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April 27, 2021
International Immigrant Investment Programs: 
Illicit Finance Risks
Immigrant investment programs (IIPs), sometimes referred 
residency or citizenship may complicate due diligence 
to as golden visas or passport programs, are immigration 
efforts or the blocking of sanctioned assets, as they may not 
programs in which applicants make a financial contribution 
trigger sanctions alerts or the enhanced scrutiny sometimes 
to the host country and, in exchange, are offered legal 
applied to citizens of certain countries. Secondary passports 
residency (residency-by investment, RBI) or citizenship 
may also enable international travel, including through visa-
(citizenship-by investment, CBI, also known as economic 
free arrangements, that an individual would not have access 
citizenship). IIPs may appeal to governments as a 
to under their primary passport. Secondary residency or 
significant source of investment. See CRS In Focus 
citizenship may also be used to avoid tax obligations.  
IF11344, The Changing Landscape of Immigrant 
Investment Programs, by Jennifer M. Roscoe, for more 
Which countries’ programs have come 
information on IIP-related trends and background. The 
under scrutiny? 
United States operates an IIP, the EB-5 Immigrant Investor 
While various international IIP programs may be vulnerable 
Program, which includes fraud-related risk assessments and 
to illicit finance, U.S. and inter-governmental reporting 
case adjudications administered by U.S. Citizenship and 
have identified certain countries of particular interest, often 
Immigration Services. See CRS Report R44475, EB-5 
in relation to specific typologies of illicit finance. In 2021, 
Immigrant Investor Visa, by Holly Straut-Eppsteiner for a 
the INCSR identified 79 major money laundering 
discussion of the U.S. IIP. 
jurisdictions, defined by the Foreign Assistance Act 
§481(e)(7) as those “whose financial institutions engage in 
As the number of international IIPs has grown in recent 
currency transactions involving significant amounts of 
decades, some observers have expressed concerns that these 
proceeds from international narcotics trafficking.” The 
programs may facilitate financial crime. While the scope of 
2021 INCSR referenced current or recent IIPs as 
these risks is uncertain and many international IIP 
vulnerabilities in 5 of the 79 identified jurisdictions (“A” in 
participants may not have criminal motivations, some 
Figure 1). The Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
participants may seek to use the programs for tax and 
and Development (OECD) has also identified countries 
sanctions evasion and money laundering by conducting 
with RBIs and CBIs that represent a potentially high risk to 
business under an easily obtained secondary residency or 
the integrity of its Common Reporting Standards (CRS), 
dual nationality. Congress has sought to strengthen U.S. 
which are designed to foster information exchange to 
responses to illicit finance by appropriating funds for U.S. 
prevent tax evasion (“B” in Figure 1).  
government entities that address financial crimes and by 
requiring reporting on anti-money laundering issues in 
Figure 1. Countries with IIPs Identified as 
foreign countries. Members have also called attention to 
Vulnerabilities or Potentially High Risk by the INCSR 
international IIPs that they have viewed as particularly 
and OCED. 
troubling through statements and in hearings.  
How might international IIPs enable 
illicit finance? 
While international IIPs typically include requirements 
designed to prevent participation by would-be criminal 
actors, some programs reportedly exhibit lax standards or 
enforcement. In 2021, the Department of State’s (DOS’s) 
 
congressionally mandated International Narcotics Control 
Notes: “A” indicates countries whose IIPs were referenced in the 
Strategy Report (INCSR) Volume II: Money Laundering 
2021 INCSR. “B” indicates countries that are listed on the OECD’s 
cited examples of current or recent international IIPs with 
website as of April 2021. The OECD countries are limited to those 
selection processes that were advertised as fast and 
that have signed on to the CRS (the United States has not signed on).  
inexpensive, did not require an interview, and raised 
concerns about attempts to evade law enforcement or 
How have jurisdictions with IIPs 
facilitate illicit finance.  
responded to allegations of illicit activity? 
In response to criticism and scrutiny, some foreign 
Once individuals become citizens or residents of a host 
governments have cancelled citizenship or residency for 
country, they may attempt to store ill-gotten funds, 
certain individuals and made reforms to their IIP processes, 
circumvent tax requirements, or evade sanctions by 
though the effectiveness of certain reforms remains in 
relocating assets to the host country or conducting business 
question. Cyprus and Malta, for instance, have reportedly 
via their new residency or citizenship. Using a secondary 
instituted reforms for their IIPs in recent years, including 
https://crsreports.congress.gov 
International Immigrant Investment Programs: Illicit Finance Risks 
through limits on the number of IIP naturalizations and 
from certain visa-related waivers. Pursuant to the Visa 
increased proof of residence requirements. Yet, both 
Waiver Program Improvement and Terrorist Travel 
countries have continued to be described as risk-prone by 
Prevention Act of 2015 (Division O, P.L. 114-113) and 
media outlets and EU institutions. In August 2020, a media 
subsequent implementation by the Department of 
exposé released footage of high-level Cypriot officials 
Homeland Security, dual nationals of the Democratic 
agreeing to facilitate a passport for a Chinese applicant with 
People’s Republic of Korea, Iran, Iraq, Sudan, or Syria are 
a criminal history, contrary to Cypriot requirements. 
not eligible to travel to the United States under the Visa 
Subsequently, the officials resigned, but denied 
Waiver Program. Additionally, according to press releases 
wrongdoing, and Cyprus ended its CBI program. In October 
from the U.S. Embassy in Barbados, individuals who 
2020, the European Commission brought legal action 
gained citizenship through a CBI in St. Kitts and Nevis, 
against both countries due to their CBIs. 
