Bahrain: Unrest, Security, and U.S. Policy
Updated April 20, 2021
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
95-1013

Bahrain: Unrest, Security, and U.S. Policy

Summary
Bahrain is a small island nation, ruled by a hereditary monarchy, that is in a partnership with
other Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf called the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman). Bahrain is led by King
Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa, who succeeded his father, Shaykh Isa bin Salman Al Khalifa, upon his
death in 1999. U.S.-Bahrain ties are long-standing and have deepened over the past four decades
as the Gulf region has become highly volatile. The country has hosted a U.S. naval command
headquarters for the Gulf region since 1948, and the United States and Bahrain have had a formal
Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) since 1991. In 2004, Bahrain was designated by the
United States as a “major non-NATO ally.” There are nearly 5,000 U.S. forces, mostly Navy,
serving at the naval facility and other bases in Bahrain, and the country is a significant buyer of
U.S.-made arms. In 2014, Bahrain joined the U.S.-led coalition combatting the Islamic State and
flew strikes against the group’s fighters in Syria that year.
Bahrain generally supports de facto GCC leader Saudi Arabia, which provides Bahrain with
substantial financial support. In 2015, Bahrain joined Saudi Arabia-led military action to try to
restore the government of Yemen that was ousted by Iran-backed Houthi rebels. In 2017, it joined
a Saudi and UAE move to isolate Qatar. Bahrain, like several other GCC states, has been building
ties to Israel over the past three years and it hosted the June 2019 economic workshop that
preceded the Trump Administration’s Israeli-Palestinian peace plan unveiled in January 2020. In
September 2020, Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu signed agreements at the White
House to fully normalize Israel’s relations with Bahrain, as well as with the United Arab
Emirates.
Bahrain is the only GCC state to have a Shia majority population, and Bahrain’s politics have
been unsettled since a 2011 uprising by a mostly Shia opposition to the Sunni-minority-led
government of Bahrain’s Al Khalifa ruling family. The stated goals of the opposition for a
constitutional monarchy have not been realized, but the government has undertaken some modest
political reforms. Since 2014, the unrest has been relatively low-level, but punishments of
oppositionists continue. Since 2002, there have been elections for the lower house of a bicameral
legislative body, but several of the elections have faced opposition boycotts and allegations of
voting district gerrymandering.
The mainstream opposition has used peaceful forms of dissent, but small factions have conducted
occasional attacks on security officials. The Trump Administration echoed the Bahrain
leadership’s assertions that Iran is providing material support to violent opposition factions. In
part to express support for the Bahrain government against Iran, the Trump Administration did
not condition major arms sales to Bahrain’s military on improvements in its human rights
practices. In 2019, Bahrain agreed to host a U.S.-led maritime mission (International Maritime
Security Construct, IMSC) to protect shipping in the Gulf from further Iranian attacks. Critics of
U.S. policy argue that the Trump Administration downplayed human rights concerns in the
interests of countering Iran, but statements by Biden Administration officials indicate that the
human rights situation in Bahrain will be part of the bilateral agenda.
Bahrain has fewer financial resources than do most of the other GCC states. Its economic
difficulties have been compounded by the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) outbreak,
which has reached 164,000 cases and 600 deaths as of mid-April 2021. Bahrain’s oil revenues
emanate primarily from a Saudi oil field whose proceeds go partly to Bahrain. In 2004, the United
States and Bahrain signed a free trade agreement (FTA); legislation implementing it was signed
January 11, 2006 (P.L. 109-169).
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Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 23
Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................................... 23

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Bahrain: Unrest, Security, and U.S. Policy

Historical Background
The site of the ancient Bronze Age civilization of Dilmun, the island nation of Bahrain was a
trade hub linking Mesopotamia and the Indus valley until a drop in trade from India caused the
Dilmun civilization to decline around 2,000 B.C. The inhabitants of Bahrain converted to Islam in
the 7th century. Bahrain subsequently fell under the control of Islamic caliphates based in
Damascus, then Baghdad, and later Persian, Omani, and Portuguese forces.
The Al Khalifa family, which is Sunni Muslim and generally not as religiously conservative as the
leaders of neighboring Saudi Arabia, has ruled Bahrain since 1783. That year, the family, a branch
of the Bani Utbah tribe, left the Saudi peninsula and captured a Persian garrison controlling the
island. In 1830, the ruling family signed a treaty establishing Bahrain as a protectorate of Britain,
which was then the dominant power in the Persian Gulf. In the 1930s, Reza Shah Pahlavi of Iran
unsuccessfully sought to deny Bahrain the right to grant oil concessions to the United States and
Britain. As Britain reduced its military presence in the Gulf in 1968, Bahrain and the other
smaller Persian Gulf emirates (principalities) sought a permanent status. A 1970 U.N. survey
(“referendum”) determined that Bahrain’s inhabitants did not want to join with Iran, a finding that
was endorsed by U.N. Security Council Resolution 278 and recognized by Iran’s parliament.
Bahrain negotiated with eight other Persian Gulf emirates during 1970-1971 on federating with
them, but Bahrain and Qatar each became independent, and the other seven emirates federated
into the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Bahrain became independent on August 15, 1971.
Governance, Unrest, and Human Rights1
Bahrain is led by King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa (71 years old, born January 1950), who
succeeded his father, Shaykh Isa bin Salman Al Khalifa, upon his death in 1999. Educated at
Sandhurst Military Academy in Britain, King Hamad was previously commander of the Bahraini
Defense Forces (BDF). The king appears to be trying to balance proponents and opponents of
accommodation with Bahrain’s Shias, who constitute a majority of the citizenry but have long
asserted they are discriminated against and suspected of loyalty to Iran.2
Within the upper echelons of the ruling family, the most active proponent of accommodation with
the Shia opposition has been the king’s son and designated successor, the U.S.- and U.K.-
educated Crown Prince Shaykh Salman bin Hamad, who is 51 years old. The Crown Prince was
named Prime Minister in November 2020, replacing his uncle, the long-serving Khalifa bin
Salman Al Khalifa, upon his death. In February 2020, another reformist, Abdul Latif Rashid Al
Zayani, was named the first non-Al Khalifa family member to be Foreign Minister,3 and he took
office in May 2020. He previously served as Secretary-General of the Gulf Cooperation Council

1 Much of the information in this section is from the State Department 2019 Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices. Bahrain, as well as published material from Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the Project on
Middle East Democracy (POMED).
2 Government officials dispute that the Shia community is as large a majority as the 70% figure used in most factbooks
and academic work on Bahrain, such as the Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook. The Shia community in
Bahrain consists of the more numerous “Baharna,” who are of Arab ethnicity and descended from Arab tribes who
inhabited the area from pre-Islamic times. Shias of Persian ethnicity, referred to as Ajam, arrived in Bahrain over the
past 400 years and are less numerous than the Baharna. The Ajam speak Persian and generally do not integrate with the
Baharna or with Sunni Arabs.
3 “Bahrain formally appoints ex-GCC chief Abdullatif al-Zayani as foreign minister.” Al Arabiya, February 12, 2020.
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(GCC, comprised of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, UAE, Qatar, and Oman), based in Saudi
Arabia.
Some in the royal family have argued against concessions to the Shia majority. Until his passing
in November 2020, Prime Minister Khalifa represented this faction, supported by some hardline
officials including Minister of the Royal Court Khalid bin Ahmad bin Salman Al Khalifa and his
brother, Bahrain Defense Forces (BDF) Commander Khalifa bin Ahmad Al Khalifa. The two are
known as “Khawalids,” hailing from a branch of the ruling family with allies throughout the
security and intelligence services and the judiciary.4 A senior BDF officer, Abdullah bin
Muhammad bin Rashid Al Khalifa, has been Ambassador to the United States since 2013.
Executive and Legislative Powers
Upon taking office in 1999, Shaykh Hamad assumed the title of king, forgoing the historic
leadership title of “Amir” (ruler) used by Bahrain’s leaders. A public referendum on February 14,
2001 adopted a “National Action Charter,”5 provisions of which were incorporated into a new
constitution issued by the King in 2002. Under Bahrain’s constitution, the king has broad powers,
including appointing all ministers and judges and amending the constitution. Al Khalifa family
members hold half of the 24 cabinet posts, including the ministries of defense and interior
(internal security). Bahrain’s cabinets typically have had five or six Shia ministers. Several
women have held cabinet positions since 2004, when Dr. Nada Hafadh was appointed as Minister
of Health.
Many Shias and reform-minded Sunnis criticized the government for not putting the new
constitution to a ratification vote and for deviating from the 1973 constitution (abolished in 1975
because of Sunni-Shia tensions) by establishing an all-appointed Shura (consultative) Council of
equal size (40 seats each) as the elected Council of Representatives (COR).6 Together, these
bodies constitute the National Assembly. Enactment of any legislation requires concurrence by
the king, but a veto can be overridden by a two-thirds majority vote of both chambers. In
implementation of reforms agreed with the Shia opposition, the King enacted constitutional
amendments in 2012 that gave the COR the power to remove individual ministers by two-thirds
majority and declared the elected COR as the presiding chamber of the Assembly. The Shura
Council was empowered to originate legislation (previously, only the COR could do so).7 The
Shura Council’s concurrence is needed to enact legislation, and the king has tended to appoint its
supporters to the body—former high-ranking government officials, as well as women and
members of minority communities (Jewish and Christian) that are underrepresented or not
represented at all in the COR (see Figure 2 for the breakdown).8

