation Under Section 232 of the T rade Expansion Act o f 1962 for relief from
Imports of T itanium Sponge that T hreaten National Security, September 27, 2018, p.19, https://www.timet.com/assets/
local/documents/petition/Titanium-Sponge-232-Petition-Executive-Summary.pdf.
106 BIS, Section 232 Investigations: T he Effects on Imports on National Security, https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/
other-areas/office-of-technology-evaluation-ote/section-232-investigations.
107 T he White House, Memorandum on the Effect of Titanium Sponge Imports on the National Security, February 27,
2020, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/memorandum-effect -titanium-sponge-imports-
national-security/.
108 Bureau of Industry and Security, “Notice of Request for Public Comments by the T itanium Sponge Working
Group,” 85 Federal Register 79464-79466, December 10, 2020.
109 Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security, "Notice of Request for P ublic Comments by the
T itanium Sponge Working Group," 85 Federal Register 79464, December 10, 2020.
Congressional Research Service
20

Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

working group is also to meet with counterpart agencies in Japan to “agree upon measures to
ensure access to titanium sponge in the United States for use for national defense and critical
industries in an emergency.”110 Furthermore, President Trump instructed the Secretary of Defense
“to take al appropriate action… to increase access to titanium sponge for use for national defense
and critical industries and to support domestic production capacity for the production of titanium
sponge to meet national defense requirements.”111
Transformers and Components112
On May 4, 2020, Commerce self-initiated a Section 232 investigation into whether imports of
certain electrical transformers or their parts, including laminations and cores made of grain-
oriented electrical steel (GOES), threaten to impair national security. The existing Section 232
steel tariffs included the expanded derivative products and do not cover GOES derivative
products, which had raised concerns among some Members of Congress who cal ed the tariffs
insufficient. They also argue that some firms had avoided tariffs by increasing imports of such
derivative products from Mexico and Canada, which do not presently face tariff restrictions.113
Canada contested the circumvention al egation in its submission to Commerce. Canadian officials
claimed that the North American supply chain was highly integrated, and that Canadian
component manufacturers source some GOES inputs from U.S. suppliers. Furthermore, they
wrote, restriction of Canadian imports might “adversely affect” the integrated North American
electrical grid shared by the United States and Canada.114 AK Steel, with manufacturing
operations in Pennsylvania and Ohio, is currently the sole domestic GOES producer.115
GOES products are incorporated into transformers used in critical energy infrastructure. Risk
assessments for the U.S. energy infrastructure have general y focused on threats and hazards that
may disable or permanently damage large numbers of high-voltage electric-power transformers
(LPTs) that are critical to the movement of electricity. Because LPTs require long lead times for
their manufacture, transport, and instal ation, the loss of these systems for any reason may have
severe long-term consequences for electric reliability. Experts have expressed increasing concern
about the threat of coordinated cyberattacks through the nation's networked control systems that
might significantly impair the nation's electric grid by damaging LPTs and other bulk-power
equipment.116 Widely recognized cyber supply chain vulnerabilities may increase cybersecurity
risks to the electricity subsector.117

110 T he White House, Memorandum on the Effect of Titanium Sponge Imports on the National Security, February 27,
2020.
111 Ibid.
112 CRS Analyst Brian E. Humphreys contributed to this section.
113 Senator Portman, “Portman, Brown, Casey Ask President T rump to Prioritize Electrical Steel in T rade Remedy,”
press release, March 8, 2018.
114 Government of Canada, Comments By the Government of Canada to the U.S. Department of Commerce, Request for
Comment: T he Effect of Imports of Laminations for Staked Cores for Incorporation Into Transformers, Stacked Cores
for Incorporation Into T ransformers, Wound Cores for Incorporation Into T ransformers, a nd T ransformer Regulators,
An Investigation Under Section 232(B) of the T rade Expansion Act of 1962, as Amended U.S. Federal Register,
Washington, DC, July 2, 2020, p. 15.
115 Representative Mike Kelly, “Reps. Kelly and Balderson Urge President T rump to Prot ect AK Steel, the Last
Remaining U.S. Electrical Steel Producer,” press release, March 6, 2020.
116 For more information, see CRS Report R45312, Electric Grid Cybersecurity, by Richard J. Campbell.
117 For more information see, NIST Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management , https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cyber-supply-
chain-risk-management .
Congressional Research Service
21

Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

In 2016, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) directed the North American
Energy Reliability Corporation (NERC) to develop a new reliability standard to address supply
chain risk management issues affecting cybersecurity of bulk-power systems.118 The rule would
require industry stakeholders to formalize cybersecurity risk management and implement more
rigorous vetting of vendors and software, among other measures.119 In April 2020, FERC delayed
implementation of the rule to October 1, 2020, due to COVID-19 contingencies.120 In April 2021,
the DOE issued a request for information related to cybersecurity risks in the grid supply chain.121
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and National Foreign Trade Council advocated for use of
AD/CVD to limit targeted imports rather than Section 232 action. There are currently duties
assessed on transformer components imported from South Korea.
Commerce concluded its investigation and delivered its report to President Trump on October 16,
2020, but it has not been made public.122 In November 2020, the Trump Administration concluded
consultations to address the transshipment of GOES. According to the then USTR, Mexico agreed
to establish a monitoring system for exports of electrical transformer laminations and cores made
of non-North American GOES to the United States. As a result, the Trump Administration stated
that Mexico would not be subject to further Section 232 action.123 No other action against other
countries was taken.
Mobile Cranes124
On May 19, 2020, Commerce initiated an investigation on imports of mobile cranes125 on the
basis of a petition filed by the Manitowoc Company, Inc.126 In its December 2019 petition, the
Wisconsin-based company asserted that lower-priced imports—particularly from Germany,
Austria, and Japan—and intel ectual property infringement127—by a Chinese competitor—have

118 North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), Implementation Plan, Project 2016-03 Cyber Security
Supply Chain Risk Management Reliability Standard, July 2017, p. 2. NERC “is a not -for-profit international
regulatory authority whose mission is to assure the effective and efficient reduction of risks to the reliability and
security of the grid.... NERC is the Electric Reliability Organization (ERO) for North America, subject to oversight by
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and governmental authorities in Canada.” See NERC, “A bout
NERC”, https://www.nerc.com/AboutNERC/Pages/default.aspx.
119 North American Electric Reliability Corporation, “Reliability Standards for the Bulk Electric Systems of North
America,” June 23, 2020.
120 U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Order Granting Deferred Implementation of Certain NERC
Reliability Standards, April 17, 2020, 171 FERC ¶ 61,052.
121 Department of Energy, "Revocation of Prohibition Order Securing Critical Defense Facilities," 08483 Federal
Register, April 22, 2021.
122 According to email from BIS Congressional Affairs to CRS on April 2, 2021.
123 UST R, “ UST R Statement on Successful Conclusion of Steel Negotiations with Mexico,” press release, November 5,
2020.
124 CRS Specialist Bill Canis contributed to this section.
125 Cranes are large machines that move heavy objects using a projecting beam. T hey are used to unload freight and
place bridge sections over highways, and in construction and manufacturing applications. Cranes can be either
stationary or mobile, with the latter mounted on wheels, crawler tracks, or trucks.
126 Bureau of Industry and Security, Office of T echnology Evaluation, U.S. Department of Commerce, “Notice of
Request for Public Comments on Section 232 National Security Investigation of Imports of Mobile Cranes,” 83
Federal Register 31439, May 26, 2020.
127 T he International T rade Commission found in May 2015 that a Chinese crane manufacturer had violated Manitowoc
patents and trade secrets with regard to certain crawler cranes and excluded them from entry into the United States. In
the Matter of Certain Crawler Cranes and Com ponents Thereof, Investigation No. 337-TA-887 1-4 (U.S. International
Congressional Research Service
22

Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

resulted in a 72% increase in imported cranes since 2014 and the closure of one of its two U.S.
production facilities.128
According to its petition, Manitowoc is the “dominant supplier of mobile cranes to the U.S.
military and has a long history of Department of Defense contract awards, having supplied a wide
number of rough-terrain and self-propel ed cranes through the Defense Logistics Agency and
through direct sales to al military branches of service.” The company asserts that in 2019, it was
the U.S. military’s exclusive supplier of al -terrain and boom truck cranes, and supplied half of
the rough terrain cranes used by the services. Manitowoc also said that its cranes are essential to
“strengthen and maintain secure, functioning, and resilient critical infrastructure” within the
United States.129 At the time, Manitowoc sought the imposition of duties on some imported
mobile cranes, though notably excluded imports of its own mobile cranes manufactured in
Germany.
The crane industry was split in its views on the Manitowoc petition: other mobile crane
manufacturers and some crane users support the petition, while others have argued against it.130
Opponents to the Section 232 investigation, mostly those involved in crane rental, sales, and
service, say that Kobelco and Tadano, two Japanese crane manufacturers that have invested in
U.S. factories, make more reliable equipment with regards to safety, quality, service, and
reliability, and are more competitively priced than their Manitowoc counterparts.131 One Texas
crane importer asserted that Manitowoc has not invested in its plants or in innovation through
research and development (R&D) since the early 1990s, so that demand for its product has
diminished.132
In August 2020, the company stated that it was no longer requesting tariffs as a remedy and that
“the most effective remedy would be for the President to take concrete steps to stimulate
demand.”133 The firm later withdrew its petition and the investigation was halted.134
Vanadium135
On May 28, 2020, Commerce, in response to a petition, initiated an investigation to determine the
effects on U.S. national security from imports of vanadium.136 Vanadium is a metal used in the

T rade Commission).
128 While the company headquarters and engineering remain in Wisconsin, its sole crawler crane manufacturing facility
was moved in 2016 to Shady Grove, Penn. Manitowoc Company, Inc., Petition of the Manitowoc Com pany, Inc. under
Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 for the Relief from Im ports of Mobile Cranes that Threaten National
Security, December 19, 2019.
129 Ibid.
130 D. Ann Shiffler, “Global crane community responds to Manitowoc petition for tariffs,” International Cranes and
Specialized Transport, July 18, 2020, at https://www.khl.com/international-cranes-and-specialized-transport/global-
crane-community-responds-to-manitowocs-petition-for-tariffs/145129.article.
131 Public comments of Scott Cummins, CEO of Scott Equipment Company, LLC, July 17, 2020,
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=BIS-2020-0009-0008.
132 Public comments of Don Udelson, President of G.P., Lift Source Machinery, LT D.,
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=BIS-2020-0009-0025.
133 D.Ann Shiffler, “New president said Manitowoc does not support tariffs on crane imports,” American Cranes &
Transport, August 11, 2020.
134 Isabelle Icso, “Commerce terminates Section 232 probe into mobile crane imports,” Inside U.S. Trade, December 4,
2020.
135 CRS Analyst Brandon S. T racy contributed to this section.
136 Bureau of Industry and Security, Office of T echnology Evaluation, U.S. Department of Com merce, “Notice of
Congressional Research Service
23

Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

production of metal al oys, and is designated a critical mineral by the Department of the
Interior.137 Vanadium is most often used as a strengthening agent for steel and is especial y valued
for its strength-to-weight ratio.138 Uses potential y important for national security include the
manufacture of components of aircraft, jet engines, bal istic missiles, and batteries for energy
storage.139 Vanadium is also used in the manufacture of steel al oys, which are commonly sold as
steel plate, sheet, beams, bars, pipes, and tubes, among others, and can be used as a catalyst for
the production of some acids. Other minerals can often serve as substitutes for vanadium.
AMG Vanadium (Cambridge, OH)140 and U.S. Vanadium, LLC (Hot Springs, AR)141 filed the 232
petition. The petitioners assert that the U.S. vanadium industry is “adversely impacted by unfairly
priced imports, limited exported markets due to value-added-tax regimes, and the distortionary
effects of Chinese and Russian industrial policies.”142 AMG Vanadium and other U.S. producers
of ferrovanadium are protected by antidumping orders on imports of ferrovanadium from China
and South Africa that have been in place since 2003.143
Opponents of the Section 232 investigation point out that there is no primary production of
vanadium in the United States, and that both of the U.S. petitioners rely on secondary sources of
vanadium, including imports of spent catalysts from oil refiners, fly ash from industrial boilers
and power plants, and vanadium-bearing steelmaking slag.144 Another U.S. manufacturer that uses
vanadium pentoxide to produce ferrovanadium, objected to any Section 232 action because the
limited production of vanadium pentoxide in the United States makes it necessary to rely on
vanadium imports for its feedstock. The company suggested that if the investigation resulted in
tariffs on al vanadium imports, it could critical y reduce the amount of vanadium available for
steelmaking.145 Other downstream producers, including manufacturers of vanadium flow batteries

Request for Public Comments on Section 232 National Security Investigation of Imports of Vanadium,” 85 Federal
Register 34179, June 3, 2020.
137 Office of the Secretary, Interior, “Final List of Critical Minerals 2018,” 83 Federal Register 23295, May 18, 2018.
138 U.S. Vanadium, LLC, https://usvanadium.com.
139 “U.S. Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross Initiates Section 232 Investigation into Imports of Vanadium,” Press
Release, June 2, 2020.
140 AMG Vanadium reclaims spent steel refinery and other vanadium-bearing residues, which it converts to
ferrovanadium as well as a ferronickel-molybdenum alloy that are marketed and sold to the carbon and stainless steel
industries; AMG Vanadium, https://amg-v.com/.
141 U.S. Vanadium LLC is a processor of vanadium that makes high -purity vanadium oxides and downstream vanadium
chemicals that it markets to the catalyst, chemical, titanium, and energy storage industries. U.S. Vanadium LLC,
https://usvanadium.com/news/f/us-vanadium-llc-announces-agreement -to-acquire-evraz-stratcor.
142 Department of Commerce, “U.S. Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross Initiates Section 232 Investigation on Imports
of Vanadium,” Press Release, June 2, 2020.
143 International T rade Administration, Department of Commerce, “Notice of Antidumping Order: Ferrovanadium from
the Republic of South Africa,” 68 Federal Register 4169, January 28, 2003, and “Notice of Amended Final
Antidumping Duty Determination of Sales at Less than Fair Value and Antidumping Duty Order: Ferrovanadium from
the People’s Republic of China,” 68 Federal Register 4168, January 28, 2003. In these antidumping orders, the scope
included all ferrovanadium, but specifically excluded all vanadium additives, such as nitride vanadium, vanadium -
aluminum master alloys, vanadium chemicals, vanadium oxides, vanadium waste and scrap, and vanadium -bearing raw
materials (slag, boiler residues, and fly ash).
144 Julie C. Mendoza et al., Comments of Bushveld Minerals, Limited, Morris, Manning & Martin LLP, Section 232
National Security Investigation of Imports of Vanadium, July 20, 2020,
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=BIS-2020-0002-0013.
145 Comments of David F. Carey, General Manager, Bear Metallurgical Company, July 20, 2020,
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=BIS-2020-0002-0015.
Congressional Research Service
24

link to page 30 link to page 33 link to page 46

Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

and of titanium mil products for the aerospace industry, also opposed the Section 232 measure.146
Commerce concluded its investigation and delivered its report to President Biden on February 22,
2021; it has not been made public.147 President Biden has until May 23, 2021, to act if there was
an affirmative finding.
Section 232 Tariffs and International Trade148
Increased U.S. tariffs on steel (25%) and aluminum (10%) under Section 232 currently affect
$13.1 bil ion of U.S. annual imports (Figure 4). The scale of imports affected by the actions
fluctuated over the past several years with various changes by the Trump Administration since it
first imposed the additional tariffs in March 2018. For example, in 2019, the Trump
Administration exempted Canada and Mexico from increased tariffs on both metals—Canada and
Mexico accounted for 40% of relevant U.S. steel and aluminum imports. In 2020, President
Trump expanded the steel and aluminum tariffs to cover additional derivative products.149 The
Biden Administration is reviewing and could modify the various tariff increases enacted by the
Trump Administration, including the existing Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum.150 U.S.
trading partners have responded to the U.S. tariff actions with retaliatory tariffs on approximately
$7.2 bil ion in U.S. annual exports (see “Retaliatory Tariffs”).
Figure 4. U.S. Trade Affected by Section 232 Tariffs in 2020
(U.S. dol ars)

Source: CRS calculations with data from the U.S. Census Bureau sourced through Trade Data Monitor.
Notes: Based on annual 2020 trade values. Excludes exempted countries. The outcome of the Commerce
Department’s Section 232 investigation on vanadium has not been publicly released, but if the investigation found
such imports pose a threat to U.S. national security, the President would have until May 23, 2021, to determine
the appropriate response. As a result of an April 2021 Court of International Trade (CIT) decision invalidating
President Trump’s expansion of the Section 232 tariffs to cover certain steel-derivative products, CBP could