Antigua and Barbuda, or Dominica are not eligible for a 
waiver for a visa interview for a U.S. nonimmigrant visa. 
In a 2014 advisory to financial institutions, the U.S. 
Department of the Treasury’s (Treasury’s) Financial Crime 
Capacity Building 
Enforcement Network (FinCEN) stated that despite 
Federal entities, including DOJ, DOS, Treasury, and the 
assurances by the Government of St. Kitts and Nevis that  it 
U.S. Agency for International Development, may engage in 
had suspended Iranian nationals from its CBI in 2013, 
capacity-building training or technical assistance with 
FinCEN believed Iranian nationals continued to participate, 
countries with high risk IIPs. Such assistance may seek to 
potentially as a way to evade sanctions. To date, the 
improve governance and counter financial crime.  
advisory has not been withdrawn, although the 2021 
INCSR cites evidence of steps taken to improve the 
Issues for Congress 
country’s CBI vetting processes. 
Other Potential IIP-Related Crimes 
How has the United States attempted to  IIPs have been linked to criminal activities beyond the 
address illicit finance in international 
provision of residency or citizenship to criminal actors, 
IIPs? 
such as the improper use of investment funds and for the 
criminal gain of host country officials or intermediaries 
Monitoring, Reporting, and Oversight 
who arrange investment opportunities. Congress may 
In addition to the INCSR, federal entities have reported on 
consider these and other aspects of IIP-related crimes in the 
specific IIP’s illicit finance risks. For example, in the 2014 
context of risks of international IIPs. 
advisory on St. Kitts’s and Nevis, FinCEN encouraged 
financial institutions to conduct customer due diligence, 
Foreign Government Responsiveness 
including  seeking identification other than or in addition to 
Reponses by host countries with reportedly risk-prone IIPs 
a St. Kitts and Nevis passport. DOS has referenced citizen 
may reflect considerations such as the value of IIPs to the 
and civil society group concerns over corruption relating to 
economy, perception of the risk as limited, prioritization of 
CBI programs in its annual country reports on human 
other policy issues, and, in some cases, opportunities for 
rights. Congress has conducted oversight of the issue 
corrupt, personal gain. Congress may seek to understand the 
through hearings on illicit finance. Additionally, the United 
role of and reasons underlying political will for IIP-related 
States is a member of the Financial Action Task Force 
reforms when considering responses to IIPs. 
(FATF), an intergovernmental body that seeks to combat 
money laundering and terrorist financing (ML/TF). The 
Transparency and Information Sharing 
FATF, as well as associated FATF-style regional bodies, 
Some observers call for additional analyses of illicit finance 
conducts mutual evaluations of member countries, which 
and international IIPs and for countries to publish 
analyze the implementation and effectiveness of measures 
identifying information of IIP participants in order to 
to combat ML/TF. Some mutual evaluations have described 
prevent “visa shopping,” whereby bad actors can search for 
vulnerabilities of specific IIP programs. 
IIPs that will accept their applications and provide the most 
benefit. These stakeholders suggest that more countries 
Investigations and Prosecutions  
should share reports and identifying information through 
The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) may investigate and 
Financial Intelligence Units, regional agreements, or other 
charge individuals for crimes facilitated by an IIP. For 
methods. Congress may consider the impact of information 
example, in 2017, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the 
sharing as a tool to combat abuse of IIPs, including via 
Southern District of New York indicted Ali Sadr Hashemi 
congressionally mandated reports or directions to U.S. 
Nejad. It alleged that Sadr took steps to evade U.S. 
entities to raise the issue in international fora. 
sanctions and defraud U.S. banks by concealing the role of 
Iranian parties in transactions in part by using a St. Kitts 
U.S. EB-5 Immigrant Investor Program 
and Nevis passport and a United Arab Emirates address. 
Congress may also consider alleged risks of the U.S. EB-5 
Sadr was found guilty in March 2020, but the verdict was 
IIP, which has been criticized by some observers, including 
vacated in July 2020 due to federal prosecutors’ violations 
certain Members of Congress, for the program’s 
of disclosure obligations during proceedings.  
susceptibility to fraudulent schemes, as outlined in a 2015 
Government Accountability Office Report. 
Visa Restrictions 
The United States has restricted individuals with dual 
Katarina C. O'Regan, Analyst in Foreign Policy   
nationalities or who gained new citizenship through IIPs 
IF11818
https://crsreports.congress.gov 
International Immigrant Investment Programs: Illicit Finance Risks 
 
 
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11818 · VERSION 1 · NEW