4 “A Palace Rift in Persian Gulf Bedevils Key U.S. Navy Base.” Wall Street Journal, February 20, 2013.
5 The National Charter and constitution’s provisions did not meet the Shia majority’s expectations, but represented
reform beyond that enacted under the king’s father, Amir Isa. In 1992, Amir Isa established a 30-member all-appointed
Consultative Council, (expanded to 40 in 1996), but its mandate was limited to commenting on government-proposed
laws – powers far less extensive than that of the elected national assembly established under the 1973 constitution.
Amir Isa’s refusal to restore an elected Assembly sparked daily Shia-led antigovernment violence during 1994-1998.
6 Bahrain’s October 24 and 31, 2002 Legislative Elections. National Democratic Institute for International Affairs,
2002.
7 Constitution of the Kingdom of Bahrain. NIHR. February 9, 2016.
8 “Bahrain: 9 Women, Including a Jew, Christian, Appointed to Shura Council.” Al Sharq Al Awsat, December 10,
2018.
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Political Groups and Elections
COR elections have been held every four years since 2002, each time generating substantial
tension over opposition and government efforts to achieve an electoral majority in the COR. If no
candidate in a district wins more than 50% in the first round, a runoff is held one week later.
Political parties are banned, but factions organize as functionally equivalent “political societies.”
The U.S. State Department, citing Human Rights Watch, noted in 2020 that the “dissolution of the
country’s principal opposition societies and laws restricting their former members from running
for office, the absence of an independent press, and the criminalization of online criticism created
a political environment that was not conducive to free elections.”9 The following represent the
main political societies in Bahrain:
 Wifaq (Accord National Islamic Society) is the most prominent Shia political
society. Its officials have, at times, engaged with the government in and outside
of formal “national dialogues” since the 2011 uprising. Wifaq’s leaders are
Secretary-General and Shia cleric Shaykh Ali al-Salman and his deputy Khalil al-
Marzuq. Shaykh Salman is serving a life sentence in prison.10 Wifaq and its allies
boycotted the 2014 elections. In 2016, Bahraini courts approved government
requests to dissolve Wifaq. Allied factions include the National Democratic
Action Society, the National Democratic Assembly, the Democratic Progressive
Tribune, and Al Ekhaa.
 Waad (“promise”)/National Democratic Action Society is a secular opposition
group that includes both Sunnis and Shias. Its former leader, Ibrahim Sharif, has
been repeatedly arrested, released, and rearrested. Its current leader is Sami Fuad
Sayedi. On May 31, 2017, the High Civil Court approved a government request
to dissolve it.
 Al Haq (Movement of Freedom and Democracy), a small Shia faction, was
outlawed for calling for regime change. Its key leaders, Dr. Abduljalil Alsingace
and Hassan Mushaima, have been imprisoned since 2011.
 The Bahrain Islamic Action Society and Amal. Two small Shia factions linked to
the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain (IFLB)—a party linked to alleged
Iran-backed plots against Bahrain in the 1980s and 1990s—are outlawed. Amal’s
leader, Shaykh Muhammad Ali al-Mafoodh, has been in prison since 2011.
 Sunni Islamists. Among the prominent Sunni factions are Minbar (Arabic for
“platform”), an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, and Al Asala, which is a
harder-line “Salafist” political society. In 2011, a Sunni political coalition—the
National Unity Assembly (NUA)—was formed as a response to the uprising.
Pre-uprising Elections
In several elections held during 2002-2010, tensions between the Shia majority and the regime
escalated. The elections held in October 2002, the first under the 2002 constitution, as well as
those in November 2006 and October 2010, were marred by opposition partial or full boycotts of
some or all three of the elections, allegations of government gerrymandering, and government

9 U.S. Department of State, 2020 Country Report on Human Rights: Bahrain, March 30, 2021.
10 Various U.S. officials have called on the Bahraini government to release Sheikh Salman. See Tom Lantos Human
Rights Commission, “Sheikh Ali Salman,” United States Congress.
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arrests of oppositionists in advance of the elections.11 In each of these elections, Shia candidates
won 17-18 seats, just short of a majority (see Figure 1).
2011 Uprising: Origin, Developments, and Outlook12
A major uprising began on February 14, 2011, following the toppling of Egypt’s President Hosni
Mubarak. On March 13, 2011, protesters blockaded the financial district of Manama, triggering
the GCC to send forces into Bahrain on March 14, 2011. The GCC’s joint Peninsula Shield force,
including 1,200 Saudi armored forces and 600 UAE police, took up positions at key locations and
Kuwait sent naval forces to help secure Bahrain’s maritime borders. As protests decreased in size
and intensity, the king ended the state of emergency on June 1, 2011, and the vast bulk of the
GCC force departed in June 2011.
On June 29, 2011, as a gesture toward the opposition and international critics, the king named a
five-person “Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry” (BICI), headed by international legal
expert Dr. Cherif Bassiouni, to investigate the government response to the unrest. The 500+ page
BICI report, released on November 23, 2011, found that there was “systematic” and “deliberate”
use of excessive force against protesters, including torture and forced confessions, and that the
opposition increased its demands as the uprising progressed. The report provided no evidence
linking Iran to the unrest.13
The report contained 26 recommendations to hold accountable those government personnel
responsible for abuses during the uprising. King Hamad promised full implementation of all
recommendations and, in November 2011, established a National Commission to oversee
implementation. Bahraini officials asserted that the government fully implemented the vast
majority of the 26 BICI recommendations, but most outside assessments, including by the State
Department and the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED), assess that Bahrain only
partially implemented the recommendations.14 POMED characterized a June 2016 State
Department assessment on the implementation of the BICI recommendations as “a real effort to
pull punches and avoid clear evaluations of progress, in order to avoid antagonizing the Bahraini
government.”15 In the 114th Congress, two bills (S. 2009 and H.R. 3445) would have prohibited
U.S. sales to Bahrain of tear gas, small arms, Humvees, and “crowd control items” until the State
Department certified that Bahrain had fully implemented all BICI recommendations.
The “National Dialogue” Process
The Bahrain government initially responded to the unrest with offers of dialogue. In March 2011,
the Crown Prince advanced a “seven principles” proposal for a national dialogue that would agree
on a “parliament with full authority”; a “government that meets the will of the people”; fair
voting districts; and several other measures. Protest leaders asserted that the principles fell short
of their demands for a constitutional monarchy in which the Prime Minister and cabinet are

11 “Bahrain’s elections overshadowed by crackdown on Shia protesters.” The Guardian, October 22, 2010.
12 The events of the uprising, are examined in substantial detail in the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry
(BICI) report released November 23, 2011. Text of the report is at http://www.bici.org.bh/.
13 The full text of the Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, op.cit.
14 Project on Middle East Democracy. “State Department Reports on Bahrain’s Implementation of the BICI.” June 23,
2016; and POMED. “One Year Later: Assessing Bahrain’s Implementation of the BICI Report.” November 2012.
15 Statement of Cole Bockenfeld, Deputy Director for Policy, POMED, before the Tom Lantos Human Rights
Commission. September 9, 2016.
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selected by the fully elected parliament—a demand encapsulated in the October 2011 “Manama
Document” unveiled by Wifaq and Waad.16
The first “National Dialogue” process was inaugurated on July 2, 2011, consisting of about 300
opposition delegates, including five Wifaq members.17 The detention of senior oppositionists
caused Wifaq to exit the talks after two weeks, but the meetings reached consensus on several
recommendations that became the May 2012 constitutional amendments discussed above:
 an elected parliament with expanded powers, including to confirm a cabinet;
 a government “reflecting the will of the people”;
 “fairly” demarcated electoral boundaries;
 reworking of laws on naturalization and citizenship;
 combating financial and administrative corruption; and
 efforts to reduce sectarian divisions.
Second National Dialogue. In January 2013, Wifaq and five allied parties accepted the King’s call
to restart political dialogue. However, the meetings broke down over opposition insistence that
consensus recommendations be put to a public referendum, while the government insisted that
agreements be enacted by the National Assembly. The dialogue was suspended on January 8,
2014, and despite efforts since then by Crown Prince Salman to revive talks, no further national
dialogue has convened to date.
Current Situation, Post-uprising Elections, and Prospects
Unrest continues, although at far lower intensity than in 2011. The government has apparently
rolled back some of the political reforms it had undertaken, and there has been no evidence of
further government-opposition dialogue to try to reach accord on additional reform. In 2017, the
King signed a National Assembly bill amending the constitution to allow military courts the right
to try civilians accused of terrorism, and the government returned arrest powers to the Bahrain
National Security Agency—powers the government had revoked in 2012 as it implemented the
BICI recommendations. The government also has stepped up citizenship revocations and
expulsions and continues to incarcerate opposition leaders. Each February 14 anniversary of the
uprising has been marked by demonstrations. Particularly in the first few years after the uprising,
the government and the opposition discussed confidence-building measures such as appointments
of oppositionists to the cabinet or the replacement of the hardline then-Prime Minister Khalifa.
Minister. The accession of Crown Prince Salman to the post of Prime Minister in November 2020
may renew prospects for reform.
Elections since the Uprising
The two elections held since the 2011 uprising have been marked by Sunni-Shia tensions similar
to those that appeared in pre-uprising votes.
2014
The government urged the opposition to participate in the November 22, 2014, COR election,
perhaps in an effort to portray the domestic political situation as having normalized. However, the