146 See comments in https://regulations.gov, BIS-2020-0002.
147 According to email from BIS Congressional Affairs to CRS on April 2, 2021.
148 U.S. trade data cited throughout this section is from the U.S. Census Bureau accessed via T rade Data Monitor.
Calculations based on products included in the Administration’s various tariff proclamations, and adjusted for
exempted countries as noted.
149 In April 2021, the Court of International T rade (CIT ) determined that the presidential proclamation imposing the
steel-derivative tariffs was “ invalid as contrary to law.” It also held that one importer was entitled to a refund of any
duties it had already paid on those products under the proclamation. For more information on the tariffs on derivative
products and court challenges, please see “ Proclamation Imposing T ariffs on Steel-Derivative Products”
150 T he outcome of the Commerce Department’s Section 232 investigation on vanadium has not been publicly released,
but if the investigation found such imports pose a threat to U.S. national security, the President would have until late
May 2021 to determine the appropriate response.
Congressional Research Service
25

link to page 32 link to page 72 Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

potential y refund duties that companies paid on the import of such products, lowering the total amount
col ected.
Steel and Aluminum Trade151
In 2020, total U.S. imports of steel and aluminum products covered by the Section 232 tariffs
totaled $16.5 bil ion and $12.2 bil ion, respectively.152 Over the past decade, steel imports have
fluctuated significantly, by value and quantity, while imports of aluminum general y increased
through 2017 (see Figure 5). Compared to 2017, the year before the additional tariffs took effect,
imports of both metals have decreased, by value and quantity, with particularly sharp declines in
2020 during the global pandemic and recession. Since 2017, steel imports have decreased 43.0%
by value (-$12.5 bil ion) and 43.6% by quantity (-15.0 mil ion metric tons). Aluminum imports
have decreased 30.2% by value (-$5.3 bil ion), and 25.3% by quantity (-1.8 mil ion metric tons).
U.S. imports from individual countries have fluctuated since the tariffs went into effect (see
Appendix D). When comparing 2020 trade data to 2017, the year before the tariffs took effect,
the largest declines in U.S. steel imports were from the European Union (-$2,411.8 mil ion, -
43.7%), South Korea (-$1,272.4 mil ion, -45.6%), Russia (-$1,266.6 mil ion, -86.7%), and
Canada (-$1,223.7 mil ion, -23.6%), with no major trade partners seeing significant increases.
The largest declines in aluminum imports were from Canada (-$1,413.8 mil ion, -20.1%), China
(-$1,277.9 mil ion, -69.1%), Russia (-$1,237.8 mil ion, -75.8%), and the United Arab Emirates (-
$595.3 mil ion, -42.8%). Aluminum imports increased by value from Turkey (+$114.2 mil ion,
+227.2%), Saudi Arabia (+$112.4 mil ion, +75.9%), and South Korea (+$102.5 mil ion, +91.9%).
The countries with permanent exclusions from the tariffs accounted for 57.7% of U.S. steel
imports and 51.6% of U.S. aluminum imports in 2020.153

151 Data in this section from the U.S. Census Bureau accessed via T rade Data Monitor.
152 Figures include countries currently exempted from the Section 232 tariffs.
153 Countries with permanent tariff exemptions for steel include Brazil, South Korea, Argentina, Australia, Canada and
Mexico. Countries with permanent tariff exemptions for aluminum include Argentina, Australia, Canada and Mexico.
Congressional Research Service
26

link to page 33 link to page 72 link to page 72

Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

Figure 5. U.S. Steel and Aluminum Imports

Source: CRS compiled from U.S. Census Bureau data, based on the HTS codes listed in the 2018 Section 232
proclamations.
Notes: Data includes U.S. imports from al trading partners, but does not include derivative products.
In February 2020, the Trump Administration declared that an increase in imports of certain
derivatives of steel and aluminum were undermining the purpose of the Section 232 steel and
aluminum actions.154 In response, President Trump proclaimed tariffs on selected derivatives
products, namely steel nails and aluminum wire, as wel as certain automobile bumpers and body
stampings for tractors made of steel and aluminum. An examination of U.S. trade data shows that
U.S. imports of both steel nails and aluminum wire increased from 2017 to 2019 (Figure 6).155
For data on country-level trade on imports of steel, aluminum, derivative products, see Appendix
D.

154 President T rump, Proclamation 9980 of January 24, 2020, “Adjusting Imports of Derivative Aluminum Articles and
Derivative Steel Articles Into the United States,” https://go.usa.gov/xHW5J.
155 Historic data on U.S. imports of bumpers (HT S 87081030) and body stampings for tractors (HT S 87082921) subject
to the tariffs are not available, because only a portion of trade under these product categories is covered by the tariff
actions. T he USIT C created two new 10HT S codes for the covered products and data are available f rom February 2020.
Congressional Research Service
27

link to page 34

Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

Figure 6. U.S. Imports of Select Derivative Products

Source: CRS compiled from U.S. Census Bureau data for HTS codes listed in Presidential Proclamation 9980
(January 24, 2020) on steel and aluminum derivative products.
Notes: U.S. imports, from al trading partners, of steel and aluminum derivative products identified in
Presidential Proclamation 9980. Steel nails consist of HTS codes: 73170030, 7317005503, 7317005505,
7317005507, 7317005560, 7317005580, and 7317006560, and aluminum wire consists of HTS 76141050,
76149020, 76149040, and 76149050. Bumpers (HTS 87081030) and body stampings for tractors (HTS
87082921) were also included in the new derivatives tariffs, but historical data for the portion of these product
categories covered by the tariffs are not available. As a result of an April 2021 Court of International Trade
(CIT) decision invalidating President Trump’s expansion of the Section 232 tariffs to cover certain steel-
derivative products, CBP could potential y refund duties that companies paid on the import of such products.
Retaliatory Tariffs
As noted above, several major U.S. trading partners who are chal enging the Section 232 actions
on steel and aluminum in the WTO are imposing retaliatory tariffs (see Figure 7).156 These tariffs
are currently in effect on approximately $7.2 bil ion of U.S. annual exports (2020 value).157 The
scale and scope of annual U.S. exports targeted for retaliation declined significantly in 2019 when
Canada and Mexico withdrew their retaliation (covering U.S. exports of $14.1 bil ion in 2019)

156 Products targeted by retaliatory tariffs were identified in countries’ World T rade Organization notifications (China
(G/L/1218, March 29, 2018); India (G/L/1237/Rev 1, June 13, 2018); EU (G/L/1237, May 18, 2018); T urkey
(G/L/1242/Supplement 2, May 22, 2019); Russia (G/L/1241, May 22, 2018), and in the notices published by the EU,
Russia, India, and the UK on their own government websites. EU: European Commission, “Commission Implementing
Regulation (EU) 2018/886,” Official Journal of the European Union, June 20, 2018, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX%3A32018R0886 ;’ Russia: Russian Federation, “ Approval of rates of imp ort
duties in respect to certain goods from the United States,” Decision no. 788, July 6, 2018,
http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001201807060023; India: Ministry of Finance (India), Notification
no. 17, June 15, 2019, https://www.cbic.gov.in/resources//htdocs-cbec/customs/cs-act/notifications/notfns-2019/cs-
tarr2019/cs17-2019.pdf; United Kingdom: Department of International T rade (UK), “ UK Announces New Approach
on US T ariffs,” December 8, 2020, press release, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-announces-new-approach-
on-us-tariffs.
157 U.S. exports are estimated using partner country import data in order to match trade values with retaliatory tariff
lists.
Congressional Research Service
28

link to page 33

Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

following the Trump Administration’s decision to exempt both countries from Section 232 steel
and aluminum duties. In 2020, the EU slightly expanded its retaliation (covering additional U.S.
exports of $31.7 mil ion), in response to the Trump Administration’s decision to expand the U.S.
steel and aluminum tariffs to derivative products.158 The EU also planned to enact a second stage
of retaliation from June 1, 2021, but suspended this action as part of U.S.-EU negotiations on
global overcapacity of both metals.159 If enacted, the second-stage EU tariffs would greatly
increase the EU’s retaliation, both in terms of the tariff levels (e.g., from 25% to 50% on
whiskies) and in terms of products covered (roughly double the current value of trade affected).160
Figure 7. Retaliatory Actions by U.S. Trading Partners, 2020

Source: CRS analysis of Trade Data Monitor trade data. Retaliatory tariff lists sourced from WTO notifications
and partner country notifications. See footnote 156 for complete sourcing.
Notes: U.S. exports approximated by using partner country import data. Steel and aluminum are among the top
exports facing retaliation by several U.S. trading partners as highlighted above. EU refers to the European Union
and excludes the United Kingdom.
(1) The EU expanded its tariffs to additional products in May 2020 in response to new U.S. tariffs on steel and
aluminum derivative products.
(2) Turkey temporarily increased its retaliatory tariffs up to 140% in August 2018 in response to the Trump
Administration’s tariff increase on Turkish steel to 50%, but in May 2019 both countries withdrew the additional
increases.
(3) India’s retaliatory tariffs were first announced in June 2018, but were repeatedly postponed until June 2019.
(4) When the United Kingdom began its independent trade regime in January 2021, it maintained the Section 232
retaliation scheme previously implemented from 2018 as part of the EU.
(5) Russia published its list of retaliatory tariff rates and products on July 6, 2018. The tariffs appear to have gone
into effect within 30 days of the publication.

158 European Commission, Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/502, April 6, 2020, https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/T XT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32020R0502&from=EN.
159 European Commission, “Joint EU-US Statement on Addressing Global Steel and Aluminum Excess Capacity,” May
17, 2021, https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=2271.
160 See Annex II in European Commission, “Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/886,” Official Journal
of the European Union, June 20, 2018, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX%3A32018R0886 .
Congressional Research Service
29

link to page 11 Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

U.S. Steel and Aluminum Manufacturing and
Employment
As discussed earlier (see “Commerce Findings and Recommendations”), a stated goal of the
Trump Administration’s tariffs on metals was to spur U.S. producers of steel and aluminum to
operate at an average of 80% or more of their production capacity. Commerce’s Section 232
reports deemed this as necessary to sustain adequate profitability, to reopen idled capacity, and to
continue capital investment in both manufacturing sectors.161 Currently, domestic steel producers
operate at 80% or less of production capacity (it was 65.1% in 2020, 77.1% in 2019, and about
the same in 2018).162 Domestic producers of primary aluminum operated at an estimated 49% of
production capacity in 2020, a drop from about 60% of capacity in 2019, and 55% in 2018.163
Domestic Steel Manufacturing
U.S. raw steel production decreased to 72 mil ion metric tons in 2020, compared to
approximately 82 mil ion metric tons in 2017, the year before the Section 232 trade action took
effect.164 According to the USGS, nationwide in 2020 three companies operated large integrated
steel mil s in eleven locations—once the chief method of producing steel in the United States—
and 51 companies operated 98 minimil s, which use electric arc furnaces to melt raw materials
(primarily iron and recycled steel scrap metal) to produce steel in the United States.165 The
minimil sector has lower capital and energy costs and a largely nonunion workforce.166
An effect of the steel tariff is that U.S. hot-rolled band steel prices initial y rose, registering a 10-
year high of more than $1,000 per metric ton at the beginning of July 2018. Thereafter, the
domestic price of steel general y began dropping, averaging around $525 per metric ton in August
2020, which was lower than before the United States applied the steel tariff.167 One reason for this
initial drop was slowing global demand for steel products from major steel-using sectors, such as
automotive, thus lessening the effect of the steel tariff. The COVID-19 pandemic has led to
temporary production shutdowns and idling of some steelmaking furnaces in the United States.168
The resulting supply-demand imbalance for steel has pushed current prices in the United States to
the highest level since 2017. According to the steel pricing website, Steelbenchmarker, hot-rolled
band steel in the United States sold at an average of $1,490 per metric ton in April 2021 as
compared with an average of about $700 per metric ton in March 2017.169 Analysts at IHSMarkit,

161 Steel Report, p. 4, and Aluminum Report, p. 107.
162 T he U.S. Federal Reserve Board publishes industrial production and capacity utilization data by industry, accessed
March 17, 2021, https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/G17/default.htm .
163 U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), Mineral Commodity Summary, Aluminum, February 2019, January 2020, and
January 2021, https://www.usgs.gov/centers/nmic/aluminum-statistics-and-information.
164 USGS, Mineral Commodity Summary, Iron and Steel, January 2021 and February 2019,
https://www.usgs.gov/centers/nmic/iron-and-steel-statistics-and-information.
165 Ibid.
166 Matthew Miller and Wilson Ko, Metals and Mining, CFRA, January 2021, pp. 19-20.
167 World Steel Dynamics, Steelbenchmarker: Price History, Tables and Charts, March 8, 2021,
http://steelbenchmarker.com/files/history.pdf.
168 Fabien Mercier, Valentina Burrai, and T omohiro Hiijkata, Steel Market Developments Q4 2020, OECD, 2020, pp.
52-3, https://www.oecd.org/industry/ind/steel-market -developments-Q4-2020.pdf.
169 World Steel Dynamics, Steelbenchmarker: Price History, Tables and Charts, March 8, 2021,
http://steelbenchmarker.com/files/history.pdf.
Congressional Research Service
30

link to page 37 link to page 21 Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

an industry research firm, attributed the rising price to idle capacity as demand rose; they also
predict that as capacity that sat idle in 2020 restarts, supply should improve and prices should
fal .170
U.S. downstream industries that use steel to manufacture products have had to contend, at least
for a time, with higher costs of inputs to production. Any domestic price increases may put U.S.
exporters of products made of steel at a disadvantage as they compete against foreign rivals who
may pay a lower price for steel in the global market when buying materials for production. In
March 2021, with U.S. prices for hot-rolled band steel 36% above Europe and 106% above
mainland China, producers may prefer purchasing imported steel even with the additional 25%
tariff.171
The effect of tariffs on steel manufacturing jobs is difficult to measure. U.S. steelmakers directly
employed 137,200 workers in 2020 (see Figure 8), accounting for 1.1% of the nation’s 12.2
mil ion factory jobs. Steel manufacturers added a total of 8,500 jobs in 2018 and 2019, up 6.2%
from 2017. In 2020, the number of steel manufacturing jobs in the United States shrank 6% from
the previous year.172 Thus, overal employment at steel mil s is little changed from three years
ago. The U.S. government expects steel industry employment to fal about 7% from 2019 to
2029.173 What is not yet known and difficult to assess is the employment effect of increased input
costs on other U.S. manufacturing industries that use steel intensively, such as manufacturers of
automobiles and parts, household appliances, and farm machinery. The possible effects of the
steel and aluminum tariffs on the automotive supply chain are discussed in the section
“Automobiles and Parts.”Beyond the various U.S. tariff actions over the years meant to protect
the industry from foreign competition, employment in the steel industry has been affected by new
technology, particularly the increased use of electric arc furnaces to make steel, which has
reduced the demand for workers.174 According to American Iron and Steel Institute (AISI), the
number of labor hours needed to produce one finished ton of steel has fal en 81% since 1980,
from 10.1 to 1.9 in 2019.175 As a result, even a significant increase in domestic steel production is
likely to result in a relatively smal number of additional jobs. In the past two years, a few steel
plant expansions have been realized or announced, and some blast furnaces have reopened.176 In
April 2021, U.S. Steel announced it was canceling a large industrial investment to modernize its
operations in western Pennsylvania.177 As of May 2021, the company has not said whether it

170 IHS Markit, Steel Markets in Turmoil, with Record Prices and Rationing, March 16, 2021,
https://connect.ihsmarkit.com/Document/Show/phoenix/3919638.
171 World Steel Dynamics, Steelbenchmarker: Price History, Tables and Charts, March 8, 2021,
http://steelbenchmarker.com/files/history.pdf.
172 Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), Current Employment Statistics (CES), Iron and Steel Mills (NAICS 3311) and
Steel Products (NAICS 3312), accessed March 8, 2021, https://www.bls.gov/ces/.
173 BLS, Employment and Output by Industry, T able 2.7, September 1, 2020, https://www.bls.gov/emp/tables/industry-
employment -and-output.htm.
174 See CRS In Focus IF10902, Trade Actions and U.S. Steel Manufacturing, for a related discussion on the domestic
steel indust ry.
175 American Iron and Steel Institute (AISI), 2019 Annual Statistical Report (ASR), August 12, 2020, p.15,
https://www.steel.org/2020/08/2019-statistical-report/.
176 Joseph S. Pete, “U.S. Steel Restarts Blast Furnace #4 at Gary Works as Conditions Recover,” NWITIMES,
December 1, 2020 Updated March 15, 2021, https://www.nwitimes.com/business/local/u-s-steel-restarts-blast-furnace-
4-at-gary-works-as-conditions-recover/article_61b32de8-143e-5cf7-9eef-0d9a7cada5dd.html.
177 U.S. Steel is an American integrated steel producer headquartered in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. T he company has
production operations in North America and Europe. David Burritt, Christie Breves, and Rich Fruehauf, First Quarter
2021 Earnings Call, U.S. Steel, April 30, 2021, p. 10, https://investors.ussteel.com/events-and-
Congressional Research Service
31

Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

plans to bring back furnaces idled during the pandemic or to add more workers.178 In contrast,
some steelmakers, such as Nucor, are expanding or are constructing new facilities.179
Figure 8. Steel and Aluminum Manufacturing Employment