16 “Bahrain opposition unites to decry “police state.” Reuters, October 13, 2011.
17 Mohamed Hasni. “Bahrain Opens Dialogue Buoyed by Shia Attendance.” Agence France Presse, July 2, 2011.
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government reduced the number of electoral districts to four, from five, further reducing the
chances that Shias would win a majority of COR seats. Wifaq and its allies boycotted. There was
little violence. The seats were mostly won by independent candidates, suggesting that voters
sought to reduce polarization. Shia Bahrainis became deputy COR speaker and the chairman of
the Shura Council.
2018
The most recent COR elections were held on November 24, 2018, with municipal council
elections held concurrently. The vote was widely derided by Bahraini oppositionists as neither
free nor fair, citing the outlawing of Wifaq and Waad (see above). According to the State
Department human rights report on Bahrain for 2019, “The government did not permit
international election monitors. Domestic monitors generally concluded authorities administered
the elections without significant procedural irregularities.”
The final list of candidates included 293 persons, of whom 41 were women—the highest number
of women candidates in any Bahrain election. The government reported that 85% of the seats
were won by independents (candidates not affiliated with any of the political societies discussed
above), only five incumbents retained their seats, and that more women won (six) than in any
prior election. The new COR selected its first female speaker, Fawzia Zainal. The Shia deputy
speaker, Abdulnabi Salman, conducts outreach to the Shia community.18 A Shura Council was
appointed in December 2018, with roughly the same ethnic and gender composition as recent
Shuras, but excluding members of any political society.
Figure 1. Composition of the Council of Representatives
Lower House, elected 2006-2018

Source: CRS graphics.
Notes: In September 2011, a special election was held after 18 Wifaq lawmakers resigned in protest.

18 Author meeting with Bahrain former parliamentarian. March 2019.
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Figure 2. Composition of Shura Council
Upper House, appointed (2006-2018)

Source: CRS graphics.
Violent Underground Groups
Since the 2011 uprising, violent underground Shia opposition groups have formed a relatively
small but widely publicized component of the opposition to the regime. Such groups, conducted
attacks mainly on security forces, have been sporadic, and appear to have waned since 2018. The
State Department international terrorism report for 2019 (latest available) states that there were
no Bahraini Shia militant terrorist attacks in 2019.19 On January 1, 2017, 10 detainees who had
been convicted of militant activities broke out of Bahrain’s Jaw prison with the help of attackers
outside the jail.20 The mainstream opposition has publicly distanced itself from the underground
groups and its members have denounced their bombings and other acts of violence.
The Bahrain government asserts that Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force
(IRGC-QF) is arming and advising the underground groups as part of deliberate effort to
destabilize Bahrain. In 2016, Bahraini authorities uncovered a large warehouse containing
equipment, apparently supplied by Iran, suitable to constructing “explosively-forced projectiles”
(EFPs) such as those Iran-backed Shia militias used against U.S. armor in Iraq during 2004-
2011.21 In September 2018, the government charged 169 persons with forming a Bahrain version
of Lebanese Hezbollah, with Iranian backing.
The most prominent underground groups in Bahrain include the following:
 Al Ashtar Brigades (AAB). This group, the most well-known of the underground
groups, revealed itself publicly in April 2013. It has claimed responsibility for
about 20 bombings against security personnel. On March 17, 2017, the Trump
Administration designated two Ashtar Brigades members, one of which is Iran-
based, as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs) under Executive Order
13224, which blocks U.S.-based property of entities that conduct terrorism. On

19 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2019: Bahrain, June 2020.
20 “Inmates escape in ‘armed attack’ on Bahrain jail.” Financial Times, January 1, 2017.
21 Souad Mekhennet and Joby Warrick. “In Bahrain’s Militant Cells, U.S. Sees Iran.” Washington Post, April 2, 2017.
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July 10, 2018, the State Department named the Al Ashtar Brigades as a Foreign
Terrorist Organization (FTO) under Section 219 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act. The group was also named as an SDGT under E.O. 13224. On
August 13, 2018, the Trump Administration designated Qassim Abdullah Ali
Ahmad, a purported Al Ashtar leader, as an SDGT.
 The “14 February Coalition” (named for the anniversary of the Bahrain
uprising) claims inspiration from anti-regime protesters in Egypt in the uprising
there in 2011. In September 2013, 50 Shias were sentenced to up to 15 years in
prison for involvement in the group. On November 10, 2017, militants allegedly
from the group attacked a key pipeline that supplies Saudi oil to the Bahrain
Petroleum Company refinery in Sitra, Bahrain.
 The Mukhtar Brigades (Saraya al-Mukhtar). On December 15, 2020, the State
Department designated the group as a terrorist entity under Executive Order
13224. According to the Department: “Saraya al-Mukhtar is an Iran-backed
terrorist organization based in Bahrain, reportedly receiving financial and logistic
support from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Saraya al-Mukhtar’s
self-described goal is to depose the Bahraini government with the intention of
paving the way for Iran to exert greater influence in Bahrain. The group has
plotted attacks against U.S. personnel in Bahrain and has offered cash rewards
for the assassination of Bahraini officials.”22
 Others: Other underground groups using the names Bahrain Liberation
Movement, al-Wafaa, the Resistance Brigades, the Basta organization, and the
Imam Army, appear to be offshoots of larger groups. On May 6, 2019, Bahrain’s
Court of Cassation sentenced 19 al-Wafaa activists to varying jail terms for links
to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Lebanese Hezbollah.23
Broader Human Rights Issues24
The bulk of U.S. and global criticism of Bahrain’s human rights practices focuses on the
government response to the unrest, including relative lack of accountability of security forces,
suppression of free expression, and treatment of prisoners. For several years after the 2011
uprising, the United States repeatedly urged Bahrain’s leaders not to use force against protesters
and to release jailed opposition leaders. High-level U.S. engagement with Bahraini leaders and
U.S.-Bahrain defense cooperation continued without significant alteration, although the Obama
Administration withheld or conditioned some arms sales to Bahrain.
As part of its stated goal of pressuring Iran, the Trump Administration dropped conditions on the
approval of new sales to Bahrain’s military and imposed U.S. sanctions on Bahraini militant
groups (see above). In May 2017, during his visit to the region, President Trump assured King
Hamad that U.S.-Bahrain relations would be free of the “strain” that characterized U.S.-Bahrain
relations on human rights issues during the Obama Administration. In 2017, the Trump
Administration criticized the dissolution of Waad as unhelpful to political reconciliation. The
Biden Administration appears to seek to balance U.S. strategic cooperation with Bahrain as well
as a greater focus on Bahrain’s human rights practices as compared to that of the Trump

22 Department of State. State Department Terrorist Designation of Saraya al-Mukhtar. December 15, 2020.
23 “Bahrain court jails 19 over Iran, Hezbollah links.” Middle East Monitor, May 7, 2019.
24 See U.S. Department of State, 2020 Country Report on Human Rights: Bahrain, March 30, 2021.
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Administration. According to a readout of Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s meeting with his
Bahraini counterpart State Department spokesman Ned Price issued the following statement on
April 2, 2021:25
Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken spoke today with the Bahraini Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Dr. Abdullatif bin Rashid al-Zayani. Secretary Blinken and the Foreign Minister
discussed Bahrain’s historic opening with Israel, ways to capitalize on progress made at
the first U.S.-Bahrain Strategic Dialogue held in December, and joint regional security
initiatives throughout the Gulf. Secretary Blinken outlined key policy objectives, including
continued progress on human rights, and commended Bahrain for its successful efforts to
combat human trafficking.
Over the past 15 years, the United States has funded programs to train Bahraini lawyers, judges,
and journalists, as well as to enhance the capabilities of Bahrain’s National Assembly. In FY2016,
the United States provided about $261,000 for democracy and human rights promotion programs
in Bahrain. No U.S. funding for democracy promotion in Bahrain was provided for FY2017 or
FY2018.In FY2019, nearly $600,000 was provided for a Democracy, Human Rights and Labor
Program.26
Several organizations are chartered as human rights groups, although the government
characterizes most of them as advocates for or members of the opposition. The most prominent
are the Bahrain Human Rights Society (the primary licensed human rights organization), the
Bahrain Transparency Society, the Bahrain Center for Human Rights (BCHR) and the Bahrain
Youth Society for Human Rights (BYSHR), which was officially dissolved but remains active
informally. The BHCR received some U.S. funding in FY2016. In 2013, in line with the BICI
report, the king issued a decree reestablishing the “National Institution for Human Rights”
(NIHR) and empowering it to investigate human rights violations, make unannounced visits to
detention centers, and request formal responses to NIHR recommendations.27 There is also a
quasi-governmental Commission on Prisoner and Detainee Rights (PDRC).
Each March since the uprising began, the U.N. Human Rights Council has issued statements
condemning the government’s human rights abuses. The United Nations has not appointed a U.N.
Special Rapporteur on human rights in Bahrain or established a formal U.N. office in Bahrain on
that issue. Bahrain has often denied entry to international human rights researchers and activists.
Women’s Rights28
Bahraini leaders have sought to promote the role of women in government and society. The
cabinet regularly has several female ministers, and, as noted, the COR elected its first female
speaker after the 2018 elections. Still, traditional customs and some laws tend to limit women’s
rights in practice. Women can drive, own and inherit property, and initiate divorce cases, but
religious courts may refuse a woman’s divorce request. If married to a non-national, a Bahraini
woman cannot transmit nationality to her spouse or children. The World Economic Forum ranks
Bahrain 137 of 156 countries on measures of gender equality: the country performs well on

25 Department of State. Office of the Spokesperson. “Secretary Blinken’s Call with Bahraini Foreign Minister Dr.
Abdullatif bin Rashid al-Zayani.” April 2, 2021.
26 USAID Foreign Aid Explorer database, accessed April 2021.
27 The full text of the National Commission’s March 20, 2012, report is at http://www.biciactions.bh/wps/portal/BICI/.
28 See U.S. Department of State, 2020 Country Report on Human Rights: Bahrain, March 30, 2021; CRS Report
R46423, Women in the Middle East and North Africa: Issues for Congress, by Zoe Danon and Sarah R. Collins.
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educational metrics, but poorly on economic and political participation and women’s health.29
The “Supreme Council for Women,” backed by the wife of the King, oversees efforts to improve
the rights of women. Other women’s rights organizations in Bahrain include the Bahrain
Women’s Union, the Bahrain Women’s Association, and the Young Ladies Association.
Religious Freedom30
The State Department’s reports on international religious freedom in Bahrain tend to focus on
government discrimination against the Shia majority and Shia clergy. In 2014, the Ministry of
Justice and Islamic Affairs, which regulates Islamic affairs, dissolved the Islamic Ulema Council,
the main assembly of Shia clerics in Bahrain, for allegedly engaging in illegal political activity. In
2016, the king signed an amendment to a 2005 law that banned persons who are active in
religious positions from engaging in political activities.31 In 2017, Bahrain became the first
country in the region to enact a unified Shia-Sunni personal status law, which weakened the
ability of religious courts to regulate matters such as marriage and divorce.
Bahrain’s constitution declares Islam the official religion, but the government allows freedom of
worship for Christians, Jews, and Hindus, although non-Muslim groups must register with the
Ministry of Social Development to operate and Muslim groups must register with the Ministry of
Justice and Islamic Affairs. There are 19 registered non-Muslim religious groups and institutions,
including Christian churches of many denominations, and Hindu and Sikh groups. A small Jewish
community of about 36-40 persons—mostly from families of Iraqi Jews who settled in Bahrain in
the 19th century or from southern Iran—remains in Bahrain and apparently does not face any
harassment or discrimination. Members of the Baha’i faith have been discriminated against in
Bahrain but can worship openly.
Human Trafficking and Labor Rights32
Bahrain remains a destination country for migrant workers from South and East Asia, as well as
some countries in Africa. Domestic workers are highly vulnerable to forced labor and sexual
exploitation because they are largely unprotected under the labor law. The State Department’s
“Trafficking in Persons Report” for 2020, 2019, and 2018 rated Bahrain at “Tier 1” (best ranking)
for “fully meet[ing] the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking.” In 2014, the
Obama Administration waived a mandatory downgrade for Bahrain to Tier 3 after it was assessed
for three consecutive years as “Tier 2: Watch List.” The government has established a Center of
Excellence for trafficking that aims to serve as a regional hub for expertise and training to combat
the crime.
Bahraini law grants all workers in Bahrain the right to form and join unions, and to strike.
However, the right to strike does not apply to workers in the oil and gas, education, and health
sectors. There are about 50 trade unions in Bahrain, but all unions must join the General
Federation of Bahrain Trade Unions (GFBTU). During March-May 2011, employers dismissed
almost 5,500 mostly Shia workers from both the private and public sectors, including 25% of

29 World Economic Forum, Global Gender Gap Report 2021, March 30, 2021.
30 This section is based on the U.S. State Department,2019 Report on International Religious Freedom: Bahrain, June
10, 2020.
31 “Bahrain King ‘Bans Mixing Religion and Politics.” Al Araby, June 12, 2016.
32 Much of this section was taken from the U.S. Department of State, 2020 Trafficking in Persons Report: Bahrain,
June 25, 2020.
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union leaders, for participating in anti-government protests. Most were later reinstated. U.S. funds
(see above) have been used for AFL-CIO projects with Bahraini labor organizations.
The architect of recent labor reforms is the Labor Market Regulatory Authority (LMRA), which
has begun to dismantle the “sponsorship system” (kafala) that essentially prohibits workers from
changing jobs. The Authority also has helped institute requirements that expatriate workers be
provided with health insurance. Still, expatriate workers have, on occasion, conducted public
protests over the slow payment of wages.
Torture
Well before the 2011 uprising, Human Rights Watch and other groups asserted that Bahraini
authorities were practicing torture, allegations that continue today, including in the State
Department human rights report for 2019. The State Department reported that there were
numerous reports of torture of protesters during the height of the 2011 uprising.
Prominent Human Rights Activists Imprisoned
In addition to figures linked to key political societies, some prominent human rights activists have
been incarcerated. Nabeel Rajab, a prominent human rights activist and head of the Bahrain
Center for Human Rights, was sentenced to five years in prison in February 2018; Bahraini courts
upheld the sentence in December 2018. He was released in June 2020. Abdul Hadi Al Khawaja,
another prominent human rights activist, is serving a life sentence for his role in the 2011
uprising.
U.S.-Bahrain Security Relations33
U.S.-Bahrain ties are long-standing and have deepened over the past four decades as the Gulf
region has become highly volatile. The American Mission Hospital was established in 1903 as the
first hospital in what is now Bahrain. A U.S. Embassy opened in Manama, Bahrain’s capital,
immediately after Bahrain became independent in 1971. The U.S. Ambassador to Bahrain from
2017 to 2021 was Justin Siberell, a career diplomat. On April 15, 2021, President Biden
announced his intent to nominate Steven C. Bondy for the position.
The bilateral security relationship dates to the end of World War II, well before Bahrain’s
independence, and remains central to the U.S. ability to address regional threats. As of early 2020,
there were about 5,000 U.S. military personnel deployed in Bahrain, mostly Navy, implementing
various missions.34 A current figure for U.S. military personnel in Bahrain has not been released.
Bahrain has formal relations with NATO under a 2004 NATO-GCC “Istanbul Cooperation
Initiative” (ICI).
U.S. Naval Headquarters and Other Facilities
A major hallmark of the defense relationship is U.S. access to Bahrain’s naval facilities. The
United States has had a U.S. naval command presence in Bahrain since 1948: MIDEASTFOR
(U.S. Middle East Force); its successor, NAVCENT (naval component of U.S. Central
Command); and the U.S. Fifth Fleet (reconstituted in 1995), have been headquartered at a