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Employment Survey for North American Industry Classification
System (NAICS) 3311 (iron and steel mil s), 3312 (steel products), and NAICS 3313 (aluminum).
Domestic Aluminum Manufacturing
Domestic production of primary aluminum has risen over the past three years, reaching 1.0
mil ion metric tons in 2020, up from 741,000 metric tons in 2017, which was the lowest level
since 1951. 180 At the end of 2020, three companies operated six primary aluminum smelters in
the United States, compared with five companies that operated nine primary aluminum smelters
in 2010.181 In April 2020, Alcoa, the largest domestic producer, announced that it would curtail its
Intalco aluminum smelting facility in Ferndale, WA, which reduced U.S. production of primary
aluminum by 230,000 metric tons.182 The action suggests that the 10% tariff has not been enough
of a factor to al ow Alcoa to maintain its current domestic capacity or to reopen curtailed
capacity. Century Aluminum, the main proponent of the tariff and chiefly a domestic producer,
has restarted some of its U.S. production capacity since the imposition of the tariff, but it has not
led to a substantial rebuild of its domestic production of primary aluminum.183

presentations/default.aspx.
178 Joe Deaux, “Biden's Rust Belt Revival Plan Risks Luring More Foreign Steel,” Chicago Tribune, April 2, 2021,
https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct -biz-biden-infrastructure-steelmakers-20210402-
e5nj64xcvfecbnz2uyzy7ae43y-story.html.
179 As one example, AK Steel’s plant in Ashland, KY, closed permanently at the end of 2019. See, AK Steel, 2019
Annual Report, Form-10K, Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2019, p. 29. As another example, Nucor plans to build a
new plate mill in Brandenburg, KY, which it expects to complete in late 2022. See, Nucor, 2020 Annual Report, Form-
10K, Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2020, February 26, 2021, pp. 3 and 7, https://www.nucor.com/reports-filings/#.
180 USGS, Mineral Commodity Summary, Aluminum, January 2011 and January 2021,
https://www.usgs.gov/centers/nmic/aluminum-statistics-and-information.
181 Ibid.
182 Alcoa, 2020 Annual Report, Form 10-K, For the Year Ended December 31, 2020, February 25, 2021, p. 39,
https://investors.alcoa.com/sec-filings/default.aspx.
183 Century Aluminum, 2020 Annual Report, Form 10-K, For the Year Ended December 31, 2020, March 4, 2021, pp.
Congressional Research Service
32

link to page 37 Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

U.S. production of aluminum accounted for a relative smal fraction of the world’s primary
aluminum production at 1.5% in 2020, whereas China constituted more than half.184 A prominent
source of imported aluminum for the United States is Canada, which was exempted from the
aluminum tariff after negotiations in mid-May 2019.185 As discussed earlier, Argentina, Australia,
and Mexico also gained exemptions from the 10% tariff as are individual product imports that
receive a product exclusion from Commerce.
One aim of the 10% tariff was to raise the price of imported aluminum as a way to encourage
domestic manufacturers to restart idled capacity and increase hiring. In 2020, the average spot
price of primary aluminum ingot produced in the United States was $1,976 per metric ton, or 16%
higher than the London price (the global price of aluminum).186
Aluminum manufacturers directly employed 56,900 workers in 2020, 700 fewer than in 2017, and
shrinking by 2,200 jobs from 2015 (see Figure 8).187 Similar to the trend in steelmaking, the U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) expects employment in aluminum manufacturing to further
shrink, fal ing 7% by 2029.188 A reason for this is that domestic smelting of aluminum from
bauxite ore, which requires large amounts of electricity, has been in long-term decline for
multiple reasons. Secondary aluminum produced from recycled scrap melted in a smelter now
accounts for the majority of domestic aluminum production.189 Secondary aluminum production,
which has been fairly steady over the past two decades, accounted for three-fourths of U.S.
aluminum production in 2020, and the United States was the world’s second largest producer of
secondary aluminum after China.190 Imports of secondary unwrought aluminum are not covered
by the Section 232 aluminum trade action.191
Another development affecting aluminum is the implementation by the Department of
Commerce’s International Trade Administration (ITA) of the aluminum import monitoring and
analysis (AIM) system, “to track imports of aluminum products and provide an early warning
system for import surges.”192 The aluminum program is similar to the import monitoring and
analysis system for steel administered by ITA’s Enforcement and Compliance unit.193 The AIM
system is set to launch in June 2021, and has garnered the support of several Members.194 Both

1-2, https://centuryaluminum.com/investors/filings-and-financials/annual-reports-and-proxy/default.aspx.
184 USGS, Mineral Commodity Summary, Aluminum, January 2021.
185 T he Section 232 U.S. aluminum tariffs on Canada and Mexico applied from June 1, 2018 to May 19, 2019. On
August 6, 2020, President T rump re-imposed the tariff on some aluminum imports from Canada and then issued a
proclamation lifting the tariffs in October 27, 2020 retroactive to September 1, 2020.
186 USGS, Aluminum Mineral Industry Surveys, T able 6, December 2020.
187 (BLS), Current Employment Statistics (CES), Alumina and aluminum production (NAICS 3313), accessed March 8,
2021, https://www.bls.gov/ces/.
188 BLS, Employment and Output by Industry, T able 2.7, September 1, 2020.
189 See CRS In Focus IF11787, U.S. Aluminum Manufacturing: National Security and Tariffs, for a related discussion
on the domestic aluminum industry.
190 Secondary aluminum can be substituted for primary aluminum in most uses, although primary aluminum is favored
in some applications, such as electronics or aerospace manufacturing.
191 Section 232 trade action includes certain semi-finished wrought aluminum products, such as bars, rods, foil, and
wire, which can be manufactured using primary aluminum, secondary aluminum, or a combination of the two.
192 See Aluminum Import Monitoring and Analysis (AIM) System, https://www.trade.gov/updates-aluminum-import-
licensing.
193 See Steel Import Monitoring and Analysis (SIMA) System, https://enforcement.trade.gov/steel/license/index.html.
194 Letter to House Appropriations Committee from Representatives Bucschon and Stevens, “ Support the Aluminum
Import Monitoring (AIM) System.”
Congressional Research Service
33

Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

the American Primary Aluminum Association (APAA), a group representing two chiefly primary
aluminum producers Century and Magnitude 7 Metals, and the Aluminum Association, the
industry’s broadest trade group representing Alcoa and others in the industry’s value chain,
support the expeditious launch and implementation of AIM.195
Global Production Trends
Tariffs to protect the domestic steel industry do not address the underlying and longstanding issue
of global overcapacity. The steel committee of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) forecasts global steel overcapacity of 703.8 mil ion metric tons in 2020, up
24% from 2019.196 Although China is the world’s largest steel producer, accounting for roughly
55% of global production in 2020,197 relatively little Chinese steel enters the U.S. market directly,
due to extensive U.S. AD/CVD duties, but the large amount of Chinese production depresses
prices global y. Between 2019 and 2023, China could add 208.57 mil ion metric tons per year of
new crude steel capacity, with closures totaling 170.92 mil ion metric tons per annum over the
same period, according to S&P Global Platts. Platts’ estimate suggests China’s net crude steel
capacity may expand by 37.65 mil ion metric tons a year through 2023.198
USTR noted China’s government’s role in excess capacity in its annual report stating:
In manufacturing industries such as steel and aluminum, China’s economic planners have
contributed to massive excess capacity in China through various government support
measures. For steel, the resulting over-production has distorted global markets, harming
U.S. manufacturers and workers in both the U.S. market and third country markets, where
U.S. exports compete with Chinese exports….
Excess capacity in China hurts various U.S. industries and workers not only through direct
exports from China to the United States, but also through its impact on global prices and
supply, which makes it difficult for competitive manufacturers throughout the world to
remain viable.199
In March 2021, China’s National Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry of
Industry and Information Technology published a notice it wil analyze steel capacity reduction
that “wil focus on the inspection of the implementation of steel capacity reduction work and the
implementation of rectification in al relevant regions since 2016.”200 It is not clear if the report or
analysis wil be made public or what specific policy changes or actions China may take as a
result. In addition, according to a press report, Chinese authorities have begun employing various
tactics to rein in steel production, such as imposing environmental fines on older polluting

195 See American Primary Aluminum Association, “U.S. Primary Aluminum Industry Lauds Import Monitoring
Program; Calls for Immediate Action to Address Current Canadian Surge,” press release, May 2020,
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/us-primary-aluminum-industry-lauds-import -monitoring-program-calls-
for-immediate-action-to-address-current -canadian-surge-301051925.html and T he Aluminum Association, “ Newly
Launched Aluminum Import Monitoring Program Critical to T rade Enforcement,” press release, January 4, 2021,
https://www.aluminum.org/news/newly-launched-aluminum-import -monitoring-program-critical-trade-enforcement.
196 Fabien Mercier, Valentina Burrai, and T omohiro Hiijkata, Steel Market Developments Q4 2020, OECD, 2020, p. 51,
https://www.oecd.org/industry/ind/steel-market -developments-Q4-2020.pdf.
197 USGS, Mineral Commodity Summary, Iron and Steel, January 2021.
198 Matthew Miller and Wilson Ko, Metals and Mining, CFRA, January 2021, p. 14.
199 U.S. T rade Representative, 2021 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, March 2021, p. 100,
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/reports/2021/2021NTE.pdf.
200 Brett Fortnam, “China orders analysis, reduction of crude steel production,” Inside U.S. Trade, April 2, 2021.
Congressional Research Service
34

link to page 31 Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

factories, though it is unclear how effective they wil be in lowering overal production and
excess capacity.201
No OECD or other multinational forum has been established to monitor global aluminum
overcapacity, though aluminum industry groups have cal ed for such a forum.202 Although China
accounted for more than half of the world’s primary aluminum production in 2020, it does not
export aluminum in commodity form to the United States.203 China ships semi-finished aluminum
such as bars, rods, and wire to the United States. These imports are subject to the Section 232
tariffs.204 APAA is the main proponent of the Section 232 tariffs.205 The Aluminum Association
opposes the Section 232 tariff program, instead favoring a country-specific approach.206
Metals imports should be put in the context of U.S. production. In 2020, the United States
produced more than three times the amount of steel it imported.207 According to Commerce,
import penetration—the share of U.S. demand met by steel imports—averaged 24.5% in 2019,
down from 28.3% in 2018, from 22.7% in 2009.208 Some segments of the domestic steel industry,
such as slab converters, import a sizable share of their semi-finished feedstock from foreign
suppliers, totaling 5.1 mil ion tons in 2020.209 In the primary aluminum market, U.S. net import
reliance fel to 13% in 2020 from 53% in 2016, according to USGS.210 Most U.S. foreign trade in
steel and aluminum is with Canada (see “Steel and Aluminum Trade”).
International Efforts to Address Overcapacity
OECD analysis has found that ongoing global steel overcapacity and excess production are
largely caused by government intervention, subsidization, and other market-distorting practices,
although these are not the only factors.211 Other reasons for excess capacity include cyclical
market downturns. The situation is similar in the aluminum industry, where government financial
support for large aluminum stockpiles has delayed the response to lower demand.
Previous U.S. Administrations worked to address the issue of steel overcapacity. President George
W. Bush, for example, initiated international discussions on global capacity reduction and
improved trade disciplines in the steel industry as part of his general steel announcement of

201 T homas Hale and Christian Shepherd, “ China struggles to rein in steel production,” The Financial Times, April 12,
2021.
202 OECD, “Measuring Distortions in International Markets: the Aluminum Value Chain,” OECD Trade Policy Papers,
January 8, 2019, p. 48, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/trade/measuring-distortions-in-international-markets-the-
aluminium-value-chain_c82911ab-en.
203 USGS, Mineral Commodity Summaries, Aluminum, January 2021, p. 2.
204 CRS In Focus IF11787, U.S. Aluminum Manufacturing: National Security and Tariffs.
205 APAA, “APAA Congratulates President -Elect Biden and Calls for the Preservation of the Section 232 Aluminum
T ariffs,” press release, January 13, 2021, https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/apaa-congratulates-president-
elect-biden-and-calls-for-the-preservation-of-the-section-232-aluminum-tariffs-301207595.html.
206 T he Aluminum Association, “Aluminum Association Calls for T arget ed, Multilateral Approach to Address
Aluminum Subsidies and Overcapacity,” press release, January 14, 2021, https://www.aluminum.org/news/aluminum-
association-calls-targeted-multilateral-approach-address-aluminum-subsidies-and.
207 USGS, Mineral Commodity Summaries, Iron and Steel, January 2021.
208 DOC, IT A, Steel Imports Report: United States, Global Steel T rade Monitor, May 2020, p. 5.
209 DOC, IT A, Enforcement & Compliance, U.S. Steel Import Monitor, https://www.trade.gov/data-visualization/sima-
import -monitor.
210 USGS, Mineral Commodity Summaries, Aluminum, January 2021.
211 OECD, “Excess Capacity in the Global Steel Industry: T he Current Situation and Ways Forward,” 2015, p. 4,
https://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/excess-capacity-in-the-global-steel-industry.pdf.
Congressional Research Service
35

Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

2001.212 Other governments agreed to join the Bush Administration in discussing overcapacity
and trade issues at the OECD in a process that started in mid-2001. The industrial, steel-
producing members of the OECD were joined by major non-OECD steel producers, such as
India, Russia, and, during later stages of the talks, China. Negotiations were suspended
indefinitely in 2004, and by 2005, the OECD had abandoned this effort to negotiate an agreement
among al major steel-producing countries to ban domestic subsidies for steel mil s.
The Obama Administration also participated in international efforts to curb steel imports,
including the launch of the G-20 Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity in 2016, another venue
that sought to address the chal enges of excess capacity in steel worldwide.213 In December 2016,
the G-20 convened its first meeting of more than 30 economies—al G-20 members plus
interested OECD members—as a global platform to discuss steel issues among the world’s major
producers.214 The same year, as part of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (SE&D)
established in 2009, the Obama Administration agreed to address excess steel production and also
to communicate and exchange information on surplus production in the aluminum sector.215
In September 2018, the OECD Forum agreed on a process to identify and remove subsidies and
take other measures to reduce the global steel overcapacity. The OECD issued a consensus report
outlining six principles and specific policy recommendations to address excess steel capacity.216
The former USTR under the Trump Administration, while supportive of the recommendations,
questioned the Forum’s ability to pursue effective implementation and did not rule out unilateral
action.217 Some Members have expressed support of U.S. participation in the Forum and other
global coalitions to address overcapacity.218 Despite cal s from international steel industry
associations and most Forum members, including the United States, the G-20 was unable to
overcome objections by China to extend the Forum’s mandate past November 2019.219 However,
the Chair noted that a large majority of members agreed to continue and USTR stated that it “wil
continue to work with like-minded partners to seek long-term solutions” to global overcapacity.220
During the OECD Steel Committee’s latest meeting in September 2020, the parties discussed the
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and countries’ related trade actions on steel trade flows.221
The aluminum industry argues it is also suffering because of China’s excess production of
primary aluminum. According to the aluminum associations of Japan, Europe, Canada, and the
United States, global overcapacity amounted to 11 mil ion metric tons in 2017. A June 2019

212 President George W. Bush, Statement by the President Regarding a Multilateral Initiative on Steel, June 5, 2001,
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010605-4.html.
213 T he White House, Fact Sheet: T he 2016 G-20 Summit in Hangzhou, China, September 5, 2016,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/09/05/fact-sheet-2016-g-20-summit-hangzhou-china.
214 European Commission, Steel: Commission Welcomes New Global Forum to Tackle Root Causes of Overcapacity,
December 16, 2016, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP -16-4435_en.pdf.
215 U.S. Department of the T reasury, 2016 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue U.S.-Fact Sheet, June 7, 2016,
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0485.aspx.
216 Global Forum on Excess Steel Capacity, Ministerial Report, September 20, 2018.
217 T he U.S. T rade Representative, “UST R Statement on Meeting of the Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity,”
UST R Press Releases, September 2018.
218 Senators Portman, Brown, Braun, and Casey, “Portman, Brown, Braun, Casey Urge UST R to Prioritize Extension of
the Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity,” October 24, 2019.
219 G-20 Chair, Japanese Ministry of Economy, “T rade and Industry, Ministerial Meeting on the Global Forum on Steel
Excess Capacity (GFSEC) Held,” October 26, 2019, https://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2019/1026_001.html.
220 UST R, “ UST R Statement on Meeting of the Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity,” October 26, 2019.
221 http://www.oecd.org/industry/ind/88th-session-of-the-steel-committee.htm.
Congressional Research Service
36

Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

OECD report found that subsidies, especial y in China and the countries of the Gulf Cooperation
Council, and other market-distorting practices impact global competition in the aluminum
industry.222As noted, the U.S. Aluminum Association and some of its international counterparts
seek to establish a global forum to address aluminum excess capacity. In an April 2021 policy
document, A Trade Policy Framework for the U.S. Aluminum Industry, the Aluminum
Association, among other policy recommendations, urged the Biden Administration to engage in
multilateral efforts to address unfair industrial policies, especial y in China, as it views
overcapacity in the global aluminum market as a major chal enge.223
The Trump Administration’s Section 232 actions have led multiple U.S. trading partners, such as
the EU, the UK, and Canada, to initiate their own safeguard investigations and quota restrictions
to prevent dumping of steel and aluminum exports and protect domestic industries. Unlike the
OECD efforts, the individual country safeguard actions are uncoordinated.
In addition to the Section 232 action, the Trump Administration pursued joint action on industrial
overcapacity in other forums. The then-USTR met with EU and Japanese counterparts in May
2018, to address “nonmarket-oriented policies and practices that lead to severe overcapacity,
create unfair competitive conditions for our workers and businesses, hinder the development and
use of innovative technologies, and undermine the proper functioning of international trade.”224
The parties also agreed to cooperate on their concerns with third parties’ technology transfer
policies and practices225 and issued a joint statement containing a list of factors that identify if
market conditions for competition exist.226 In January 2020, the three parties issued a statement
with specific recommendations and proposed reforms to strengthen the existing WTO Agreement
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM) rules.227 Some analysts suggested that the
UK might join the trilateral effort. China opposes several of the proposed ASCM reforms.228 With
the Biden Administration’s emphasis on working with al ies to address issues with China, it is
expected to continue with the trilateral efforts.229
The G-7 Trade Ministers also agreed to “discuss the impact market-distorting practices, such as
harmful industrial subsidies, including those causing excess capacity in some sectors, are having
on our economies and chart a way to address these collectively.”230
In addition, in November 2018, the United States, the EU, Japan, Argentina, and Costa Rica put
forward a joint proposal in the WTO to increase transparency, proposing incentives for