33 Much of the information in this section is obtained from: U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Security Cooperation with
Bahrain,” January 20, 2021.
34 U.S. Central Command. Information provided to CRS in January 2020.
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sprawling facility called “Naval Support Activity (NSA)-Bahrain.” Prior to the 1991 U.S.-led war
against Iraq, the U.S. naval headquarters in Bahrain was on a command ship docked and
technically “off shore.”
NSA-Bahrain coordinates the operations of warships from 30 countries participating in Combined
Task Force (CTF) 151 and 152 that seek to interdict the movement of terrorists, pirates, arms,
weapons-related technology, and narcotics across the Arabian Sea. Bahrain has taken several
turns commanding CTF-152, and it has led an antipiracy task force in Gulf/Arabian Sea waters.
U.S.-Bahrain naval cooperation undoubtedly facilitated Bahrain’s August 2019 decision to join a
U.S.-led maritime security operation (“International Maritime Security Construct,” IMSC,
formerly called “Operation Sentinel”) to secure the Gulf against Iranian attacks on commercial
shipping.35 On November 7, 2019, IMSC formally launched its operations, headquartered in
Bahrain.
To further develop the Naval Support Activity facility, the U.S. military implemented a military
construction program from 2010 until the end of 2017 that doubled the size of the facility (to over
150 acres) and added buildings for administration, maintenance, housing, warehousing, and
dining. The expansion supports the deployment of additional U.S. coastal patrol ships and the
docking of larger U.S. ships.36 The separate Khalifa bin Salman Port, is one of the few facilities in
the Gulf that can accommodate U.S. aircraft carriers and amphibious ships.37 U.S. forces also use
Shaykh Isa Air Base, which hosts a variety of U.S. aircraft. In December 2014, Bahrain agreed to
allow Britain to establish a naval base in Bahrain and to store equipment and house military
personnel.38
Unrest in Bahrain has raised questions whether the United States should examine alternatives to
NSA-Bahrain. No legislation has been enacted to mandate Defense Department planning to move
NSA-Bahrain, but the Department reportedly has done such contingency planning.39 Should there
be a decision to relocate the NSA, potential alternatives could include Qatar’s New Doha Port,
Kuwait’s Shuaiba port, and the UAE’s Jebel Ali.40All three are close U.S. allies, but none has
stated a position on whether it would be willing to host such a facility.
Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) and Major Non-NATO
Ally Designation
Bahrain has sent its forces to join U.S.-led operations in the region. Bahrain was part of the U.S.-
led coalition that ousted Iraq from Kuwait in 1991, hosting U.S. troops and combat aircraft that
participated in the 1991 “Desert Storm” offensive against Iraqi forces. Bahraini pilots flew strikes
during the war, and Iraq fired nine Scud missiles at Bahrain, of which three hit facilities there.
After that war, Bahrain and the United States institutionalized the defense relationship by signing
a Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) on October 28, 1991. It was renewed in 2017 for 15

35 “Bahrain Joins U.S.-led Coalition to Protect Gulf Shipping.” Thehill.com, August 19, 2019.
36 Hendrick Simoes. “Bahrain Expansion Latest Sign of Continued Presence.” Stars and Stripes, December 16, 2013.
37 Ibid.
38 “U.K. to Boost Military Presence in the Persian Gulf.” Associated Press, December 7, 2014.
39 Testimony of Cole Bockenfeld, Deputy Director for Policy, Project on Middle East Democracy, “Human Rights in
Bahrain: Next Steps,” Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, September 9, 2016.
40 Ibid.
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years.41 Under the DCA, Bahrain provides access, basing, and overflight privileges to facilitate
U.S. regional military operations.42 The pact includes a “Status of Forces Agreement” (SOFA)
placing U.S. military personnel serving in Bahrain under U.S. law.
U.S. pilots flew combat missions from Bahrain in both Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in
Afghanistan (after the September 11, 2001, attacks) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) to oust
Saddam Hussein (March 2003). During both operations, Bahrain also deployed its U.S.-supplied
frigate warship (the Subha) to help protect U.S. ships, and it sent ground and air assets to Kuwait
in support of OIF. Bahrain deployed 100 police officers to Afghanistan during 2009-2014.
Major Non-NATO Ally Designation
In March 2002, President George W. Bush designated Bahrain a “major non-NATO ally”
(MNNA) in Presidential Determination 2002-10. The designation qualifies Bahrain to purchase
certain U.S. arms, receive excess defense articles (EDA), and engage in defense research
cooperation with the United States for which it would not otherwise be eligible.
U.S. Security Assistance and Arms Transfers
The main recipient of U.S. military assistance is the Bahrain Defense Force (BDF)—Bahrain’s
regular military force—which totals about 10,000 active duty personnel, including Bahraini Air
Force and Navy personnel. There are another 2,000 personnel in Bahrain’s National Guard—a
unit that is separate from both the BDF and the Ministry of Interior.
Bahrain’s small national budget allows for modest amounts of national funds to be used for
purchases of U.S. major combat systems, offset partly by U.S. security assistance credits. The
government’s response to the political unrest caused the Obama Administration to put on hold
U.S. sales to Bahrain of arms that could easily be used against protesters, such as Humvee
armored vehicles, until Bahrain had met U.S. conditions for improving its human rights record.43
The Trump Administration has maintained restrictions on security cooperation with Bahrain’s
Interior Ministry, which supervises Bahrain’s internal security forces, while dropping conditions
or holds on sales of most major combat systems, including F-16 combat aircraft.44
According to the State Department’s 2021 security cooperation factsheet (cited above), the
United States has provided Bahrain with $22.5 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) since
2014. According to the factsheet, the assistance helps Bahrain “provide for its own defense and to
operate effectively alongside U.S. air and naval forces. U.S. assistance has also strengthened
Bahrain’s interoperability for regional security and counterterrorism cooperation, boosted its
maritime defenses against smuggling and terrorism, and improved its ability to deny terrorist
sponsorship, support, and sanctuary in a manner that respects the human rights of its citizens.”
Excess Defense Articles (EDA)45
The BDF is eligible to receive grant excess defense articles. Since 2014, the United States has
provided Bahrain with $28.423 million in military grant assistance. Among the major military

41 “US, Bahrain Extend Defense Cooperation for 15 Years.” Al Defaiya, April 12, 2017.
42 State Department security cooperation factsheet, op.cit.
43 Statement by State Department spokesman John Kirby. “Lifting Holds on Security Assistance to the Government of
Bahrain.” June 29, 2015.
44 “Trump administration drops human rights conditions to sell fighter jets to Bahrain.” The Guardian. March 30, 2017.
45 Most of the information in this section is from the State Department security cooperation factsheet, op.cit.
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equipment transferred to Bahrain as EDA are: M-60A3 tanks (1995) and the FFG-7 “Perry class”
frigate Subha (1997). On October 23, 2019, DOD notified Congress (Transmittal 19-61) that the
State Department approved $150 million in funding to refurbish another Perry-class frigate
(Robert G. Bradley) to facilitate its transfer to Bahrain as grant EDA. The notification cited
Section 1020 of P.L. 115-232 (FY2019 NDAA) as authorizing the grant. Since 2014, Bahrain has
received M198 Howitzers, Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles (MRAPs), and the Mk V
Special Operations Craft, via the EDA program.
Major Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
Some U.S. sales to Bahrain have been the subject of debate because of Bahrain’s human rights
record, its involvement in the Yemen conflict (see below), and its dispute with some of its
neighbors (see below). About 85% of Bahrain’s military equipment is of U.S.-origin. As of
January 2021, the United States has $5.8 billion in active government-to-government sales cases
with Bahrain under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system. The United States also performs
end-use monitoring of how Bahrain uses its U.S.-supplied weaponry.46 There are no reported new
major sales of U.S. arms to Bahrain as a consequence of its September 2020 decision to
normalize relations with Israel, which is discussed further below.
 F-16s and other U.S.-made Aircraft. In 1998, Bahrain purchased 22 U.S.-made
F-16 Block 40 aircraft. In 2016, the Obama Administration notified to Congress a
sale to Bahrain of up to 19 additional F-16s, stipulating that would not finalize
approval until Bahrain improves its human rights record.47 The Trump
Administration dropped that condition, and in September 2017, notified Congress
of the possible sale to Bahrain of 19 F-16Vs and upgrading of its existing F-16s,
at an estimated value of nearly $4 billion.48 The sale was not subject to then-
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob Corker’s July 2017
withholding of informal concurrence to arms sales to the GCC states.49
 Air-to-Air Missiles. In 1999 and 2009, the United States sold Bahrain Advanced
Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAMs) to arm the F-16s. On May 3,
2019, the State Department approved a possible sale of a large variety of
munitions, including additional AMRAAMs and large bombs (GBUs) at an
estimated value of $750 million (Transmittal Number 18-20). Citing Bahrain’s
Air Force participation in the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, a resolution of
disapproval for the sale, S.J.Res. 20, was introduced on May 13, 2019. The
Administration issued a statement on June 12, 2019 opposing that resolution, and
a motion to discharge was defeated on June 13, 2019 by a vote of 43-56.
 Anti-Armor Missiles/Rockets. An August 2000 sale of 30 Army Tactical Missile
Systems (ATACMs, a system of short-range ballistic missiles fired from a
multiple rocket launcher), valued at about $70 million, included an agreement for
joint U.S.-Bahraini control of the weapon. That arrangement sought to allay U.S.
congressional concerns about possible U.S. promotion of regional missile
proliferation. On September 28, 2018, the State Department approved a potential
sales to Bahrain of 110 ATACM missiles and 720 Guided Multiple Launch
Rocket System rockets, with an estimated value of $300 million. A joint

46 State Department security cooperation factsheet, op.cit.
47 Anthony Capaccio, Bloomberg News, September 30, 2016.
48 DSCA Transmittal numbers 16-60 and 16-59.
49 Letter to Secretary of State Rex Tillerson from SFRC Chairman Bob Corker. February 8, 2018.
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resolution, S.J.Res. 65, was introduced to block that sale, citing Bahrain’s
participation in the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. The Senate voted 77-21 on
November 15, 2018, not to advance the measure.
 Stingers. Section 581 of the FY1990 foreign operations appropriation act (P.L.
101-167) made Bahrain the only Gulf state eligible to receive the Stinger
shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missile, and the United States has sold Bahrain about
70 Stingers since 1990. (This authorization has been repeated subsequently.)
 Humvees and TOWs. In September 2011, the Obama Administration notified
Congress of a sale to the BDF and National Guard of 44 “Humvee” (M115A1B2)
armored vehicles and several hundred TOW missiles of various models, at an
estimated total value of $53 million. Two joint resolutions introduced in the 112th
Congress (S.J.Res. 28 and H.J.Res. 80) would have withheld the sale pending
Administration certification that Bahrain has improved its human rights
practices.50 In January 2012, the Obama Administration put the sale on hold, but
in June 2015, the State Department announced that the sale would proceed
because the government had “made some meaningful progress” in its human
rights practices.”51 On September 8, 2017, the Trump Administration notified
Congress of a potential sale of 221 TOW missiles of various types, with an
estimated valued of $27 million.
 Maritime Defense Equipment. In May 2012, in conjunction with a visit to
Washington, DC by Bahrain’s Crown Prince, the Obama Administration
announced the sale and grant to Bahrain of U.S. weaponry to support Bahrain’s
maritime defense, including a Perry-class frigate, and harbor security boats for
the Bahrain Coast Guard.52 On September 8, 2017, the Trump Administration
notified Congress of a potential sale of two 35-Meter Fast Patrol Boats, at an
estimated cost of $60 million. As discussed above, the Trump Administration has
agreed to provide a frigate to Bahrain as grant EDA.
 Attack Helicopters. On April 27, 2018, the Defense Department notified
Congress that the State Department had approved a potential sale to Bahrain of
up to 12 AH-1Z (“Cobra”) attack helicopters and associated munitions to the
Royal Bahrain Air Force, with an estimated value of $911 million.53
 Missile Defense. U.S.-made Patriot missile defense batteries have long been
deployed in Bahrain. On May 3, 2019, the State Department approved a potential
sale to Bahrain of the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missile defense
system with an estimated value of $2.5 billion. S.J.Res. 22 would have
disapproved that sale, but the resolution did not advance.
Russia Purchases
Bahrain has sought to diversify its arms supplies somewhat. In 2016, Bahrain took delivery of
about 250 Russian-made Kornet anti-tank systems. In 2017, Bahrain military officials stated they
were in discussions to possibly purchase the Russian S-400 missile defense system, but no

50 Blocking an arms sale would require passage of a joint resolution to do so, presumably with a veto-proof majority.
51 Statement by State Department spokesman John Kirby. “Lifting Holds on Security Assistance to the Government of
Bahrain.” June 29, 2015.
52 Nicole Gaouette. “U.S. Resumes Bahrain Arms Sales Citing Security Interests.” Bloomberg News, May 11, 2012.
53 Defense Security and Cooperation Agency. Transmittal Number 16-36. April 27, 2018.
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purchase of the system has been announced.54 Purchases from Russia, particularly the S-400,
could trigger U.S. sanctions on Bahrain under the Countering America’s Adversaries through
Terrorism Act (CAATSA, P.L. 115-44). No sanctions on Bahrain under that law have been
announced, to date.
International Military Education and Training Funds (IMET)
Since 2014, the U.S. Department of State has provided Bahrain with $2.432 million for
International Military Education and Training (IMET). Over 866 members of the Bahrain Armed
Forces have received training in the United States, including 30 members in FY2018. The
factsheet states “IMET provides professional military education and training to military students
and is key to establishing lasting relationships with future leaders. IMET courses increase military
professionalization, enhance interoperability with U.S. forces, offer instruction on the law of
armed conflict and human rights, provide technical and operational training, and create a deeper
understanding of the United States.”
Counterterrorism Cooperation/Ministry of Interior55
Bahrain is assessed by U.S. reports and officials as continuing to face a terrorist threat from Iran-
backed groups, discussed above. There have been no reported attacks in Bahrain by Iran-backed
groups since 2017, and authorities thwarted terrorist attacks in 2019 according to the State
Department, as well as an Iran-backed plot to attack foreign diplomats and Bahrain security
officers in early 2020.56 Nine were arrested in the alleged 2020 plot and nine others involved are
said to be in Iran. Critics assert that the security services use antiterrorism laws and operations to
suppress Shia dissidents who do not use violence.
Regarding a potential threat from Sunni jihadist groups, no Islamic State or Al Qaeda terrorist
attacks have been reported in Bahrain. In June 2016, Bahraini courts sentenced 24 supporters of
the Islamic State for plots in Bahrain, including attacks on Shias, and the government has stripped
the citizenship of some Bahrainis accused of supporting the Islamic State organization (ISIS).
The United States provides training, equipment, and other assistance to Bahrain’s Interior
Ministry on counterterrorism issues, although both the Obama and Trump Administrations
reduced U.S. overall cooperation with the Ministry since 2011. For much of 2014, because of
Bahraini leadership resistance to U.S. scrutiny of its treatment of dissidents, the Obama
Administration suspended virtually all cooperation with the Ministry.57
Arms Sales to the MOI/Bahrain Coast Guard
Sales of U.S.-made small arms such as those sold to the Interior Ministry are generally
commercial sales, licensed by State Department, with Defense Department concurrence. In May
2012, the State Department put “on hold” license requests for sales to Bahrain of small arms, light
weapons, and ammunition58—all of which could potentially be used against protesters.
Apparently referencing Bahrain, the FY2014 Consolidated Appropriation Act (P.L. 113-76)
prohibited use of U.S. funds for “tear gas, small arms, light weapons, ammunition, or other items

54 Bahrain in Talks For Purchase Of Russian S-400 Missile Systems. Defense World.net. October 17, 2017.
55 Much of the information in this section is from the State Department report on international terrorism for 2019.
Released June 2020.
56 “Bahrain Says it Broke Up Militant Attack Plot in Early 2020.” Washington Post, September 20, 2020.
57 Michael Gordon. “Expelled U.S. Official to Return to Bahrain.” New York Times, December 2, 2014.
58 Email from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, May 20, 2013.
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for crowd control purposes for foreign security forces that use excessive force to repress peaceful
expression, association, or assembly in countries undergoing democratic transition.” The Trump
Administration retained restrictions on selling Bahrain similar weaponry, according to September
12, 2017, testimony by then-Ambassador Justin Siberell, and no sales of these weapons to
Bahrain were announced by the Trump Administration.
Bahrain’s Coast Guard, under the Ministry of Interior, polices Bahrain’s waterways and
contributes to the multilateral mission to monitor and interdict the seaborne movement of
terrorists and weapons. U.S. restrictions on support for the Ministry of Interior forces have
generally not applied to the Bahrain Coast Guard.
U.S. Training/NADR Funding
As noted above, the United States has continued cooperation with the Ministry of Interior on
issues of counter-terrorism. The United States runs training programs for Bahraini MOI offers
using Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR) funds. The
United States provided Bahrain $400,000 in NADR funds in each of FY2017 and FY2018 to train
MOI personnel in investigative techniques, and to help MOI personnel respond to terrorist’s use
of explosives. No NADR funds for Bahrain were provided in FY2019, and none was requested
for FY2020 or for FY2021.
Countering Terrorism Financing and Violent Extremism
Bahrain has been a regional leader in countering terrorism financing since well before the Islamic
State organization emerged as a threat. Bahrain has hosted the secretariat of the Middle East and
North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF), a regional body to exchange
information and recommendations to promote anti-money laundering and countering the
financing of terrorism (AML/CFT). Bahrain’s financial intelligence unit is a member of the
Egmont Group. Bahrain’s banks cooperate with U.S. efforts against terrorism financing and
money laundering. In October 2017, King Hamad issued a series of decrees mandating extensive
prison sentences and financial penalties on persons raising funds for terrorist groups.59
In 2017, Bahrain jointed the U.S.-GCC Terrorist Financial Targeting Center, which coordinates
GCC counterterrorism financing efforts. In concert with other members of that center, Bahrain
has imposed sanctions on persons and entities linked to the Islamic State and Al Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and on entities linked to the IRGC or the Afghanistan Taliban.
Countering Violent Extremism. Pursuant to the country’s 2016 National Countering Violent
Extremism strategy, Bahrain’s Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs heads the country’s efforts
to counter radicalization. It has organized regular workshops for clerics and speakers from both
the Sunni and Shia sects. The ministry also reviews schools’ Islamic studies curricula to evaluate
interpretations of religious texts.
Foreign Policy Issues
Bahrain’s foreign policy generally adheres to that of its closest allies in the GCC, particularly
Saudi Arabia. The close Bahrain-Saudi relationship was demonstrated by the Saudi-led GCC
intervention to help the government suppress the uprising in 2011, and Bahrain’s joining of the
June 2017 Saudi-led move to isolate Qatar. That dispute, which lasted more than three years, and