222 OECD (2019), “Measuring Distortions in International Markets: the Aluminum Value Chain”, OECD Trade Policy
Papers, No. 218, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/c82911ab-en.
223 T he Aluminum Association, A Trade Policy Framework for the U.S. Aluminum Industry, April 6, 2021, p. 2,
https://www.aluminum.org/sites/default/files/T AA_T rade%20Framework -FINAL.pdf.
224 U.S. T rade Representative, “Joint Statement on T rilateral Meeting of the T rade Ministers of the United States,
Japan, and the European Union,” May 2018.
225 Ibid, Annex Statement 2, Joint Statement on T echnology T ransfer Policies and Practices.
226 Ibid, Annex Statement 3, Joint Statement on Market Oriented Conditions.
227 U.S. T rade Representative, “Joint Statement on T rilateral Meeting of the T rade Ministers of Japan, the United States
and the European Union,” January 14, 2020.
228 Statement by Zhang Xiangchen, China's Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the WTO, July 15, 2020.
229 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Finance, Hearing to Consider the Nomination of Katherine C. Tai, of the
District of Colum bia, to be United States Trade Representative, with the rank of Am bassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary, 117th Cong., February 25, 2021.
230 UK Government, “ G7 T rade Ministers’ Meeting – Chair’s Statement,” March 31, 2021,
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/g7-trade-ministers-meeting-chairs-statement .
Congressional Research Service
37

Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

compliance or penalties for noncompliance with WTO notification reporting requirements
regarding subsidies.231
The Biden Administration may continue the efforts to pursue new subsidy and transparency rules
in the WTO. U.S. unilateral tariff actions, however, may limit other countries’ wil ingness to
participate or support U.S. reform proposals in multilateral forums. How the Biden
Administration decides to act on the Section 232 tariffs, whether to retain, withdraw or amend
them, may influence the actions and attitudes of individual U.S. trading partners, potential y
impacting the likelihood for coordinated action, whether at the trilateral or multilateral level.
Preparations for the planned WTO November 2021 Ministerial meeting may provide an
opportunity to revisit debate on the proposed WTO reforms.
Policy and Economic Issues
Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum imports into the United States raise a number of issues
for Congress. The economic repercussions of U.S. and foreign actions may be felt not only by
domestic steel and aluminum producers, but by downstream manufacturers or other industries
targeted for retaliation, and consumers. Some companies have chal enged President Trump’s
actions through domestic litigation,232 and may also seek alternative markets for their own
products to avoid U.S. tariffs.
The response by other countries can have implications for the U.S. economy and multilateral
world trading system. Also, other countries may be hesitant in the future to cooperate with the
United States to address broader global issues, including steel and aluminum overcapacity, if their
exports are subject to U.S. tariffs. U.S. trading partners’ responses to Section 232 actions have
varied based on the country’s relationship with the United States. Some countries are pursuing
direct negotiations, while keeping other countermeasures in reserve, and raising actions at the
WTO (see below). Others have proposed or pursued retaliation with their own tariffs.
Domestic Court Challenges
President Trump’s actions under Section 232 resulted in legal chal enges in the U.S. domestic
court system. Specifical y, the Section 232 actions on steel and aluminum have been chal enged
in cases before the U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT). In one case, Severstal Export GmbH,
a U.S. subsidiary of a Russian steel producer, sought a preliminary injunction from the CIT to
prevent the United States from collecting the import tariffs on certain steel products.233 The
company and its Swiss affiliate argued that the President acted outside of the authority delegated
by Congress because the tariffs were not truly imposed for national security purposes.234 The
court denied the motion, determining that the plaintiffs were unlikely to prevail on the merits of
their chal enge.235 According to the case docket, the parties agreed to dismiss the case in May
2018.

231 “Procedures to Enhance T ransparency and Strengthen Notification Requirements Under WT O Agreements,”
JOB/GC/204, November 1, 2018.
232 See, e.g., Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, Inc. v. United States, No. 18-00152 (Ct. Int’l T rade filed June 27, 2018); Severstal
Exp. GmbH v. United States, No. 18-00057 (Ct. Int’l T rade May 3, 2018) (order granting joint stipulation of dismissal).
233 See Severstal Export GmbH v. United States, No. 18-00057, 2018 WL 1705298, at *2 (Ct. of Int’l T rade April 5,
2018).
234 See ibid. at *9.
235 See ibid. at *10. Another case filed in December 2019 against the steel and aluminum tariffs challenges the
Congressional Research Service
38

Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

In another case, which was heard by a three-judge panel of the CIT, the American Institute for
International Steel (AIIS), a trade association, chal enged the constitutionality of Congress ’s
delegation of authority to the President under Section 232.236 The plaintiffs argued that “Congress
created an unconstitutional regime in section 232, in which there are essential y no limits or
guidelines on the trigger or the remedies available to the President, and no alternative protections
to assure that the President stays within the law, instead of making the law himself.”237
On March 25, 2019, the CIT issued an opinion rejecting the plaintiffs’ arguments that Congress
delegated too much of its legislative power to the President in Section 232 in violation of the
Constitution’s separation of powers established.238 In granting the United States’ motion for
judgment on the pleadings, the CIT held that it was bound by a 1976 Supreme Court precedent
determining that Section 232 did not amount to an unconstitutional delegation because it
established an “intel igible principle” to guide presidential action.239 One member of the three-
judge panel, Judge Katzmann, wrote separately to express his significant concerns about the
ruling without openly dissenting.240 Judge Katzmann wrote that he was bound to follow Supreme
Court precedent and uphold the delegation, but questioned whether the nondelegation doctrine
retained any significant meaning if a delegation as broad as that in Section 232 was
permissible.241 On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit)
affirmed the CIT’s decision, agreeing that the case was controlled by the Supreme Court
precedent that “declare[d] section 232 not to violate the nondelegation doctrine.”242 AIIS asked
the Supreme Court to review the Federal Circuit’s decision, but in June 2020, the Court declined
to hear the case, denying AIIS’s petition for a writ of certiorari.243
Later, the CIT issued a preliminary decision in a case in which U.S. importers of Turkish steel
al eged that President Trump’s increase of the Section 232 steel tariffs from 25% to 50% on U.S.
imports from Turkey did not have a sufficient national security rationale, did not follow statutory
procedural mandates, and violated the plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment Due Process rights because the
action “creates an arbitrary distinction between importers of steel products from Turkey and
importers of steel products from al other sources.”244 In a decision denying the United States’
motion to dismiss the company’s complaint in Transpacific Steel LLC v. United States, the CIT

executive branch’s alleged failure to meet Section 232’s statutory requirements, and its purportedly overbroad
interpretation of “threat to national security” in Section 232. Complaint at 14-17, Universal Steel Prods., Inc. v. United
States, No. 19-00209 (Ct. Int’l T rade Dec. 3, 2019). In February 2021, the court granted the government’s motion for
judgment on the pleadings, holding that: (1) the Section 232 steel report was not a final agency action subject to
judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act; (2) the President’s determination that the imports threatened
national security was unreviewable; and (3) the duration of the tariffs did not violate Section 232. Opinion and Order at
9-28, Universal Steel Prods., Inc. v. United States, No. 19 -00209 (Ct. Int’l T rade Feb. 4, 2021).
236 Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, Inc. v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 3d 1335, 1337 (Ct. Int’l T rade 2019), aff’d, No. 2019-
1727, 2020 WL 967925 (Fed. Cir. February 28, 2020).
237 Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, at 3 –4, Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, Inc. v.
United States, No. 18-00152 (Ct. Int’l T rade July 19, 2018).
238 Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, 376 F. Supp. 3d at 1344–45.
239 Ibid. at 1340–41 (citing Fed. Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 559 –60 (1976)).
240 Ibid. at 1345 (Katzmann, J., dubitante).
241 Ibid. at 1352.
242 Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, Inc. v. United States, No. 2019-1727, 2020 WL 967925, at *1 (Fed. Cir. February 28,
2020).
243 Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, Inc. v. United States, No. 19-1177, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 3353, at *1 (S. Ct. June 22, 2020).
See also Sarah Martinson, “ Steel Importers T ake National Security T ariff Fight T o Justices,” Law360, March 25, 2020.
244 Complaint at 1-3, T ranspacific Steel LLC v. United States, No.19-00009 (Ct. Int’l T rade January 17, 2019).
Congressional Research Service
39

Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

indicated that the President’s power to impose tariffs under Section 232, while broad, is not
unlimited.245 Specifical y, the court suggested that the President must closely adhere to the
procedural requirements of the statute when exercising such authority.246 The court also
determined that the company raised a plausible argument that the Executive violated
constitutional guarantees of equal protection protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause when imposing, without a rational basis, the additional steel tariffs only on imports from
Turkey.247 In a July 2020 opinion, the CIT ruled that the President violated Section 232’s
mandated procedures and the Fifth Amendment’s Equal Protection guarantees when issuing the
proclamation doubling the tariffs on steel imports from Turkey.248
The decision in Transpacific Steel indicates that courts might scrutinize whether the executive
branch has followed the proper procedures, including meeting statutory deadlines, when
exercising Section 232 authority.249 Presidential action that does not follow these statutory
procedures may be deemed in excess of the President’s authority.250
Companies have also had some success chal enging the government’s denial of an exclusion
request. U.S. importers have chal enged the Department of Commerce’s exclusion process for
Section 232 tariffs. In JSW Steel, Inc. v. United States, the plaintiff argued that Commerce’s
failure to grant the company’s products an exclusion from the steel tariffs violated the
Administrative Procedure Act. The company asserted that the Agency improperly determined the
U.S. market could furnish the products “in a sufficient quantity or quality on a timely basis to
replace the steel slab [the plaintiff] currently imports.”251 According to the case docket, on August
5, 2020, the CIT remanded the case to the Department of Commerce, instructing the agency to
(1) supplement the administrative record that it relied upon when denying the company’s
exclusion requests, and (2) to reconsider its decisions on those requests. In September 2020, the
federal government settled the case with JSW, agreeing to refund the duties paid on the items that
would have benefited from an approved exclusion request without admitting liability.252
Although plaintiffs have had some success in chal enging the denial of individual requests, in
March 2021, the CIT rejected a broad constitutional chal enge to the tariff exclusion process.253
The court held that the Department of Commerce could grant tariff exclusions on imports of a
particular metal product only to those companies that requested the exclusion without violating
the Uniformity Clause of the Constitution.254

245 T ranspacific Steel LLC v. United States, 415 F. Supp. 3d 1267, 1276 (Ct. of Int’l Trade 2019).
246 Ibid. at 1275–76.
247 Ibid. at 1270.
248 Opinion at 22, T ranspacific Steel LLC v. United States, No. 19-00009 (Ct. of Int’l Trade July 14, 2020).
249 See ibid. at 1276.
250 See ibid.
251 Complaint at 13-14, JSW Steel, Inc. v. United States, No. 19-00133 (Ct. Int’l T rade July 30, 2019).
252 Confidential Order, JSW Steel, Inc. v. United States, No. 19-00133 (Ct. Int’l Trade Sept. 21, 2020).
253 Opinion at 21, T hyssenkrupp Materials NA Inc. v. United States, No. 20 -00093 (Ct. Int’l T rade Mar. 10, 2021).
254 Id. T he court also dismissed the plaintiff’s claims that the exclusion process reflects an unlawful interpretation of the
President’s tariff proclamations. Id. T he Uniformity Clause requires that “all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be
uniform throughout the United States.” U.S. CONST. art I. § 8, cl. 1.
Congressional Research Service
40

Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

Proclamation Imposing Tariffs on Steel-Derivative Products
As noted, in a January 2020 proclamation, President Trump expanded the steel and aluminum
tariffs to cover derivative products (e.g., steel nails, tacks, drawing pins, and stranded wire).255 On
February 4, 2020, a U.S. importer of steel-derivative products sued the United States in the CIT,
seeking a temporary restraining order preventing CBP from collecting the additional duties.256
The company argued that the imposition of the tariffs failed to follow required statutory
procedures; occurred after the statutory deadline for action; and violated the company’s
constitutional rights, among other things.257 On February 13, 2020, with the consent of both
parties, a judge issued an order enjoining CBP from collecting the additional duties and requiring
the plaintiff-company to post a bond for the duties until the CIT reaches a final judgment on the
merits of the plaintiff’s complaint.258 In February 2021, the court dismissed al but one of the
company’s claims: that the presidential proclamation is invalid because it was issued after the
statutory deadline for action.259 In April 2021, the CIT granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment on this claim, determining that the untimely presidential proclamation was “invalid as
contrary to law.”260
WTO Cases
The U.S. imposition of tariffs on certain imports of steel and aluminum products,261 as wel as
Commerce’s exemption of certain WTO members’ products from such tariffs, may also have
implications for the United States under WTO agreements. As an example, on April 9, 2018,
China took the first step in chal enging the executive branch’s actions as violating U.S.
obligations under the WTO agreements (particularly the Agreement on Safeguards) by requesting
consultations with the United States.262 Under WTO dispute settlement rules, members must first
attempt to settle their disputes through consultations. If consultations fail, the member initiating a
dispute may request the establishment of a dispute settlement panel composed of trade experts to
determine whether a country has violated WTO rules.263 In October 2018, China requested the

255 Presidential Proclamation 9980 of January 24, 2020, Adjusting Imports of Derivative Aluminum Articles and
Derivative Steel Articles into the United States, 85 Federal Register 5281 (January 29, 2020).
256 Motion for T emporary Restraining Order at 1-6, PrimeSource Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. United States, No. 20-00032
(February 4, 2020).
257 Id.
258 Order at 1-3, PrimeSource Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. United States, No. 20-00032 (February 13, 2020).
259 PrimeSource Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. United States, 2021 WL 276338, *1 (Ct. Int’l T rade Jan. 27, 2021).
260 PrimeSource Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. United States, 2021 Ct. Intl. T rade LEXIS 36, *12-13 (Ct. Int’l T rade Apr. 5,
2021). Several other companies have also filed cases at the CIT challenging the President’s January 2020 Proclamation
imposing tariffs on steel- and aluminum- derivative products. See, e.g., Complaint at 19-25, J. Conrad Ltd. v. United
States, No. 20-00052 (Ct. Int’l T rade Mar. 2, 2020); Complaint at 17 -23, Aslanbas Nail & Wire Co. v. United States,
No. 20-00049 (Ct. Int’l Trade Feb. 26, 2020). In June 2020, the court denied the plaintiffs’ motions for temporary
restraining orders and preliminary injunctions against implementation of the proclamation in the J. Conrad case, stating
that the plaintiffs could not demonstrate the likelihood of irreparable harm from the proclamation. Slip op. at 2, J.
Conrad Ltd. V. United States, No. 20-00052 (Ct. Int’l T rade June 1, 2020).
261 For legal background on the tariff measures, see CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10097, UPDATE: Threats to National
Security Foiled? A Wrap Up of New Tariffs on Steel and Alum inum , by Brandon J. Murrill.
262 Request for Consultations by China, U.S.—Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminum Products, WT/DS/544/1 (Apr.
9, 2018) [hereinafter Request for Consultations]. T his report does not examine potential implications under other
international agreements to which the United States is a party, such as other U.S. free trade agreements.
263 WT O Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) arts. 3-6. A WT O
Member may appeal a panel’s report to the WT O Appellate Body, id. art. 17(1), however that Body stopped
Congressional Research Service
41

link to page 50 Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

formation of such a panel.264 Other WTO members have requested consultations with the United
States, or have joined existing requests, and panels have been composed to hear the cases (see
Figure 9).
In its request, China al eged that the U.S. tariff measures and exemptions are contrary to U.S.
obligations under several provisions of the GATT, the foundational WTO agreement that sets
forth binding rules on international trade in goods.265 In particular, China al eged that the
measures violate GATT Article II, which general y prohibits members from imposing duties on
imported goods in excess of upper limits to which they agreed in their Schedules of Concessions
and Commitments.266 It further al eged that Commerce’s granting of exemptions from the import
tariffs to some WTO member countries, but not to China, violates GATT Article I, which
obligates the United States to treat China’s goods no less favorably than the goods of other WTO
members (i.e., the so-cal ed most-favored-nation treatment principle).267 China also maintained
that the Section 232 tariff measures are “in substance” a safeguard measure intended to al eviate
injury to a domestic industry from increased quantities of imported steel that compete with
domestic steel, but that the United States did not make the proper findings and follow the proper
procedures for imposing such a measure, as required by the GATT and WTO Safeguards
Agreement.268
The United States has invoked the so-cal ed national security exception in GATT Article XXI in
defense of the steel and aluminum tariffs. GATT Article XXI states, in relevant part, that the
GATT269 wil not
be construed ... (b) to prevent any [member country] from taking any action wh ich it
considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests

functioning as of December 11, 2019, when it lost its quorum, see CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10385, The WTO’s
Appellate Body Loses Its Quorum: Is This the Beginning of the End for the “Rules-Based Trading System”?, by
Brandon J. Murrill. T he text of the DSU and other WT O agreements discussed in this report are available at
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/final_e.htm.
264 Items proposed for consideration at the next meeting of the Dispute Settlement Body, WT O/AIR/DSB/70, Oct. 19,
2018.
265 General Agreement on T ariffs and T rade 1994 (GAT T ) art. II.
266 GAT T Article II limits the charges that WT O Members can impose in connection with the import of products. It
provides that a WT O Member shall not impose “ordinary customs duties” in excess of the bound tariff rates set forth in
that Member’s Schedule of Concessions. It also bars “other duties and charges of any kind imposed in conn ection with
the importation” of products in excess of charges levied on the date of the tariff concession. A member’s schedule is a
list of specific commitments as to tariffs and other trade barriers. Goods Schedules: Mem bers’ Com m itm ents, WORLD
T RADE ORG, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/schedules_e/goods_schedules_e.htm. T he GAT T provides limited
ways in which WT O members may modify the bound tariff rates. E.g., GAT T art. XXVIII (establishing procedures for
negotiations among WT O members on changes to a member’s bound tariff rates in its schedules).
267 Request for Consultations at 2; GAT T art. I:1 (“With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on
or in connection with importation or exportation ..., and with respect to the method of levying such duties and charges,
and with respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation and exportation ... any advantage, favour,
privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country
shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all
other contracting parties.”). China also alleged that the measures violate GAT T Article X:3(a), arguing that the United
States “failed to administer its laws, regulations, decisions, and rulings in relation to the measures at issue in a uniform,
impartial and reasonable manner.”
268 Request for Consultations at 2.
269 As noted, China has also alleged that the United States’ imposition of steel and aluminum tariffs violated the WT O
Safeguards Agreement, which lacks an exception for national security interests. T his report does not analyze whether
the United States could invoke the GAT T ’s national security exception to justify a violation of the Safeguards
Agreement.
Congressional Research Service
42

Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which they are derived;
(ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such traffic in
other goods and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying
a military establishment; [or]
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations.
While some analysts argue that a WTO panel may evaluate whether a WTO member’s use of the
national security exception fal s within one of the three provisions listed above, historical y, the
United States has taken the position that this exception is self-judging—or, in other words, once a
WTO member has invoked the exception to justify a measure potential y inconsistent with its
WTO obligations, a WTO panel may not proceed to the merits of the dispute to evaluate whether
the WTO member’s use of the exception is proper.270 In the past, however, WTO members have
expressed concern that overuse of the exception wil undermine the world trading system because
countries might enact a multitude of protectionist measures under the guise of national security.271
In April 2019, a WTO panel interpreted the national security exception in Article XXI of the
GATT for the first time. In Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, the panel determined
that it had jurisdiction to review whether a member’s actions were justified under Article XXI’s
national security exception and whether the member satisfied the requirements for invoking the
exception.272 As of December 11, 2019, however, the WTO’s Appel ate Body lost its quorum of
three members necessary for the Body to decide appeals of WTO dispute settlement panel
decisions and issue final reports.273 Because of this, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) (i.e., the
committee composed of al WTO members that oversees the dispute settlement mechanism) can
no longer adopt panel reports in line with the WTO’s Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU).274 Consequently, unless WTO members agree to
consider unadopted dispute reports as final, the DSB cannot oversee the losing member’s
implementation of a panel ruling or authorize the prevailing member to engage in trade retaliation
if the losing member ignores the dispute panel’s recommendations. Thus, even if the United
States or one of its trading partners prevails in a dispute over the Section 232 or retaliatory tariffs,
there are significant doubts as to whether the ruling would be enforceable under WTO
procedures.
Prior to December 2019, if one of the WTO panels had rendered an adverse decision against the
United States, the United States would be expected to remove the tariffs, general y within a

270 See, e.g., Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on October 23, 2017,
¶ 4.9, WT /DSB/M/403 (Feb. 20, 2018) (noting that a U.S. representative, in commenting on the United Arab Emirates’
invocation of national security exceptions in a dispute with Qatar, had maintained that national security issues “ were
political and were not matters appropriate for adjudication in the WT O dispute settlement system”); GAT T Panel
Report, United States—Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua, ¶ 1.2, L/6053 (October 13, 1986) (noting the United
States’ argument that the national security exception in the GAT T “left it to each [GAT T party] to judge what actions it
considered necessary for the protection of its essential security interests” and that “[a] p anel could therefore not address
the validity of, nor the motivation for, the United States’ invocation of [the exception]”).
271 See, e.g., WT O Council for T rade in Goods, National Security Cited in Two Trade Concerns at Goods Council
Meeting, WORLD T RADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news17_e/good_10jul17_e.htm (June 30, 2017)
(discussing potential systemic risks to the world trading system from overuse of the national security exception).
272 Report of the Panel at ¶¶ 8.1(d)(i)-(iv), Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, WT /DS512/R (Apr. 5,
2019).
273 Alan H. Price, Real WT O Reform Now Possible With Demise of Appellate Body , BLOOMBERG LAW (Dec. 20,
2019). For more on this issue, see CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10385, The WTO’s Appellate Body Loses Its Quorum : Is
This the Beginning of the End for the “Rules-Based Trading System”?, by Brandon J. Murrill.
274 WT O Dispute Settlement Understanding art. 16, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dsu_e.htm#16.
Congressional Research Service
43

Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

reasonable period of time, or face the possibility of paying compensation to the complaining
member or be subject to certain countermeasures al owed under the rules.275 Such
countermeasures might include the complaining member imposing higher duties on imports of
selected products from the United States.276 Nonetheless, several trading partners have already
imposed retaliatory duties on selected U.S. exports without awaiting the outcome of a dispute
settlement proceeding.277
In turn, the United States has argued that unilateral imposition of tariffs in response to the U.S.
Section 232 measures cannot be justified under WTO rules.278 On July 16, 2018, the United States
filed its own WTO complaints over the retaliatory tariffs imposed by five countries (Canada,
China, the EU, Mexico, and Turkey) in response to U.S. actions; in late August 2018, it filed a
similar case against Russia;279 and in July 2019, it filed a similar case against India.280 Canada,
Mexico, and the United States withdrew their cases regarding the Section 232 tariffs and
corresponding retaliatory measures in May 2019 when the parties agreed to settle the disputes.281
Dispute settlement panels have been composed to hear the other cases, but, as noted, there are
questions about the viability of the WTO’s dispute settlement system because the Appel ate Body
has suspended its operations. According to the WTO’s website, WTO panels wil delay issuing
final reports in these disputes (and the original disputes brought against the United States) until
the second half of 2021 because of the global COVID-19 pandemic.

275 DSU arts. 21-22. Members whose measures are deemed inconsistent with its WT O obligations and unjustified under
one of the GAT T exceptions are expected to implement the panel and/or Appellate Body ’s report. Id. art. 21.3. T hat is,
the defending member must withdraw, modify, or replace its violative measures. See id. If a disagreement arises as to
whether the defending member has, in fact, implemented the report, a WT O panel may be convened to hear a dispute
over compliance issues. Id. art. 21.5. T he WT O Appellate Body hears appeals of these compliance panel reports. Id. art.
17.1.
276 See id. art. 22.3. Ultimately, when a defending member fails to implement a panel or Appellate Body report within
the established compliance period, the prevailing member may request that the defending member negotiate a
compensation agreement. Id. art. 22.2. If such negotiations are not requested, or if an agreement is not reached, the
prevailing member may also request authorization to impose certain trade sanctions against the noncomplying member.
Id. art. 22.2-22.3. Specifically, the WT O may aut horize the prevailing member to suspend tariff concessions or other
trade obligations that it otherwise owes the noncomplying member under a WT O agreement. Id.
277 Charles Hutzler, China Retaliates Against Trump Tariffs with Duties on American Meat and Fruit, WALL STREET J.
(April 1, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-retaliates-with-new-tariffs-on-u-s-meat-and-other-products-
1522618533.
278 See, e.g., Committee on Safeguards, Imposition of a Safeguard Measure by the United States on Imports of
Aluminum and Steel: Communication from the United States in Response to China’s Requests Circulated on 26 March
2018, 1-2, G/SG/161/Suppl.1 (Apr. 4, 2018) (“ Because the actions under the Steel and Aluminum Proclamations are
not safeguard measures, the United States considers that Article 8.2 of the Agreem ent on Safeguards does not justify
China’s suspension of concessions or other obligations. China has asserted no other justification for its measures, and
the United States is aware of none. T herefore, it appears that China’s actions have no basis under WT O rules.”) .
279 UST R, “United States Challenges Five WT O Members Imposing Illegal T ariffs Against U.S. Products,” press
release, July 2018, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2018/july/united-states-
challenges-five-wto.
280 Request for Consultations at 1-2, India—Additional Duties on Certain Products from the United States,
WT /DS585/1 (July 4, 2019).
281 Notification of a Mutually Agreed Solution, Mexico—Additional Duties on Certain Products from the United States,
WT /DS560/4 (June 3, 2019); Notification of a Mutually Agreed Solution, United States—Certain Measures on Steel
and Alum inum Products, WT/DS551/13 (June 3, 2019); Notification of a Mutually Agreed Solution, Canada—
Additional Duties on Certain Products from the United States, WT /DS557/4 (May 27, 2019); Notification of a
Mutually Agreed Solution, United States—Certain Measures on Steel and Alum inum Products, WT /DS550/13 (May
27, 2019).
Congressional Research Service
44

Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

Figure 9. WTO Cases Challenging the United States’ Section 232 Actions

Source: CRS based on WTO filings.
Notes: The UK is included as a member of the EU for cases filed prior to January 31, 2020. Independent of the
EU, the UK has not been a complainant or third party in the WTO Section 232 disputes.
Retaliation
The process of retaliation is complex given multiple layers of relevant international rules and the
potential for unilateral action, which may or may not adhere to those existing rules. Both through
agreements at the WTO and in bilateral and regional free trade agreements (FTAs), the United
States and its trading partners have agreed to maintain certain tariff levels. Those same
agreements include rules on potential responses, including formal dispute settlement procedures
and in some cases commensurate tariffs, when one party increases its tariffs above agreed-upon
limits.282 Increased tariffs are permitted under these agreements, under specific circumstances,
including for example, national security considerations, which the Trump Administration argued
was the basis for its Section 232 actions. Other tariff increases al owed under these agreements
include antidumping tariffs, countervailing duties, and safeguard tariffs.283

282 Chad P. Bown, Trump’s Steel and Aluminum Tariffs: How WTO Retaliation Typically Works, Peterson Institute for
International Economics, March 5, 2018, https://piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/trumps-steel-and-
aluminum-tariffs-how-wto-retaliation-typically.
283 Antidumping duties are imposed when a domestic industry is materially injured, or threatened with material injury,
by sales found to be at less than fair value in the U.S. market ; countervailing dut ies are imposed when a domestic
industry is materially injured, or threatened with material injury, as a result of sales in the U.S. market of products
found to be subsidized by a foreign government or other public entities; and safeguards are provided in response to
injury to a domestic industry from a sharp increase in imports. For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10786,
Safeguards: Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 , by Vivian C. Jones, and CRS In Focus IF10018, Trade Rem edies:
Antidum ping and Countervailing Duties, by Vivian C. Jones.
Congressional Research Service
45

link to page 46 link to page 50 link to page 56 Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

Retaliatory actions have magnified the effects of U.S. Section 232 tariffs. From an economic
perspective, retaliation increases the scope of industries affected by the tariffs. U.S. agricultural
exports, for example, are among the largest categories of U.S. exports targeted for retaliation,
which may have contributed to reduced sales of certain U.S. farm products.284
Retaliatory actions may also heighten concerns over the potential strain the U.S. Section 232
tariffs place on the international trading system. Many U.S. trading partners view the Section 232
actions as protectionist and in violation of U.S. commitments at the WTO and have initiated
WTO dispute settlement proceedings against the United States, while the Trump Administration
viewed the actions within its rights under those same commitments (see “WTO Cases”). The
retaliating countries notified their retaliation to the WTO pursuant to the WTO Agreement on
Safeguards, arguing that U.S. steel and aluminum tariffs are intended to protect U.S. industry and
therefore are effectively safeguard tariffs.285 The Trump Administration argued, in turn, that the
retaliation violates WTO rules, as it has not been authorized by a WTO dispute settlement panel,
and responded by initiating additional WTO disputes. If the WTO dispute settlement process
cannot satisfactorily resolve this conflict, it could lead to further unilateral actions and increasing
retaliation. The Biden Administration has not yet stated a position on the ongoing WTO cases.
Economic Impacts
The Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs and resulting retaliation affect various stakeholders in
the U.S. economy, prompting reactions from several Members of Congress, some in support and
others voicing concern. Congress has held a number of hearings to examine the issue since the
tariffs were enacted.286 Press reports, company earnings statements, government data, and
academic studies have suggested the U.S. steel and aluminum tariffs raised the tariff inclusive
cost of imports leading to declining demand for U.S. imports of the products subject to the tariffs,
which al owed domestic steel and aluminum producers to increase domestic prices and expand
output for a time.287 In turn, downstream domestic industries (e.g., manufacturers using steel and
aluminum as inputs) and consumers have likely faced higher costs than they would have without
the tariffs in place.288 Trade data suggest other countries’ retaliatory tariffs have also had negative
effects on U.S. industry by reducing demand for certain U.S. exports (see “Retaliation”).
Most studies assessing the tariffs’ overal economic impact estimate a negative effect on U.S.
gross domestic product (GDP) (see “Aggregate Effects on the U.S. Economy”). Some groups
supporting the tariff actions, however, argue that potential negative effects on the broader
economy are exaggerated and that such effects are outweighed by the benefits to the domestic

284 For more information, see CRS Report R45903, Retaliatory Tariffs and U.S. Agriculture, by Anita Regmi.
285 For example, see European Union, “United States – Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminum Products Request for
the Establishment of a Panel by the European Union,” WT O WT /DS548/14, October 19, 2018.
286 See, for example, 115th Congress, the House Ways and Means Committee held hearings examining the potential
economic implications of the tariffs and the product exclusion process, and its T rade Subcommittee held a hearing on
the effects on U.S. agricultural producers. T he Senate Finance Committee also held a hearing during the 115 th Congress
with Commerce Secretary Ross to discuss the Administration’s Section 232 investigations and the potential impacts of
Section 232 auto tariffs. In the 116th Congress, the House Committee on Financial Services held a hearing on the
impact of recent trade policies on the U.S. economy.
287 Sources cited throughout this section. For an overview of the estimated effects of the tariffs on the U.S. economy,
see Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Econom ic Outlook: 2020 to 2030 , January 28, 2020, p. 33,
https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2020-01/56020-CBO-Outlook.pdf.
288 Mary Amiti, Stephen J. Redding, and David E. Weinstein, "T he Impact of the 2018 T ariffs on Prices and Welfare,"
Journal of Econom ic Perspectives, vol. 33, no. 4 (Fall 2019), pp. 188-189.
Congressional Research Service
46

link to page 53 Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

steel and aluminum industries in any case.289 Over the past year, the global pandemic and
recession caused major disruptions to both supply and demand for many industrial goods making
it difficult to separate the effect of the tariffs from broader economic shifts.
Industry-Level Dynamics of the Tariff Increase
Changes in tariffs affect economic activity directly by influencing the price of imported goods
and indirectly through changes in exchange rates and real incomes. The extent of the price change
and its impact on trade flows, employment, and production in the United States and abroad
depend on resource constraints and how various economic actors (foreign producers of the goods
subject to the tariffs, producers of domestic substitutes, producers in downstream industries, and
consumers) respond as the effects of the increased tariffs reverberate throughout the economy.
Several industry-level dynamics that occurred after the increase in steel and aluminum tariffs are
described below. Tariffs, however, are only one of many variables influencing market conditions.
 Tariffs raise the costs of imports relative to domestic goods, which may have
given domestic steel and aluminum producers the ability to raise prices, at
least temporarily, relative to foreign competitors. Both foreign and domestic
producers may respond to increased tariffs. Domestic firms are likely to increase
their prices in response to the new tariff protection, while foreign producers may
lower their prices and absorb a portion of the tariff increase in order to remain
competitive in the U.S. market.290 Foreign producers’ response determines the
tariff “pass-through” rate, and most early economic studies of the tariff actions
found that the U.S. Section 232 tariffs had largely been passed through to
downstream industries and consumers with little effect on foreign export
prices.291 A more recent study, however, found that foreign steel producers
absorbed some share of the tariff increases, potential y lowering their export
prices by as much as 50%.292

BLS data on domestic producer and import price indices for broad categories of
steel and aluminum suggest that price differences between domestic and
imported steel and aluminum increased after the Section 232 tariffs took effect in
March 2018. For steel, the domestic producer price index increased by 20.5%
from January to December 2018, while the price index for imports (excluding
tariffs) increased by 8.5% (see Figure 10). By the end of 2019, after Canada and
Mexico were exempted from the additional duties, domestic and imported steel

289 See for example: Jeff Ferry, Steel & Aluminum Tariffs Produce Minimal Impact on Jobs, GDP, Coalition for a
Prosperous America, March 2018, https://www.prosperousamerica.org/
steel_aluminum_tariffs_produce_minimal_impact_on_jobs_gdp ; and Robert E. Scott, Alum inum Tariffs Have Led to a
Strong Recovery in Em ploym ent, Production, and Investm ent in Prim ary Alum inum and Downst ream Industries,
Economic Policy Institute, December 11, 2018, https://www.epi.org/publication/aluminum-tariffs-have-led-to-a-strong-
recovery-in-employment-production-and-investment-in-primary-aluminum-and-downstream-industries/.
290 Mary Amiti, Sebastian Heise, and Noah Kwicklis, “ Will New Steel T ariffs Protect U.S. Jobs?,” Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, Liberty Street Econom ics (blog), April 19, 2018, http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/
2018/04/will-new-steel-tariffs-protect-us-jobs.html.
291 For example, see Alberto Cavallo, et al., Tariff Passthrough at the Border and at the Store: Evidence from U.S.
Trade Policy, Becker Friedman Institute, Working Paper No. 2019-124, October 2019, https://bfi.uchicago.edu/wp-
content/uploads/BFI_WP_2019124-1.pdf.
292 Mary Amiti, Stephen J. Redding, and David E. Weinstein, Who’s Paying for the U.S. Tariffs? A Longer-Term
Perspective, National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 26610, January 2020, https://www.nber.org/
papers/w26610.
Congressional Research Service
47

link to page 53 link to page 54 link to page 54

Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

prices had become more closely aligned. For aluminum, both domestic and
import prices drifted lower in 2019 and the first half of 2020 after peaking in
mid-2018, but import prices fel at a faster rate throughout the period. Since June
2020, both imported and domestic aluminum prices have increased significantly
(see Figure 11).
Figure 10. Steel Price Indices
Figure 11. Aluminum Price Indices
(monthly % change from January 2018)
(monthly % change from January 2018)

Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Notes: Based period set to January 2018.
Notes: Base period set to January 2018.
Production series ID = PCU3311 and import
Production series ID = PCU3313 and import
series ID = EIUIZ3311. Import price index
series ID = EIUIZ3313. Import price index
excludes tariffs.
excludes tariffs.
 U.S. steel and aluminum production initially expanded and U.S. imports
declined as demand for goods produced domestically increased relative to
demand for imported goods (see Figure 12 and Figure 13). Although U.S. steel
and aluminum producers increased prices relative to foreign producers in 2018
and 2019, the additional tariff costs on imports, which were largely passed
through to downstream firms (as discussed above), put downward pressure on
demand for imports.293 By the first quarter of 2020, U.S. real imports of steel and
aluminum (adjusted for price fluctuations) had decreased by more than 30% and
16%, respectively, compared to their average quarterly values in 2017, the year
before the tariffs went into effect.294

By contrast, U.S. production increased in the first two years after the tariffs took
effect. The increase in domestic steel and aluminum production peaked in the
fourth quarter of 2018 at 13.5% and 9.0%, respectively, above average 2017
values.295 In the first and second quarters of 2020, domestic production of both
metals fel sharply in line with broader declines in U.S. economic activity
associated with the COVID-19 pandemic, but rebounded significantly by the end
of the year. Imports remained significantly depressed throughout 2020. In April
2020, citing declining market conditions including the global oversupply of

293 Downstream firms’ demand sensitivity to higher import prices (their price elasticity of demand) depends on the
degree to which the steel and aluminum products produced domestically are sufficient substitutes for the products
facing the tariffs, and the availability of domestic supplies.
294 Import statistics sourced from U.S. Census Bureau.
295 Production data are from Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED), Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
Congressional Research Service
48

link to page 35 link to page 35 link to page 37

Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

aluminum, fal ing prices, and the economic fal out from the pandemic, Alcoa
announced plans to cut production at its Intalco aluminum smelter in Ferndale,
WA, and began layoffs at the facility in June.296 Some U.S. steel facilities have
announced similar plant closures, or reductions in capacity (see “U.S. Steel and
Aluminum Manufacturing and Employment”).
Figure 12. Domestic Production and
Figure 13. Domestic Production and
Imports: Steel
Imports: Aluminum
(quarterly % change from 2017, real values)
(quarterly % change from 2017, real values)

Source: Production data from Federal Reserve
Source: Production data from Federal Reserve
Economic Data (FRED) and imports from U.S.
Economic Data (FRED) and imports from U.S.
Census Bureau.
Census Bureau.
Notes: Base period set to 2017 average.
Notes: Base period set to 2017 average.
Production series seasonal y adjusted, ID =
Production series seasonal y adjusted, ID =
IPN3311A2RSQ. Import classification = NAICS
IPG3313S. Import classification = NAICS 3313.
3311. Data are in real terms (adjusted for price
Data are in real terms (adjusted for price
fluctuations).
fluctuations).
 The combination of higher domestic prices and the added duties on imports
led to higher input costs for some downstream industries. Academic studies
suggest U.S. industries that use steel and aluminum in their products
(“downstream” industries, including auto manufacturers and oil producers) faced
higher input costs as a result of the tariffs.297 These studies suggest that higher
input costs led to some combination of lower profits for producers and higher
prices for importers and consumers, which in turn may have dampened demand
for downstream products, leading to some contraction in these sectors. A study by
researchers at the Federal Reserve Board, which examined effects on the
manufacturing sector from al U.S. tariff actions in 2018, found that higher input
costs from the tariffs were associated with higher prices, employment declines,
and reductions in output for affected firms.298 Another study found that the higher
input costs associated with the tariffs may have led to a decrease in U.S. exports
for firms reliant on imported intermediate inputs. This study suggests export

296 Geoff Baker, “ Alcoa Begins Laying Off Workers at its Ferndale Aluminum Plant Ahead of Schedule,” Seattle
T imes, June 4, 2020. For more information, see “ Domestic Aluminum Manufacturing”.
297 Mary Amiti, Stephen J. Redding, and David E. Weinstein, "T he Impact of the 2018 T ariffs on Prices and Welfare,"
Journal of Econom ic Perspectives, vol. 33, no. 4 (Fall 2019), pp. 188 -189.
298 Aaron Flaaen and Justin Pierce, Disentangling the Effects of the 2018-2019 Tariffs on a Globally Connected U.S.
Manufacturing Sector, Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sy stem, Finance and Economics
Discussion Series 2019-086, December 23, 2019, https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/2019086pap.pdf.
Congressional Research Service
49

Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

growth was approximately 2% lower for products made with steel and aluminum
or other goods subject to higher U.S. tariffs, relative to unaffected products.299
Some groups supporting the tariffs refute these estimates; a report by the
Economic Policy Institute argues that increased domestic steel prices had a
negligible effect on downstream manufacturers and consumer good prices.300

Several U.S companies have stated that the tariffs have increased their operating
costs, and that these higher input costs for U.S. downstream firms potential y
gives their foreign competitors an advantage in the U.S. market and abroad.301
Al egheny Technologies, which uses imported steel slabs in its production of
stainless steel sheet, cited the Section 232 tariffs in its April 2020 decision to
close a facility in western Pennsylvania.302 In January 2020, the Trump
Administration expanded the Section 232 tariff actions to certain steel and
aluminum derivative products, arguing that higher input costs had disadvantaged
these downstream domestic manufacturers relative to their foreign counterparts,
in turn leading to more imports of the downstream products.
 U.S. exports subject to
retaliatory tariffs declined. Six
Figure 14. U.S. Exports Subject to Section
U.S. trading partners (China, EU,
232 Retaliation
India, Turkey, UK, and Russia)
(% change from 2017)
are currently imposing retaliatory
tariffs in response to U.S. Section
232 tariffs affecting
approximately $7.2 bil ion of
U.S. annual exports (2020
value).303 The retaliatory tariffs
affect many products, including
agricultural goods (e.g., pork,
fruits, and nuts), whiskies, and

Source: CRS analysis with data from partner country
customs agencies via Trade Data Monitor.
Notes: Base period set to 2017. Exports estimated using
partner country import data. India began imposing
retaliatory tariffs in 2019.

299 T he authors suggest that the U.S. import increases had the equivalent effect of U.S. trading partners applying a 2%
tariff on U.S. exports. Kyle Handley, Fariha Kamal, and Ryan Monarch, Rising Im port Tariffs, Falling Export Growth:
When Modern Supply Chains Meet Old-Style Protectionism , National Bureau of Economic Research, NBER Working
Paper No. 26611, January 2020, https://www.nber.org/papers/w26611.
300 Adam S. Hersh and Robert E. Scott, Why Global Steel Surpluses Warrant U.S. Section 232 Import Measures,
Economic Policy Institute, March 24, 2021, https://files.epi.org/pdf/218728.pdf.
301 Coalition of American Metal Manufacturers and Users, “Letter to Honorable Gina Raimondo, Secretary of
Commerce,” March 15, 2021, https://www.tariffsaretaxes.org/sites/default/files/2021-
03/CAMMU_232%20Raimondo_%20March%2015%202021.pdf .
302 "Allegheny T echnologies to Shutter Steel Plant, Cites T ariffs," U.S. News, April 1, 2020.
303 U.S. exports estimated using partner country import data in order to match retaliatory tariff lists with trade data.
Partner country trade data accessed via T rade Data Monitor.
Congressional Research Service
50

link to page 55 Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

steel and aluminum.304 General y, the retaliatory tariffs appear to have led to
decreased demand for these U.S. exports as they lower the competitiveness of
U.S. firms relative to other suppliers in foreign markets. U.S. exports facing
retaliation in the EU, UK, Russia, and Turkey have seen the largest declines,
decreasing by nearly 50% since 2017 (Figure 14). U.S. exports to China subject
to retaliation declined in 2018 and 2019, but increased in 2020—many of these
products are included in China’s purchase commitments under the U.S.-China
Phase One agreement.305 India delayed its retaliatory tariffs until 2019, after
which U.S. exports of the targeted products declined.

Retaliatory tariffs also have given U.S. exporters an incentive to manufacture
abroad to avoid the retaliation. Facing retaliatory tariffs on U.S. motorcycle
exports to the European Union, Harley-Davidson announced its intent to shift
some of its production out of the United States to remain competitive in the EU
market.306 In July 2019, the company received approval from the European
Union to begin importing motorcycles from Thailand, facing a 6% tariff, as
compared to the 31% tariff applied to motorcycles exported to the European
Union from the United States.307 In April 2021, however, the European
Commission issued a ruling requiring the EU to treat imports of Harley-Davidson
motorcycles as originating from the United States, and thus subject to EU
retaliatory tariffs, regardless of their production origin.308
Aggregate Effects on the U.S. Economy
In addition to industry-level effects, tariffs also have the potential to affect the broader U.S.
economy. For example, academic studies suggest the ad hoc nature of the tariffs may have
increased uncertainty in the U.S. business environment placing a drag on investment activity. One
study found that uncertainty resulting from U.S. trade policy reduced investment by roughly 1.5%
in 2018.309 U.S. tariffs may also reduce national consumption patterns, as the higher costs of
imported goods potential y reduces consumers’ discretionary income and therefore aggregate
demand. Similarly, retaliatory tariffs may dent U.S. consumption to the extent they cause export
declines and lower incomes in affected industries. For example, some research suggests U.S.
counties most exposed to China’s retaliatory tariffs on U.S. agricultural exports saw auto sales
decline by 4%-5% relative to unaffected counties after the retaliatory tariffs were imposed.310

304 Canada and Mexico removed retaliatory tariffs affecting approximately $14.1 billion of U.S. annual exports (2019
value) after the T rump Administration exempted both countries from Section 232 tariffs in May 2019.
305 For more information, see CRS Insight IN11208, U.S. Signs Phase One Trade Deal with China, by Karen M. Sutter.
306 “U.S. T rade War with Europe Revs Up as Harley-Davidson Shifts Production,” Financial Times, June 25, 2018.
307 “Harley-Davidson Gets EU Approval for Plan to Dodge $100-million T ariff Hit,” Los Angeles Times, July 23, 2019.
308 According to the Commission, the company’s shift in production location was motivated in part by a desire to avoid
the EU’s retaliatory tariffs and therefore is not “economically justifiable” as defined in EU law. European Commission,
“Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/563,” Official Journal of the European Union, April 7, 2021,
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32021D0563&from=EN.
309 Dario Caldara, et al., “T he Economic Effects of T rade Policy Uncertainty,” Journal of Monetary Economics, vol.
109 (January 2020), pp. 38-59.
310 Michael E. Waugh, The Consumption Response to Trade Shocks: Evidence from the U.S.-China Trade War,
National Bureau of Economic Research, NBER W orking Paper 26353, December 2019, https://www.nber.org/papers/
w26353.
Congressional Research Service
51

Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

Some groups that support the tariffs, however, argue that estimates of their impact may
exaggerate potential negative effects.311
Assessing the tariffs overal impact on the U.S. economy is in part a distributional question, given
the tariffs varied effects on producers in protected industries, downstream industries, consumers,
and exporters subject to retaliation. From a policy perspective some analysts see the Section 232
trade actions as addressing long-standing issues of fairness that are intended to provide U.S. steel
and aluminum producers with a more level playing field.312 Research by academic economists,
however, general y argues the negative impact of higher prices on consumers and industries using
the imported goods outweighs the benefit of higher profits and expanded production in the
import-competing industries and the additional government revenue generated by the tariffs,
especial y if the negative effects of retaliatory tariffs are taken into consideration.313 Quantitative
estimates of the effects vary based on modeling assumptions and techniques, but most suggest a
negative overal effect on U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) as a result of the tariffs.
The Congressional Budget Office, for example, estimated that the increased tariffs in effect as of
December 2019 would reduce U.S. GDP by 0.5% in 2020, below a baseline without the tariffs,
while raising consumer prices by 0.5%, thereby reducing average real household income by
$1,277.314 From a global perspective, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated that the
tariffs would reduce global GDP in 2020 by 0.8%.315 As these studies examine the effects of al
recent U.S. tariff actions, the impact directly attributable to the Section 232 tariffs on steel and
aluminum is likely smal er as these tariffs accounted for less than 10% of imports affected by the
Trump Administration’s tariff actions in 2020.
The United States entered a recession in 2020, as a result of the economic fal out from the global
COVID-19 pandemic with the scale of economic disruption far outweighing estimated negative
effects of the Trump Administration’s tariff actions, cited above.316 U.S. and global GDP
decreased by 3.5% and 3.3%, respectively, in 2020.317 Various stakeholders, including some
Members of Congress, cal ed for suspending the U.S. tariff increases during the economic
downturn, including actions under Section 232, in an effort to enhance U.S. economic growth.318

311 Robert E. Scott, Estimates of Jobs Lost and Economic Harm Done by Steel and Aluminum Tariffs Are Wildly
Exaggerated, Economic Policy Institute, March 21, 2018, https://www.epi.org/publication/estimates-of-jobs-lost-and-
economic-harm-done-by-steel-and-aluminum-tariffs-are-wildly-exaggerated/.
312 Adam S. Hersh and Robert E. Scott, Why Global Steel Surpluses Warrant U.S. Section 232 Import Measures,
Economic Policy Institute, March 24, 2021, https://files.epi.org/pdf/218728.pdf.
313 For example, see Pablo D. Fajgelbaum, et al., “T he Return to Protectionism,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
vol. 135, no. 1 (January 2020), pp. 1 -55.
314 Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2020 to 2030, January 28, 2020, p. 33,
https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2020-01/56020-CBO-Outlook.pdf.
315 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook: Global Manufacturing Downturn, Rising Trade Barriers,
October 2019, pp. 31-33, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2019/10/01/world-economic-outlook-
october-2019.
316 For more, see CRS Report R46270, Global Economic Effects of COVID-19, coordinated by James K. Jackson.
317 Bureau of Economic Analysis, "Gross Domestic Product, 2nd Quarter 2020 and Annual Update," press release, July
30, 2020, https://www.bea.gov/news/2020/gross-domestic-product -2nd-quarter-2020-advance-estimate-and-annual-
update.
318 Ana Swanson, "U.S. Weighs T ariff Relief but Some Fear China Will T ake Advantage," New York Times, March 15,
2020. Representative Stephany Murphy, "Murphy, Cunningham Urge Congressional Leadership to Suspend T ariffs in
Upcoming Coronavirus Response Bill," press release, March 18, 2020,
https://murphy.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=1254 .
Congressional Research Service
52

Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

Some beneficiaries of the increased tariffs, however, argue they are necessary to help the industry
recover from the pandemic and maintain a level playing field in the face of global overcapacity.319
Issues for Congress
As Congress debates the Trump Administration’s Section 232 actions and potential action under
the Biden Administration it may consider the following issues, many of which include potential
legislative responses.
Possible Long-Term Effects
Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum imports have now been in place for over three years
and have no statutory expiration. President Biden has not indicated if he wil remove or amend
the tariffs, but various industry groups and Members of Congress have reached out to the Biden
Administration both for and against the tariffs.320 Some Members, including then Senate Finance
Chair Grassley, have also urged for tariff relief to help U.S. importers in the wake of the
economic downturn of the COVID-19 pandemic.321
Congress may explore the long-term economic consequences of the tariffs on U.S. domestic
industry, including steel and aluminum producers, downstream manufacturers, and those sectors
targeted by retaliatory tariffs. Impacts may include increased prices and costs for steel and
aluminum producers and users, respectively; changes in workforce levels; shifts in global supply
chains as firms seek to avoid tariffs; and potential loss of foreign markets for domestic producers
facing retaliatory tariffs.
In a 2018 Ways and Means Committee hearing on the Section 232 tariff exclusion process,
Commerce stated the “Secretary has directed Commerce Department economists to conduct semi-
annual reviews of the impacts of the steel and aluminum tariffs, including on downstream
sectors.”322 As part of its own assessment, Congress may request the Commerce Department’s
analysis.
Appropriate Delegation of Constitutional Authority
In enacting Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act, Congress delegated aspects of its authority to
regulate international commerce to the executive branch. Use of the statute to restrict imports
does not require any formal approval by Congress or an affirmative finding by an independent
agency, such as the USITC, granting the President broad discretion in applying this authority.
Should Congress disapprove of the President’s use of the statute, its current recourse is limited to
passing new legislation or using informal tools to pressure the Administration (e.g., putting holds

319 See January 2021 letters from various U.S. steel associations and the American Primary Aluminum Association to
then President -Elect Biden, at https://www.steel.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Steel-Coalition-Letter-to-President -
Elect -Biden-011121.pdf and https://mma.prnewswire.com/media/1419331/APAA_Biden_letter.pdf?p=pdf .
320 See, for example, Americans for Free T rade letter to President -Elect Biden, December 7, 2020,
http://americansforfreetrade.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/AFT-FFT-Biden-Transition-Team-Letter-Final-
120720.pdf; American Iron and Steel Institute, et al., letter to President -Elect Biden, January 11, 2021,
https://www.steel.org/2021/01/urge-biden-keep-steel-tariffs/.
321 Adam Beshudi, “ Grassley: White House, Congress should consider tariff easing measures,” PoliticoPro, March 16,
2020.
322 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, Subcommittee on T rade, Hearing on Product Exclusion
Process for, 115th Cong., 2nd sess., July 24, 2018, Serial No. 115-T R06, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/WM/WM04/
20180724/108591/HHRG-115-WM04-Transcript-20180724.pdf.
Congressional Research Service
53

Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

on presidential nominee confirmations in the Senate). Some Members and observers have
suggested that Congress should require additional steps in the Section 232 process. In the 116th
Congress, a variety of proposals were introduced to amend Section 232, in various ways, such as
by:
 placing the Department of Defense in charge of the investigation stage and/or
determination of a national security threat,
 requiring an economic impact study by the USITC, congressional consultation, or
approval of any new tariffs,
 al owing for a resolution of disapproval of trade actions, or
 mandating a transparent exclusion process to limit potential negative domestic
effects.
In addition, the 2020 expansion of the steel and aluminum tariffs, initial y imposed in 2018, has
raised questions about Section 232 authority expiration. Some stakeholders have suggested that
Section 232 reform should include new or clarified timelines, deadlines, or expiration dates for
any tariffs or quotas imposed or on the authority to impose new or expanded trade actions.
During the 116th Congress, then-Senate Finance Chair Senator Grassley, sought to draft a
consensus bil to restore certain congressional authority that would gain sufficient bipartisan
support to withstand a possible presidential veto. Contentious issues have included whether any
changes would be retroactive, potential y affecting the steel and aluminum tariffs, or whether they
would only apply to future actions, and whether Congress’s role should be consultative or
decisive (e.g., requiring congressional approval). At the time, the Grassley noted that, “the
president’s use of tariffs has brought to our attention the shortcomings of the 1962 and 1974
legislation on trade that delegated too much authority from Congress’ constitutional power [over
trade] to the executive branch.”323 After multiple meetings, Grassley stated that the efforts had
stal ed.
The current Senate Finance Chair Senator Wyden has not stated how he wants to proceed in the
117th Congress, although he previously supported legislative reform efforts.324 The Biden
Administration’s stance on potential changes to the Section 232 authority and the subsequent
need for a veto-proof congressional majority to enact any amendments is also unclear. To date,
Senator Portman has re-introduced his previous proposal (see S. 746) with some of the same
bipartisan co-sponsors as in the last Congress (see 116-S. 365). According to press reports,
Senator Toomey may reintroduce his proposed amendment from the previous session (see 116-S.
287).325 The bil s sponsored by Senators Portman and Toomey were the focus of then-Chair
Grassley’s consensus efforts in the last Congress. Ways and Means Ranking Member Brady
indicated that there is stil “real interest” in strengthening Congress’ authority and sees an
opportunity to work with the Administration on the issue.326

323 Megan Cassella, “Grassley Still Hopes to Craft 232 Reform Bill with Wyden,” PoliticoPro, March 4, 2020.
324 In reference to reform efforts in the 116th Congress, Senator Wyden stated “ I am all for putting some guardrails in
this administration’s unpredictable and chaotic trade policy. We haven’t been able to find the solution yet, but I am
ready to continue to work with the chairman to find a legislative solution that will garner wide bipartisan support.” Niv
Elia, “ Grassley says he wants to rein in T rump tariff powers,” The Hill, January 8, 2020.
325 “Senators re-introduce bill to expand Pentagon’s role in Section 232 probes,” Inside U.S. Trade, March 16, 2021.
326 Representative Kevin Brady speaking during CSIS event, “A Conversation with Representative Kevin Brady on the
Republican Party's T rade Agenda,” April 15, 2021, https://www.csis.org/events/conversation-representative-kevin-
brady-republican-partys-trade-agenda.
Congressional Research Service
54

link to page 69 link to page 69 Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

Others have proposed revisiting the delegation of congressional constitutional authority more
broadly, such as by requiring congressional approval of executive branch trade actions more
general y. The Tariff Reform Coalition, a cross-sectoral coalition of industry associations, have
advocated for “greater Congressional oversight with respect to Presidential use of tariff
authority.”327
USTR Tai endorsed modernizing Section 232 during her testimony to the Senate Finance
Committee. “I would real y like to strengthen the trade tools that we have to address the problems
that we have today, whether that is global overcapacity or other chal enges that weren't
contemplated 50 or 60 years ago when many of our trade statutes were drafted… We should plug
in the gaps we see in countering the unfair trade practices we see today.”328
For a list of proposals in the 117th and 116th Congresses, see Appendix C.
Legislative Responses to Retaliatory Tariffs
Several major U.S. trading partners are currently imposing retaliatory tariffs in response to the
U.S. actions. In the 116th Congress, some Members of Congress proposed legislation to respond
to the potential economic impact of these foreign retaliatory tariffs. Some proposals would have
expanded programs like trade adjustment assistance to include assistance for workers, firms, and
farmers harmed by foreign retaliation.329 The Trump Administration established trade aid
packages in 2018 and 2019 to provide both direct and indirect assistance for farmers affected by
“trade damage” from foreign retaliation to Section 232 and other tariffs through the U.S.
Department of Agriculture.330 While many of the retaliatory tariffs remain, the subsidy programs
have expired. Congress may review the impact of the assistance program and examine whether
they should be renewed in part or in whole. Others have suggested broader trade adjustment
assistance reform is needed to help U.S. workers and firms harmed by globalization, supply chain
shifts, global over-capacity in certain sectors, and depressed demand due to the COVID-19
pandemic. For a list of proposals from the 116th Congress, see Appendix C.
Establishing Threshold
It is relatively easy for a stakeholder to prompt the Section 232 investigation process. The statute
states that “Upon request of the head of any department or agency, upon application of an
interested party, or upon his own motion, the Secretary of Commerce .. shal immediately initiate
an appropriate investigation.” To limit the volume of Section 232 petitions and help ensure that
any requests are sufficiently justified, Congress may consider establishing criteria or a threshold
that a request must meet before Commerce and Defense agencies invest resources in conducting a
Section 232 investigation. Similarly, Congress may consider limiting the types of imported
articles that may be considered under Section 232 (e.g., 116- S. 287, H.R. 940).

327 T ariff Reform Coalition, letter to Chair and Ranking Members of Senate Finance and House Ways and Means
Committee, September 19, 2020, http://www.nftc.org/default/trade/T ariff%20Reform%20Coalition%20Letter.pdf.
328 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Finance, The President’s 2021 Trade Policy Agenda, 117th Cong., May 12,
2021.
329 For more information on trade adjustment assistance, see CRS In Focus IF10570, Trade Adjustment Assistance for
Workers (TAA), by Benjamin Collins, CRS Report RS20210, Trade Adjustm ent Assistance for Firm s, by Rachel F.
Fefer, and CRS Report R40206, Trade Adjustm ent Assistance for Farm ers, by Mark A. McMinimy.
330 For more information see CRS In Focus IF11289, Farm Policy: Comparison of 2018 and 2019 MFP Programs, by
Randy Schnepf and CRS Report R45310, Farm Policy: USDA’s 2018 Trade Aid Package, by Randy Schnepf et al.
Congressional Research Service
55

Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

Interpreting National Security
Congress created the Section 232 process to try to ensure that U.S. imports do not cause undue
harm to U.S. national security. Some observers have raised concerns that restrictions on U.S.
imports under Section 232, however, may harm U.S. al ies, which could also have negative
implications for U.S. national security. For example, Canada, a top source of U.S. imports of steel
and aluminum, was initial y subject to the Section 232 tariffs even though U.S. law considers the
country part of the U.S. defense industrial base.331
National security is not clearly defined in the statute, al owing for ambiguity and alternative
interpretations by the Executive Branch. International trade commitments both at the multilateral
and FTA level general y include broad exceptions on the basis of national security. The Trump
Administration argued its Section 232 actions were permissible under these exceptions, while
many U.S. trading partners claim the actions are unrelated to national security. If the United
States invokes the national security exemption in what may be perceived to be an arbitrary way, it
could similarly encourage other countries to use national security as a rationale to enact
protectionist measures and limit the scope of potential U.S. responses to such actions.
Congress may consider amending Section 232 to address these concerns. For example, some
Members proposed legislation that would narrowly define “national security” under Section 232
and the factors to be considered in a Section 232 investigation. One bil from the 116th Congress
would have limited the scope of national security under the statute to protection against foreign
aggression (S. 287, H.R. 940). Some Members have also proposed changing the primary
investigative authority from Commerce to Defense to provide more weight to the military
perspective on what constitutes a national security threat.
Establishing New International Rules
Addressing the specific market-distorting practices that are the root causes of steel and aluminum
overcapacity (e.g., government intervention, subsidization) may require updating or amending
existing trade agreements. In addition to the international efforts discussed, U.S. FTA
negotiations, including the recently implemented USMCA, include related disciplines (e.g., by
establishing rules on state-owned enterprises or anticorruption). To address these issues, Congress
could consider establishing specific or enhanced new negotiating objectives for trade agreement
negotiations, potential y through TPA legislation as the current version expires in July 2020.
Congress could also consider directing the executive branch to prioritize engagement in such
negotiations, by, for example, endorsing the new U.S.-EU discussions on overcapacity,
continuation of the OECD discussions or the trilateral proposals by USTR with the EU and Japan
to address nonmarket practices, including subsidies, state-owned enterprises, and technology
transfer requirements, mostly aimed at China. Congressional oversight on ongoing reform efforts
at the WTO may examine efforts to establish new international trade rules on these issues (see
below).
Impact on the Multilateral Trading System
Some analysts argue that the United States risks undermining the international system it helped
create when it invokes unilateral trade actions that may violate core commitments and with regard
to broad uses of national security exemptions. These observers fear that disagreements at the
WTO on these issues may be difficult to resolve through the existing dispute settlement
procedures given the concerns over national sovereignty that would likely be raised if a WTO

331 10 U.S.C. §148.
Congressional Research Service
56

Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

dispute settlement panel issued a ruling relating to the U.S. use of national security exemptions.
Furthermore, actions by the United States that do not make use of the multilateral system’s
dispute settlement process may open the United States to criticism and could impede U.S. efforts
to use the multilateral system for its own enforcement purposes. For example, China cal ed on
other parties to join it in opposition to the U.S. actions on Section 232, while simultaneously
promoting domestic policies often seen as undermining WTO rules.332 Congress could potential y
address these concerns by conducting increased oversight by inviting testimony from multiple
parties, considering legislation to establish more stringent criteria for Section 232 investigations,
or requiring congressional approval of any use of Section 232, among other possible actions.
The WTO overal is at a critical point and many observers believe it needs to adopt reforms to
retain its credibility and continue its role as the foundation of the world trading system. Potential
areas of reform could include addressing the issues underlying the Section 232 actions including:
the proposal on subsidies and nonmarket practices, reforming certain aspects of the WTO dispute
settlement mechanism, or clarifying the national security exception and the WTO’s role. The
growing debate over the role and future direction of the WTO may be of interest to Congress as it
conducts oversight over the U.S. position and role in reform efforts as some Members have
expressed support to address long-standing concerns of the United States.333
Impact on Broader International Relationships
The U.S. unilateral actions under Section 232 have raised the level of tension with U.S. trading
partners and could pose risks to broader international economic cooperation. The strain on
international trading relationships also could have broader policy implications, including for
cooperation between the United States and al ies on foreign policy issues and U.S. credibility in
future trade negotiations. The Biden Administration has expressed support for stronger
relationships with al ies and support of multilateral institutions, creating a potential opportunity to
lower the tension and stress. For example, WTO reform could provide an opportunity for the
United States to address issues of joint concern, such as rules for subsidies, with U.S. al ies and
trading partners, and strengthen those relationships.

332 Lyubov Pronina, “China Seeks EU’s Support in Standing Up to U.S. T rade T hreat ,” Bloomberg BNA, April 9, 2018.
For more information on U.S.-China trade, see CRS Report RL33536, China-U.S. Trade Issues, by Wayne M.
Morrison.
333 For more information, see CRS Report R45417, World Trade Organization: Overview and Future Direction ,
coordinated by Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs.
Congressional Research Service
57

Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

Appendix A. Amendments to Section 232 (19 U.S.C.
§1862)
Concern over national security, trade, and domestic industry was first raised by the Trade
Agreements Extension Act of 1954 (P.L. 83-464 §2). The 1954 act prohibited the President from
decreasing duties on any article if the President determined that such a reduction might threaten
domestic production needed for national defense.334 In 1955, the provision was amended to also
al ow the President to increase trade restrictions, in cases where national security may be
threatened.335
The Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1958 (P.L. 85-686 §8) expanded the 1955 provisions, by
outlining specific factors to be considered during an investigation, al owing the private sector to
petition for relief, and requiring the President to publish a report on each petition.336 The factors
to be considered during an investigation included (1) the domestic production capacity needed for
U.S. national security requirements, (2) the effect of imports on domestic production needed for
national security requirements, and (3) “the impact of foreign competition on the economic
welfare of individual domestic industries.”
Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (P.L. 87-794) continued the provisions of the
1958 Act. Section 232 has been amended multiple times over the years, including (1) to change
the time limits for investigations and actions; (2) to change the advisory responsibility from the
Secretary of the Treasury to the Secretary of Commerce; and (3) to limit presidential authority to
adjust petroleum imports.337
Section 232: Joint Disapproval Resolution Provision for Petroleum Products
In 1980, Congress amended Section 232 to create a joint disapproval resolution provision under
which Congress could override presidential actions to adjust petroleum or petroleum product
imports.338 Congress included the joint disapproval resolution provision in the Crude Oil Windfal
Profit Tax Act of 1980. The bil was signed into law on April 2, 1980, the same day that President

334 P.L. 83-464, §2.
335 T he original inclusion of the 1955 provision appears to be due to considerations about specific minerals, namely
petroleum, fluorspar, lead, and zinc. However, according to the committee report, the committee chose not to focus on
specific commodities, but to create a more general provision requiring the President to adjust imports where national
security may be threatened. (See S.Rpt. 84-232, p. 4.)
336 P.L. 85-686, §8. For a review of the committee’s rationale for these changes see, H.Rpt. 85 -2502, H.Rpt. 85-1761,
and S.Rpt. 85-1838.
337 Following the reorganization of trade functions in 1973, the T rade Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-618, §127(d)) changed the
responsibility to advise t he President from the Director of Office of Emergency Preparedness to the Secretary of the
T reasury with requirements to consult with the Secretaries of Defense, Commerce, and other appropriate departments
and agencies. T he 1974 Act also placed a one-year time limit on the investigation. Following the reorganization of
trade functions in the Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1979, the Omnibus T rade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (P.L.
100-418, §402) changed the advisory responsibility from the Secretary of the T reasury to the Secretary of Commerce.
T he Omnibus T rade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 also reduced the investigation timeline from one year to 270
days and created the 15-day implementation period for the President to act . T he Crude Oil Windfall Profit T ax Act of
1980 (P.L. 96-223, §402) created an option for Congress to override presidential actions to adjust petroleum imports
through a joint disapproval resolution.
338 P.L. 96-223, §402, the Crude Oil Windfall Profit T ax Act of 1980.
Congressional Research Service
58

Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

Carter proclaimed a license fee on crude oil and gasoline pursuant to Section 232 in Proclamation
4744.339
On April 15, 1980, two weeks after the President’s proclamation on the crude oil and gasoline
license fee, Representative James Shannon introduced House Joint Resolution 531 to disapprove
and effectively nullify the presidential action. The House Ways and Means Subcommittee on
Trade voted 14 to 4 to disapprove the presidential action; the resolution was favorably reported
out of the full committee on a 27 to 7 vote. Dissenting views were voiced by Members who
supported the fee program and were concerned about U.S. dependence on foreign oil. While the
measure passed the House, it was indefinitely postponed in the Senate.340 Multiple joint
resolutions of disapproval were introduced in Congress in 1980, but none passed both c hambers.
In addition to the disapproval mechanism created in the Crude Oil Windfal Profit Tax Act of
1980, President Carter’s action in Proclamation 4744 was also chal enged in court and through
separate legislation in Congress. On May 13, 1980, a federal district court struck down the
President’s action on petroleum imports as unlawful, thereby preventing the government from
implementing the program. The court’s decision, however, was appealable to the higher courts.341
Before a court could consider an appeal, Congress enacted an amendment to a bil to extend the
public debt limit (P.L. 96-264, Section 2) on June 6, 1980, which terminated Proclamation 4744’s
petroleum import program. Section 2 of P.L. 96-264 did not use the disapproval mechanism
established in the Crude Oil Windfal Profit Tax Act of 1980; it was a separate piece of legislation
that was attached as an amendment to an unrelated bil .342
On June 19, 1980, the President formal y rescinded Proclamation 4744 “in its entirety, effective
March 15, 1980.”343

339 Presidential Proclamation 4744, “Petroleum Import Adjustment Program,” Federal Register volume 45, No. 66,
April 3, 1980.
340 H.J.Res 531.
341 Indep. Gasoline Marketers Council, Inc. v. Duncan, 492 F. Supp. 614 (D.D.C. 1980).
342 H.R. 7428 (P.L. 96-264).
343 “Imports of Petroleum and Petroleum Products,” Proclamation 4766, June 19, 1980, (45 Federal Register 41899).
Congressional Research Service
59

Appendix B. Section 232 Investigations
Table B-1. Section 232 Investigations and Presidential Actions, 1962-2020
Treasury or
Commerce

Subject of Investigation
Year Initiated
Initiator
Determination
Presidential Action
1
Manganese and chromium ferroal oys
1963
Manufacturing Chemists
Negative
-
Association, Inc.
2
Tungsten mil products
1964
General Electric Company
Negative
-
(Co.)
3
Antifriction bearings
1964
Anti-Friction Bearing
Terminated at request of
-
Manufacturers Association
petitioner
4
Watches, watch movements and parts
1965
Presidential Request
Negative
-
5
Manganese, silicon and chromium
1968
Committee of Producers of
Negative
-
ferroal oys and refined metals
Ferroal oys and Related
Products
6
Miniature and instrument precision bal
1969
Anti-Friction Bearing
Negative
-
bearings
Manufacturers Association
7
Extra high voltage power circuit
1972
General Electric Co.
Negative
-
breakers, transformers, and reactors
8
Petroleum
1973
Chairman of the Oil Policy
Positive
Transitioned away from existing quota
Committee
system to a license fee (Proclamation
4210, 38 FR 9645).
9
Petroleum
1975
Secretary of the Treasury
Positive
Added supplemental fee to the license
fee (Proclamation 4341); fee was later
reduced to zero (Proclamation 4655).
10
Iron and steel nuts, bolts, large screws
1978
Presidential Directive
Negative
-
11
Petroleum
1978
Secretary of the Treasury
Positive
Conservation fee added, but found to
be il egal and blocked by District
Court in 492 F. Supp. 614.
CRS-60

link to page 68 link to page 68 link to page 68
Treasury or
Commerce

Subject of Investigation
Year Initiated
Initiator
Determination
Presidential Action
12
Petroleum from Iran
1979
Secretary of the Treasury
Positive
Embargo imposed on petroleum from
Iran on Nov. 12, 1979 (Proclamation
4702).
13
Glass-lined chemical processing
1981
Ceramic Coating Co.
Negative
-
equipment
14
Manganese, silicon and chromium
1981
Ferroal oys Association
Negative
ferroal oys and related metals
-a
15
Iron and steel nuts, bolts, large screws
1982
Secretary of Defense
Negative
-
16
Petroleum from Libya
1982
Presidential Request
Positive
Embargo imposed on petroleum from
Libya on Mar. 10, 1982 (Proclamation
4907).
17
Metal-cutting and Metal Forming
1983
National Machine Tool
Positive
Deferred a formal decision on the
Machine Tools
Builders’ Association
Section 232 case and instead sought
voluntary restraint agreements
starting in 1986 with leading foreign
suppliers and developed a domestic
plan of programs to help revitalize the
industry.b
18
Antifriction bearings
1987
Anti-Friction Bearing
Negative
-
Manufacturers Association
19
Petroleum
1987
National Energy Security
Positive
No action taken. c
Committee (an industry
group)
20
Plastic injection molding machinery
1988
Society of the Plastic
Negative
-
Industry, Inc.
21
Uranium
1989
Secretary of Energy
Negative
-
22
Gears and gearing products
1991
American Gear
Negative
-
Manufacturers Association
CRS-61

link to page 68 link to page 68 link to page 68 link to page 68
Treasury or
Commerce

Subject of Investigation
Year Initiated
Initiator
Determination
Presidential Action
23
Ceramic Semiconductor Packaging
1992
Coors Electronic Package
Negative
-
Co. and Ceramic Process
Systems Corporation
24
Crude Oil and Petroleum Products
1994
Independent Petroleum
Positive
No action taken. c
Association of America
25
Crude Oil
1999
Secretary of Commerce
Positive
No action taken. c
26
Iron ore and finished steel
2001
Representatives James
Negative
-
Oberstar and Bart Stupak
27
Steel
2017
Secretary of Commerce
Positive
Imposed tariffs of 25% on steel
imports, from al countries, with an
initial exception for Canada and
Mexico, with other potential future
exceptions (Proclamation 9705).
28
Aluminum
2017
Secretary of Commerce
Positive
Imposed tariffs of 10% on aluminum
imports, from al countries, with an
initial exception for Canada and
Mexico, with other potential future
exceptions (Proclamation 9704).
29
Automobiles, including SUVs, vans and
2018
Secretary of Commerce
Positive
Directed USTR to negotiate with
light trucks, and automotive parts
European Union (EU), Japan, and
others to resolve national security
threat (Proclamation 9888).
30
Uranium ore and products
2018
U.S. uranium mining
Positive
President did not concur with
companies (UR-Energy and
Commerce findings. Established U.S.
Energy Fuels)
Nuclear Fuel Working Group to
develop recommendations to revive
domestic industry.d
31
Titanium Sponge
2019
Titanium Metals Corp.
Positive
President concurred with Commerce
findings but did not restrict imports.
Established working group with Japan
to ensure access to titanium sponge.e
CRS-62

link to page 68 link to page 68
Treasury or
Commerce

Subject of Investigation
Year Initiated
Initiator
Determination
Presidential Action
32
Transformers and certain grain-
2020
Secretary of Commerce
[Determination Unknown]f N/A
oriented electrical steel parts
33
Mobile Cranes
2020
Manitowoc Company, Inc.
Terminated at request of
N/A
petitioner
34
Vanadium
2020
AMG Vanadium and U.S.
[Determination
N/A
Vanadium
Unknown]g
Source: CRS compiled from the Bureau of Industry and Security’s (BIS) “Section 232 Investigations Program Guide,” June 2007, and other Department of Commerce
sources.
a. Although this investigation concluded with a negative threat determination, the President accepted Commerce’s recommendation to start a 10-year program to
upgrade the National Defense Stockpile ore into high-carbon ferrochromium and ferromanganese and to remove certain ferroal oy imports from eligibility for duty-
free entry under the Generalized System of Preferences (49 FR 21391).
b. For the announcement of the action, see, U.S. President (R. Reagan), “Statement on the Machine Tool Industry,” May 20, 1986. For an announcement of the
voluntary restraint agreements with Japan and Taiwan, see “Statement on the Revitalization of the Machine Tool Industry,” Dec ember 16, 1986. The agreement was
modified in 1991 and extended through December 1993, (see U.S. President (G. H.W. Bush), “Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on Extension of Machine
Tool Voluntary Restraint Agreements With Japan and Taiwan,” December 27, 1991).
c. In the 1987, 1994, and 1999 investigations into petroleum and crude oil, the Commerce Department determined that certain oil imports threatened to impair
national security but did not recommend that the President use his authority to adjust imports. In not acting, the President fol owed the Commerce
recommendation in these three investigations. In the 1989 report, Commerce did not recommend that the President adjust imports using quotas, fees, or tariffs
under the authority of Section 232 because any such actions would not be “cost beneficial and, in the long run, impair rather than enhance national security.” In the
1994 and 1999 investigations into oil imports, Commerce found that existing government programs and activities related to energy security were more appropriate
and cost effective than import adjustments. (Also see Department of Commerce, “The Effect of Crude Oil and Refined Petroleum Product Imports on the National
Security,” January 1989.)
d. President Donald Trump, “Memorandum on the Effect of Uranium Imports on the National Security and Establishment of the United States Nuclear Fuel Working
Group,” July 12, 2019.
e. President Donald Trump, “Memorandum on the Effect of Titanium Sponge Imports on the National Security,” February 27, 2020.
f.
According to CRS communication with BIS, Commerce sent its investigation report to the White House on October 16, 2020.
g. According to CRS communication with BIS, Commerce sent its investigation report on vanadium to the White House on February 22, 2021.

CRS-63

Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

Appendix C. Proposals Concerning Section 232
Table A-1. Select Proposals on Section 232: 117th Congress
(Through May 2021)
Legislat

ion
Title
Brief Description
S. 691
Global Trade

To require congressional approval,
Accountability Act
through a joint resolution, of
certain trade actions under Sec.
232 and other trade authorities.
Would require the President to
report to Congress on the
proposed trade action and provide
an analysis of its economic impact.
S. 746
Trade Security Act of

To amend Sec. 232 to al ow for a
2021
congressional joint disapproval
resolution to override presidential
actions. Bil would also transfer
investigatory authority to the
Secretary of Defense and would
outline the scope of a national
security assessment.
Source: CRS, compiled from Congress.gov
Notes: Sec. 232 = Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962; IEEPA = International Emergency Economic
Powers Act.

Table C-1. Select Proposals on Section 232: 116th Congress
Legislation
Title
Brief Description
Select Proposals on Congressional-Executive Powers
H.R. 3673
Promoting Responsible and Free
To require congressional approval of certain trade
Trade Act of 2019
remedies, including a joint resolution for approval of
Sec. 232 investigation report; and to change
investigatory authority to the Secretary of Defense,
and recommendation authority to the Secretary of
Commerce.
S. 899 / H.R. 3477
Reclaiming Congressional Trade
To require congressional approval of duty rate changes
Authority Act of 2019
under Sec. 232 and IEEPA, and to al ow for
congressional disapproval of actions under Section 301
of the Trade Act of 1974.
S. 365 / H.R. 1008
Trade Security Act of 2019
To amend Sec. 232 to al ow for a congressional joint
disapproval resolution to override presidential actions;
to transfer investigatory authority to the Secretary of
Defense; and to outline the scope of a national
security assessment.
S. 287 / H.R. 940
Bicameral Congressional Trade
To amend Sec. 232 to require congressional approval
Authority Act of 2019
of presidential actions; to transfer investigatory
authority to the Secretary of Defense. The bil also
outlines specific national security-related items to be
covered under Sec. 232 investigations.
Congressional Research Service
64

Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

Legislation
Title
Brief Description
H.R. 723 / S. 1284
Global Trade Accountability Act
To amend Sec. 232 and other trade authorities to
of 2019
require congressional approval of unilateral trade
actions. Both measures would require the President to
report to Congress on the proposed trade action and
provide an analysis of its economic impact, and
Congress would need to pass a resolution before the
action would go into effect. H.R. 723 provides the
President 90-day temporary authority to act for
national security reasons, after which congressional
approve would be required.
Select Proposals on the Auto Investigation
H.R. 1158
Consolidated Appropriations
Requires the Administration to publish the Sec. 232
Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-93)
report on automotive imports publical y, and to
provide any classified information from the report to
Congress.
S. 121 / H.R. 1710;
Automotive Jobs Act of 2019;
To require a study of the U.S. auto industry by USITC
H.R. 8352
Automotive Jobs Act of 2020.
and to stal any action relating to the 2018 Sec. 232
investigation into auto imports until such a study is
completed and reviewed by the President.
Select Proposals on Tariff Exclusions and Tariff Revenue
S. 2551
Tariff Rebate Act
To establish the Tariff Rebate Program to disburse
revenues from tariffs to certain eligible individuals.
S. 2362
American Business Tariff Relief
To establish a process for U.S. businesses to obtain
Act of 2019
exclusions from certain duties imposed under Sec. 301
of the Trade Act of 1974 and Sec. 232 of the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962, and for other purposes.
Select Proposals to Mitigate the Impact of Retaliatory Tariffs
S. 1984
To amend the Magnuson-Stevens To provide relief for fisheries targeted for retaliation,
Fishery Conservation and
in response to Sec. 232 actions.
Management Act to provide
fisheries disaster relief for
commercial fishery failures that
are due to certain duties, and for
other purposes.
H.R. 2690 / S. 1453 Assistance for Farmers Harmed
To provide trade adjustment assistance to farmers
by Tariffs on Exports Act
affected by retaliatory tariffs on U.S. exports in
response to Sec. 232 actions.
H.R. 6124
Assistance for Firms Harmed by
To provide trade adjustment assistance to firms
Tariffs on Exports Act
affected by retaliatory tariffs on U.S. exports in
response to Sec. 232 actions.
H.R. 2362 / S. 3980 American Agriculture First Act
To prioritize the purchase of agricultural commodities
from domestical y owned enterprises, and for other
purposes. The bil cites trade damage from retaliation
by foreign nations, as primary determining factor.
Select Other Measures
Congressional Research Service
65

Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

Legislation
Title
Brief Description
S. 5049
National Critical Capabilities
To set up a Committee on National Critical
Defense Act of 2020
Capabilities to review certain investments and other
transactions that could result in a threat to one or
more national critical capabilities. If the committee
determines a transaction poses such a threat, it would
recommend that the President take certain
appropriate actions; initiation of a Sec. 232
investigation is one such action named in the bil .
Source: CRS, compiled from Congress.gov.
Notes: Sec. 232 = Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962; USITC = U.S. International Trade
Commission; IEEPA = International Emergency Economic Powers Act.

Congressional Research Service
66

Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

Appendix D. 2019 U.S. Steel and Aluminum Imports
Table A-2. Top U.S. Import Suppliers of Aluminum and Steel Products
(2020, Mil ions of U.S. Dol ars)
Aluminum
Steel
Change
Change
Trading
Import
Import
since
Trading
Import
Import
since
Partner
Value
Share
2017
Partner
Value
Share
2017
Tariff Exempt
Tariff Exempt
Canada
$5,629.1
46.3%
-20.1% Canada
$3,967.0
24.0%
-23.6%
*Argentina
$318.4
2.6%
-41.8% Mexico
$2,182.1
13.2%
-12.5%
Mexico
$173.2
1.4%
-32.2% *Brazil
$1,641.5
9.9%
-33.0%
Australia
$154.5
1.3%
-27.6% *South Korea
$1,517.5
9.2%
-45.6%
Total Exempt
$6,275.4
51.6%
-22.1% Australia
$199.6
1.2%
0.6%
Not Exempt
*Argentina
$27.3
0.2%
-87.7%
EU
$1,169.8
9.6%
-2.3% Total Exempt
$9,535.1
57.7%
-28.6%
U.A.E.
$795.7
6.5%
-42.8% Not Exempt
China
$571.8
4.7%
-69.1% EU
$3,112.5
18.8%
-43.7%
Germany
$405.2
3.3%
8.6% Japan
$985.9
6.0%
-40.5%
Russia
$394.3
3.2%
-75.8% Germany
$872.0
5.3%
-42.7%
Bahrain
$339.1
2.8%
-42.0% Taiwan
$607.7
3.7%
-51.9%
South Africa
$319.1
2.6%
-6.3% China
$497.5
3.0%
-49.9%
India
$295.9
2.4%
-22.5% Italy
$370.3
2.2%
-49.2%
Saudi Arabia
$260.3
2.1%
75.9% Netherlands
$330.0
2.0%
-35.6%
South Korea
$214.0
1.8%
91.9% Sweden
$290.4
1.8%
-41.1%
Oman
$188.5
1.6%
102.5% United Kingdom
$279.5
1.7%
-39.7%
Qatar
$180.6
1.5%
-41.2% Austria
$274.5
1.7%
-35.9%
**Total Not
$5,879.8
48.4%
-37.1% **Total Not
$7,003.0
42.3%
-55.2%
Exempt
Exempt
U.S. Total
$12,155.
100.0%
-30.2% U.S. Total
$16,538.1
100.0%
-43.0%
(All Countries)
2
(All Countries)
Source: CRS, compiled from U.S. Census Bureau data on HTS products included in the Section 232
proclamations. These data do not include derivative products, see next table.
Notes: Percentage change comparisons are made to 2017 annual data, as a baseline before tariff actions took
effect. EU refers to the European Union (EU) and excludes the United Kingdom. U.A.E. refers to the United
Arab Emirates. (*)Absolute quota effective in place of additional tariffs. (**)Total not exempt includes additional
countries not listed.

Congressional Research Service
67

Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

Table A-3. Top U.S. Import Suppliers of Steel and Aluminum Derivatives
(2020, Mil ions of U.S. Dol ars)
Aluminum Derivatives
Steel Derivatives
Trading
Import
Import
Trading
Import
Import
Partner
Value
Share
Partner
Value
Share
Tariff Exempt
Tariff Exempt
Canada
$9.1
22.9% South Korea
$30.4
9.7%
Mexico
$8.1
20.5% Canada
$28.8
9.2%
Australia
$0.0
0.0% Mexico
$23.6
7.5%
Argentina
$0.0
0.0% Argentina
$0.0
0.0%
Total Exempt
$17.3
43.4% Australia
$0.0
0.0%
Not Exempt
Brazil
$0.0
0.0%
EU
$5.6
14.1% Total Exempt
$82.8
26.4%
Bahrain
$4.8
12.0% Not Exempt

India
$4.4
11.0% Oman
$51.2
16.3%
Turkey
$4.4
11.0% Taiwan
$28.5
9.1%
Belgium
$2.4
5.9% Thailand
$26.1
8.3%
China
$1.6
4.1% Turkey
$25.9
8.3%
Italy
$1.4
3.4% Sri Lanka
$18.5
5.9%
Sweden
$0.6
1.6% India
$15.7
5.0%
Spain
$0.6
1.5% Liechtenstein
$15.5
4.9%
Vietnam
$0.6
1.4% EU
$14.1
4.5%
Ecuador
$0.5
1.3% China
$12.2
3.9%
Austria
$0.5
1.3% Malaysia
$9.9
3.2%
*Total Not
$22.5
56.6% *Total Not
$230.8
73.6%
Exempt
Exempt
U.S. Total
$39.8
100.0% U.S. Total
$313.6
100.0%
(All Countries)
(All Countries)
Source: CRS, compiled from U.S. Census Bureau data on HTS products included in Presidential Proclamation
9980 (January 24, 2020), concerning steel and aluminum derivative products.
Notes: This table includes data on steel and aluminum bumpers and tractor stampings, which are only available
from 2020. EU refers to the European Union (EU) and excludes the United Kingdom. (*)Total not exempt
includes additional countries not listed.
Table A-4. Estimates of U.S. Imports Under Section 232 Vanadium Investigation
(2020, Mil ions of U.S. Dol ars)
Top Trading Partners
Import Value
Import Share
Total U.S. Imports
$126.8
100.0%
EU-27
$39.1
30.8%
South Africa
$40.4
31.8%
Congressional Research Service
68

Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

Canada
$22.7
17.9%
Czech Republic
$19.5
15.3%
Brazil
$17.8
14.0%
Source: CRS, compiled from U.S. Census Bureau data, based on HTS codes likely within the scope of the
Section 232 vanadium investigation.
Notes: These are estimates based, narrowly, on the products described in publicly available Section 232
petitions and includes: HTS 2825300050, 2850002000, 7202920000, 2841901000. The ful scope of the
investigation has not been made public. EU refers to the European Union (EU) and excludes the United
Kingdom.

Author Information

Rachel F. Fefer, Coordinator
Brandon J. Murrill
Analyst in International Trade and Finance
Legislative Attorney

Keigh E. Hammond
Michaela D. Platzer
Senior Research Librarian
Specialist in Industrial Organization and Business

Vivian C. Jones
Brock R. Williams
Specialist in International Trade and Finance
Specialist in International Trade and Finance

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should n ot be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to
copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

Congressional Research Service
R45249 · VERSION 33 · UPDATED
69