59 Release by the Embassy of Bahrain in Washington, DC. October 4, 2017.
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longer than an earlier dispute in 2014, was resolved on January 5, 2021, when Saudi Arabia, the
UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt agreed to lift the blockade, and Qatar agreed to drop its pursuit of legal
cases against those countries in international organizations.60 The intra-GCC rift hampered the
Trump Administration’s plan to forge a “Middle East Strategic Alliance” (MESA)—consisting of
the GCC and other Sunni Arab monarchies—to counter Iran.61 The MESA reportedly was to be
formally launched at a planned U.S.-GCC summit, but that meeting has not been held to date.
Many Saudis visit Bahrain using a causeway, constructed in 1986, that links Bahrain to the
eastern provinces of Saudi Arabia.
Bahrain is also politically close to Kuwait, in part because of historic ties between their two royal
families. Both royal families hail from the Anizah tribe that settled in Bahrain and Kuwait.
Kuwait has sometimes sought to mediate the Bahrain political crisis, but Shias in Kuwait have
expressed resentment at the Kuwait ruling family’s alignment with the Al Khalifa regime.
Kuwait, as noted, joined the GCC intervention in Bahrain in 2011 and has become a major
investor in Bahrain, as has the UAE. In 2018, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and UAE announced a $10
billion aid package to stabilize Bahrain’s budget and finances.
Bahrain and Qatar have been at odds many times prior to the 2014 and 2017 intra-GCC rifts. The
two had a long-standing territorial dispute over the Hawar Islands and other lands, with roots in
the 18th century, when the ruling families of both countries controlled parts of the Arabian
Peninsula. In 1991, five years after clashes in which Qatar landed military personnel on a
Bahrain-constructed man-made reef (Fasht al-Dibal) and took some Bahrainis prisoner, Bahrain
and Qatar agreed to abandon Saudi mediation and refer the issue to the International Court of
Justice (ICJ). The ICJ ruled on March 16, 2001, in favor of Bahrain on the central dispute over
the Hawar Islands but awarded to Qatar the Fasht al-Dibal reef and the town of Zubara on the
Qatari mainland, where some members of the Al Khalifa family were long buried. Two smaller
islands, Janan and Hadd Janan, were ruled not part of the Hawar Islands group and were also
awarded to Qatar. Qatar expressed disappointment over the ruling but accepted it as binding.
Iran62
Bahraini leaders conduct virtually no dialogue with Iran’s leaders and they have consistently
claimed that Iran is fomenting unrest in Bahrain. In 1981 and again in 1996, Bahrain publicly
accused Iran of trying to organize a coup by pro-Iranian Bahraini Shias. Bahrain backed Saudi
Arabia in its 2016 dispute with Iran in which Iranian protesters attacked two Saudi diplomatic
facilities in Iran in response to the Saudi execution of a dissident Shia cleric. Bahrain broke
diplomatic relations with Iran in 2016, going beyond a 2011-2012 cycle of tensions in which Iran
and Bahrain withdrew their ambassadors. The diplomatic ties have not been restored. Bahrain’s
accusations of Iranian backing for violent Shia groups in Bahrain, and the operations of those
groups, are discussed in the sections above.
On Iran nuclear issues, Bahrain’s leaders have maintained that “when it comes to [Iran’s] taking
[nuclear] power to developing it into a cycle for weapon[s] grade, that is something that we can
never accept, and we can never live with in this region.”63 Bahrain joined the other GCC leaders
in expressing support for the 2015 multilateral Iran nuclear deal (Joint Comprehensive Plan of

60 For detail on the rift, see CRS Report R44533, Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.
61 “Trump seeks to revive ‘Arab NATO’ to confront Iran.” Reuters, July 27, 2018; CRS In Focus IF11173, Cooperative
Security in the Middle East: History and Prospects, by Clayton Thomas.
62 See also CRS Report R44017, Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies, by Kenneth Katzman.
63 Department of State. Transcript of Remarks by Secretary Clinton and Foreign Minister Al Khalifa. December 3,
2010.
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Action, JCPOA) that limited Iran’s nuclear program. However, Bahrain’s leaders publicly
supported the May 2018 Trump Administration withdrawal from the JCPOA in favor of a strategy
of “maximum pressure” on Iran. During October 21-22, 2019, Bahrain cosponsored a multilateral
meeting on Iran under the U.S.-led “Warsaw Process,” named for the meeting of 60 countries in
that city in February 2019 that discussed how to counter Iran. And, Bahrain’s hosting of the
IMSC (see above) further reflects its backing for Trump Administration policy on Iran.
Bahrain’s animosity toward Iran also stems from issues that predate the formation of the Islamic
Republic in 1979. Officials in Iran contested Bahrain’s sovereignty repeatedly during the 19th and
20th centuries. In 1970, as British rule in Bahrain was ending, Iran asserted its claim to Bahrain
again. That year, the U.N. Secretary-General dispatched a representative to determine the views
of Bahrainis, who found that the island’s residents overwhelmingly favored independence from
all outside powers, including Iran. The findings were endorsed by U.N. Security Council
Resolution 278 and Iran’s Majlis ratified them.
Like the other GCC states, Bahrain maintains relatively normal civilian trade with Iran despite its
criticism of that country, and has not always strictly enforced U.S. secondary sanctions on Iran.
Bahrain did not close the Manama offices of the Iran-owned Future Bank until 2016, long after
the bank was sanctioned by the United States in 2008 under Executive Order 13382 (anti-
proliferation). Iran-Bahrain discussions in 2002 on joint energy projects did not bear fruit.
Iraq/Syria/Islamic State Organization (ISIS)
Bahrain participated in efforts to contain Iraq during the 1990s by hosting the U.S.-led
Multinational Interdiction Force (MIF) that enforced a U.N. embargo on Iraq during 1991-2003.
Bahrain also hosted the U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspection mission that worked to
dismantle Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. Bahrain backed the U.S.-led 2003 overthrow of
Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, but Bahrain did not post an ambassador to Iraq until 2008.
Bahraini and the other GCC leaders publicly blamed Syrian President Bashar Al Assad for
authoritarian policies that alienated Syria’s Sunni Arab majority and fueled support for the
Islamic State. In 2011, Bahrain and the other GCC states (except Oman) closed their embassies in
Damascus and voted to suspend Syria’s membership in the Arab League. Bahrain’s government
was not reported to have provided funding or weaponry to any Syrian rebel groups. Apparently
recognizing that Assad is prevailing in the civil war, Bahrain reopened its embassy in Damascus
in December 2018, as did the UAE, arguing that doing so might help limit Iranian influence in
post-civil conflict Syria.64
Asserting that the Islamic State poses a regional threat, on September 22, 2014, Bahrain and the
other GCC states joined the U.S.-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. Bahrain conducted air
strikes against Islamic State positions in Syria, as did several other GCC states. The State
Department’s report on international terrorism for 2016 stated that Bahrain “has not contributed
substantively to coalition [anti-ISIS] military efforts since 2014,” and no military operations by
Bahrain in this effort have been reported since.

64 “Why did the UAE and Bahrain reopen their embassies in Syria?” Al Jazeera, January 8, 2019.
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Yemen65
Bahrain has also used its small force to intervene in the region, in partnership with Saudi Arabia.
In 2015, Saudi Arabia assembled a coalition of Arab states, including Bahrain and all the other
GCC countries except Oman, to combat the Iran-backed Houthi movement in an effort to restore
the Republic of Yemen Government. About 200 BDF are deployed in Yemen supporting the
Saudi-led coalition there, according to the State Department’s report on international terrorism for
2018.66 The head of the Bahrain’s Air Force stated in February 2019 that Bahrain’s U.S.-made F-
16s had conducted over 3,500 sorties since the Saudi-led intervention.
Israeli-Palestinian Issues/Normalization with Israel
On the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, Bahraini leaders have long tended toward engagement with
Israel, while supporting Palestinian aspirations for statehood. Bahrain participated in the 1990-
1996 multilateral Arab-Israeli talks, and hosted a session on the environment (October 1994). In
September 1994, all GCC states ceased enforcing secondary and tertiary boycotts of Israel, but
Bahrain did not join Oman and Qatar in exchanging trade offices with Israel. In conjunction with
the U.S.-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement (see below), Bahrain dropped the primary boycott and
closed boycott-related offices in Bahrain.
In 2017, King Hamad called for the Arab states to forge direct ties to Israel and end the Arab
League boycott of Israel.67 In July 2019, Bahrain’s Foreign Minister met Israeli Foreign Minister
Yisrael Katz at a State Department-hosted meeting in Washington, DC and reportedly discussed
the threat from Iran, culminating in a statement by the Bahrain Foreign Minister that Israel is
“there to stay.” 68 Israeli officials subsequently attended the Bahrain-hosted session of the Warsaw
Process in October 2019.
Bahrain’s engagement with Israel made it a suitable location for the Trump Administration’s
workshop to promote the economic component of its Israeli-Palestinian peace plan in Bahrain
(“Peace to Prosperity Workshop”) on June 25-26, 2019.69 Bahrain Embassy representatives, as
well as those of the UAE and Oman, attended the January 2020 unveiling of the Administration’s
proposal for an Israeli-Palestinian settlement.70
On September 11, 2020, Bahrain followed an initiative announced one month earlier by the UAE
to agree to normalize relations with Israel (the so-called “Abraham Accords”), including to
exchange embassies, permit direct flights between Israel and Bahrain, and forge commercial ties
in a broad range of fields. In a joint ceremony at the White House on September 15, 2020, Israel’s
Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and Bahrain’s Foreign Minister Zayani, signed the
normalization agreement, and the UAE and Israel signed their accords as well.71 In subsequent
comments, Bahrain’s leaders, including King Hamad, continued to express support for a two-state
solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. On September 23, 2020, an Israeli delegation visited

65 For information on the conflict in Yemen, see CRS Report R43960, Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention, by
Jeremy M. Sharp.
66 Department of State. Country Reports on Terrorism 2018. Bahrain.
67 CRS Report RL33961, Arab League Boycott of Israel, by Martin A. Weiss.
68 “Israel, Bahrain foreign ministers talk Iran in groundbreaking public meet.” Times of Israel, July 18, 2019.
69 “Trump to Open Middle East Peace Drive with Economic Incentives,” New York Times, May 19, 2019.
70 Simon Henderson, “Trump peace plan attracts some Gulf states, but not consensus backing,” The Hill, January 29,
2020.
71 White House. “Remarks by President Trump, Prime Minister Netanyahu, Minister bin Zayed, and Minister Al Zayani
at the Abraham Accords Signing Ceremony.” September 15, 2020.
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Bahrain to discuss implementation of the bilateral agreement. Press reports indicated that some
Bahraini Sunni hardliners, as well as some Shias who tend to sympathize with the Palestinians
and other marginalized communities in the region, demonstrated against the government
normalization decision. It is likely that Saudi leaders at least tacitly supported the Bahrain move
in light of the close Saudi-Bahrain relationship. Bahrain named its first ambassador to Israel,
Khaled Yousif Al-Jalahma, in late March 2021. The nation’s airline also announced that direct
flights between Manama and Tel Aviv will begin in June 2021.
Economic Issues and U.S.-Bahrain Economic Ties
Bahrain’s economy has been affected by the domestic unrest and by a decline in oil prices from
2014 levels, and its economic difficulties have been compounded by the COVID-19 pandemic in
2020. As of mid-April 2021, Bahrain has reported over 164,000 infections and 600 deaths from
the disease.72 However, Bahrain’s economy has suffered from restrictions on public gathering and
on travel, measures that began to be lifted during June, as well as the sharp decline in oil prices
(which recovered somewhat since June).
To cope with the COVID-19 pandemic—which caused an economic contraction of about 5% in
2020—Bahrain’s leaders have cut government spending, issued sovereign debt, and delayed new
investments in the energy sector.73 Yet, Bahrain’s financial difficulties long predate the COVID-
19 pandemic; in October 2018, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE assisted the country with a
$10 billion aid package.74 U.S. aid to Bahrain is depicted in the table below, and it is possible that
the United States might increase aid to Bahrain in appreciation of the Bahrain normalization of
relations with Israel.
Even though Bahrain has always had an industrial sector and an economy somewhat more diverse
than other GCC states, Bahrain has had difficulty reducing its reliance on hydrocarbon exports
that account for about 80% of government revenues. Most of Bahrain’s daily oil production of
about 200,000 barrels per day come from a Saudi field (Abu Safa), the revenue from which Saudi
Arabia shares equally with Bahrain. Bahrain’s own oil and gas reserves are the lowest of the GCC
states, estimated at 125 million barrels of oil and 5.3 trillion cubic feet of gas.75 Bahrain is not a
member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). However, Bahrain’s
energy export potential might be revived if the 2018 discovery of a shale oil field in Bahraini
territory that contains an estimated 80 billion barrels of shale oil proves commercially viable.76
To encourage reform and signal U.S. appreciation, the United States and Bahrain signed an FTA
on September 14, 2004. Implementing legislation was signed January 11, 2006 (P.L. 109-169). In
2005, bilateral trade was about $780 million, and U.S.-Bahrain trade has increased more than
threefold since, even though the United States buys virtually no oil from Bahrain. The major U.S.
import from the country is aluminum. In concert with Crown Prince Salman’s visit to
Washington, DC, in November 2017, Bahrain-based companies in several sectors signed trade
deals with U.S. based firms. More than 200 American companies operate in Bahrain.77

72 World Health Organization, “Bahrain,” WHO Coronavirus (COVID-19) Dashboard, accessed April 20, 2021.
73 The Economist Intelligence Unit. Various articles on aspects of the Bahrain economy. Accessed April 2021.
74 “Saudi, Kuwait, UAE to sign $10 billion Bahrain aid deal: Kuwait newspaper.” Reuters, October 4, 2018.
75 “Bahrain is betting on 80 billion barrels of oil to help clear its budget deficit.” CNBC, May 8, 2018.
76 Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy. May 3, 2018.
77 “Bahrain Signs $10 million Worth of Trade Agreements with US Firms,” Constructionweekonline.com, December 3,
2017.
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Figure 3. Bahrain

Area
3.5 times the size of Washington, DC
People
Population: About 1.4 million, of which about half are citizens. Expatriates are mainly from South
Asia and other parts of the Middle East.
Religions: Nearly all the citizenry is Muslim, while Christians, Hindus, Bahais, and Jews constitute
about 1% of the citizenry. Of the total population, 70% is Muslim, 9% is Christian, 10% are of
other religions.
Economy
Gross Domestic Product (GDP): $70 billion / $34 billion at official exchange rate
GDP per capita: $51,800 (2017) on ppp basis
GDP Real Growth Rate: -5% expected in 2020
Budget: $5.5 billion revenues, $9.3 billion expenditures
Inflation Rate: about 1%
Unemployment Rate: 3.8%
U.S. Exports to Bahrain: $1.4 billion in 2019, about one-third lower than in 2018.
U.S. Imports from Bahrain: $1.046 billion in 2018, slightly higher than 990 million in 2018.
Sources: Map created by CRS. Fact information from CIA, The World Factbook; U.S. Census Bureau “Foreign
Trade Statistics”; Bahrain Ministry of Finance statements; Economist Intelligence Unit report June 2020.
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Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Bahrain Since 2011 Uprising
($ in millions)
FY20
FY21

FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19 request request
FMF
15.46
10
13.0
10
7.5
5.0
0
0
0
0
0
IMET
.435
.554
.487
.522
.577
.416
.641
.290
.400
.400
.650
NADR
1.5
.500
.900
.790
.610
0
.400
.400
.400
0
0
ESF/Dem.

.300
.52
.685
.350

and Gov.
DOD

.588
.294

counternarcotics
DHS/ICE

.248
.028

counternarcotics
Source: U.S. State Department Congressional Budget Justification.
Notes: IMET = International Military Education and Training Funds, used mainly to enhance BDF military
professionalism and promote U.S. values. NADR = Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, De-Mining and Related
Programs, used to sustain Bahrain’s counterterrorism capabilities and interdict terrorists.

Author Information

Kenneth Katzman

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Acknowledgments
This report was prepared with the assistance of Sarah Collins, Research Assistant, Middle East and Africa
Section.

Disclaimer
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Congressional Research Service
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